ML20042H060

Forwards Summary of Corrective Actions for 900320 Site Area Emergency Due to Loss of Offsite Power Concurrent W/Loss of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Capability.Truck Driver Disciplined for Lack of Attention

ML20042H060
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	05/14/1990
From:	Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CON-IIT05-338-90, CON-IIT5-338-90 ELV-01632, ELV-1632, NUDOCS 9005170134
Download: ML20042H060 (6)

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Georgia Power Company -

- 333 Piedrnont Avenue A11anta, Georg,a 30308 ~

.- . %Iephonc 404 526 3195 ,

Maihng Address:

40 lnverness Center Parkway '

Post Ottce Box 1295 -

Birmingham. Aiabama 35201 Telephone 205 800 5581

+ tric southern ucctnc systern W O. Hairston, til Senior Vce PresvJent Huclear Operations May 14, 1990 ELV-01632 0379 i

Docket No. 50-424  :

50-425 i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: . Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:-

Re: Correspondence ELV-01516, dated 4-9-90 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY- i Georgia Power Company hereby submits a summary of the corrective actions resulting from the Site Area Emergency, as indicated in' the referenced letter.

Should you have questions, please inquire.

Sincerely, td.), w1xC W. G. Hairston, III WGH,III/NJS/gm Attachment xc: Georaia Power Comoany Mr. C. K.' McCoy Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.

Mr. R. M. Odom Mr. P. D. Rushton NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR q Mr. R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle a

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9005170134 900514 PDR ADOCK 05000424 PDC F .

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.i ATTACHMENT ,

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY i On. March 20, 1990, a Site Area Emergency. was declared due to a loss of offsite _!

power-concurrent with a loss of onsite Emergency Diesel Generator capability, j In accordance with Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-(VEGP) Procedures, an Event Review Team has investigated the events leading up to and following the Site '

Area Emergency. This review team identified four main-issues associated with the event. These issues: involved low. voltage. switchyard access _ controls, Diesel- ,

Generator failures, Emergency Plan implementation, and procedures for shutdown  !

plant conditions. A summary of each issue _ and completed or planned corrective ,

actions follows. 4 The cause of the event was a lack of attention on the part of.the driver of:the truck, compounded by inadequate procedural controls for access to the low 1 voltage switchyard. 'Furthermore, while site procedures required a security officer to accompany the vehicle in the protected area, due to visibility restrictions he was unable to assist the driver. q To prevent this type of initiating event from recurring, the following corrective actions have been, or are being, implemented. .;

o The truck driver was disciplined for . lack of attention and alertness in backing the truck when visibility was impaired.

o Although the _Vogtle site safety manualfrequired the use of flagmen ~ for' l backing large trucks, this' requirement had not been incorporated .into site- ,

procedures. A memo has been issued'to-site personnel to ensure understanding of this policy and site procedures have been _ revised to-incorporate this requirement. -The use of flagmen-will be added to the next ,

i cycle of General Employee Training. Security officer ; training will be

, revised to emphasize that officers have authority.and responsibility-to assist vehicle operators- to assure safe vehicle operation. Specifically,  !

security escorts will ensure that ground guides-(flagmen) are used when ,

large vehicles are maneuvered -inside the-protected area. This security training will be completed by 6-1-90.

o Outage Area Coordinators have been instructed to stage _ welding machines and other materials on the east and west ends of the Turbine Building, whenever j possible, to avoid unnecessary equipment and vehicle traffic in the -low  ;

voltage switchyard. 'l h

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ATTACHMENT (CONTINUED)

V0GTLE ElfCTRIC GENERATING PLANT  :

CCRRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EM(PfdhCL E in o Maintenance procedures will be revised to restrict staging of equipment in w the low voltage switchyard. The procedures will be revised by 6 15-90. y o Barriers were installed with signs which require authorization from the Unit Shift Supervisor for vehicle access to the low voltage switchyard.

o Sensitive plant areas have been identified and plant procedures have been revised to control vehicle access, hatardous 'mstorials and transient "

combustibles in these areas.

Another issue involved the failure of Diesel Geneator (DG) lA to remain running to )tovide emergency power. The event review team, utiltring utility and vendor tocinical experts, reviewed the two sequential failures of the diesel engine.

f The cause of the first trip can only be postulated, but most likely is the same  ;

as the second trip. The ongoing investigation indicates the most likely cause of the second trip was intermittent actuation of the jacket water temperature switches. A problem with restarting the diesel occurred because the Engineered Safety features Actuation System (ESFAS) sequencer logic and diesel generator

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start logic (as designed) resulted in the diesel engine being locked out i following the initial trip until the sequencer logic was reset.

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As a result of the event investigation, the following actions have been or are being implemented to ensure a high state of diesel generator reliability. -

o The suspected switches were replaced and extensive diesel generator testing was performed to ensure operability prior to return to service, o Investigation of the suspect temperature switches <has been performed by an independent testing laboratory and a fermal reprt is expected by 5-18-90.

The investigation revealed that the temperature switches are sensitive to "

calitration techniques and foreign matcrial within the switches. i o Maintenance procedures for temperature switches will be revised by 5-15-90 [-

to include lessons learned from laborat6ry testing. All jacket water higi.

temperature switches will be cicaned and calibrated using the revised procedure by 5 31-90. Other non-essential trip temperature switches will be  :

cleaned and calibrated by the end of the next refueling outage for the i associated unit, o Vendor failure analysis of a low lube oil pressure switch is expected to be completed by 6 30 90 and results of this analysis will be used to determine if procedure changes, cleaning or re-calibration is necessary for various -

pressure trip switches on the DG.

