ML20133F509
| ML20133F509 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1985 |
| From: | Harpster T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Opeka J NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8510110074 | |
| Download: ML20133F509 (2) | |
Text
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OCT 0 41965 Docket Nos. 50-245 50-336 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company ATTN: Mr. J. F. Opeka Senior Vice President - Nuclear Engineering and Operations Group P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Gentlemen:
The enclosed memorandum from Richard W. Krimm, Assistant Associate Director, Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs, FEMA, dated August 29, 1985, forwarded to NRC the FEMA report for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station exercise which was conducted on October 12, 1984. Although there were several Category B deficiencies observed at the exercise, FEMA reports that they do not seriously detract from the overall demonstrated capability to protect the health and safety of the public. The approval under 44 CFR 350 will remain in effect.
The State of Connecticut is preparing a schedule of corrective actions. We request that you continue to coordinate your planning efforts with those of ,
the State to assure deficiencies in offsite emergency preparedness are expeditiously corrected.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact W. Lazarus of my staff at (215) 337-5207.
Sincerely.
Orietnal Sir"*d "8 Terry L. Harpster, Chief Emergency Preparedness Section Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
As stated !
cc w/encis-E. J. Mroczka, Vice President, Nuclear Operations i W. D. Romberg, Station Superintendent i D. O. Nordquist, Manager of Quality Assurance R. T. Laudenat, Manager, Generation Facilities Licensing Gerald Garfield, Esquire PublicDocumentRoom(POR)
LocalPublicdocumentRoom(LPOR)(NSIC)
Nuclear Safety Information Center NRC Resident Inspector Stt'e of Connecticut /
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Northeast Nuclear En rgy Company 2 - - - -
bec w/o encl:
Regicn I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Senior Operations Officer (w/o encl)
DRP Section Chief M. McBride, RI, Pilgrim P. Swetland, SRI, Haddam Neck
-T. Rebelowski, SRI, Millstone 3 D.'Osborne, LPM, NRR R. Smith, EPS, RI W. Lazarus, EPS, RI FEMA, Region I 1
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~ 10/4 /85 0FFICIAL RECORD. COPY
,9, Federal Emergency Management Agency
[kh[$ , Washington, D.C. 20472 AUG 2 9 1953 MEMORANDlH FOR: Edwa ra '.. Jo rdan ,
Di rector, Division of Emergency Preparedness -
and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcenent U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Canmission F ROM: cha rd . rimm /
Assistant Associate Director '
Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs StBJECT: Exercise Report of the October 12, 1984, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station Attached is a copy of the Exercise Report of the October 12,1984, joint exercise of the offsite radiological energency preparedness plans for the s Millstone Nuclear Power Station. This exercise was full participation for the State of Connecticut and 11 localities. The report, dated Decenber 7, 1984, was prepared by Region I of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
( FEM A) .
Although there were Category B deficiencies observed at the exercise, they did not seriously detract from the overall demonstrated capability to protect- the health and safety of the public. The State is preparing a schedule of corrective actions. As soon as it is received, we will send you a copy. However, since there were no identified impediments to protecting the public during the exercise, the approval under 44 CFR 350 will remain in effect.
If you have any questions, pl ease contact Mr. Robert S. Wilkerson, Chief,
, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-2861.
Attachment -
As Stated
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- MN EXERCISE ASSESSMENT JOINT STATE AND LOCAL RADI'0 LOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE FOR THE MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION WATERFORD, CONNECTICUT OCTOBER 12,1984
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y l-L FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION I JOHN W. MCCORMACx POST OFFICE AND COURTHOUSE BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02109
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PREFACE POWER PLANT TESTED: Millstone Nuclear Power Station f
LICENSEE: Northeast Nuclear Energy Conpany PLANT LOCATION: Waterford, Connecticut
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REPORT DATE: December 7, 1984 ENERCISE DATE: October 12, 1984
- PARTICIPATING STATE: Connecticut Area IV., Of fice of Civil Preparedness
. PARTICIPATING LOCAL 7 GOVERNMENTS, C0hhECTICUT: Town of East Lyme City of New London City of Groton Town of Old Lyme Town of Groton Town of Old Saybrook Town of Ledyard Town of Waterford Town of Montville PARTICIPATING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, NEW YORK: Fisher's Island Plum Island STATE AND LOCAL GOVERhE NTS THAT St10ULD HAVE PARTICIPATED BUT DID NOT: None
- Rhode Island was pe riphally involved.
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- JOINT STATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE FOR THE MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION OCTOBER 12, 1984 CONTENTS
- Page PREFACE..................................................................i ,
e L IS T OF AB B KEV IAT IONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i v SQTHARY..................................................................v
- 1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 2$
1.1 E xe r ci s e B a ck gr oun d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.2 Gove rnments within the Plume Exposure Pa thway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.3 F e d e r a l 0 b s e r ve r s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.4 E va lu a t io n C r i t e r i a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.5 E xe r ci s e 0 bj e c t i ve s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.5.1 State 0bjectives......................................... 5
,1. 5. 2 Lo c a l o bj e ct i v e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
. 1. 6 E x e r ci s e S c e n a ri o S u mma ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
- 2. E XE R CI S E E V ALU AT IO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.1 Conn e ct icu t S t a te O pe rat ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.1.2 C on n e c t i cu t S t a t e E 0C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.1.2 Area IV O f f ice of Civil Prepa rednes s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 2.1.3 Radiological Hea1th...................................... 24 2.1.3.1 S t a t e E 0C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 .
2.1.3.2 E me rgen cy O pe ra tion s Facility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2.1.3.3 Corpo rate Emergency Ope rations Center. . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.1.3.4 Field Monitoring Teams and Radiological......... 31 Health Laboratory 2.1.4 S ta te Police Acces s C on trol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 4
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Page 2.1.5 S ta t e De con t a min a t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 2.1.6 Medi a C e n t e r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 2.2 CO N NE CT IC UT LOC AL E 0C s' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 t
2.2.1 E a s t L y me . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0
- 2.2.2 Groton, City of........................................ 43 2.2.3 G r o t o n , T o wn o f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6
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2.2.4 Ledyard................................................49 2.2.5 M o n tv i l le . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1 2.2.6 New London............................................. 54 2.2.7 O l d L y me . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 2.2.8 Old Saybrook........................................... 60 2.2.9 Wa t e r f o rd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 f
4
, 2.3 NEW YO RK L OC AL E 0C s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5 2.) .1 F i s h e r 's I s l a n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5 2.3.2 P l u m I s la n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7
- 3.
SUMMARY
LIS TING OF DE FICIENCIE S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 APPENJIX A. S t a tu s of E xe r ci se Obj e ct ive s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A -1 FIGURES AND TABLES
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1-A M i l ls t o n e 10-M i l e E P Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 S eq uen ce o f S ele ct ed O f f-S i t e E ven t s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4
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.. s LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ,
ANL ArSonne National Laboratory BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory DOE U.S. Department of Energy -
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EBS Emergency Broadcast System
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EOC Eeergency Operations Center EOF Licensee Near-Site F.rergency Operations Facility EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ,
FDA U.S. Food & Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency KI
- Potassium Iodide ,
mR Milliroentgen .
mR/hr. Milliroentgen / hour
. NAWAS National Warning System 7 NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration' NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (" Criteria for Preparation
- and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support.of Nuclear Power Plants")
NWS National Weather Service RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RADEF Radiological Defense Officer SEO Station Energency Operation SOP Standard Operating Procedure TLD Thermolundnescent Dosimeter USCG U.S. Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture .
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SUMMARY
On October 12, 1984, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) conducted a full-scale exercise for the Millstone Nuclear Power Station in Wate rford, CT. The purpose of this exercise was to test the resources, .
1 facilities, and the capabilities of state and local governments in imple-menting the radiological emergency response plan and responding to a radio-
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logical emergency at the Mills tone Nuclear Power Station. Twenty-four/
federal observers evaluated the exercise results. A briefing for the participants and the public was held on October 13, 1984 at the Waterford Public Library in Waterford, CT. Evaluation, identification of deficiencies -
and areas for improvement, &nd recommendations are set forth in Section 2 4
of this report. A summary listing of deficiencies is found in Section 3.
State Of Connecticut Operations The dell equipped EOC, fully staffed with trained professionals, demonstrated a high degree of capability in responding to a radiological emergency at the power station. Lt. Governor Fauliso acting for Governor O'Neill, who was out of the state, actively participated in the exercise.
The Area IV Office of Civil Preparedness demonstrated capability in their role of supporting the State EOC operation and providing assistance to the local communities. The State Media Center, located adjacent to the Governor's of fice and the EOC, is an outstanding facility staf f ed by knowl-ledgeable public information officers who were suppo rted as needed by highl'y qualified and well-informed technical people.
Coordination of dose assessment pe rf o rmed independently by the State Department of Environmental Protection and the utility was excellent and a high degree of proficiency was demonstrated. These teams were
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Summary supported by the Gove rnor 's Independent Risk Assessment Team made up of volunteer experts from academic institutions. Deployment of field monitor-ing teams, who were well trained and equipped, was prompt. Evacuation procedures were well demonstrated at the last exercise and were demonstrated ,
to a lesser degree at selected locations for this exercise. Simulation of public alert and notification was not well executed. This was because an actual test of the sirens apart from but held during the exercise confus/d ma t ters. Tests not intended to be part of and synchronized with the scenario should not be done on the day of the exercise.
Thorough and detailed discussion of recovery and reentry of proce-dures were ' led by the Assistant Civil Preparedness Director. Representa-tives of state agencies having responsiblities in these areas explained in 7 detail the actions and precautions required for safe, orderly reoccupancy.
Local Operations
- Ten Connecticut communities participa ted in the exe rcise. Fish-er's Island and Plum Island of New York also participated. All of these communities are within, or partially within the 10-mile (plume exposure)
EPZ. All of the EOC f acilities had enough space, furniture, and other resources including staff for supporting prolonged continuous operation.
Communications worked well at all locations. Equipment was of high
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quality and ope rato rs were well trained. Amateur radio (RACES) volun tee rs t
were available at most locations and provided reliable back-up. The use of radio pagers activated by transmissions from the utility provided capability for almost instant notification of key emergency response personnel.
I-Public alerting and ins truction accomplished by the sounding of sirens coordinated with EBS messages, was adequate.
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Summary 9
The actual test of the sirens was not in step with the scenario, i however, this did not cause problems for the participants. Out of 144 sirens installed, at least eleven f ailed to operate. Otherwise, the public' ,
was kept informed by periodic state and locally generated EBS broadcasts.
The capacity to control an evacuation, such as the ability to
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establish traf fic and access control and provide transportation, was demon- /
strated. Evacuation procedures were more thoroughly demonstrated in the 1983 exercise.
Dose assessment was not perf o rmed at the local level. However, some of the local communities had trained field monitors to supplement the state and utility teams if necessary.
7 Dosimeter kits which included permanent record devices (TLDs) were available in suf ficient supply at all EOCs for emergency workers.
Knowledge of exposure control procedures appeared to be good at most loca-tions.
Decontamination procedures generally were well known and were demonstrated in some communities.
Mos t of the recovery and reentry preparations were done at the State EOC, but some local communities also discussed actions they would take on local initiatives. .
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, ' ',# tl / Revision 1 Date: 8/81
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FIGURE l-A MILLSTONE PL ANT 10 AND 50 MI L E EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES
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- 1. Introduction 1.1 Exercise Background This full-scale exercise, s ite-s pe cific for the Millstone Nuclear.
Power Station took place as scheduled on October 12, 1984. Twenty-four (24) observers from FEMA and other agencies evaluated the implementation of the state and local radiological emergency response plans and assessed the capability of the utility, the State of Connecticut, and the local govern 7 ments to properly respond to an accident at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station. Observa tions were made both on-site and off-site. The exercise began at 7:30 a.m. on-site, and at 8:34 a.m. of f-site when the utility declared an Alert, and was terminated at, most locations at 4:15 p.m. The last previous full-scale exercise for Millstone was held on October 5,1983. Both exercises
- were followed by meetings with the participants and with the public on the n' ext day.
1.2 . Governments within the Plume Exposure Pathway The towns of Ledyard and Groton, and the Cities of New London and Groton in Connecticut, and Fisher's Island, New York were in the plume expo-sure pathway. Communities to the northeast of the plant in Connecticut and Rhode Island were in the ingestion pathway.
1.3 Federal Observers .
Following is a list of evaluators, their respective agencies and their assigned locations:
Evaluator Agency Location Rebecca Thomson, Team Leader FEMA State EOC Floyd Davis ANL1 State EOC Frederick Olson, Team Leader FEMA Radiological Health State EOC
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Intrcductica Warren Church FDA State EOC Radiological Health Lab Kenneth Horak FEMA Media Center .
Thomas Baldwin ANLI State EOC -
e Andrew Hull BNL2 EOF Edward Wojnas NRC3 Utility Corporate HQ Jack Dolan, Team Leader FEMA Area IV OCP .)
