ML17348A802

Simulator Initial Certification, Vol II

ML17348A802
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	01/02/1991
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
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ML17348A800	List: ML17348A799 ML17348A801 ML17348A802
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NUDOCS 9101080144
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FLORIDA POWER 8c. LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR INITIALCERTIFICATION VOLUMEII TEST ABSTRACTS

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FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TUQCEY POINT UNIT3 INmALSIMULATOR CEIIFICATIONREPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME I Infroducfion General Information Excepfions to ANSI/ANS 3.5 Sfandard 1.0 Simulafor Information 1.1 General Informafion 1.2 Control Room Information 1.2.1 Physical Arrangement 1.2.2 Panels/Equtpmenf 1.2.3 Simulated Systems 1.2.4 Confro! Room Environment 1.3 Insfrucfor Interface 1.3.1 Inifial Condifions 1.3.2 Malfuncfions 1.3.3 Local Operafor Confrols 1.3.4 Insfructor Stafion Feafures 1.4 Operafing Procedures 1.5 . Changes Since Last Report 2.0 Simulafor Design Data Base 3.0 Simulafor Tesfs 3.1 Certification Test Development and Format 3.2 Fufure Year Test Plans 4.0 Simulafor Discrepancy and Upgrade Program 4.1 Simulator Configurafion Managemenf Sysfem 4.2 Simulafor Discrepancy Reporting Instrucfions 4.3 Planf Design Change Tracking 4.3 Simulafor Work Order Stafus Appendix A: Qualifications of fhe Cerfificafion Team, SCRB, and SCRB Altemafes

I List of Figures 0-1 Simulafor Configuration Review Board 0-2 Initial Certification Organization 1-1 Planf and Simulator Confrol Room Floor Plan 1-2 Developmenf of Simulator Inifial Conditions 3-1 Ceiti%cation Tesf Process 3-2 Simulator Test Dafa Documentation System 4-1 Simulafor Configurafion Management Information Flow Diagram 4-2 Outsfanding Discrepancies by Priorify 4-3 Outsfanding PCM Updates by Priority 4-4 Assignment of Discrepancy Operational Priorify List of Tables 0-1 ANSI/ANS 3.5 Cross-Reference 1-1 Summary of Initial Condifions 1-15 1-2 Summary of Malfunctions 1-3 Insfrucfor Stations Main Keypad Functions 3-1 Turkey Point Ceiti%cation Tesf Matrix Profile 3-2 ANSI/ANS 3.5 Certification Tesf Matrix 3-3 Cerfi%cation Tesf Mafrix 3-4 Annual Tesfs 3-5 1991 Test Plan 3-6 1992 Test Plan 3-7 1993 Test Plan 3-8 1994 Tesf Plan 3-9 Test Acceptance Criteria

l VOLUME II - TEST ABSTRACTS Infroduction 1.0 Computer Real Time Test (RTT) 2.0 Sfeady State Tesfs (SSQ 3.0 Normal Planf Evolutions (NPE) 4.0 Surveillances (SUR) 5.0 Malfunctions 5.1 Confainmenf (MCN) 5.2 Common Services (MCS) 5.3 Chemical & Volume Confrol Sysfem (MCV) 5A Feedwafer (MFA 5.5 Generator & Grid (MGG) 5.6 Main Power Distribufion (MMP) 5.7 Reacfor Coolant Sysfem (MRC) 5.8 Reactor (MRQ 5.9 Steam Generator & Main Steam (MSG)

5. 10 Sfandby Power & Synchronization (MSP) 5.11 Safety Sysfems (MSS)

5. 12 Turbine (MTU)

Appendix A - Sample Complefe Cerfi%cation Tesf Procedure Lisf of Tables 0-1 Summary of Certification Testing Discrepancies

TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT INTRODlJCllON Volume II contains abstracts from all of the certification tests along with one complete test. The abstract comprises two pages that contain the following information:

Description of the Test, Options Relevant to the Test, Initial and Final Conditions, Basis for Evaluation, Discussion of the Test Results, Out of Bounds Conditions Encountered, Deficiencies Noted During the Test, and Exceptions to ANS 3.5.

Appendix A contains one complete test. This test procedure is provided as an example of the test format and content. Table 0-1 provides a summary of all deficiencies noted during Certification testing and the current status thereof.

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TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT TABLE O-l

SUMMARY

OF CENlFICAllON TESTING DISCREPANCIES TEST NUMBER SW'RN NUMBER DESCRIPTION STATUS RTT-001 None RTT-002 None SST-001 9000347 CRDM cooler ouflet femperafure too low. In work 9000348 ECC CCLV flow foo low. Closed 9000349 Hot weil level higher than in plant. Closed SST-002 9000350 N-35 reading too low Closed SST-003 9000351 Containment pressure doesn't mafch planf. Closed SST-004 None NPE-001 9000007 Reactor vessel, pressurizer, and RCS temperafures are incorrecf. In work 9000134 PRT level doesn'f increase during primary fill. In work 9000135 RV/pressurizer levels do not correspond during primary fill. In work 9000136 L/-6421 confinues fo indicate when de-energized. Closed 8900434 RCP seal leakoff manual isolafion valves aren'f modelled. Closed 9000137 RV/pressurizer vents: Over-sized and allow flow withouf flowpath. In work 9000006 Aborts occurred when primary wafer to containmenf opened. Closed Page 0.-2

I TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT NPE-D02 89D0219 Alarm G/8/4 does not clear. Closed 8900220 Manual isolafion valve to blender isn't modelled. In work 8900221 RHR temperafure trends are erroneous. Closed 8900223 RCS heatup rate Is too high. Closed 8900234 Pressurizer boron increases wifhouf an increase in RCS boron. in work 9000086 Improper acfuation of alarm X/6/3. Closed 9000087 Alarm X/6/3 comes in and cannot be cleared. Closed 9000091 RCP temperature recorder alarm. Closed 9000092 Loss of 3B 4160 bus when starting C RCP. Closed 9000098 High lefdown flowrate af low RCS pressures. In work 9000099 S/G blowdown flow delayed. Closed 9D00100 IC 4 is unstable. Closed 9D00 105 RCS pressure spikes when solid. Closed NPE-003 8900238 Heafer drain pump won'f go info service and cavifafes. Closed 8900242 Delta I response is inadequate. In work 8900258 Sfeam Jet air ej ecfor valves are open and shouldn'f be. Closed 9000133 Erroneous acfuafion of motor overload alarms. Closed 9000138 Wafer counfer to VCT only reads 10% of tofal flow. Closed 9000223 Cycle 10 curves. In work NPE-004 None NPE-005 9000224 Turbine decelerafion doesn'f change when vacuum is broken. In work 9000239 MSR femperafure frends. In work Page 0.-3

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TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT NPE-006 9000285 RHR SOS on low suction pressure. Closed 9000366 Vacuum and hotwell level spikes. Closed 9000383 OMS tesf switches aren't modelled. Closed SUR-001 9000248 Reactivify compufer doesn'f work. Closed SVR-002 9000260 I/F page 552 shows incorrect flowpath. In work 9000252 Posf refueling sfarfup boron not in spec. In work SVR-003 8900208 Adjusfing EDG volfage affects load. Closed 8900209 EDG load confrol insensifive with zero droop. Closed SUR-004 None SUR-005 None 8UR-007 None SUR-008 9000021 Boric acid transfer pump 3B normal/isolafe swifch logic problem. Closed SUR-009 None SVR-010 None SVR-011 None Page 0.-4

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W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CER11FICATION REPORT SUR-012 None SUR-014 None SUR-015 None SUR-016 None SUR-017 None SUR-018 9000217 DDPS console doesn'f respond fo "CAL command. Closed SUR-019 9000450 R-3-14 goes to 78K when aux bldg. exhausf fans sfopped. Closed SUR-020 None SUR-021 None SUR-022 None SUR-024 None SUR-026 8900266 RCP lower guide bearing heafs up on loss of CCW. Closed 9000012 SGFP breaker logic is incorrecf. Closed 9000013 Pressurizer backup heafers breaker logic incorrecf. Closed 9000014 Inadeguafe CCW header flow per 3-OSP-203. In work Page 0.-5

M W W W W W W W W W W TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT 9000015 Spent fuel pool pump breaker logic is incorrect. Closed 9000016 CCW pumps fail to start. Closed 9D00018 LC 3D supply breaker fails to trip. Closed 9000019 MCC 3A supply breaker fails to trip. Closed 9000080 Aux oil pump breaker logic. Closed 8900267 Spray pump trips when it shouldn'. Closed SUR-029 None SUR-030 None SUR-031 9000340 Unexplained actuation of alarm E/9/1. Closed 9000341 Improper actuation of alarm G/5/l. In work SUR-D32 9000510 Blinking lights on incore detector. In work MCN-D01. None MCS-001 None MCS-002 None MCS-D03 8900409 Various components don't alarm on loss of TPCW. Closed MCS-004 8900407 PORV's can'I cycle fully on loss ofinstrument air. Closed Page 0.-6

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TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT 89D0419 TCV-3-143 fails in wrong position on loss of instrument air. Closed 89D0422 Instantaneous header pressure reduction on loss of instrument air. Closed 89D0423 CV-3725 fails wrong way on loss of Instrument air. Closed MCV-D01 None MCV-D02 None MCV-D03 9000346 No area radiation monitor alarm with charging line break. Closed MCV-004 9000154 RV-203 cycles wildly when CV-204 is failed shut. Closed 9000339 RHX letdown outlet temperature is too low. Closed MCV-005 8900286 CCW surge tank process monitor alarm following NRHX tube leak. Closed MFW-001 None MFW-002 8900284 Steam dumps to condenser have excessive capacity. Closed 8900375 Insufficient total steam generator mass at HFP. In work MFW-003 9000592 PORV liquid relief conductance is too high. In work MFW-004 9000594 S/G outlet flow spikes at 500-600 seconds. In work MFW-005 None Page 0.-7

W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT MFW-006 None MFW-007 None MFW-008 None MGG-001 None MGG-D02 9000044 Incorrect power supply to MOV's 1433, 1434. Closed MGG-003 None MGG-D04 8900228 RCP failure on loss of cooling clears when it shouldn'. Closed 8900231 RCP failure: incorrect indication. Closed 8900247 Lack of head void in natural circ coo/down. Closed MMP-001 8900202 T/-3-140 improper failure. Closed 9000062 PR-3-6306B wrong color stripe. Closed 9000063 TR-3-607B,610B wrong power supply. Closed 9000049 Vital bus 3P06 instruments do not fail. Closed MMP-002 9000040 AFW flow controllers wrong power supply. Closed 9000060 FR- 154A wrong pen fails. Closed MMP-D03 9000039 LI-6308B wrong color stripe. Closed 9000058 RCP seal leakoff recorder wrong power supply. Closed Page 0.-8

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TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT 9D00059 CST level wrong power supply. Closed MMP-D04 9D00056 7?-607A, 6 lOA wrong power supply. Closed MMP-D05 None MMP-006 9D00055 Reactor frip bypass breaker 52/BYA does nof lose power. Closed 9000057 CV-3-6320B does not lose power. Closed MMP-007 None MMP-008 None MRC-001 None MRC-002 9000555 Low confainmenf pressure affer an Sl. In work MRC-003 9000593 Oscillafions in break flow as loops begin fo refill. In work MRC-004 None MRC-005 None MRC-006 None MRC-007 9000009 Pressurizer surge line temperafure response inconecf. Closed Page 0.-9

TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT MRC-008 9000591 FCV's take too long to shut from less than fully open. In work 9000436 RCP current differs from plant by 60 amps. Inwork MSC-001 None MSC-002 None MSC-003 None MSC-004 8900243 Flux deviation with a stuck control rod is underestimated. In work MSC-005 None MSC-006 None MRX-007 None MSC-008 None MSC-009 None MSG-001 None MSG-002 None MSG-003 None Page 0.-10

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W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT MSG-004 None MSG-005 None MSG-006 9000492 Feedwafer temperature drops when feedwafer is resfored. ln work MSP-D01 9000312 B/U heafers breakers do nof frip and lockouf on loss of bus 3A. Closed 90003 13 Aux oil pump breaker doesn'f trip and lockouf on loss of bus 3A. Closed 9000448 Spray pump trips and restarts. In work MSS-001 8900292 No aux bldg. ARM alarms wifh Sl pipe leak outside confainmenf. Closed MSS-002 8900410 Inconecf accumulator check valve leakage. Closed MSS-003 8900277 Saturation margin calculations. Closed MSS-D04 None MTU-001 None MTU-002 None MTU-D03 90003 15 No increase in vibrafion on loss of lube oil, Closed MTU-004 8900211 Turbine doesn'f become self-sealing. Closed 8900212 Gland exhaust fans don'f effecf pressure. Closed Page 0.-11

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W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMUlATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT MTU-005 None MTU-006 None MTU-008 9000311 No alarm on high liquid level in generator. Closed MTU-009 None MTU-010 None MTU-011 None Page D.- 12

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TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT 1.0 COMPUTER REAL TIME TEST 1.1 RTT-001 SIMULATOR REAL TIME TEST 1> RTT-002 SIMULATOR REAL TIME TEST VALIDATIONTEST

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITIEi SIMUIATOR REAL 11ME TEST NUMBER: RTT-001 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 8.1.1 Normal Plant Evolutions 3.1.2 Plant Malfunctions A.8.1 Computer Real Time Test DESCRIPTION This test is designed to verify that the simulator is operating in real time. In the Turkey Point simulator, most of the modules are run on a 200 mi7li-second time step. There are a few modules which are run each 50 mi7II-seconds. Each 50 mi%l'~and period is called a leg.'f the computer is unable to complete all module calculations within one leg. an overrun will be generated. When an overrun occurs. the computer reschedules the missed tasks.

and may be able to make up the time during the next three legs. Four consecutive overruns would mean that all calculations were not completed within the 200 milli-second time band. For this test, the simulator wiN be set up to receive a module abort if, at any time. four consecutive overruns occur.

This function will be run with five different conditions in the simulator, including some significant transients.

OP11ONS Any malfunctions could be used with the dispatcher to verify simulator real time. this test will select significant malfunctions which will challange the simulator's abi7ity to remain in real time.

INITIALCONDI11ONS FINAL CONDIITONS 100% power steady state with maximum consecutive Each run will proceed for about 60 minutes, or until the signilicant transient overruns set at four. has occurred.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATEi < ~f 9O o~rs ~~B SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

Page 1 m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m

SIMUIATOR REAL llME TEST: RTT~I BASIS FOR EVALUATION The simulator must not abort on four consecutive overruns.

DISCUSSION OF TESl'ESULTS The simulator passed this test in aii respects. For each of the sk conditions run in the simulator, four consecutive overruns never occurred. This indicates that ail tasks were run within their design time steps.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~'2 7 0 DATEr DATE: DA1E: ~l<- 9 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CER11FICA11ON TEST PROCEDURE IE: SIMUlATOR REAL TIME TEST VALIDATIONTEST NUMBER: RTT-002 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: S.1.1 NORMAL PlANT EVOLU11ONS 8.1.2 PlANT MALFUNCTIONS A.S. I COMPUTER REAL TIME TEST DESCRIPTION This test is designed to show that the methods used in RTT401. Simulator Real Time Test, will give proper indication if the computer fai7s to operate in real time. For this test. test modules wm be Finked into the simulator configuration which can be controlled to cause the simulator to go out of real time.

OP11ONS 1his test may be run from any simulator operating condition Five test modules with user controlled execution times are linked into the simulator to force overruns and verify the simulator's ability to detect them. These tasks may be linked to any processor with at least seven tasks.

INITIAL CONDI11ONS FINAL CONDITIONS Simulator unloaded and the Work and Father configurations When testing Is completed, the test modules in the work conFiguration willbe are the same. removed by copying the Father conFiguratton to the Work configuration.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE: ~ /o 'T> DATE:

SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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SIMUIATOR REAL TIME TEST VAODATION TEST: RTT-002 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Overrun or processor halt conditions must be detected by the simulator. The simulator must freeze and the appropriate warning message must be displayed on all Instructor facility terminals.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESUI TS The simulator passed this test in all respects. The detection methods were all exercised and in each case provided the appropriate warnings.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVAI.UATION TEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: /6 r DATE: I DATE: ID /& 'I DATE: ~D- 0 4 DATE: DATE: ~/0- /0-Page 2

TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT 2.0 STEADY STATE TESTS 2.1 SST-001 STEADY STATE 45% POWER HEAT BALANCE 2.2 SST 002 STEADY STATE 75% POWER HEAT BALANCE 2.3 SST-003 STEADY STATE 100% POWER HEAT BAIANCE 2A SST-004 100% POWER 60 MINUTE NULL TRANSIENT

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE llTLEs STEADy STATE 45% POSER HEAT BAIANCE NUMBER SST401 ANS L5 REFERENCE SECTIONSs 4.1 Simulator CapabINies AS.2 Steady State and Normal Tests B2. Simulator Operability Test DES CRIPllON This test examines the steady state performance of the Simulator at an Intermecfiate power level. The 45% (approximate) power level was chosen for this test because it roughly corresponds to a standard hold point for chemistry testing dunng plant startup. Data from the plant logs and from the plant heat balance procedure wiN be compared to the same data in the sfmutator. Cntical parameters wN be verified to be within 2% of each other and other logged parameteN wiN be verified to be within IDL lhe simulator wiN be operated per normal operating procedures to reach the same condftions as reflected on the plant hgs.

OPTIONS The simulator steady state heat balance test can be performed at any Intermediate power level at which heat balance data is avaikrble.

INIllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS Steady state at approximatety 30% power. BOL Steady state 45% power.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lEAM DAu; >9 DAIE: ~~@

SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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STEADY STATE 45% POWER HEAT BAlANCE: SSHN I BASIS FOR EVALUA11ON Plant data as compared to simulator data. Critica parameters must ogree withn 2% and others must agree within 10%. No parameters may be different enough to detract from training.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS Overall the test was successful as almost ail simulated parameters ogreed with the plant within the required tolerances. In order to match the plant conditions.

the BB1 ond 3B2 circulating water pumps were turned off as they were for the plant conditions used. The plant logs used did not have a pkice for recording the reading of the gommometric neutron detectors so these values were not compored. One intermediate range nuclear instrument was out of tolerance.

This problem was noted on a DR for SST~ so no new DR was written. Loop hot leg and cold leg temperatures ore not recorded on the logs so they were calculated based on the recorded average temperatures and the loop delta T's recorded in the heat balance. In addition, the plant had a leaking reactor vessel heod vent valve which caused PI4317 to read RCS pressure insteod of ambient. No DR was written os this will not be a permanent plant problem and the simulator correctly reads ambient pressure.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES Three deficiency reports were written for thi test and three old DRs continued to exit. The new DRs were written on condenser hotweii level being controlled in the simulator too high. the emergency containment cooling CCW flow being too low and the CRDM cooler temperatures being recorded too low. The old DRs were that the one channel of intermediate range was out of tolerance. one channel of axial flux difference was too low in the simulator and the heater drain flow wos too low. None of these problems, the okt or the new, were deemed as detracting from training to ony significant degree.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5

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EVALUA11ON TEAM SIMUlATOR CONHGURATION REVIEW BOARD DAIEr DATB ~l&/Fo DATEr 8<SRO DATE: DAIE: ~E-~Z" 9 PAGE 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITIEi STEADY STATE 75% POWER HEAT BAlANCE NUMBER: SSH)02 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 4.1 Simulator Capabilities A3.2 Steady State and Normal Tests B2 Simulator Operabi7ity Test DESCRIPTION This test examines the steady state performance of the Simulator at an intermediate power level. The 75% (approximate) power level was chosen for this test because it roughly corresponds to a standard hold point for chemistry and heat balance testing during plant starlup. Data from the plant logs and from the plant heat balance procedure will be compared to the same data in the simulator. The post-refueling startup of unit 3 cycle twelve logs will be used. Critical parameters wi7I be verified to be within 2% of each other and other logged parameters will be verified to be within 10%. The simulator will be operated per normal operating procedures to reach the same conditions as reflected on the plant logs.

OPl?ONS The simulator steady state heat balance test can be performed at any intermediate power level.

INNAL CONDlllONS FINAI. CONDmONS Hot standby, beginning of core life, equilibrium xenon Steady state at approximately 75% power.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lEAM DATE 7 I >O DAlE 7 ) FO SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATEi Page 1 m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m A IL

SlEADY STATE 75% POSER HEAT BALANCEr SST~

BASIS FOR EVALUATION Pkrnt data as compared to simukrtor dato. Cntical parameters must ogree witMn 2% ond others must agree within IOX No parameters may be different enough to detroct from training.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS 7he 75% steady state comporison test showed satisfactory results for almost aN parameters. Five cntical parameters failed to meet the 2% comparison test and three of those were attr/buted to abnormal readings /n the plonf. The Intermediate range channel N45 wos reading too low in the simulator ond a deficiency (DR) wos written for tMs problem. The flux difference meters were oN much lower in the simulator than in the plant. A DR was not written for thi's deviation as'it /s a known problem and severo/ DR's are olready outstanding for other certif/cation tests. lhe pkrnt containment was reading about 1.0 psig where the s/mukrfor read 0 pslg. No DP wos generated for tMs discrepancy as lt is a known pkrnt instrumentation probkrm and ~II not be permanent.

Another plant prob/em fs that the loop A OPDT setpolnt is reading hl'gher than it should. Channels B and C are reoding 62 degrees while A fs 64. Since 62 matches fhe simulator, no DR was written for tMs difference. 77re lost prob/em in the critical parameters section is that the A and B steam generator nanow range levels are controlNng about 2% hi'gh in the plant. The p/ont logs make note of this prob/em. No DP wos written for this smoN discrepancy.

In the ~fico/ parameter Nst. no new DP's were generated. A DR was written on the emergency containment cooler CCW flow wMch /s Mgher In the plonf than in the simulator and a DR was written on the control rod dnve mechanism cooler outlet temperatures which are reading lower in the simulator than in the plant. Another DR wos heater droin tlow wh/ch wos greater in the simulator than the plant. AN of these DR's are attached to SSM) I (45% power lxrrt bakrnce). so no new DR's were written. One other norwitica/ parameter was not in specification. If was the pressure downstream of the reactor vessel heod vent valve. This valve Is leaking in the plant and a plant work request hos been written to correct it, therefore, no DR wos wntten for IMs discrepancy.

IVone of the def/ciencies were determined to detract from training s/gnit/cant/y.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS IVone DEFICIENCIES As discussed obove, several parameters were not witMn the required tolerance: however, only one new Discrepancy Report was wn'tten as the other problems had been discovered in the other steady state testa 7he one discrepancy was wn'tten on the /ntermediate range instrument reoding lower in the simulator.

This problem is being Investigated but poses no Mnderance to training in the power range.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 The recorded parameters wrN be compared to fhe reference plant and will be required to agree witMn +/- 2X (+/-IOX) of fhe instrument /oop range rather than witMn 2% (IOX) of the reference plant value.

EVALUAll TEAM / DATE ~7- r) A P SI UIATOR C.

FIGURAllON IEy/ BOARD F fS g o DATE:

DATE: oarr: ~iS"70 DATE: DAKr~/5- 9 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEi STEADY STATE 100K POWER HEAT BAIANCE NUMBER: SSMN ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSi 4.1 Simulator Capabilities A8.2 Steady State and Normal Tests B2 Simulator Operability Test DESCRIPTION This test examines the steady state performance of the Simulator at a power level of IKC. Data from the plant logs and from the plant heat balance procedure will be compared to the same data in the simulator. The postvefueling startup of unit 3 cycle twelve logs will be used. Critical parameters will be verified to be within 2% of each other and other logged parameters will be verified to be within 10%. The simulator will be operated per normal operating procedures to reach the same conditions as reflected on the plant logs.

OPTIONS The simulator steady state heat balance test can be performed at any intermediate power level.

INITIAL CONDITIONS FINAI, CONDITIONS Hot full power, beginning of core fife, equi7ibiium xenon Steady state at approximately IRK power.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATEi 1 5 eO DATE: ~7/ 6 SIMUIATOR N6INEERINS COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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SlEADY STATE TONS POWER HEAT BAlANCE: SSMN BASIS FOR EVALUATION Pfant data as compored to simulator data. Crftical parameters must agree within 2% and others must agree within 10%.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The TN% steody state comparison test showed satisfactory results for almost aN parameters. Three cn'ticol parameters fai7ed to meet the 2% comparison test and one of those was attributed to an abnomal reading in the plant. The Intermediate range channel N-35 was reading too Iow in the simulator and a deficiency 03$ wos written for fhis problem. The 3B 41M volt bus was reading 4310 volts in the plant for the logs chosen whi7e it read 41iM volts in the simulator. A DR wos not written for this deviation os it represents on unusual reading for this bus and was not this high for the other comparison tests. In addition. 'A'iop of nanow range temperature. was out of service in fhe plant and so it could not be compared. but the other two kops were witMn specfficatforL Since the plant wos in steady state, there is no reason to suspect that the 'A'iop woukt not be within specification. Lastly, the planf containment wos sNghtly pressurized to obout 1.8 psig where the simulator read 0 psig. A DR was generated to examine ths discrepancy.

In fhe noncritica parameter Nst. three new DR's were generated. A new DR wos written on condenser hotweN level wMch is controNing Mgher in fhe simulator thon in the plant. Another new DR wos wntten on the emergency containment cooler CCW liow wMch is higher in the p!ont than In the simulator. Lastly. a DR was written on the control rod drive mechanism cooler ouNet temperatures which are reefing lower in the simulator than in the plant. One other norw:ritical parameter was not in specification TMs was the pressure downstream of. the reactor vessel head vent valve. ibis valve is leaking In the plant ond a plant work request has been written to correct it. therefore. no DR wos wntten for this discrepancy. None of the deficiencies were deterinined to detract from training significantly.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES Deficiencies were written for N-35. containmenf pressure. condenser hotweN level, emergency containment cooler CCW flow, and CRDM cooler temperature.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 The recorded parameters will be compared to the reference plant and wiN be required to agree within +/- 2% (+/- TO%) of the instrument kiop range rather than witMn 2% (10%) of the reference plant value.

EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUIATOR CONRGURAllON REVIEW BOARD DATEi </> 10 DATE: ~IGLOO DAlE: DATEi )~I,-9 0 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITLEr IONA POWER 80 MINUTE NUlL TRANSIENT NUMBER: SSM04 Ah5 8.5 REFERENCE SECllOh5: 4.1.2 Steady State Operation B.2.1 Steady State Performance DES CRIPllON This test wN verify the stability of the simulator models dunng a one hour run at IOOX power. In accordance with the AA5I standard 8.5, the computed values of the pn'nciple primary ond secondary system parameters should not vory more than 2% from their initial values during the run.

OPllONS Any time in core life may be chosen for the steady state run. However, the simulator should have reached equllibnum xenon prior to taking data.

INmAL CONDlllOh5 FINAL CONDmONS IR% power, steody state. Data should be recorded for at least 60 minutes.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATEr DATEr ~lb MUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

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W W W W W W M W W W W W m m m IRK POMIER dO MINUlE NULL TRANSIENTr SSM04 BASIS FOR EVALUATION All of the examined parameters shall be shown to not vary by more than 2X from their &itial values dunng the test.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS The run was performed ond data plotted for l00 minutes in order to Insure sr'muiator stabifty. The simulator showed consklerable stability during the ru. The maximum deviation of any slgr5cant parameter wos 0.3%. One parameter deviated by 5%. ThIs was volume contrA tank leveL VCT level Is mentioned ln the plant's heat bakrnce test os on Indicotor of plant stoMity. The requirement wos that it 'not be changing appreciably.'he 5% change in VCT level wos not considered on appreciable change, it hod no effect on other system parameters, and it is expected due to normal PCP seal leakoff.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.$

Steam generator temperature is mentioned in AN&3.5 as a secondary parometer to monitor. This temperature is not measured in Westinghouse verticol steam generators. Instead, steam generator secondary side pressure and level were monitored. Both these parameters were stable dun'ng the run.

EVALUAllONlEAM SIMULATOR CONHGURAllON REVIeiy BOARD DATF'ATE.~/i~

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m m m m m m m m m m w m aa w m m m m m TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT 3.0 NORMAL PLANT EVOLUTIONS 3.1 NPE-001 PIANT FILL AND VENT FROM A PARTIAL DRAIN DOWN TO A SOLID PRESSURIZER 3.2 NPE-002 PLANT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY 3.3 NPE-003 PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBY TO RATED POWER 3.4 NPE-004 REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWED BY RECOVERY TO RATED POWER 3.5 NPE-005 PLANTSHUTDOWN FROM RATED POWER TO HOT STANDBY 3.6 NPE-006 COOLDOWN FROM HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEi PIANT FILL AND VENT FROM A PARTTAL DRAINDONN TO A SOLID PRESSURIZER NUMBER: NPE-001 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 3.T. T(I) Plant Starfup from Cold Shutdown fo Hot Standby DESCRIPTION During this tesf the simulator will be taken hom a partially drained reactor cookinf system to a water solid pressurizer. The reacfor vessel. reactor system, and the pressurizer will be fiNed and vented. This fest will be run using the plant operating procedure Filling and Venting the Reactor Coolant coolant System.

3&P44L8, and other plant operating procedures as directed by 3&P4d1.8. This test includes such evolutions as initialing charging to fhe reactor coolant system and the reactor coolant pump seals, Nling Ihe reactor cookrnt system and the pressurizer. venting the reactor vessel and fhe pressunzer. starting stopping the reactor cookrnt pumps, and other evolutions as necessary to complete the test. There are no equipment malfunctions in place. aNowing and ven'ficatlon that the simukitor can be taken hom a parh'ally drained reactor coolant system to a water solid pressurizer by the use of normal plant operating procedures.

Several parameters will be monitored in order to compare simulator results with expected planf results. AN aspects of the simulation will be'monitored, including control room indications. alarms. and trends. Local actions wNI be simukited and the impact verilied. The plant heatup will not begin with this procedure, but with NPE-M2.

OPTIONS INI11AL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS Cold shutdown with a partkiNy drained reactor vessel. The test is complete when fhe procedure is complete. The RCS has been fil!ed and vented and the pressurizer is water solid.

APPRO ED FOR USE TEST DAlE $ /O yy DAIE: ~/>N/Rcp SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE >

EVALUA N TEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURA11ON REVIEW BOARD DAK DATE ~~

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICATION TEST PROCEDURE llTLE: PIANT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDOWN TO HOT STANDBY NUMBER: NPE-002 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.I. 1(l) Plant Star/up-Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby 3.1.1(5) Operations at Hot Standby 3.l. 1(10) Operator Conducted Sun eillance Testing on Safety Related Equipment DESCRIPTION During this test the simulator wm be taken from cold shutdown to hot standby. This test wi7I be run using the normal operating procedure Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby, 3-GOP-RU, ond other plant operating procedures os directed by 3&OP-RU. This test includes such evolutions as heating up the pressurizer in order to draw a bubble ond then heating up the reactor coolant system by the use of pump heat. Reactor coolant pumps will be started, the residual heat removal system wi71 be taken out of service and placed in safety /ntection standby. blowdown wil/ be used to drain the steam generators to an operating level and to maintain th/s level during startup, the safety Ir/lection accumulators will be placed in standby, charging and letdown will be placed in service, the VCE will be purged with hydrogen to replace the nitrogen atmosphere, a main feedwater pump will be started in order to initiate feedwater to the steam generators, and other evotut/ons performed as necessary to complete the test. Alloctions will be conducted in accordance with normal operating procedures.

There are no equ/pment malfunctions in place, allowing verification that the simulator can be token from cold shutdown to hot standby by the use of normal plant operating procedures.

Several parameters will be monitored in order to compare simulator results with expected plant results. Al/ aspects of lhe simulation wm be'monitored, including control room indications, alarms. and trends. Local actions will be simulated and the impact verified. Power escalation will not begin with ths procedure. but with NPE-RU. The plant Nl and vent from a pahially drained reactor coolant system is accomplished in NPE~I.

