ML20141B813

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Forwards Response to 860220 Request for Addl Info Re Procedures Generation Package.Tmi Action Item 1.C.1 & SER Confirmatory Item 44 Discussed
ML20141B813
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 03/28/1986
From: Bailey J
GEORGIA POWER CO.
To: Youngblood B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-1.C.1, TASK-TM GN-850, NUDOCS 8604070118
Download: ML20141B813 (33)
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Text

r-Georgia Power Company Routa 2 Box 299A Waynesboro, Georgi 30830 Telephone 404 554-9961 404 724-8114 Southern Company Services, Inc.

Post Office Box 2625 m Birmingham, Alabama 35202 Telephone 205 8704011 Vogtle Proj.ect March 28,1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation File: X7BC35 Log: GN-850 Attention: Mr. B. J. Youngblood PWR Project Directorate #4 Division of PWR Licensing A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 REF: Youngblood to Conway, 2/20/86 NRC DOCKET NUMBERS 50-424 AND 50-425 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMBERS CPPR-108 AND CPPR-109 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PIANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 SER CONFIRMATORY ITEM 44: TMI ITEM I.C.1

Dear Mr. Denton:

Attached for your staff's review is the VEGP response to the referenced letter. The attachment contains responses to your staff's request for additional infonnation concerning the Procedures Generation Package.

If your staff requires any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely, o h, J. A. Bailey Project Licensing Manager JAB /sm Enclosure G. Bockhold, Jr.

xc: R. E. Conway D. C. Teper R. A. Thomas J. E. Joiner, Esquire W. C. Ramsey B. W. Churchill, Esquire NRC Resident Inspector M. A. Miller (2) L. T. Gucwa B. Jones, Esquire Vogtle Project File 0053V 1 ,

1 0604070118 860328 PDR ADOCK 05000424 E PDR

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,) k CONFIRMATORY ITEM 44 (REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION)

NRC POSITION

1. The justification for Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) #19000-1 (Emergency Response Guideline (ERG) f E-0) Step 15 stated that your plant design does not include a phase B containment isolation signal.

Provide a comparison table of all the systems isolated in the high pressure (HP) reference plant phases A and B and the systems isolated on phase A for your plant. Provide justification for each system that is isolated in the reference plant which is not isolated at Vogtle.

VEGP POSITION Attached is a comparison table of containment isolation signals phase A and B components for VEGP and the high pressure (HP) reference plant (see attachment A). The HP reference plint is of typical SNUPPs design.

A comparison of the VEGP and SNUPPs isolation valves identified three cases where VEGP does not provide isolation signals that is provided for by the reference plant. These cases are: (1). Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System Isolation Valves, (2) Containment Spray Emergency Sump Isolation Valves, and (3) ACCW Containment Isolation Valves.

The following is a discussion as to why VEGP does not provide an isolation signal for the above cases.

VEGP considers the Hydrogen Monitoring, the Containment Spray Emergency Sump, and the ACCW Containment penetrations to be essential systems.

The Hydrogen Monitoring System is Class IE, Seismic Category 1 and designed to retain its integrity and to be operable under all conditions following a design basis accident. The containment spray emergency sumps isolation valves and associated piping are safety grade, Seismic Category 1, and provides for the long term removal of heat and gaseous iodine from the containment atmosphere. The ACCW System penetrations are considered essential due to the importance of maintaining cooling water to the Reactor coolant pumps. This is consistent with Regulatory Requirement Review Comittee position 4.C.17.

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NRC POSITION

2. Justify the elimination of sample line radf 3 tion and blowdown line radiation from the procedure identifying a ruptured steam generator. (EOP #19030-1 i (ERG #E-3) Step f2). l i

VEGP RESPONSE In order for the operator to be in Procedure 19030-1 (E-3), the primary to secondary leakage is substanital enough to cause SI actuation. Without SI actuation, the operator is directed to the Abnomal Operating Procedure for SG tube leakage, instead of 19030-1.

Two methods are provided in 19030-1 for determining the ruptured SG. These are: 1) an unexpected rise in the SG level, or 2) high radiation in a main steam line.

In the case of a large tube rupture, SG level provides obvious indication of the ruptured SG. A' comparison of the SG level trends from the recorders show the ruptured SG. For smaller tube ruptures, the urgency is not as critical and time is available for monitoring SG level and steam line radiation for changes that indicate a ruptured SG. High main steam line radiation is available regardless of size of tube failure to identify the leaking steam generator. VEGP did not include SG sampling and blowdown radiation as methods for determining the ruptured SG because these process lines are isolated by SI actuation. The attached diagrams show the logic and circuitry which provides the isolation signal for these valves. In addition, there are certain plant conditions (see attachmentwhich B . p)revent Even forre-opening cases whereofthe the blowdown valves can be and sample re-opened, theisolation val steps involved to check each SG require complicated and time consuming local operator actions which should not be included in procedure 19030-1.

NRC POSITION

3. In E0P #19251-1 step 12 (reference ERG FR-2.1 step 7), provide your plant-specific means for measurement of hydrogen concentration.

