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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217P3791999-10-21021 October 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396 & NRC Form 398 for Renewal of Licenses SOP-20607-1 & SOP-20610-1.Without Encls ML20217N2521999-10-20020 October 1999 Provides Supplemental Info Re 990405 Containment Insp Program Requests for Relief RR-L-1 & RR-L-2,in Response to 991013 Telcon with NRC ML20217K7541999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Unit 1,Cycle 9 & Unit 2 Cycle 7 Colrs,Iaw Requirements of TS 5.6.5.Figure 5, Axial Flux Difference Limits as Function of Percent of Rated Thermal Power for RAOC, Was Revised for Both Units ML20217G6751999-10-13013 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Info Contained in Application for Amend to OLs to Implement Relaxations Allowed by WCAP-14333-P-A,rev 1 ML20217G1071999-10-0707 October 1999 Informs That on 990930,NRC Staff Completed mid-cycle PPR of Vogtle & Did Not Identify Any Areas in Which Performance Warranted More than Core Insp Program.Nrc Plans to Conduct Core Insps at Facility Over Next Six Months ML20216J9041999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20216J9161999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990723 RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20217B0141999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-424/99-06 & 50-425/99-06 on 990725- 0904 at Vogtle Units 1 & 2 Reactor Facilities.Determined That One Violation Occurred & Being Treated as non-cited Violation ML20212E8751999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Description of Methods Used to Comply with Std Along with Most Recent Test Results Encl ML20212E7481999-09-20020 September 1999 Requests Approval Per 10CFR50.55a to Use Alternative Method for Determining Qualified Life of Certain BOP Diaphragm Valves than That Specified in Code Case N-31.Proposed Alternative,Encl ML20212C2191999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, Which Is Current Need for NRC Operator Licensing Exams for Years 2000 Through 2003 of Plant Vogtle,Per Administrative Ltr 99-03 ML20211Q4801999-09-0101 September 1999 Informs That on 990812-13,Region II Hosted Training Managers Conference on Recent Changes to Operator Licensing Program. List of Attendees,Copy of Slide Presentations & List of Questions Received from Participants Encl ML20211J5291999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Snoc Copyright Notice Dtd 990825,re Production of Engineering Drawings Ref in VEGP UFSAR ML20211J5251999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990727 RAI Re GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20211J7381999-08-27027 August 1999 Informs That Licensee Vessel Data Is Different than NRC Database Based on Listed Info,Per 990722 Request to Review Rvid ML20211E9251999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1999,as Required by 10CFR26.71(d).Data Reflected in Rept Covers Employees at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant ML20210V0881999-08-16016 August 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-424/99-05 & 50-425/99-05 on 990620- 0724.No Violations Noted.Vogtle Facility Generally Characterized by safety-conscious Operations,Sound Engineering & Maintenance Practices ML20210Q4611999-08-0505 August 1999 Informs That NRC Plans to Administer Generic Fundamentals Exam Section of Written Operator Licensing Exam on 991006 for Vogtle.Requests Info Re Individuals Who Will Take Exam. Sample Registration Ltr Encl ML20210L2181999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396 & Form 398 for Renewal of Listed Licenses,Iaw 10CFR55.57.Without Encl ML20210N1191999-08-0202 August 1999 Discusses 990727 Telcon Between Rs Baldwin & R Brown Re Administration of Licensing Exam at Facility During Wk of 991213 ML20210G3351999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Second Request for Addl Info Re GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20210E0121999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards Second Request for Addl Info Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20210D9341999-07-22022 July 1999 Discusses Closure of TACs MA0581 & MA0582,response to Requests for Info in GL 92-01,rev 1,suppl 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity ML20210C8011999-07-21021 July 1999 Provides Response to NRC AL 99-02,which Requests That Addressees Submit Info Pertaining to Estimates of Number of Licensing Actions That Will Be Submitted for NRC Review for Upcoming Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20210E0431999-07-15015 July 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-424/99-04 & 50-425/99-04 on 990502- 0619.Two Violations of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violations Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20209H3881999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Revs 1 & 2 to ISI Program Second 10-Year Interval Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 & 2 ML20209C4041999-07-0101 July 1999 Forwards Rev 29 to VEGP Units 1 & 2 Emergency Plan.Rev 29 Incorporates Design Change Associated with Consolidation of Er Facilities Computer & Protues Computer.Justifications for Changes & Insertion Instructions Are Encl ML20196H8081999-06-28028 June 1999 Discusses 990528 Meeting Re Results of Periodic PPR for Period of Feb 1997 to Jan 1999.List of Attendees Encl ML20212J2521999-06-21021 June 1999 Responds to NRC RAI Re Yr 2000 Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants.Gl 98-01 Requested Response on Status of Facility Y2K Readiness by 990701 ML20196F9171999-06-21021 June 1999 Forwards Owner Rept for ISI for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Unit 1 Eighth Maint/Refueling Outage. Separate Submittal Will Not Be Made to NRC on SG Tubes Inspected During Subj Outage ML20195F8031999-06-11011 June 1999 Forwards Changes to VEGP Unit 1 Emergency Response Data Sys (ERDS) Data Point Library.Changes Were Completed on 990308 While Unit 1 Was SD for Refueling Outage ML20207E7421999-06-0303 June 1999 Refers to from NRC Which Issued Personnel Assignment Ltr to Inform of Lm Padovan Assignment as Project Manager for Farley Npp.Reissues Ltr with Effective Date Corrected to 990525 ML20207F6201999-06-0202 June 1999 Sixth Partial Response to FOIA Request for Documents.Records in App J Encl & Will Be Available in Pdr.App K Records Withheld in Part (Ref FOIA Exemptions 7) & App L Records Completely Withheld (Ref FOIA Exemption 7) ML20207D9861999-05-28028 May 1999 Informs That,Effective 990325,LM Padovan Was Assigned as Project Manager for Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20207D2701999-05-19019 May 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-424/99-03 & 50-425/99-03 on 990321- 0501.One Violation of NRC Requirements Identified & Being Treated as non-cited Violation Consistent with App C of Enforcement Policy ML20206M5141999-05-11011 May 1999 Informs That NRC Ofc of Nuclear