OPllONS The simulator can be /n/tialized in cold shutdown with a water-solid pressurizer or a pahialiy drained reactor coolant system.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS The simulator is in cold shutdown with a water-solid pressurizer. The The test is complete when the procedure Is complete. The simulator has RHR Is in service and oil IK'P's are stopped. Tav is 118F and the been brought to hot standby. the RCS pressure control is in automatic at pressurizer pressure /s 320 psig. 2235 psig and the RCS temperature is 5E/6-545F. Steam generator pressure is maintained at 1005 psig by the use of the atmospheric dumps and a main feedpump is supplying feedwater with the flow controlled manually.

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PIANT STARTUP FROM COLD SHUTDowN ro Hor SrANDBy: NPE-002 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert Examination Control roomindications should be as expected by the procedure. The evaluation team willinclude a cunent or past Turkey Point senior reactor operator license holder and/or a hot license instructor to assist in the evaluation of the discrete control room interactions and indications.

Plant Data. Plots wi7I be compared with a Unit 3 plant heatup started on AprB22, 1990 DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The simulator was able to be token from cold shutdown to hot standby by the use ofplant operating procedures. The pressurizer bubble formation and RCS heatup went very well, the RHR was able to be removed and placed in safetyinjection standby via the use of normal procedures. the VCT was purged with hydrogen to remove the nitrogen, and charging and letdown functioned properly. The PRT had to be drained due to a high level and ail actions were properly modelled. Steam generator blowdown was used Initially to drain the generators to their proper level for startup and occasionally during the heatup to return the levels to around R% Blowdown functioned as It should except for one minor problem. The atmosphenc dumps workedin manual and auto to conlrol steam generator pressures and RCS temperatures after the heatup was completed. A SGFP was started to maintain steam generator levels and the bypass valves were used to control the flowrate. Except for the deficiencies detailed below. the control room indications and alarms were appropriate for this test.

The plant plots start with a bubble already drawn, so that part of the heatup cannot be looked at for comparison purposes. The simulated heatup does not have the delays that are encountered in the plant. but the pressure and temperature responses seem appropriate, except as noted below. There is a similar steady decline in RCS flow and RCP amps as RCS temperatures Increase. The steam generator pressureincreases appropriately with RCS temperature. The S/G levels are appropriate, but because secondary leakage is not modelled, the narrow range levels do not drop as much as the primary heats up.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDIONS None DEFICIENCIES IC 4 is unstable, resulting in numerous false alarms and conditions that would not be seen at this plant state. While solid, the plant would not conlrol above 320 psig. but experienced pressure spikes of l00 psi. The steam generators have a 30 to 40 minute delay after blowdown Is lined up before flow starts. The letdown tlowrate is too high at low RCS pressures, permitting the early removal of RHR. When the second RCP Is started on the B4MO bus, off site poweris loss to that bus, causing a few other problems: the B EDG does not tie on and the 480 volt LC 3D cannot be aligned to supply MCC D. The RHR cools off too quickly and undergoes temperature transients when it should not. There is an excessive RCS heatup rate, up to 60F per hour, and it does not appear to be dependent upon the number of RCP's runnin. The pressurizer boron trends up without a corresponding change in the RCS boron. Alarms G/8/4, X/3/4, and X/6/3 were in and should not have been. H/9/6 comes in. but does not stayin, when a point on the reactor coolant pump temperature recorderis above the alarm point. The manual Isolation valve for primary water to the blender is not modelled. DR's have been written on all problems encountered.

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CER11FICATION TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: PlANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBY TO RATED POyjrER NUMBER: NPE-003 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 3.1. IN Nuclear Sfartup from Hot Standby to Rafed Power 3.1.1(3) Turbine Stahup and Generator Synchronization 3.I. I(5) Operations at Hot Standby 3.1. 1(d) Load Changes 3.1. 1(10) Operator Conducted Surveillance Testing on Safety Related Equipment DESCRIPTION During this test the simulator wiN be taken from hot standby to full rated power. This test will be run using fhe normal operating procedure Hot Standby to Power Operation. 3~P-301. and other plant operating procedures as directed by 3OP-301. 1his test includes such evolutions as warming up fhe steam lines and opening the main steam Isolation valves, placing gland sealing steam in service and drawing a vacuum on fhe condenser, withdrawing control rods to take the reactor critical, rolling the turbine generator up to speed and synchronizing it to the grid. either pulling control rods or diluting the PCS whilst escalating power. and starling secondary and auxr7iary plant equipmenf as needed to complete the test. AN actions will be conducted in accordance with plant operating procedures. There are no equipment malfunctions in place, allowing verification that the simulator can be taken from hot standby to full rated power by the use of normal plant operating procedures.

Several parameters will be monitored in order to compare simulator results with expected plant results..AN aspects of the simulation will be monitored.

including control room indications, alarms. and trends. Local actions will be simulated and the impact verified.

OPTIONS The simulator can be Initialized af different times in core life.

INITIAL CONDI11ONS FINAL CONDITIONS Middle of core life, 0% reactor power, and 0 megawatts generated. The lest is complete when the procedure is complete. The plant has been The simulator is at hot standby wifh the atmospheric dumps brought to fuN rated power, approximately 714 megawatts electrical and controlfing steam generator pressure and RCS temperatures. 1he IQR nuclear power.

control rods are fully inserted and the reactor is su~riticai. The secondary side of the simulator Is essentially shutdown APP VED FOR TEST TEA DATE: DAKi ~Y DAlE: > 7 Pa DATE: ~) 8a Page 1

PLANT STARTUP FROM HOT STANDBY TO RATED POWER: NPE-003 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert Examination Control roomindications should be as expected by the procedure. The evaluation team wil/include a current or past Turkey Point senior reactor operator license holder and/or a hot license instructor to assist in the evaluation of the discrete control room interactions and indications.

P/ant Data. Rats willbe compared with a Unit 3 startup commenced on June 3, 79Ã.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The simulator was able to be token from hot standby to fullrated power by the use of normal plant operating procedures. Generally the control room indications were appropriate for the actions. P/ant procedures were used to warm up the main steam lines and open the main steam isolation valves, place gland sealing steam in service, and draw a vacuum on the condenser. A low rod index was calculated for the estimated en/ical position, requiring a dk7ution. A second and charging pump were placed in service to expedite the dilution. After the dilution was completed, rods were pulled to take the reactor critical. Powerorifice was then escalated to 24% and Tav was maintained by use of the atmosphen'c dump valves until the turbine was synchronized to the grid. Whilst power was held at 24%, the turbine was rolled and synchronized to the grid. Power was escalated and secondary plant equipment was placed in seivice as required. The MSR's were purged. warmed up. and placed in sennce. A second condensate pump. second SGFP. and boih heater drain pumps were placedin service following the appropriate procedures. 7he FCV's were left in automatic to venfy their response during the vanous pump starts. Because of the low rod index.by rod motion was mainly used as power was escalated, but dilution also had to be used. Control room indications, interactions. and alarms were appropriate except as noted below in the deficiency section.

The plots for the plant and simulator display simi7ar increases in pressurizer level and 7hot as power increases. Tcold also remains fairly steady with power. On the secondary side steam flow'. feed I/ow. and TREF increase with power. S/G narrow range levels osci7!ate a lot at the lower power levels. but the genera! trend is also upwards. Steam pressure has a corresponding decrease as powerincreases.

OUT OF BOUNDS COND/77ONS None DEFICIENC/ES The delta I responds inadequately to rod position versus power level. Even with the lowinitia/rodindex, the maximum absolute value that was obtained for delta I was -7.875 at 756 steps on bark D with 8CC power. 7he /C has foo many valves open to the SJAE's, allowing vacuum to be drawn as soon as the gland sealing steam /s putinto service. The latteris due fo the snapshot for the IC and is not a modelling problem. The A counter for primary water to the VCT only counts 7%

of Ihe total flow. A heater drain pump cannot be put into senrice at 225 MWe: it either cavitates excessively or trips on overload. Allmajor pumps bring in the overioud alarm about half a minute after being started and then the alarm immediately clears. The condensate recovery tank, pump, pump cfhscharge valve.

and alarm are not property modelled. The condensate recovery tank pump start and hi hi/eve/ alarm actuate at the same time, the pump discharge valve does nof shut when the pump stops, and when the pumpis afigned to the DWST (Ihe normal f/owpath) it does not put out any flow; thereby allowing the condensate recovery tank to continue to fillwhi7e the pumpis running. Following a dilution. the pressurizer boron dropped to about EIO ppm below RCS boron, then recovered to RCS boron after the spray valve was shut. The present coreis not modelled, making the reactivily curves in the plant curve book somewhat inaccurate. DR's have been submitted on all problems.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUA N TEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD Z4/

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TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEr REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWED BY RECOVERY TO RAIED POlVER NUMBER: NPE-004 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.1N Nuclear Startup from Hot Standby to Rated Power 3.1.1(3) Turbine Startup and Generator Synchronization 3.1.1(4) Reactor Trip Followed by Recovery to Rated Power 3.1.1(5) Operations at Hot Standby 3.T. 1(8) Load Changes DESCRIPTION During this test the imutator willbe tnpped from M power and returned to IKN power. This test will be run using operating procedures 3-EOP-E4 @hector Trip or Safety I+ection), 34OPS&0.1 (Reactor Trip Response), and 3&OP401 (Hot Standby to Power Operation). This test includes such evolutions as venfication of reactor trip response. changing from auxr7iory feedwater back to main feedwater. taking the reactor critical. turbine generator startup and synchronization, and power escalation. The purpose of this test is to verify that the simulator can be taken back to full power following a reactor Irip and that this evolution can be performed by the use of normal plant operating procedures. lhe reactor tnp response will be verified per procedures 3 EOP-E4 and 3<OP+SR 1, but for a detaI7ed analysis of a trip response see MHAN2. Turbine Trip hom IIXO Power.

OPllONS INmAL CONDIONS FINAL CONDmONS Steady state, 100% power, approximately 714 megawatts generated. The test is complete when the procedure is complete. The simulator has been returned to IKIpower with approximately 714 megawatts generated.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM E

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REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWED BY RECOVERY TO RAlED POWER NPE-004 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert Examination. Control room irx$cations should be os expected by the procedure. The evaluation team willinclude someone that currently holds or hos held a Turkey Point senior reactor operator Tcense and/or a hot Ncense instructor to assist in the evaluation of the discrete control room interactions and Indications.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS This test was fafrfy uneventfuf. AN required actions for the verffications of M'OPS% and 3<OP-EM.I were avoi7abie in the control room ond oN required local actions were able fo be performed from the I/F. 3~%75 worked for shutting down the AFW pumps and transfem'ng to MFW. lhe 25%/hour power escalation went weN. The steam generators had no problems hancIng this rate. Feedwoter wos controlled on the bypasses untIl slightly above 15% then tronsferred successfuNy to the FCV's. Due to the buNdup of xenon some dilution had to be done, but due fo the rote of power ascension. not a lot. It is apparent from the trends at the end of the test thot boration would hove to be used to maintain rod index as xenon burned ouf. No new problems were encountered and no DP's were generated from this test.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DERCIENCIES ElfCEPTTONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUlATOR CONRGURATION REVIEW BOARD DAIF: ~4/'/8 DATE: 4 6 Po DATEr < -I-f DATEr & D DATE: ~f I 0 n~re~c:-(-

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TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CER11FICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLE: PIANT SHUTDOWN FROM RATED POWER TO HOT STANDBY NUMBER: NPE-005 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 3.1. 1(5) Operations at Hot Standby 3.1.1(d) Load Changes 3.1.1(8) Plant Shutdown from Rated Power to Hot Standby DESCRIPTION During this test the simulator will be taken from full rated power to hot standby. This test will be run using the normal operating procedure Power Operation to Hot Standby. 3~P-103. and other plant operating procedures as directed by 3~P-103. This test includes such evolutions as reducing generated power and taking the turbine generator off-fine, breaking condenser vacuum, borating the reactor coolant system to cold shutdown, starling and using the standby feedpump to feed the steam generator. shutting down miscellaneous secondary and auxi7iary plant equipment, inserting control rods. and other evolutions performed as necessary to complete the fest. All actions wi7I be conducted in accordance with normal operating procedures. There are no equipment malfunctions in place, allowing verification that the simulator can be token from full rated power to hot standby by the use of normal plant operating procedures.

Several parameters will be monitored in order to compare simulator results with expected plant results. All aspects of the simulation will be monitored.

including control room indications, alarms. and trends. Local actions AN be simulated and the impact verified. The plant cooldown from hot standby to cold shutdown wi8 be performed in NPE~

OPTIONS INI11AL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDI11ONS Steady state IN% power, approximately 7 'egawatts generated, 1he test is complete when the procedure is complete. The plant has and equilibrium xenon been brought to hot standby, Tav is 547F, the generator is off-line.

vacuum has been broken. the regulating rods have been inserted. the RCS has been borated to cold shutdown. and the standby feedpump is feeding the steam generators.

APPRO ED FOR US

/8l TEST TEA DATE ( go DAIR DATE:

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PIANT SHUTDOWN FROM RATED POWER To HOT STANDBY: NPE-005 BASIS FOR EVAI.UAnoN Expert Examination. Control room indications should be os expected by the procedure. The evaluation team weal include a current or post Turkey Point senior reactor operator tcense holder and/or a hot license hstructor to assist h the evaluation of lhe discrete control room Interactions and Indications.

Rant Data. Plots weal be compared with a Unit 3 plant shutdown from 30% power completed on June 4, 1990.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS off Generally this test went quite well. The skndator was able to be taken Itom Mlrated power to hot standby by the use of normal plant operating procedures. There were a few discrepandes enon@tered. but most of them had been seen In other tests. There were a few new defldendes and DR's have been written to cover them. A boratlon was started to lower Tav and as It came down. generator load was reduced. A second charging pump and letdown orifice were placed In service to make the RCS more responsive to boron changes. The boratlon and generator load reduction was able to be controlled and allowed a 25'/hour load reduction be maintained. Rods were used some during the shutdown. but mast of the rod Insertion was after the plant was fufy shutdown. As power was reduced. secondary plant equipment was shutdown.

Thtslnctuded a SGFP. both heater drab pumps. a condensate pump. and the MSR's. 1he in4ouseloads were transfered to the startup transformer hom the auxiliary transformer before the turbhe generator was taken lin. Vacua was broken and the gland sealhg steam was taken out of service. After the turbine had coasted down It was paced on the turning gear. The steam dumps to the condenser were used to control Tav mtl shortly before the MSN s were closed. then control was passed to the ADV's.

The standby steam generator feedwater pump was used to feed the steam generators after the feed control had been transfered hom the FCV's to the bypass volves. As power was being decreased, the appropriate Nl status lights and olarms changed state. After the reactor was taken subcrltlcal and the Intermediate ranges were below 5x10-11 amps, the scxxce range voltages were restored. The'RCS was borated to cold shutdown. Al control room alarms. Indications, and hteractlons were appropriate

. except as noted below In the deildency section.

It ls impossible to exactly match the conditions for the Unit 3 shutdown on June 4. 1990. but the plot comparisons were generally quite good. Tav responds to changes In load and this produces slmlar responses In pressurlter level. RCS ltow. and RCP amps. The secondary side parameters. corresponded quite well. also.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS None DEFICIENCIES Most of the deltclendes have been covered by other tests: e.g.. happroprlate alarm forstartup transformer trouble. lack of a proper delta I model, and the heater drain pump tripping with turbine load below 3OOMWe. There were. however. a few new problems. The turbine deceleration rate did not hcrease when condenser vacuum was broken.

The MSR's did not provide appropriate temperature responses when behg taken out of service. The temperatures out of the MSR's did not decrease until the time control valves were aknost fuly closed and then the temperatures wanted to come back to 5OOF. Atter the turbine trip the temperatures went to almost 600F and they dropped to lOOF when the MSIV's were shut. DR's have been submitted on all new problems.

ExcEpnoNs To ANs 3.5 EVAI.UAnON M SINU OR CONFI ON REVIEW BOARD DATE: DATE.

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TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITIEi COOLDOWN FROM HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHNDOWN NUMBER: NPE-006 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.l. 1(5) Operations at Hot Standby 3.l.l(8) Plant Cooldown from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown 3.1.1(IO) Operator Conducted Surveillance Testing on Safety Rekrted Equlpmenf DESCRIPTION During this test the simulator will be taken from hot standby to cold shutdown. This test will be run using the normal operating procedure Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown, 3~P405, and other plant operating procedures as directed by 3GOP405. This test includes such evolutions as cooling down the reactor coolant system and the pressurizer, stopping the reactor coolant pumps. placing the residual heat removal system in service, taking the pressurizer solid, and other evolutions performed as necessary to complete the test and as directed by 3&OP405. All actions will be conducted in accordance with normal operating procedures. There are no equipment malfunctions in place, allowing verification that the simulator can be taken from hot standby to cold shutdown by the use of normal plant operating procedures. Several parameters will be monitored in order fo compare simulator results with expected plant results. All aspects of the simulation will be monitored. Including control room in'tions. alarms, and trends. Local actions wi7I be simulated and the impact verified.

Power reduction w8I not be performed in this procedure, but with NPC-005.

OPllONS INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS The simulator is at hot standby. lhe test is complete when the procedure is complete. The simulator has been brought fo cold shutdown, decay heat is being removed by the residual heat removal system. and fhe pressurizer is wafer solid.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM L~ SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATEi ~

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COOIDOWN FROM HOT STANDBY TO COLD SHUTDOWN: NPE-006 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert Examination Control roomindications should be as expected by the procedure. 1he evaluation team wuinclude a current or past Turkey Point senior reactor operator Ecense holder and/or a hot license instructor to assist in the evaluation of the discrete control room interactions and indications.

Plant Data. Plots wi7I be compared with a Unit 3 cooldown completed on April25, 79Ã.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS 3GOP405 was used forthe primary plant cooldown. the shutdown of secondary and auxiliary plant equipment, and to take the pressurizer sordid. With the exception of the few DR's noted below, the simulator responses were as expected. 1he cooldown was initiated by opening the ADV'sin hand as required and stopping A reactor coolant pump. The depressurization was accomplished by turning off the pressurizer heaters and opening one spray valve as necessary to reduce pressure in accordance with RCS temperature as the cooldown went along. Shortly after the test was started condenser vacuum commenced spiking up to 15inches, even though vacuum had been broken. 3&P450 was used to place RHR in seNlce and aII responses were proper. After placing RHR in service CV-2202 had to be adjusted to clear a high CCW cooler outlet temperature alarm. This is a reasonable response. Towards the end of the test an attempt was made to go to one CCW pump. but there was too much decay heat left and RHR temperatures could not be kept fromincreasing. Again. this seems I7re a reasonable response for the amount of time since shutdown The plots of the Unit 3 cooldown compare quite nicely to this evolution S/G pressure follows RCS temperature at about the same values. The cooldown on the plant went quite rapidly to around ALOOF. then slowed down considerably with a constantly decrease rate until RHR was putin seNice at about 280F. The same events occurred during the simulator cooldown. The running RCP current increased with the cooldown Pressurizer steam and Equid space temperatures follow pressurie at the same values. Both surge line temperatures showed decreasing temperatures at the same rate on aninsurge and slowty increasing temperatures afterwards.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDI11ONS None DEFICIENCIES There Is an improper SOS on low RHR suction pressure. Vacuum spikes of up to 15 inches occurred along with high hotwell level spikes and lhe turbine speed would Increase during the spkes. The OMS primary and backup test switches need to be modelled. DR's hove been submitted against these problems.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUA71ON TEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD OAK~+ DATEr /> 'FO DATE: ~~~/i DATEr l~'~. 'fO DATE: 1<- >->- DATE: l<f"~ l0 Page 2

M W W W TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT 4.0 SURVEILIANCES 4.1 SUR-001 INITIALCRITICALITYAFTER REFUELING, OP-0204.3 4.2 SUR-002 NUCLEAR DESIGN CHECK TESTS DURING STARTUP SEQUENCE AFTER REFUELING, OP-0204.5 4.3 SUR-003 EDG 8 HOUR LOAD TEST AND LOAD REJECTION TEST, OP-4304.3 4A SUR-004 COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMPS LOW HEADER PRESSURE START TEST, 3-OSP-030.5 4.5 SUR-005 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK RATE CALCULATIONS, 3-OSP-041.1 4.6 SUR-007 CVCS BORIC ACID TRANSFER FLOW TEST, 3-OSP-046.2 4.7 SUR-008 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 3B TRANSFER AND CONTROL SWITCH TEST, 3-OSP-046.5 4.8 SUR-009 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM LOGIC TEST, 3-OSP-049.1 4.9 SUR-010 RHR MOV's/SYSTEM PRESSURE INTERLOCK TEST, 3-OSP-050.7 4.10 SUR-011 RHR MOV's 750, 751, 862, 863, INTERLOCK TEST, 3-0SP-050.8 4.11 SUR-012 EMERGENCY CONTAINMENTFILTER FANS OPERATlhlG TEST, 3-OSP-056.1

4. 12 SUR-014 SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST, 3-OSP-059.1

4. 13 SUR-015 INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST, 3-OSP-059.2

4. 14 SUR-016 INTERMEDIATERANGE NIS SETPOINT VERIFICATION, 3-OSP-059.3

4. 15 SUR-017 POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST, 3-OSP-059A

4. 16 SUR-018 POWER RANGE NUCLEARINSTRUMENTATIONSHIFT CHECKS AND DAILY CALIBRATION,3-OSP-059.5 4.17 SUR-019 PROCESS RADIATIONMONITORING OPERABILITY TEST, 3-OSP-067.1 4.18 SUR-020 MAINSTEAM ISOLATION VALVECLOSURE TEST 4.19 SUR-021 STANDBYSTEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMPS/CRANKING DIESELS TEST, O-OSP-074.4 4.20 SUR-022 AUXILIARYFEEDWATER TRAIN 1 OPERABILITY VERIFICATION, 3-OSP-075.1 4.21 SUR-024 MAIN TURBINE VALVES OPERABILITY TEST, 3-OSP-089 4.22 SUR-026 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS INTEGRATED TEST, 3-OSP-203 4.23 SUR-029 OPERATIONAL TEST OF MOV-535, 536, AND PORV 455C, 456, OP-1300.2 4.24 SUR-030 FULL LENGTH RCC - PERIODIC EXERCISE, OP-1604.1 4,25 SUR-031 INDUCING XENON OSCILLATIONS TO PRODUCE VARIOUS INCORE AXIALOFFSETS, OP- 12304.8 4.26 SUR-032 NORMAL OPERATION OF INCORE MOVEABLEDETECTOR SYSTEM AND POWER DISTRIBUTION SURVEILLANCE, OP- 12404.1

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICATION lEST PROCEDURE TITLEs INITIAL CRITICAOTYAFlER REFUELING, OP-0204.3 NUMBER: SUR-001 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.1 (9) Core Performance Testing DESCRIPTION This test will be a perfonnance of the InNal criticality after refueling procedure. lhe procedure will be followed as closely as possible to insure that the simulator can support training on initial cnticality procedures. Because of the specific nature of the test, the plant reactor engineering staff will actually perform the physics tests with the simulator test team acting as the plant operators.

OPllONS Parts of the test require chemistry testing for boron concentration. lhe simulator computed values for boron concentration may be used for 'these steps.

INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS BOL hot standby. AN rods In. Procedure OP~.3 complete.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATEs 5 7 9a DAIS ~G- 7- p SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

DATE:

Page 1

INITIAL CRITICAUTYAFTER REFUEVNG, OP~.3r SUR-001 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of the abi7ity to perform the procedure on the simulator.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESUI.TS For this test the simulator test team was assisted by a group of reactor engineers who normally perform the procedure in the plant. The procedure was used successfully to perform a reactor startup in the simulator. The main problem encountered was that the reactivity computer did not respond property. To circumvent this problem, the simulator test team set up a graphic screen in the instructor facility to take the place of the reactivity computer. The reactor engineers directed the test using this screen. From a training standpoint. the test was a success. The eirperienced reactor engineers used the test as a review of the procedure and as a chance to train new reactor engineers.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES The reactivity computer fai7ed to work properly for this test. A deficiency report was submitted and the computer was subsequently calibrated. A reactor engineer participated In the retest of the reactivity computer.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVAI.UATIONTEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIBV BOARD DAIF: ~6- w DATE:

DATEr I> DATEr 4 gO DATE: oar: ~C Page 2

TURKEy POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE llllE: NUCLEAR DESIGN CHECK TESTS DURING STARTUP SEQUENCE AFTER REFUELING, OP-0204.5 NUMBER: SUR-002 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: S.1.1 l9) Core Performance Testing DESCRIPTION This test will be a performance of the post refuefing core physics test procedure in the simulator. The procedure will be followed as closely as possible to insure that the simulalor can support training on core performance testing procedures.

OPTIONS Parts of the test require chemistry testing for boron concentration. The simulator computed values for boron concentration may be used for these steps.

INITIAL CONDITIONS RNAL CONDmONS BOL hot zero power after Initial critfcafity Procedure OM204.5 complete.

Procedure is complete.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE: DATE: O SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

Page 1

NUCLEAR DESIGN CHECK lESTS DURING STARTUP SEQUENCE AFTER REFUELING, OP-D2M5i SUR-002 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert evaluation of the ability to perform the core physics tests in the s/muiator and the ability of the simulator to meet the acceptance criter/a of the procedure.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS The test was run with very little problems. The reactor engineering group assisted the certification test team by performing the core physics testing associated with this test. The only ho/d up on finishing the test was some problems with the /lux mapping system in the simulator. These problems were fixed and the flux mapping test LSUR432) was run.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS DEFIC/ENC/ES Two discrepancies were written on th/s test. Fiat, the critical boron concentration was outside the /imits allowed by the physics testing procedure. Second, one of the /nstructor I'acility pages was found to have Incorrect page connectors. Neither of these discrepancies has a s/gnificant effect on operator training.

EXCEPllONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: o DATE. /o-lo-f~

DAlEi iN DAlE. ('Og0+0 DAlE: DATE: ~l0- ~9)

Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllONTEST PROCEDURE TITLE: EDG B HOUR LOAD TEST AND LOAD REJECTION TEST, OPM04.3 NUMBER: 5UR-003 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.l. 1(10) Operator Conducted Surveillance Testing on Safety Related Equipment DESCRIPllON The purpose of this test is to verify that the emergency diesel generators (EDG's) can be operated from the simulator control room and that they operate as do the actual EDG's in the plant. The eight hour full load test and toad rejection test operator surveillance willbe used to perform this test.

OPTIONS INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS Any power level. normal electric plant lineup. EDG survei7lance complete.

APPROVED FOR USE DATE: 3 /5 tO DATE: ~- I s-0s SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

Page 1 m m m m m m m m m m w m m m m m m w m

EDG 8 HOUR IOAD TEST AND I.OAD REJECTION TEST, 3-OSP4304.3i SUR-OO3 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Errpert evaluation of the obility to perform the surveillance in the simulator and the simulator's ability to meet the acceptance cntena of the surveillance.

For the load rejection portion of the test, the simulator response was compared to actual plant data obtained from the applicable test results.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULT lhe team was able to mn the surveillance without any problems. AN functions which needed to be controlled from the control room were performed. In additkrn, any local control functions which needed to be manipulated. such as speed droop. were controikrble from the instructor facility.

For the load rejection portion of the sur'ei7lance. the simulator data wos graphed ond compared to octual plant data. Both the simulator and the octual plant EDG's returned to steady state values within two seconds of opening the output breaker. The actual plant EDG's hod higher transient frequency and voltage, but the direction of the response was correct ond the transient is over so quickly that no adverse effect on training would occur due to the differences in the response.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES Two problems were noted and both had discrepancies previously written on them. First, a voltage adjustment on the EDG whi7e it is in porallel with the grid causes a change in EDG real kxrding (megawatts). Second, with the EDG in parallel with the grid. its kxrding could be easily controlled even with zero speed droop set In EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURAllON REVIEW BOARD DATEr ~7- ~o DATEr p~~, ~a7- ro DATEi okra ~HO Poge 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLE: COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMPS LOW HEADER PRESSURE START TEST, 3-OSP-030.5 NUMBER: 5UR-004 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 3.1. 1(10) Operator Conducted Surveillance Testing on Safely Related Equipment DESCRIPTION 1his test willconsist of performing the normal operator surveillance procedure, 3&SPM0.5, for checking the low pressure auto starts on the component cooling water pumps. With no malfunctions present. the test should pass the applicable acceptance contained in 3&SP430.5.

OP11ONS 1his test can be performed in any plant condition.

INI11AL CONDmONS FINAL CONDITIONS IR% power, steady state. . 1he test is complete when the surveillance has been completed.

APPROVED FOR USE Owrar~/0 9> DATE:

SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

Page 1

COMPONENT COOLING WATER PUMPS LOW HEADER PRESSURE START TEST, 3&SP~0.5r SUR~

BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert examination 3C)SPAM.5 can be performed and the applicable acceptance crftena of the procedure met.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The test went well. The survemance was able to be performed on the simulator, the low pressure start of the CCW pumps worked, and the acceptance critena of 3&SP430.5 were met. The CCW pump auto start works property. There is a 30 second delay on the auto start of a CCW on low pressure. The surveillance does not require monitoring this delay. but it was checked and works properly.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUAllONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFISURATION REVIEW BOARD narra ~S9Q DAlE 90 DATE: I oars ~Z 50-DATE: DATE: 4-~- /0 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLE: REACTOR COOIANT SYSTEM lEAK RATE CALCUIATIONS,.3-OSPMI.I NUMBER: SUR-005 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2 Plant Maffuncttons 3.1.1 (10) Plant Sun elllances DESCRIPTION This test will verify the obilily of the simulator to support operator conducted RCS leak rote calculation in accordance with normal operations procedures.

A small leak will be inserted. and the operating procedures will be performed to verify that they colculate the correct leak rate wilhin a reasonable tolerance.

OPllONS Leak size is optional but should be less than about 5 gallons per minute to prevent the need for makeup to the Volume Control Tank.

INITIAI. CONDOIONS FINAL CONDmONS ICOS power or HSD, must be steady state. IKC power, steady state.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lEAM DATE' 0 DAIB ~3-X<

SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DAlE Poge I

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK RATE CALCUIATIONS, 3-OS'. I: SUR~5 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of the results of the survei71ance as compared to the known leak rate.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The calculate leak rate on the surveillance was 3. 16 gallons per minute. The leak rate initiated by the malfunction was a port area of 0.0001. This resulted in a leak rate which the simulator reported as 0.2 to 0.3 pounds mass per second. Converting this to gallons per minute yields a leak rate in gallons per minute which cooresponds very closely to the 3. I6 gpm.

The team was able to perform the surveillance with no dif'ficutty.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAIIONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE:~33e- DATE. $ x o to DAIE: ~~W DATE: ~9" 3~~~

4'ATE:

DATEr Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEr CVCS BORIC ACID TRANSFER FLOW TEST, 3-OSP-046.2 NUMBER: SUR-007 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSr 3.1. I(10) Operator Conducted Surveillance Testing on Safety Related Equipment DESCRIPTION This test wi7I consist of performing the normal operator surveillance procedure, 3-OSP-046.2. for verifying adequate boric acid flow capability. With no malfunctions present. the test should pass the applicable acceptance criten'a contained in 3-0SP4d6.2.

OPTIONS This test can be performedin any stable shutdown condition.

INITIALCONDmONS FINAL CONDITIONS Cold shutdown with a water-solid pressuCer. The test is complete when the surveillance has been completed.

APPROVED FOR USE l/D TT DATE:

SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR ~/E'ATE:

I DATE:

Page I

CVCS BORIC ACID TRANSFER FLOW TEST, 3-OSP-N6.2: SUR407 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert examination 3C)SP446.2 can be performed and the applicable acceptance criteria of the procedure met.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS lhe surveillance was performed on the simulator, but due to a cafibration inaccuracy on the control room flow recorder Ffh3-113, the acceptance cnteria were not met. This Is the sort of problem that could occur in plant testing and Is not considered to be a deficiency. The Stylized Instrument for FR-3-113 indicated 10 gpm, which would have met the acceptance cnteria. This is a hardware problem and not a software one.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS None DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUAllONlEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: DAlE:

DATE: ozrs~Z5 0 DATF. DAlE: ~~~9 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 3B TRANSFER AND CONTROL SMIITCH TEST, 3-OSP-046.5 NUMBER: SUR-008 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1. It'10) Operator Conducted Surveillance Testing on Safety Related Equipment DESCRIPTION This test willconsist of performing the normal operator surveillance procedure, 3-OSP-046.5, for checking the 3B boric acid transfer pump transfer and control switch.