VEGP RESPONSE l

VEGP's containment hydrogen monitoring system is discussed in the VEGP FSAR, l subsection 6.2.5. Please refer to the attachment C.

l MRC POSITION

4. Provide plant specific procedures E0P #19261-1 and 19262-1 (reference ERG
  1. FR-1 and 1.2).

VEGP RESPONSE Attached please find copies of Procedures E0P 19261-1 and 19262-1 (see attachment D).

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NRC POSITION

5. For E0P steps corresponding to ERG steps which require establishing specific charging flow values, modify your E0Ps to specify the amount of charging flow to be establisned. ,

.f VEGP RESPONSE The intent of the Er,G steps which require 60 gpm charging flow while p. lacing normal charging in service is to ensure adequate charging pump cooling.

Vogtle's design incorporates two charging pump miniflow paths. Tha normal miniflow path directs a portion of the pumps discharge through the seal water heat exchanger and back to the pump's suction header. This flow path is automatically isolated on a safety injection actuation. The alternate miniflow path directs the pumps discharge to a pressure relief valve, which is sized to ensure pump cooling and prevent cavitation, should the pump become dead headed. This flow path is normally isolated and is automatically aligned on a safety injection actuation.

The ERG steps direct the operator to place normal charging in service and isolate the safety injection flow path through the BIT. The reference plant verifies 60 gpm charging flow in lieu of verifying a miniflow path. In the correspc,nding Vogtle E0P steps, the operator verifies the normal miniflow isolation valves are open before securing the BIT flow path. In the event the normal miniflow path cannot be established, the operator is instructed to leave the alternate miniflow aligned to provide a relief _ path to the RWST.

By verifying a pump miniflow path exists prior to isolating the BIT flow path, the operator ensures charging pump cooling is established. This allows the operator to control charging flow as required to maintain pressurizer level while providing pump protection. In most cases, the pressurizer level is high when the operator attempts to establish charging and secure safety injection. During these times it is desired to have minimum charging flow.

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/TTK@ar A teW PHASE A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION i;

V0GTLE SNUPPS 150. VALVE 150. VALVE NUMER, NUMER DESCRIPTION C0 6 i

HV-8047 BB HV-8026 PRT Nitrogen Iso.

Valve HV-8033 BB HV-8027 PRT Nitrogen Iso.

Valve HV-8100 BG HV-8100 Seal Water Return CTNT Iso. Valve HV-8112 BG-HV-8112 Seal Water Return CTMT Iso. Valve HV-8152 BG HV-8152 Letdown System CTNT Iso. Valve HV-8160 BG HV-8160 Letdown System CTMT Iso. Valve HV-8028 BL HV-8047 Reactor Makeup Water. CTML Iso...-- --

Valve HV-8825 EJ HCV-8825 RHR to SI Test Line Iso. Valve HV-8890A EJ HCV-8890A RHR A to SI Pumps Test Line Iso. Valva HV-8890B EJ HCV-8890B RHR B to SI Pumps l

. Test Line Iso. Valve HV-8823 EM HV-8823 SI/ Accumulator In-jection Test Line Iso. Valve l HV-8824 EM HV-8824 Safety Injection i Pump B Test Line l Iso. Valve l HV-8843 EM HV-8843 Boron Injection

! Upstream Test Line Iso.

l HV-8871 EM HV-8871 SI Test Line to l

RWST Iso. Valve HV-8881 EM HV-8881 Safety Injection Pump Test Line i Iso. Valve i HV-8964 EM HV-8964 SI Test Line Sys-tem Outside CTMT Iso.

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r 1045 V0GTLE SNUPPS 150. VALVE ISO. VALVE NUISER NUMlER DESCRIPTION C0f0 H T

GS HV-3 Hydrogen Analyzer B Vogtle considers the Inlet Iso. H2 monitor essential i

GS HV-4 Hydrogen Analyzer B Vogtle considers the Inlet Iso. H2 monitor essential i

GS HV-5 Hydrogen Analyzer B Vogtle considers the Inlet Iso. H2 monito'r essential

GS HV-8 Hydrogen Analyzer B Vogtle considers the Disch. Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-9 Hydrogen Analyzer B Vogtle considers the Disch. Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-12 Hydrogen Analyzer A Yogtle considers the Inlet Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-13 Hydrogen Analyzer A Vogtle considers the Inlet Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-14 Hydrogen Analyzer A Vogtle considers the Inlet Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-17 ' Hydrogen- Analyzer-A Vogtle-considers the Disch. Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-18 Fydrogen Analyzer A Vogtle considers the Disch. Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-31 Sampic Line to CTMT Vogtle utilizes Atmos Monitor one CNMT. atmos. rad.

monitor. See HV-12975, 6, 7, & 8 below.

Vogtle design provides isolation with fewer valves. See HV-12975 6, 7, & 8 for 3tm11dr, valves arrange-ment.