Regulation Reorganized Effective 990328.As Part of Reorganization,Div of Licensing Project Mgt Created.Rl Emch Section Chief for Vogtle. Reorganization Chart Encl ML20206U4061999-05-11011 May 1999 Confirms Telcon with J Bailey Re Mgt Meeting Scheduled for 990528 to Discuss Results of Periodic Plant Performance Review for Plan Nuclear Facility Fo Period of Feb 1997 - Jan 1999 05000424/LER-1998-006, Forwards LER 98-006-03 Re Motor Control Ctr Breaker Buckets Not Being Seismically Qualified.Rev Is Submitted to Document Results of Seismic Testing That Demonstrated That No Condition Outside Design Basis of TS Requirements Exi1999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards LER 98-006-03 Re Motor Control Ctr Breaker Buckets Not Being Seismically Qualified.Rev Is Submitted to Document Results of Seismic Testing That Demonstrated That No Condition Outside Design Basis of TS Requirements Existed ML20206D6411999-04-29029 April 1999 Forwards Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Radiological Environ Operating Rept for 1998 & Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 & 2 1998 Annual Rept Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept ML20206D5881999-04-29029 April 1999 Forwards Rept Which Summarizes Effects of Changes & Errors in ECCS Evaluation Models on PCT for 1998,per Requirements of 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(ii).Rept Results Will Be Incorporated Into Next FSAR Update ML20206D6951999-04-28028 April 1999 Provides Update of Plans for VEGP MOV Periodic Verification Program Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs ML20206C2241999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.Page E2-2 Was Iandvertently Omitted from Previously Submitted Rept on 990413 ML20206A6371999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards SE Authorizing Licensee Re Rev 9 to First 10-yr ISI Interval Program Plan & Associated Requests for Relief (RR) 65 from ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code ML20205Q3351999-04-15015 April 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-424/99-02 & 50-425/99-02 on 990214-0320.Three Violations Identified & Being Treated as Non-Cited Violations ML20205T2351999-04-0909 April 1999 Informs That on 990317,B Brown & Ho Christensen Confirmed Initial Operator Licensing Exam Scheduled for Y2K.Initial Exam Date Scheduled for Wk of 991213 for Approx 10 Candidates ML20205K7501999-04-0505 April 1999 Informs That Effective 990329,NRC Project Mgt Responsibility for Plant Has Been Transferred from Dh Jaffe to R Assa ML20209A3741999-04-0505 April 1999 Submits Several Requests for Relief for Plant from Code Requirements Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) & (g)(5)(iii).NRC Is Respectfully Requested to Approve Requests Prior to Jan 1,2000 ML20205H3481999-03-31031 March 1999 Forwards Georgia Power Co,Oglethorpe Power Corp,Municipal Electric Authority of Ga & City of Dalton,Ga Status of Decommissioning Funding for Each Reactor or Part of Reactor Owned for OLs NPF-68 & NPF-81 ML20205F9091999-03-29029 March 1999 Submits Rept of Number of SG Tubes Plugged During Plant Eighth Maintenance/Refueling Outage (1R8).Inservice Insps Were Completed on SGs 1 & 4 on 990315.No Tubes Were Plugged ML20205G0761999-03-26026 March 1999 Provides Results of Individual Monitoring for 1998.Encl Media Contains All Info Required by Form NRC 5.Without Encl 1999-09-20
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARML20217P3791999-10-21021 October 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396 & NRC Form 398 for Renewal of Licenses SOP-20607-1 & SOP-20610-1.Without Encls ML20217N2521999-10-20020 October 1999 Provides Supplemental Info Re 990405 Containment Insp Program Requests for Relief RR-L-1 & RR-L-2,in Response to 991013 Telcon with NRC ML20217K7541999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Rev 1 to Unit 1,Cycle 9 & Unit 2 Cycle 7 Colrs,Iaw Requirements of TS 5.6.5.Figure 5, Axial Flux Difference Limits as Function of Percent of Rated Thermal Power for RAOC, Was Revised for Both Units ML20217G6751999-10-13013 October 1999 Requests Withholding of Proprietary Info Contained in Application for Amend to OLs to Implement Relaxations Allowed by WCAP-14333-P-A,rev 1 ML20216J9161999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990723 RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of SR Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20216J9041999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Response to RAI Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves ML20212E7481999-09-20020 September 1999 Requests Approval Per 10CFR50.55a to Use Alternative Method for Determining Qualified Life of Certain BOP Diaphragm Valves than That Specified in Code Case N-31.Proposed Alternative,Encl ML20212E8751999-09-20020 September 1999 Forwards Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear Grade Activated Charcoal. Description of Methods Used to Comply with Std Along with Most Recent Test Results Encl ML20212C2191999-09-16016 September 1999 Forwards NRC Form 536, Operator Licensing Exam Data, Which Is Current Need for NRC Operator Licensing Exams for Years 2000 Through 2003 of Plant Vogtle,Per Administrative Ltr 99-03 ML20211J5291999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Snoc Copyright Notice Dtd 990825,re Production of Engineering Drawings Ref in VEGP UFSAR ML20211J5251999-08-30030 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990727 RAI Re GL 96-06, Assurance of Equipment Operability & Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions ML20211J7381999-08-27027 August 1999 Informs That Licensee Vessel Data Is Different than NRC Database Based on Listed Info,Per 990722 Request to Review Rvid ML20211E9251999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards fitness-for-duty Performance Data for Jan-June 1999,as Required by 10CFR26.71(d).Data Reflected in Rept Covers Employees at Vogtle Electric Generating Plant ML20210L2181999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards NRC Form 396 & Form 398 for Renewal of Listed Licenses,Iaw 10CFR55.57.Without Encl ML20210C8011999-07-21021 July 1999 Provides Response to NRC AL 99-02,which Requests That Addressees Submit Info Pertaining to Estimates of Number of Licensing Actions That Will Be Submitted for NRC Review for Upcoming Fy 2000 & 2001 ML20209H3881999-07-14014 July 1999 Forwards Revs 1 & 2 to ISI Program Second 10-Year Interval Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 & 2 ML20209C4041999-07-0101 July 1999 Forwards Rev 29 to VEGP Units 1 & 2 Emergency Plan.Rev 29 Incorporates Design Change Associated with Consolidation of Er Facilities Computer & Protues Computer.Justifications for Changes & Insertion Instructions Are Encl ML20196F9171999-06-21021 June 1999 Forwards Owner Rept for ISI for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Unit 1 Eighth Maint/Refueling Outage. Separate Submittal Will Not Be Made to NRC on SG Tubes Inspected