With no malfunctions present, the test should pass the acceptance criteria contained in 3-OSP446.5.

OPTIONS ibis test can be performed in any stable plant condition.

INITIALCONDfllONS FINAL CONDITIONS IODX power, steady state. lhe test is complete wtren the surveillance has been completed.

APPROVED fOR USE DATEi 1 9C> DATE: ~/Y/ NET SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

Page I

BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMP 3B TRANSFER AND CONTROL SWITCH TEST, 3-OSP~6.5: SUR-005 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert examination 3&SP446.5 can be performed and the applicable acceptance criteria of the procedure met.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The surveillance was performed on the simulator, but the acceptance critena were not met. The normal/isolate switch does not Inhibit operating the 3B boric acid pump from the control room when the switch is placed in isolate. A OR has been submitted to correct this. Otherwise, alarms and IrxFcattons were as expected.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDNONS None DEFICIENCIES With the normal/isolate switch in isolate, the 3B boric acid transfer pump can still be operated from the control room.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllONlEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATEs DATE ~S 9o DATE I f DATE. ~~SO DAlE:

Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CER11FICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITLEr REACTOR PROTEC11ON SYSTEM LOGIC TEST, 3-OSP-049.1 NUMBER 5UR-009 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSr 3.1.1(10) Operotor Conducted Surveillance Testing on Safely Related Equipment DESCRIP11ON This test willconsist of performing the normal operator survei7lance procedure. 3&SPM9. 1, for checking the proper operation of the reactor protection system logic.

Train A and train B willboth be checked. With no malfunctions present, the test should pass Ihe applicable acceptance criteria contained in 3-OSP449.I. The RPS logic test cfrcuitry weal also be verified to work conectly.

OP11ONS The power level determines which portions of the surveillance are to be performed. but lhe reactor protection system logic test circuitryis full modelled and this surveillance con be performed at any stable plant condition on the simulator.

INITIALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDI11ONS 100% power, steady state. The test is complete when the surveillance has been completed.

APPROVED FOR USE DATEr / l< DATEr

~ ~4' SIMUIATORENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAK~// o Fo DATE:

Page 1

REACTOR PROTECllON SYSTEM LOGIC TEST, JWSP-049.1: SUR-009 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert examination 3&SP449.1 can be performed and the applicable acceptance criteria of the procedure met.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The test went we/i. The surveillance was performed on the simulator, the reactor protection system logic test circuitry worked property. and the applicable acceptance criteria were met. The control room indications and alarms were appropriate for the exercise. The RPS logic test panels (racks 36 and 41) are modelled correctly and operat/ons in them produce the correct responses Inside control room. The RPS logic matnx inside the control room changed /n accordance with the OSP and operator actions inside the logic cabinets. Also. the changes inside the logic cabinets corresponded to operator actions.

The reactor trip and reactor trip bypass breakers worked properly. The trip bypass breaker test position not being modelled had no apparent effect inside the control room. The shunt block and shunt trip pushbultons not being modelled also had no apparent effect inside the control room.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS DEFICIENC/ES EXCEPllONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURAllON REVIEW'OARD DAlE DATE. g gO DAlE / 7 DATE Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITIEi RHR MOV'S/SYSTEM PRESSURE INIERIOCK lEST, 3&SP-050.7 NUMBER: SUR-010 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SEC77ONSi 3.7.7(10) Operator Conducted Sun ei7krnce Testing on Safety Rehted Equipment DESCRIPTION This test wi7I be conducted by performing the operator survei7lance procedure 3&SP450.7, RHR MOV's/System Pressure Interlock Test with no malfunctions Inserted. The aMity to successfully perform the operator surveaance will be verified.

OP17ONS None INlllALCONDlllONS FINAI CONDITIONS Mode 4 with RHR Isolated. Mode 4 with RM2 isolated. survei7lance complete.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE. m /o gP okra ~>- > - o SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

Page 1 m m m m m m m m m m m m m w m m m m

RHR MOV'S/5 ySTEM PRESSURE INTERLOCK TEST, M)SP-050.7r SUR010 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON

&pert evaluation of the abi7ity to successfully perform the control room functions of the surveillance with the test passing the acceptance criteria.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS lhe test wos run in the simulator with no problems. The instrument tasks to simulate pressure at the pressure switches was accomplished by failing the associated bistobles on or off. There were no cScrepancies.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS J.5 EVALUAllONlEAM SIMULATOR CONFIeURATION REVIEMf BOARD DAK ~Y-) DATE: ~

DAK ~~MIPB DAK ~EZD 0 DAlE: DATE: ~3-Page 2

TURKEy POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE llTLEr RHR MOV'S 750, 1'51, 85/, &0, INTERLOCK TEST, 3-OSP-050.8 NUMBER: 5UR-011 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONSi 3.1.1(10) Operator Conducted Surveillance Testing on Safety Related Equipment DESCRIPTION This test wN be conducted by performing the operator surveillance procedure 3&SP450.8, RHR MOV's Interlock Test with no malfunctions inserted. The abi7ity to successfully perform the operator survemance wi7l be verified.

OPTIONS None INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS Plant pressure less than 500 psfg and cooldown in progress. Surveillance complete.

RHR system isolated.

APPROVED FOR USE lEST lEAM SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE Page 1 W-W W W W W W W W W W W

RHR MOV'S 750, 751, SSQ SN, INTERLOCK TEST, M)SP-OSO.Si SUR<11 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON

&pert evaluation of the aMity to successfully perform the contrA room functions of the surveillance with the test passing the acceptance criteria.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS lhe surve8lance was performed almost exactly as written and without any probbms. To simulate the Instrument Technicians'ask of simulating pressure at the RCS low range pressure detectors, the test team fai7ed the detectors high from the instructor faci7ily.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS J.5 EVALUAllON lKAM SIMULATOR CONRGURAllON REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~>E- DATE: $ 2 yP DATD ~>ED'& DATEr ~W~

DATF DATEr Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CER11FICA11ON TEST PROCEDURE TITLEi EMERGENCY CONTAINMENTFILTER FANS OPERA11NG lEST, 3&SP-056.1 NUMBER: SUR-012 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 3.1. 1(10) Operator Conducted Sun eillance Testing on Safely Related Equipment DESCRIPTION 1his fest willconsist of performing the normal operator sun eillance procedure. 3-OSP456. 1. for verifying the proper operation of the emergency containment filter fans. With no malfunctions present, the test should pass the applicable acceptance criteria contained in 3-OSP456. L OP11ONS This survei7lance can be performed in any plant condition INI11AL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDI11ONS IOOX power. steady state. The fest is complete when the procedure has been completed.

APPROVED FOR USE SIMULATORENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAK ~/F/$ 0 DAB: ~+)5D DATE:

DATE:

Page 1

EMERGENCY CONTAINMENTFILTER FANS OPERAllNG TEST, M)SPASM. 1: SUR-012 BASIS FOR EVAI.UAlloN Expert examination 3C)SPO56.1 can be performed and the applicable acceptance criteria of the procedure met.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS lhe test went well. The sunreIIIance was performed on the simulator, the fans operated properly. and the acceptance criteria were alf met.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS To ANS 8.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUIATOR CONRGURAlloN REVIEW BOARD DATa DATE: ~ ~ 7~

DATa r S f'rt DATa Z-S~

DATa DATa ~~9 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITIEr SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATIONANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST, 3&SP-059.1 NUMIIERr SUR-014 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1. 1(IO) Operator Conducted Survetikrnce Testing on Safety-Rekrted Equipment or Systems DESCRIPllON This test will be conducted by performing the operator surveillance procedure 3&SP459. 1, Source Range Nuclear Instrument Analog Channel Operational Test.

OPllONS May be done shutdown by performing aitemate sections of OSP~.I.

INITIAL CONDIONS FINAL CONDmONS Done at power. SurveNance complete.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAIEr DA1E: ~f DATE:

DAlE:

Page 1 M & W && W W W M W &&& W & W

SOURCE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATIONANALOG CHANNEL OPERAllONAL TEST, 3-OSP-059. 1: SUR414 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of the test team's abiTity to use the surveillance as written and the ability of the simulator to meet the acceptance criteria of the test.

DISCUSS>'ON OF lEST RESULTS The test was run using the operator surveNance procedure as written with power at IIXIL lhe test went completely as planned and afl parameters, alarms, and inclinations met the acceptance criteria. No discrepancies were noted.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS None DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUIATO C Fl U N REVIEW BOARD DAlE: ~~o DATEr DAIS ~V/o DATEr 4 /4~

DATE: DATEr <- ~-9O Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: INTERMEDIATERANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTA11ON ANALOG CHANNEL OPERA 11ONAL TEST, 3-OSP-059.2 NUMSER: SUR<15 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 3.1. 1(10) Operafor Conducted Surveillance Testing on Safety Related Equipmenf DESCRIPTION 1his test willconsist ofperforming the normal operator surveillance procedure. 3&SP-Q59.2. for verifying the proper analog output of theintermediate range nuclear instrumentation. With no malfunctions present. the test should pass the applicable acceptance criteria contained in 3-OSP-059.2. 1he proper modelling of the intermediate range nuclear Instrumentation analog test circuitry will also be verified.

OPTIONS This test can be performed in any stable plant condition.

INI11AL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS IOOX power, steady state. The test is complete when the surveillance has been completed.

APPROVED FOR USE DAIEs DATE:

SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAK:~7 DATE:

Page 1

INlERMEDIATERANGE NUCLEAR INSlRUMENTATIONANALOG CHANNEL OPERAllONAL TEST, 3-OSP-a59.2r SUR-OI5 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert examination. 3&SP459.2 can be performed and the applicable acceptance criteria of Ihe procedure met.

DISCUSSION OF IEST RESULTS The test went well. The surveNance was performed on the simulator without any local operator actions. The intermediate range nuclear instrumentation analog test circuitry checked out propeity and the acceptance crftena in 3&SP459.2 were met.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DAIEr DATEr I DATEr 2-5+

DAlE: DATEr+--IO Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON lEST PROCEDURE TillE: INTERMEDIATE RANGE NIS SETPOINT VERIFICATION, 3-OSP-059.3 NUMBER: SUR-016 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSs 3.1.1 (ID) Operator Conducted Sunrei7lance Testing of Safety-Reioted Equipment or Systems DESCRIPTION This test wl be conducted by performing the operator surveillance which checks the intermediate range setpoints during a power escatatfon. The test un7I be performed concunentiy with SUMQ2, the post-refueling power escalation OPllONS IN TIAI. CONDillONS FINAI. CONDmONS Hot standby. Surveillance complete.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATEr <r~ ~< DAK: ~C l r~-

DAlE:

DATE:

Page 1 W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W

INlERMEDIATERANGE NIS SETPOINT VERIFICAllON, 3-OSP059.3: SURO16 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON

&pert evaluation of simulator's abi7ity to support the sunreillance and pass the acceptance criteria of the test.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The test was conducted In conjunction with the post refueling startup and power escalation of SURER lhe intermediate range nuclear instruments passed the acceptance cnteria of the test and the test was performed with no problems.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDIllONS None DEFICIENCIES None EX'CEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGU TION REVIEW BOARD oArs ~r. 10

~9 DATE:

oArs

+

oArs

~G'ATEs

~&'/

~ ~

o~rs Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CER77FICA11ON TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: POWER RANGE NUCLEAR IN57RUMENTA17ON ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST, 3-OSP-0594 NUMBER: SUR-017 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SEC17ONS: 3.1. 7(70) Operator Conducted Surveillance Testing on Safety Related Equipment DESCRIP71ON This test wi7I consist of performing the normal operator surveillance procedure, 3&SPM9.4. for verifying Ihe proper analog output of Ihe power range nuclear Instrumentation. With no matfunctions present. the test should pass the applicable acceptance criteria contained in 3-OSP-059.4. The proper modelling of the power range nuclear instrumentation analog test circuitry willalso be verified.

OP17ONS The power level determines which portions of the surveillance are to be performed. but the power range analog test circuitry'is full modelled and this surveillance can be performed at any stable plant condition on the simulator.

INITIALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS 100K power. steady state. The test is complete when Ihe suivei7lance has been completed.

APPROVED FOR USE DATEi / 1+ 7 0 DATE:i SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATIONANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST, J-OSP-059.4: SUR417 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert examtnatfon 3&SPI 4 can be performed and the applicable acceptance criteria of the procedure met.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The test went weil. The sunreiliance was performed on the simulator, the analog output from the power range nuclear instrumentation was correct per Ihe sunreitlance procedure. and the apptfcable acceptance criteria of 3~P459.4 were met. The nuclear instrumentation analog test circuit~ works prope+.

The OSP requires tripping certain protection channel blstables and that also worked property; the correct lights came on in the protection channel cabinets and proper reactor protection matrix lights lit in the control room and the associated alarms were annunciated.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPllONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONlEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE C~ cJ DAlE DATE: I DATE: 2 $ t0

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TlllE: POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SHIFT CHECKS AND DAILYCAUBRA77ON, 3-OSP-059.5 NUMBER: SUR-018 ANS 5.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.1 (10) Operator Conducted Sun eillance Testing on Safety-Related Equipment or Systems DES CRIPllON In this fest, the normal plant sujvemance to calibrate the power range nuclear instruments will be performed. ibis will insure that the simulator provides correct heat balance data for the Indicated power level and that it is possible to do the surveillance. This test will be performed dun'ng the steady state stabs7ity run.

OPTIONS lhe test may be run at any time in core life.

INITIAL CONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS IMX Power, steady state. Surveillance complete.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lFAM SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE: ~4 DATE: ~Tr E'-

DAlE:

DATE:

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POWER RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SHIFT CHECKS AND DAILYCALIBRATION, 3-OSP-059.5i SUR-018 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of the ability to perform the operator suiveillance in the simulator and the simulator's ability to meet the performance criteria of the surveillance.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The surveillance was run with satisfactory heat balance results. The only problem was that the Digital Oata Processing System model in the simulator did not support the use of the computer calculated heat balance (the 'cal'rogram). The team used meter indications ond instructor facility variable monitoring to the perform the functions normally provided by the 'cal'rogram.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES The DDPS 'cal'rogram wtil not run in the simulator. A deficiency report was submitted to get this problem fixed.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUATION lKAM SIMUIATOR CONflGURA O REVIEW BOARD DATE:

DA1E: ~Y/

DATEi Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE Z

llTLEr PROCESS RADIAllONMONITORING OPERABILITY TEST, 3-OSP-057.1 NUMBER: SUR<19 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTTONSr 3.1.1(10) Operator Conducted SurveN!ance Testing on Safety Related Equipment DES CRIPllON This test will consist of performing the normal operator surveiNance procedure. 3&SP467. 1, for monitoring the operabNily of the process radiation monitors.

This test wrTI actuate aN aksrms and Interlocks associated with each tested process rnfiation monitor channel. These process monitors Include R4-IT (Containment air particulate), R4-12 (Containment air gaseous). &3-14 (Plant vent gas monitor), R4-15 (Condenser air ejector moritor), R4-17A and &8-17B (Component cooling water monltoa), N-18 (Waste disposal system Nqukt eflluent monitor), R4-19 (Steam generator 0'quid monitor), and R4-20 (Reactor coolant letdown monitor). Each channel should pass the appTeable acceptance cNeria contained in 3&SP467. 1, which includes proper actuation of aN alarms and Interlocks.

OPllONS TMs test can be performed tn any plant condition. If containment purge is not in service, the associated channels need not be tested.

INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS IK% power with containment purge in service. The test is complete when the procedure Is complete.

APPROVED FOR USE DAK ~sK1 qo DA IE: +8+ 815o SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

DATE:

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PROCESS RADIAllONMONITORING OPERABILITy TEST, 3WSP-067. 1: SUR<19 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert Evaluation. MSPM7.1 can be performed and the applicable acceptance criteri can be met.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS Basically, the test went well. The team was able to perform the surveillance and the applicable acceptance criteria were met. There were a few problems and they wiN be detailed below In the deficiency section lhe process monitors'ndications were appropriate throughout this test. The control room alarms and equIpment Interiocks functioned as expected. The tested interiock included such actuations as Isolating and stopping the containment purge and shutting the Instrument air bleed valves when N-I I or R4-12 were tested: isolating a waste gas release when R-3-14 is actuated: shutting the CCW surge tank vent when R4-l7A or N-17B are tested: and Isolating a liquid release when R 3-18 is tested.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES Vyhen the auxi7iary building exhaust fans were stopped as part of the test of R4-14 the reading for N-14 quickly increased from 3K to approximately 78K.

tjiyhen a fan was restarted the recxfing quickly returned to 3K. A DR will be submitted against this problem. The OSP requires checking the high alarm setpolnt against the I&C posted value. These values are not posted. This w8 be covered by the plant/simulator hardware comparison. therefor a new DR will not be written against lt.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUAllONlEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURAllON REVIEIV BOARD DAD:

DAlB DAlB

~86/% DAlB (pg(E ~(o (( 0--

fo fr 9y

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE llTLEr MAIN SlEAM ISOLAllON VALVE CLOSURE TEST NUMBER: SUR<20 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTTONSr J.l. 1(10) Operator Conducted Sunreillance Testing On Safety Rekrfed Equipment or Systems DESCRIPTION This survei7lance test involves closing each of the main steam line isolation valves at a hot zero steam flow condilion to verify that the valves will close in less time than required by the Technical Specifications. lhe procedure covers all three of the steam lines. Aspects of the test that involve local actions wi7I be simulated through the scenario.

lhe majority of the activities in this Survieiiance are either not simulated or are performed remotely. However. the test was performed to verify the closure timing of the MSIV for a pressurized hot zero steam flow condition OPllONS The simulator Is capable of simulating this test for each of the MSA!s.

INITIAL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS OX power steady state. hot, zero steam flow. The test is complete when the procedure is complete. lhe system thermal steam generator pressure greater than 1000 psig. hydraulic conditions are Ihe same as at the start of the test.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lEAM DAlE: 4 $O DATE: ~~

SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE ~EDE~D'i DATE:

Page 1 W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W

MAINSTEAM ISOLATION VALVE CLOSURE lEST: SUR-020 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert Evaluation - The control room indications. overall response, and specific relevant parameters will be evaluated.

Plant Data - Results from completed plant procedures will be used to compare the closure timing.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The surveillance was conducted as planned. The acceptance criteria for main steam isolation valve closure time was met by the simulator and the closure time provided reasonable agreement with plant data.

.OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPllONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW/ BOARD oArs7~~l<c'A DATEr4 DATE:

ZO RO DAK IE:

~C.

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE llTLEr STANDBY SlEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMPS/CRANKING DIESELS lEST, D-OSP-D74.4 NUMBER: SURM1 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 3.1.1 (ID) OPERATOR CONDUClED SURVEIllANCES ON SAFEIY-REIATED EClUIPMENT OF SYSlEMS DES CRIPllON This test wiN show the abmy of the simulator to support the testing of the standby steam generator feed pumps. For this test. the applicable plant surve8krnce procedure has the operators supply the standby feed pump from the unit 1 and 2 cranking cresels which are a backup power supply to the nuclear units. The certification test ueN be performed by performing the applicable operator sunrelllance procedure to the fullest extent possible in the simulator.

OPllONS INmAI. CONDITIONS RNAL CONDmONS The survemance requires that it be posible to deenerglzed Survellance complete.

the unit 3 4C 4Kv bus. This Is most easily done at hot standby.

APPROVED FOR USE lEST TEAM DATEt ~ o DATE:

SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

Page 1

STANDBYSTEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMPSICRANKING DIESELS lEST, O-OSP<74.4i SUR-02l BASIS fOR EVALUATION Expert Evaluation - The control room indications, overall response. and specific re!event parameters wi7I be evaluated. In addition. the abTily of the simulator to support the surveillance as written will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS lhe surveillance was performed almost exactly as wntten without any problems. Some local actions were performed hom the instructor facility, but this is normal for simulator operation. In addition to testing the 'A'tandby feed pump, the test team started the 'B'tandby feed pump and fed the steam generators with it to show that it could be used. The 'B'ump is powered from unit 4C bus and is not fully modeled electricatty so the sun eillance was not performed for it. No deficiencies were noted.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPllONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUIAllONCONFIGURAllON REVIEW BOARD

~

i

~

(~ g ~ DAlE: d 3 DAlE:

DA1E: ~C DAlE:

DAlE: DAIE:~~/ 9 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON lEST PROCEDURE NIE: AUXIIIARYFEEDWATER TRAIN 1 OPERABIIITY VERIFICATION, 3-OSP<75.1 NUMBER: SUR<22 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.1(10) Operator Conducted Sun eillance Testing on Safety Related Equipment DESCRIPTION This test will be conducted by performing the operator surveillance procedure 3C)SP475.1. Auxifiary Feedwater Train 1 Operability Verification wilh no malfunctions inserted.

OPllONS Eittar train of Auxifiary Feedwater could be tested.

INITIAL CONDmONS FINAL coNDmoNS Can be performed at any power level above the point of Surveillance complete.

adding heat.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST 1FAM DATEr 2- 2 DATE: 3 2 fo SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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AUX!VARYFEEDWATER TRAIN I OPERABILITY VERIFICATION, M)SP<75. I: SUR-022 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of the abiTity to successfully perform the control room functions of the surveillance with the test passing the acceptance criteria.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The team was able to perform the survei7lance with no problems. All the control room functions could be performed. The portions of the test done locally were not done, but this did not adversely affect the test.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATION lEAM SIMUIATOR CONFI6URATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~a~ DATEr g ~O DAK: ~+W DAK ~30 DATE: DATEr 5- '~Q Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITLEs MAIN lVRBINE VALVES OPERABIIITY TEST, 3&SP-089 NUMBER: SUR-024 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 3.1.1(10) Operator Conducted Sunreiikrnce Testing on Safely Related Equipment DES CRIPllON lMs test Is a performance of the operator survemance which checks the freedom of motion of the main turbine valves. In order to provide as much data as possible, the test wl be run at power even though the operator survellance has the option of being run at hot standby.

OPllONS The test may be run at power or shutdown INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS Power less than 40%, Surveillance completed.

APPRO'IED FOR USE lEST TEAM DAlE: ~ > 9b oArs ~r.

SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

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MAIN TURBINE VALVES OPERABILITy TEST, 3-OSP-089:

SUR-02'ASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert Evaluation - The control room indications, overall response. and specific relevent parameters will be evaluated. In addition. the abi%'ty to successfully perform the surveillance and the abi%ty of the simulator to pass the acceptance criteria will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The final run of this surveillance was performed with very tittle problem. As in the plant, Ihe initial stages of shutting the left turbine control valves with the test switch ls very difficult due to the large change in power with a small valve movement. The team was. however, able to perform the test without undue transients ensuing In the simulator. No deficiencies were noted.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM .SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~9.>c:8 DATE: 1O /

DAD: ~F~4 ~& A . << ~'"~O DATE: DATEr I'~-f~- iO Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE llTLEr ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS INTEGRATED TEST, 3-OSP-203 NUMBER: SURES ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSt 3.1. 1(10) Operator Conducted Surveilkrnce Testing on Safety Rekrled Equipment DESCRIPTION This test wm consist of performing the normal operator surveillance procedure, 3~P-203, for verifying proper engineered safety features actuation. With no malfunctions present, the test shoukl pass the applicable acceptance criterkr contained in ESP-203. As stated in the title, this is an integrated fest and it verifies the proper plant response to a loss of off~te power. It also verifies proper plant response to a high containment pressure followed by a loss of off-site power. AIImodelled equipment that would receive a signal during a safely injection or loss of off-site power willreceive that signal during the performance of this OSP. In order to verify proper equipment actuation without actually starting components in conditions that could damage them or lhe plant. Ibis surveillance requires starting or auto starting these components with their breakers in the test position.

OPllONS This test can be performed in cold shutdown, solid or pahiatty drained.

INlllALCONDIllONS FINAL CONDmONS Cold shutdown, partkilly drained. lhe test is complete when the procedure is complete.

APPROVED FOR USE DATEi )

l'EST TEAM DATE: /

SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATEi In DATE:

Page 1

ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS INTEGRATED TEST, 5-OSP-205: SURES BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert examination 3&SP-203 can be performed and the applicable acceptance criteria met.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The surveillance was performed on the simulator and, generally. control room alarms and indications were appropriate. but a number of small problems were encountered. These problems resulted in 10 DR's being written against this test. Some of the deficiencies. such as the spent fuel pit pump not stopping.

do not have an immediate effect inskle the control room. but after a period of time could cause on alarm. Olher equipment not tripping or auto starting, however. woukf have an immediate indication or alarm inside the control room. ibis includes such equipment as the 3C CCW pump, the turbine auxiliary oil pump, and the pressurizer heaters. The operator actions for setting up this surveillance worked well and. although this is on extensive test. most of the operafkns functioned properly.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES With the SGFP breakers in test, starting the first SGFP produced an AFW auto start signal.

On loss of offwte power the spent fuel pit pump continued to run, the turbine auxTary oil pump continued to run, pressurizer backup group B heaters crid not de-energize. and the 3A supply to MCC 3A remained closed as did the LC 3D supply to MCC C.

For the Sl followed by a loss of off-site power, the total CCW was less than the procedural minimum. pressurizer backup group A heaters did not deenergize.

the turbine aue7iaiy oil pump cfid not trip, the some LC supplies to the MCC's fai7ed to open, and the 3C CCW pump did not start when it was Ihe standby pump.

The RCP gukfe bearing temperatures increased when CCW was isolated, even though the RCS was cokf and the RCP's were not runnin.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 5.5 None EVALUAll N TEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DA\B 2./i/W6 DATE. 5 ga DATE:2 r DATE: QQ~Q~

DATE:

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITIEr OPERAllONAL TEST OF MOV-535, 536 AND PORV 455C,456, OP-1300.2 NUMBER: 5UR-029 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.100) Operator Conducted SwveBksnce Testing on Safety Related Equipment DESCRIPllON This test w8f be conducted by performing the operating procedure 3DP-13IXL2. Operational Test of MOV-535. 536 and PORV<55C. 456. This test performs a leak check of the associated vaNes.

OP11ONS INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS Unit at Hot Standby. Survei7iance complete.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATEr ~ ~> >~ DATE:

OAa

~IJ

~<i~/

~

DATE:

Page I m m m m m m m m m m m w m m m m m m m

OPERAllONAL TEST OF MOV-535, 536 AND PORV~SC, 456, OP-1300% SUR<29 I

BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of the abI7ity to perform the surveillance in the simulator and the simulator's abi7ity to meet the acceptance criteria of the surveillance.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The test team was able to perform the surveillance with no difficulties. All actions that needed to be taken from Ihe control room were performed as written and all parameters which needed to be monitored were available for recording. No deficiencies were noted.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPllONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUAllONTEAM MUIATOR CONFIr URAnON REVleft BOARD DAK~?- / F> DAIE ~/3 9d DAK ~~~ nzrr:~l3 0

+C'AlE' o~a C~/J-Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE lllIEi FULL LENGTH RCC - PERIODIC EXERCISE, OP-lrm4.1 NUMBER: SUMO Ah5 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIOh5i S.L 1(10) Operator Conducted Surveillance Testing on Safety Reksted Equipment DESCRIPllON This test wi7I consist of performing the operator sun eifiance procedure OP-1604.I. which exercises the control and shutdown rods. In this surveillance each bank of rods is individually moved and veriTication wu be made via the step counters and rod posit on indicators OKAPI's). less than 12 steps deviation between the step counters and RPI's wiN be checked, proper operation of the rod off top lights will be monitored, and when the safety rods are moved the actuation of the shutdown bank off top alarm wi7I be verified. With no malfunctions present this test should pass the applicable acceptance criteria contained in OP-IN4.I. The data sheets of this test will be compared with the data sheets from an actual performance of this test at Turkey Poinf.

OPllONS This fest can be conducted hom any steady state power level.

INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS IK% power. lhe test Is complete when the procedure is complete.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE. $ /0 20 oars ~dial FO SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATEi DATE:

Page 1 m w m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m

FUll LENGTH RCC - PERIODIC EXERCISE, OP-76M. lr SUR-0M BASIS FOR kVALUAllON Expert exomlnatkrn OP-7604.1 can be performed on the simulator and the appfrcoble acceptance criteria of the procedure can be met.

Plant data. The data sheets of this test wr71 be compared with the data sheets from the performance of this test on Unit 4 on 6/I I/N.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESUlTS This test went well: aN control room Indications, interactions, ond alarms were as expected. The review of the ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA was satisfactory. lhe maximum devkrtion between group step counters and RPI's was 6 steps. Tavg dropped with rod motion and returned to its original value upon the return of the rods to full out. AN of the shutdown rods off top lights come on by 216 steps, which Is within the occeptance cnten'a. The bonk low limit alarm annunckrted for A, B, ond C rod banks. AN control rods were driven to 275 steps. D bonk was driven to the same position. although the required Tavg change occurred at a slightly higher rod position. 7he return to 228 steps was accomplished in one continuous rod pull. During the pull for A and C banks the alarm NIS power range overpower rod withdrawal stop annunciated and rod withdrawal was blocked. It cleared in a few seconds and the pull was resumed successfully. This octuation seems reasonable and is to be expected for a continuous rod pull of this size at 100% power. The comparison w'rth the plant performance of this test was olso satisfactory. Tavg dropped more on the simulator, but it was not a mojor difference and it is due to a couple of causes. In the simulator performance of thfs test rods were driven 3 steps further in and were oNowed to stay In slightly longer than in the plant performance.

7he shutdown rods had to be dn'ven in further on the pkrnt to iNumlnate oN of the rod off top lights, but for the purpose of training this is insignificant.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS None DERCIENCIES TO ANS 3.5

'XCEPnONS EVAlUAllON TEAM SIMUIATOR CONRr URATION REVIEy/ BOARD DATE: DATEr < ~f >d DATErr li DATE: MY FO DAlE:

Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITIEr INDUCING XENON OSCILIAllONS TO PRODUCE VARIOUS.INCORE AXIAL OFFSETS, OP-12304.B NUMBER: SURM1 Ah5 8.5 REFERENCE SECllOh5: J.T.T(10) Operator Conducted SurveNIance Testing on Safety Reksted Equipment DES CRIP17ON This test wNI ~ of perfcenlng the operating procedure for inducing a xenon osa77ation in order to produce various axial offsets. OP-12304.B. From a steody state condition rods wiN be Inserted In order to dnve delta I in the negative direction and start a xenon osciNation. A dilution wN also be performed to counteract the negative reacttvtiy of the rod Insertion This test ve7I also be used to actuaNy look at the effects of the xenon oscillation on a number of core nodes. The xenon oscNlatlon wiN be storted and power stabifized. lhen to expedite matters. xenon will be run at o fast time factor of ten for at least 1.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br />. This will be iong enough to see xenon ond power peak or bottom out at oN core nodes and start back in the other direction The xenon osciNotion wIN be recorded and analyzed. A llux map will not be performed on the simulator at this time, but for a test including the performance of a flux map see SUI2-M2. Several incore parameters wiN be monitored and recorded in order to compare simulator results during this test with expected plant results.

OPllONS This fest may be performed at any steady state power level.

INlllALCONDmOh5 RNAL CONDmONS 7%% power, steady state. lhe test is complete when the procedure is complete. After inducing the xenon osciNotion and stabilizing power ond temperature. xenon wi7I be run at fast time for ot least 1.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br />.