Christopher Weillandies BNL2 Ff aid Monitoring Paul White FEMA Town of Groton EOC
' Edward Thomas', Division. Chief FEMA Town of Groton EOC Natural and Technological Hazards -
and,RAC Chairman ,
Gary Kaszynski ANL1 City of Groton EOC Irene Babineau FEMA Ledyard EOC Elizabeth Dionne FEMA Montville EOC Robert Arch 11a FEMA New London EOC Bruce Swiren FEMA Waterford EOC Robert Sonnichsen FEMA East Lyme EOC Michael Goetz FEMA Old Lyme EOC Ellen Rooney FEMA Old Saybrook EOC Robert Conley USDA4 Plum Island, NY EOC Jimmy Smith USCG5 Fi, sher's Island, NY EOC George Hatch FEMA State Police Access Control and State Decontaminaton Donald Connors ARC 6 Groton Evacuation and Mass Care Reception '
Center, Training at New Britain, CT
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IContract employee, Argonne National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy.
2Brookhaven National Laboratory ,
1 3 U .S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4 Department of Agriculture -
U .S.
i SU .S. Coast Guard, Department of Transportation 6American Red Cross
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1.4 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 are based on applicable phnning standards and evalbation criteria set forth in Sec. II of NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (Nov. 1980). Following the overview narrative for each jurisdiction or activity, deficiencies and areas for improvement are presented
.with accompanying recommendations. Deficiencies can be presented in two cate-gories. The first category lists only those deficiencies that caused a finding that of f-site emergency preparedness was not adequa te to provide assurance th'at appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and l
safety of the public living in the vicinity of the site in a radiological emergency. These are deficiencies that lead to a negative finding. A nega-tive finding must be based on at least one deficiency of this ty pe . No I deficiencies in this category were observed.
The second catergory includes deficiencies where demonstrated per-formance during the exercise was considered faulty, corrective actions are i
considered necessary, but other factors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that in a radiological emergency, appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public. Those f
deficiences identified by an asterisk (*) in this catergory merit priority attention.
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Introduction Areas for improvenant also are listed as appropriate for each jurisdiction or activity. These items are not deficiencies; rather, they are suggestions for improved performance. '
1.5 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 1.5.1 STATE OF CONNECrICUT
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I. MAJOR ELEMENTS TESTED
- 1. Evacuation coordination and activa ~ tion of State Police access control.
- 2. Capability for accident assessment.
. II. SPECIFIC ELEMENTS TESTED I 1. Notification and Alerting of Officials and Staff A. Demonstrate receipt of emergency notification within 15 minutes of classification of the incident and receive call-back information.
B. Demonstrate the ability to activate the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at Broad Street in Hartford upon notification of an Alert incident or higher.
C. Demonstrate the ability to notify designated host com-nunities for those affected EPZ communities which plan to conduct a simulated evacuation.
D. Demonstrate that the state emergency organization can be alerted and fully activated. .
' l E. Demonstrate the ability to provide information to con-tiguous states as necessary.
- 2. Notification and Alerting of the Public A. Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and offical information to the public through the media and Emer-gency Broadcast System (EBS).
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Introductica ' '
STATE OF CONNECTICUT OBJECTIVES (continued)
- 3. External Communications Capability Between Sites A. Demonstrate that communication systems (radio, tele-phone, or messengers) are available and operational. .
between the: *
- 1) State of Connecticut and the utility,
- 2) State of Connecticut and FEMA,
- 3) State of Connecticut and the towns,
- 4) Commissioners and their field personnel, and
- l the
- 5) State of Connecticut and contiguous states.
B. Demonstrate that the communication systems are capable of continuous operation.
- 4. Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Facility (Space. Comfort. etc.)
A. Demonstrate that the EOC has equipment and the facilities f , available for continuous operation.
- 5. EOC Internal Communications and Displays.
(Message Handling. Maps , etc. )
A. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain ef fective communications (telephone, messenger, or f ace-to-f ace) among EOC personnel, as well as be-tween agencies.
B. Demonstrate that status boards and display maps are maintained and kept current.
- 6. Adequacy of Staf fing (Shif t Capability, etc.) -
A. Demonstrate that the state can staff the EOC and the media center (located adjacent to the State EOC),
while providing access control.
- 7. Facility Access Control / Security A. Demonstrate the ability to control entry to the emergency operations center in order to maintain security during an eme rgen cy.
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Introductica STATE OF CONNECTICUT OBJECTIVES (Continued)
- 8. Support by Responsible Elected or Appointed Public Officials A. Verify that positions designated by the RERPs are staff'd and able to perform appropriate functions.
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- 9. Direction and Control (Timely Decision Making, Management, etc.)
A. Verify that the State of Connecticut agencies provide recommended protective actions to the Governor's office and to the local governments.
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B. Demonstrate that State of Connecticut officials make timely and accurate decisions regarding the direction and control of all activities and actions required to respond to the emergency, effectively communicate re-quirements to emergency workers, and support all levels of government.
C. Demonstrate the ability of the Department of Environ-mental Protection (DEP) representatives to perform con-firmatory dose calculations and provide data updates
'y to EOC staf f.
D. Demons trate the ability of the state radiological emer-
. gency monitoring teams to use the emergency equipment to perform radiological surveys, report results, and have them analyzed.
- 10. Coordination (Between Officials, Agencies, Federal Agencies, etc. )
A. Demonstrate that State of Connecticut officials along with utility and local of ficials can coordinate the activities and actions required to respond to the eme rge ncy.
B. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate outside federal assistance. *
- 11. Emergency Plans (Procedures and Checklists Consulted)
A. Demonstrate the ability to take actions iri accordance with the State radiological emergency response plan (RERP) and applicable procedures.
- 12. Public Information (Interface with News Media)
A. Demonstrate that the news media can be provided facili-ties in the state Media Center.
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Introductica s l*
STATE OF CONNECTICUT OBJECTIVES (continued)
B. Demonstrate that the State of Connecticut goverr. ment can provide accurate and timely information to the media.
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- 13. Accident Assessment (Monitoring, Reporting, Projecting, Coordinating)
- A. Demonstrate that State of Connecticut officials and emergency response staffs can evaluate the nature and/
seriousness of the accident.
B. Demonstrate that the State o.f Connecticut can verify utility field monitoring reports.
C. Demons trate the capability to adequately sample and ,
analyze drinking water, milk, and food in processing' plants and stores.
- 14. Protective Actions (Evacuation, Shelter, Reception)
A. Demonstrate' that State of Connecticut of ficials can make decisions and give orders regarding evacuation, shelter-
. ing, and other protective measures required to protect emergency workers and the general population from unnec-
.' essary hazards.
B. Establish or simulate establishing access controls for those State of Connecticut parks and recreation areas within the af fected areas.
C. Use outside agencies (i.e. , the Red Cross and Salvation Army) to provide assistance to designated evacuees in relocating to host communities.
- 15. Exposure control (Access and Traffic Control, Record Keeping)
A. Demonstrate that State of Connecticut officials can provide protection to State emergency workers and to the general population.
B. Demons trate that. dosimetry equipment is disseminated to state emergency workers.
C. Demonstrate that decontamination facilities are available to state emergency workers and equipment, as applicable.
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Introductien STATE OF CONNECTICUT OBJECTIVES (Continued)
D. Demonstrate the capability to record simulated .
exposure information for State of Connecticut emergency workers.
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- 16. Recovery and Reentry A. Demonstrate that recovery and reentry can be accom- .
plished by means of a tabletop discussion. j i
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' Introduction 1.5.2 LOCAL COMMUNITIES Local town obj e ctives are representative in nature. Each obj e c-tive listed below will actually be demonstrated by one of the EPZ towns.
Each town will demonstrate some of the objectives and simulate others, accord- ,
ing to the scenario.
The Town of Lyme which is in the Haddam Neck EPZ, has already played in 1984 Activities will be limited to tabletop discussion only.
J I. MAJOR ELEMENTS TESTED
- 1. Test of the 10-mile public alerting system to be independent of the exercise scenario.
- 2. Simulated evacuation of various zones.
3.* Distribution of permanent dosimetry to the emergency workers of local towns.
7 II. SPECIFIC ELEHENT TESTED
- 1. Command and control / Emergency Plans
- A. Demonstrate that towns can staff their emergency operations centers (EOCs).
B. Demonstrate the ability to staff a shif t change, C. Demonstrate the ability to take actions in accordance with emergency procedures.
D. Demonstrate that local officials can make tirely and
- appropriate decisions regarding the direction and con-trol of all activities. Further, demonstrate their ability to ef fectively communicate' with emergency per ,
sonnel.
- 2. Classifica tion Scheme A. Demonstrate the ability to use the incident class-ification and posture code scheme.
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Introduction LOCAL C0tOfUNITY OBJECIIVES (continued)
- 3. Alert and Notification A. Demonstrate that key officials receive notification within 15 minutes of classification of the incident '
and receive call-back information. .
B. Demonstrate that local emergency workers can be alerted and then brought into play.
C. Demonstrate coordinated public alerting by means of .)
the public alert siren system. /
- 4. Communications A. Demonstrate that the communication systems (radio, telephone, or both) are available and capable of continuous operation between:
- 1) Town and State of Connecticut media center (telephone to State EOC).
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- 2) Town and area Office of ~ Civil Preparedness (radio or telephone or both).
- 3) Local agency heads and their field personnel e . (departmental communications).
- 4) Neighboring towns (Civil Preparedness high band radio).
- 5. Support by Responsible Elected and Appointed Public Officials A. Demonstrate key personnel designated by the local RERP are available to perform appropriate functions.
- 6. Public Information A. Demonstrate that the local government, in coordination with the State, can provide accurate and timely updates to the media through the State of Connecticut media center.
- 7. Eme rgency Facilities and Equipment / Security _
A. Demonstrate the ability to control entry to the emergency operations center in order to maintain security during an emergency.
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' . Intr @ duction LOCAL CGGGNITY OBJECTIVES (continued)
B. Demonstrate that status boards and display maps are maintained and kept current.
- 8. Accident Assessment A. Demonstrate the ability in certain communities to' .
assist the state in collecting samples of surface water supplies and milk, if requested by State agency personnel.
- 9. Protective Response j (Protective Actions: Evacuation, Shelter, Reception)
A. Demonstrate that local officials can make decisions and give orders regarding evacuation, shelter, and other protective measures required to protect emergency wor-B. Demonstrate " evacuation" and "take shelter" capability either by actual deployment of a few buses or by. table-top exercise discussion.
. C. Demonstrate the ability to activate a host community 7 shelter as required by the scenario.
E D. Demonstrate or simulate, as appropriate, the ability to establish local access control.
- 10. Radiation Exposure (Exposure, Access Control, and Traffic Control, Record Keeping)
A. Demonstrate that local emergency workers are provided with personal dosimetry.
B. Demons tra te that de contamination facilities are available for local emergency workers and equipment, as applicable.
C. Demonstrate or simulate the ability to monitor and record exposure information for local emergency workers.
Transmit information to the State of Connecticut Depart-ment of Health Services.
- 11. Recovery and Reentry A. Demonstrate through a tabletop discussion that recovery and reentry can be planned based on field team reports and utility information.
B. Demonstrate through a tabletop discussion that equipment and personnel are available to control reentry.
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1.6 Scenario Summary The scenario began at the Millstene Nuclear Power Station Unit #1 at approximately 0800 when the of fgas ejector monitor read about 3 x 105 e
mR/hr, indicating that fuel cladding damage and possible fuel damage had occurred. The control room reduced reactor power and investigated the, ala m. Because attempts to clear the alarm were unsuccessful, the shift j supervisor initiated a reactor scram at 0810 and activated the isolation condenser to cool down and depressurize the reactor; he also isolated the secondary side by shutting the MSIVs (main steam isolations valves). One of the four isolation condenser isolation valves (IC-3 ) failed to open t'o its designed ,open position, thereby significantly limiting the cooldown
. rate.
7 At 0820, the shift supe rviso r declared an ALERT (Posture Code Charlie One) based on a high offgas air ejector monitor reading. He sound-
'ed the station evacuation siren and made a public address announcement.
This caused the station protected area to be evacuated. The station and corporate emergency organization were alerted and activated; the State and local community Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs) were activated.
By 0855, Security commenced an accountability of personnel inside the protected area and reported that all personnel were , accounted for by 0920. '
By 0920, the station and corporate emergency organization were fully activated, and the Director of Station Emergency Operations (DSEO) assumed control of the emergency response ef forts.
At 0925, while the reactor was cooling down, several heat exchang-er tubes in the isola tion condenso r ruptured providing a direct release I
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' sesnario Summary path for radioactive water and gases to the atmosphere. The shift super-visor ordered the isolation condensor to be secured to stop the release ,
but the two steam side valves remained open (IC-1 because of an electrical
. i fault and IC-2 because of sticking mechanically on the back seat) but IC-4 closed; release continued uncontrolled. Also, the control room attempted to open the six safety relief valves (SRVs) to rapidly vent the reactor,
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but an electrical fire broke out in the SRV switch panel when an operator tried to open the first SRV. The fire went out immediately but the SRVs were rendered inoperable from the control room.
By 0955, a E NERAL EMERGENCY was declared (posture code
, Bravo) based on a small break LOCA witrt failure to isolate containment.
The of f-site and on-site radiological emergency monitoring teams were deployed to monitor for radioactivity in the atmosphere.
-Between 1000 and 1015, two emergency repair teams were dispatch-
- ed, *one to troubleshoot and repair the SRV control panel, the other to manually shut one of the broken isolation conder.sor valves. An electric-ian on the first repair team received a mild electrical shock when he began to investigate the damage to the SRV control panel. The second repair team reached the isolation condensor valve (IC-2) outside the primary containment but was unable to close it. .