During Subj Outage ML20212J2521999-06-21021 June 1999 Responds to NRC RAI Re Yr 2000 Readiness at Nuclear Power Plants.Gl 98-01 Requested Response on Status of Facility Y2K Readiness by 990701 ML20195F8031999-06-11011 June 1999 Forwards Changes to VEGP Unit 1 Emergency Response Data Sys (ERDS) Data Point Library.Changes Were Completed on 990308 While Unit 1 Was SD for Refueling Outage 05000424/LER-1998-006, Forwards LER 98-006-03 Re Motor Control Ctr Breaker Buckets Not Being Seismically Qualified.Rev Is Submitted to Document Results of Seismic Testing That Demonstrated That No Condition Outside Design Basis of TS Requirements Exi1999-05-10010 May 1999 Forwards LER 98-006-03 Re Motor Control Ctr Breaker Buckets Not Being Seismically Qualified.Rev Is Submitted to Document Results of Seismic Testing That Demonstrated That No Condition Outside Design Basis of TS Requirements Existed ML20206D5881999-04-29029 April 1999 Forwards Rept Which Summarizes Effects of Changes & Errors in ECCS Evaluation Models on PCT for 1998,per Requirements of 10CFR50.46(a)(3)(ii).Rept Results Will Be Incorporated Into Next FSAR Update ML20206D6411999-04-29029 April 1999 Forwards Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Radiological Environ Operating Rept for 1998 & Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 & 2 1998 Annual Rept Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept ML20206D6951999-04-28028 April 1999 Provides Update of Plans for VEGP MOV Periodic Verification Program Re GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Movs ML20206C2241999-04-21021 April 1999 Forwards Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.Page E2-2 Was Iandvertently Omitted from Previously Submitted Rept on 990413 ML20209A3741999-04-0505 April 1999 Submits Several Requests for Relief for Plant from Code Requirements Pursuant to 10CFR50.55a(a)(3) & (g)(5)(iii).NRC Is Respectfully Requested to Approve Requests Prior to Jan 1,2000 ML20205H3481999-03-31031 March 1999 Forwards Georgia Power Co,Oglethorpe Power Corp,Municipal Electric Authority of Ga & City of Dalton,Ga Status of Decommissioning Funding for Each Reactor or Part of Reactor Owned for OLs NPF-68 & NPF-81 ML20205F9091999-03-29029 March 1999 Submits Rept of Number of SG Tubes Plugged During Plant Eighth Maintenance/Refueling Outage (1R8).Inservice Insps Were Completed on SGs 1 & 4 on 990315.No Tubes Were Plugged ML20205G0761999-03-26026 March 1999 Provides Results of Individual Monitoring for 1998.Encl Media Contains All Info Required by Form NRC 5.Without Encl ML20205H4051999-03-25025 March 1999 Forwards Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Each Reactor or Part of Reactor Owned for OLs NPF-68 & NPF-81,as Requested IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1) ML20205H3891999-03-25025 March 1999 Forwards Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Each Reactor or Part of Reactor Owned for OLs NPF-68 & NPF-81,as Requested IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1).Page 2 in Third Amend Power Sales Contract of Incoming Submittal Not Included ML20205A9441999-03-25025 March 1999 Forwards VEGP Unit 1 Cycle 9 Colr,Per TS 5.6.5.d ML20205H3811999-03-24024 March 1999 Forwards Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Each Reactor or Part of Reactor Owned for OLs NPF-68 & NPF-81,as Requested IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1) ML20205H3621999-03-22022 March 1999 Forwards Info on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Each Reactor or Part of Reactor Owned for OLs NPF-68 & NPF-81, as Requested IAW 10CFR50.75(f)(1) ML20204G4361999-03-18018 March 1999 Forwards Summary Rept of Present Level & Source of on-site Property Damage Insurance Coverage for Vegp,Iaw Requirements of 10CFR50.54(w)(3) ML20204C0591999-03-17017 March 1999 Forwards Rev 0 to WCAP-15160, Evaluation of Pressurized Thermal Shock for Vegp,Unit 2 & Rev 0 to WCAP-15159, Analysis of Capsule X from Vegp,Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program ML20207K9551999-03-11011 March 1999 Forwards Response to Rai,Pertaining to Positive Alcohol Test of Licensed Operator.Encl Info Provided for NRC Use in Evaluation of Fitness for Duty Occurrence.Encl Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790(a)(6) ML20207L9721999-03-10010 March 1999 Forwards Rev 15 to EPIP 91104-C of Manual Set 6 of Vogtle Epips.Without Encl ML20207B0191999-02-25025 February 1999 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for six-month Reporting Period 980701-1231,IAW 10CFR26.71(d) 05000424/LER-1998-009, Forwards LER 98-009-00 Re Event in Which Improper Testing Method Resulted in Inadequate Surveillances on 9812291999-01-27027 January 1999 Forwards LER 98-009-00 Re Event in Which Improper Testing Method Resulted in Inadequate Surveillances on 981229 ML20199F7701999-01-13013 January 1999 Submits Revised Response to RAI Re Licensee 980713 Proposed Amend to Ts,Eliminating Periodic Response Time Testing Requirements on Selected Sensors & Protection Channels. Corrected Copy of Table,Encl ML20199F7981999-01-13013 January 1999 Forwards Corrected Pages to VEGP-2 ISI Summary Rept for Spring 1998 Maint/Refueling Outage. Change Bar in Margin of Affected Pages Denotes Changes to Rept ML20199G1381999-01-13013 January 1999 Forwards Copy of Permit Renewal Application Package for NPDES Permit Number GA0026786,per Section 3.2 of VP Environ Protection Plan 05000424/LER-1998-007, Forwards LER 98-007-00,re Inadequate Surveillances Due to Improperly Performed Response Time Testing,On 981215,IAW 10CFR50.731999-01-13013 January 1999 Forwards LER 98-007-00,re Inadequate Surveillances Due to Improperly Performed Response Time Testing,On 981215,IAW 10CFR50.73 ML20198F6131998-12-18018 December 1998 Forwards Revised Certification of Medical Exam Form for License SOP-21147.Licensee Being Treated for Hypertension. Util Requests That Individual License Be Amended to Reflect Change in Status ML20198L6631998-12-18018 December 1998 Forwards Amend 37 to Physical Security & Contingency Plan. Encl 1 Provides Description & Justification for Changes & Encl 2 Contains Actual Amend 37 Pages.Amend Withheld,Per 10CFR73.21 ML20198D9291998-12-16016 December 1998 Forwards Requested Info Re Request to Revise TSs Elimination of Periodic Pressure Sensor Response Time Tests & Elimination of Periodic Protection Channel Response Time Tests ML20198D9991998-12-16016 December 1998 Forwards Responses to 980916 RAI Re Response to GL 97-01, Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle & Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations ML20198D8171998-12-14014 December 1998 Forwards NRC Form 396 & Form 398 for Renewal of License OP-20993.Without Encls ML20206N3051998-12-0808 December 1998 Submits RAI Re Replacement of Nuclear Instrument Sys Source & Intermediate Range Channels & post-accident Neutron Flux Monitoring Sys 1999-09-20
[Table view] Category:UTILITY TO NRC