APPROVED MR USE lEST TEAM SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR ezra ~><< nzra~bX/ d DAlE:

DATE:

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INDUCING XENON OSCILIATIONS TO PRODUCE VARIOUS INCORE AXIAL OFFSETS, OP-123M.8i SUR-0S I BASIS FOR EVALUA11ON Expert examination. OP-1230EI.B must be able to be performed. The nodal xenon and power plots willbe analyzed and evaluated for any impact on training.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS OP-12304.8 was used to induce the xenon oscillation A 700 gallon dilution was used, requin'ng that control rods be inserted to 171 steps to maintain TAV and power level steady. 1his magnitude of dilution and rod motion was used because of the problem with the delta I model. This caused an immediate change in delta I. Boron was equalized, power and TAV were stabilized, then a snapshot was taken Xenon was placed at fast time and the simulator was taken out of freeze. TAV and power started dropping and continued to drop for .75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> real time before starting an upwards trend. Both were still increasing at the end of the run by which time TAV had increased .8F and power .8%. Changes in delta I indication. xenon by node, and power by node seemed not to be overly influenced by this. 1he delta I trend in the negative direction continued as xenon built up in the top of the core and was burned out in the bottom. Ws continued for about 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> before the processes reversed. Delta I started trending in the positive direction, xenon started burning out in the top and bur7ding up in the bottom. These trends were still going on at the end of the test, but started to change at tower rates. The magnitude of xenon and power change varied by node, but total xenon reactivity remained virtually constant. The time required to peak also vaned by riode.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDI11ONS None DEFICIENCIES The alarm for hydrogen system alarm panel hydrogen trouble actuated about an hour after the simulator was taken out of freeze and the alarm for delta flux >5% max power 56% actuated less than five minutes after coming out of freeze. The delta I model Is not fully responsive.

EXCEP11ONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUA11ON TEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURA11ON REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~6 ( z.

DATE: ~FE 2> ogre ~&to DATE DATEr Z-40-9 O Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICATION TEST PROCEDURE lllIEs NORMAL OPERAllON OF INCORE MOVEABIE DElECTOR SySlEM AND POWER DISTRIBUllON SURVEILlANCE, OP-12404.1 NUMBER: SURM2 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSt J.1.1 P) CORE PERFORMANCE lESllNG S.1.1 (10) OPERATOR CONDUClED SURVEILIANCES DES CRIPllON This test will verify the operaMity of the incore moveable detector system in the simulator. The operating procedure will be used to operate the system and the plant reactor engineers wi be used to perform the actual operation. A full flux map wiN not be taken, but at least one pass will be done with each detector in order to insure that all detectors work in the simulator.

OPllONS Each defector can be insehed Into several locations in the core. Each detector should be inserted into a different location in order to test as much of the system as possible with the runs performed.

INmAL CONDmONS FINAL CONDmONS Any power level in mode 1, steady state. Pequfred operations complete.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DAlE:

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NORMAL OPERATION OF INCORE MOVEABLE DHECTOR SySTEM AND POWER DISTRIBUTION SURVEILLANCE, OP-I24N.lr SUR-032 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of simulator's alx7ity to support the surver7krnce and pass the acceptance criteria of the test.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS 7he test was run successfully. In addition to runrvng the detector through the calibrate and normal positions, the test team ran all detectors through both their emergency positions to verify emergency operations. In addition. the team checked that the detectors would stick if misoperation of the drive system occufed.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES The only problem noted was that several light on the right hand side of the panel were periodically blinking off and on for no apparent reason. This problem cad not affect the operation of the system.

EXCEPT!ONS TO Ah5 8.5 EVALUATION TEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIElV BOARD DAiB ~Ca o DATE. /o-/u- ~o DAfE:

DATE:

+~I 8/Pc/ DATEr ogre I~O lO-

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W W W W W W W W W W TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT 5.0 MALFUNCTIONTESTS 5.1 CONTAINMENT MCN 5.1.1 MCN-001 CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND MALFUNCTIONS 5.2 COMMON SERVICES MCS 5.2.1 MCS-001 COMPONENTCOOLING WATEROPERATIONS AND MALFUNCTIONSUP TO AND INCLUDING TOTAL LOSS OF CCW 5.2.2 MCS-002 INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND MALFUNCTIONS 5.2.3 MCS-003 TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER OPERATION AND MALFUNCTIONS 5.2.4 MCS-004 INSTRUMENTAIR SYSTEM OPERATION AND MALFUNCTIONS 5.3 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM MC 5.3.1 MCV-001 UNCONTROLLED MAXIMUMRATE BORON DILUTION 5.3.2 MCV-002 CHARGING SYSTEM FAILURES 5.3.3 MCV-003 CHARGING LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT 5.3,4 MCV-004 LETDOWN AND VOLUME CONTROL TANK SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND MALFUNCTIONS 5.3.5 MCV-005 NON-REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE LEAK 54 5 4.1 MFW-001 LOSS OF VACUUM TESTS, INCLUDING LOSS OF CONDENSER LEVEL CONTROL 5 4.2 MFW-002 LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER 5.4.3 MFW-003 LOSS OF NORMAL AND EMERGENCY FEEDWATER 5.4.4 MFW-004 FEEDWATER LINE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT 5.4.4 MFW-005 MAINFEEDWATER LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT 5.4.6 MFW-006 FAILURE OF STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CHANNEL PROVIDING INPUT TO THE FEEDWATER CONTROLLER, 5A.7 MFW-007 EQUIVALENTTMI-2 SCENARIO 5A.8 MFW-008 LOSS OF FEEDWATER/ATWS 5.5 GENERATOR AND GRID MGG 5.5.1 MGG-001 GENERATOR TRIP 5.5.2 MGG-002 LOSS OF 4KV BUS 3A 5.5.3 MGG-003 LOSS OF 4KV BUS 3B 5.5.4 MGG-004 LOSS OF ALLAC POWER 5.6 MAIN POWER DISTRIBUTION MMP 5.6.1 MMP-001 LOSS OF VITALBUS 3P06 5.6.2 MMP-002 LOSS OF VITAL BUS 3P07 5.6.3 MMP-003 LOSS OF VITAL BUS 3P08 5.6A MMP-004 LOSS OF VITALBUS 3P09 5.6.5 MMP-005 LOSS OF DC BUS 3A (3D01) 5.6.6 MMP-006 LOSS OF DC BUS 3B (3D23) 5.6.7 MMP-007 LOSS OF DC BU$ 4A (4D01) 5.6,8 MMP-008 LOSS OF DC BUS 4B (4D23)

TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT 5.7 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM MRC 5.7.1 MRC-001 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 5.7.2 MRC-002 LARGE BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER 5.7.3 MRC-003 SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT 5.7A MRC-004 PORV FAILURE (OPEN) WITHOUT HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION 5.7.5 MRC-DD5 LOSS OF FORCED REACTOR COOLANT FLOW 5.7.6 MRC-OD6 LOSS OF A SINGLE REACTOR COOLANTPUMP WITH POWER BELOW P-8 5.7.7 MRC-D07 STUCK OPEN SPRAY VALVE 5.7.8 MRC-008 LOSS OF B AND C REACTOR COOIANT PUMPS AT lD0% POWER 5.8 5.8.1 MRX-001 SPURIOUS ROD POSITION INDICATIONRESULTING IN MAXIMUMRATE RUNBACK TO 70% POWER AND MAXIMUMRATE RETURN TO FULL POWER 5.8.2 MRX-002 LOSS OF PROTECTION SYSTEM CHANNEL 5.8.3 MRX-003 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATIONFAILURE DURING STARTUP 5.8.4 MRX-004 STUCK CONTROL ROD 5.8.5 MRX-005 UNCOUPLED CONTROL ROD TEST 5.8.6 MRX-006 DROPPED CONTROL ROD 5.8.7 MRX-007 DROPPED ROD WITH INABILITYTO DRIVE CONTROL RODS 5.8.8 MRX-008 FUEL CLADDING FAILURE RESULTING IN HIGH REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITY 5.8.9 MRX-009 MANUALREACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER 5.9 STEAM GENERATOR & MAINSTEAM MSG 5.9.1 MSG-OD1 MAINSTEAM LINE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT 5.9.2 MSG-D02 MAINSTEAM LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT 5.9.3 MSG-003 SIMULTANEOUS CLOSUREOF ALL MSIV's 5.9.4 MSG-004 TRANSMITTER FAILURE RESULTING IN MAXIMUMATMOSPHERIC DUMP DEMAND 5.9.5 MSG-005 FAILURE OF REFERENCE TEMPERATURE TO STEAM DUMPS 5.9.6 MSG-006 CLOSURE OF A SINGLE MSIV AT SEVERAL DIFFERENT POWER LEVELS 5.10 STANDBY POWER & SYNCHRONI2ATION MSP 5.10.1 MSP-001 BUS STRIPPING AND LOAD SEQUENCING TESTS 5.11 SAFETY SYSTEMS MSS 5.11.1 MSS-D01 SMALL LEAK IN SAFETY INJECTION PIPING OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT 5.1 1.2 MSS-002 ACCUMULATOR OPERATIONS AND MALFUNCTIONS 5.1 1.3 MSS-003 LOSS OF RHR WHILE IN COLD SHUTDOWN 5.1 1.4 MSS-004 LOSS OF INVENTORY DURING A SHUTDOWN AND PARTIAL DRAINDOWN CONDITION

TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 INITIALSIMULATOR CERTIFICATION REPORT

5. 12.1 MTU-001 TURBINE TRIP WHICH DOES NOT CAUSE AUTOMATICREACTOR TRIP

5. 12.2 MTU-002 TURBINE TRIP FROM 100% POWER

5. 12.'3 MTU-003 TURBINE LUBE OIL SYSTEM (BEARINGS)

5. 12A MTU-004 TURBINE GlAND SEAL SYSTEM

5. 12.5 MTU-005 TURBINE TURNING GEAR OPERATION

5. 12.6 MTU-006 HYDROGEN SEAL OIL

5. 12.7 MTU-008 HYDROGEN COOLING

5. 12.8 MTU-009 TURBINE LUBE OIL CONTROL AND AUTO-STOP OIL

5. 12.9 MTU-010 TURBINE LUBE OIL PUMP AND MOTOR

5. 12. 10 MTU-011 FAILURE OF TURBINE CONTROL VALVESPRING

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON lEST PROCEDURE TITLEi CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM OPERAllONS AND MALFUNCTIONS NUMBER: MCNM1 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 8.1.2(23) Passive Malfunctions in Engineered Safety Features Systems DESCRIPTION Two fai7ures wi7I be placed on the spray system in order to verify proper modelling of the spray system. One fai7ure consists of a stuck shut valve on the B spray pump discharge with a LOCA instated. Ten minutes after the LOCA has been initiated the RVVST outlet valve will be shut. No manual actions will be taken Several parameters will be monitored and recorded in order to compare simulator results with egmcted results.

OPTIONS Either spray pump discharge valve can be failed shut.

INIllALCONDmONS FINAL coNDmoNs Steady state IR% power. The test wi7I run for five minutes after the RVVST outlet valve has been shut.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DAlE. 9 Po o~rs ~Y SIMUlATOR ENGINEERINS COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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MCN~lr CONTAINMENTSPRAY SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND MALFUNCTIONS BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert examInation DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS This test went well. The B spray pump had no flow, but containment pressure continued to decrease due to the A spray pump flow and the containment coolers. VNxn the RAST outlet was shut, the spray flow, RHR flow, and Unit 3 Sl flow went to zero. With the new pump cavitation mode!. Ihe flow actually was zero. Because thfs was well Into the scenarfo and there was stiN St flow from Unit 4 along with the containment coolers. the containment pressure held steady.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES Y

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUATIONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD .

DAIS ~Y/ c7 DATE: Pg Pa DAK: ~W DATE: K 7 9O DATE: DAK: ~I7 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITIEi COMPONENT COOUNG WAlER OPERAllONS AND MALFUNCllONS UP TO AND INCLUDING TOTAL LOSS OF CCW NUM8ER: MCS-001 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSi 8.1.2 (8) Loss of Component Cooling DESCRIPTION This test wi8 exercise the Component Cooling Water system with different malfunctions in order to insure proper simulator response. In one case, the Intake Cooling Water to the CCW heat exchangers w8I be lost. In the second case, a8 CCW pumps will be tripped, resulting in a total loss of CCW cooling.

OPllONS lhere is a large number of malfunctions which can be run on the Component Cooling System. Only representative ones need be chosen for this test, but they should put the system near its limits. In addition. numerous component could be monitored for their response to a toss of cooling. Representative Important components will be chosen INlllALCONDmONS FINAL CONDmONS IN% power. normal system line ups. Run 1. no Intake Cooling of CCW for 20 minutes.

Run 2. no CCW flow for 20 minutes.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE: 3 fo 9D SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

Page 1 m m m m m m m m m w m m m m m w m m m

COMPONENT COOVNG WATER OPERATION ANDF MAlUNCTIONS UP TO AND INCLUDING TOTAL LOSS OF CCW: MCS~I BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of overaN system ond selected component response.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS KIN li LOSS OF IMAKE COOLING TO THE COMPONEM COOVNG WATER HEAT EXCHANGERS In this ru. component cooNng ttow was maintained so that the temperatures of cooled components rose, but not at an extreme rate. Letdown temperature out of the non-regenerative heat exchanger rose 20 degrees In twenty minutes. and RCP upper bearing temperatures rose about 15 degrees in Ihe same time penod. Other temperatures began rising ot lesser rates os expected. AN components showed an increasing rote of temperature nse os the event continued.

SIN 2: TOTAL LOSS OF COMPONEM COOLING WATER FLOW In this run, oN of the component cooring pumps were tripped to create a total loss of component cooring. As expected. aN temperature rose rapidly to trip or failure conditions. Expected alarms were received. and appropriate automatic actions took place. for example. the letdown divert around the demineralizers occurred ln about 20 seconds. No unanticipated responses occurred.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATIONTEAM SIMU TOR CONRGURATION REVIEW BOARD DAID~Z-/e- DAID ~V/ D DAIE ~J DATEi ~l~0 DATEi DATEi '1- j~~

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TURKEy POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE llTLE: INTAKE COOLING WATER Sl5TEM OPERAllONS AND MALFUNCllONS NUMBER: MCS-002 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2 (6) Loss of Service Water or Cooling to Individual Components DESCRIPllON TNs test wiN check proper Component Coofng Water and Turbine Plant CooNng Water system response to a loss of Intake Cooling Water. Since other tests verify simulator response to loss of CCW and TPCW, only the ICW loss's effect on these two systems willbe checked.

OPllONS There are several different means to cause a loss of Intake Cooling Water including tripping of the pumps, clogging of suction screens and large leaks. Any method may be used.

INITIALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDlllONS IOOX power. steady state. The run wiN be stopped 30 minutes after the Intake Cooling Wafer pumps are tripped.

APP VED FOR USE DAlE. Q y go DAlE: ~ro ~P SIMUIATORENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAK:~d'8 DAlE:

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INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND MALFUNCIIONS: MCS~2 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of system response.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The loss of ICW test went as expected. The CCW and TPCW system temperatures rose as expected. TPCW system femperature rose N degrees in 30 minutes.

In addition, a number of expected alarms were received including: QCP motor brg high temperature. TPCW high temperature. instrument air system high temperature, turbine tube oil high temperature, turbine bearing high temperature. exciter air cooler high temperature, hydrogen system alarm panel trouble, generator RlD high temperature, Generator core trouble, and CC surge tonk high level (due to system heat up).

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DAK: ~7-I DAT:4r~ VO ogre >Zmi <c o~rs ~f "f N DATE: DATE: ~/-

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON lEST PROCEDURE llllE: TURBINE PlANT COOlING WAlER OPERAllON AND MALFUNCTIONS NUMBER: MCS~

ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONSr 8.1.2 (d) Loss of Service Water or Cooling to Indivktuot Components DESCRIPTION This test wiN exercfse the Turbine Piont Cooling Water system with two different malfunctions in order to insure proper simulator response. In one case, the Intake Cooling Water to the TPCW heat exchangers wiN be lost. In the second cose, aN TPCW pumps wiN be tripped. In both cases, no operator action wiN be taken.

OPllONS Several different means ore avai7abte to cause a loss of Turbine Plant Cooling Water.

INtllAL CONDtllONS FINAL CONDmONS 100% power, normal fine up. For each run, the test will be stopped 30 minutes after the initiation of the event.

APPROVED FOR USE TEAM 5

TEST DATEr ~ /' DAIEi ~~~ "

SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAK: ~7/o DATEr Poge 1

TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER OPERA77ON AND MALFUNCTIONS: MCS4N BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of overall plant and selected parameter response.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS RUN 1: LOSS OF INTAKE COOLING WATER TO TPCW HEAT EXCHANGERS In run one, the cooling medium for the TPCW coolers was Isolated via valve CV-2201 which was foiled shut. As expected. the TPCW out of the heat exchangers heated up rapidly. TPCW temperature went from 111 degrees to 157 degrees in 30 minutes. This is turn caused components cooled by 1PCW to heat up rapidly. 7he turbine and generator toads were monitored ond graphed. An example is that P'I turbine beanng temperoture went up from 133 degrees to almost 180 degrees in the 30 minutes. Several akrrms were received: Generator RID high temp., Turbine lube oi7 high temp., turbine bearing high temperature, hydrogen system trouble, exciter air cooler hl temp., instrument air high temp, TPCW bgh temp.. and generator core trouble.

RIJN 2: TOTAL LOSS OF TPCW In this run, all the 1PCW pumps were tripped to simulate a total loss of 1PCW. As expected, aII TPCW cooled components heated up extremely rapidly.

For example, the generator stator gas outlet temperature reached 250 degrees injust over three minutes. The alarms received in run one again annunciated with the addition of the TPCW low pressure alarm.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES Several expected alarms were not received. They were: steam generator feed pumps. condensate pumps. heater drain pumps, and the Bophose bus duct coolers. 1hese discrepancies were documented in October 1989 on SWRNOK6409. Due to the nature of the loss of TPCW event, the lack of these alarms does not constitute a serkius training deficiency. Al cfscrepancies wm be fixed however.

EXCEPTIONS To ANS 3.5 None EVALUA77ON 7FAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURA N REVIEW BOARD DAK:~3-/o- DA re ~~7- PO DATE: DATE:

DATE: DATEi ~t- 7~0 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON lEST PROCEDURE TtllE: INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM OPERATION AND MALFUNCTIONS NUMBER: MCS~

ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 8.1.2N Loss of Instrument Air DESCRIPTION The purpose of this test is to verify the proper performance of the simulator dunng operations involving the instrument air system and with various instrument air malfunctions. There wN be six separate runs involved in the completion of this test and a different malfunction will be inserted in each run In the first test Ihe diesel air compressor discharge pressure wiN be reduced to 74.6 psia and system pressure will be allowed to decay for 6 minutes. at which time the service air supply wN be opened to raise system pressure back to 75 psig. In the second fest the dryer will be completely fouled, allowing no air passage after a 3 minute romp in of the fouling. System pressure wi7I decoy more rapidly in this case. The service air supply wN be opened to verify that it has no effect, then the dryer bypass from Unit 4 will be opened to restore system pressure. In the thrd test a leak wi7I be placed on the instrument air reservoir.

The senrice air supply wi7I be opened to reduce the rate of pressure decay and the Unit 4 supply wi7I be opened to recover pressure. In the fourth test leaks wi7I be placed on several headers. System pressure wi7I be allowed to fully decoy to verify simulator response to a complete loss of instrument air. In the fifth test a leak wN be placed on the containment air header. Affer a 5 minute time delay the containment header wi7I be isolated. In the sixth test a leak wi7I be placed on the turbine bui7ding air header. lhe same procedure will be followed as for the containment header leak. In the fifth and sixth tests the Isolated headers should decay to atmospheric pressure whi7st the rest of the system Ls fully restored.

Several parameters will be monitored in order to compare simulator results with expected plant results. A member of the test team will be on the control room for at least part of each run to venfy that alarms. indication, and actuations are appropriate.

OPTIONS Leaks of variable size are avai7able on the simulator in numerous locations, including each major air header and lhe instrument air reservoir. Multiple leaks or individual leaks can be Instated. The diesel air compressor discharge pressure and the amount and rate of dryer fouling can also be varied. The instrument air filters can be used instead of the dryers.

INITIAL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS Steady state, IQR power. NIA APP VED FOR USE TEST TEAM 7 DATE. $ L 9O DAK ~s/Z SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

DATE:

Page I m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM OPERATION AND MALFUNCIlONS: MCS-004 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert examination DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS Generally, this test went extremely weil. There were a few discrepancies, but they were all of a minor nature and they are detailed below in the deficiency section Reducing the diesel air compressor output causes system header pressure to gradually decrease accordingly. Opening the service air supply restores system pressure to 75 psig. but due to the inabi7ily to control the FCV's this is not enough to prevent a plant trip. Clogging the instrument air dryer causes a much more rapid system pressure decay. In this instance opening the service air supply has no effect, but opening the Unit 4 supply is enough to fully restore system pressure. Ihe leak on the instrument air reservoir is not meaningful because the diesel oir compressor con keep up with it. Since there are a number of other means for causing a toss of instrument air. this is not significant and has no impact on training. During the complete loss of Instrument oir, valves drifted shut and with two exceptions, one inskfe the control room and one outside, all valves fai7ed to the proper position. The valves did not all foil simultaneously, but as system pressure dropped, different valves started to drift. The volves would give Intermediate indication while drifting. Valves that hod a backup source of either nitrogen or some other air supply were able to be controlled. On the single header failures. system and different header pressures dropped to various steody values. Headers not impacted by the rupture, restored when the ruptured header was isolated. Ihe ruptured header dropped to atmospheric pressure after it was isolated. Control room indication, alarms, and interactions were appropriate for oil runs except as noted below.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES .

TCV4-143.foiled to the demineralizers ond not the VCT. The pressurizer POIPV's could not be cycled full open when on their nitrogen backup. Ihe gland steam spillover valve. CV-3-3725. fai7ed open instead of shut. 1Vhen a header is Isolated, it decays to atmospheric pressure in less than 10 seconds. DR's have been submitted on all problems encountered.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATION TEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIBV BOARD DAK ~W~ C DATEi >~ ~O DATE: DAIR ~VFO DATE: ~n G. ogre ~d7 10.

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TURKEy POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEr UNCONTROLLED MAXIMUMRAlE BORON DILUTION NUMBER: MCV-001 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2 (17) Failure of Automatic Control Systems which Affect Reaclivily and Core Heat Removal DESCRIPllON This test is designed to evaluate the simulator behavior following a malfunction of a control system which affects core reactivity. Primary water wi7I be charged through the charging header at the maximum rate which can be balanced by letdown. For the 10m'ower test, this willbe approximately 105 gpm with rods in manual to prevent automatic rodinsertion. For the Cold Shutdown test, this willbe approximately 150 gpm. In Ihe cold shutdown test, the dilution willbe done in real time for 30 minutes to verify that parameters are tracking as expected. After 30 minutes, the fast time mode of lhe simulator willbe used to more quickly lower the boron concentration in order to allow checking the 'High Rux at Shutdown'larm. The simulator response willbe verified to reflect the anticipated response of the plant.

OPTIONS Various combinations of letdown and charging system controls may be used to insure that the proper dilution rate Is achieved.

INlllALCONDmONS FINAL CONDlllONS Test 1, IK% steady state, equilibrium. Test l. Simulaloi stable after a series of overtemperature delta T Test 2, Cold shutdown. solid. borated to cokf shutdown boron run backs.

concentration. Test 2, High flux at shutdown alarm received.

APPROVED FOR USE DAlE: DAlE:

SIMUlATORENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

DAlE:

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M M M M M M M UNCONTROLLED MAXIMUMRATE BORON DILUTION: MCV<01 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of overall plant response and of selected plant variables.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS In both cases, the simulator responded as expected. At power, overtemperature delta T runbacks responded to the increasing temperature which occurred as a result of the Ch7ution. In addition. overpower rod stops occurred as expected. The overtemperature delta T runbacks continued unthl the turbine was taken to zero megawatts. Since the next runback failed to reduce delta T any further. the unit tripped on overtemperature delta T. Because temperature was elevated prior to the trip, a large outsurge from the pressunzer occurred and the resulting pressure decrease caused a safety irT'ection The safely Inlection ended the dilution and started adding boron to the RCS from the Refueling Water Storage Tank.

In the cold shutdown case. source range counts increased as expected. The source range high flux at shutdown alarm occurred at the proper setpoint.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPllONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUIAllONCONFIGURATION REVIEyhr BOARD DAK~~d 'h DATEr J ~

PQ 4P ~. ~M DAIE P/PO.JFO DAhh: ~O'r 0 DATE: DAlE'~JO- h0 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CER11FICA11ON TEST PROCEDURE I

TITLEr CHARGING SYSTEM FAILURES NUMBER: MCV-002 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 8.1.2 OB) Failure of Reactor Cooksnt System Pressure and Volume Control Systems DESCRIPTION The purpose of this test Is to simulate various malfunctions in the charging and seal injection systems in order to verify proper simulator modeling of these systems. Four cases wi7I be run. The fiat run will consist of clogging the seal injection filter. The second run will fai7 closed the charging flow control valve, CV-121. In the third run. a leak downstream of CV-121 wI be simulated. The last run will be a failure of all three charging pumps resulting in a loss of seal Injection and charging. In each case, the simulator wi7I be left in run until proper system responses can be verified.

OP11ONS The Turkey Point simulator has the capabi7ity of failing almost any component in the charging system. Therefore there are wide variety of fai7ures are possible.

INlllALCONDI11ONS FINAL CONDITIONS IIXol power. steady state, with normal charging system Final conditions wi7l vary from run to run.

lineup.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM

. SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATEr 1 DATE: ~i/ 6 DATE:

DATE:

Page 1

CHARGING SYSTEM FAILURES: MCV-002 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of system response and parameter trends.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS lhe simulator correctly responded to all the charging system malfunctions imposed upon it. All system parameters trended in the correct directions and in the approximate amount expected.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPllONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVALUAllONlEAM SIMULATOR CONHGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATEr ~//

DAK: ~VS/Po

~ DAlE:

oAK: 0 1 I 9O II Po DAlE: DAlE: ~/= /

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICATION TEST PROCEDURE lllK CHARGING LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT NUMBER: MCV-OO3 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: - 3.T.2(T) Ib) Loss of Coolant Outside Primary Confainment 3.1.2(T8) Failure of Volume Control System DESCRIPTION lhe purpose of this test to verify proper simulator modelling with a charging line leak outside of the containmenf bui7ding. This test wi7I consist of two runs.

In the first run a leak will be placed upstream of HCV-121, charging flow control valve. and 3&NOP- 041.3. Excessive Reacfor Coolant System Leakage. wi7I be used to recover from the Incident. Isolating the leak would require stopping charging and seal injection. necessitating a plant shutdown and isolating letdown This test will be allowed to run for 15 minutes. The leak will not be isolated and charging, seal injection, and letdown will be Ieft in service. In the second run the leak will be placed downstream of HCV-121. This will allow the maintenance of sealinjection and plant operation can be continued. Letdown wi7I have to isolated and the excess letdown heat exchanger will be placed in service. This lest will be token fo the point of isolating the leak an'd stabilizing the plant. Several parameters will be monitored and recorded in order to compare the simulator results with expected plant results.

OPllONS lhe leak sizes are fully variable.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS TC6% power with charging and letdown stable and in automatic. RUN 1: This test will run for 15 minutes. A second charging pump will be started and the pressurizer level will be recovered.

RUN 2: The leak has been isolated, the excess letdown heat exchanger has been placed in service, and charging is in balance with letdown APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE:

@ ~> 9D oars ~4rS SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DAlE:

Page I

CHARGING LINE BREAK ONSIDE CONTAINMENT: MCV4N BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert Evaluation - The contrA room indications. overall response, and specific relevant parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULlS

GENERAL COMMENT

S ON BOTH QJNS: lhe first Indication of a problem is the alarm labyrinth seals low delta P, followed shortly by alarms for charging pumps high speed and letdown Ene high temperature. There Is no charging flow indicated and the pressurizer level stabs to drop. A second charging pump was able to provide enough charging flow to maintain pressurizer level. Letdown had flashed, but it recovers with the start of the second pump. The VCT level decrease Is rapkf enough to be noffceabte. Shen makeup to the VCT starts it is not enough to maintain level at the initial setpoints and the flowrates were doubled. lhey are then adequate to maintain VCT level. Indications were as expected inside the control room. QJN I: No other actions were required.

The makeup flow was enough to maintain pressurizer level. A plant shutdown would be required, but condilions were stable. QJN 2: Swapped to the 45 gpm orifice and the charging pumps were able to reduce speed from l00% and still maintain pressurizer level. HCV-121 was shut and relief valves started liffing on the charging pump discharge. Stopped one charging pump and isolated letdown This took care of the relief valve problem. Seal inJection ffowrate increased and the flow control valves were throttled from the I/F to reduce flow along with reducing the charging pump Io minimum speed. This enabled controlling the pressurizer fiN wb7e excess letdown was being put into service. The use of excess letdown enabled the pressurizer level to start trending towards setpoint. Operation could continue in this mode while the leak was being repaired or until it was'convenient to shutdown the plant.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS None DEFICIENCIES lhere were no area radiation monitor or process monitor alarms during either run A DR has been written against this.

EXCEPllONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUAllONlEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATEi @ I> DAlE DAB: ~+D DATE: $ ~45 DAlE: DAlE: ~-cubi~

Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEs LETDONV AND VOLUME CONTROL TANKSYSIEM OPERATIONS AND MALFUNCTIONS NUMBER: MCV~

ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: S.1.2 (18) Failure of Reactor Cooksnt Pressure and Volume Control Systems DESCRIPTION The test checks the response of the Letdown and Volume Control Tank portions of the CVCS system. Various malfunctions which affect these systems willbe initiated to verify proper system response. A total of five different malfunction tests wi7I be run.

OP11ONS There are numerous malfunctions which can be run on the Letdown and Volume Control Tank systems. Representative malfunctions should be chosen to exercise as many parts of the systems as possible INITIALCONDmONS FINAL CONDI11ONS IOOX power, normal letdown lineup. Terminate each run after system parameters have stabilized or trends are clearly evident.

APPROVED FOR USE DAB.~/l Qc SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

Page 1 m m m m m m m m

LETDOWNAND VOLUME CONTROL TANK SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND MALFUNC11ONSi MCV-004 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of system response and the response of specific parameters depending on the particular.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS A total of five different runs were made with different malfunctions. With one exception. in each case letdown and VCT parameters responded as expected to the system perturbations. Alltemperatures, pressures and flows changed as predicted. The malfunctions run were: Loss of CCW to the NRHX. Failure of PC V-145 open. Failure of PCV-145 shut, Failure of LCV-115A to the divert position, and Fai7ure of CV-204 shut.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES On the failure of CV 204 shut, the delay pipe pressure cycles wildlyrather than stabilizing at relief valve RV203 set pressure and a discrepancy report was written.

One discrepancy between the simulator and the plant was noted. During normal operation. the letdown temperature out of the Regenerative Heat Exchanger In the plant is reading approximately 320 degrees F. while the simulator Is reading 215 degrees. A discrepancy report was wrilten. but preliminary heat balance calculations point to the plant as being incorrect. The problem is being investigated.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONlEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD l

DATE: ~l DATE. /I g $0 DAJE,~is Wd oars ~lt-Zfk DATE:

LETDOWN AND VOLUME CONTROL TANKSYSTEM OPERATIONS AND MALFUNCTIONS: MCV-004 PAGE 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE 111K NON-REGENERA11VE HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE LEAK NUMBER: MCV ~5 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3. L2(l)fb) Loss of Coolant Outside Primary Containment 3.1.2(18) Failure of Volume Control System DESCRIPTION The purpose of this test to verify proper simulator modelling with a tube leak on the non-regenerative heat exchanger. ibis test wi7I consist of two runs. In the first run no operator actions will be taken and it will be allowed to run for 15 minutes. In the second run ONOP4 109.2, High Activityin Component Cooling Water, and 3&NOP441.3, Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage, will be used to recover from the incident. This will require isolating CCW to the non-regenerative heat exchanger, isolating letdown, and placing the excess letdown heat exchanger in service. Several parameters wi7I be monitored and recorded in order to compare Ihe simulator results with expected plant results.

