ML20206G196

Insp Repts 50-369/87-10 & 50-370/87-10 on 870323-27. Violation Noted:Failure to Provide Required Annual Emergency Response Training to Three Members of Emergency Organization

ML20206G196
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	04/03/1987
From:	Decker T, Gooden A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206G134	List: IR 05000369/1987010 ML20206G131 ML20206G156 ML20206G196
References
50-369-87-10, 50-370-87-10, NUDOCS 8704140474
Download: ML20206G196 (7)

See also: IR 05000369/1987010

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UNITED STATES

[$2 Klogo NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

O\ .f/^ REGION li

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• ".( ). ' f. 101 MARIETTA STRE ET, N.W.

C ATL ANT A. GEORGI A 30323

% .' ,' '. . # APR07IW

Report Nos.: 50-369/87-10 and 50-370/87-10

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos: NPF-9 and NPF-17

Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station

Inspection Conducted: Marc 23-27, 1987

Inspector: O. N MNA _; '/- 3-87

A. Gooden~ I - Date Signed

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Approved by: i / [N/' ('.1

T. R. Decker, Chief

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Emergency Preparedness Section

Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards Date Signed

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine unannounced inspection was conducted in the area of

emergency preparedness.

Results: One violation was identified - failure to provide the required annual

energency response training to three members of the emergency organization.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

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L. W. Abernathy, Shift Supervisor

• N. G. Atherton, Associate Chemist

! *T. K. Beal, Operations Administrative Supervisor

! M. E. Connell, Health Physics Specialist

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R. M. Cloninger, Safety Assistant

• T. L. McConr. ell, Station Manager

• B. H. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services

• R. B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations

• J. R. Leonard, Station Emergency Planner

i R. E. Harris, System Emergency Planner

, *E. O. McCraw, Compliance Engineer

i R. R. Tracey, Shift Supervisor

i R. A. Lindsay, Shift Supervisor

• W. O. Reeside, Operations Engineer

*J. E. Snyder, Performance Engineer

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D. J. Walcott, Health Physics Specialist

! *R. B. White, Jr., Instrument & Electrical Engineer

I *S. E. LeRoy, Production Specialist

! *B. M. Gragg, Production Specialist

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Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,

operators, security office members and office personnel.

j Other Organization

i J. B. Kinney, Fixed Nuclear Facility Planner, North Carolina Emergency

l Management Agency

' NRC Resident Inspector

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• W. T. Orders

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• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were surmiarized on March 27, 1987, with l

those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the j

j areas inspected and discussed in detail the violation identified in ,

paragraph 6 below. No dissenting cormients were received from the  !

l licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the 1

material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

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i This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

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4. Emergency Detection and Classification (82201)

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Pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(4) and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,

Sections IV.B and IV.C, this program area was inspected to determine

whether the licensee used and understood a standard emergency

classification and action level scheme.

1 The inspector reviewed the following classification procedures.:

RP/0/A/5700/01 - Notification of Unusual Event

RP/0/A/5700/02 - Alert

RP/0/A/5700/03 - Site Area Emergency

RP/0/A/5700/04 - General Emergency

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The event classifications in the above-referenced procedures were

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consistent with those required by regulation. The classification

procedures did not appear to contain impediments or errors which could

lead to incorrect or untimely classification.

Selected emergency action levels (EALs) specified in the classification

procedures were reviewed. The reviewed EALs appeared to be consistent

with the initiating events specified in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654. The

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inspector noted that some of the EALs were based on parameters obtainable

i from Control Room instrumentation.

The inspector verified that the licensee's notification procedures

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included criteria for initiation of offsite notifications and for

i development of protective action recommendations. The notification

procedures required that offsite notifications be made promptly after

i declaration of an emergency.

f The inspector discussed with licensee representatives the coordination of

EALs with State and local officials. A licensee representative provided

the inspector with documentation dated May 29, 1986, which showed that the

licensee had contacted State and local officials during 1986 to review the

EALs used for event classification and protective action decision-making.

In addition, the inspector reviewed documentation from the offsite

authorities providing concurrence with the EALs used by the licensee.