MONTHYEARELV-02056, Forwards Operator Exam Schedule for Facility,Per Generic Ltr 90-07 Request,Including Number of Candidates to Be Examined During NRC Site Visits,Requalification Schedules & Number of Candidates to Participate in Generic Fundamentals Exam1990-09-0606 September 1990 Forwards Operator Exam Schedule for Facility,Per Generic Ltr 90-07 Request,Including Number of Candidates to Be Examined During NRC Site Visits,Requalification Schedules & Number of Candidates to Participate in Generic Fundamentals Exam ELV-01599, Discusses Mods to HED-1114 Re Plant Dcrdr,Per . Amber Monitor Light Covers Installed for Spare Pumps to Make Status of Pumps Readily Apparent to Operator1990-09-0404 September 1990 Discusses Mods to HED-1114 Re Plant Dcrdr,Per . Amber Monitor Light Covers Installed for Spare Pumps to Make Status of Pumps Readily Apparent to Operator ELV-02059, Clarifies 900409 Response to 900323 Confirmation of Action Ltr.Util Made 31 Successful Start Attempts for Diesel Generator (DG) 1A & 29 Successful Start Attempts for DG 1B1990-08-30030 August 1990 Clarifies 900409 Response to 900323 Confirmation of Action Ltr.Util Made 31 Successful Start Attempts for Diesel Generator (DG) 1A & 29 Successful Start Attempts for DG 1B ELV-01956, Forwards Listed Documents in Response to Request for Addl Info Re Settlement Monitoring Program,Per 900614 Request1990-08-30030 August 1990 Forwards Listed Documents in Response to Request for Addl Info Re Settlement Monitoring Program,Per 900614 Request ELV-02050, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-424/90-08 & 50-425/90-08.Corrective Actions:Administrative Procedures Controlling Verification & Validation of Emergency Operating Procedures Will Be Evaluated & Revised as Required1990-08-30030 August 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-424/90-08 & 50-425/90-08.Corrective Actions:Administrative Procedures Controlling Verification & Validation of Emergency Operating Procedures Will Be Evaluated & Revised as Required ELV-02028, Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for First Six Month Period,Per 10CFR26.71(d)1990-08-22022 August 1990 Forwards Fitness for Duty Performance Data for First Six Month Period,Per 10CFR26.71(d) ELV-02022, Forwards Revised LER Re Apparent Personnel Error Leading to Unsecured Safeguards Info.Ler Withheld1990-08-22022 August 1990 Forwards Revised LER Re Apparent Personnel Error Leading to Unsecured Safeguards Info.Ler Withheld ELV-02027, Forwards Rev 0 to Core Operating Limits Rept, for Cycle 3, Per Amends 32 & 12 to Licenses NPF-68 & NPF-79,respectively1990-08-20020 August 1990 Forwards Rev 0 to Core Operating Limits Rept, for Cycle 3, Per Amends 32 & 12 to Licenses NPF-68 & NPF-79,respectively ELV-01973, Submits Rept Re Results of Leakage Exams Conducted During Spring 1990 Refueling Outage,Per TMI Item III.D.1.1.None of Identified Leakage Considered Excessive.Work Orders Issued in Effort to Reduce Leakage to Level as Low Practical1990-08-14014 August 1990 Submits Rept Re Results of Leakage Exams Conducted During Spring 1990 Refueling Outage,Per TMI Item III.D.1.1.None of Identified Leakage Considered Excessive.Work Orders Issued in Effort to Reduce Leakage to Level as Low Practical ELV-01918, Responds to NRC 900612 Request for Comments & Suggestions on Draft risk-based Insp Guide.Util Conducting Individual Plant Exam & Will Withhold Comment on risk-based Insp Guide Until Completion1990-08-0303 August 1990 Responds to NRC 900612 Request for Comments & Suggestions on Draft risk-based Insp Guide.Util Conducting Individual Plant Exam & Will Withhold Comment on risk-based Insp Guide Until Completion ELV-01943, Responds to Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Insp Repts 50-424/90-11 & 50-425/90-11.Corrective Action: Complete Audit of Contents of Safeguards Info Container Performed & Unassigned Safeguards Info Dispositioned1990-07-27027 July 1990 Responds to Violation & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in Insp Repts 50-424/90-11 & 50-425/90-11.Corrective Action: Complete Audit of Contents of Safeguards Info Container Performed & Unassigned Safeguards Info Dispositioned ELV-01949, Forwards Info Re Status of Pen Branch Fault Investigation. Investigations Conducted So Far Still Indicate That Pen Branch Fault Not Capable1990-07-26026 July 1990 Forwards Info Re Status of Pen Branch Fault Investigation. Investigations Conducted So Far Still Indicate That Pen Branch Fault Not Capable ELV-01500, Forwards Nuclear Decommissioning Funding Plan for Plant.Info Provides Assurance That NRC Prescribed Min Funding Will Be Available to Decommission Facilities1990-07-25025 July 1990 Forwards Nuclear Decommissioning Funding Plan for Plant.Info Provides Assurance That NRC Prescribed Min Funding Will Be Available to Decommission Facilities ML20055H6441990-07-23023 July 1990 Submits Summary of Snubber Types & Sample Plans for Functional Testing to Be Performed During Sept 1990 Outage ML20044B0311990-07-13013 July 1990 Forwards Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 1 Reactor Containment Bldg 1990 Integrated Leakage Rate Test Final Rept. ML20044B1541990-07-12012 July 1990 Responds to NRC 900612 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-424/90-08 & 50-425/90-08.Corrective Actions:Eop Step Deviation Documents to Be Upgraded,Adding More Justification & Temporary Change Issued to Correct EOP Deficiencies ELV-01867, Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-424/90-10 & 50-425/90-10.Corrective Action:Level Indication Error Corrected After Discrepancy Discovered1990-07-12012 July 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-424/90-10 & 50-425/90-10.Corrective Action:Level Indication Error Corrected After Discrepancy Discovered ML20055F1651990-07-0909 July 1990 Forwards Comments Re NUREG-1410 ELV-01858, Advises That Full Compliance W/Violation Will Not Be Achieved Until Nov 1990,when Evaluation of VP-2693 Complete1990-07-0606 July 1990 Advises That Full Compliance W/Violation Will Not Be Achieved Until Nov 1990,when Evaluation of VP-2693 Complete ML20044A8851990-07-0606 July 1990 Forwards Response to NRC Question on Steam Generator Level Instrumentation Setpoints,Per Revised Instrument Line Tap Locations.Tap Location Will Be Changed from Above Transition Cone to Below Transition Cone ELV-01834, Forwards Response & Comments to Regulatory Effectiveness Review Rept.