OPTIONS The leak size is fully variable.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDITIONS IK% power with charging and letdown stable and in automatic. RLIN 1: This test will run for 15 minutes.

RUN 2: The simulator has been brought to a stable condition, letdown has been isolated, and the excess letdown heat exchanger has been placed in service.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATEi ~ (~ 9'O

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NON-REGENERAllVE HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE LEAK: MCV-005 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert Evaluation - The control room indications. overall response, and specific relevant parameters wi7I be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS RUN l. Immediately after the leak is placed the process monitor for CCW alarms, followed by high CCW surge tank level. The Iow pressure letdown flow drops to zero and pressure to 100 psig. The leak is over 65 gpm, which means all of the letdown is going to the leak. The NRHX pressure drops to 100 psig then increases to 135 psig. Relief valves &nit pressure to this. The NRHX outlet temperatures drops throughout the test. which seems reasonable with no letdown ffow. The CCW surge tonk goes solid and it is at this point that CCW and letdown pressures staMize at 135 psig. This seems reasonable for training purposes. QJN 2. The InNal indications were the same for this test as for the first run. but all in ail this is a much more interesting test. Approximatety 3.5 minutes after getting the leak the CCW valves in and out of the NRHX were shut. This stopped all leak ffow from letdown to CCW, causing letdown to re-pressurlze to over 400 pslg. Long before then RV-79IC on the CCW skte of the NRHX should have liffed. holding pressure to something slightly over 150 psig.

When the NRHX ls isolated letdown pressure spi7<es to over d00 psig, then recovers to 250 psig as PC V-145 takes control. NRHX outlet temperature is increasing rapidly. Letdown is manually Isolated. which causes an immediate increase In pressurizer level. Charging pump speed is reduced to minimum to keep level under control whle excess letdown 8 being placed in service. The excess letdown temperature and flow indications were appropriate for this evolution OUT OF BOUNDS CONDIllONS DEFICIENCIES The process monitor for CCW alarms as soon as the leak is instated. A DR has been submitted against this. Leakage flow stops when CCW Ls Isolated to the NRHX, but since the proper results can be achieved by instructor inputs and this would be a significant scope change it wi7l be left as is.

EXCEPllONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUAllONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEyY BOARD P'Z DAIE'ATE:

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICATION TEST PROCEDURE llllE: LOSS OF VACUUM TESTS, INCLUDING LOSS OF CONDENSER LEVEL CONTROL NUMBER: MFW~1 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: S.l.2 (5) Loss of Condenser Vacuum Including Loss of Condenser Level Control DESCRIPTION This series of tests will simulate various conditions which cause of loss of condenser vacuum. One of the tests will cause the loss of vacuum by inducing an overlill condition thigh level) in the condenser.

OPllONS Several different ways of creating a loss of vacuum condition are avai7able. These include air inleakage, high level, foufng of heat transfer surfaces.

loss of cooEng water flow and air ejector malfunctions. The test wiN include several representative means of causing a loss of vacuum.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS l00%. any time in life. For each run, the test will terminate after a turbtnejreactor trip due to low vacuum.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lEAM Lc.

SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE: /I 9O DATE: 7-i/ Po DA K'Z<~+YG DATE:

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LOSS OF VACUUMTESTS, INCLUDING LOSS OF CONDENSER LEVEL CONTROL: MFMr-001 BASIS FOR EVALUA11ON Expert evalualion of plant and condenser response to the various conditions.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS RUN 1: AIR INLEAKAGEWITH AIR EJEC TORS ISOLATED As expected, condenser pressure began to rise at a fairiysteady rate unti7 the turbine tripped on low vacuum at 400 secondsinto the test. Prior to the trip. several parameters changed as expected. Generator megawatts steadily decreased from 720 to about bf0 due to the increase in backpressure. Condenser hotwell temperaturesincreased as the saturation temperatureincreased with the increasing pressurein the hotwelis. The combined condensate outlet temperature rose as fhe hotwell temperatures rose. this graphis labelled 'Cooling waterinlet temperature'ecause itis the inlet to the air ejector condensers.) After the trip, the plant returned to hot standby on the atmospheric dump valves as designed.

RUN 2: BLOCKAGE OF CONDENSER CIRCUlATING WATER INTAKESCREENS One problem which became readily apparentin this testis that the flow through the water boxes osci7lates widely rather thanjust being cut down to a low value.

This problem has been identified previously in other tests and is associated with the pump handler for the circulating wafer pumps, specifically the handling of cavitation conditions. The response of the plant is correct. however. since Ihe loss of cooling flow almost immediatefy caused a rapid rise in condenser shell pressures with the resulting turbine trip and plant trip. No other discrepancies were noted.

RUN 3: LOSS OF LEVEL CONTROL LEADING TO HIGH CONDENSER LEVEL This test leads to a slow rise in condenser level. Condenser pressure slowlyincreases until Ihe tubes begin to be covered with water at which point fhe pressure rises rapidly. Hotwell temperature also decreases due to theintroduction of the colder makeup water mixing with Ihe condensing steam. Although the process is slow due to the size of the condenser, fhe plant trips on low vacuum at about 3KO seconds.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES The circulating water pumps do not cavitate in run two as they should. This discrepancy has been previously identified.

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TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE lllLEi LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER NUMBER: MFW~2 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSi 8.1.2(9) LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER OR FEEDWATER SYSlEM FAILURE DESCRIPllON ibis loss of normal feedwater transient wi7I be compared to a best estimate analysis using the Turkey Point RETRAN model. As such, no operator actions were taken during the course of the event. and several assumptions were made to make the simulator and the RETRAN model consistent. Since the RETRAN model does not include charging and letdown models, these paths were isolated in the simulator. The transient was initiated by tripping open the feedwater pump motor breakers. The turbine runback that would normally result from the tripping of these breakers was blocked. Allcontrol systems werein automatic except the control rods. Two tests were performed. the first with a setting of 135 GPM on the demand thumbwheel. and the second with a 300 GPM demqnd setting.

OPllONS The main feedwater can be lost via a variety of mechanisms including the faiTing closed of the isolation or regulation valves, pump bearing failures, and motor breaker fai7ures.

INlllALCONDmONS FINAL CONDlllONS 100% Power Steady State. BOL, Equi%brium Xenon The test will be run for 1200 sec at which time the steam generator level is recovering steadily and the system is approaching a stable hot shutdown condition.

APPROVED FOR USE DATEi Z IS 9a SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAK ~l>

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LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATERi MFW-002 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Best Estimate Analysis - The Simulator results willbe compared to a Turkey Point RETRAN model.

Expert Evaluation - The control room indications. overall response. and specific relevent parameters will be evaluated.

trip DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The overall trends and magnitudes of the results are comparable between the Simulator and fhe RETRAN model. Both of the cases behave consistently approximately20second with the physical processes and assumptions involved in the scenario. The Simulator reaches a low steam generator level earlier than the RETRAN model. 7Ms difference is probably due to the non-inertial models used to calculate the circulating flows in the Simulator. This isn't classified as a deficiency. but it is a characteristic that should be investigated. To allow a proper overall comparison, the Simulator was set fo trip at the same time as the REIAN modeL Differences in the circulating flow calculatedin the RETRAN model relative to the Simulator model were fhe source of most of the observed differences. The REIAN model calculates circulating flows that are unreasonably large for fhe heal load and downcomer level following the loss of feedwater and the reactor trip. This large flow causes the entire steam generator to be completely mixed.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDIITONS DEFICIENCIES material indicates Two deficiencies were noted. neither of which has a direct affect on training. The steam dump capacity in the Simulator is approximately 15% greater than design This has the effect of causing the bypass to control the pressure to a greater degree and close earfier. The initial HFP steam generator fluid mass is approximatefy 1 1% less than Westinghouse reference i should be. This should be investigated.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATTONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DA1&~3.2P DATE: DATE:3 4> ~3 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION lEST PROCEDURE TIRE: LOSS OF NORMAL AND EMERGENCY FEEDWATER NUMBER: MFW~

ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 8. 1.2(10) LOSS OF NORMAL AND EMERGENCY FEEDWAlER B22N SIMULTANEOUS TRIP OF ALL FEEDWAlER PUMPS DESCRIPllON ibis loss of normal and emergency feedwater transient wlIIbe compared to a best estimate analysis (BEA) using the Turkey Point RETRAN model. lhe primary objective is to test the Simulator models in the feed and bleed mode. In order to limit the total transient time. the scram was delayed to quickly deplete the steam generatorinventory. The scenario was designed to go directly into the feed and bleed mode. Key operator actions were initiated via Ihe scenario based on EOP-FR-H. 1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink. Several assumptions were made to moke the simulator and the RETRAN model consistent. Since the RETRAN model does not Include charging and letdown models, these paths were isolated in the simulator. The transient was initiated by tripping open the feedwaler and condensate pump motor breakers. The turbine runback that would normally result from the tripping of these breakers was blocked. The steam admission valves for the aum7iary feedwater pump turbines were failed shut to prevent their function Allcontrol systems were in automatic except the control rods.

OPTIONS The main feedwater can be lost via a variety of mechanisms including the faiTing closed of the Isolation or regulation valves, pump bearing failures. shaft shear, local pushbutton, and motor breaker fai7ures. The aum7iary feedwater can be lost via a wide variety of mechanisms including failures of the steam turbines, controllers. pumps. and valves in the flow paths.

INITIALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS IK% Power Steady State, EOL, Equi%brium Xenon The transientis analyzed for approximately 15 minutes. At Ibis time. the RCS has beenin feed and bleed for approximately IOminules,is two phase, and is slowly depressurizing at approximately Im psi.

APPROVED FOR US TEST TEAM DATE: iI ~ DAIE:~lQ  ! Q SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

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LOSS OF NORMALAND EMERGENCY FEEDWATERi MFW-003 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Best Estimate Analysis - The Simulator results wi7ibe compared to a Turkey Point RElRVI model.

Expert Evaluation - The control room indications, overall response, and specific relevant parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS The overall behavior is consistent with the processes occurring and the trends and magnitudes meet the requirements of ANS 3.5. The Simulator results are comparable with the RETRAN model.

Since the scram was delayed to reduce the time to steam generator dryout. and feed and bleed procedures were initiated immediately, the primary pressure response doesn't look too niuch like a loss of heat sink. The depressurization during the vapor relief portion is generally very good. The Simulator depressurizes to just under l200 psta before showing any signs of upper head tlashing whereas the RETRAN model changes slope in the range of 1280 psia. In the Simulator the pressurizer fills up approximately d0 seconds later than the RETRAN model and during this period continues to depressurize. When Ihe Simulator pressurizer fills up, the pressure ticks up about 80 psia. The RETRAN model does the same thing but not to as great an extent. This problem is under study via a separate DR. The most notable character of ths transient is the periodic osa7lation in pressure. flowand temperature. The Simulator starts such an oscillation between 200 and 300seconds but then it damps out quIckly. We have seen osci7lations ln other REIAN two phase natural circulation condilions, but they have always been more random. The oscillations seem to be stimulated by the liquid and vapor refief phasesin the pressurizer. Thisin combination with the magnitude of the void fraclion in the system have produced a periodic and slowty damping oscillation. The impact of this on the temperature, particularly the cold leg, is significant because each time the flow decreases, the cooler Sl flow pushes the temperature down.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS None DEFICIENCIES The PORV liquid relief conductance Is too large.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUAl7ONTEAM SI UIATIONCONFIGURAllON REVIEW BOARD C. DATEi J~

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TURKEy POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON lES T PROCEDURE llllE: FEEDWAlER LINE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT NUMBER: MFW404 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONSL J. IAP0) MAIN SlEAM LINE AS WELL AS MAIN FEED LINE BREAKS (8010 INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT)

DESCRIPTION This test replicotes a Best Estimate Analysis NEA) Feedwoter Line Break Inside Containment performed by the FP&L Fuel Resources Department using the RElRAN02 program. As such the test is not Intended to follow in detail the EOPs covering this type of transient. However, the operator action to turn off the RC pumps on low subcooBng margin was programmed into the scenario. In addition, if was assumed that 10 minutes after the Initiation of the break the operator Isokstes AFW!n the offected loop, secures the atmospheric dump valve, and closes the MSIV on the affected loop. Since the RElRAN mode/ does not Include charging and letdown models, or accumulators, these paths were isolated in the Simulator. The event ls initiated from full power ot endwfwycle conditions. All control systems are initially in automotic. safety systems function at full capability, and no odditional malfunctions ore Included. Rod control is assumed to be in manual in order to simplify the interface between the simulator and the RElRAN'model.

A 50% severity break Ls assumed to occur ln the loop B feedwater piping inside the containment.

OPllONS lhe simulator is capable of simulating variabl severity feechmter line breaks at several locations inside and outside the containment.

INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS IK% power steady state. endwf-cycle. equilibrium xenon The transient is analyzed for approximately 20 minutes. At thfs time. Ihe B steam generator is dry ond the plant is trending toward o stable shutdown condition.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lEAM DATEr 7 I'o 0O lQ QQ SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

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FEEDWATER LINE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MFW~

BASIS FOR EVALUATION Best Estimate Analysis - The Simulator results wi7I be compared to a Turkey Point REIPAN model.

Expert Evaluation - The overall response ond specific relevant parameters wi7I be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS Because of anomalous behavior I'n the REIPAN model prediction that coukf not be quickly resolved. two feedline break cases were analyzed. The RETRAN02 model predicts a drastic cooldown just as the affected steam generator dnes out. While this appears to be a problem in IKlPAN, the Fuels Resources group could not resolve that this behavior was correct or Incorrect. Schedule contraints did not allow resolution at this time. Fuels Resources did Iind that the problem could be ovolded by closing the break at 600 seconds. Hence, the two cases.

The overall response of the Simulator Is os expected and consistent with the physical processes involved. The ogreement between the REIPAN02 model predictions for the first 600 seconds 8 very good. For the case where the break remains open ofter 600 seconds, the Simulator affected loop cold leg temperature maintains a mi7d slope down os the affected steam generator dries out. On Ihe other hand, the REIPAN02 model shows a sharp decrease in the cold leg temperature followed by a steody nse. The RETRAN model behavior is suspicious, but a specific error or problem could not be /dentified.

For the case where the break is closed after 6CO seconds, the Simulator affected loop cold leg temperature increases slightly when the breok Is closed then maintains a mild slope down as a result of steam generator heat losses. On the other hand, the REII2AMQ model. which does not have heat losses, shows a steody rise.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES There are spi7res in the steam generator outlet flow rate in the 500 to 600 second range that do not appear to have any bean'ng on the transient or the abi7ity to perform training on this scenario. but should be corrected.

EXCEPllONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMU TOR CONFIGURATTON REVIEW BOARD DAK: ~813 %0 DAK:~r7 DAJEi /' DAlE: 8 i 8 DAlE: DAlR ~E >7-Page 2

TURKEy POINT SIMULATOR CER11FICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITLE: MAIN FEEDWATER LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT NUMBER: MFW405 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 8.1.2 g0) MAINSTEAM LINE AS WELL AS MAIN FEED LINE BREAK CBOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENQ DESCRIPTION This test wi7I be run by implementing a .5 severity leak on the main feed header which is outside containment. The leak will be ramped in over a 30 second period. In addition. the 'A'eed regulating valve will be fai7ed as is from the start. The only operator action to be simulated is the trip of the reactor coolant pumps if safety injection occurs and RCS subcooling goes below 25 degrees. The test will be run for about 10 minutes at which time the condenser should be empty which effectively stops the leak OPTIONS There are several locations outside containment at which a leak can be initiated and any leak may be varied in size from very small to a double ended pipe rupture.

INI11AL CONDI11ONS FINAL CONDmONS MOL. 100K power. steady state. Unit stable after both main feed pumps have tripped and the leak has stopped.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATEr

/ DATE:~CF ft DATE:

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MAIN FEEDWATER LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT: MFW-005 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert Evaluation - The conhol room indications, overall response, and specific relevant parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS Initially. the leak was ramped in over a 30 second period. Additionally. the feed regulating valve for the 'A'team generator was fai7ed as is. which would be its IN% power position. As the leak increased in size. the leak flow increased and the pressure on the feed header decreased. The reduction in feed flow also caused Tavg to increase slightly. The increase in Tavg caused an increase in steam generator pressures so that. after the leak size stabilized, feed header pressure increased slightly. At approximately 60 seconds into the transient. the unit tripped on low steam generator level. The ensuing transient with its high feed flow rates caused the 'B'team generator feed pump to trip on low suction pressure at about 70 seconds. With one feed pump running, the feed header pressure decreased to about 620 psia. At about this time, Tavg had dropped enough so that feed isolation occurred and the feed control valves shut so that all feed flow was now out the break. lhe secondary stabilized with feed header pressure at about 620 psia and leak flow at about 2100 Ibm/sec.

This flow rate equates to about 16.500 gallons per minute out of the hotweti. At about 320 seconds, the condensate pumps began to flash and the second feed pump tripped on low suction pressure. This caused the feed header pressure to quickly drop to near atmospheric. Leak flow oscillated as steam/water mixture until the header was empty and the leak stopped. No discrepancies were noted.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllON TEAM SIMULATOR CONRGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~7- 1~1 DATE: ~ /7 9u DAlE:

DATE: DATEi E-/7-9 0 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: FAILURE OF SlEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CHANNEL PROVIDING INPUT TO THE FEEDWATER CONTROLLER NUMSER: MFW~

ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2 (9) Loss of Normal Feedwater 3.1.2 g2) Process Instrumentatton, Alarm, and Control System Failures DESCRIPTION This test checks the response of the simulator to a failed steam generator level channel when that channel is controlling for the feedwater regulating valve. Two cases will be run. one in which no operator action is taken and one in which the operator takes corrective action by placing the associated feedwater regulating valve in manual to stabiTize the plant.

OPllONS Any of the three steam generators may be used.

INlllALCONDIONS FINAL CONDmONS IRK power, steady state. Run 1 - Rant stable after the reactor trip Run 2 - Rant stable with the associated channel in manual APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATEr /S 9d DATEr /-rS -P~

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FAILURE OF SlEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CHANNEL PROVIDING INPUT TO THE FEEDWAlER CONTROllER: MFW-006 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of overall plant response and the response of selected parameters.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS RUN 1 lhe porn/ responded as eirpected to the failure of the level chonneL The affected steam generator's level rose as the feed reg valve opened in response to the sensed low level. The /eve/ rose until the tnp setpolnt of NR wos reached. The other two steam generators'eve/s went down sfightly as feed flow went preferentially to the affected steam generator. After the fnp, the steam dumps opened to reduce pnmary temperature to no load temperature, main feed Isolated, and auxiTiary feed began restoring the levels in the steam generatoN. The affected steam generator level recovered first since it hod been high prior to the trip.

RUN 2 In this test the team responded to the failed level channel at the first atom. The team placed the ossociated feed regulating valve in manub/ and restored level in the affected steam generator. Reactor power, pressure, ond temperature stayed essentially constant throughout the transient. The steam generator level oscillated some as the operator attempted manual control, but it soon stabilized ot the program level with steam and feed flows matched. At this point, the alternate control channel was selected. The team verified that this channel controlled level satisfactorily, then placed the simulator in freeze and ended the test.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS None, DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVALUAllONlEAM SIMULATOR CONRGURATION REVIEW BOARD DAlE: Q 0 DATEi ~g DATE:

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TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE lllLEr LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER WITHAFW SYSlEM FAILURES AND STUCK OPEN PORV gM-2 EQUIVALEN7)

NUMBER: MFW~7 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSr 8.1.2 (I.c) FaNure of Safety and Relief Valves 8.1.2 (6 Loss of AllFeedwafer (normal and emergency)

DESCRIPllON TMs test willmimic the conditions of the accident at lhree Mi7e Mand Unit Two. Since TMI-2 is a different design plant. some modifications to the actual event wi7I be necessary. The test wi7I be performed by initiating a loss of aN feedwater event. In order to simulate the different steam generators. the unit tnp willbe delayed unti7 the steam generators are nearly d y. One pressurizer PORV willstick open, RCPs wiN be tripped when the hops void, and the safety Infection pumps wi7l be turned off to simulate the operator actions at TMI. The test wiN continue long enough to insure that the loops and vessel void, the core begins to heat up due to core uncovery, and the accumulators and RHR pumps have started intecting water to restore core cooling and pressurizer level.

OPTIONS Several means are available to simulate the Three Mile Island 2scenano. Conditions should be chosen whch wi7lsimulate the plant and operator response as closely as possible. Included should be sufficient malfunctions and time to allow Ihe core to reach melt conditions.

INITIALCONDmONS FINAL CONDIllONS IK6'ower, MOL steady state. with the AFW system isolated. RCS being refiNed by the accumulators and RHR pumps.

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LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER WITH AFW SySTEM FAILURES AND STUCK OPEN PORV HAMI-2 EQUI VALENQi MFW-007 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of the RCS, pressurizer and core response to the loss of coolant and failure of secondary heat sink conditions.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS Overall the test results were very good and represented the ~ of posibte core melt scenario which was desired. The initial stages of the transient looked like a toss of feed without trip transIent due to the dryout of the steam generators prior to the trip. This fs very similar to a TMI type system trip. Without the AFWsystem, the RCS stayed hot and the pressurizer stayed fuII and pressurized for about 45 minutes. At the same time, the high core temperatures caused voiding to begin ln the vessel and loops. The RCPs were tripped when the loop void fractions reached RC which corresponds to the actions taken at TMI. About I hour into the scenario. decay heat was low enough that the pressurizer level began dropping and RCS pressure began decreasing. This causedincreased voidingin the core.

and at about 70 minutes Into the scenario, the core cladding temperatures began rapidly escalating. At M minutes into the scenario upper center clad temperatures had reached AN degrees F. This was clear indication that fuel temperatures were responding to the core uncovery conditions. At this point, RCS pressure lowered to accumulator pressures so that the accumulators began dumping and cooling the system. Thisquickiy lowered RCS pressure to the RHR head and allowed the pumps to begin fdling the system. The addition of the cold water effectively ended the transient as planned. No discrepancies were pumps'hutoff noted ln the final run of this test.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM DATE:/ - a" SIMUIAT CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE ~lL i'-

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TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLE: LOSS OF FEEDWATER/ATWS NUMBER: MFW<08 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 3.1.2(9) LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER 3.1.2') FAILURE OF AUTOMA71C REACTOR TRIP DESCRIPTION This loss of normal feedwater transient without scram willbe compared to a best estimate analysis (BEA) using the Turkey Point RETRAN model. This test examines a broad spectrum of models and conditions including core kinetics, water solid PCS behavior and the transient into two phase conditions, fiquid relief through the pressurizer safeties, two phase degradation of the RCS pumps. and so on. In order to test the Simulator models through a severe pressure transient and water solid condition both pressurizer PORVs were fai7ed closed. Procedures call for the operator to trip the turbine when the plant has Iripped but the rods haven'

.been released, therefore, this action was simulated by the tripping of the turbine at 75 seconds. No other expected operator actions were simulated and no emergency boration wasinitiated. Several assumptions were made lo provide consistency between models. S'rnce the RETRAN model does notinclude charging and letdown models, these paths wereisolatedin the simulator. The transient wasinitiated by failing closed all of the feedwater control valves. Allcontrol systems were in automatic except the control rods.

OPTIONS 7he main feedwater can be lost via a variety of mecharisms Including the failing closed of the isolation or regulation valves, pump bean'ng fai7ures. and motor breaker fai7ures.

INI17AL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS IDOL Power Steady State. BOL, Equilibrium Xenon The transient is analyzed for 15 minutes. At this time, safety injection has begun and a reasonable heat sink has been re-established in the steam generators.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE: l~ r DAK:~~+ ~ 9~

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LOSS OF FEEDWATER / ATWS: MFW-008 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Best Estimate Analysis - lhe Simulator results willbe compared to a Turkey Point RETRAN model.

Expert Evaluation - lhe overall response and specific relevant parameters willbe evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS In general, the overall trends and magnitudes of the results compare very well between the Simulator and the RETRAN model. The system response during the loss of feedwater without scram is a complex combination of how the RCS heats up (steam generator) and the core power response (reactivity feedbacks). The RCS pressure provides a picture that reflects the interaction of all of the phenomena. The trends and overall character of the pressure response compare very well between the Simulator ond the RETRAN model. The Simulator RCS pressure peaks ot 3NO psia vs 3400 psia in the RETRAN model, but considering the magnitude of the change and the complexity of the processes occuring this differenceis not significant. The pressurizer safety relief valves reduce the pressure to around 2700 psia and the formation of voids in the core begin to drive the core power from about 24% toward a completely shutdown condition. At this point Ihe auxiliary feedwateris sufficient to remove the heat load and a steady cooldown begins. At 680 seconds the reactor coolant pumps are tripped based on an Sl signal from low pressurizer pressure and low subcooling.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUIAnON CONFIaURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE:i~45 QD DAIEi ~~ ~ ~o DATEs I < KO DAlE:

DAlE: DAlE: /3 ~ - 1 (3 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TlllE: GENERATOR TRIP NUMBER: MGG-001 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2 (16) Generator Titp DESCRIPTION This test ~7I consist of a plant trip initiated by a generator trip from IMX power.

OPTIONS Several different means of tripping the generator are available on the simulator. Any means may be used so long as the generator trip is the initialing transient.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS 193%. steady state, MOL Plant stable at hot standby.

APPROVED FOR USE TES1'EAM DATEr S 1'i'~ DAEEr ~//-FD SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

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GENERATOR TRIPs MGG40l BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of overall plant response and the response of specific parameters.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The plant trip Initiated by the generator trip went as exrpected. Reactor power, temperature and pressure all responded as expected and no deficiencies were noted. All control systems acted as eirpected to bnng the unit to hot standby.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS DEFICIENCIES None EXCEP)lONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUAllON TEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DA1B ~?-Z 7- a DAK'~ZG/FG DATE:

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TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEs LOSS OF 4k V BUS 3A NUMBER: MGG-002 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTlONS: 3.1.2 (3) Loss of Electrica Power DESCRIPTION The purpose of this test is to verify proper simulator response to the loss of 4kV bus 3A. Since this bus supplies Load Centers 3A and 3C, and these supply vital MCC's 3A and 3C, all loads of 480 V or greater in this train willbe tested with this test. In order to makeit easier to start and stop loads, lhe test willbe conducted from a hot standby condition.

OPTIONS None.

INITIALCONDmONS FINAL CONDlllONS Steady State and Hot Standby, any time in life. 3A bus energized from Ihe Hot standby with 3A deenergized.

Startup transformer.

APPROVED FOR USE SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATEs DAK: ~d DAIE:

DATE:

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LOSS OF 4k V BUS 3A: MGG-002 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of simulator response versus plant electrical drawings.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS Overall, the test went as planned. Only two discrepancies between the toad fists and the simulalor response were noted. In both cases, plant drawings showed the simulator to be in error and Discrepancy Reports were generated. Although the problems must be fixed, they do not cause any serious training problems.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES Two motor operated vatves, MOV'S- 1433 and 1434 (MSR steam supply) deenergized when 4kV bus 3A was deenergized, even though they are both powered from MCC3B (non-vital) which is not powered from bus 3A EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM SIMULATIONCONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DAlE: ~X DAIEr '3 >f >o

/

Z4

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DAK:~sP /8 pua~32(- 0 DATEr DAIEi 5-Al- 90 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: LOSS OF 4k V BUS 3B NUMBER: MGG-OO3 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 3.1.2 f3) Loss of Electricat Power DESCRIPTION The purpose of this testis to verify proper slmu!ator response to the loss of4kVbus 3B. Since this bus supplies Load Centers 3B and 3D, and Ihese supply vital MCC's 3B and 3D, all loads of 480 V or greater in this train willbe tested with this test. In order to makeit easier to start and stop loads. the test wiIIbe conducted from a hot standby condition.

OPTIONS None INITIALCONDmONS FINAL CONDITIONS Steady State and Hot Standby, any time in fife. 3B bus energized from the Hot standby with 3B deenergized.

Startup transformer.

APPROVED FOR US C DAIE ~ DAlE:~~o SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAIE:

DAlE:

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LOSS OF 4k V BUS 3B: MGG-003 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert evaluation of simulator response versus plant electrical drawings.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS lhe test was run without any problems. Allloads on the load lists responded as predicted.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllON lEAM SIMULAllONCONFIGURAllON REVIEW BOARD J ~

DAlE:7~oW o m-DATE:

~i'+~JR'AlE:

/ '4 DAK: ~+/~

VO'Arp;~<-tp 0

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TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: LOSS OF ALLAC POWER NUMBER: MGG-004 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2 P) Loss or Degraded Electrical Power to the Station DESCRIPllON This test wN verify the abiTity to property simukrte plant conditions upon a loss of ail AC power to the plant's electrical buses (480V and up). Included un7I by.

recovery from thfs condition with and without safelyinjectkn required. The plant's Emergency Operating Procedures Emergency Contingency Actions ECACO, Loss of AllAC Power, ECAC. 1, Loss of AIIAC Power Recovery without SI Required, and 02, Loss of AllAC Power Recovery with Sl Required, ueP be used.

For the recovery without Sl required, a paNal natural circulation cooldown per EOP ES4.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, and ESC.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Vessel with RVLMS (QSPDS), willbe performed to verify this capability.

OPlTONS The loss of offsite power may be accomplished many different ways. Any suitable method may be used to deenergize the unit 3 4kV buses.

INITIALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDlllONS 100% power. equiEbrtum Run 1. stop upon transition to E-l, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

Run 2, stop offer verifying the capability to cooldown under natural circulation conditions using both ES4.2 and ES4.3.

APPROVED FOR USE DAlE: DAK $ 5 9Q SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAIE: ~l 4-DATE:

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LOSS OF ALL AC POWER MGG-004 BAStS FOR EVALUAnON Expert evaluation of overall simulator response. the response of selected systems and parameters, and the ability to use the plant emergency procedures in the simulator.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS RUN 1- RCP SEALS FAIL, NO NC COOLDOWN: The scenario was initiated and caused a total loss of offsite and emergency power to unit 3. 7he plant procedure ECAC.O was used to respond except that no attempt to restore power was made. Whi7e the team was waiting to get 6% nanow range level in one steam generator. the RCP seals failed. RCP seal failure was indicated by high flows on Ihe seal leakoff recorders and a little while later, by increased containment radiation and pressure. One deficiency was noted at this point: the seal leakoff recorders oscr7lated rapidly rather than simply going to a high reading. 7he team continued with ECA4.0 by performing a rapid cooldown and depressurlzation to maintain RCS subcooling at 50 degrees. Safety InJectton actuated during the cooldown although no actual loads were energized. Shen the steam generators reached the hold pressure. the test team restored power to the buses In order to allow transition to the recovery procedure. The recovery procedure, ECA4.2 Recovery from Loss of AllAC Power wtlh Sl Required, was performed with no diflicully. The team stopped the test when the transition to the Loss of Coolant procedure was reached. One deticiency was noted in that the RCP seals returned to normal when seal injection was restored. They should have continued to leak.

RUN 2- NO RCP SEAL FAILURE, NC COOLDOWNS: The initialpart of this scenario was the same as in run one except that power was restored early in ECA4.0. This allowed the test team to go straight to the end of ECA<.0 bypassing the rapid cooldown and seal isolation steps. The plant was stable and Sl was not required.