The station emergen cy organization continued to demonstrate incident assessment and classification. The corporate emergency organ-ization demonstrated the ability to work with the station organization in analyzing and mitigating consequences and to communicate with the State EOC and the media center. The corporate emergency organization also 9
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Sesnario Summary demonstrated the ability to control offsite field monitoring activities, j l
and the ability to trend and correlate measured versus projected data. .
At approximately 1040, additional core fuel damage occrrred, sig-nificantly increasing the radiological release rate. Shortly af terward, a radiological emergency monitoring team at the site boundary reported that radiation levels were increasing significantly.
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At approximately 1100, a ENERAL EMERENCY (Posture Code Alpha [
was declared based on site boundary dose rates exceeding 5 R/hr (whole body).
The station and corporate emergency organizntion continued to asse.ss the inc4 dent and mitigate the consequences.
. At 1140, the State EOC demonstrated the ability to activate the
. Emergency Broadcast 'Sys tem (EBS ), independent of the exercise scenario.
7 The State EOC also monitore.d and supported local community actions. The 1
joint State / local / utility media center in the Hartford armory demonstrated
'the' ability to release information in a timely manner and to respond to media questions and prevent rumors from causing a crisis situation.
The local communities demonstrated the ability to activate the I EBS and the public alerting system, and to respond in accordance with their respective radiological emergency response plans (RERPs). Some communities simulated an evacuation while others conducted planned sattelite drills to l
demonstrate their emergency response capabilities.
At 1315, the emergency repair team completed repairs to the SRV control panel and the SRVs were opened quickly to vent the reactor vessel to the suppression chambe r ( toru s ). When the reactor vessel pressure dropped to a point where the radioactive release through the isolation condensor to the atmosphere was minimal, the second emergency repair team i
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sf, . io Summary was able to shut IC-2, thereby terminating the release.
The plant was stabilized and brought to a safe shutdown condition.
At 1350, down grade to an AI2RT4harlie' One was declared based on termination-of radioactive releases and plant stabilization.
o The reentry and recovery phase commenced at approximately 1415 in the form of a tabletop discussion. The exercise was terminated at about 1530.
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SEQUENCE OF SELECTED EVENTS - OFF-SITE APPR0XIHATE TIME .,
. Old State Area E. City Town Led- Mont- New Old Say- Wa t e r- Fishers Plum ACTIVITY Schid EOF E OC IV Lyme Groton Groton yard ville London Lyme
- brook ford Island Isle
,A17tt-CHARLIE I 8:35 8:35 8:34 8:39 8:35 8:35 8:36 8':37 8:36 8:36 8:35 8:20 8:43 8:35 8:35 Prior Prior Prior to to to ~ . .
EOC Activated --
8:35 8:34 8:39 8:35 8:35 8:36 8:38 8:57 8:36 8:50 8:20 8:53 N/0 8:40.
EOC Operational --
9:00 9:19 9:00 8:45 9:30 8:44 9:10 8:30 9:10 9:00 8:55
,Cancrel Eme rgency -
BRAVO 10:10 9:35 9:58 9:49 9:47 9:46 9:48 9:49 9:45 9:45 9:46 9:30 9:54 9:40 9:45 tot Ev cuation/
Shalter order -- --
10:25 N/A 9:58 10:18 11:10 10:58 10:30 10:27 10:24 N/A 10:45 N/A N/A ,
Sirena Sounded E (Si mu le ted ) -- --
N/A N/A 10:27 10:27 10:27 10:27 10:27 10:27 10:27 10:27 10:27 10:27 10:48 s EBS Heesages -- --
10:18 N/A 9:58 9:46 11:10 10:58 10:26 10:09 10:40 10:49 10:45 N/0 10:48 Stetc of Emergency Not Not Declcred 10:25 N/0 11:20 11:47 11:56 11:55 11:55 11:53 11:47 Rec'd 11:45 Rec'd 11:55 N/0 N/O
,G:nsrcl Eme rgency -
ALPHA 11:15 10:40 10:52 10:54 11:23 10:49 11:21 10:50 10:55 10:51 10:51 10:45 10:51 N/0 10:58 2nd Evacua tion / 10:52 11:05 11:02 Sh21ter Order -- --
1:08 N/A N/A 2:00 2:00 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NA "Down Grade to Alert 1:45 1:50 2:05 2:08 2:12 2:12 2:15 2:00 2:05 2:14 2:13 2:11 2:13 N/0 2:15 Exarcice Terminated 4:15 --
4:00 2:42 3:15 3:15 4:15 3:18 3:05 3:15 3:22 3:15 3:18 N/0 3:35 call emergency classification recommendations were made by the Utility Director of the State Emergenc'y Operation (SED) coordinated with the Corporate Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and broadcast over the "fadio' pager system.
'CCicck at Old Saybrook was slow by approximately 15 minutes. N/A = Not Applicable N/0 = Not' Obse rved e
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State EOC
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2.1 Connecticut State Operations 2.1.1 State EOC The EOC, located in the Armory in Hartford, was a well-lit, efficiently arranged facility capable of supporting continuous ope ra tion. Three high
- quality status boards and a number of maos showing all necessary information were strategically posted. However, a well-designed emergency message board
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was not used to advantage, it could have been an excellent meann of providing the staff with information on the situation as it developed.
The communications center was separated f rom the operations area. The equipment was efficiently arranged and of excellent quslity. Ope rators demonstrated thorough knowledge and capability. The high band or ADMIN system was the primary means of communication between the state, area of fices, and local EOC s . , Separate eq ui pmen t and frequencies were available for the Connecticut Depa rtmen t of Transportation, and the State Police. The Depart-ment of Health could also communicate directly with the field monitoring teams. Cood hard copy equipment was available and its use denonstrated and a cound proof area was provided for pecparation and transmission of ERS messages.
Commercial telephones were used as backmip.
Initial notification at 8:34 a.m. of an Alert decla ration at the Millstone plant was received simultaneously by the State EOC, the Connecticut State Police in Hartford, and state and local of ficials equipped with radio pagers.
- These messages were verified by use of the call back system in accordance with the plan. The activation of the EOC was not demonstrated because the of ficials were at their normal duty stations in the Office of Civil Pre-paredness located in the same building in the EOC. Capability to provide staffing for sustained contintious operations was demonstrated by double
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State EOC
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staffing. Full' State EOC staffing was accomplished by use of fan out' telephone calls and was es se ntially complete by 9 : 3 0 a . m. , abou t 55 min-utes after the Alert declaration. All state agencies with emergency response duties we re repr esented and the Lt. Governor, representing. the ,
e Governor (who was in Europe), actively participated. The EOC staf f were , ;
i well trained.
The Civil Preparednes s Director was clearly and effectively in')
charge, held frequent briefings for the Governor and the EOC staff, and I
fully involved the staf f in decision making. Copies of the plans , opera-ting procedures, and che ck lis ts were used. Both incoming and outgoing messages were logge d , seq uentially numbered , recorded on printed multi-colored forms, and dis tribut ed to the appropriate agencies. A central
's I- ' message file - also was maintained. Formal identification and log-in was required for admittance to the EOC. Simulated placing of the Wethersfield reception center on standby, simulation of opening shelters and dispatching l of radiological field teams were timely.
Overall, public alerting and notification was accomplished in a tine-I ly manner. At 10:05 a.m. the State EOC sent a message for all towns to stand l by to simulate activating their sirens. At 10:19 a.m. sirens and EBS were
{ ' ordered to be activated af ter a decision (by the acting Lieutenant Governor) to recommend protective actions within the EPZ. At 10:30 a.m. a message was
- received from the Area Of fice that all sirens had been activated (sinulated).
llovever, East Lyme , acting within their aathority, had simulated the activa-tion of their sirens shortly after the 9:58 a.m. receipt of the upgrade to General Emergency (BRAVO) . They also simulat ed the broadcast of an EBS message which instructed the residents within 2 miles of the plant to 1
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State EOC shelter. Approximately 15 minutes later, the State EOC broadcast a message to evacuate the area within 2 miles of the plant and shelter 5 miles downwind.
The seemingly rapid change in protective action recommendations could have caused unnecessary anxiety among some members of the public.
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The actual test of the sirens was conducted at 11:40, which was not in sequence with the exercise. However, this test did not cause problems with ,
the players.
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Dose assessment and formulation of protective action recommendations peh formad at the State EOC, the EOF, and Corporate Head. quarters in Berlin, CT are covered under Radiological Health, Section 2.1.3.
The location of non-institutionalized mobility-impaired persons was avail-able in written form and provisions were made for their transportation. However, 1,
. the decision was made to shelter all mobility-impaired persons. According to the participants,' adequate transportation resources are available for evacuating the schools-but no instructions or other information were provided to the par-ents 'and no arrangements were made to handle possible congestion at the schools.
Information about the location of f arms was available and workers were ,
sent into the field to collect samples. Also, recommendations to place animals in sectors C, D, E, and F on stored feed were made to the public. The States of Rhode Island and New York were also advised to implement ingestion pathway protective actions.
During the exercise a training program for reception and mass care was being held in New Britain, CT by the American Red Cross. A Red Cross EOC was established at the Connecticut Power and Light Co. Headquarters and requests for supplies and staff were received and forwarded to the Eastern Operational Headquarters in Alexandria, VA. Cots, blankets, and comfort kits were prepared (simulated) for shipment to Farmington, CT, the staging area, for distri-1 .
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( State EOC bution by the National Guard to the various shelters that were being estab-lished.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- 1.
Description:
EBS mes' sages were not sufficiently coordinated in that dif fering protective actions were '
recommended by local and state officials. .
(NUREG-0654, II.E. 5,6)
Recommendation: Review and revise EBS procedures; .
conduct training to assure proper coordination of messages, access to EBS and notification of local *
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of ficials prior to release of EBS messages. -
- 2.
Description:
The protective action recommendations associated with the General Emergency Pos~ture Codes Bravo and Alpha do not provide local of ficials with enough guidance to make appropriate decisions, nor do they require coordination of actions with other local and state officials. For example, East Lyme activated their sirens and simulated an EBS message recommending that residents within 2-miles of the plant shelter. Approximately 15-minutes later a
's State EBS message recommended evacuation of residents
' i within.2-miles of t,he plant.
(NUREG-0654, II, D.4).
Recommendation: The state should revise the pos ture
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codes to provide enough guidance so local officials can make appropriate decisions that have been coord-inated with other local and state officials.
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- 3.
Description:
No instructions were given to parents about evacuation procedures for schoolchildren.
(NUREG-0654, II, J.10.k; E.7).
Recommendation: Emergency messages should include specific instructions about evacuation of school-children so as to avoid having parents go to the schools to get their children and cause traf fic .
congestion.
AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT
, 1.
Description:
The emergency message board available for posting significant developments was not used to advantage. This device would have been very useful for reference and for incoming relief pe rso nnel .
(NUREG-0654, II, 0.3).
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AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT .
Recommendation: In future exercises keep the emergency message board up-to-date with entries of
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significance so that all interested personnel can better be kept abreast of developments.
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Area IV Offic'e of Civil Prsparcdnssa 1
2.1.2 Area IV Civil Preparedness Office A kitchen, showe rs , sleeping accommodations and back-up power were available for sustained' operations. The facility was adequate.
Area IV had extensive radio communications with the State EOC, E'PZ communities, adjacent communities, amateur radio operators, State Police, Civil Air Patrol, and the utility. Adequa te telephones were available.
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Area IV verified that local EOCs had received messages sent to them from the utility via radio pager. ,
The Area IV Office of Civil Preparedness (OCP) was activated and and staffed before the. Alert, which was received from the utility on the '
radio pager system at 8:39 a.m. The staff consisted of well-trained civil defense personnel, some professional but mostly volunteers. The primary responsibility of the area of fice was to coordinate State and local support and serve.as a communications link. Twenty-four hour capability was dem-ons'trated by presentation of a ros ter.
1' The OCP Area coordinator was a competent professional who was clear-ly and ef fectively in charge. Operations management was ef fective. Incom-ing and outgoing message control was efficient. F requen t staff briefings were conducted. Clearly visible status boards were kept current.
l Recovery and reentry procedures were not demonstrated.
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s Rediolcgicci H2cith - Stato EOC 2.1.3 RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH 2.~ 1. 3 .1 State EOC This exercise again demonstrated the capability of the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) Radiological Health section assisted by several members of the Independent Radiological Assessment Team to promptly assess the off-site radiological situation and to make recommend-ations for the protection of the general public. This effort was improved by1 the close cooperation of the EOF and corporate headquarters assessment fac'il-icy. The coordination of and communication with the two utility and two state off-site monitoring teams had improved; measurements necessary to develop an early estimate of the source term were available sooner than ,
, in previous exercise. The complex nature of the scenario, particularly the nature of the surface wind variations, was a severe test of the players, but they responded well and were able to recognize the need for an early evac-untion of-several to as far as five miles away from the plant. It also was recognized that help would be needed from other states and federal agencies as there were significant particulate concentrations in the plume. The State DEP staf f members usually assigned to the EOF were not available, but e
a well-trained representative from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Branch subetituted and provided excellent reports on plant status and the nature of the unusual release occurring. He corrected an early in plant error which overestimated the iodine exposure by more than a factor of ten (10).