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21)1990-06-28028 June 1990 Forwards Response & Comments to Regulatory Effectiveness Review Rept.Encl Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20044A2791990-06-25025 June 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 90-04, Request for Info on Status of Licensee Implementation of Generic Safety Issues Resolved W/Imposition of Requirements or Corrective Actions. Table Indicating Status of Each Generic Safety Issue Encl ML20043J0171990-06-22022 June 1990 Discusses Corrective Actions for Plant Site Area Emergency, Per 900514 Ltr.Jacket Water High Temp Switches Calibr for Diesel Generators,Using Revised Calibr Procedure ML20043H3061990-06-15015 June 1990 Forwards Rev 3 to ISI-P-014, Inservice Insp Program, for Review & Approval,Per Tech Spec 4.0.5 Re Surveillance Requirements.Rev Includes Withdrawal of Relief Requests RR-45,47,48 & 54 ML20043G2071990-06-12012 June 1990 Forwards Amend 18 to Physical Security & Contingency Plan. Amend Withheld (Ref 10CFR73.21) ML20043G1021990-06-0606 June 1990 Requests Temporary Waiver of Compliance from Requirements of Action Statement 27 of Tech Spec 3.3.2 for Period of 6 H When Two Operating Control Room Emergency Filtration Sys Trains Shut Down for Required Testing ML20043E6901990-06-0505 June 1990 Forwards Rev 12 to Emergency Plan & Detailed Description & Justification of Changes.W/O Rev ML20043G7651990-06-0505 June 1990 Forwards Rev 13 to Emergency Plan & Description & Justification of Changes ML20043B5991990-05-25025 May 1990 Forwards Scope & Objectives Re 1990 Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise to Be Conducted on 900801 ML20043B5981990-05-24024 May 1990 Responds to Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-424/90-05 on 900217-0330.Corrective Actions:Locked Valve Procedure Revised to Eliminate Utilization of Hold Tag on Valves Required by Tech Specs to Be Secured in Position ML20043B6291990-05-22022 May 1990 Forwards Rev 5 to ISI-P-008, Inservice Testing Program, Per Tech Specs 4.0.5 Re Surveillance Requirements & Generic Ltr 89-04 ML20043B6351990-05-22022 May 1990 Forwards Rev 2 to ISI-P-016, Inservice Testing Program, Per Generic Ltr 89-04, Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs. ML20042H0601990-05-14014 May 1990 Forwards Summary of Corrective Actions for 900320 Site Area Emergency Due to Loss of Offsite Power Concurrent W/Loss of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Capability.Truck Driver Disciplined for Lack of Attention ML20042G7301990-05-11011 May 1990 Forwards Revised Pages for May 1989,Jan & Mar 1990 Monthly Operating Repts for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant,Units 1 & 2.Revs Necessary Due to Errors Discovered in Ref Repts ML20042E2911990-04-18018 April 1990 Forwards Amend 17 to Security Plan.Amend Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20042E7481990-04-0909 April 1990 Requests Approval to Return Facility to Mode 2 & Subsequent Power Operation,Per 900320 Event Re Loss of Offsite Power Concurrent W/Loss of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Capability ML20012E9001990-03-28028 March 1990 Provides Supplemental Response to Station Blackout Rule,Per NUMARC 900104 Request.Mods & Associated Procedure Changes Identified in Sections B & C W/Exception of Mods to Seals Will Be Completed 1 Yr from Acceptance of Analysis ML20012E8581990-03-28028 March 1990 Suppls Response to NRC Bulletin 88-010,Suppl 1 Re Traceability Reviews on Molded Case Circuit Breakers Installed in safety-related Applications.All Breakers Procured & Installed in Class 1E Equipment Reviewed ML20012E9761990-03-27027 March 1990 Requests Withdrawal of Inservice Insp Relief Requests RR-45, RR-47,RR-48 & Conditional Withdrawal of RR-54 Based on Reasons Discussed in Encl,Per 900206 Conference Call ML20012D8561990-03-22022 March 1990 Submits Special Rept 1-90-02 Re Number of Steam Generator Tubes Plugged During 1R2.One of Four Tubes Exceeded Plugging Limit & Required Plugging.Remaining Three Tubes Plugged as Precautionary Measure.No Defective Tubes Detected ML20012D6641990-03-22022 March 1990 Provides Followup Written Request for Waiver of Compliance to Make Tech Spec 3.04 Inapplicable to Tech Spec 3.8.1.2 to Permit Entry Into Mode 5 W/Operability of Diesel Generator a & Associated Load Sequencer Unverified ML20012D3681990-03-19019 March 1990 Forwards Proprietary & Nonproprietary Suppl 2 to WCAP-12218 & WCAP-12219, Supplementary Assessment of Leak-Before-Break for Pressurizer Surge Lines of Vogtle Units 1 & 2, Per 900226 Request.Proprietary Rept Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790) ML20012D3401990-03-19019 March 1990 Submits Response to 891121 Request for Addl Info Re Settlement Monitoring Program.Current Surveying Procedures Used by Plant to Monitor Settlement of Major Structures Outlined in Procedure 84301-C.W/41 Oversize Drawings ML20012D6631990-03-15015 March 1990 Responds to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Resolution of USI A-47 on Safety Implications of Control Sys in Lwrs.Overfill Protection Sys Sufficiently Separate from Control Portion of Main Feedwater Control Sys & Not Powered from Same Source ML20012C4681990-03-0606 March 1990 Provides Summary Rept of Property Damage Insurance Levels, Per 10CFR50.54(w)(1) ML20012B2891990-03-0606 March 1990 Forwards Plant Pipe Break Isometrics,Vols 1 & 2 & Advises That Encl Figures Have Been Revised to Be Consistent W/Pipe Analysis in Effect at Time That Unit 2 Received Ol,Including Revs Through 890930.W/309 Oversize Figures ML20012B2421990-03-0606 March 1990 Forwards Cycle 3 Radial Peaking Factor Limit Rept & Elevation Dependent Peaking Factor Vs Core Height Graph ML20011F5291990-02-26026 February 1990 Withdraws 881107 Proposed Amend to Tech Spec 3.8.1.1, Revising Action Requirements for Inoperable Diesel Generator to Clarify Acceptability of Air Roll Tests on Remaining Operable Diesel Generator ML20011F5261990-02-26026 February 1990 Forwards 1989 Annual Rept - Part 1. Part 2 Will Be Submitted by 900501 ML20011E8911990-02-12012 February 1990 Advises That Hh Butterworth No Longer Employed by Util 1990-09-06
[Table view] |
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. s Ma.i r; Acdress Post Of Fce Sc4 4545 s Acama Geer;a 30302 L Georgia Power D. O. Foster '
V ce Presdent and Genera' Wm;s-vc y,e P c -c~ \
April 26, 1984 Mr. Harold R. benton, Director File. X6BB06 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Log: GN 352 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
References:
Letter from D. O. Foster (CPC) to H. Denton (NRC) dated November 11, 1983 (Log: GN-281)
NRC DOCKET- NUMBERS 50-424 AND 50-425 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMBERS CPPR-108 AND CPPR-109 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE PIPE BREAKS
Dear Mr. Denton:
In the referenced letter,'GPC requested your approval for the application of alternative pipe break criteria which would eliminate the need to postulate arbitrary intermediate pipe breaks, i.e., those break locations which, based on stress analysis, are below the stress limits and the cumulative usage factors specified in the current NRC criteria, but are selected to provide a minimum of two breaks between terminal ends. In this submittal we are providing additional technical information to further justify that request. Specific NRC concerns, as discussed on March 6, 1984, are addressed in attachments a through f as follows:
- 1. Technical justification for Attachment a elimination of arbitrary intermediate breaks
- 2. Provisions for minimizing Attachment b stress corrosion cracking in high energy lines