7he team transitioned to ECA<. 1 for recovery without Sl required. 1he procedure was followed without any problems and the team was able to set up to perform the natural circulation cooldown of ES4.2, Natural Circuiation Cooldown. A natural circulation coo!down per ES4.2 was conducted for about 40 degrees to verify ths capacity. When this had been done. the team transitioned to ESN.3. Natural Circulation Coo!down with a Steam Void in the Reactor Vessel, for the more rapid cooldown allowed in that procedure. A 700 degree per hour cooldown was performed for about one hour without any problems. One deficiency was generated due to Ihe lack of a steam voidin the reactor vessel. 7he deficiencyinvestigation willdetermine whether or not steam void should have formed. No other problems were noted.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES Three deficiencies were noted that directly relate to this test. Two deficiencies concern the RCP seals. Fiat, when RCP seals fai7ed, the RCP seal Ieakoff recorders oscillated rapidly over their fullranges instead of going to a high reading. Second, when seal cooling is restored and seal temperature drops below 350 degrees, lhe seals stop leaking and return to normal. The last deficiencyis open for study rather than being a definite problem. During the rapid natural circulation coo!down of ES4.3, no void formedin the reactor vessel head as the procedure seems to expect. Itis possible that the Turkey Point vessel would not experience void growth in this condition so the possibifily is being examined.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUIATO ONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: DATEi> ~ 90 DAK:~~F + DATEi 3 K (0 DATE: DATE: >-40" 90 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllflCAllON TEST PROCEDURE TlllEr LOSS Of VITAL BUS 3P06 NUMBER: MMP-001 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2 P) Loss of Electrtcat Power DESCRIPTION The purpose of this certification test Is to verify proper simulated response to a loss of the 120 VAC vital buses 3PO6 and 3P21. These buses supply power to channel 1 of the plant's instrumentation The test will be initiated from IOCC power, steady state with all control systems lined up for normal operation. No other malfunctions wll be present. After checking the boards for proper loss of power indications. the test team will operate the simulator in accordance wilh the plant Off-Norma/ Procedure for 10 minutes in order to venfy that it can be used successful!y in the simulator.

OPTIONS The vital bus may be deenergized by opening ils supply breaker or by failing the inverter to transformer automatic transfer and deenergizing the supply inverter. In order to provide an operationally realistic scenario, the latter method should be used.

INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS IK% power. steady state, MOL Simulator in freeze with 3P06 deenergized.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE / pa DATEr >- fa-Iro DAlE:

DATE:

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LOSS OF VITAL BUS JP06i MMP~I BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of simulator response versus the plant electncai drawings.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The simulator responded fairly weil to the loss of DP06 test. Only four items did not fai7 as they should have. These are listed below. None of the four items is significant enough to seriously degrade a training session. but they wi7I be corrected in any case.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES Four deficiencies were noted. Three indicators did not fai7 as they should have. Two of these were TI44106 and 607B, fhe CCW pumps inlet and outlet temperatures. The other was 774-1', the QR letdown outlet temperature. Lastly. the Containment pressure recorder PIZ4306B has a blue vice, a red stripe for power supply Indication.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS L5 None EVALUATION TEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~P- DATE:

pArs ~8~<58 DATE: ~30~8 DATE: DATE: 2-QO 90 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLE: LOSS OF VITAL BUS 3PO7 NUMBER: MMP-002 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSr 3.1.2 L3) Loss of Etectricat Power DESCRIPTION The purpose of this certification test is to verify proper simulated response to a loss of the I20 VAC vital buses 3P07 and 3P22. These buses supply power to channel 2 of the plant's Instrumentation. The test wiN be initiated from IOCC power, steady state with aN control systems lined up for normal operation No other malfunctions will be present. After checking the boards for proper loss of power indications. the test team will operate the simulator In accordance with the plant Off&ormal Procedure for IO minutes in order to verify that it can be used successfuNy in the simulator.

OPTIONS The vital bus may be deenergized by opening its supply breaker or by failing the inverter to transformer automalic transfer and deenergizing the supply Inveher. In order to provide on operafionaNy realistic scenario, the latter method should be used.

INITIAL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS IK% power, steady state, MOL Simulator in freeze with 3P07 deenergized.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE:

SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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LOSS OF VITAL BUS 3PO7: MMP~

BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of simulator response as compared to plant electncal drawings.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The loss of 3P07 test went very smoothly. Only two discrepancies were generated as a result of this test, one minor and one which coused some confusion.

but which con easily be fixed. The overall plant response wos as expecte'd and Ihe Off-Normal Procedure was used to oid in controlling the plant. The major problem was that the Off4brmci procedure has several mistakes in it. Feedback has been provided to the plant to enable the ONOP to be updated.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES The Auxiliary Feed Flow controllers train 2 failed instead of train I. This stN leaves one train of AFW to each SG.

On the IMP seal leokoff low range flow recorder, the red pen fai7ed instead of the blue pen.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: f- )o- 0u DATE 5 2- 9o DA ra ~~/~>/ owrs~3. 0 DATE: DAIE: ~9. 0- 'P Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TillE: LOSS OF VITAL BUS 3P08 NUMBER: MMP-003 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2 f3) Loss of Electrical Power DESCRIPTION The purpose of this certification test is to verify proper simulated response to a loss of the 120 VAC vital bus 3P08. ibis bus supplies power to channel 3 of the plant's instrumentation. The test will be initiated from IN% power, steady state with ail control systems lined up for normal operation. No other malfunctions wiIIbe present. After checking the boards for proper Ioss of power indications. the test team will operate the simulator in accordance with the plant Off-Normal Procedure for 10 minutes in order to venfy that it can be used successfully in the simulator.

OPTIONS lhe vital bus may be deenergized by opening its supply breaker or by failing the Inveher to transformer automatic transfer and deenergizing the supply inverter. In order to provide an operationally realistic scenario, the latter method should be used.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS 100% power, steady state. MOL Simulator in freeze with 3P08 deenergized.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATEr C- 9o DATE: ~ ) 1c SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

Poge 1 W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W

LOSS OF VITAL BUS 3POS: MMP-003 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Brpert evaluation of the simulator's response versus the plant drawings and the Off-Normal Operating Procedure.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The loss of 3P08 test went fairly well with four discrepancies being generated. The most significant problem is the train 2 AFW flow controllers. which did not lose power. The train I and 2 controllers'ower supplies are reversed in the simulator. Since only one train fails with a given bus, the plant can still be operated and training can continue. The power supplies need to be corrected, however. The other discrepancies noted are considered minor in nature as they are indications only and do not hinder the ability to use the simukrtor for training.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES A Deficiency Report was generated for the train 2 AFW flow controllers which should have lost power with this bus. but instead lost power in the 3P07 test.

A DR was generated for U44308B, Containment Sump level, as it had a yellow stripe. vice the blue stripe associated with 3P08. It lost power with the correct bus however. A DP was generated for the Condensate Storage Tank train B level detector which should have lost power, but instead lost power with 3P07.

Lastly, the RCP seal Ieakoff recorders did not respond properly. On the low range recorder. the red and blue pens failed and on the high range recorder, no pens failed. On both recorders, the red pen only should have failed.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATiE~D- 3- DATE:

DAT& ~<>i 8 DATE: ~3'%

DATE: DATE ~3-Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TillEr LOSS OF VITAL BUS 3POP NUMBER: MMP-M4 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSi 3.1.2 f3) Loss of Etectrlcat Power DESCRIPTION The purpose of this certification test is to verify proper simulated response to a loss of the 120 VAC vital bus 3POR This bus supplies power to channel 4 of the plant's instrumentation The test will be initiated from 100% power steady slate with ail control systems lined up for normal operation. No other malfunctions will be present. After checking the boards for proper loss of power indications, the test team will operate the simulator in accordance with the plant Off-Normal Procedure for 10 minutes In order to verify that it can be used successfully in the simulator.

OPTIONS The vital bus may be deenergized by opening its supply breaker or by fai7ing the inverler to transformer automatic transfer and deenergizing Ihe supply inverter. In order to provide an operationally realistic scenano, the latter method should be used.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDITIONS IN% power, steady state, MOL Simulator in freeze with 3PN deenergized.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATEi < "~ 9D DAK ~+3 Po SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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LOSS OF VITAL BUS 3POR MMP-004 BASIS FOR EVALUA11ON

&pert evaluation of simulator response as compared to the plant electrical drawings.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The test ran almost perfectly with all but two items losing power as they should. O~ the CCW temperature indicators. TIM7A and 610A did not fai7 as they should have.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDI11ONS None DEFICIENCIES CCW temperature indicators TIM7A and 610A did not fail as they should have. A DP has been written to address this problem.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUA11ON TEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: Q X~u DAIE: &>$ ~76 DATEr ~<<~

DATE: DA1E: ~E'f~

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TURKEY POINT- SIMUIATOR CER11FICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEr LOSS OF DC BUS 3A (3D01)

NUMBER: MMP-005 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 8.1.2 (3) Loss of Elechtcat Power DESCRIPTION The purpose of this test is to verify proper simulator response to the loss of DC bus 3A (3DOI). DC bus 3A supplies safety related electrical loads with DC power for control and indication. The test wi7I be initiated from 100% power. steady state with all control systems fined up for normal operation. No other malfunctions wiII be present. After deenergizing the bus, the test team will operate the simulator in accordance with the plant Off-Normal Procedure for 10 minutes. At that point. the simulator will be frozen to allow Ihe team to walk down Ihe boards and verify that all components responded properly to the loss of power.

OPTIONS None INI11AL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS IN% power. steady state, MOL Simulator in freeze with DC bus 3A deenergized.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE DATE: 0~2- l DAlE:

DATE:

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LOSS OF DC BUS 3A PD01): MMP~5 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

'xpert evaluation of simulator response as compared to the plant electrical drawings.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS The simulator responded exactly as predicted for the loss of 3DOI. A!I components which should have fajled did and those which shouldn't have failed continued to operate.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIElV BOARD DAlE. P 2 o qo DAlE: ~3~~0 DATE: DATE: ~~/

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TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: LOSS OF DC BUS 3B (3D23)

NUMBER: MMP-006 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2 L3) Loss of Electrical Power DESCRIPTION The purpose of this test is to verify proper simulator response to the loss of DC bus 3B (3D23). DC bus 3B supplies safety related electrical loads with DC power for control and indication The test will be initiated from steady state IN% power with all control systems lined up for normal operation No other ma!functions will be present. After checking the boards for proper loss of power indications, the test team will further deenergize some of the backup DC power supplies. to insure that the components with two sources of DC power are powered from the correct two sources. lhe Off-Normal Operating Procedure will be used to confirm the loads powered by bus 3D23.

OPllONS lhe DC bus may be deenergized by more than one method. lhe exact method is not important so Iong as only 3D23 is deenergized.

INlllALCONDIllONS FINAL CONDmONS IMX power, steady state, MOL Simulator in freeze with DC bus 3B deenergized.

APPROVED fOR USE lEST TEAM DATE: 9o DATE: ~Q-SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DAlE:

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LOSS OF DC BUS 3B (3D23)i MMP-00b BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of simulator response as compared to plant Off-Normal Operating Procedures and the plant electrical drawings.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The loss of the 3D23 bus test was performed with only minor discrepancies. The plant tripped and the various components responded as predicted by the test team and the Olf-Normal Operating Procedure. Only the two loads fisted below did not fail as they should have.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDIONS DEFICIENCIES Deficiency reports were written on two components which should have lost power, but didn'. The reactor trip bypass breaker 52/BYA and the RCS vent valve CV44321)8. Since neither of these components fs normally operated for simulator training. these deficiencies hove only minor impact on training and do not compromise the ability to use the imulator.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUlATOR CONRGURATION REVIEMl BOARD DATE: ~ >rT-$ a DATEi 3 ~a 9s DATE: DATD ~3

~+~A/%'ATE:

DATE: 3~0 Poge 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE llllE: lOSS OF DC BUS 4A (4DOI)

NUMBERs MMP-007 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: S.1.2 fS) I.oss of E!ectrtcai Power DESCRIPTION The purpose of this test Is to venfy proper simulator response to the loss of DC bus 4A gDOI). DC bus 4A supplies certain unit 3 and common safety related electricai loads with DC power for control and indication The test will be initiated from IIX6'ower, steady state with ail control systems fined up for normal operation. No other malfunctions will be present.

OPllONS The 4DOI bus may be deenergized by several methods. Any method which deenergizes 4DOI only is acceptable.

INITIALCONDIllONS FINAI. CONDmONS IN% power. steady state. MOL 100%, with bus 4DOI deenergized.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE: /~ 7O DATEr 3-r)-f0 SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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LOSS OF DC BUS 4A (4DOI): MMP~7 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of simulator response simulator response as compared to plant electrica! drawings.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS A total of five loads were checked in this test. These represent loads powered from unit 4 which impact the simulated operation of unit 3. AIIloads lost power as expected. There were no loads which lost power which shouldn't have and the simulator responded as expected.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUAllONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE:

'7 >o-go DATEi 9 9<

ogre DATEr 3-N-f0

>1~/4'ATE:

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CER11FICA11ON TEST PROCEDURE TITLEs LOSS OF DC BUS 48 (4D23)

NUMBER MMP~

ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 3.1.2 P) Loss of Electrical Power DESCRIPTION The purpose of this test is to verify proper simulator response to the loss of DC bus 4B (4D23). DC bus 4B supplies some safety related electrical loads on unit d3. including the normal lnverter for vital bus 3POR The test will be iniliated from hot shutdown.

Since this a unit 4 bus. the Off4brmal Procedure for it wi7I not be used. Only the correct backup powering will be checked in this test.

OP11ONS INITIAL CONDI11OHS FINAL CONDmONS HSD, steady state, MOL. HSD, various buses deenergized in order to check unit 3 response to loss of 4B.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM

'T DATE. DATE: ~3-/ 'l-SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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LOSS OF DC BUS 4B (4D28): MMP-008 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of simulator response as compared to the plant electrical drawings.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The test went as ected, with no deficiencies noted.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVALUATION TEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~V- 3 o- DATE:

oAre ~3>> /~el DATE: 3 DQ<

DATE: DAIE: >~0-90 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICA11ON lEST PROCEDURE TITLEr STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE NUMBER: MRC-III ANS S.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: J.1.2(l,a) SIGNIFICANT PyIIR STEAM GENERATOR LEAKS DESCRIPTION This test repiicates a Best Estimate Analysis SEA) Steam Generator Tube Rupture performed by the FP&L Fuel Resources Deparlment using the REIAN02 program. As such the test is not intended to follow in detail the EOPs covering this type of transient. However. the operator action to turn off the IK'umps on low subcooling margin was programmed into the scenario. In addition. it was assumed that 10 minutes after the initiation of the rupture the operator isolates AFW in the affected loop. secures the atmospheric dump valve, and closes the NISIV on the affected loop. Since the RETRAM model does not include charging and letdown models. or accumulators, these paths were isolated in the Simulator. The event is initiated from full power at endwf~ycle conditions. AN control systems are irv'tfaNy In automatic, safety systems function at full capability. and no additional malfunctions are included. The safety systems function at fuN capably. and no additional malfunctions are included. Rod control is assumed to be in manual in order to simplify the interface between the simulator and the REIRAIVmodel. A split break of a single tube is assumed to occur in the loop B steam generator.

OPTIONS The simulator Ls capable of simulating steam generator tube ruptures ranging from minute leaks to ruptures of many tubes in each of the steam generators. There are no restrichons regarding other ruptures of the primary or secondary system that may be assumed to occur simultaneously or cause the tube rupture itself.

INlllALCONDIONS FINAL CONDmONS 100% power steady state, endwfwycle. equihbrium xenon The transient ls analyzed for approximately 30 minutes. At this time, the B steam generator is nearly full and recovery actions are now required by the operator.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lEAM SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE: DAK

~ISO DAlE:

DAlE:

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SlEAM GENERATOR TVBE RUPTVRE: MRC~I BASIS FOR EVAI.UATION Best Estimate Analysis - The Simulator results wN be compared to a Turkey Point RETRAN model.

Expert Evaluation - The overall response and specific relevant parameters wN be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS The overall response of the Simulator fs as expected and consistent with the physical processes involved.

lhe pressurfzer pressure agrees reasonably weil throughout the 30 minute transient and the pressurizer level keks excellent. lhe IKS flow'oastdown and natural cfrcufatfon charocterfstfcs kok much the same as several other transients we have studied. The simulator always seems to produce more natural circulation flow than the REIRAN model. In this test the Simulator shows the stagnation affects in the B loop although it does not completely stagnate in the 30 minutes examined here.

The timing and magnitude of the condenser dump flow agrees perfectly and a deficiency written on the steam dump capacity has been corrected.

All of the affected loop parameters agree reasonably well. The only inconsistency in the Simulator that may deserve some attention is the level response relative to the pressure response. The steam generator narrow range level is roughly 60% when the pressure reaches the setpoint of the lowest code valve. The REIPAN response seems more consistent in this regard. The affected loop temperatures compare very well between the two models. The pofd leg temperature In the Simulator fs beginning to show the Impact of the flow stagnation in the B loop.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS None DEFICIENCIES None

&'CEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVAI.UATION lEAM Sl VIATOR C HGURAllON REVIEW BOARD DATE: 5 l0 DATE r

DATE: DATE:

DATEi DAlE: > //7~

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lURKEYPOINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEi LARGE BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENTWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER NUMBER: MRC-002 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2(1)(B) Loss of Coolant Inside Primary Containment 3.1.2(1) (C) Large and Small Reactor Coolant Breaks Including Demonstration of Saturation Condition B.2.2(8) Maximum Size Reacfor Coolant System Rupture Combined with Loss of AllOffsite Power DESCRIPTION The purpose of this test is to ascertain proper simulator behavior In response to a doubl~nded guillotine break on the B loop cold leg coincidental with a total loss of offsite power. Allcontrol systems areinitiallyin automatic, the safety systems are fullyfunctional, and there are no additional malfunclionsin place. Because thisis an ANS Appendix B test. it witt be entirely scenario driven and there willbe no operator follow up actions. The parameters listed in ANS Appendix B Section B2.2.3. along with several other retevant parameters. willbe recorded with a 2 second resolution. Additionally. the control room alarms. indications, andinteractions will be monitored to confirm that they are appropriate for this exercise.

OPTIONS Leaks can be initiated on each of the hot legs and cold legs or at numerous other locations in the RCS, such as the pressurizer. Allof the leaks are fully variable in size.

INITIALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS EOL. 1QN'ower with steady state conditions. This test wiii run until the fAVST has emptied to the point that the RHR pump suctions are about to switch to Ihe containment sumps.

pygmy, APPROVED fOR USE lEST TEAM SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR

~fu/8 ~ ~zl 9 0 DATE:

DATE:

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LARGE BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENTWITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER MRC~2 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert Evaluation - The control room Indications, overall response. and specific relevant parameters m7l be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS Generally, this test went well. The control room indications and responses were appropriate except as noted belowin the deficiency section In less than a minute containment pressure had peaked at 49 psig and began a downwards frend. By the end of the testit had actually gone negative. Containment temperature started at 120F. peaked at 265F. and was flattening out near 175F at the end of the test. The responses for pressurizer pressure and level were appropnate, 7he pressurizer emptied in less than 15 seconds and never recovered. The RHR and accumulator flow went to 900 lb/sec in half a minute and then decoyed to 5M lb/sec unti7 the accumulators emptied after 4 minutes. RHR flow then went to about 350 Ib/sec. Saturation margin went to -320F. but recovered to -50F by three minutes and had recovered to saturation after 12 minutes. The reactor vessel head emptied and remained empty for the duration of the test. Steam line flow experienced oscillations. They peak at 6 lb/second and eventually disappear. The most unique feature of the steam fine llowis that C 5/G does not osci7late and the oscillations in the A and B S/G's exactly oppose each other; l.e.. as one generator's flowincreases. the other's willdecrease the same magnitude.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDI11ONS None DEFICIENCIES Containment pressure goes subatmospherlc by the end of the test. A DR has been submitted to correct this problem.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVALUA11ON TEAM SIMU TOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD

~

I-

.(~ zo DATEr DATEi ir Z I'AKJlZ6 lo DATE: DATE: ~/I B Page 2

TURKEy POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEr SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT NUMBER: MRC-003 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 8.1.2(I,B AND C) LOSS OF COOlANT: lARGE AND SMALL BREAKS, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT DESCRIPllON This test replicates a Best Estimate Anatysfs (BEA) Small Break LOCA performed by the FP&L Fuel Resources Department using the RETRANQ2 program. As such the test is not intended to foNow in detaN the EOPs covering this type of transient. However, the operator action to turn off the RC pumps on Iow subcoofing margin was programmedinto the scenario. No other operator actions were taken during the course of the event, and several assumptions were made to moke the Simulator and the RETRAN model consistent. Since the RETRAN model does not include charging and letdown models, or accumulators. these paths were Isolated in the Simulator. The event Is initiated from fullpower at beginningwf~cte conditions. A three inch diameter breakis assumed to occurin the hot leg of loop B. AN control systems are InitiaNy In automatic, safety systems function at full capabi%'ty. and no additional malfunctions are included.

OPllONS The simulator is capable of simulating RCS breaks of any size at several locations. The three inch hot leg break was selected because it Is one of the standard hot leg breaks that is used for LOCA and pressurized thermal shock analyses.

INlllALCONDmONS FINAL CONDlllONS IR% power steady state, beginriing of core life. equ17ibnum xenon The transientis analyzed for approximately 30mtnutes. At this lime, the safety flection flow rateis approximately equal to the break flowrate and the system is depressurized.

APPROVED FOR USE pptp ~B2 I I 0 SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

DAlE:

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SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC-003 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Best Estimate Analysis - lhe Simulator results wi7I be compared to a Turkey Point RETRAN model.

Expert Evaluation - The overall response and specific relevant parameters wi7Ibe evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS 7he break flowpredictions for the Simulator ond RETRAN models agree very well for the duration of the transient. The agreement in the RCS pressure responseis also very gcvd although the Simulator does depressurize to a greater degree than the RETRAN model from obout 15 to 20 minutes. lhe deviation reaches approximately 200 psi. but at this point in the transient It. is not ignlficant from a training standpoint.

Preliminary runs showed that an excessive two phase natural circulation flow in the Simulator resulted in cold leg temperatures that followed saturation throughout the test and did not exhibit the cooling due to stagnation of the Intection tiow in the cold legs as did the RETRAN model. The first SCRB meeting that discussed this tronsient resulted in a directive by the SCRB to correct this shortcoming. Subsequent modifications to the Simulator models have resultedin a reasonable agreement of the cold leg temperatures between the Simulator and the RETRAN models. The Simulator does not exhibit as enatic a behavior os the RETRAN model os it cools, but it does show a consistent overall magnitude and a tendency to return to saturation late in the transient when natural circulation begins to be restored.

The behavior of the balance of the secondary parometers is os expected and the Simulator ond RETRAN model results agree reasonably weil.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None.

DEFICIENCIES Oscillations in the break flowrate occurin the 25 to 30 minute range, as the loops ore starting to refilland begin natural circulation lhe magrv'tude of Ihe osci7lations is not excessive and cannot be observed by the trainee. However, the problem deserves some attention and wi7l be entered as a discrepancy.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUIAllONCONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATEi ~ (0 O DATEi f'g'~

DAlE: rr V DAIF:~ll K C'"

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON lEST PROCEDURE TITLEs PORV FAILURE (OPEN) WITHOUT HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION NUMBER: MRC-NM ANS L5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: J.1.2(l,d) fAILURE Of SAFETY & RELIEF VALVES B2.2(IO) SLOW PRIMARY DEPRESSURIZAllON TO SATURATED CONDITIONS USING A PRESSURIZER RELIEF OR SAFETY STUCK OPEN WITHOUT ACllVATIONOF THE ECCS DES CRIPllON This test replicates a Best Estimate Analysis 8&V of a single stuck open PORV without high pressure iryection performed by the FP&L Fuel Resources Department using the RETRAM)2 program. It should be noted that the Turkey Point plant does not have a high pressure ECCS system that willinject at normal system pressures as many of the newer plants. lherefore. this test has been performed with a failure of the Turkey Point system with the highest available delivery pressure (shutoff at approximately 15IX) ps0. This test is not intended to follow in detail the EOPs covering this type of transient. However, the operator action to turn off the RC pumps on low subcooling mary'n was programmed into the scenano. Since the RETRAN model does not include charging and letdown models. or accumulators, these paths were isolated in the Simulator. The event is initiated from full power at beginning-ofwycie conditions. All control systems are initiallyin automatic and no additional malfunctions are included. Pod con!rol is assumed to be in manual in order to simplify the interface between the simulator and the RETRAN model.

OPllONS The imulator is capable of simulating one or both of the PORVs failing open or closed. Failures to an intermediate position may also be simulated.

INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS IK6'ower steady state, beginning-ofwycle, equibMum lhe transient is analyzed for approximately 30 minutes. At this time, the xenon pressure is approximately 8LO psia and has been drifting slowly down for approximately 14lXl seconds.

APPROVED FOR USE lEST TEAM DATE: ~ l~ DAK 4//L4 I D SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DAlE:

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PORV FAILURE (OPEN) WITHOUT HI6H PRESSURE INJECTION: MRC-004 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Best Estimate Analysis - The Simulator results will be compared to a Turkey Point RETPAN model.

Expert Evaluation - The overal/ response and specific relevant parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The overall response of the S/mulator Ls as expected and consistent with the physical processes involved. The agreement between the /KlR'WQ2 model predict/ons /s reasonab/y good for the entire duration of the transient. The IK'S pressure drops rather quickly to approximately /100 ps/a following opening of the POPV. The pressure then drifts slowly down over then remainder of the test. The pressurizer fills as a result of the two phase swell from the RCS loops. The loop temperatures fo/low the steam generator pressures until roughly 800 seconds when the cold legs /lash. The natural clrculat/on f/ow rate in the S/mu/ator /s /arger thon REIAN, especially during the long two phase port/on of the transient. This problem is not severe and /s being studied vta deficiency reports written against MISC~, Small Break LOCA, MFWM7, TMI Equivalent, and MFW~. Loss of Heat Sink OUT OF BOUNDS CONDIllONS DERCIENC/ES None EXCEPllONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURAllON REVIBV BOARD DATE:8 1Z DATEr DATEs o nzrs ~ll-LS 0 DAlE: DATEt i'~-<~- ~~

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TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TinEr LOSS OF FORCED REACTOR COOLANT FLOW NUMBER: MRC-005 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 8.1.2(4) LOSS OF FORCED CORE COOIANT FLOW DUE TO SINGLE OR MULTIPlE PUMP FAILURE B22(4) SIMULTANEOUS TRIP OF ALL REACTOR COOIANT PUMPS B22(5) TRIP OF ANYSINGLE REACTOR COOIANT PUMP DESCRIPTION This test comprises three loss of forced reactor coolant flow cases that result from tripping one, two, and three reactor coolant pumps. These three tests were run from fullpower. therefore. a reactor Irip occursimmediately following the pump trip. Since thisis an ANS 3.5 Appendix B transient.

no operator actions were taken during the course of the event and all control systems were in automatic. The transient was initiated by failing Ihe RC pump motor breakers open. The response of Ihe overall primary and secondary parameters are much Ihe same as many other trips. Hence, the emphasisin this test willbe placed on Ihe flow coastdown ancl the development of flow through the dead loops. Plant datais available for the early part of the transient. (A additional fest (MRC4C8) was performed to evaluate the two pump trip that occurred on 04/09/Ã on Unit 4.)

OPllONS lhe tripping of the RC pumps may be accomplished by manual action from the control room. an override of the switch position. or the fai7ing open of the motor breaker.

INlllALCONDmONS FINAL CONDlllONS 106% Power Steady State, BOL. Egui7i7ium Xenon The test will be run for 600 sec at which time the RC loop flows have reached a steady state and the overall system parameters are steadily recovering.

APPROVED FOR USE DATEs l~ j ~0 SIMUIATORENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

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LOSS OF FORCED REACTOR COOIANT FLOW: MRC-005 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert Evaluation - The control room indications, overall response, and specific relevant parameters willbe evaluated.

Plant Data - Data from startup tests Is available for the loop flow rates (or the early part of the test.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The overall trends and magnitudes of the transient results are as expected and meet the guidelines of ANS 3.5. The transition from forward to reverse flow in the dead loops for the one and two pump coastdowns Is smooth and the magnitude of the reverse flowis reasonable. In the three pump coastdown case, the transition to natural circulation is smooth and the magnitude of natural circulation flowis reasonable.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATIONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DAID~4 DAra~~

DATE: DAK:~l "D fl)

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TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON lEST PROCEDURE TtlIEr LOSS OF A SINGLE REACTOR COOIANT PUMP WITH POWER BELOW P-8 NUMBER MRC-008 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: J.1.2 (4) Loss of Forced Coohnt Flow Due to Single or Multiple Pump Failure DESCRI nON ibis test will simulate a single loop loss of flow transient at a power level below which a reactor tn'p would not occur. In accordance with AAS-8.5, no operator action will be taken after the event occurs.

OPllONS Any of the three Reactor Coolant Pumps may be tripped.

INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS 40X power, steady state. MOL 40K power, steady state. two loop operation.

APPROVED FOR USE lEST TEAM DATEr I /f 9O DAlE: ~I~I'-

SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

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LOSS OF A SINGLE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP WITH POWER BELOW P-8: MRC-ON BASIS fOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of overall plant response ond the response of selected variables.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The plant responded to the pahial loss of flow event as expected. Initiallypower went down due to the increose in average temperature, but from steody state to steady state. the power of the core remained the same. Actual power. irxficated power. coolant temperature, and axial flux difference all underwent the transients expected for thfs event.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS r

None DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATIONlKAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~ Io DATEr DATE: ~ 6'Pd DAK ~Z-I I 0 DATE: DAK: 4~~9 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICATION lEST PROCEDURE TITLE: SlUCK OPEN SPRAY VALVE NUMBER: MRC-007 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2 (18) FAILURE OF REACTOR COOIANT PRESSURE AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION ibis test willsimulate a susfained loss of pressure accident due to a stuck open spray valve. The valve willbe stuck fullyopen via a mechanical failure. lhe plant should trip and eventually safety inject on low pressure. For this test, two scenarios willbe run First the normal plant Emergency Operating Procedures will be utilized with the exception that the RCP supplying the stuck open spray valve willnot be stopped until after the Sl. Second, the plant willbe allowed to stabilize with no operator action.

OPllONS Either spray valve fs acceptable.

INITIALCONDmONS FINAL CONDITIONS 100% power, BOL Run 1

- Rant pressure stable after the RCP supplying spray flow is stopped.

Run 2 - Plant pressure relatively stable with no operator action.

APP VED FOR USE TEST TEAM DAlE: / /& 90 SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE: / gi O DAlE:

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SlUCK OPEN SPRAY VALVE: MRC-007 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of overall plant response. capability of performing plant emergency procedures and response of selected plant parameters.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS RUN I lhe overall plant response to the stuck open spray valve was as expected. Initiallypressure drops steadily due to the spray. At about 300 seconds, a OT DT runback occurs as the lower pressure lowers the OTDT setpoint. At 600 seconds the low pressure trip occurs. ibis causes a large drop in pressure and ca~s fhe safety iry'ectfon to occur just after the trip. At about 660 seconds, fhe 'C'CPis stopped, thus making spray flow negfigible and stopping the pressure decrease. At this point the simulator is frozen. The team was able to perform the emergency procedures without any problems.

RUN 2 The overai/ plant response to the stuck open spray valve with no operator action was as expected. The plant response before the safety injection /s the same as in case one. After fhe Sl. however, pressure continues to decrease due to spray flow OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFIC/ENC/ES One possible deficiency was uncoveredin run 2. With safelyin/ection refllling the pressurizer, pressurizer surge line temperature indicated a value close to pressurizer temperature, vice RCS hot leg temperature. Ths is beinginvestigated to determine whether there was an actual insurge occurring or ifIhe flow of water in the surge line was due to fhe spray flow.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM SIMULAllONCONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DAlE ~~it go DAIE ~~If/go DA% ~Z/<~7+ DA/E 2-l+PO DAlE: DAK: ~IV 00-Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITIE: LOSS OF B AND C REACTOR COOlANT PUMPS AT 100% POWER NUMBER: MRC-008 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 8.1.2(4) loss of Forced Core Cookrnt Flow Due to Mull/pte Pump Failure DESCRIPTION This test wN s/mulate a loss of the B and C reactor coolant pumps with power at ION/, which w77/result in a reactor trip. This scenario has been chosen to compare simulator results with the Unit 4 trip on April9. 1990 from the same cause. The Unit 4 trip was due to a failed under frequency relay. but the scenario willbe started in the simulator by opening the B and C RCP breakers. Actions wi7l be simulated to approximate those taken following the Unit 4 trip; e.g., the main steam stops to the moisture separator reheaters willbe shut, an extra charging pump wi7/be started. the auxiiiaIy steam supply w/7/ be changed, the main steam isolation valves w/7/ be shut, main feed willbe reinstated through the feed control valve bypasses, and AFM/to B and C steam generators willbe throttled ofter appropriate delays.