This was confirmed by the of f-site air sampling results.
The potential problems for ingestion as far away as Rhode Island were recognized. Messages were sent to RI indicating the need for ingestion monitoring and radiological monitoring station activation was simulated for several towns along the Connecticut /Rhode Island border. The DEP Radiological Health Supervisor requested collection of allk, water, and unharvested food
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Rcdio. ,1 cal H;rith - Secta EOC crops, and specified which isotopes s pecifically should be of concern in the lab analysis. The ingestion pathway teams were deployed with assistance from Food & Drug Administration staff located in Hartford. -
This was the first exercise in which the USFDA (Region I) participated ,
as players. At 8:20 a.m. FDA Region I in Boston was notified that the State of Connecticut had requested the assistance of an FDA team to assist the State in the collection of ingestion zon e samples during the emergency exercisd.
The FDA Residence Post was notified at 8:25 a.m. to send a two person team to the monitoring control point in Waterford to provide this assistance. A team of two FDA inves tiga to rs was dispa tched immediately. They arrived at the monitoring control point at approximately 9:20 'a.m. While'in Waterford they assisted the State of Coinecticut Dept. of Agriculture in collecting milk and forage samples which were returned to the State Lab in Hartford.
The demonstration went smoothly and was an excellent example of federal-state
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cooperation in responding to nuclear power plant accidents.
The ingestion zone agencies (Depts. of Health, Agriculture, and Consumer Protection) were well staffed and good use was made of staff support.
The agencies communicated with each other well and made appropriate protec-tive action decisions cooperatively. However, consideration should be given to providing an exercise scenario that will core adequately test the ingestion zone agencies. Because of the brevity of the exercise, . the ingestion zone monitoring teams were sent out at an artificially early time to collect samples and to areas that did not correlate with the exercise scenario. This caused considerable confusion among these agencies. The scenario should include collection and analysis of ingestion zone samples as well as an analysis of the environmental data.
During the discussion of recovery problems, it was recognized by
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d, Y Rcdiologicat Hacith - Secto EOC the DEP Radiological Health section and the State Health Department that reentry would have to avait the results of surface monitoring, food and water sample analysis, population dose during and af ter radioactive releases, care-ful assessment of eme rgency worker dosimetry, and the need for marshalling ,
hundreds of trained monitors and environmental health laboratories before the af fected areas could be cleared for reentry and uncontrolled habitation.
The exercise confirmed the need for many more dosimeters (both s,ekf reading and permanent record) for emergency workers, e spe cially during the early hours of evacuation and controlled access. " Connecticut has three thou-sand (3000) SR self reading dosimeters on order to supplement the Civil Defense dosimeters (0-20R and 0-200R) currently being used. '
It also is evident that much more concern for personal contamination would be necessary during recovery. New training materials on this subject
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for local gove rnments has only recently been developed and distributed to towns in the EPZ. Training of local RADEF officers is the peacetime problems w'hich can arise during accidents has recently been recognized by FEMA and new courses are being introduced for training local monitors.
The previous deficiency found in radio communication between the state radiation control unit and their of f site monitoring teams has been partially
, corrected. The conversations of these teams with one another and the State DEP and utility can be monitored on a hand-set at the State EOC/DEP working ,
area. Howe ve r , this capability was not exercised because of lack of space and staff. The DEP/ Radiation Control Unit has less than 80 square feet for six to ten players and three phone sets. This problem should be addressed before the next exe rci se.
It was noted that the DF.P Radiation Control chief conferred fre*
quently with the Governor's news secretary on composition of news releases.
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Rcdi(i o <ical Hamith - State EO including EBS messages. Exercises have increased the understanding and ability of the playe rs to compos e or narrate public inf o rmation regarding radiological conditions and protective actions.
- Previous recommendations to improve early attention to and detection ,
of iodine and particulates in the plume have been addressed. The DEP players (monitoring teams) also were aware of the need to f requently observe or es-timate their exposure to gamma radiation while in the plume. The DEP tea,ds do not carry potassium iodide (KI) as do the utility teams. However, they do have protective clothing and breathing face mask's, but are not being train-ed to use these in the presence of iodine. This seems counter productive, and it is recommended that the SOPS for use of protective equipmen t for monitoring teams be revised.
' DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 44
Description:
The DEP monitoring teams have not been trained to use their protective equipment in the presence of iodine.
(NUREG-0654, II, 0.5)
Recommendation: It is recommended that the SOPS for use of protective equipment for monitoring teams be revised.
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
- 2.
Description:
The DEP/ Radiation Control Unit has less than 80 square feet in the EOC for six tb ten players and three phone sets.
Recommendation: More space should he provided in the State EOC for the DEP/ Radiation Control Unit.
- 3.
Description:
The exercise scenario did not test the ingestion zone agencies thorouchly.
Recommendation: The next exercise should test the ingestion zone agencies more thoroughly including collection and analysis of samples.
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R diolcgiesl Hasich - EOF 2.1.3.2 Emergency Operations Facility The space and furnishings fo r supporting ope ra tions were excellent, and all necessary maps and other displays were posted and used effectively.. '
The facilities at the EOF provided for the state representative was excel-lent. The location provided is directly adjacent to the Emergency Director,
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which facilitated communications between them. /
The state representative (Massachusetts Department of Health) was noti-fied of an Alert by radio pager in accordance with the RERP and the New England Compact procedures. He then proceeded directly to the EOF, which was f ully staf' fed within 30. minutes of the Alert de cla ra tion. A pre-determined sequential ca'll up . list ' indicated a capability of staffing for continuous
? ope ra tions , but a shif t change was not demonstrated or simulated.
The EOF conmunicated with the State EOC bv dedicated land line and with local EOCs by commercial telephone.
Primary dose assessments and f o rmula tion of protective action recom-mendations by the utility were made at the Corporate Headquarters in Berlin, CT, which would be the alternate EOF. Primary dose assessments by the state were made at the State EOC in Hartford. The state representative was promptiv briefed upon his arrival on the plant status, meteorological conditions, and significant radiological data. This information, excent 'for plant status, was subsequently provided in hard copy form, and was promotly posted on the large, easily visible status board. Although the utility's meteorological data did not include the s tabili ty c la s s , the state representative readily made the determination. There were no provisions for plotting field monitoring data, so it was dif ficult to assimilate the data into a consistent ** in s t a n t a n e ou s "
picture of the radiological conditions in the field. This problem was further
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k olegical Hsalth -
EOF complicated by dual direction of the utility field monitoring activities b'y the EOF on site and the Corporate Headquarters EOC.
Recovery procedures by the utility were systematic and sound, and were made in consultation with state representatives. .
AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT ,
- 4.
Description:
Dual direction of utility field .)
monitoring activities by the EOF and corporate /
headquarters, along with the lack of provisions for plotting field monitoring data, prevented development of a clear, " instantaneous" picture of field conditions.
Recommendation: Provide a large-scale map for plotting field monitoring data so. that the
- changing plume ~ can be continuously monitored,
. and consider providing a' field team coordinator.
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Corpsrsto EOC 2.1.3.3 Corporate Emergency Operations Center The Corporate Emergency Operations Center in Berlin, CT, serves as
- the alternate EOF and is adequate to perform its function which is engi- ,
neering back-up and support for the af fected plant. There was no state or local representative, nor do the plans call for one.
Activation and staf fing was timely and in accordance with the li-/
censee's corporate emergency plan. Notification of personnel was by radio-pager that produces an Alert signal as well as a ' verbal message. Although a shift change was not demonstrated, a roster with on-shif t and relief personnel was developed and presented.
Communications between the Corporate EOC and the State EOC in
., Hartford is primarily over a dedicated telephone line, backed up by two commercial telephone lines. There is also a hard copy device for sending
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copies of press releases to the state media center and information from the u't ility for the media is developed here, not at the EOF. Communications worked well.
A rumo r control number was activated with two licensee pe rsonnel assigned to answer questions. This function was handled capably; two rumors were checked and terminated by call-back.
Dose assessments based upon exis ting plan t conditions were done .
quickly. Pe rsonnel were kn owledgeable and pe rf o rmed well. Protective action recommendations were made promptly, and in accordance with the licensee's emergency plan.
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Redivicgical H:alth Field Teams, Rad. Health Lab.
2.1.3.4 Field Monitoring Teams and Radiological Health Laboratory Af ter the Alert message was received two field .nonitoring teams were '
mobilized and dis patched from Connecticut State Police Headquarters in ,
Montville at 9:40 a.m. The teams, each consisting of one state employee and one employee of General Dynamics, arrived at the pre-assigned locations at 10:08 a.m. The order to dispatch the two teams was received from the Den,Mrt-ment of Environmental Protection (DEP) communication center in Hartford.
A vehicle equipped to handle a hazardous waste emergency was used.
A COV-777-1 radiological instrument kit, a G-M counter, ionization chamber rate, meter, and a detector with pancake probe were' available for radiation monitoring. Air equipment included a calibrated air pump operated
? on the vehicle paa r and silver zeolite cartridges for iodine measurements.
Calibration dates were current, check lists were used to ensure that equip-men,t inventories were complete, and all equipment was checked with a source to be sure it was working before the teams lef t Montvillie.
The team members reviewed their standing or.erating procedures. They appeared to be f amiliar with the area and had no trouble finding their assigned locations. They knew how to operate their eautpment and collection
. of air samples and correct procedures f or measuring radiciodine levels in the air were demonstrated. ,
Calculation of iodine air concentrations were made in the field and counting of all samples was done in an area of known low background radia-tion. One team was directed by the controller to simulate bringing a sample in for a Ge Li count and analysis. The team leader said that if this were actually to have been done, the sample would be taken to Electric
k-Radiological Health Field Teams and Rad. Health Lab.
i Boat. This is not consistent with the plan which calls for samples to be taken to the State Radiological Health Laboratory.
The teams were in constant radio communication with the controller.
- There were no problems with dead spots, but, in some areas, there was nome (
fading of signal strength. A back up radio brought along by Electric Roat
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workers, although tested before they lef t Montville, did not work in the field. i The only protective clothing possessed by the teams were gloves for I
handling and coun ting samples; they had no res piratory eauipment. 9 tate personnel had 0-20R and 0-200R dosimeters and the Electric Boat personnel l l
had 0-200mR and 0-5R dosimeters. All instruments were properly zerced and the teams were instructed to check readings at least once every half-hour, l P
s which they did. Neither the state nor the Electric Boat personnel had KI f with them, and had no knowledge of how or when it should be administered.
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- The state radiological health laboratory performs radiological analysis I of food, water, milk, and vegetation samples, and analyses TLDs for determining dosos received by emergency workers. Laboratory participation consisted only of sinulating the proceduros for receiving sampieg from the field. Future }
exercises should involve the state health laboratory to a much greater extenti laboratory personnel should become involved in deciding the numbers and tyne of samples to be analyzed. An extended (two-day) exerckse would allow time for sample analysis. The exercise scenario should include a situation which would result in an overload of samples thereby testing the labo ra to ries '
ability both to prioritive and screen samples and to seek help from other source.
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AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
- 5.
Description:
The field monitoring team indicated
- that they would taka samples to Electric Boat .
(General Dynamics) ,for analysis. This is not i
consistent with the plan which calls for samples to be taken to the state radiological health , ,
laboratory.
Recommenda tion: Ensure that the field teams know
- where to take the samples they collect.
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- 6.
Description:
The state objective to demonstrate the l ability to analyze drinking water, milk, and food f rom processing plants and stores was not demonstrated by the Radiological Health Lab due en insufficient exercise play.
R ecommenda tion t Increase involvement of Radiological Health Laboratory.
- Include netting priorities for +
' . sample analysis and assisting State EOC staf f on -
! deciding the types and numbers of samples to be gathered and analyzed.
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' Stato Polied l'
..:sso Centrol 2.1.4 State Police Access Control Activation of access control by the state police was accompitsbed at 10:00 a.m. as a result of consultation with the Governor and key agencies nearly five minutes before the transmission declaring a General -
e Emergency (Bravo). Troopers were dispa t ched; one trooper and car for each of the six control points established. There is some nuestion as to whether the deployment stations are entirely appropriate. specifically /
the one at the Niantic Bridge. All of the troopers said that they alone could not control access, yet there was no demonstration of efforts to supplement them with local police or Department of Transportation workers. ,
tiowever, the state police colonel in charge of this at the State EOC stated in conference with the Governor and other agencias that he would
" . , call for additional resources from reserve troopers and, if necessary, the National Guard. The Director of Transportation, in the same meeting, said that he was prepared to (sinulate) establish of harricades and take dny actions neces sa ry to remove impediments to evacuation. 9te* s also were taken to effect control of air, water, and rail transportation.
The troopers possessed only direct rending dosimeters and. when inter-viewed showed that they had little knowledge of radioloalcal etnosure control.
DEFICIENCIES AND HECO*f"ENDATION9 .
S.
Description:
There is mone nuestion as to the ef fectiveness of access control as deronstrated.
Individual troopers said that they alone could not handle access and traf fic conernt, but no ef forts were nade to supplement them.
( NUR f.G-0054, 11. J.lu.g; J.10.k).
Recommendation: The state police confunder in the Stato FAC should mke Mure that resource 9 for adequately mnning access control can be obtained and demons trated.
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State Police Access Control DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (cont'd. )
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- 6.