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ATTACHMENT (CONTINUED)

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY o The Corporate Maintenance Support Department will teview the diesel generator instrumentation. This review will include determining the feasibility of upgrading the existing pneumatic sensors to those of a different manufacturer or replacing portions or all of the entire system with either an electrical or electronic system. Corrective actions or improvements will be made if appropriate. This review, along with an implementation schedule, if required, will be completed by 9-190.

o The Under similar to a Voltage Safety In(UV)jection emergency start.This diesel providesstart was changed in both Units a higher degree of reliability for UV bus conditions. A broader review of diesel start and trip logic, to be completed by 7 31-90, wir) determine the need for any further changes, o Instructions on the emergency start and restart features of the DG have been provided to operators at shift briefings and have been incorporated into operating procedures. Additional training will be provided in the normal operator requalification program by 915 90.

o A policy detailing guidelines for logging pertinent alarms and indications to assist in evaluation of equipment or system malfunctions has been developed and applicable procedures have been revised.

o After engine overhauls, functional diesel engine testing will be enhanced to include bubble testing to ensure any air logic system leakage is acceptable, o Trend program data is being reviewed to ensure DG component failures are adequately included. The data review will be completed by 6-5 90.

Notification of state and local government agencies was not timely due to a loss ofpowertotheEmergencyNotificationNetwork(ENN), Communication inaccuracies, a lack of understanding of the source of the ENN power, and inadequate supervision of the notification process were also-identified as Emergency Plan implementation issues. Information flow to the Corporate Emergency Response Organization (ERO) resulted in some inaccurate information (i e., time of declaration of event and magnitude of RCS heatup) being provided to the media. There was some confusion among plant personnel concerning assembly and accountability procedures.

The following actions have been implemented, o The State of Georgia and Burke County have been added to the backup ENN circuit, o The General Manager has issued memos to the plant staff to ensure proper understanding of:

1. Assembly and Accountability procedures.

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ATTACHMENT (CONTINVED)  :

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT

[0RRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2. ENN Communications procedures.

The following corrective actions will be implemented by the dates indicated.  !

o Battery backup powar will be provided to the primary ENN in the control room by 9-1-90. ,

o An evaluation will be performed to review and recommend further improvements  ;

in notification systems. This evaluation will be completed by 6-190.  ;

o A memo to all Emergency Directors (EDs) has been issued explaining the communications duties and responsibilities of EDs. The Manager Operations and the Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness will conduct further training for all EDs l'. review the role and responsibilities of the ED '

including lessons learned from this event by 8-1-90.

o Control room communicators and EDs have been informed by memorandum that i there are alternative means of making notifications in the event of a failure of the primary ENN circuit. These alternative means are the backup ENN circuit, now extended to include all agencies, or the ENN in the TSC >

which has a different power supply. Control room communicators and EDs will i receive additional training in the operation of and power supplies for emergency communication equipment by 8-1-90.

o The Emergency Preparedness group will establish a monthly test program to  !

validate Emergency Response Facility (ERF) computer data by 6-15 90, o The Corporate ERO will be added to the ENN by 7-15-90 to provide another means of ensuring the transmittal of accurate information to the Corporate Office during emergencies.

• o The Corporate ERO will be re-trained in the use of available communication systems to talk with the site by 615-90.

o A full-scale assembly and accountability drill will be performed by 6-15-90. ,

o A full scale assembly and accountability drill will be included as a periodic emergency plan objective. Procedure 91602-C " Emergency Drills and Exercises", will be changed by 8-190 to reflect this commitment.

o Changes to Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in the Emergency Plan will be requested from the NRC based on NUMARC's EAL report presently under review  ;

by the NRC.

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ATTACHMENT (CONTINUED)

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY Plant procedures did not sufficiently address plant shutdown conditions [

encountered during the emergency.

o The Abnormal Operating Procedure covering loss of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) will be revised by 71-90 to include various Reactor Coolant System '

(RCS) and containment conditions present during either an outage or a loss of Offsite Power (LOSP) event.

1 A loss cf power condition will be specifically addressed in the pi 'edure.

2. TF, time to boil curves will be adjusted to address a $100 degree F tarting point for accidents, o An evaluation will be performed for system lineups and power sources during planning for Unit outages. In addition, we will continue to monitor the industry issue of loss of AC power during shutdown modes and will take '

appropriate actions in response to regulatory initiatives arising from this issue, o A study of alternate means of feeding ESF busses has been performed and is '

being reviewed by management. Initial review of this study indicates that a vihble alternate power source is available by backfeeding using the main power transformer and the Unit Auxiliary Transformers. This review will be completed by 6-15 90. As appropriate, procedures will be revised by 8 31 90. A copy of this report will be available at the site for NRC review, o A study of alternate sources of cooling water to mitigate a loss of RHR during reduced RCS inventory operation had been performed and included in site procedures prior to this refueling outage. An additional study of alternate sources of cooling water during a loss of all AC power event while at reduced RCS inventory will be performed by 8-1-90. Any appropriate ,

procedure changes will be implemented prior to the next refueling outag%

o A means of closing the equipment hatch without electrical power will be evaluated by the next refueling outage, o Senior Reactor Operators will receive training on reduced inventory boiling and cooling mechanisms during the requalification cycle which will be completed by 9-15-90.

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