- 3. Provisions for minimizing the Attachment c effects of thermal and vibration induced piping fatigue
- 4. Provisions for minimizing Attachment d v water / steam hammer effects DESICHATED OilD11;AL I
8405170302 840426 CertifiedByjf),[ <fQ PDR ADOCK 05000424 -
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Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director File: X6BB06
- April'26, 1984'
~
Log: GN'352 Page 2 s
5.- Provisions for minimizing Attachment e local stresses from welded attachments 6.. Postulated pipe break location Attachment f
'information As'statedIin the referenced letter, the application of the proposed criteria = changes will result in the deletion of approximately 182 break locations and 110 pipe whip restraints. The breaks and restraints currently targeted for elimination are listed in that. letter. However,-
it should be noted that piping-and system design is an iterative process and that postulated break locations could potentially move as the system design and analysis of structures and piping develops :over the course of the design process. Owing to the iterative nature of the design process and its potential for affecting postulated break locations, changes affecting high energy systems are continuously monitored and evaluated to determine the impact on break location. We propose to apply these
' alternative criteria to any subsequently identified break locations in the systems, identified herein, provided the stresses at those locations
.are below' the break selection threshold, and the operational concerns in attachments b through e are adequately addressed. This flexibility is necessary to minimize future requests for break elimination as the location of intermediate break points change during the evolution of the plant design.
-We would appreciate a favorable response to our proposed alternative pipe '
break criteria by June 8, 1984.
Your trulyg# p A
D. . Foster DOF/ JAB /sw xc:' R.-A. Thomas
- 0. Batum J. A. Bailey M.-Malcom M. A. Miller E. L. Blake, Jr. '
J. E. Joiner J. P. O'Reilly W. F. Sanders-W. R. Spezialetti
s l
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Attachment a ,
l TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR ELIMINATION OF ;
ARBITRARY INTERMEDIATE BREAKS I i
The following items provide generic technical justification 4 for the elimination of arbitrary intermediate pipe breaks and
- 12He associated pipe whip restraints. ;
- 1. The operating procedures and piping and system designs ;
minimize the possibility of stress corrosion cracking, thermal and vibration induced fatigue, and water / steam i hammer in these lines in which arbitrary pipe breaks are i 4
currently postulated. Detailed descriptions of the j design provisions for these phenomena are provided in r attachments b, c, and d, respectively. !
- 2. Welded attachments are not located in close proximity to )
the breaks to be eliminated. Consequently, local ;
bending stresses resulting from these attachments wil. j not significantly affect the stress levels at the break j locations (refer to attachment e). l
- 3. The pipe breaks and whip restraints not being eliminated ;
provide an' adequate level of protection in areas !
containing high energy lines. ;
i
- 4. Pipe breaks are postulated to occur at locations where stresses are only 80% of code allowables (Class 2 !
i and 3) or where the cumulative usage factor is only j 10% of the allowable 1.0. The arbitrary breaks '
to be eliminated all exhibit stresses and usage factors l below these conservative' thresholds. 3 4 5. Pipe rupture is recognized in branch technical position MEB 3-1 as being a " rare event which may only occur j under' unanticipated conditions." -
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- 6. Arbitrary intermediate breaks are only postulated to l provide additional conservatism in the design. There is !
L.. no technical justification for postulating these breaks. i l I
- 7. Elimination of pipe whip restraints associated with the j arbitrary breaks will facilitate in-service inspection, >
- reduce heat losses from the restrained piping, and !
reduce the unanticipated restraint of piping due to !
thermal growth and seismic motion.
]
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- 8. Pipe break related equipment qualification (EQ) require- f ments will not be_affected by the elimination of the arbitrary breaks. Breaks are postulated non-mechanisti-
! cally for EQ purposes. l i
i It is concluded that the elimination of arbitrary in'termediate breaks is technically justified, based on the reasons stated above.
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Attachment b !
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PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZING STRESS CORROSION l CRACKING IN HIGH ENERGY LINES
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, - Industry experience has shown (NUREG 0691) that stress corrosion i cracking (SCC) will not occur unless the following conditions j exist simultaneously: high tensile stresses, susceptible i piping material, and a corrosive environment. Although any l
, stainless or carbon steel piping will exhibit some degree of !
- residual stresses and material susceptibility, Georgia Power l Company minimizes the potential for SCC by choosing piping material with low susceptibility to stress corrosion and by !
preventing the existence of a corrosive environment. The l material specifications consider compatibility with the i system's operating environment (both internal and external), j
- i. as'well as other materials in the system, applicable ASME code i requirements, fracture toughness characteristics, and welding, processing, and fabrication techniques. :
4
, The likelihood of stress corrosion cracking in stainless steel l increases with carbon content. Consequently, only the lower j L
carbon content stainless steels-(304, 304L, 316, 316L) have .
been used for the primary systems
- at Plant Vogtle. The existence of a corrosive environment is prevented by strict !
criteria.for internal and external pipe cleaning, and water l chemistry control during startup and normal operation. l t
For the secondary systems **, ferritic type carbon steel has !
been the choice for the piping, fittings, and valve bodies l L forming the pressure boundaries. This ferritic material has ;
been found satisfactory from the standpoint of non-susceptibility i to stress corrosion cracking for the service conditions !
encountered. Since in the case of PWR's the secondary systems ;
L are not made of stainless steels, the question of stress j corrosion cracking as reported in stainless steels does not l arise. !
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- Primary Systems: ** Secondary Systems:
Reactor Coolant (RCS) Main Steam (MS) l
, Chemical and Volume Control (CVCS) Main Feedwater (MFW) l Safety Injection (SI)- Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) l Steam Generator !
! Blowdown (SGBDS) !
