ML20206G196
| ML20206G196 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 04/03/1987 |
| From: | Decker T, Gooden A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206G134 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-87-10, 50-370-87-10, NUDOCS 8704140474 | |
| Download: ML20206G196 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1987010
Text
l
'
[$2 Klog
UNITED STATES
o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
O\\
.f/^
REGION li
h ( ).
f.
101 MARIETTA STRE ET, N.W.
- ". '
C
ATL ANT A. GEORGI A 30323
% .' ,' '. . #
APR07IW
Report Nos.: 50-369/87-10 and 50-370/87-10
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370
License Nos:
Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station
Inspection Conducted: Marc 23-27, 1987
Inspector:
O. N
M N A
_;
'/- 3-87
A. Gooden~ I
-
Date Signed
//
Approved by:
i / [N/' ('.1
'[ f - 6 7
-
T. R. Decker, Chief
Emergency Preparedness Section
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Date Signed
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine unannounced inspection was conducted in the area of
Results: One violation was identified - failure to provide the required annual
energency response training to three members of the emergency organization.
1
h[h
[
C
5
o
1
l
,
-
-
.
.
.
.
.
,
_ __
_
_
l
l
.
.
!
2
REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
i
L. W. Abernathy, Shift Supervisor
- N. G. Atherton, Associate Chemist
!
- T. K. Beal, Operations Administrative Supervisor
!
M. E. Connell, Health Physics Specialist
R. M. Cloninger, Safety Assistant
'
- T. L. McConr. ell, Station Manager
- B. H. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services
- R. B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
- J. R. Leonard, Station Emergency Planner
i
R. E. Harris, System Emergency Planner
- E. O. McCraw, Compliance Engineer
,
R. R. Tracey, Shift Supervisor
i
i
R. A. Lindsay, Shift Supervisor
- W. O. Reeside, Operations Engineer
- J. E. Snyder, Performance Engineer
.
D. J. Walcott, Health Physics Specialist
!
- R. B. White, Jr., Instrument & Electrical Engineer
I
- S. E. LeRoy, Production Specialist
!
- B. M. Gragg, Production Specialist
1
Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
operators, security office members and office personnel.
j
Other Organization
J. B. Kinney, Fixed Nuclear Facility Planner, North Carolina Emergency
i
l
Management Agency
NRC Resident Inspector
'
I
- W. T. Orders
.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were surmiarized on March 27, 1987, with
those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
j
j
areas inspected and discussed in detail the violation identified in
,
paragraph 6 below.
No dissenting cormients were received from the
l
licensee.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the
material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
i
J
-
-
.
.
-
-
_ .
_
__
--
_
,
.
1
3
4
4.
Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)
'
Pursuant to
and
10 CFR part 50,
Appendix E,
Sections IV.B and IV.C, this program area was inspected to determine
whether the licensee used and understood a standard emergency
classification and action level scheme.
1
The inspector reviewed the following classification procedures.:
RP/0/A/5700/01 - Notification of Unusual Event
RP/0/A/5700/02 - Alert
RP/0/A/5700/03 - Site Area Emergency
RP/0/A/5700/04 - General Emergency
,
i
)
The event classifications in the above-referenced procedures were
consistent with those required by regulation.
The classification
'
procedures did not appear to contain impediments or errors which could
lead to incorrect or untimely classification.
Selected emergency action levels (EALs) specified in the classification
procedures were reviewed.
The reviewed EALs appeared to be consistent
with the initiating events specified in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654.
The
inspector noted that some of the EALs were based on parameters obtainable
4
i
from Control Room instrumentation.
The inspector verified that the licensee's notification procedures
included criteria for initiation of offsite notifications and for
,
i
development of protective action recommendations.
The notification
procedures required that offsite notifications be made promptly after
i
declaration of an emergency.
The inspector discussed with licensee representatives the coordination of
f
EALs with State and local officials.
A licensee representative provided
the inspector with documentation dated May 29, 1986, which showed that the
licensee had contacted State and local officials during 1986 to review the
EALs used for event classification and protective action decision-making.
In addition, the inspector reviewed documentation from the offsite
authorities providing concurrence with the EALs used by the licensee.
,
!
Interviews were held with three Shift Supervisors to verify that they
i
understood the relationship between core status and such core damage
indicators as containment dome monitor, inadequate-core-cooling indicator,
i
high-range effluent monitor, containment hydrogen monitor, and
)ost-accident primary coolant analysis.