Description:
State police assigned for access control were not furnished with sufficient -
f e
I dosimeters or survey instruments, and did not understand their use. (NUREG-0654 II.K.3.a: K.3.b)
- Recommendation
- Provide proper radiological monitoring equipment for all emergency workers ,j and train them in its use. ,.
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Secte D2contsmination 2.1.5. State Decontamination The designated State Decontamination Facility was the Norwich State-Hospital, which state field emergency workers and field monitoring teams ,
would use. Decontamination of vehicles would have been done by the Depart-ment of Transportation at other selected locations. For this exercise, two people operated the facility and demonstrated good procedural knowledge./
The facility, however, was not well adapted for decontamination. For example, there were no separate sections for the' sexes, clean and contam-inated sections are not separated, no space for registration and record keeping .was set apa rt from the contamination area ~, no emergency first ' aid capability was apparent, no evidence of s'ustaining operations by shift changes was shown, and there were no provisions for handling radioactive wastes.
DEFICIENCY AND RECO.TIENDATION
- 7.
Description:
The state decont aination facility at Norwich State Hospital was not well-suited for this function; there was no separation of cican and con-caminated areas, no area for registration, and no evidence of shift change capability.
(NUREC-06 54, 11, K. 5,6 )
Recommendation: Facilities to be used for emergency workers should be equipped and arranged for properly handling decontamination. .
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Stato Media C:ntor 2.1.6 State Media Center The State Media Center, immediately adjacent to the State EOC and t,o a conference room held available for the Governor, is outstanding. It can
- e accamodate at least 50 reporters at one time and is equipped with virtually everything needed to pe rform effectively, including excellent displays and maps. All of the modifications, such as substituting lights for bells pn telephones and installing an intercom between the Media Center and the Governor's Public Infonnation Of ficer's work area suggested af ter the last exercise, have been made. There are no suggestions ,to offer for any further improvement. ,
Both internal and external communications system were excellent. The location of the Media Center next to the EOC and State PIO working area meant t
that access to command and control information was direct and face-to-face.
Ten telephone lines and radio ba ck-up were available for communicating directly with the EOF and local EOCs. The new intercom between the Media Center and the Governor's PIO work ares enhanced communications and coord-ination of actions between the two locations. However, the intercom should be continuously monitored because other duties required the frequent absence of the Governor's PIO.
i Activation and staf fing of the Media Center by the gtility and the State PIO was good. All of these people were clearly well trained and knowledgeable.
l They and back-up staf f are on 24-hour call at.d can be mobilized rapidly.
The only staf fing weakness observed was a lack of supporting staf f for the l Gove rnor's PIO. While she performed remarkably well, it was clear that she t was overburdened with routine tasks that should have been done by support staff.
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State Media Center With three exceptions, informational functions were very well per-formed. While the Lt. Governor was announcing a General Emergency (Bravo) a General Emergency (Alpha) was posted and, of a more serious nature, an hour -
and twenty minutes elapsed between declaration of a General Emergency and the briefing for the media. Finally, although briefings were clear and comprehen-i sive with an absence of jargon, they did not provide enough detail regarding protective action recommendations. For example, wind direction was not given (although reference was made to " downwind" in the release) nor were the conuounities af fected indicated. However, the spokesman was attended by a full complement of state and utility technical experts who were called upon during the' briefings, and their presentations were impressive and credible;
? they used charts, maps, and hard copy news releases very effectively. It was apparent that they had coordinated their presentations before the briefing and were well prepared.
A rumor control number was not of ficially activated for the exercise, but ' rumors were called in from various sources to both utility and state contact points. In each case, appropriate staf f members ran the rumor down, dispelled the runor, and relayed factual corrective information. According
.to the Governor's PIO, contingency plans include establishing a rumor control office in event of a real emergency. This plan should be tested.
- The scenario was fast paced and provided a good test of media relations capabilities. In the future, howe ve r , it would be a good idea to provide more realistic teats of activation and rumor control. It appears doubtful that in a real emergency the flood of rumors could be handled by the capa-bilities shown in this exercise.
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Stato M;dio Csntar DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
- 8.
Description:
The Governor's PIO did not have suf-ficient staff and had to handle routine clerical duties and answer telephones which would impose an impossible burden on the PIO in a real emergency. ~
(NUREG-0654, II, C'.4.a ).
Recommen da tion : Provide the Gove rnor's PIO with an '
assistant or clerk.
- 9.
Description:
Nearly an hour and a half elapsed between the declaration of a General Emergency and l the press briefing (NUREG-0654, II,G.3..t). '
Recommendation: Report important information to the media with less delay.
AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT ,
- 7.
Description:
Press releases did not provide enough detail regarding protective action recommendations; i e.g., wind direction was not given (although reference
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s was made to " downwind" in the release) and the com-munities af fected were not indicated.
. Recommendation: Revise procedures to ensure news releases have detailed information regarding protective actions.
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y Ecot Lyme ',' .
2.2 CONNECTICUT LOCAL EOCs 2.2.1 East Lyme The EOC was roomy and well equipped for sustaining prolonged an'd continuous operations. It was well lit, had emergency power and nearby , '
kitchen facilities and sleeping space. The status board was kept updated, and maps with all necessary information were posted.
- High band civil preparedness radio was the primary means of commu)n-icating with Area IV. The tri-town radio was available for communicating with other EOCs. Amateur radio (RACES) was operational for back-up and radio pagers were used for notification and emergency action level changes emanating from the utility. Telephones were used for communicating with the '
State EOC and some local EOCs. All systems worked well, but there was very 7 little information flow from Area IV to East Lyme.
The Civil Preparedness Director was at the EOC, his normal place of wo rk, a t 8:00 a.m. He and other key of ficials received an Alert message from the utility by radio pager at 8:35 a.m. , and the staff call-up was initiated. The EOC. was fully staffed in 30 minutes. Staffing capability for continuous operation was demonstrated by double staf fing (14 persons in the EOC) and presentation of a roster.
Operctions were managed by the Civil Preparedness Director under the authority of the yirst Selectman. The staff was perio'dically briefed and involved with de cision making. However, same communications and public alerting and instructional activities were confused.
A Ceneral Emergency (Bravo) from the utility was received at 9:47 a.m.
and at 9:58 a.m. The local decision was made to take shelter immediately within two miles. Sounding of sirens coordinated with an EBS message was
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(> Ecot Lyme simulated for the two-mile radius. During their decision making and imple-mentation process, a message from Area IV was received indicating that E. Lyme should be evacuated up to two alles radius and shelter to five miles. The First Selectman disagreed with the evacuation recommendation' and .
called Area IV to protest. He was informed that this was an order from the Governor, when, in fact, it was a recommendation by the DEP. The Governor
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had not yet proclaimed a State of Emergency. By 10:50 a.m. the decision was made by the First Selectman to go along with the two mile evacuation, but to send the evacuees only up to the high school instead of the appointed reception center located outside the EPZ. This decision was inconsistent with the local and state plans. The five mile shelter recommendation was never carried out.. When the General Emergency was upgraded from Posture Code Bravo to 7 Alpha at 11:23 a.m. , no further public announcements or protective actions ensued.
. Activation of traf fic control points were ' romptly p ordered and there was some dis cussion of traf fic volume. The state police trooper said that he could muster all necessary assistance for access control but did not explain further. The staff was aware of the location and needs of the handicapped and nobility-impaired. This information was available in written form. A school evacuation capability was demonstrated by police escort of P
buses from one school to the high school.
Suf ficient kits containing 0-20R and 0-200R dos ime te rs and TLDs were, on hand and were distributed along with exposure record cards. The Radiation Of ficer handled the distribution bu t provided no ins truction on their use. No one had knowledge about the use of K1 and no location for de-(- r -
\ Ecst Lyme ',- ,
c contamination was established. The constable at the door was unable to dire't a centaminated person to a center for treatment.
There was only a short discussion about recovery and reentry and the participants said that they would rely almost entirely on the state for ,
1 guidance and assistance.
DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATION.1
- 10. Descriorion: There was confusion about prote ctive ,
actions to be taken at the General Emergency caused by confusion about whether the protective action l
was a recommendation or an order. The plan for imp-lementing actions was not followed.
l (NUREG-0654, II, J.10).
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Recommendation: Provide training as needed to make the EOC staf f f amiliar with the plans f or implementing protective actions. Whether the protective action given was an order or a recommendation was irrelevant in 7,
this instance.
- 11.
Description:
No instructions for the use of dosimeters
, or for record keeping procedures were tiven, no place was established for decontamination, and the staf f bad
- no knowledge about the use of KI.
(NUREC-0654, II, K.3.b; J.10.a; and K.S.a).
Recommendation: See that proper training in radiological exposure conersi is given to all staf f members.
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,' 'k ( ( i City of Grcten 2.2.2 city of Groton The EOC, located in the municipal building, was sufficiently furnished and the space was large enough for handling the operations. However, the e
partitions used to separate the response organizations did not suppress the j noise enough. Other physical resources were suitable for sustaining contin-uous operations. A status board was prominently poeted and was kept currentf Haps of good quality which showed all necessary information such as the IO-mile EPZ, population by sectors, evacuation routes and access control points also were displayed and ef fectively used. However, the arrangement for handling radio communications was not optimal. Messages had to be relayed y telephone to a communications center on another floor for transmission.
High-band civil defense radio was used as the primary means of communicating with the state and Area IV. Fire, police, and utility nets and telephones provided back-up and communications with other EOCs. However, outgoing messages to be transmitted by radio had to be called into the communications center by telephone which introduced possibilities for error.
It might have been better to use the telephone as the primary system. Another possibility might be to arrange for remote radio transmission from the EOC or to use a messenger system.
EOC activation was initiated by an Alert message from the utility sent by radio pager to the Civil Preparedness Director who in turn notified the Mayor and began staf f call up by telephone. Staffing was completed in 25 minutes af ter the Alert message was received. The call from the utility was verified by call-back. The Mayor and the Civil Preparedness Director, and other staf f members to a lesser degree, were knowledgeable about the plan and operating procedures.
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( Cit.y of Grcten The Mayor was clearly in charge and the Civil Preparedness Director handled operations. The staff was involved with decision making and briefings were held periodically. Access to the EOC was controlled by a uniformed policeman who required positive identification before permitting entrance. ;
Written procedures and checklists were used and messages were logged and ,
di s tributed. Message handling was, however, inef ficient because of the
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separation of the communications center and the EOC.
Dose assessment is a state and utility function and, therefore, is not done at the EOC. Based on protective action recommendations provided by the state and on the information from the utility and the state, protective
- action decisions were made in consultation with the staff and were implemented by simulation. The actions taken were consistent with che state's recommen-s dations.
Whan the Ceneral Emergency message was received, public alerting and procedures for instructing the public were demonstrated by simulated sounding of sirens to coordinate with the EBS messages. Vehicles with public address systems were dispatched and calls were placed to schools, factories, and other large institutions. Initial instructions for the public were prepared j by the state and additional messages were written locally for simulated trans-mission. These local messages included information on sheltering procedures, and included instructions for transients without shelters, which corrected a previously identified deficiency. Also, a detailed discussion about proce-dures for evacuating schools took place.
Activation of traf fic and access control points was timely and the expected traf fic volumes were discussed. Although not activated, the par-ticipants maintain that suf ficient resources are available for keeping evac-
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City of Grcten 1
uation routes open. Written information on the locations and special needs of mobility-impaired and handicapped people is maintained and a rrangemen t;s f were made for simula ting their evacuation. Sufficient buses were said to e
be available for comple te evacuation of schools within the plume exposure i pathway. Bus drive rs would be contacted directly by the bus c ompany'.
i Direct read dosimeters (0-200mR, 0-20R, 0-200R) and TLDs, cha rge rp ,
f and record keeping cards were available in adequate supply. The Radiation Safety Of ficer gave instructions in their use and. in how to maintain exposure records. Decontamination procedures appeared to be well understood.
Had any members of the press appeared, they would have been referred to the Media Center in Hartford. For information relative to local actions,
.the city manager would be the spokesman.
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AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT
- 8.
Description:
Means of handling radio communications was inef ficient and a source of possible errors.
Messages sent or received had to be transmitted by telephone to a communications center on another floor. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.d)
Recommendation: F.ither use telephone a9 the primary communications system or provide renote radio capability in the EOC.
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Town of Groton
'- 2.2.3 Town of Groton The EOC, located in the basement of the police station, was' well-lit and furnished with sufficient space for conducting operations. ,- e i
Resources, such as sleeping, kitchen accommodations, and emergency power provided excellent capability for sustaining continuous operations. All necercary maps and a status board were displayed and were well utilized,!
The space allocated to the EOC normally is used as a pistol range, but because the EOC equipment is stored in an adjacent room, set-up time is minimal. Probicas with ventilation and emergency power identified in a
! previous' exerc'ise were corrected.
- l l Civil Defense radio was used' as the primary means of communicating
- with the Area IV Office of Civil Preparedness and, through Area IV, with l the State EOC. Utility radio nets were used to communicate with other local l
- EOCs, with commercial telephone as back up. Commercial telephone was also used as the primary system for communicating with schools and hospitals.
Operators were proficient, and all systems worked well.