GS HV-32 Sample Line to CTNT Same as GS-HV-31 Atmos Monitor HV-8212 GS HV-33 Hydrogen Sample Re-turn From PASS HV-8211 GS HV-34 Hydrogen Sample Re-turn From PASS HV-12975 GS HV-36 Sample Line to CTNT Atmos Monitor HV-12976 GS HV-37 Sample Line to CTMT Atmos Monitor GS HV-38 Sample Return CTMT HV-12977 Atmos Monitor

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V0GTLE SNUPPS 150. VALVE ISO. VALVE NUMBER NUMBER DESCRIPTION CO M NT

GS HV-3 Hydrogen Analyzer B Vogtle considers the Inlet Iso. H2 monitor essential i

GS HV-4 Hydrogen Analyzer B Vogtle considers the Inlet Iso. H2 monitor essential ,

GS HV-5 Hydrogen Analyzer B Vogtle considers the Inlet Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-8 Hydrogen Analyzer B Vogtle considers the Disch Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-9 Hydrogen Analyzer B Vogtle considers the Disch. Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-12 Hydrogen Analyzer A Vogtle considers the i Inlet Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-13 Hydrogen Analyzer A Vogtle considers the Inlet Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-14 Hydrogen Analyzer A Vogtle considers the Inlet Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-17 Hydrogen Analyzer-A"- - Vogtle considers the Disch. Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-18 Hydrogen Ana.lyzer A Vogtle considers the Disch. Iso. H2 monitor essential

GS HV-31 Sample Line to CTMT Vogtle utilizes Atmos Monitor one CNKT. atmos. rad.

monitor. See HV-12975, 6, 7, & 8 below.

Vogtle design provides isolation with fewer valves. See HV-12975, 6, 7, & 8 for Similiar valves crrange-g ment.

GS HV- Sample Line to CTMT Same as GS-HV-31 Atmos Monitor HV-8212 GS HV-33 Hydrogen Sample Re-turn From PASS HV-8211 GS HV-34 Hydrogen Sample Re-turn From PASS HV-12975 GS HV-36 Sample Line to CTMT Atmos Monitor HV-12976 GS HV-37 Sample Line to CTMT Atmos Monitor HV-12977 GS HV-38 Sample Return CTMT Atmos Monitor

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, 90GTLE SNUPPS 150. VALVE ISO. VALVE NUfBER _ NUMBER DESCRIPTION C0f0ENT HV-12978 GS HV-39 Sample Return CTMT Atmos Monitor HV-7126 HB HV-7126 RCDT Vent Inside ,

CTMT q HV-7136 HB HV-7136 RCDT' Pumps Disch.

Hdr. Outside CTMT Iso.

HV-7150 HB HV-7150 RCDT Vent Outside CTNT HV-7699 HB HV-7176 RCDT Pumps Disch. Hrd.

Inside CTMT Iso.

HV-9378 KA FV-29 Reactor Bldg. Instr.

Air Supply Outside CTNT Iso.

HV-780 LF FV-95 CTNT normal Sumps to Floor Drain Tank In-sida CTMT Iso.

HV-781 LF FV-96 CTMT Normal Sumps to Floor Drain Tank Out-side CTMT Iso.

HV-3507 SJ HV-5 PZR/RCS Liquid Sample Inner CTMT Iso.

HV-3508 SJ HV-6 PZR/RCS Liquid Sample Outer CTMT Iso.

HV-3513 SJ HV-12 PZR Vapor Sample Outer CTNT Iso.

HV-3514 SJ HV-13 PZR Vapor Sample Inner CTNT Iso.

l HV-10950 SJ HV-18 Accumulator Sample l

HV-10951 Inner CTNT Iso.

HV-10952 i HV-10953 SJ HV-19 Accumulator Sample

! Outer CTMT Iso.

HV-3502 SJ HV-127 PZR/RCS Liquid Sample Outer CTMT Iso.

HV-3548 SJ HV-128 PZR/RCS Liquid Sample Inner CTNT Iso.

HV-8220 SJ HV-129 PZR/RCS Liquid Sample Outer CTMT Iso.

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  • V0GT1.E SNUPPS 150. VALVE 150. VALVE NUMBER DESCRIPTION COM4ENT MUMlER

. -------- SJ HV-130 PZR/RCS Liquid Sample Vogtle design provides Outer CTMT Iso. Yalve isolation with fewer ,

valves HV-8208 SJ HV-131 PASS Discharge to RCDT ,

HV-8209 SJ HV-132 PASS Discharge to RCDT HV-8888 EM HV-8888 Accumulator Tank Fill Line Iso. Valve

EN HV-01 CTNT Recirc. Sump to Vogtle considers CTNT Spray Pump A Iso. CNMT Spray Emer-gency Sump Iso.

valves essential

EN HV-07 CTNT Recirc. Sump to Same as EN HV-01 CTMT Spray Pump B Iso.

HV-8880 EP HV-8880 CTMT Nitrogen Supply Iso. Valve HV-9385 GS HV-20 Hydrogen Purge Inner -

CTNT Iso.

GS HV-21 Hydrogen Purge outer Vogtle design pro-CTMT Iso. vides a check valve iso. inside CNMT.

HV-27091 KC HV-253 Fire Protection Sys-ttm Hdr Outer CTMT Iso.