Steam Generator Wet ;
Layup j Waste Evaporator l Steam Supply l l
6 1
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l i l' All piping involved in the elimination of arbitrary inter- i mediate breaks will be cleaned externally and flushed as part of the startup test program. The piping will be flushed with j domineralized water subject to written criteria for limits on ;
total dissolved solids, conductivity, chlorides, fluorides and i pH. Flush water quality will be monitored daily. The flushing [
will be controlled by detailed procedures written for each ;
system. Water chemistry for pre-operational testing will be ,
. controlled by written specifications. I During plant operation, primary and secondary side water i chemistry will be monitored in the carbon steel and stainless !
steel piping. Contaminant concentrations will be kept below t the thresholds known to be conducive to stress corrosion !
cracking. The major water chemistry control standards will !
be included in the plant operating procedures for the lines in ;
which arbitrary breaks were previously postulated. Oxygen i concentration in the fluid in the Vogtle stainless steel ,
piping is expected to be less than'O.005 ppm during normal power operation, thus further minimizing the likelihood of stress corrosion cracking. I Table 1 summarizes the systems in which currently postulated .
arbitrary intermediate breaks are to be eliminated. Note that !
a number of these systems operate at temperatures below 200*F. j Industry wide experience shows that stress corrosion is not a :
. problem at temperatures this low. The recommended water !
chemistry requirements for primary systems are provided in !
Table 5.2.3-3 of the FSAR. Operating water chemistry guide- l lines for secondary side piping are given in Table 10.3.5-1 of i the FSAR. Although the final water chemistry specifications j have not been prepared at this time, it is Georgia Power !
Company's intent to adhere to the guidelines cited above to i the greatest extent possible. l l
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Attachment b !
TABLE 1 i
< ELIMINATION OF ARBITRARY BREAK i SYSTEMS
SUMMARY
l l
Vogtle # Of Breaks l Piping Piping Operating Deleted ;
Piping System Material Class Temp. (*F) (per Unit)
Safety Injection SS 111, 212 120 14 i CVCS - Charging SS 212 516/130 4/22 CVCS - Letdown SS 212 293 8 l 1
CVCS - RCP SS 111, 212 130 13 !
Seal Inj. l RCS - Surge Line SS 111 653 1 l
RCS --Drains SS 111 556 7 !
Auxiliary CS 212, 313, 445/70 14/12 Feedwater 424 .
Steam Generator CS 212, 427 545/155 24/2 l Blowdown F Steam Generator CS 212 545 8 ;
Wet Layup Main. Steam CS 212, 424 545 24 313 l Main Feedwater CS 212, 424 445 15 ['
l l Main Steam' CS 212 545 8 :
! Atmos. Dump Waste Evap. CS 424 360 6 ;
Steam Supply l SS - Stainless' Steel I CS - Carbon Steel f
I l 3
i Attachment c l PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZING THE EFFECTS OF !
THERMAL AND VIBRATION INDUCED PIPING FATIGUE >
i
-I. GENERAL FATIGUE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS l For Class'1 lines, fatigue considerations are addressed by the l cumulative usage factor (CUF). In order to ensure that piping !
will not fail due to fatigue, the ASME Code has set the CUF !
limit at 1.0. By definition, all arbitrary intermediate break !
locations have CUFs below 0.1. j
, i For Class 2 and 3 lines, fatigue is considered in the allowable i l stress range check for thermal expansion stresses. This stress is included in the total stress value used to determine !
postulated break locations. All arbitrary break locations !
exhibit stresses less than 80% of the code allowables. If the !
number of thermal cycles is expected to be greater than 7,000, l then the allowable stresses are further reduced by an amounu ;
dependent on the number of cycles, j II. THERMAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS i
- y limiting the mixing of low velocity, low temperature B I auxiliary feedwater with high temperature water in the steam !
generator inlet nozzles, cyclic thermal stresses in the t
- auxiliary feedwater piping of the Vogtle Plant are minimized. [
t i Mixing is prevented in the auxiliary feedwater supply to the
! 6-inch auxiliary feedwater steam generator inlet nozzle with a l vertical piping arrangement followed by a 90 degree elbow welded to the 6-inch inlet nozzle. Stratification and stripping, which promote cyclic thermal stress and subsequent cracking, ,
are eliminated by maintaining a minimum auxiliary feedwater flow rate of 75 gpm during startup and hot standby. Feedwater temperature instrumentation is provided in the vertical run of !
the inlet elbow to the 6-inch steam generator inlet nozzle to {
monitor and alarm the backflow of high temperature water. j f
Mixing of the low velocity, low temperature main feedwater ;
with high temperature water in the steam generator is prevented 3 in the main 16-inch feedwater nozzle by isolating flow to the ;
main nozzle and introducing feedwater to the 6-inch auxiliary j feedwater steam generator inlet nozzle for power levels below .
15 percent. Above 15 percent power, stratification and stripping arc prevented by maintaining a minimum flow rate of ;
-500 gp1. Mixing is prevented in the main feedwater supply to (
the steam generator by piping arrangement similar to that i utilized at the auxiliary feedwater inlet nozzle. Feedwater !
temperature instrumentation is provided in the vertical run of !
the inlet elbow to the 16-inch steam generator main feedwater !
inlet nozzle to monitor and alarm the backflow of high temperature water. !
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The physical layout of the main / auxiliary feedwater piping l temperature monitoring / alarm instrumentation, and minimum i feedwater flow rates are in compliance with the Westinghouse l design criteria for the main / auxiliary feedwater supply piping to the steam generators.
Cyclic thermal stress is prevented in the other lines contain-ing arbitrary intermediate breaks by maintaining uniform temperatures with no mixing.
III. VIBRATION DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS Piping in Plant Vogtle is designed and supported to minimize transient and steady state vibration. Although the piping !
system vibration tests have not yet been defined, testing will be performed as described in Section 3.9.B.2 of the FSAR to ?
ensure that vibration of the piping systems is within allowable levels. -
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Attachment d i
- PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZING STEAM / WATER HAMMER EFFECTS i 7
Systems-within Westinghouse scope of supply are not, in !
general, susceptible to water hammer. The reactor coolant, l chemical and volume control, and residual heat removal systems !
have been specifically designed to preclude water hammer. !
Preoperational testing and operating experience have verified l the Westinghouse design approach and furthermore, have indic- l ated that significant water hammer events have usually been ;
initiated in secondary systems within the Balance of Plant l (BOP) scope of supply. Westinghouse has conducted a number of j
, investigations into the causes and consequences of water !
hammer events. The results of these investigations have been i
, reported to Westinghouse operating plant customers and have ,
I been reflected in design interface requirements to the BOP designer for plants under construction, to assure that water !
hammer events initiated in the secondary systems do not l compromise the performance of the Westinghouse supplied l safety-related systems and components. !