Key of ficials were notified of an Alert declaration by radio pager at 8:35 a.m. Notification also was received from Area IV. Full staffing,
. consisting of the Town Manager, the Civil Preparedness Director and his assistant., the Police and Fire Chief s, and the Public Worlds Superintendent, ,
was initiated by telephone call-up and was completed about 30 minutes later.
Additional support for handling social services was added later. Shift change capability was demonstrated by presenting a second shift roster.
Operations were, in general, handled well by the Town Manager and the Civil Preparedness Director. The staf f was well organized according to 7
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( Town cf Groton functions. The social services support group had responsibility for re-sponding to the special needs of mobility-impaired and handicapped persons.
There was some confusion at times caused by frequent introduction of free .
I play activities. Messages were logged and recorded on multi-copy forms and ~
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distributed, and check lists and written procedures were used. Periodic I briefings were held and the key staff members participated in decision l
making.
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Six field nonitoring teams were deployed and sent readings in to
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the EOC where they were plotted on a map. This information was used as con-
~ firmation of information about radiation levels received from the state.
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These teams also were in the field to assist the state and utility field monitoring' efforts if needed. Actual dose assessments were made at the
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s State EOC and utility corporate headquarters.
l Capability for implementing protective actions was demonstrated f by evacuation and sheltering in a unique msnner. School children were I
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evacuated from school, boarded school buses for a few minutes, and then re-entered the school where they were greeted as " evacuees" and were pro-t cessed through the Red Cross Shelter procedure. While some students were f fed, others were taken into the gym where a disaster dsplay had been
, assembled. They were given a briefing on preparedness for all types of disasters and given written material, "Is Your Family Disaster Wise?" ,
which they took home. The interest and behavior of the children is to be commended. They were outstanding in all ways and deserve recognition for their participation.
A simulated traffic accident was introduced to further test implementation of traffic and access control and the ability to keep
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Tcvn( roton -
evacuation routes open. Written information about the locations and special needs of mobility-impaired, handicapped, and mentally retarded persons, and procedures for moving them were placed in motion.
Simulated sounding of sirens coordinated with EBS transmissions ,
e upon declaration of a General Emergency were used to alert and instruct the public. Subsecuent EBS messages were developed locally. for further
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instructing the public. Transmission of these messages were simulated./
The alerting actions were timely and well-coordinated.
An adequate supply of kits containing 0-200nR, and 0-200R direct reading dosimeters and TLDs was available, and the Radiation Safety Officer instructed the staff and emergency workers in their proper use; how to l
record readings, and how to maintain exposure records. Survey equipment 21sowas available and used. Entrants to the EOC ' were surveyed and a contaminated (simulated) worker was detected. Procedures for discarding contaminated clothing and transportation of this ' person to a reception center were demonstrated. Procedures for vehicle decontamination were demonstrated by a well-executed drill at the Department of Public Works o
Yard. Decontamination procedures also were demonstrated at a simulated traffic accident.
No representative of the media appeared, but the Town Manager said that if any had appeared he would act as the spokesman in accordance with the plan.
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Town of Ltdyard 2.2.4 Ledyard The EOC, located in the sub-basement of the Senior High School, ,
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was'well-lit and furnished. Space and resources such as kitchen, bath, and emergency power made it well suited for sustaining continuous operations. -
The status board and maps showing all necessary information were posted..
The primary means of communicating with other EOCs was the high
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band Civil Preparedness radio. Messages from the utility relating to chang'es in emergency action levels were received by radio pagers. Commercial tele-phone and amateur radio (RACES) provided back-up.
The key officials were notified by a radio pager alert message from the utility at 8:37 a.m. Staff call-up by telephone began immediately a'nd the EOC was fully staffed ten minutes later. A roster was presented as evidence of round-the-clock staffing capability.
Jhe Civil Preparedness Director and his assistant managed operations under the authority of the Mayor who was present throughout the exercise.
The staf f took part in decision making and was briefed periodically by the Mayor and the Civil Preparedness Director. Copies of the plans, procedures, and checklists were readily available and were referred to as needed. Message handling was ef ficient; all messages were logged and distributed without delay. Access to the EOC was controlled.
Ledyard relied entirely upon the state and Area kV EOC for protective action recommendations but actual protective actions were not implemented until the recommendations and the consequences had been discussed.
The first message recommending protective action was a declaration of a General Emergency, posture code Bravo. Accordingly, si=ulated siren sounding was coordinated with att EBS message from the state. This message
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Town cf Lsdyard was a recommendation to take shelter and included instructions for the public.
A second protective action message recommending evacuation was received at 2:02 p.m. This message was followed by two locally generated EBS message's which were coordinated through the Media Center in Hartford before release. ,
e Howe ve r , none of these messages contained any instructions pertaining to schools. All public alerting and instruction activities were timely.
The Town of Montville supported Ledyard with traf fic and ace,eis control. When the evacuation recommenda tion was received, actions were taken to maintain an orderly movement of evacuees.
0-200 mR, 0-20R, 0-200R, TLD pe rmanent record devices, and chargers in kit form were available in suf ficient quantity and were distributed along '
- with ins tructions for their use. The Radiation Safety Officer explained the 7 importance of and procedures for maintaining exposure records.
4 Two press releases were developed and sent to the State Media Center for, concurrence and release for (simulated) broadcast over Station WSLB. No media representatives appeared at the EOC.
Procedures for handling recove ry and reentry were discussed for about an hour in considerable detail before ending exercise activities.
. DEFICIENCY AND REC 0!OfENDATION:
- 12.
Description:
EBS messages for instructing th6 public .
did not include instructions for the parents of school children. (NUREG-0654, 11, E.6).
Recommendation: Use pre-scripted messages for parents and school of ficials to inform them about e va cua t ion procedures for school children.
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Town af Mcntvills 2 2.5
. Montville The EOC, located in the state police dispatch building, while small, was well arranged and adequate for conducting operations. It was well furnished, and resources such as kitchen facilities, sleeping spade, .
and emergency power made it well suited for sustaining continuous o pe ra-tions. Plans, checklists, and operating procedures were readily available
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and sufficient. A clearly visible status board was kept up-to-date and.
detailed maps containing all necessary information were posted.
Primary communications with the State EOC and Area IV were by means of high band radio, with telephone used for other organizations and for back-up. Messages also were received directly from the utility by radio pager. - Message flow from the utility, the State EOC, and Area IV was
, , excellent.
Activation of the EOC was initiated by an Alert message at 8:35 a.m.
sent by radio pager from the utility to the Civil Preparedness Director who had been on duty at the EOC since 8:00 a.m. The Director verified the messages by call back and then began the staf f call-up. The EOC was fully staf fed thirty minutes after the Alert was received. The staf f appeared to be well qualified and presented a roster to demonstrate continuous scaffing capability.
The Civil Preparedness Director, under the authority of the Chief .
Executive Officer, was clearly in charge and demonstrated good management.
He held numerous conf erences with the staf f and f ully involved the staff, who showed knowledge of the plan and operating procedures in the decision making process. The Director supported the New London and Ledyard evacua-evacuations by supplementing their traf fic and access control. Access to
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...a cf Mtutvills the EOC was controlled by a uniformed officer who required sign-in before admittance. All messages were logged and distributed.
Dose assessment and formulation of protective action recommendations were done by the state and the utility. No protective actions for Montville were required by the scenario.
Since Montville was not threatened try the plume, public alerting and
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instruction of the public were unnecessary, but the public received an EIls message from the state at 10:26 a.m. The Chief Executive Officer later initiated a general information message.
Montville implemented traffic control procedures and provided as-
' sistance to New' London and Ledyard. Written ' information about mobility-impaired and handicapped people and their special needs was avilable and arrangements were made for their possible transportation.
tlontville's Radiological Safety Officer is a professional and well-trained in radiological emergency response requirements. His staff also is well-trained and has developed standard operating procedures for twelve monitoring routes. Kits containing 0-200mR, 0-20R, 0-200R direct reading dosimeters, TLDS , and record keeping cards were available in suf-ficient quantity. The Radiation Safety Officer and others were aware of the maximum allowable exposure dose and of decontamination procedures.
Decontamination capability was demonstrated by setting up a decontamina-tion center at the nearby fire station on Route 32. Also, a contaminated individual was detected when he attempted to enter the EOC. He was sent in his car to the decontamination center and decontaminated. After receiving the documentation that decontamination had been completed, the Civil Prepared-ness Director released him.
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Town of Montvillo There were no media present at Montville. Had there been, the First Selectman (CEO) said he or a person he designated as his PIO would .
confer with the State PIO through the media center and then act as the t
s poke s pe rson.
Recovery and reentry was demonstrated by a detailed " tabletop" exercise led by the Civil Defense Director and involved all of the EOCs )
emergency response pe rs onnel. The thorough and prolonged discussion involved consideration of radiological monitoring, health effects to the public, continuity of gove rnment, and crime control in evacuated areas.
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9 Nsw Lenden ,
2.2.6 New London The EOC was located in the training room on the second floor of the police station. The communications center is in the police dispatcher's room on the firs t floor. A status board and appropriate maps were posted and ,
e used af factively. Noise was adequately controlled and access to the EOC was managed by a uniformed police of ficer.
Communications equipment consisted of a civil defense radio,ra4Yo pager, telephones, and an amateur radio and operator in the EOC. Communi-cations and verification of messages were handled well but the staff thought that they should have been getting more information from Area IV. The police,.
fire', wa ter, and public works departments each were equipped with mobile radio equipment which can be used for field activities such as traffic and
' access control and for supporting field teams if needed.
Call-backs to the utility now are made only by the police dispatcher instead of by each of the other officials who received pager messages. This has relieved telephone traffic and is an improvement over previous exercises.
An announcement of an Alert at 8:35 a.m. was received on a radio pager by the police dispatcher who then verified the calls and began callmip of the staff. By the time the Civil Preparedness Director arrived eight
. minutes later, the EOC was fully staf fed. The fire, police, water, and sewer departments were represented with additional personnel *placed on standby. .
The City Manager, assisted by the Civil Preparedness Director, 'was actively in charge, held frequent briefings, and involved the staf f in decision making. Copies of the plans were available and used along with check lists and operating procedures. Messages were logged and distributed as required.
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m New Lcndon Dose assessment and formulation of protective action recommendations were state and utility functions, but three field teams were deployed to pre-established locations and were available to take readings if so requested by the state. They also were available to provide the City of New London 'with -
data for comparison with information received from the state and the EOF.
The City Manager ordered the City Engineer to report on the condi-
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tions along eva cuation routes after receiving notification of a General Emergency (posture code Bravo), briefed the staff, and requested preparation ,
of an EBS message for New London. The CP Director caught and corrected an error in the message. Simulated siren sounding and EBS transmissions were timely and 'well coordinated. Several locally introduced EBS messages in-structing the public in dealing with traffic congestion, sheltering, and 5 evacuation followed. Calls to factories and institutions were made. .
, Protective actions taken were . sheltering and evacuation as recom-mended by the state. Worke rs were sent out for traffic control and access control support. The City Manager and the CP Director felt that Area IV ;
should have provided more information on the nature of the accident and communicated more frequently with local EOCs. Personnel for supporting the simulated evacuation were sent out promptly. 1 A sufficient number of dosimeters including permanent record devices (TLDs) had been provided since the last exercise. However, issuing of -
dosimeters and initiating exposure record keeping, which are supposed to be handled by the Fire Department, were neither demonstrated nor simulated.
Vehicle decontamination procedures were. well demonstrated at a station set up at the Nathan Hale Elementary School. Personnel decontamination procedures were not demonstrated. l l
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Ntw London Reporters from Channel 12 TV and a newspaper ("The Day") appeared and were admitted to the EOC af ter being checked through security. The City Manager, who was the designated spokesperson, briefed them in an area set aside for this purpose.
Recovery and reentry procedures were discussed for about an hour, and exercise activities were terminated at 3:15 p.m. j DEFICIENCY AND RECOMMENDATION
- 13.
Description:
Dosimeters were not issued sad radiation exposure record keeping was not simulated or demonstrated.
(NUR8G-0654, II, K.3 )
Recommendation: Demonstrate adeouate training in use .of dosimetry and ' record keeping.
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! t Old Lyme 2.2.7 Old Lyme The Old Lyme EOC was located in the basement of the town hall. The recently remodeled f acility had adequate light, space, furniture, and noise control. While no kitchen or showering facilities were available, b'unks .
were available in the adjacent visiting nurses facility. The EOC had back-up, power which was demonstrated. A clearly visible status board and maps showing
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the EPZ with sector evacuation routes, reception center, and access control points were pos ted.
All communication systems worked well. Radio pagers were used to notify EOC staff of plant conditions and to alert staff to contact the utility by phone for additional information. Radio contact with the chief bus driver and ambulanc,es will be available shortly with the installation of mobile
' radio's. Radio was the primary system used for most communication with tele-phone back-up available. The emergency workers felt that messages from Area IV were sometimes unclear and confusing and the recorded messages from the utility were too fast to copy so that on several occasions the transmission had to be repeated. This was rectified by a tape recorder for incoming plume messages.
Activation and staffing of the EOC was promptly and efficiently accomplished. Pager notification was received and verfied at 8:35 a.m. and a written call list was used to notify remaining personnel. The alternate personnel (the Second Selectman, police, and communications) ran this exercise for training purposes, and perf ormed their duties ef ficiently with little or no assistance from the more experienced members. Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by presentation of a roster of second shift personnel.