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! Interviews were held with three Shift Supervisors to verify that they

i understood the relationship between core status and such core damage

indicators as containment dome monitor, inadequate-core-cooling indicator,

i high-range effluent monitor, containment hydrogen monitor, and

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)ost-accident primary coolant analysis. All interviewees appeared

) (nowledgeable of the various core damage indications and their

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relationship to core status.

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! The responsibility and authority for classification of emergency events

I and initiation of emergency action were prescribed in licensee procedures

and in the Emergency Plan. Interviews with selected key members of the

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licensee's emergency organization revealed that these personnel understood

their responsibilities and authorities in relation to accident

classification, notification, and protective action recommendations.

Selected Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) were reviewed by

the inspector and discussed with licensee personnel. The EPIPs provided

directions to users concerning timely classification of accidents. All

personnel interviewed appeared to be familiar with the classification

information in the EPIPs.

Walk-through evaluations involving accident classification problems were

conducted with three Shift Supervisors. All personnel interviewed

promptly and properly classified the hypothetical accident situations

presented to them, and appeared to be familiar with appropriate

classification procedures.

The inspector verified that the appropriate notifications and followup

actions were taken by the licensee following the declaration of an unusual

event on January 30, 1987. The inspector reviewed the initial and

followup notification fonns in addition to a letter from the Station '

Manager addressed to each of the offsite authorities (dated February 2,

1987) which summarized the event and actions leading up to the event. No

problems were noted in event classification, notification, or followup.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Protective Action Decision-Making (82202)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) and (10) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,

Section IV.D.3, this area was inspected to determine whether the licensee

had 24-hour-per-day capability to assess and analyze emergency conditions

and make recommendations to protect the public and onsite workers, and

whether offsite officials had the authority and capability to initiate

prompt protective action for the public.

The inspector discussed responsibility and authority for protective action

decision-making with licensee representatives and reviewed pertinent

portions of the licensee's Emergency Plan and procedures. The Plan and

procedures clearly assigned responsibility and authority for accident

assessment and protective action decision-making. Interviews with members

of the licensee's emergency organization revealed that these personnel

understood their authorities and responsibilities with respect to accident

assessment and protective action decision-making.

Walk-through evaluations involving protective action decision-making were

conducted with three Shift Supervisors. Personnel interviewed

demonstrated familiarity with the use of procedures which addressed the

appropriate onsite and offsite protective action recommendations following

the declaration of an emergency. Personnel interviewed were aware of the

need for timeliness in making initial protective action recommendations to

offsite officials. Interviewees demonstrated adequate understanding of

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the requirement that protective action reconmendations be based on core

condition and containment status even if no release is in progress.

Licensee procedures made provisions for contacting responsible offsite

authorities on a 24-hour basis. Backup conmunications links with offsite

authorities were available. The inspector confirmed that offsite

decision-makers with authority for emergency response activities could be

contacted on a 24-hour basis by observing a conmunications check (as

discussed in Paragraph 6 below) via the Selective Signaling Phone to the

State and county warning points from the Control Room. In addition, the

inspector requested a communications drill via the backup communications

link by conducting a radio check from the Control Room to the county

warning points.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Knowledge a' d Performance of Duties (Training) (82206)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(15) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,

Section IV.F, this area was inspected to determine whether emergency

response personnel understood their emergency response roles and could

perform their assigned functions.

The inspector reviewed Section 0 of the Emergency Plan and Station

Directive 2.5.1 for a description of the training program and training

procedures. In addition, selected lesson plans were revk ted and members

of the instructional staff were interviewed. Based on these reviews and

interviews, the inspector determined that the licensee had established a

formal emergency training program.

Records of training for key members of the onsite and offsite emergency

organization for the period February 1986 to March 1987 were reviewed. It

was noted that three members of the emergency organization, designated as

Alternate Performance Technician, had not received the required annual

retraining for station emergency response personnel. Although the

specialized training, " Plant Data Transmission / Retrieval," specific for

the before-mentioned personnel was completed, failure to attend the

required annual retraining is inconsistent with training requirements as

specified in the Station Emergency Plan, Section 0, and Station

Directive 2.5.1 (Revision 2, dated January 7, 1987). A licensee

representative acknowledged this finding as an oversight due to resources

that were committed to a refueling outage during the period in which

training was conducted. This item is identified as a violation of

10 CFR 50.54(q) which requires the licensee to follow an emergency plan

which meets the planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b).