Some of the lines in which arbitrary intermediate breaks are !
to be eliminated have the potential for water / steam hammer i effects. These lines have been designed to minimize or i preclude such effects. Water hammer in each of the systems f involved in the elimination of arbitrary breaks is described 3 i
below: l r
- 1. Safety Injection System [
t
- The safety injection lines are all water solid and at ;
ambient temperature, thus no water hammer is expected. l I
l 2. Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) j I l Normally, the CVCS is water solid. In the low tempera- l ture lines (less than 125'F) water hammer would not be !
expected because of the small probability of steam void i formation. In the high temperature lines, the piping has i been designed to maintain water solid conditions during i normal operation, thus minimizing the possibility of l water hammer effects. l
- 3. Reactor Coolant System l There is a low potential for water hammer in the reactor coolant system, because it is designed to preclude steam void formation. However, excessive cooling of the reactor coolant system, which initiates safety injection, could potentially result in water hammer. If any problems are experienced during preoperational test, they will be eliminated by modifying operating procedures, i
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- 4. Auxiliary Feedwater A separate auxiliary feedwater line and nozzle has been '
,provided to each steam generator to minimize the potential [
for water hammer. Each steam generator inlet nozzle 2 utilizes a 90* elbow connected immediately to a vertical i run of pipe to minimize steam voids. Tempering flow is .
maintained so the line will be filled with water at all !
times. ;
[ It is recognized, however, that some potential for water hammer in the auxiliary feedwater lines exists. Con-sequently, the temperature in these lines is monitored so ;
that they may be filled slowly and flow initiated gradually when steam voids are suspected. The piping involved in ;
the arbitrary intermediate breaks contains thermowells t allowing such temperature increases to be detected and l the proper operating procedures to be implemented. The l associated valves are periodically checked for leaks. I Following the implementation of design guidelines and I testing contained in BTP ASB 10-2, steam generator water hammer in top feedring design steam generators is not ,
expected to occur. t Auxiliary feedwater design and operation are described ,
further in attachment C. ;
- 5. Steam Generator Blowdown (SGBS)
Blowdown flow from the steam generators is normally two-phase and of 0-10 percent quality. The piping layout :
is routed continuously downward starting from the steam ;
generator blowdown nozzle connection and continuing to the containment penetration thus minimizing the .
formation of water pockets. Therefore, the potential for !
water hammer is minimized for the blowdown lines within i containment. Water hammer may occur downstream of the ,
isolation valves upon reinitiation of blowdown flow ;
following isolation. Minimal water hammer problems are expected due to providing operating procedures to gradu- i ally repressurize the downstream piping before establ- :
ishing full flow. No valves exist between the SGBS isolation valves and the SGBS coolers.
- 6. Steam Generator Wet Layup During full power operation, there is no flow in the wet layup piping. During operation of the wet layup system the steam generator will not be a source of high energy fluid. Consequently, water hammer is not expected in this system.
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- 7. Main Steam I The main steam piping from the 5 way restraints just
,outside containment to the main turbine is sloped at !
1/16 of an inch per foot to assure proper drainage during the various phases of operation. 18-inch diameter drip I
legs approximately five feet long are installed upstream [
i of the main turbine inlet on the 36-inch and 38-inch t' j main steam lines to collect and dispense drainage to the condenser. The branch lines that tee off the main steam :
lines are properly sloped with drain provisions to t eliminate the possibility of water hammer to occur due to (
condensate-drain water pockets collecting in low points ;
or pipe loops. !
J 8. Main Feedwater
, The routing of the main feedwater piping, which varies in temperature from approximately 300*F at low load to 445'F i
at full load, into the steam generators, which operate betwen 545*F to 557'F during normal operation, is in compliance with the Westinghouse criteria for layout, }
t temperature monitoring / alarm, and operational procedures (
to minimize or eliminate water hammer. i i
In Westinghouse plants with a top feedring steam generator ;
l design, water hammer has been experienced in main feedwater !
4 lines in cases where feedwater spargers or feedrings have l i become uncovered or drained, and subsequently recovered l with water. The water hammer has been identified as steam-water slugging resulting from the sudden collapse of steam trapped in the feedwater line due to contact with cold feedwater. The VEGP steam generators have !
J-tubes installed on top of the feedring to prevent or delay water draining from the feedring following a drop in steam generator water level. This approach has been -
i shown.to be effective in minimizing the potential for !
steam bubble collapse water hammer in the feedring. I Additional descriptions of the main feedwater system l l design and operation are provided in attachment C, i i
Item II. :
- 9. Main Steam Atmospheric Dump ;
The steam piping to the inlet of the main steam atmos- ,
pheric dump valves is sloped so that condensate drains !'
back into the main steam header when the valve is closed.
l The valve discharge piping continuously drains to the nearest floor drain. When the valve opens, steam and/or I
drains will be routed to the nearest floor drain.
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- 10. Waste Evaporator steam Supply The waste evaporator steam supply piping is routed
,through the auxiliary building with a continuous downward slope to the radwaste evaporators located at level C to eliminate pockets of condensate. Where low points exist, adequate drain lines and traps are provided to continu-ously dispense condensate. Consequently, the possibility of water / steam hammer has been minimized.
4
Attachment e PROVISIONS FOR MINIMIZING LOCAL STRESSES
, FROM WELDED ATTACHMENTS We have reviewed all arbitrary intermediate break locations to be eliminated and have determined that in no cases are welded attachments closer than five piping diameters from postulated break locations. At this distance, local bending stresses induced by the attachment will not affect the stresses at the postulated break point. To ensure that this is the case, the local stresses have been determined and added to the primary stress report.
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Attachment f POSTULATED PIPE BREAK LOCATION INFORMATION A detailed listing of the currently postulated pipe breaks to be eliminated was provided in attachments A and B of our November 11, 1983 submittal. Inside containment, 92 breaks l and 89 restraints are to be deleted, leaving'256 breaks and :
103 rentraints in the design. Outside containment, 90 breaks f and 21 restraints are to be deleted, leaving 138 breaks and 20 !
restraints in the design. The actual locations of the breaks l and restraints to be eliminated can be determined by examina-tion of the FSAR Figures referenced in the November 11 letter.
I The distribution of the breaks and restraints to be deleted is relatively even throughout the plant. Consequently, the !
remaining breaks and restraints still provide an adequate level of protection in all areas containing high energy lines.
The above information reflects the break arrangement in i Unit 1. However, the majority of the breaks in Unit 2 will !
be mirror image to the Unit 1 breaks. The justifications for i the elimination of Unit 1 breaks will be extrapolated for i elimination of non-mirror image Unit 2 breaks provided !
the requirements of the alternative pipe break criteria are !
satisifed at those locations. i i
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