There was no prepositioning of EOC staf f.
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.id Lyme The Second Selectman functioned as the Chief Executive Of ficer for this exercise and effectively managed emergency operations. The entire staff appeared well trained and capable of effectively carrying out their duties.
A copy of the plan was available and procedures were used to carry out neces- '
sary actions. Message handling was efficient and messages were logged as
' they were received. . Access to the EOC was controlled.
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Dose assessment and formulation of protective action recommen'da-tions were utility and state responsibilities. Old Lyme followed the state's recommendations and took appropriate actions for implementing procedures such as notifying f armers, schools, and institutions, and placing bus drivers on standby.
- Public ale'rting was accomplished by siren simulation on two occa-sions. The sirens were sounded at 10:22 t
- a. m. in response to a dire ctive from Area.IV. The town simulated sounding the sirens at 10:40 a.m. with a "taka shelter" notice for all 5-mile EPZ sectors. The EOC simulated the sending of EBS messages to explain both the 10:40 a.m. siren sounding and followed with a update at 12:16 p.m. Three (3) police vehicles were sent to the affected 5 mile EPZ sectors for public alerting over the public address system.
Although not needed at this exercise, resources were available for l traffic control and keeping evacuation routes clear. The town did initiate patrol of evacuation routes to insure that problems did not develop. Suffi-cient buses were available to evacuate schools and lists were maintained of individuals requiring evacuation assistance.
Radiological exposure control procedures were well understood and demonstrated. .The EOC was equipped with adequate supplies of mid-and high-
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( Old Lyme range pocket dosimeters, chargers, TLDs, record keeping cards, and survey meters, but the supply of low-level dosimeters was not adequate to cover all emergency workers.
The supplies of mid and high-level dosimeters and TLDs were suo- ,
plied on loan by the state for this exercise. The town plans to request that those supplies be provided on a permanent basis. Potassium iodide was not available at the EOC but the town of ficials were knowledgeable about itk ,
use. Radiation levels were monitored both inside and outside the EOC and individuals entering the EOC from outside were monitored for possible con-tamination. 'The RADEF of ficer was knowledgeable as to maximun allowable-dose' levels and record ke e' ping procedures. Facilities for decontamination were available at the nearby fire station.
- . Recovery and reentr- was not necessary as the plume did not af fect the town. However, recovery and reentry procedures were covered by tabletop discussions of questions posed by the utility's controller.
The scenario seemed well designed to test the town's capabilities in all areas except evacuation and traf fic access control.
DEFICIENCY AND RECOMMENDATION 14
Description:
There was an insufficient supply of direct reading dosimeters which are needed by emergency workers.
(NUREG-0654 II, K.3 ). -
Recommendation: Supply Old Lyme with more low-level dosimeters, such as the 0-SR type which have been ordered by the State Dept. of Emergency Preparedness.
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2.2.8 Old Saybrook The EOC is in the Town Hall and is well-appointed with sufficient space, furniture, phones, eme rgency power, and lighting. Cots and bedding A s tatus board was kept up-to-date '
are available for extended operations. .
and an EPZ map with sectors labeled were clearly visible. Other information about evacuation routes and access control points was readily available but 1
not posted. This facility has all resources needed to support continuous ope ra tions.
Radio is the primary means of communicating with Area IV and the State EOC. The utility contacts the EOC directly bh radio pager when there are significant changes in the plant status. The town then calls the utility to receive a recorded message. Other communications are handled by telephone,
' and ambulance, fire, and police radio.
All communications systems worked well.
. The EOC was partially staf fed before the Alert message was received
, by officials from the utility over radio pagers. The balance of the staff was called up by telephone from a written list, and full staffing was com-pleted within 30 minutes af ter receipt of the Alert. Back up for radio pager call-up for of ficials is the police dispatcher system which is continuously monitored. Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by a shif t change, and the second shif t was briefed.
The First Selectman was clearly in charge and was ably assisted in operations management by the Civil Preparedness Director. The staff was kept informed by periodic briefings and participated in decision making. Plans, checklists, and written procedures were used for reference and all messages were logged. No one was admitted to the EOC without presenting satisfactory ideneification.
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Old Scybrock Dose assessments are not local functions, but there are five people trained as instructors for radiological monitoring. Qualified teams can be put in the field if needed.
only part of the Town of Old Saybrook is within the perimeter of the Millstone 10-mile EPZ. The town was not af fected by the plume and no' protective actions were recommended for them. Public alerting and instrue- j tion would be done by sounding the two fixed sires, backed up by route ale t-ing. Howe ve r, the convalescent home was apprised of the incident resulting at the General Emergency (Bravo) stage and told that sheltering actions possibly would be recommended. Local radio station WLIS was also kept inform-ed and broadcast the EBS messages originated' by the state. At the General
. Emergency (posture code Bravo) the EOC prepared to sound sirens and send an EBS message. Bus drivers were placed on standby in preparation for evac-uating the* two small areas in the EPZ at the eastern boundary of the town should evacuation be recommended. Written information about the location and needs of the mobility-impaired and handicapped and arrangements for shelter-ing, evacuation, transportation, and traffic control were discussed.
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Twenty dosimetry kits containing 0-20R, 0-200R, and TLDs were on hand and distributed to emergency workers who were instructed in their use.
Five persons had been trained in decontamination procedures. The town was not in the plume, but dosimeters were issued to police assigned for possible access control.
Recovery and reentry problems probably would be minimal for Old Saybrook since it is largely outside the 10-mile EPZ. Procedures were, however, thoroughly discussed for over an hour.
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t Watsrford 2.' 2. 9 Waterford 1
The ECC, which was located in the police station, was somewhat small
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for accommodating the number o'f peopla involved in operations. Also, contro1 of noise was difficult because of simultaneous radio and telephone traffic. '
This did not, however, result in significant problems. The facility has the necessary resources for supporting extended continuous operations. A status
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board and all necessary maps were posted. '
The communications system is extensive and worked well. There were direct lines to the State EOC, the EOF, and to one EBS station. Also avail-able was the high band Civil Preparedness radio which was used extensively
, to communicate with Area IV and the Tri-town- radio connecting Waterford with New London and East Lyme. Since Waterford simulated many activities, commercial telephone was used for most communications with the State EOC.
The hard copy device linking the Waterford and the State Media Center was not used because activation of the Waterford Media Center was not planned for this exercise.
The police dispatcher received de claration of the Alert from the utility and began call-up of the staff who were all in place within 30 minutes.
The Civil Preparedness Director sent two representatives to the EOF at 9:00 a.m. to monitor plant information and keeping the Waterford Civil Prepared-
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ness Director informed directly. Waterford was the only toe that did this. ,
Continuous staffing capability was demonstrated by presenting a roster.
The Civil Preparedness Director, under the authority of the First Selectman, was clearly in charge of operations and gave frequent briefings.
The staf f was involved in decision making and appeared to have a clear under-standing of their res ponsibilitie s. Written procedures, checklists, and
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/ : ( Wntsrford copies of the plan were available as needed, and message handling was effi-cient. A message log was maintained and messages were recorded and distri-buted.
Because dose assessment and protective action recommendations' are -
state and utility functions, these were not performed, but the town has train-ed field monitoring and EOF liaison personnel available who have some limited
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capability in dose assessment. Protective actions recommended for and si'a-ulated by Waterford were sheltering followed by evacuation.
Public alerting and instruction was accomplished by the simulated sounding of sirens coordinated with an EBS broadcast from the state when the EdC was notified by the utility and Area IV that a General Emergency '(Bravo) had been declared. Several locally generated EBS messages were simulated a
subsequen tly. Information. and instructions pertaining to school children were included in the messages concerning evacuation.
When the General Emergency was declared, traffic and access con trol procedures were implemented by simulation. The staff were aware of the location and special needs of the mobility-impaired and handicapped, which were in written form.
The expected traf fic volume and number of evacuees was discussed with Area IV and the problem of a simulated jacknifed trailer as it affected routing of traffic was discussed at length among the staff.
The capability of contacting bus drivers, draf ting of messages for the parents of school children, or dealing with possible traffic congestion at the school were not demonstrated.
Fif ty kits containing 0-20R, 0-200R, TLDs and exposure record cards were available. Two kits were distributed to demonstrate capability.
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Watarford Persons were che ck ed for contamina tion before permitting entran'ce to the EOC. The staf f were knowledgeable about the use of KI, supplies of which are stored in Waterford in custody of the pharmacist who would issue 'it to authorized persons by prescription. ,
a Waterford has a media center in the high school, but it was not act-ivated. Normally, all media contacts should occur there, but the press w'as admitted once during the morning to observe EOC activities. There was no fl Nw of information from the State Media Center to Waterford about news releases.
Recove ry and reentry procedures were discussed for about 30 minutes and exercise participation stopped at 3:00 p.m. Even though the discussion, was not lengthy, the staf f showed a good understanding of the actions that would be required. Waterford has a reentry coordination group consisting of
- two teams of three persons each, one located at the State EOC and one at the reception center. This group, under the direction and authority of the Civil Preparedness Director and First S ele ct man is responsible for resolution of unforseen problems that arise from the evacuation process such as forgotten medicines, separated children, missing pets, etc. This seems to be an excellent idea worthy of study by other communities.
AREA FOR IMPROVEMENT
- 9.
Description:
Waterford would be a center of in' tense media activity in an event of a real energency and coordination with the state cmild he a problem.
(NUREG-0654. II, G.4. b).
Recommendation: The advisibility of maintaining a media center at Waterfurd should be studied. In event of a i real emergency, the Waterford Media Center would be
- overwhelmed and the benefits of coordinated media relations would possibly be los t.
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( l Fisher's Island 2.3 NEW YORK LOCAL EOCs 2.3.1 Fisher's Island The Fisher's Island EOC, which is located in the Fire Station, is ad-equate. There is sufficient furniture, space, lighting, telephones, and back-up power supply. The noise was adequately controlled and the facility J
is capable of extended operations.
The EOC was activated shortly af ter the Chief Executive called the utility back af ter the radio pagers sounded and was informed of the Alert.
Staffing was completed in 25 minutes by a telephone call-up system an.d included representatives of the school district, the telephone company, the electric company, the State Police, the utility, and the Harbor Master.
The EOC functioned eficiently and was well inanaged. A roster of available staff members was presented to indicate sufficient staff to suppo rt con-tinued operations.
The communications system consisted of commercial telephones, RACES, and additional radios. There was a delay in contacting the Suffolk County Office of Civil Preparedness because the EOC had to go through a switchboard operator in the state building where the OCP is located.
Although Fisher's Island was in the plume, implementation of protective actions were not demons tra ted. Actions taken to notify the public of the incident included activating the sirens (all worked), and notifying the schools of the emergency situation.
Radiological equipment and training were not sufficient. More dosime-try and a training program in radiological health are needed.
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DEFICIENCY AND RECOMMENDATION
- 15.
Description:
On Fisher's Island radiological equipment and training in radiological exposure ,
control procedures 'are not suf ficient.
(NUREG-0654, II, K.3 ).
- f Recommendation: See that Fisher's Island is properly equipped and that the EOC personnel are trained in radiological exposure control procedures.
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(s Plum Island 2.3.2 Plum Island Plum Island is a U.S. Department of Agriculture operation and all personnel on the island are federal employees who work in or for the Plum
- f Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), which is a diagnos tic and research facility. The EOC on Plum Island is a complete, 24-hour-a-day f acility , and is operational every day of the year. It is prepared for every conceivabJe ,
type of emergency, including storms, ice conditions, and biological releases.
The island has its own prima ry and back-up power systems. A radiological emergency status board was used during the exercise and updated frequently.
An appropriate map of the island was posted; however, population (by building),
radiological monitoring points , and evacuation routes were available but not
" included on the map. Overall, the facilities were excellent.
It should be noted that the two major, secure, and extremely sensitive laboratories on the island have a negative pressure, single pass ventilation system. All exhaus t systems have High Efficiency Particulate Absorption Filt ers (HEPA) for biological containment. However, the air intake sys tem is not filtered.
These laboratories cannot be lef t unmanned, therefore, either the air
. intakes need to have filte rs placed on them or other satisfactory methods have to be employed to protect the emergency workers from ' excessive exposure. ,
A PIADC Duty Officer is on duty a r ound-th e-clo ck , every day. The e=er;e ncy staf f can be act iva t ed within minutes and can manage energency response until other staff membe rs arrive. Activation and staf fing during the exe rcise took five mi nu t e s. The eme rgency coordinator and his staff were very knowledgeable about radiological eme rgency response procedures.
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The Millstone radio pager is monitored 24-hours-a-day at the EOC. The de-tailed Radiological Emergency Response Plan, which has just been completed for the island, was followed during the exercise. Overall, activation, staf fing, and EOC management were excellent.
Communications at the EOC included a radio pager, commercial tele-phone, and FTS (Federal Telecommunications System) and the police / medical /
safety / marine radio (island only). These were observed to be adequate.
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However, a complete two-way radio system that can be used to contact emerg-ency response organizations in New York and Connec.ticut would enhance the systen.
Notification was by siren and was activated (simulated) promptly. The siren is used on a daily basis for ferry departure, noon hour notice, qtc.
.The island " evacuates" every day via the Plum Island - Orient Point govern-ment operated ferry and this can be accomplished in 30 minutes.