All interviewees appeared
'
)
(nowledgeable of the various core damage indications and their
l
relationship to core status.
.
!
The responsibility and authority for classification of emergency events
I
and initiation of emergency action were prescribed in licensee procedures
and in the Emergency Plan.
Interviews with selected key members of the
.
.
4
licensee's emergency organization revealed that these personnel understood
their responsibilities and authorities in relation to accident
classification, notification, and protective action recommendations.
Selected Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) were reviewed by
the inspector and discussed with licensee personnel.
The EPIPs provided
directions to users concerning timely classification of accidents.
All
personnel interviewed appeared to be familiar with the classification
information in the EPIPs.
Walk-through evaluations involving accident classification problems were
conducted with three Shift Supervisors.
All personnel interviewed
promptly and properly classified the hypothetical accident situations
presented to them, and appeared to be familiar with appropriate
classification procedures.
The inspector verified that the appropriate notifications and followup
actions were taken by the licensee following the declaration of an unusual
event on January 30, 1987.
The inspector reviewed the initial and
followup notification fonns in addition to a letter from the Station
Manager addressed to each of the offsite authorities (dated February 2,
'
1987) which summarized the event and actions leading up to the event. No
problems were noted in event classification, notification, or followup.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Protective Action Decision-Making (82202)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and (10) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV.D.3, this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee
had 24-hour-per-day capability to assess and analyze emergency conditions
and make recommendations to protect the public and onsite workers, and
whether offsite officials had the authority and capability to initiate
prompt protective action for the public.
The inspector discussed responsibility and authority for protective action
decision-making with licensee representatives and reviewed pertinent
portions of the licensee's Emergency Plan and procedures.
The Plan and
procedures clearly assigned responsibility and authority for accident
assessment and protective action decision-making.
Interviews with members
of the licensee's emergency organization revealed that these personnel
understood their authorities and responsibilities with respect to accident
assessment and protective action decision-making.
Walk-through evaluations involving protective action decision-making were
conducted with three Shift Supervisors.
Personnel interviewed
demonstrated familiarity with the use of procedures which addressed the
appropriate onsite and offsite protective action recommendations following
the declaration of an emergency.
Personnel interviewed were aware of the
need for timeliness in making initial protective action recommendations to
offsite officials.
Interviewees demonstrated adequate understanding of
.
.
5
the requirement that protective action reconmendations be based on core
condition and containment status even if no release is in progress.
Licensee procedures made provisions for contacting responsible offsite
authorities on a 24-hour basis.
Backup conmunications links with offsite
authorities were available.
The inspector confirmed that offsite
decision-makers with authority for emergency response activities could be
contacted on a 24-hour basis by observing a conmunications check (as
discussed in Paragraph 6 below) via the Selective Signaling Phone to the
State and county warning points from the Control Room.
In addition, the
inspector requested a communications drill via the backup communications
link by conducting a radio check from the Control Room to the county
warning points.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Knowledge a' d Performance of Duties (Training) (82206)
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15)
and
Section IV.F, this area was inspected to determine whether emergency
response personnel understood their emergency response roles and could
perform their assigned functions.
The inspector reviewed Section 0 of the Emergency Plan and Station
Directive 2.5.1 for a description of the training program and training
procedures.
In addition, selected lesson plans were revk ted and members
of the instructional staff were interviewed.
Based on these reviews and
interviews, the inspector determined that the licensee had established a
formal emergency training program.
Records of training for key members of the onsite and offsite emergency
organization for the period February 1986 to March 1987 were reviewed.
It
was noted that three members of the emergency organization, designated as
Alternate Performance Technician, had not received the required annual
retraining for station emergency response personnel.
Although the
specialized training, " Plant Data Transmission / Retrieval," specific for
the before-mentioned personnel was completed, failure to attend the
required annual retraining is inconsistent with training requirements as
specified in the Station Emergency Plan, Section 0,
and Station
Directive 2.5.1 (Revision 2,
dated January 7,
1987).
A licensee
representative acknowledged this finding as an oversight due to resources
that were committed to a refueling outage during the period in which
training was conducted.
This item is identified as a violation of
10 CFR 50.54(q) which requires the licensee to follow an emergency plan
which meets the planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b).
Violation (50-369/87-10-01 and 50-370/87-10-01):
Failure to provide
annual retraining to personnel assigned to the station emergency
organization.