Allactions willbe scenario driven.

An ERDADS tape has been obtained of the Unit 4 trip on 4/9/90 and several parameters have been plotted. Tbesimulator responses w/7/ be also be plotted and compared to the ERDADS data.

OPTIONS 1he RCP's can be tripped by a vanety of meehan/sms, including failing their breakers open, simulating the opening of their hand switches. and putting in a false over current condil/on. These failures are available for all three RCP's.

INmAI CONDITIONS FINA/. CONDITIONS

/R% power, all three reactor coolant pumps running. OX power. hot standby with only A reactor coolant pump running. The test wii/

run for 30 minutes after the loss of B and C reactor coolant pumps.

APPROVED FOR USE lEST lEAM

/Z/S/gd.

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DAlE: DA IE SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR oA~.~~~+/!~

DATE:

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LOSS OF B AND C REACTOR COOlANT PUMPS AT 100% POWERi MRC-008 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Plant Data. The simulator results Ml be compared to the ERDADS plots from the Unit 4 trip on 4/9/Ã.

Expert examination. lhe control room indications, overall response. and specific relevant parameters w7I be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS lhe fest was evaluated using ANS 3.5 criteria and meets all requirements. The plot comparisons between theimutator the Unit 4 event are extremely close. Many of the sfmutator plots lay on top of plant's and most of the differences can be explained by operator actions that cannot be determined from logs and the ERDADS tapes. These include such items as the position on the feedwater bypass valves and AFWflowsetlingsin the lower ranges. Also. most of the differences occur more than ten minutes after the reactor coolant pumps were tripped and none of the differences have any significant impact on training or the performance of the simulator. Although the simulator doesn't have any steam leakage as a normal condition. a slight amount was put in for this test in order to match the plant and this produced favorable compansons between steam generator pressures and levels. The initial steam pressure spkeis about 40 pounds less on the simulator and the simulator doesn't drop as much as the plant. but the differences are minor. The pressurizer pressure and level are virtuallyidentical for most of Ihe transient.

Pressure drops about 50 psi lower on the simulator. Again. this is a very minor difference and doesn'I have any significant impact on training. The reverse flow indication was appropriate and the running pump current and amperage increased about the some as in the plant. Reactor coolant system teIri peratures corresponded very well to the slope. magnitude, and direction of change that occurred in the plant.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES lhe RCP current is 60 amps too low on the simulator. The feed control valve modelling takes slightly too long to shut the valves when they are less than fully open.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllON TEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURAllONREVIEW BOARD DAK <W+ +D DATE: i 2 DAlE' ~Q DATE: rrArr'~r>

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TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITLE: SPURIOUS ROD POSIllON INDICAllONRESULllNG IN MAXIMUMRATE RUN TO 70% POWER AND MAXIMUMRATE RETURN TO FULL POWER NUMBER: MRX-001 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: B.22 L7) MAXIMUMRATE POWER RAMP (100% DOWN TO 75% AND BACK UP TO 100%)

3.1.2 L28 PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION, ALARM, AND CONTROL SYSlEM FAILURES DES CRIPllON ibis test w8 eva!uate the ah7ity of the simulator to support a return to 100% power at a rapid rate after a runback due Io a failed rod position detector.

OPllONS Any condition which would cause a 200 %/minute runback could be used to initiate this test.

INIllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS IR% power, steady state, BOL IK% Power, after recovery.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATEr DATEr SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR pAK ~IO ~'/FD DATE:

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SPURIOUS ROD POSITION INDICATIONRESULTING IN MAXIMUMRATE RUN TO 70% POWER AND MAXIMUMRATE RHllRN TO FUll POWER MRX~I BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of overall plant response. simulator operabi7ity ond the response of selected parameters.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS lhe team utilized the plant Off4brmal procedures for a Dropped Rod and for the Runback to aid in stabifizing the plant at 70% power. After the plant was stabiTized, the malfunction was cleared and the return to I00% power begun. Rods were used for the initial power increase. ofter which the romp up in power wos limited by the mcxdmum caution rate achievable. The test team wos oble to recover the plant back to 100% power within 40 minutes after the initiol spurious runback without ony problems.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: DATEs If-2E-98 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CER11FICA11ON TEST PROCEDURE TITLEr LOSS OF PROTEC11ON SYSTEM CHANNEL NUMBER: MRX-002 ANS X5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: J.1.2 (I I) Loss of Protection System Channel DESCRIPTION In this test a failure of a protection channel while a second channel is in test will cause a reactor tn'p. For the test, one channel of narrow range coolant temperature will be placed in test and a second channel will fail.

OP11ONS There are several protection channels in the plant and any channel can be fai7ed in ony direction by several different means. The failure ofjust one channel uo7I not cause a plant transient, however. so a redundant channel should be placed in test.

'NITIAL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS IRK. MOI'teady state Hot standby.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DAlE. 5 /3 $0 DA% ~4'-

SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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W W W M M W M M. M M M M M M LOSS OF PROTECllON SYSlEM CHANNEL MRX-002 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of plant response as compared to protection system logic diagrams and a normal plant trip transient.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS lhe test went as planned. With channel one temperature bistabtes In trip. the fai7ure of channel two hot leg narrow range temperature caused a trip on overtemperalure and overpower delta temperatures. Since normally to bring the unit to hot standby.

~ the protection channels of temperature were affected, the control channels operated OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUAllONlEAM SIMUIATOR ONFIGURA N REVIElV BOARD DATE: ~s 'TiP

~ DAlE:

DATEi </~~ra DATEi ~i~9&

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CENIFICA11ON TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: NUCLEAR INSWUMENTATIONFAILURE DURING STARTUP NUMSERi MRX-m ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSr 3.1.2 CP I) Nuclear instrumentation Failures DESCRIP11ON Ths test wi7I examine the sfmubtor's abiTity to mode/malfunctions of nuclear instrumentation. specifically during startup conditions. Two cases willbe run. In the fiat case, bothintermediate ranges wi71 foillow such that P4 willnot be satisfied and the source range high flux trip cannot be blocked. The reactor wi7I trip when the source range high flux trip setpolnt Is reached. In the second case. three power range nuclear instruments will be fai7ed Iow such that the P-10 interlock cannot be satisfied and the Intermediate range high flux trip and the power range low high flux trip cannot be blocked. The power range low flux trip willbe inoperable with 3 power range detectors foi7ed Iow. The reactor should trip at about 25% by intermediate range high flux. Il is notintended to test the ability of the simulator to perform a startup with this test. The Normal Plant Evolution series of test willperform that function.

OPTIONS Any three of the four power range instruments may fai7ed low In run 2.

INI11AL CONDIPONS FINAL CONDmONS Case 1: Hot shutdown, any time In life. F$ant at hot shutdown after source range high flux trip.

Case 2: Approximately 20K power during startup, any time in life. Plant at hot shutdown after intermediate range high flux trip.

APPROVED FOR USE Lc. DAIEr DAIEi / a SIMULATORENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

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NUCLEAR INSlRUMENTATIONFAILURE DURING STARTUP: MRX-003 Ba SIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert evaluation of plant response with the nuclear instrumentation failures inserted.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS RUN 1 The reactor was went critical on the shutdown banks due to the low boron concentration As expected, the reactor tripped af 10'PS on the source range instruments. No problems were encountered.

RUN 2 Reactor power was raised using rods along with the maximum dilution rate possible with three letdown orifices in service. As expected, the reactor tripped on intermediate range high flux at 25% power. No problems were encountered.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPllONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM SIMULAllONCONFIGURA llON REVIEW BOARD DAlE ~> /f 7O

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TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLE: STUCK CONTROL ROD NUMBER: MRX~

ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 3.1.2 (1$ Confrol Rod Failure Including Stuck Rods, Uncoupled Rods, DrNIng Rods, Rod Drops, and Misaligned Rods DESCRIPTION This test wiN demonstrate the simulator's ability to correctly model the plant parameters which would be evident when one control rod sticks in one position and becomes mfsafgned from its group. The test will be run from two different power levels, one which w17I require a power reduction and one which wiN not. Both tests wi7I be run from frv'tial conditions shot during Ihe power escalation test. NPE~. In both cases. the plant Off Normal Operating Procedure will be used.

OPTIONS The simulator will support sticking any rod in any position A rod should be chosen so that it will have a fairly significant effect on nuclear inslrumentation when the test is run.

INITIAL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS For run one. the initial power will be 30% during a power The test will be terminated when the team has determined Ihe response of escalation. the nuclear instruments to the sfuck rod.

For run two, the initial power will be 75% during a power escalation.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE:~~< 9D DATE: ~fD.-

SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE: /8 ~C>

DATE:

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STUCK CONNOL ROD: MRX-004 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of nuclear instrument and annunciator response.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS RUN I: POWER ESCAlATION FROM 35%

The team recalled IC-21 for about 35% power and implemented the malfunction to stick rod HA fin D ban@I in its current position. This rod is positioned symmetrically between power range channels N<I and N43. Next, a power escalation was begun. D bonk started at 80 steps. When D bank was at 92 steps, annunciator G-9-2 (rod deviation) was received. The IRPI indications confirmed the problem. The team stopped the ramp and performed Off-normal operating procedure 3-ONOPMB. I for RCC misalignment. At the reduced power level. the ONOP basically has the team maintain power less than 75%,

perform notifications. and have engineering confirm the stuck rod. At this point. the team restarted the power escalation to insure that the nuclear instruments would eventually alarm in response to a flux tilt. When the alarm B~ (Power range channel deviation) was received, Ihe team stopped Ihe test. This occurred with the rest of D bark at 160 steps. Power range channel indications confirmed the alarm as N<I and N43 gradually diverged from NA2 and NM. The only possible deficiency is that the power ranges should have shown the flux deviation sooner. A Deficiency Report is outstanding to investigate this problem.

RUN 2: POWER ESCAlATION FROM 75%

The team recalled IC-16 for 75% power and implemented the malfunction to stick rod H4 again. D bank was initially at 210 steps. The power escalation was begun, but with the rods already out so close to the top,. the team did not expect the flux deviation alarm. When the rest of D bank reached 222 steps.

however, the rod deviation alarm (G-9-2I was received. At this point, the team implemented Ihe ONOP again. but this time the ONOP required the team to reduce power to less than 75%. Ihs was done. and power and rod positions were reduced far enough to insure that the rod deviation alarm was received with D bank 12 steps below the stuck rod. The rod deviation alarm was received as expected. No other deficiencies were noted.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES Flux deviation between the nuclear instrument channels did not respond as soon as expected to the rod misalignment.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUIATO C FIGU ION REVIEW BOARD DATE:

DATE: ~L~9 DATE: ogre C.

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEi UNCOUPLED CONTROL ROD TEST NUMBER: MRX~

ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSr 8. 14 08 CONTROL ROD FAILURE INCLUDING STUCK RODS, UNCOUPLED RODS, DRIFTING RODS, ROD DROPS, AND MlSAVGNED RODS DES CRIPllON This test wiN verify proper simulator response to a rod which drops due to a broken shaft. Since the drive shaft extension will be unaffected. there wi7I be no rod position runback. Also, since the nuclear Inshument runback ls normally disable, no runback will occur. lhere wi7l be no operator action taken in this test, only indications and automatic responses wN be checked. Other tests check the ability of the operators to diagnose and recover from a.

dropped rod.

OPllONS Any rod may be uncoupled ln the simulator. A rod should be used which will have a fairly sign@cant effect on nuclear instrumentation indications.

INmAL CONDlllONS RNAL CONDmONS 100% power. steady state. Plant stable after the rod has dropped.

APPROVED FOR USE TES 1'EAM SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE ~i- ~

DAlE Page 1 W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W

UNCOUPLED CONlROL ROD TEST: MRX~

BASIS FOR EVALUAllON

&pert Evaluation - The control room indications, overall response, and specific relevent parameters wiN be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS The test was run from 193% power with the rod H4. which Ls ln D bank. dropping to the bottom via the uncoupled malfunction. This rod ls positioned symmetrically between power range channels hM I and hM3. The dropped rod did not cause a turbine runback since the NIS runback function Ls defeated in the s&nulator as in the plant, and the IRPI does not change when the rod drops due to uncoupling. Channels hM I and N<3 did show a lower final power than N42 and NM as expected. In addition, their delta flux was less negative than the other channels. The rest of the plant responded to the transient as eyed:ted. No deficiencies were noted.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPllONS. TO ANS 8.5 EVALUAllONlEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURAllON REVIEW BOARD DATEr @ ~- to DAlE:

DATEi DATEi ~

C-'(-qJ

ATE:

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERTIFICA11ON TEST PROCEDURE mLEr DROPPED CONTROL ROD NUMBER MRX-006 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECT7ONSr 3.1.2 (121 Control Rod Failures Including Stuck, Uncoupled, Misaligned, and Dropped Rods DESCRIPTION The full length control rod from Bark C at location M Is assumed to experience a fai7ure of unspecified origin. causingit to dropinto the core. The transient is initiated hom IOOX power at the beginning of cycle and with equilibrium xenon. Allcontrol systems are in automatic and no additional malfunclions areincluded.

Upon indication of the dropped rod, the turbine wi7irunback to approximately 70X power. It willbe assumed that the problem is located immediately and that a recovery of the dropped rod is performed. The test is complete when the rod has been restored to its original posilion and the plant Is stable.

There are basicaliy two phases in this transient: the runback transient due to the rod drop. and second. the conduct of Ihe rod recovery procedure. The rod recovery poNon of the test wiIIbe performed from the control panels using 3&NOP42B.3. Dropped RCC. The transient response of the second phase of the test Is not parlicularly significant. whereas. the performance of various discrete logic, lights, switches. and Ihe kke Is important.

OP11ONS The simulator is capable of s/mutating a variety of fai7ures that would result in any, as well as any number, of the d5 control and shutdown control rod drive mechanisms to fail.

INITIALCONDmONS FlhfAL CONDI17ONS IOOX power steady state, beginning of core li(e, equi7ibrtum xenon Rod recovery procedure complete. Off Normol Procedures have been exited, and the plant tending toward a steady state.

APPROVED FOR USE DAIR r DAlE: ~ I SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE: /

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DROPPED CONTROL ROD: MRX~6 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert Evaluation - The control room indications, overall response, and specific relevant parameters w ll be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The overall trends and magnitudes of the transient results are as expected and meet the guidelines of ANS 3.5. The specific responses during the rod recove~

procedure were proper and the procedure was completed as intended.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM SIMUIATIONCONFIGURATION REVIBYBOARD 9<~

DATE: Bi Q DAlE:

DAlE: / DAIE:~&-(0 DAlE:

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERTIFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: DROPPED ROD lYITHINABILITYTO DRIVE CONlROL RODS NUMBER: MRX-007 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2 (12) Control Rod Failures Including Stuck, Uncoupled, Misaligned, and Dropped Rods 3.1.2 (13) Inability to Drive Control Rods DESCRIPTION ibis test willsimulate a dropped rod with all other rods stuck fullout. lhe stuck rods willbe simulated by placing the rod control switchin manual and not allowing manual control dunng the test. The plant wi7l be stabilized using boration alone in accordance with Off Normal Operating Procedures.

OPTIONS Any rod may be dropped, but the most Information weal be gathered by dropping an asymmetric rod so that the nuclear instruments willshow some flux tilt.

INITIALCONDmONS FINAL CONDITIONS 100% power. steady stale, rods in manual. Plant stable at about 70% power after Ihe dropped rod runback.

APPROVED FOR USE DAlE. I /b PO DAlE:

SIMULATORENGINEERING COORDINATOR

&M DAIK ~14/

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DROPPED ROD WITH INABIVTYTO DRIVE CONTROL RODS: MRX-007 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of overall plant response, simulator operabi7ity. and the response of selected parameters.

Comparison with actual plant data for flux tilt calculations.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS Ihe plant responded as expected by the team. The turbine ran back to 70K in response to the NIS and RPI dropped rod signals. 7he nuclear instruments clearty showed which quaChant the dropped rod was in and confirmed the RPI rod botton bistabte Indication. The steam dumps openedin response to the runback and minimized the load rejection effects. Then the steam dumps slowl'y modulated shut over the next 200seconds to bring power down below 76% and temperature back to reference temperature. The feed regulating valves were a little sluggish in responding to the reduction in steam liow. so the team placed them in manual unti7 the plant had stabi7ized and they were able to control betterin automatic, This Is a fairly standard operator action on a runbaC. 7he team had no trouble controlling the transient.

7he calculated flux tilt for this run was 4.7% which agrees favorably with the flux tilt received in the plant for a drop of rod K4 on August 20, 7585. 7hat plant event resulted in a flux tilt of 5. I% for a rod which was relatively close to the one dropped in this simulator test.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDIIIONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUA77ON TEAM SIMULA77ON C NFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DAlE: ~o~~ DATE:

DAK:i~3Zc 4cf DAD ~s'2 DATEi nAra~s o-Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: FUEL CLADDINGFAILURE RESULllNG IN HIGH REACTOR COOlANTACTIVITY NUMBER: MRX~

ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 8.1.2 (14) Fuel Ckrdding Failure Resulting In High ActivityIn Reactor Coolant and lhe Associated High Radiation Akrrms DESCRIPllON This test will consist of a small fuel cladding fai7ure followed by a small RCS leak The test wI verify that the proper activity responseis seenin the RCS, letdown and in the containment building.

OPllONS lhe ckrdding fai7ure size and the size of the RCS leak can vary from extremely small to full failures. Small failures should be used in order to check the response of the systems in a reasonable manner.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDlllONS IOOX power, steady state. The test will terminate when the test team has venfied lhe response of the simulator to the event. (About 20 minutes expected)

APPROVED FOR USE SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR oars'AIE: DAlE

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FUEL CLADDINGFAILURE RESULllNG IN HIGH REACTOR COOLANT ACTIVITy: MRX-008 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert evalualion of RCS and containment radiation level responses.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The test went as planned with no problems noted. The fuel failure caused PCS activity to increase, and when the leak was Initiated, containment activities increased as expected. The leak was set to .00001 which coorsponds to about a 3 gallon per minute leak rate. The appropriate racfiation alarms were received also.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMULATIONCONFIGURAllONREVIElYBOARD DAK~C DATE:~CQ~

ozrs~+PO DAK: ~45 DAlE: DA% ~I-Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITlE: MANUALREACTOR TRIP FROM INK POSER NUMBER: MRX-009 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 3.1.2(19) Reactor Trip B2.2(1) Manual Reactor Trip DESCRIPTION In this test the simulator will be manually tripped from the control room floor. Since this is an Ah5 Appendix B test, no operator actions will be taken after the reactor has been tripped. Additionally. specified parameters wN be monitored at .0 second intervals. Because no manual actions are to be taken the reactor trip recovery procedure willnot be used. Also, because no manual actions are token. the simulator will cool down more than the plant would post trip. For a test Involving the use of reactor trip recovery procedures along with normal post trip actions see NPE-CM OPllONS This test can be performed at BOL, MOL Oil EOL INITIAL CONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS MOL, steady state at IM% power This test will run for 15 minutes after Ihe reactor trips.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE DA TE: ~+~+4 SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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MANUALREACTOR TRIP FROM 100K POWER: MRX-009 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert Evaluation - 1he control room Incfications. overall response. and specific relevant parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The test went well. 1he reactor was manually tripped from the bench console 'and the first out tile for manual reactor trip flashed red. All other alarms.

interactions, and indications on the control room floor were appropriate for this exercise. The plots all show reasonable trends. Pressurizer pressure quickly drops to I %0 psia due to the shrink caused by the RCS cooldown. After the cooldown has stopped and backup heaters are energized the pressurizer pressure recovers. Pressurizer level drops, but stays above 20% for the short term as the single charging pump increases in speed. With the long term cooldown.

however, pressurizer level does go below 20K, Pressurizer temperatures follow saturation, but the liquid space does go Nightly subcooled on an insurge. Steam generator narrow range levels promptly shrink to less than 15%, causing AFW to actuate. After the initial steam generator pressure increase and with the AFW actuation. steam generator levels begin to recover.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDI11ONS None DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUA11ON TEAM SIMULATOR CONRGURATION REVIEW BOARD

~

DATE rB A DATEi I'r <~ >>

DATE ~l DATE @II 0 DATE: DATE: ~l'-4&9J Page 2

TURKEy POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllONTEST PROCEDURE llTLE: MAINSTEAM LINE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT NUMBER: MSG-00l ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSr 8.1.2L20) MAINSTEAM ONE AS WELL AS MAINFEED LINE BREAKS (BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENI)

B22 lP) MAXIMUMSIZE UNISOLABLEMAINSTEAM VNE RUPTURE DESCRIPllON ibis steam line break transient wiN be compared to a best estimate analysis using the Turkey Point RElRAN model. As such the lest is not intended to use the EOPs covering this type of transient. However. the operator action to turn off Ihe RC pumps on Iow subcooiing margin and isolation of AAVto the affected steam generator was programmed into the scenario. No other operator actions were taken during the course of the event. and several assumptions were made to make the Simulator and the RETRANmodeiconsistent. Since the RETRAN model does notinciude charging and letdown models or accumulators, these paths wereisolated in the Simulator. Ailother control systems werein automatic. Two tests were performed. the first with the RC pumps being turned offat the appropriate time. and a second with the RC pumps left operating throughout the transient. A steam line break equivalent to the area of the flowrestrictor at the steam generator outlet is assumed to occur in the B steam line inside containment.

OPllONS lhe simulator Is capable of simulating steam Ene breaks of any size at several locations inside containment.

INITIALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS 100K Power Steady State, BOL, Equi7ibrium Xenon The transient is analyzed for approximately 10 minutes. The affected steam generator is completely depressurize, the primary system cooidownis very slow, and the upper head void has been collapsed.

APPROVED FOR USE OATE:1 /V ~ DATEi ~ ~~ ~G SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

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MAINSTEAM ONE BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MSG-001 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Best Estimate Analysis - The Simulator results willbe compared to a Turkey Point RETRAN model.

Expert Evaluation - The control room indications. overall response. and specific relevant parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The overall response and control room indications were as expected. The response of the affected loop cold leg in the anginal RETRAN 'pumps off'case showed a greater cootdown and different trend than the Simulator near the end of the cooldown period. Subsequent study of the Simulator did not identify problems that would Indicate that the trend was anomalous. 1he test was again discussed with the SCRB and it was concluded that additional studies with RETRAN should be performed to attempt to pourpoint the basis forthe differences. The subsequent RETRAN analyses have shown that amount of liquid leftin the steam generator when the pumps are turned off at 100 seconds fs the source of the difference. Two RETRAN runs. one that dried out the steam generator sfightly before the pumps were turned off and a second that still had liquidin the steam generator when the pumps were turned offprovided the required clue to the difference in trends. Both of the trends are equally physical depending on the extent of dryout at the time when the RC pumps are turned off. The dryout point depends on the initialsteam generator mass and the amount of liquid carried out the break. Neither of the RETRAN runs in the fest fi7e represent a completely consistent comparison, but the differences are understood and demonstrate that the Simulator behavior is consistent with the physical processes occurring and are in the proper range.

The 'pumps on'ase was performed as a sensitivity study to examine the general response and the ability of the Simulator pump models to handle this situation.

Normal plant procedures prevent operation in this mode. The overall agreement between the Simulator and RETRAN modelsis good and the trends and magnitudes of the change are consistent with the physical processes occurring.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES None

'XCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATIONTEAM SIM LATOR FIGURA77ON REVIEW BOARD TE1 DATE: /

DATE: S 7 0 DATE: I X 0 DATE:

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TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE llTLE: MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT NUMBER: MSG-002 ANS L5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 8.1.2 I20) MAIN STEAM LINE AS WELL AS MAIN FEED LINE BREAK NOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT)

DESCRIPTION ibis test will simulate a main steam fine break which is isolable and occurs outside the containment structure. Operator action will be taken to trip the reactor coolant pumps if the trip criteria of the emergency procedures is met. The simulator response will be analyzed to insure that applicable parameters trend in the correct direction, that the parameters do not obtain unreasonable values or violate the laws of nature.

OPTIONS There are several locations in the main steam system outside containment at which a leak may be initiated. In addition. any leak is variable in size from very small to a full pipe rupture.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS IMX power, MOL, steady state. Plant stable at hot standby.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM

~ <c'o DATE: ) ~s SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

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MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OUTSIDE CONTAINMENTs MSG I BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert Evaluation - lhe confrol room indications, overall response, and specific relevent parameters wi7I be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS For ths test, a leak wos initiated in the main steam header. outside containment. The leak initially caused increased steam flow. decreased sfeam generator pressures. falling reoctor coolant system femperature and an increase reactor power due to the moderator temperature decrease. The decrease in PCS cold leg temperature caused an increase in reocfor power, ond led to a high flue.'rip. Shortly thereafter, within seconds. the OPdT trip setpoint was reached also.

The reactor trip caused a turbine trip which momentarify caused an increase in main steam header and steam generator pressures. Shohly fhereaffer, however. RCS temperature reached the low setpolnt which combined with the high steam flow out the break to give a safety injection signal. This signal also shut the main steam isolation valves, thereby teminating the occident as the remairing steam in fhe main steam header quickly bled out the leak. All parameters responded as ected and no deficiencies were noted.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVALUAllON TEAM SIMULATOR CONFfGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~F3 '7 D DATE:

DATE: J~ DATE: P/ EED DAlE: DATE: ~TT Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: SIMULTANEOUS CLOSURE OF ALL MSIVs NUMBER: MSG-ON ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: B2.2fS) SIMULTANEOUS CLOSURE OF ALL MSIVs DESCRIPTION This test examines the Simulator response to the simultaneous closure of all of the main steam line isolation valves. Two cases were studied: one with the control rods in automatic. and a second with the control rods in manual. Per ANS;1.5 Appendix B, no followup operator actions were taken OPllONS N/A INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS IOOX power steady state. beginning of core life. equi7ibrtum The transient Is analyzed for approximately 15 minutes. By this time. the xenon system is trending toward a hot shutdown condition The lack of followup actions resets in some fairly non-standard level conditions in the steam generators.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lEAM DATE. ~ j~ t<

SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR Page 1

SIMULTANEOUS CLOSURE OF ALL MSIVs: MSG~

BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert Evaluation - The control room indications. overall response. and specific relevant parameters wi7I be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS physical The overall response and control room indications were as expected. The results were consistent with the processes involved.

With the control rods in manual, the reactor scrammed on overtemperature della-T at approximately 20 seconds. The action of the atmospheric dumps and the safety valves reduced the pressure to a normal range and the post trip transient was typical.

However. with the control rods In automatic the rods began moving almost immediately and, allhough it was quite close, managed to keep the delta-T from touching the overtemperature delta-T setpoint. Since the reference temperature dropped to 547 degF very shortly after the MSIVs closed.

the rods kept on driving until the average temperature went below setpolnt. The shrink due to the secondary pressurization caused the feedwater controller to respond lethargically to the decreasing steam liow, thus filling the generators to the high level trip setpoint for the main feed pumps.

This activated the AFW system which continued to cool and hll the system.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS L5 EVALUATIONTEAM S MUIATOR FIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATF.~ l 3'R DATEi DAK ~~/ Cl DAlE: 9 / I DATE: a~ra ~i/9.

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TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEt TRANSMITTER FAILURE RESULllNG IN MAXIMUMATMOSPHERIC DUMP DEMAND NUMBER: MSG~

ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 8.1.2I20) MAINSTEAM LINE AS WEll AS MAINFEED LINE BREAKS (BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENI)

S.1.2(25 PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION,AIARM,AND CONTROL SYSlEM FAILURES

'DESCRIPllON ibis test examines the response of the simulator to a transmitter failure that results in a maximum demand to one of the atmospheric steam dump valves. The atmospheric dump valve opens fully and remains open for the duration of the transient. The dump flow rateis small relative to the total steam demand. Hence, it is a fairlymI7d fransient and the system comes to a new steady state at Ihe higher steam load without operator intervention.

Two cases were examined, one at BOL and a second at EOL OPTIONS lhe simulator is capable of simulatinginstrument. transmitter, and controller faI7ures of different types and varying degrees for each of the atmospheric dump valves.

INlllALCONDmONS FINAL CONDlllONS Run 1: IK6'ower steady state. BOL, equilibrium xenon lhe transient is analyzed for approximately 10 minutes. At that time the primary Run 2: IODX power steady state. EOL, equilibrium xenon system has adjusted to the additional heat load and all system parameters are steady.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DAIE:~+~ l D SIMU TOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

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TRANSMITTER FAILURE RESULTING IN MAXIMUMATMOSPHERIC DUMP DEMAND: MSG-004 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert Evaluation - The control room indications. overall response, and specific relevant parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The overall response and control room indications were os expected. Because the atmospheric dump valve capacity is small relative to the fullpower steam toad. the changes in system parameters is quite small. The additional steam demand caused by the stuck open valve on the A steam generator, results in a drop in pressurein the steam header ond each steam generator. During the transient the primary average temperature decreases slighllyond reactor power increases to provide the odditionol load. The difference in response for the BOL and EOL cases was consistent with expectations. The decrease ln primary average temperature is slightly larger in BOL case.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES None, EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUATIONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIElVBOARD DATE:

DATE: ~ B 70 DATE:

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TURKEy POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICATION TEST PROCEDURE llTLEr FAILURE OF REFERENCE lEMPERATURE TO SlEAM DUMPS NUMBER: MSG-005 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 3.1.2 g8 Process Instrumentation, Alarms, and Control System Failures DES CRIPllON This test wN check the response of the simulator to a loss of feed pump runback in which the turbine first stage impulse pressure channel which supplies the reference temperature circuit Is failed low. This wi7I keep the steam dumps open on the runback and will cause automatic rod insertion to bring average temperature down to 547 degrees. The test will run until the plant is stable at 547 degrees but is still on line at about 6C% indicated power, the power which normally terminates a runback due to the loss of a main feed pump.

OP17ONS Several methods for fai7ing the reference channel are available. The octuol fai7ure method is not cntical so long as the reference channel fai7s Iow. Also, several runback signals ore avai7able. ony may be used.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS 75% power, oll systems in automatic. Plant stable after the runback APPROVED FOR USE lEST TEAM Lc.

SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAK ~F DAK ~~i/- ~

DAlE:

DATE:

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FAILURE OF REFERENCE TEMPERATURE TO STEAM DUMPS: MSG-005 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert evaluation of overall plant response and the response of selected parameters.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The simulator responded as ected. The trip of the feed pump caused the initiation of a runback which should stop at 60K power. The runback did stop ot 60% power as based on channel 4 impulse pressure. but because channel 3 was fo17ed low. the dumps stayed open and the rods continued to drive in to reduce averoge temperature to 547 degrees. As shown by the plots, thfs is what happened. Actual generator megawatts stobi7ized at a level well below 60% power since the reduction in average temperature caused an abnormally Iow steam pressure.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDI77ONS DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUlATOR CONRGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: 0 /0 DAlE: DAlE:

DATE: DAIR ~4 Poge 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TllIEr CLOSURE OF A SINGLE MSIV AT SEVERAL DIFFERENT POSER LEVELS NUMBER: MSG-006 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: S.1.205 Process Instrumentation, Alarm, and Control System Failures DESCRIPTION This series of tests will examine the simulator's response to the closure at different power levels of one of the three main steam isolation valves (MSIV's). The tests will be run at 10I7y; 75. and J0% power. The test wIN be run at three different power levels in order to insure a good range of conditions for checking the simulator's dynamic response. The 75% and 80% power levels were chosen because they correspond to hokt points during the power ascension and snapshots have been stored for these power levels. Several parameters wNI be monitored, recorded. and plotted in order to compare simulator results with expected plant results.

OPTIONS Any or aN of the three MSIV's can be fai7ed dosed by a variety of mechanisms. This test can be performed at any power level.