PHASE B CONTAINMENT ISOLATION

EG llV-58 CCW to RCS Iso. Vogtle maintains ACCW to CNMT. To provide continued RCP operation; which is considered essential.

EG HV-59 CCW Return From Same as EG HV-58 RSS Iso.

EG HV-60 CCW Return From Same as EG HV-58 RCS Iso.

EG HV-61 CCW Return From Same as EG HV-58 RCS Iso.

EG HV-62 CCW Return From Same as EG HV-58 RCS Iso. .

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STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN. ISOLATION VALVES TRAIN B ESFAS HAND SWITCH .-- =

TRAIN-A ESFAS

SG TO OPEN -

_ .__ . l __ /

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' 4 ISOLATION _. l VALVE -g. g. g - /

g .

i AIRSUPPLY-M G#C GWC Ge ./

Gj J r_ V . V p -

_V_ . V. .. V . .

& TO SG BLOWDOWN, HEAT.

iI EXCHANGER i

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~ STEAM GENERATOR SAMPLE' ISOLATION O .

_ p _ _.- ESFAS

-v 54 8, i

t 8

-  :, D W AIR SUPPLY

%) n - L:-

! n l -

i k FC

> TO-SMPLE COOLER

REFERENCE:

P & ids: 1X4D159-1 & 3 e

, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. _ . - . - - - , _ . - . - . - - , . , . - , . _ , _ - . . . . , . ,,......,_,...-----,.--,.m.,. . , -m,w-_~ , _ _ , - - - _ _ -

- 8 200 ,

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1 SG BLOWDOWN ISOLATION AX-2 SG SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE l VALVE ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT i l

2 '

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, CSi-R -- CSi-R

.-OPEN AUTO

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I.AX-2 l OPEN 7

VALVE OPEN

. SOL ENERGIZED

.- .T0 ALIGN AIR .

UPPLY TO

~ g ISOLATION

  • AX-2 VALVE ~/

SOL ENERGIZED C -

O OPEN-1 Tv - .. . _ .

ESF INTERLOCK CIRCUIT .

.-i._ - .

CLOSES ON ~

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CLOSES-jggy

. OW'I.DW ON $1 " .

j_ LEVEL POWER i .~

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G I-NI CLOSES ON MAIN CLOSES ON MIN LEVEL 51 FDW PMP TURB - --fDW PMP TURB

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,  : DRIVEN TRIP -- DRIVEN TRIP I 1-1306-K4-001 1-1306-K4-002 T ~

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MAIN FDW .

PMP TURB .

. DRIVEN TRIP  ;!

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REFERENCE:

ELEMENTARIES: 1X3d-BC-Q01A,B,C.D,Q048,C,Q07E.F i

- s sas SG BLOWDOWN a SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVE LOGIC SG HI-HI SI SG LW-LW LOSS OF LEVEL LEVEL OFFSITE PW ER l _

if TRIP SGFPs

/ 's SGFP "A" SGFP "B" TRIPPED TRIPPED 1 I i

i f CLOSE SG BLOWDOWN

& SAMPLE ISOLATION VALVES

REFERENCE:

LOGIC DIAGRAM: 1X50N117-1

3. Hydreyn N3enn3 ATTliC44EMT d i .e a 6.2.5.1.4 containment Hydrogen Monitoring . system

-s A. The hydrogen monitoring system is designed as a class IE, Seismic Category 1 syste'm. It is designed to ~

i retain its integrity and operability under all conditions,following a design basis accident (DBA).

I B. All materials and equipment required by this system are selected to be compatible with the environmental conditions anticipated during accident operation and are suitable for a lifetime consistent with that of

  • the plant.

C. The system samples containment air, providing the means to measure the containment hydrogsn concentration and to alert the operator in the event that a high hydrogen concentration is detected, in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.7.

D. The hydrogen monitoring system consists of two identical units that are completely independent of each other and are powered from independent Class lE power sources. Therefore, assuming a single failure,

- capability is svailable to monitor the hydrogen concentration in the containment.

E. Proper shielding and other provisions are incorporated

into the design to ensure that personnel exposure does l not exceed the limits of General Design Criterion 19 and that the required radiological analysis can be

- performed on the containment air sample.

6.2.5.2.4 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System Each redundant hydrogen monitoring train in the hydrogen ,

monitoring system consists of a hydrogen analyzer and two -

associated sample lines with solenoid-operated isolation valves inside and outside the containment. These sampling lines are.

designed to be free of water traps (runs where liquid could -

accumulate) and are equipped with sufficient heat tracing to prevent condensation from the sample being supplied to the analyzers. .

4 After the sample has been analyzed, it is returned to the containment. The analyzers are located in accessible areas outside the containment. The hydrogen monitoring subsystem IE piping is in accordance with the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.26, Quality Group B. Solenoid-operatedisolationvalvesarel9l14 arranged to obtain samples from two locations within the -

containment for each train.' The operator may select either of.

these sampling points from the main control room.