Violation (50-369/87-10-01 and 50-370/87-10-01): Failure to provide

annual retraining to personnel assigned to the station emergency

organization.

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According to training records, with the exception of the finding stated

i above, all other training provided to key members of the onsite emergency

organization was consistent with approved procedures. The inspector

reviewed 1986 training records for various offsite support agencies and

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the Crisis Management Center (CMC) personnel. It was noted that training

was provided in accordance with Section 0 of the Station and CMC Emergency

Plans.

In response to IE Information Notice No. 85-80, " Timely Declaration of an

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Emergency Class, Implementation of an Emergency Plan, and Emergency

Notifications," the inspector interviewed two Shift Support Technicians

i and an Operations Administrative Supervisor who may be designated as an

i Offsite Communicator for the Control Room. The Offsite Communicator is

4 responsible for initial comunications to the offsite agencies (State and

l county) via the Selective Signaling Telephone System. The inspector

conducted walk-through evaluations with comunicators using drill messages

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for transmission via the Selective Signaling Phone System and the backup

comunications system (two-way radio) to State and county warning points.

The interviewees demonstrated familiarity with both comunication systems

1 and the responsibility as a comunicator during an emergency. A review of

training records verified that interviewees had received annual training.

In addition, the inspector was informed by a licensee representative that

i the Control Room Communicators periodically participate in conducting the

i required monthly comunications checks between the Station and State / local

warning points.

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The inspector conducted walk-through evaluations with selected key members

of the emergency organization. During these. walk-throughs, individuals '

, were given various hyrethetical sets of emergency conditions and data and

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asked to respond as if an emergency actually existed. The individuals

demonstrated familiarity with emergency procedures and equipment, and no

problems were observed in the areas of emergency detection and

classification, notifications, dose calculation, assessment action (to

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include plant conditions, in-plant sample collection and analysis), and

protective action decision-making.

One violation and no deviations were identified.

) 7. Emergency Equipment, Instrumentation, and Supplies (82210)

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l The inspector verified the operational readiness of protective equipment

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and supplies by direct observation and records review. Records of

equipment inventory and operability checks for the period May 1986 to

January 1987 were reviewed. In addition, discussions with cognizant

. personnel and direct observation of an inventory and/or operability check

conducted on the Operation Support Center Kit, Technical Support Center

Kit, and the Personnel Survey Kit for North Personnel Access Portal (PAP),

i disclosed no discrepancies. It appears the . inventory and operability

checks are being conducted in accordance with Plant Procedure

PT/0/A/4600/11.

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8. Inspector Followup (92701)

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-369/84-31-02: Required improved

management and administrative controls in routine operation of TSC. The

inspector reviewed the October 1986 annual exercise report (86-27) and

noted that required operation of the facility proceeded in an orderly

manner. Assumption of duties by the Emergency Director was definite and

fi rm.

(Closed) IFI 50-369/85-42-01: Establish a range for iodine-131 increase

rate to trigger incident classification. A review of the licensee's EALs

disclosed that a range for iodine-131 increase rate was established for

triggering the appropriate incident classification.

(Closed) IFI 50-369/86-27-01 and 50-370/86-27-01: Restore to operational

i status and assure continued operation of all sirens located in Mecklenburg

County, NC. A review of licensee documentation disclosed that followup

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siren tests fere conducted after replacing a faulty encoder and resulted

in the subsect sirens as being operational.

9. IE Information Notice (92717)

(Closed) IFI 50-369/86-IN-98 and 50-370/86-IN-98: Offsite Medical

Services. The inspector reviewed the licensee's letters of agreement with

Offsite Medical facilities to verify that agreements were current for

providing medical services to licensee personnel. In addition,

discussions with a representative from the State Emergency management

l Agency disclosed that the State Department of Human Resources has

identified and periodically evaluates the capabilities, procedures, and

willingness of North Carolina hospitals to accept and treat members of the

general public who may be victims of a radiation accident.

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