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Because of the nature of the work on the Island, there are no school children. Nor are there any mobility-impaired. As stated above, complete evacuation of the Island by ferry can be accomplished in 30 minutes; however, the two secure laboratory f acilities cannot be lef t unmanned. Special shel-tering provisions must be decided upon by EOC staff if a general evacuation is ordered to maintain laboratory operations and security. Protective clothing, respirators, dosimetery equipment and decontamination f acilities are available on the island.
Ingestion pathway considerations need to be made for the experimental animals on the island. They are, however, sheltered in confined laboratories and given only stored feed and water.
The PIADC caintains personal dosimeters for emergency workers and has a supply of KI stored in the dispensary. Exposure record keeping cards were
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Plum Island available. Knowledge of and facilities for decontamination procedures was excellent because the PIADC routinely implements decontamination of personnel, vehicles, and equipment for biological agents. Exposure control was excel-lent.
f Recovery and reentry procedures were discussed. The Emergency Coord-inator had a very good understanding of recovery and reentry procedures and issues that would have to be resolved and addressed in order for the PIADC j to continue with its mission.
The scenario was adequate and the experience gained by the Plum Island EOC was valuable as this was the first time they had participated in an exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan.
Deficiencies and Recommendations
- 1.
Description:
The .two major, secure,and extremely sensitive laboratories on the island, which cannot be left unmanned, do not have filters on the air intake system. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.d)
Recommendation: Install air filters on air intakes or develop procedures and obtain equipment for other methods to protect the emergency worker from exces-sive exposure.
- 2.
Description:
There was no two-way communications with the States of New York and Connecticut except by commercial and FTS telephones. (NUREG-0654, II, F.1.a)
Recommendation: Direct two-way radio capability-for communicating with the emergency response organizations of the States of New York and Connecticut would enhance response capability.
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SUMMARY
LISTING OF DEFICIENCIES Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies with recommendations noted by the federal evaluators of this exercise. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning s tandards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (November 1980) ' .
and the exercise objectives.
The Regional Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C. , that any de- .j ficiencies noted in the exercise have been corrected and that such ?
corrections have been incorporated into the plan.
FEMA suggests that the state and local jurisdictions submit the mea-sures they haie taken or intend to take to correct deficiencies. FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including dates of completion for sched-uling and implementing remedial actions, be provided if remedial actions cannot be instituted immediately.
Deficiencies f all into two categories:
, A. Deficiencies that cause a finding that of f-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the
. public.
B. Deficiencies identified where demonstrated (and observed) performance during the exercise was considered f aulty, corrective actions were con-sidered necessary, but other f actors indicate that reasonable assurance could be given that, in a radiological emergency, appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the public. Deficiencies identified with an
' asterisk (*) merit priority attention.
No deficiencies in Category A were identified in this exercise.
Deficiencies identified in Category B are summarized below.
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l DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS STATE COMMENTS
- l."
Description:
EBS messages were not suf ficiently coordinated in that dif fering protective actions were i recommended by local and state of-ficials.
(NUREG-0654, II, E. 5,6)
Recommendation: Review and revise EBS '
s procedures; conduct training to assure proper coordination of messages, access to EBS and notification of local of fic-ials prior to release of EBS messages.
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- 2.
Description:
The protective action recom- /
mendations associated with the General Emergency Posture Codes Bravo and Alpha do not provide local of ficials with enough guidance to make appropriate decisions, nor do they . require coordination of actions ,
with other local and state of ficials. For example, East Lyme activated their siren l and simulated an EBS message recommending that residents within 2-miles of the plant shelter. Approximately 15-minutes later a State EBS messaFe recommended evacuation 7 of residents within 2-miles of the plant.
l (NUREG-0654, II, D.4).
l Recommendation: The state should revise the posture codes to provide enough guidance so local of ficials can make apropriate decisions that have been coordinated with other local and s tate of ficials.
- 3.
Description:
No instructions were given to parents about evacuation procedures for ;
schoolchildren. (NUREG-0654, II,
' J.10.k; E. 7).
- Recommendation: Emergency messages should include specific instructions about evacuation ,
of schoolchildren so as to avoid having parents .
go to the schools to get their children and cause traf fic congestion.
, 4.
Description:
The DEP monitoring teams have not been trained to use their protective
! equipment in the presence of iodine.
l (NUREG-0654, II, 0.5) l l Recommendation: It is recommended that the SOPS f or use of protective equipment for monitoring teams be revised.
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DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (continued) STATE COMMENTS i
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Description:
There is some question as to the ef fectiveness of access control as demonstrated.' Individual troopere said that they alone could not handle -
l access and traf fic control, but no ef forts were made to supplement them. '
(NUREG-0654, II, J.10.g: J.10.k).
Recommendat ion : The state police commander l
l in the State EOC should make sure that re-sources for adequately manning access con- ,j trol can be obtained and demonstrated. /
- 6.
Description:
State police assigned for access control were not furnished with' .
sufficient dosimeters or survey instru-sents, and did not understand their use. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3.a: K.3. b)
Recommendation: Provide proper radiolog-ical monitoring equipment for all emerg-gency workers and train them in its use.
!- % 7.
Description:
The state. decontamination f
f acility at Norwich State Hos'pital was not well suited for this function; there l was no separation of clean and contaminated
! areas, no areas for registration, and no l . ' evidence of shift change capability.
(NUREG-0654, II, K.5,6)
Recommendation: Facilities to be used for emergency workers should be equipped and
. arranged for properly handling decontamin-ation.
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Description:
The Governor's P10 did not have sufficient staff and had to handle I routine clerical duties and answer tele-
- phones which would impose an impossible burden on the PIO in a real emergency. !
(NUREG-0654, II, G.4.a )
Recommendation: Provide the Governor's PlO with an assistant or clerk.
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- 9.
Description:
Nearly an hour and a half elapsed between the declaration of a General Emergency and the press briefing.
(NUREG-0654, II . G.3.a)
Re commen da t ion : Report important infor-mation to the media with less delay.
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DEFICIENCIES AND REC 0KHENDATIONS (Continued) STATE COMMENTS
- 10.
Description:
There was confusion about protective actions to be taken at the General Emergency caused by -
confusion about whether the protective action was a recommendat' ion or an orde r. The plan for implementing '
actions was not followed. -
(NUREG-0654, II, J.10)
Recommendation: Provide training as needed to make the E0C s taf f f amiliar with the plans for implementing pro- f tective actions. Whether the protec- #
tive action given was an order or a recommenda tion was irrelevant in this instance.
- 11.
Description:
No instructions for the use of dosimeters or for record keeping pro-cedures were given, no place was estab-lished for decontamination, and the staff had no knowledge about the use of KI.
(NUREG-0654, II, K.3.b; J.10.a; and
.K.5.a)
- 12.
Description:
EBS messages for instructing the ~ public did not include instructions for the parents of school children.
. (NUREG-0654, II, E. 6. )
Recommendation: Use pre-scripted messages for parents and school of ficials to inform them about evacuation procedures for school children.
- 13.
Description:
Dosimeters were not issued and radiation exposure record keeping was not simula ted or demonstrated.
(NUREC-0654, II, K. 3. )
Recommenda t ion : Demonstrate adequate training in use of dosinetery and record keeping.
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Description:
There was an insuf ficient supply of direct reading dosimeters which are needed by emergency wo rke rs.
(NUREG-0654, II, K.3 )
Re commenda t ion : Supply Old Lyme with more low-level dosi eters, such as the 0-5R type which have been ordered by the State Dept.
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' DEFICIENCIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (centinuad) STATE COMMENTS 15.., Description,:. Radiological equipment and. training in radiological exposure control and procedures are not suf-ficient. (NUREG-0654, II, K.3)
Recommendation: See that Fisher's Island is properly equipped and that EOC personnel are trained in radio- ,
logical exposure control procedures. -
- 16.
Description:
The two major, secure and extremely sensitive laboratories on the island, which cannot be left unmanned, do not have filters on the air intake ;)
system. (NUREG-0654, II, J.10.d) '
Recommendation: Install filters on air intakes or develop procedures and obtain equipment for other methods to protect the emergency worker from excessive exposure.
- 17.
Description:
There was no two-way com-munications from Plum Island with the States of New York and Connecticut except
- by commercial and FTS telephones.
(NUREG-0654, II, F.1.a)
Recommendation: Direct two-way radio capability for communicating with the
. emergency response organizations of the States of New York and Connecticut would enhance response capability.
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_0F EXERCISE OBJECTIVES e
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APPENDIX A Page 1 of 4 pares MILLSTONE NUC1. EAR POWER STATION STATUS OF EXERCISE OBJECTIVES -
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f EXERCISE Ma r 19 ' 82 Oct 10 '83 Oct 22 '84 OBJECTIVE Exercise Exercise Exercise
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- 1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize P P P staff and activate facilities promptly.
- 2. Demonstrate ability to fully P P P staff facilities and maintain staf fing around the clock.
- 3. Demonstrate ability to make P P P decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
- 4. 7 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities '
l Q P PS and displays to support emergency ope rations.
- 5. Demonstrate ability to communicate R Q P with all appropriate locations, crganizations, and field personnel.
- 6. ' Demonstrate ability to mobilize P P NP and deploy field monitoring team in a ticely fashion.
- 7. Demonstrate appropriate equipment P P P and procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.
- d. Demonstrate appropriate equipment P P' P and procedures for measurecent of l airborne radioiodine concentrations i a s low a s 10~7 uCi/CC in the presence of noble gases.
- 9. Demonstrate appropriate couinment S Q P and procedures for collection, t rans po rt, and analyses of samples of soil, vegetation, snow, wa t e r, and milk.
3 APPENDIX A c ,. %
4 Pega 2 of 4 pag 2s ' '
EXERCISE Ma r 19 ' 82 Oct 10 '83 Oct 22 '84 OBJECTIVE Exe rcise Exercise Exercise
- 10. Demons trate ability to project ' P P P -
dosage to the public via plune '
exposure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAG's, available shelter, evacuation time estimtes, and all other appropriate factors. jf
- 11. Demonstrate ability to project N N N dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on ,
, PAG's and other relevant f a cto rs.
- 12. Demonstrate ability to implement N N N protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards.
13.' Demons trate ability to alert the R P P public within the 10-mile EPZ. and disseminatg an intial instructional message, within 15 minutes.
14.- Demonstrate ability to formulate Q S 0 and distribute appropriate ins tructions to the public, in a timely fashion.
- 15. Demonstrate the organizational O P P ability and resources necessary to manage an orde rly evacuation
, of all or part of the plune EPZ.
- 16. Demons trate the organiza tional N N N ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traf fic obs tructions.
- 17. Demonstrate the organiza tional P P 0 ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.
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APPENDIX A Page 3 of 4 Pages EXERCISE Ma r 19 ' 82 Oct 10 '83 Oct 22 '84 OBJECTIVE Exe rcise Exercise Exe rcise
- 18. Demons trate the organiza tional N* N*' N -
e ability and resources necessary to ef fect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals within the plume EPZ.
- 19. Demons trate the organiza tional P3 N N ,.Y ability and resources necessary to ef fect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ.
- 20. Demonstrate ability to continuously
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Q Q Q monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
- 21. Demons trate the ability to mahe the Z N 'N decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to
- emergency workers and/or the general population.
- 22. Demonstrate the ability to supply 0 N N and adndnister KI, once the decision has' been made to do so.
- 23. Demonstrate ability to ef fect an N N N orderly evacuation of on site pe rsonnel.
24 Demonstrate ability to brief the P O O media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.
2[. Demonstrate ability to provide P! P2 P advance coordination of information '
released.
2 b. Demonstrate ability to establish P N N and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
2 7. Demons trate adequacy of procedures P N N' for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.
- 26. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities P P4 N for mass care of evacuees.
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Paga 4 cf 4 pse2s EXERCISE - Mar 19 '82 Oct 1 0 '83 Oct 22 '84 OBJECTIVE Exe rcise Exercise Exercise 29., Demonstrate adequate eauipment, P P Q and procedures for decontandnation -
of emergency workers, eouipnent ,
and vehicles.
- 30. Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance P S N -
facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.
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- 31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital Q S N facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.
- 32. Demonstrate ability to identify need N P P for, request, and obtain Federal -
assistance.- ,
33'. Demonstrate ability to relocate to N N N and operate the alternate EOF /EOC.
- 34. Denonstrate ability to estimate N N N total popula tion exposure.
3 5. Demons trate ability to de termine P P P and implement appropriate measures
-tor ' controlled recove ry and re-entry.
P1 Simulated P2 Activity demonstrated (Rumor Control Nurber not published or used)
P3 Town of Waterford demonstrated activity.
P4 Mass Care f acility which was used during exercise was not the one which would be used during a real event.
P5 Space for DEP Radiation Control Unit at State EOC needs to be enlarged N*' Identified lack of specific evacuation plans for nobilitv-impaired in the City of Groton and Old Savbrook.
LBGEND:
, N Not an exe rcise objective N* Not an exercise objective; corrective action identified N' Not an objectivel capability demonstrated P Ubjective; capability demonstrated P* Objectives capability denonstrated; minor problem identified Q corrective action identified R
Objective , demons Si gn if ican tra tepi ,de'ntif f'ed (1982. Exercise) t deficiency i
S tot obse rved by FEMA ,
Z Objective, capability nbt"derenstrated.J l
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