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- - - - - r--,.,-,-m ------m,-,,---n,,--,----- - - - - , - , - n,wn,--, ,--.,~~,-----------.------_-2 --f.. - - - - - --- - - - - - - - ,

C f o4 5 The operation of the hydrogen gas analyzer is based on the measurement of thermal conductivity of the gaseous containment atmosphere sample. The thermal conductivity of the gas mixture l changes in proportion to the changes in the concentration of I the individual gas constituents of the mixture. The thermal conductivity of hydrogen is far greater (approximately seven i times the thermal conductivity of air) than any other gases or vapors expected to be present. This operation of the hydrogen monitoring system is not limited due to radiation, moisture, or tertperature expected at the equipment location. The monitors are designed to function under design pressure conditions of -2

- to 60 psig.

Indication of hydrogen concentration is available within 30 min of initiating flow through the monitors. This is accomplished by operating the monitors in standby during normal plant oper& tion.

The range of the monitors is O to 10 volume percent with an accuracy of +5.0 percent of scale. .

The output signal of the hydrogen monitors is indicated locally and recorded and alarmed in the control room. In addition to the high hydrogen alarm, a common malfunction alarm is located in the control room to indicate loss of power, low or high, pressure, or low or high temperature.

Design data for principal system components are presented in table 6.2.5-5. The system is schematically shown in figure 9.4.6-2.

The hydrogen monitoring system meets the requirements of TMI Action Plan Task II.F.1 regarding hydrogen monitoring.

6.2.5.5.4 Containment Hydrogen Monitoring System .

The control switches for the sample selector valves and l

containment isolation valves are located on the process control ,

j panel in the control room. Operation of the hydrogen analyzers is controlled remotely from the main control board. Hydrogen concentration is both indicated and recorded on the main control board.

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VEGP-FSAR-6

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TABLE 6.2.5-5 DESIGN DATA FOR PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF THE CONTAINMENT BYDROGEN MONITORING SYSTEM

{',- --

' Hydrogen Analyzer Quantity 2 per unit Type Thermal conductivity Range 0 to 1 and 0 to 10 volume percent (s) '-

Acc.uracy 15 percent of full scale Valves (isolation) 10 Quantity Type 8 solenoid-operated gate valves and

- 2 check valves Tubing Material Stainless steel (Class 2) o M.

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' -MEUT h i' hTThC 1 P:Ocedure No,

  • Appro*/ 1 j l

19261-1 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant y

  • NUCLEAR OPERATIONS hous p ,

0 o.:.

unit 1 GeorgiaPower -e.w. uo.

1 or 12 ,

1  ;.

d EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE FR-l.1 RESPONSE T0 ll!GH PRESSURIZER LEVEL PURPOSE This procedure provides actions to respond to a high pressurizer -

level..

ENTRY CONDITIONS 19206-1. F-0.6 ItWENTORY CSFST on a YELLOW Conditien.

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COMf1NUED

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1 PAGE NO.

'., "PROCEDUREHO.

REVISION 0 2 of 12

- 19261-1 U

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION / EXPECTED RESP 6NSE

1. Return to procedure and step
l. Check if ECCS Has Been in effect.

Teratinated: ..

o SI pwnpa - AI.L STOPPED.

o BIT - ISOLATED.

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l CONTINUED l l t -

. ' PROCEDURE NO. y9gg1,l REWSiON 0 3 of 12 i

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE i

CAUTION The PRZR may be water solid. Charging and letdown flows should be carefully controlled to avoid sudden RCS pressure changes.

2. Establish Excess Letdown By 2. Establish Safety Grade Initiating 13008-1, CVCS Letdown:

EXCESS LETDOWN.

a. Open reactor vessel head vent isolation valves:

e HV-8095A

' t HV-8096A e HV-8095B e HV-8096B

b. Open reactor vessel head vent throttle j

valves as required l

' to obtain 90 gpm letdown flows e HV-442A e HV-442B

c. Continue safety grade letdown until m of the following occurs:

o PRZR level - LESS THAN 921.

-OR-e PRT pressure - GREATER THAN 80 PSIG.

-OR-e PRT level - GREATER THAN 901.

d. Isolate safety grade letdown.

l CONTINUED

o-PROCEDURE No. g,y REVISION 0 4dH I

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE NOTE e If all sources of RCP seal cooling flow have been of Recovery lost, then the RCP seal is assumed to be hot.

No. I seal cooling is performed by Step 5.

e Without instrument air available charging should be established using Attachment A.

3. Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established:
a. Perform the following:
a. The following conditions are IF ACCW flow to RCP satisfied: 1) Eermal barrier is zero, THEN isolate seal o CCP - AT LEAST ONE injection to the RUNNING. affected RCP before RCP seal injection - starting a charging e pump.

AT LEAST 8 GPM. .

2) Start one CCP.
b. Establish instrument air to
b. Instrument air to containment:

containment -

ESTABLISHED. ,

1) Verify instrument air pressure is normal.

IF instrument air W essure is NOT normal, THEN_ start one air compressor by initiating 13710-1, SERVICE AIR SYSTEM.

2) Open instrument air to containment isolation valve HV-9378 if necessary.