__
. -
- -
.--
.-
--=
.
._ -
._
..
. .
- .
4
I
,
.
.
6
<
According to training records, with the exception of the finding stated
i
above, all other training provided to key members of the onsite emergency
organization was consistent with approved procedures.
The inspector
'
reviewed 1986 training records for various offsite support agencies and
the Crisis Management Center (CMC) personnel.
It was noted that training
was provided in accordance with Section 0 of the Station and CMC Emergency
Plans.
In response to IE Information Notice No. 85-80, " Timely Declaration of an
Emergency Class, Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency
,
Notifications," the inspector interviewed two Shift Support Technicians
i
and an Operations Administrative Supervisor who may be designated as an
i
Offsite Communicator for the Control Room.
The Offsite Communicator is
responsible for initial comunications to the offsite agencies (State and
4
l
county) via the Selective Signaling Telephone System.
The inspector
conducted walk-through evaluations with comunicators using drill messages
for transmission via the Selective Signaling Phone System and the backup
'
comunications system (two-way radio) to State and county warning points.
The interviewees demonstrated familiarity with both comunication systems
1
and the responsibility as a comunicator during an emergency. A review of
training records verified that interviewees had received annual training.
In addition, the inspector was informed by a licensee representative that
i
the Control Room Communicators periodically participate in conducting the
i
required monthly comunications checks between the Station and State / local
warning points.
.
I
The inspector conducted walk-through evaluations with selected key members
'
'
of the emergency organization.
During these. walk-throughs, individuals
were given various hyrethetical sets of emergency conditions and data and
,
asked to respond as if an emergency actually existed.
The individuals
4
demonstrated familiarity with emergency procedures and equipment, and no
problems were observed in the areas of emergency detection and
classification, notifications, dose calculation, assessment action (to
'
include plant conditions, in-plant sample collection and analysis), and
protective action decision-making.
One violation and no deviations were identified.
)
7.
Emergency Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies (82210)
i
l
The inspector verified the operational readiness of protective equipment
i
and supplies by direct observation and records review.
Records of
equipment inventory and operability checks for the period May 1986 to
January 1987 were reviewed.
In addition, discussions with cognizant
personnel and direct observation of an inventory and/or operability check
.
conducted on the Operation Support Center Kit, Technical Support Center
Kit, and the Personnel Survey Kit for North Personnel Access Portal (PAP),
i
disclosed no discrepancies.
It appears the . inventory and operability
checks are being conducted in accordance with Plant Procedure
PT/0/A/4600/11.
!
!
4
vr~
w-
,,,,-n.
- - , . -
~.,-,-r-
+w---g1
--- -+
rrw.---*m-
yw+
--n-nmw------,-u..
w.--,----
.,w--.--
- n
e-s
- w e-
i-t -
..
.
7
8.
Inspector Followup (92701)
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369/84-31-02:
Required improved
management and administrative controls in routine operation of TSC.
The
inspector reviewed the October 1986 annual exercise report (86-27) and
noted that required operation of the facility proceeded in an orderly
Assumption of duties by the Emergency Director was definite and
manner.
fi rm.
(Closed) IFI 50-369/85-42-01:
Establish a range for iodine-131 increase
rate to trigger incident classification.
A review of the licensee's EALs
disclosed that a range for iodine-131 increase rate was established for
triggering the appropriate incident classification.
(Closed) IFI 50-369/86-27-01 and 50-370/86-27-01:
Restore to operational
status and assure continued operation of all sirens located in Mecklenburg
i
County, NC.
A review of licensee documentation disclosed that followup
siren tests fere conducted after replacing a faulty encoder and resulted
'
in the subsect sirens as being operational.
9.
IE Information Notice (92717)
(Closed) IFI
50-369/86-IN-98 and 50-370/86-IN-98:
Offsite Medical
Services. The inspector reviewed the licensee's letters of agreement with
Offsite Medical facilities to verify that agreements were current for
providing medical services to licensee personnel.
In addition,
discussions with a representative from the State Emergency management
l
Agency disclosed that the State Department of Human Resources has
identified and periodically evaluates the capabilities, procedures, and
willingness of North Carolina hospitals to accept and treat members of the
general public who may be victims of a radiation accident.
i
1
,
,-__ -.
- - _ -
.-
.
- .
- . .
--
.