CONTINUED

. emocsount No. gg,3 navisien 0 5dH ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED [

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c. Establish charging flow.
c. Charging flow -

. ESTABLISHED. IF chargig can NOT be established, THEN establish excess TeTdown using Procedure 13008-1, CVCS EXCESS LETDOWN.

Go to Step 6.

4. Establish letdown by
4. Check Letdown - IN SERVICE. initiating 13006-1, CVCS STARTUP AND NORMAL OPERATION.
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CONTINUED

1 PALE NO.

REVISION XEC . 6E N3 _

i RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE

5. Check If RCP Seal Return Flow Should Be -

Established:

a. Restore seal injection f
a. Seal injection flow - flow using Attachment B. j GREATER THAN 8 GPM. I
b. Verify RCP seal b. Secure the affected RCP.

parameters: Go to Step 6. j e Seal inj ection '

supply temperature -

LESS THAN 135'F. .

e RCP No, I seal temperature - LESS THAN 220*F.

e ACCW supply temperature - LESS - -~

THAN 105'F.

c. Establish flows
1) Open RCP seal return header isolation valves:

e HV-8100 e HV-8112 '

2) Open RCP seal leakoff
2) Verify seal return valves as necessary:

flow from each RCP -

NORMAL FOR RCP e HV-8141A (RCP 1)

NUMBER 1 SEAL e HV-8141B (RCP 2)

DIFFERENTIAL o HV-8141C (RCP 3)

PRESSURE. e HV-8141D (RCP 4)

CONTINUED

n--,,,,sr,,c , _ ,-nee m.-me,, , , m. m - - - - - , - - - - - - - -, - - -

3CEDURE N A ggggy,y W SION 0 7 of 12 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE .

6. Check PRZR Pressure:
a. Verify at least one PRZR
s. Pressura - LESS THAN PORV and block valve open.

2335 PSIG.

IF NOT, THEN open one PORV  !

and T ock valve as necessary until pressure is less than 2315 psig. .

b. Control charging and
b. Pressure - LESS THAN letdown flow as necessary 2260 PSIG. to lower PRZR pressure to less than 2260 psig.

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7. Manually shut PORVs.
7. Verify PRZR FORVs - SHUT '

IF any valve can NOT be shut -

THEN manually shut its block '

valve.

8. Energize PRZR Heaters.
9. Check PRZR Spray Valves:
a. Manually shut spray valves.
a. Normal spray valves - .~

SHUT. IF any valve can NOT be EEut, THEN stop the RCP supplying the failed spray valve.

b. Auxiliary spray valve - b. Manually shut auxiliary spray valve.

SHUT. .

O CONTINUED

u PN2E NO.

e, ' ' PROCEDURE ND.

REVISION 0 8 of 12 19261-1 i

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE i

10. Control Charging And Let'down Flow As Necessary To Maintain RCS Pressure '-

Stable.

11. Return to Step 10.
11. Check PRZR Level - LESS THAN 922.
12. Return To Procedure And Step In Effect.

END OF PROCEDURE TEXT l

l 1

9 9

e LEVISION PAGENO.

PROCEDURE NO.

0 9 of 12 l

,*;. 19261-1 Sheet 1 of 3 l l'

ATTACHMENT A C

ESTABLISHING CHARGING WITHOUT INSTRUMENT AIR l

l A. Establish Charging With Both Train A And Train B Emergency Buses l Energized: l

1. Verify alternate miniflow isolation valves - OPEN:

e HV-8508A e HV-8508B ,

2. Verify one CCP - RUNNING.
3. Verify charging isolation valves - OPEN: )

e HV-8105 e HV-8106

4. Verify BIT isolation valves - SHUT:

e HV-8801A e HV-8801B e HV-8803A e HV-8803B

5. Dispatch local operators to do the following:
a. Open 1208-U4-136 CVCS SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 BYPASS
b. Shut 1208-U4-134 CVCS SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 INL ISO
c. Shut 1208-U4-135 CVCS SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 O ISO
d. Adjust to obtain 8 to 13 gpm RCP SEAL INJ NEEDLE VLVS

.Tc i1 SEAL:

e 1208-U4-414(RCP #1) '

e 1208-U4-415(RCP #2) e 1208-U4-416(RCP #3) e 1208-U4-417(RCP #4)

e. Adjust to obtain desired charging flow 1208-U4-136 CVCS SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 BYPASS.

PROCEDURE NO. l926l,1

!sEWSON 0' 10 cf 12 Sheet 2 of 3 ATTACHMENT A (Cont'd.) ,

i B. Establish Charging With Train A EmerEency Bus Energized: ,

1. Verify Train A alternate miniflow isolation valve h'!-8508A - .

OPEN.

l

2. Verify Train A CCP - RUNNING. l
3. Verify Train A charging isolation valve HV-8106 - OPEN.
4. Dispatch local operators to do the followings
a. Shut CCP discharge crosstie isolation valve HV-8438
b. Verify Train B charging isolation valve HV-8105 - OPEN
c. Open 1208-U4-136 CVCS SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 BYPASS
d. Shut 1208-U4-134 CVCS SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 INLET ISO
e. Shut 1208-U4-135 CVCS SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 OUTLET ISO
f. Adjust to obtain 8 to 13 gpm RCP SEAL INJ NEEDLE ,

VLVS TO fl SEAL:

e 1208-U4-414(RCP #1) e 1208-U4-415(RCP #2) e 1208-U4-416(RCP #3) e 1208-U4-417(RCP #4)

I

g. Adjust to obtain desired charging flow 1208-U4-136 CVCS

' SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 BYPASS.

O 3

- - - - , - - - - , <. -- , , , . ~ , ,<-,-ww,-- - ---,-----,----s --. ---- - - - -s-.- --- --

PAGE No.

REVISloN

- PROCEDURE NO. ,

Sheet 3 of 3 ATTACHMENT A (Cont'd.)

C. Establish Charging With Train B Emergency Bus Energized:

1. Verify Train B alternate miniflow isolation valve HV-8508B - -

OPEN.

2. Verify Train B CCP - RUNNING.
3. Verify Train B charging isolation valve HV-8105 - OPEN.
4. Verify Train B BIT isolation valves - SHUT:

e HV-8801B e HV-8803B

5. Dispatch local operators to do the following:

~

a. Verify Train A BIT isolation valves - SHUT e HV-8801A e HV-8803A - - -- . .
b. Verify Train A charging . isolation valve HV-8106 - SHUT
c. Open 1208-U4-136 CVCS SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 BYPASS
d. Shut 1208-U4-134 CVCS SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 INLET ISO .
e. Shut 1208-U4-135 CVCS SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 OUT ISO
f. Adjust to obtain 8 to 13 gpm RCP sed INJ NEEDLE VLVS TO #1 SEAL:

I e 1208-U4-414(RCP #1) i, e 1208-U4-415(RCP (2)

' e 1208-U4-416(RCP #3) e 1208-U4-417(RCP (4)

g. Adjust to obtain desired charging flow 1208-U4-136 CVCS SEALS FLOW CONTROL HV-181 BYPASS.

e END OF ATTACHMENT A b

6

PAIE NO.

PROCEDURE NO.

Revision 0 12 of 12 19261-1 Sheet 1 of 1 ATTACHMENT B i RECOVERY OF RCP SEAL INJECTION i

1. Check RCP No. 1 seal temperature. .

IF less than 220*F, THEN open CVCS SEALS RCP SEAL INJReturn SUPPLY to CNMT Step Sb. ISO valve and ICM supply to the affected RCP.

IF greater than 220*F, THEN proceed to Step 2 of this Attachment.

2. Verify seal injection supply temperature - LESS THAN 135*F.

Verify ACCW supply temperature - LESS THAN 105'F.

3. Dispatch operator to shut CVCS SEALS RCP SEAL INJ NEEDLE.VLVS TO #1 SEAL for affected RCP.

e 1208-U4-414(RCP 1) e 1208-U4-415(RCP 2) e 1208-U4-416(RCP 3) e 1208-U4-417(RCP 4)

4. Verify CVCS SEALS RCP SEAL INJ NEEDLE VLVS of Step 3 of this Attachment is shut.
5. Open CVCS SEALS RCP SEAL INJ SUPPLY CNMT ISO valve for affected l

i RCP.

6. Slowly o7en CVCS SEALS RCP SEAL INJ NEEDLE VLVS TO fl SEAL to establish a l'F per minute cooldown rate.

l I

j 7. WHEN RCP No. I seal temperature is less than 220*F, THEN restore ACCW supply to the affected RCP.

l;

8. Verify RCP serl parameters:

e Seal injection supply temperature - LESS THAN 135'F.

s ll e RCP No. I seal temperature - LESS THAN 220*F.

e ACCW supply temperature - LESS THAN 105'F.

IF RCP seal parameters can NOT be verified, THEN secure the affected RC E

9. Return to Step Sb of procedure.

END OF ATTACHMENT B l

Vogtb Boctric Cenerating Plant

' NUCLEAR OFERATIONS 19262-1 Revision h 0

Date 1 GeorgiaPbwer e..e =

unit 1 of 6 61 . 5c

. f EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE ..

FR-1,2 RESPONSE TO LOW PRESSURIZER LEVEL PURPOSE This procedure provides actions to respond to a low pressurizer level.

y.

ENTRY CONDITIONS _

j, e

19200-1, F-0.6 INVENTORY CSFST on a YELLOW condition.

i i

i ll I

P i CONTINUED 1 ., _ - _ _ = . .. _ - ___ - . _ - . .-. _ - . - .

PAGE NO.

REVISION

. ' PROCEDURE NO.

0 2 of 6

  • 19262-1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE i
1. Return to procedure and step
1. Check If ECCS Has Been in effect.

Terminated: .

e SI pumps - ALL STOPPED.

e BIT - ISOLATED.

2. Manually isolate letdown.
2. Verify Letdown - ISOLATED.

NOTE If all RCP seal cooling flows have been isolated, then the RCPs seal is assumed to be hot.

3. Check If Charging Flow Has Been Established:
a. Perform the following:
a. The following conditions are satisfied: IF ACCW flow to RCP
1) Hiermal barrier is e CCPs - AT LEAST ONE ~

zero, RUNNING. THEN isolate seal RCP seal injection -

injection to the e affected RCP before AT LEAST 8 GPM. starting CCP.

2) Start one CCP.

P 9

O e

CONTINUED

7

.1

.  : . PAGE N;;.

' ' PROCEDURE NO.

REVISION 0 3 of 6 19262-1 i

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE

b. Establish instrument air
b. Instrament air to to containment:

containment - -

ESTABLISHED. 1) Verify instrument air pressure normal.

IF instrument air iressure NOT normal, THEN start one air compressor by initiating 13710-1 SERVICE AIR SYSTEM.

2) Open instrument air to containment isolation valve HV-9378.
c. Establish charging flow.
c. Charging flow - - -

ESTABLISHED.

4. IF charging flow at maximum,
4. Raise Charging Flow.To THEN manually operate ECCS Restore PRZR Level. , pumps as necessary.

IF PRZR level can NOT be reistored, -

THEN go to 19010-1, E-1 LOSS DTTLEACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.

5. Check PRZR Levels
a. Return to Step 4.
a. Level - RISING.
b. Return to Step Sa.

i

b. Level - GREATER THAN 5

17%.

6 h

1 CONTINUED

O PAGE NO.

  • ' PROCEDURE NO.

REVIStoN 0

4 of 6 19262-1 8

RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE

6. Check If RCP Seal Return Flow Should Be Established:
a. Restore seal injection
a. Seal injection flow- AT flow using Attachment A.

LEAST 8 GPM. '

b. Stop the affected RCP.
b. Verify RCP seal parameters: Go to Step 7.

e Seal injection supply temperature - LESS THAN 135'F.

e RCP seal number one seal temperature -

LESS THAN 220'F.

e ACCW supply -

temperature - LESS THAN 105'F.

c. Establish flow:
1) Open RCP seal return '

header isolation valves:

e HV-8100 e HV-8112

2) Open RCP seal leakoff
2) Verify seal return valves as necessary:

ll flow from each RCP -

NORMAL FOR RCP SEAL e HV-8141A (RCP 1)

NUMBER 1 DIFFERENTIAL e HV-8141B (RCP 2)

PRESSURE. e HV-8141C (RCP 3) l 8

e HV-8141D (RCP 4)

I i

I t

. CONTINUED _

-9 g,-.w.-- _.__.m--,-___,r,,,-c.,-.%,,..-,__.,--.y,7 _,,. ,_ ,., _ _ , , ____._--,,_.,_-_ym- _-_ - ,-,,.-_ ,,, n, --

C

. PAGE NJ.

REVISION

.- PROCEDURE NO.

0 5 of 6 19262-1 RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED ll ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE  ?

I

7. Energize PRZR Heat'ers As Necessary. .
8. Return To Procedure And Step In Effect. .

e e* e e

END'OF PROCEDURE TEXT t

i .

O e 9 a

g 4 g g 9 g 4

4 i

O 9

i e

t

? -

i

-]

REVISloN PAGE NO.

PROCEDURE No.

19262-1 0 6 of 6 Sheet 1 of 1 ,

ATTACHMENT A t

RECOYERY OF RCP SEAL INJECTION

1. Check RCP No. I seal temperature.

IF less than 220*F, ,

THEN open CVCS SEALS RCP SEAL INJ SUPPLY CNMT ISO valve and ACCW supply to the affected RCP. Return to Step 6b.  !

IF greater than 220'F, TREN proceed to Step 2 of this Attachment.

2. Verify seal injection supply temperature - LESS THAN 135'F.

Verify ACCW supply temperature - LESS THAN 105'F.

3. Dispatch operator to shut CVCS SEALS RCP SEAL INJ NEEDLE VLVS ,

TO #1 SEAL for affected RCP.

e 1208-U4-414(RCP 1) ,

e 1208-U4-415(RCP 2) i e 1208-U4-416(RCP 3) '

e 1208-U4-417(RCP 4)

4. Verif CVCS SEALS RCP SEAL INJ NEEDLE VLVS of Step 3 of this

~

Attac ent is shut.

5. Open CVCS SEALS RCP SEAL INJ SUPPLY CNMT ISO valve for affected RCP.
6. Slowly olen CVCS SEALS RCP SEAL INJ NEEDLE VLVS TO fl SEAL to establisi a l'F per minute cooldown rate.
7. WHEN RCP No. I seal temperature is less than 220*F, THEN restore ACCW supply to the affected RCP.
8. Verify RCP seal parameters:

e Seal injection supply temperature - LESS THAN 135'E.

e RCP No. I seal temperature - LESS THAN 220*F.

e ACCW supply temperature - LESS THAN 105'F.

IF RCP seal parameters can NOT be verified, THEN secure the affected RC E

9. Return to Step 6b of procedure.

END OF ATTACHMENT A

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