INITIAL CONDmONS FINAL CONDmONS IRK. 75%. and 80% power. Each test will run for 15 minutes after closure of the A MSlV.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATE: DATE:

SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

DATE:

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CLOSURE OF A SINGLE MS/V AT SEVERAL DIFFERENT POWER LEVELS: MSG-006 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert examination The control room indications. overall response. and specific relevant parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS All three runs went well with no noticeable inc/dents that wou/d have a negative impact on training. The trends were analyzed and oil seem reasonable and the control room indicat/ons ond alarms were appropriate in all three tests. The first alarm in all cases was A feed flow > A steam flow, followed closely by numerous others. A S/G would shrink and B and C would swell, the magnituide of which depended on the starting power level. From INK power the shrink resulted in a tnp, ond OTDT just barely missed also causing one. An automatic runback was initiated on this run also. but the effects were minimal and it could not prevent a trip. A S/G pressure was limited by the actuation of the appropriate atmospheric dump and steam line safety va/ves. At IXI,power these valves opened before the trip and shut shortly thereafter. At 75% these valves opened and stayed open. At 3/7// only the atmospheric dump valve opened. The FRV's were in automatic in all cases and before the end of the 75K and 3/K runs, main feedwater flow was balanced with steam flow in order to maintain steam generator levels on program. In the /OC% run AFW actuated after the reactor tripped. In the two higher power runs pressurizer spray actuoted to limit the pressure increose. In the 30% run the pressure increase was not enough to cause spray to actuate. After the plant tripped from /MX power and the RCS delta T's approached a minimal value. the conditions in all three loops were approx/mately equal. In the 3/7// run and. especially. in the 75% run, the delta T's changed drastically and A loop differed significantly from B and C loops. All differences were analyzed and were appropriate.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS None DEFICIENCIES In the K% iun, when feedwater flow wos resumed to A S/G after having been isolated for obout 10 minutes, the feedwater temperature dropped about 20F instead of increasing to B and C feedwater temperatures. A DR will be submitted against this.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMULATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD oars ~YP/ DATE / 9o DAlE: ~ ~4 ~ DATEi /0-tl-'lo DAlE: oAra ~iO Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE llTIEi BUS STRIPPING AND LOAD SEQUENCING TESTS NUMBER MSP001 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONSr S.1.2 fS) Loss or Degraded Power to the Station DES CRIPHON lhe bus stripping and load sequenahg tests are designed to verify proper operation of the undervoltage bus stripping circuits. bus clearing relays. and the load sequencer. The test will check for proper load handling, time delays, and operation under failure of the power supply circuits.

OPllONS There Is an infinite number of combinations of time delays and failures which could be run to check this system. The fifteen different cases wilt be run in order to provide a variety of data points for this test.

INllIALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS Hot Standby, any time in life, normal electric plant lineup Eoch test will be run for approximatety 2-2 I/2 minutes to allow time for the with all normal loads running. sequencers to time out.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TFAM DATE 9o DAffi~W SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

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BUS STRIPPING AND LOAD SEQUENCING TESTS: MSP-001 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON The results of each run will be compared with the plant drawings to verify that the loads tripped and started as designed.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS The test proved very successful wflb only 3 problems showing up in the hnoi runs. Fifteen different cases were run to test the load sequencing ond bus strippin circuits with only three deliciencies being generated. One of these deMencies was not related to the sequencer or the bus stripping circuits.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES Breakers 30107 (Pressurfzer bockup heaters) and 303 12 gurbine aux8ety lube oil pump) foi7ed to trip and lockout on the loss of power events as they should.

The containment spray pumps started, but then tripped on overcunent, then restarted and kept running on the loss of coolant combined with a loss of offsite power scenarios. De5ciency reports have been written on these three problems.

EXCEPTIONS TO Ah5 3.5 EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUIATOR CONRGURATION REVIEIV BOARD DATEr ~~g DATEr > <<Vu DATEr DAlE:

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DAlE: DATE: ~~Std 9- <<-90 Poge 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITLEt SMALL LEAK IN SAFEIY INJECllON PIPING OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT NUMBER: MSS401 ANS 5.5 REFERENCE SECllONSt 5.1.2(1)tb) Loss of Coolant Outside Primary Containment 5.1.2g5) Passive Malfunctions in Engineered Safety Features System DESCRIPllON The purpose of this test to verify proper simulator modelling with a leak on the safety injection system outside of the containment building. This test will consist of two runs. In the first run a leak willbe instated on the reactor coolant system. causing a safely injection. The leak wi7I cause part of the Sl flow to go the auxi7iary bui7ding sump. This malfunction will be camouflaged by the other actions and alarms inherent with an Sl. This test will run for twenty minutes.

In the second run two check valves will leakby. allowing flow from the RCS to the auxi7iary building sump as soon as the leak is placed on the Sl piping. 3-ONOPMI.3. Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage, will be used to isolate the leak and stabilize the simulator. Several parameters will be monitored and recorded in order to compare the simulator results with expected plant results.

OPllONS The safety injection piping leak size Is variable and so is the amount of check valve leakage. Leaks can be placed on the safety Injection piping in several locations.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS IQR power. RUN 1: This test wi7! run for twenty minutes, fifteen of wMch will be after the RCS break has been put in place.

RUN 2: The leak has been isolated and the simulator has been stabilized.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE: DA18 ~+%

DATE:

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SMALL LEAK IN SAFETY INJECTION PIPING OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT: MSS~l BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert Evaluaf ion - The control room indications. overall response, and specific relevant parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS lhe first run went well. Approxfmafely 180 gpm of Sl flow went to the auxiliary building basement, but due to other alarms and the break location, there wasnoindicationin thecontrolroomof the leak. It would besome timebeforethelossofSlmassshowed up. lhesecond run also went well. Indications.

alarms, and interactions were as expected. Pressurizer level and pressure fell rapidly. A second charging pump was started, letdown isolated, and a third pump started to slow the pressurizer level decrease. 7he VCT level also feN rapidly. a makeup was started and flowrates to the VCT were doubled to keep VCT level up. 7hfs only slowed the rate of decrease and the charging pump suction swopped to the RL4ST. This resulted in the inf'ection of borated water Into the RCS, which caused a drop in TAV. 7he leak was Isolated after the pressurfzer level dropped below 3(%. The pressurizer started refiNing, a charging pump was stopped and letdown returned to servfce. The VCT level recovered and charging pump suction returned to fhe VCT. Boron flow rate to the VCT was reduced to almost zero, resulting in TAV being less than l degree below setpoint at the end of the scenario. Yjrith pressurizer level almost at setpolnt a second charging pump was stopped. At the end of the simulation pressurizer level was increasing only slightly ond aN other parameters returned to normal.

lhe pressurizer level increase caused a pressure increase, actuating spray. lhe pressure was decreasing sflightly at Ihe end of fhe scenario and was under control. Manual valve 8NA had to be shut, isolating one train of safety inlection. But it enabled the opeiators fo place the plant in a stable condition OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS DEFICIENCIES There were not any auxifiary buikfing area monifor alarms or plant process monitor alarms during run 2.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 None EVALUAllONTEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURAllON REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~+ TEi a lb yO DAlE: 4 FO DATE: ~f DAlE: DATE: ~~" ~~

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE llllE: ACCUMUlATOR OPERAllONS AND MAIFUNCllONS NUMBER: MSS~2 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSt 3.1.2l28) Passive Moffunctfons lri Engineered Safety Features Systems DES CRIPllON This test w7I consist of two runs. In the first run the plant wm be in cold shutdown with the pressurizer drained. In the second run the plant willbe at operating temperature and pressure. In the first run the normal operating procedure 3~464, Safety Irjection Accumulators, willbe used for various routine operations on C accumulator. It wiN be manually drained to below the alarm setpoints for low pressure and low level, then lilfed to above the high pressure and high level alarm setpolnts, then vented to below the low pressure alarm setpofnt and drained to clear the high level alarm. Then nitrogen will be added to clear the low pressure alarm. Finally, alf three occumufator outlet valves will be manuo!Iy opened. The second run will be scenario driven The check vaNe for C safety injection accumulator outlet wiN be given a smalf leakby failure. then five minutes later the downstream check valve for the RHR/accumulator Interface with the RCS will be given a leakby failure, also. Several parameters wi7I be monitored and recorded in order to compare simulator resulls with expected results.

OPllONS The sofety fnjechon accumulators are fullymodeled and the routine operations con be performed on any or oif of them. The check valve out of either safety Injection accumulator can be foi7ed and the size of the leak is variable. The same holds for the check vafves Into the RCS.

INITIALCONDmONS RNAL CONDmONS Run 1: Cold shutdown wfth a droined pressurizer. Run 1: This test will end 10 mfnutes after the accumulator outlet valves have been opened.

Run 2: 100% power, normal operating temperature and pressure. Run 2: Thfs test will run for 10 minutes.

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ACCUMUIATOR OPERAllONS AND MAIFUNCllONS: MSS-002 BASIS FOR EVAIUATION Expert examination DISCUSSION OF TEST RESUITS The first run went well. The procedure ~PO64 worked on the simulator. the accumulator level and pressure responded property to changes and fhe associated alarms come In at the proper setpolnfs. As C accumulator was drained, its pressure also come down. When it was filled, the pressure went up.

Venting the occumulator dropped the pressure. Adding nitrogen robed the pressure. When the accumulator outlet valves were opened oil three levels and pressures dropped, counts decreased, and the PCS temperatures decreased sfightly and held steady. VII and pressurizer level went to IIX%. The RCS pressure equalized with occumulafor pressure around 297 p+ ond then both steodiiy decreased to atmosphen'c pressure due to the vent soienolds being Ened up to containment atmosphere. The second run did not go quite as weN. With the first check valve fai7ure the C occumulotor level ond pressure Increosed. There was no fiowpoth into the accumulator at this point and level and pressure should have held steady. With the second check valve failure the pressurizer pressure ond level started decreasing. Thb was rapid enough to cause a plant tnp and eventually an Sl. The A and B occumulator levels did not Increase during either check valve failure, but the pressures did. The A and B pressures started a.5 pound oscillation about.2 minutes into fun 2, increased obout 1 pound after the second check valve fai7ure, dropped bock to the original values. then stahed a siow. steady increase. By the end of the fest they were obout 1.5 pounds higher thon at the start of the fest. Thb phenomena was due the leakoge hom C accumulator heating up the containmenf, which ln turned heated A and B accumulators, causing their pressures to increase.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES The C occumulator level increased with only one check valve failure.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVAIUAll N TEAM SIMUIATOR CONRGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: C7 DATE: ~/o 8 DATE.

DATE: Omar~<- <- 9 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEs LOSS OF RHR WHILE IN COLD SHUTDONN NUMBER: MSS4N ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECQONSs 3. 14 I7) Loss of Shutdown Cooling DES CRIPllON lhfs test weal sfmulate a loss of RHR coofng by tripping both RHR pumps with the plant in cold shutdown and partially drained. The case of CCW Isolation to the RHR heat exchangers wS be checked In the test of loss of CCW.

OPllONS Various options exfst in the simulator to cause the RHR pumps to trip. lhe actual mefhod used is irrelevant in this test.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDlllONS CSD, 149 F. plant in partial drain. Core at saturation conditions at near atmosphen'c pressure.

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I.OSS OF SIIUTDOWN COOUNG: MS'S-ON BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert evaluation of plant response to the loss of shutdown cooling condition DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The test was initiated by tripping both RHR pumps while the plant was in cold shutdown and partial drain. This caused the core temperatures to begin rising immediately at a steady rate. Over the first M minutes, the core exit rose from 150 degrees to 200 degrees. The rise in temperature cause the RCS to expand and this was indicated in the reactor vessel plenum and on the RCS draindown level indicator. 1here expansion caused a minor effect on reactor vessel pressure. but the vents were open and the vessel stayed at near atmospheric. Despilte the two small problems wifh subcooling and core exit temperatures noted below, the test went satisfactorily and the scenario could be used for training on loss of RHR events.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDI11ONS DEFICIENCIES Two problems were noted. Iirst, the subcooling monitor registered zero subcooling while the core exit thermocouple was st8I at just 175 degrees. At atmospheric pressure. it should not be at zero suboooling until about 212 degrees. Second, the core exit thermocouple registered a temperature much greater than 212 degrees. With the unit at atmospheric pressure. temperature should not exceed 212 degrees. Discrepancies have been written to identify these problems.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVALUA11ON TEAM SIMUlATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DAK: ~/~l- o DATE:

DATEr Yir/e DATEr <

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TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERTIFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE 77TLEi LOSS OF INVENTORYDURING A SHUTDONN AND PARllAL DRAINDOWNCONDIllON NUMBER: MSS-004 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SECllONSi 3.1.2(ll Loss of Shutdown Cooling DESCRIPTION TMs test willbe performed with the reactor coolant system on residual heat removal cooling and in a partially drained condition. The RHR to letdown control vatve, HCV-145, and letdown pressure control valve. PC V- 145. willboth be fai7ed open. Flow wi7I be thereby be diverted from RHR to the waste holdup tanks. TMs wi8 have the effect of reducing RCS inventory with the plant already in a drained condition. The letdown pressure and ffowIndicators along with draindown level indication wi7I be failed as is. providing no apparent indication inside the control room that Inventory is being lost. After RCS level has dropped sufficiently to cause the RHR pumps to cavitate or bring in the Iow RHR flow alarm. off normal operating procedures 3&NOP450, Loss of RHR, and ONOP420B. 1, Malfunction of Residual Heat Removal System, will be entered to recover from thisincident. Basically, the RHR pumps wi7I be stopped, core exit temperatures wi71 be monitored. charging will be used to recover the lost RCS inventoiy, and an RHR pump willbe restarted.

OP17ONS Besides being failed open, HCV-142 and PCV-145 can be given a variable leakby signal.

INlllALCONDmONS FINAL CONDlllONS RHR Is in service and the RCS is partially drained. This test willrun until inventory has been restored sufficiently to allow restarling an RHR pump and RCS temperatures have been stabi7ized.

APPROVED FOR USE DAK: l~ ~ ~t+ DAK: <~/ ~N>

SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

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LOSS OF IAVENTORYDURING A SHUTDOWNAND PARTIAL DRAINDONVCONDlllON: MSS404 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert examination. lhe control room alarms, indications, and interactions willbe monitored and several parameters willbe recordedin order to compare simulator responses with expected responses.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS lhe plant responses were appropriate for this scenario. When RCS level dropped below nozzle level. RHR flow was lost and A RHR pump amps dropped appreciably.

RCS and core temperatures started to nse, but dropped when charging put more mass into the system. Plenum level. draindown level, and RCS mass all go down until charging is placed In service. When charging was stopped, level dropped unt8 the RHR to letdown control valve was shut. After level was restored, RCS and core temperatures responded to changes in RHR cooler liow. The plant procedures worked on the simulator to recover from this scenario.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 eVmUAnON TEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURATION Renal BOARD DAK: +>/s/+M DAIE: j DAlE DAlE LW 5 DAlE: DATE/4- -90 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON lEST PROCEDURE lllIE: 1VRBINE TRIP WHICH DOES NOT CAUSE REACTOR TRIP NUMBER: MlV-001 ANS 3.5 REFERENCE SEC llONS: 3.1.2(15) Turbine Trip Appendix B22(6) Turbine Trip (maximum power level which does not result in immediate reactor trip)

DESCRIPTION This test willinvolve a turbine trip from 35% power with the reactor tnp by turbine trip blocked to that the reactor does not trip. This will test the ability of the steam dumps and rods to handle a load rejection transient. In the actual plant configuration. any turbine trip above 10% power will cause a reactor trip. but in order to gather as much meaningful information as possible, this test will be run from a power level just below that which the steam dumps and rod control system could handle. Two cases wiii be run. In the first case, rods will be left in manual so that the reactor should stabilize near its power level. In the second case, the rods will be in automatic and should bring reactor power down to near zero percent.

OPTIONS For the loop variable monitoring requirements, any loop of the 3 may be recorded. but the same loop must be used for ail the variables. lhe turbine tnp can be caused by many different means. the simplest of which is to press the turbine trip buttons.

INITIAL CONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS Reactor at 35% power, MOL Run I: Plant stable with turbine off line and power at 35%.

Run 2: Plant stable with the turbine off the line and the reactor at or near zero power APPROVED MR USE TEST TEAM SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATEr ~ DAlE: ~~a DAK ~s++/C DATE:

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TURBINE TRIP WHICH DOES NOT CAUSE AUTOMAllCREACTOR TRI: MTU401 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert Evaluation - The control room indications. overall response, and specific re/event parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS RIN 1: ROD CONIOL IN MANUAL In this run. the total transient was controlled by the action of the condenser steam dumps. Shen the turbine is initial!y tripped, there is a rop/d decrease in steam flow and a corresponding rise In cold leg temperature. The turb/ne trip signol also sends a signal to the condenser dumps which causes them all to trip fully open The combined effect Is a small decrease in reactor power for the first twenty seconds of the transient, then a s/ow retuin to a power level near the /n/t/al value. Since there is no rod motion to decrease average temperature, the final RCS temperatures are slight/y higher than the initio/. Th/s leads to a slightly higher steam pressure with a corresponding lower final steam flow. But the overau effect is that reactor power steadies out near its Init/al value as would be expected. Pressurizer level ond pressure follow the changes in coolant temperature as woukf be expected.

KIN 2: ROD CONIPOL IN AUTOMATIC In this run, the combined oct/on of rods and dumps acted as expected to bring the reactor to a zero power condition after the turbine was tripped. As soon as the turbine ls tripped, the rods begin driving in and the steam dumps open /n order to reduce average temperature. The net effect is a controlled reduction of power. temperature and steam flow over the next 10 minutes to hot standby conditions.

'UT OF BOUNDS COND111ONS None DEFICIENCIES None .--

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 Appendix B to ANSI'.5 requires that a test be run where the turb/ne is tripped from the maximum power level which does not cause an automatic reactor trip. At Turkey Point, this power level /s IOL A turbine trip from /0% power level would be an extremely small transient and wouk/ provide very little certification data. Therefore, th/s test is being run from a power level just below that for wh/ch rod control and steam dumps are designed to provide a controlled stabi7ization of the plant.

EVALUATIONlKAM SIMUlATOR CONRGURATION REVIEW BOARD l aara ~Tr /fo DATEi ~ i'>

a~a ~S~ /<< >c'zre~&8 0

DATEi

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TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CER11FICA11ON TEST PROCEDURE TITLEs TVRBINE TRIP FROM 10K/ POWER NUMBER: MIV-002 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SEC11ONS: 8.1.2 (15) Turbine Trip DESCRIPTION This test will consist of a manual trip of the turbine from 100% power. Data will be collected per ANSI'.5.

OPTIONS Several different means of tripping the turbine are avai7able in the simulator. The simplest is to press the trip button from the console. 1he turbine trip should be performed with as ENe other system pertubations as possible.

INITIAL CONDI11ONS FINAL CONDITIONS 100% power, MOL, steady state. Plant steady state at hot standby.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATEs P << DATE:~rl /O SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR ozrE: ~<<

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TURBINE TRIP FROM 100% POWER: MTU~2 BASIS FOR EVALUA11ON Expert evaluation of overall plant response and the response of specific parameters.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The plant trip initiated by the turbine trip went as expected. Reactor power. temperature and pressure all responded as expected and no deficiencies were noted. All control systems acted as expected to bring the unit to hot standby.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDlllONS None DEFICIENCIES-EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 Since the manual turbine trip wi7I Instantly generate a reactor trip from IR% power, this test will be used to satisfy the requirements of Appendix B section 2.2(l) for the reactor trip from IK6l power.

EVALUATIONTEAM SIMULATOR CONHGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: DATE. /9 Po DATE: ~~II>+P DATEi (o -l3" to DATE:

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TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE 7ITIEi 1VRBINE lUBE OIL SYSTEM (BEARINGS)

NUMBER MIV ~

Ah5 5.S REFERENCE SECllOh5s 5.1.1 Normat Pfant Evolutions 5.1.2 Pkint Malfunctions DES CRIPllON This test is designed to exercise the normal controls for that portion of the turbine lube oil system which supplies the main turbine and generator bearings.

In addition. this test wiN exercise some of the available malfunctions for the system to insure proper simulator modelNing. In one run the control valve for TPCW hom the tube oi7 coolers (CV22M) willbe adjusted to two different positions to verify the effect that this has on turbine bearing drain temperalures. In another run the main oN pump shaft wi71 be sheared with the auxifiary oi7 pump (AOP) running and the turbine generator will be verified not to trip. The AOP will then be stopped and the turning gear oN pump (TGOP) w8 be verified to start at 10 psig bearing oi7 header and the emergency oi7 pump (EOP) wi71 be verified to start at 8 psig. Ilnaly. the oN cooler Inlet valve wiN be romped shut and simulator response wi7I be venhed. Several parameters wi71 be monitored and recorded In order to compare slmukitor responses to expected responses.

OPllOh5 CV2200 is fuNy adjustable and can be put at any position. lhe oN cooler inlet or outlet valve could be used to isolate oil to the bearing oi7 header and both are also fully adjustable. Although not used In this test, the main oil reservoir could be drained to get a response similar to ckeng the cooler illation valves.

WmAI. CONDmOh5 FINAL CONDmONS-IN% power. steady state. RUN 1: This test wi7I run for 10 minutes after CV2200 Is shut.

RUN 2: This test wiN run for 10 minutes after the lube oil cooler Inlet valve has been fully shut.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lEAM DATEi ~ j'~ ~+ odors g SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR

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DATE:

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TURBINE LUBE OIL SYSTEM CLEARINGS): MTV-003 BASIS FOR EVALUATION Expert examination. The control room atoms, Indications. and interactions will be moritored and several parameters will be recorded in order to compare simulator responses with expected responses.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS RUN I: ADJUSTMENT OF CV2200. In this run aN control room indications were as expected. The first change to CV-2200 opened it further than it had been Bearing drain temperatures decreased sNghtly. The second change to CV-2200 shut the valve. Quite shortly thereafter alarms E/2/2. turbine bearing high temp.

and E/4/3. turbine tube oN high temp, came In Recorder RQMO. turbine tube oi7 temperatures. and R44d5, turbine thrust bearing temperature indicated a steady Increase in temperature. There was an Immediate Increase of temperature out of the lube oi7 cooler of about l(F. foNowed by a slow, steady climb.

RUN 2: TEST OF LUBE OIL PUMPS. When the MOP shaft was sheared the turbine stayed on the line. but there was a sudden. slight drop in hydrauNc oi7 pressure. This perturbation was enough to cause arming of the steam dumps. YIthen the AOP was tripped the TGCP and the EOP cd start at the proper pressures. MOen the cooler Inlet valve was shut the bearing drain temperatures experienced an immediate temperature increase of about 200F then showed a gradual decrease back towards their original values. This seems proper. Turbine vibrations were not effected by a loss of oi7 pressure.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DEFICIENCIES Turbine vibrations were not effected by a loss of oi7 pressure. A DR has been submitted against this.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUA77ON 7KAM SIMUlATOR CONRSURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: DATEi DATE:

DATEi oars ~+O Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE llllE: TURBINE GLAND SEAL SYSTEM NUMBER: MTU-N4 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllOh5: S.1.1 Normal Plant Evolutions 8.1.2 Plant MaNuncflons DESCRIPTION This test wm venfy the simulator's modeINng of the system used to prevent steam from leaking out of the turbine glands and air from lealang info the turbines.

The test wiN consist of a normal control test which will check proper operation of the system control vafves. foNowed by a transient test which wi7I fai7 portions of the system to insure proper simulator response. The simulator will be Initialized at a Iow power level and power will be increased. The spillover valve will come open at 0 pslg in the gland seal header. Each gland exhaust fan wi7I be tumed off from the control room floor to verify proper control room annunciation and the gland exhaust condenser receiver drain pump will be turned off from the instructor's faci%ty and proper annunciation will again be ven'fied when the receiver level increases to the alarm point. The auxiliaiy steam supply to the gland steam system will be shut to verify that the turbines are self-sea Ning.

OPllONS INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS The simulator Is stable at 19K power. Gland sealing steam Is being The simulator Is at a higher power level with gland steam being provided by provided by auxiliary steam. the high pressure turbine and the spillover valve Is open or the simulator has been brough to IOC6'ower. The gland exhaust fans and the gland exhaust condenser receiver drain pump have been tested.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DATEs S/~ ~o DATEi SIMULATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

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TURBINE GLAND SEAL SYSTEM: MIU-004 BASIS FOR EVALUArlON Expert examination. The control room alarms, indications. and interactions will be monitored ond several parameters will be recorded in order to compare simulator responses with expected responses.

DISCUSSION OF rEST RESULTS When a gland exhauster is stopped the control room annunciation is correct. The drain pump, drain tank, and ossocioted alarm worked property. With the pump running at the end of the test the high level alarm had not cleared. but level was trending down. The turbines do not become self-seofing, even at IRK power. When the aue7iary steam Isolation to gland sealing steam was shut the gland seal header pressure dropped to a sfight vacuum.

oUT oF BoUNDs coNDlrloNs DEFICIENCIES The turbines do not become self~ling. even at IN% power. Mmn the auxiTiary steam fsotatfon to gland sealing steam wos shut the gland seal header pressure dropped to a sight vocuum. A DP has been wntten against this.

ExcEprloNs To ANs 8.5 EVALUArrON TEAM SIMUIAroR coNFIr URAnoN REviav BoARD ogre ~'8/~> DATE: ~

DATEr < DATE:

DATE: DATE: (-C-90 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE llllEi lURBINE TURNING SEAR OPERAllON NUMBER: M77I-005 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: J.1.1 Normof Plant Evolutions 8.1.2 Plant Malfunctions DES CRIPllON In this test the turbine wiN be tripped from IB00 rpm and the proper operation of the turning gear, turning gear oil pump, aue7iary oi7 pump. bearing fift oi7 pump, and system Interiocks ond setpofnts wiN be veriffed. With turbine speed at 500 ipm the auxiliary oil pump will be stopped and the turning gear oi7 pump will auto start. lhe turning gear will auto engage and start after the turbine reaches zero speed. The turning gear oil pump will be stopped, causing the bearing oi7 lift pump and the turning gear to auto stop. The emergency oil pump wi7I auto start ond the liff pump and turning gear will restart. The bearing lift oil pump will then be stopped and the turning gear will again stop. The bearing lift oi7 pump will be restarted and the turning gear will also restart. During aN of this the turning gear will remain engaged.

OPllONS lws test could be conducted from any power level with the turbine at 1800 re l.e., synchronized to the grid.

INITIAL CONDmONS FINAI. CONDmONS IQR power, turbine speed Is 1800 rpm. The turbine is on the turning gear.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lEAM rp / l DATE DATF SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

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TIIRBINE lURNING GEAR OPERATION: MTU~5 BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert examination The control room alarms, indications, and interactions will be monitored and several parameters will be recorded in order fo compare simulator responses with expected responses.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS Dun'ng the turbine coastdown the BOLP started at 6M rpm and the AOP starte'd slightly later when oil pressure dropped to 12 psig. Shen the AOP was stopped the TGOP started at 10 psig to maintain heoder pressure. Shen the TGOP wos stopped the BOLP stopped, the TG stopped but remained engaged, fhe EOP started. the BOLP then restarted when pressure had built bock to 9 psig and then the TG restarted. The TG did not restart immediatety, but waited a few seconds unN the BOLP had Increased its discharge to above 800 psfg. The TG stopped when the BOLP wos tripped ond remained idle until ofter the BOIP was restarted and ogain repressurfzed its header.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENClES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 None EVALUAllONlEAM SIMULATOR CONRGURAllON REVIEW BOARD DATE:

DAiF: 6 f'o DATE)

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TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERlIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE lllIEi HYDROGEN SEAL OIL NUMBER: Mm~

ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 8. l4 C25 PROCESS INSlRUMENTAllON, AIARMS, CONTROLS, AND CONTROL 5YSlEM FAILURES DES CRIPllON ibis test w8I exercise various malfunctions in the hydrogen seal oi7 system. Proper system response to the malfunctions will be venfied. Malfunctions will be run on the both the air side and the hydrogen side of the system.

OPllONS Various malfunctions are avai7abte in the simulator. Only a sample wi7I be tested with this test.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS IR% power, steady state Each run wiN be allowed to continue for 5 to IO minutes in order for the test team to verify system response.

APPROVED FOR USE lEST TEAM SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE. 4 / fo oars ~(

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HYDROGEN SEAL OIL MTU~

BASIS FOR EVALUAllON Expert Evaluation - lhe control room Indications, overall response, and specific re/event parameters wiN be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS RUN 1: FAILURE OF AIR SIDE SEAL OIL PUMP. AIR SIDE BACKUP PUMP AND BACKUP REGUtATOR In the first part of this run. the air side seal o8 pump was tripped. LSxe this happened, the backup regulator momentarily opened to supply air side seal oil hom the turbine lube oil system whi7e the backup pump wos starting. Shen the bockup pump began suppiyihg sufficient oi7 to the air side seal oil fines.

the backup regulator closed. Next, the backup olr side pump wos tripped. Shen this happened. the backup regulator opened to supply the air side as expected. No deficiencies were noted.

RUN 2: FAILURE OF V-217, V-210, AND HYD/2OGEN SIDE SEAL OIL PUMP All port/ons of this run went satisfacton7y. Valves V217 and V-210, the hydrogen side differential pressure regulators. were alternately fai7ed open and closed.

lhe system responded correctly to the valve failures with the other pressure regulating valves responding in the correct directions and the drain regulator and loop seal tanks'eve/s changing accordingly. The hydrogen seal oil pump was tripped and ogain. the pressure regulating valves and system tanks responded os expected.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS DERCIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUAllONTEAM CONRGURAllON REVIEW BOARD DAlE 6 ( ' >

DAlE'IMUIATOR ozrs ~~r. DATEr 7-lL <0 DAlE: /-I6- %0 PAGE 2

TURKEY POINT SIMULATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TITIEr HYDROGEN COOLING NUMBER: MTV-008 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: 8.1.2 g2l PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION, ALARMS, AND CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES DES CRIPllON This test wll exercise two representative matfunctions In the hydrogen cooling system and wBI verify proper simulator response to the malfunctions.

OPllONS Various malfunctions are avai7abie in the hydrogen cooling system. Representative malfunctions which exercise the system should be chosen.

INIllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS IN% power, steady state Each run w8Iproceed unN the test team can verify that proper response has occuned.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST TEAM DAm; SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DAlE:

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HYDROGEN COOLING: MTU~

BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert Evaluation - The control room Indications. overall response. and specific relevent parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS In the first part of the test, one of the generator RTDs was failed Hl. This caused the generator hi temperature and generator RTD recommend trip annunciators to alarm as eirpected. In the second part of the'est. a leak from the turbine pkint coofing system to the generator was created in one of the generator hydrogen coolers. This malfunctk/n caused the simulator variables for generator liquid level and generator liqukt level detectors to show increasing level and mass, but no alarm was received in the control room. A DR has been written on the kick of alarms in the control room.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES A deflclencY report was writlen on the failure of the alarm to annunciate on the high generator liquid level.

EXCEIETIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATION TEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DATE: ~fO DATE: DATE; ~)/4- 0 Page 2

TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TllIEt TURBINE LUBE OIL CONTROL AND AUTO-STOP OIL NUMBER: MlV~

ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONS: S.LR L2Zl PROCESS INSTRUMENTAllON, ALARMS, AND CONTROL SYSlEM FAILURES DESCRIPllON This test wi7I exercise various malfunctions in the turbine control oil and auto-stop oi7 sytems. Normal operation of these systems are thoroughiy checked in other certification tests such as piant startup and shutdown.

OPllONS Various malfunctions are avai7abie for these systems. Several representative malfunctions will be chosen to exercise the system faiiures.

INITIAL CONDmONS FINAL CONDmONS Any power level with the turbine on Bne. Hot standby.

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TURBINE LUBE OIL CONTROL AND AUTO-STOP OIL MlU~

BASIS FOR EVALUAl7ON

&pert Evaluation - The control room indications, overall response, and specific relevent parameters will be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS Overall, this test went as planned with no deficiencies noted. The failures to foi7 the rF2 stop valve 'as Is'orked as the valve did not close on turbine trip.

lhe foi7ure of oll manual and automatic trips of the turbine worked to keep the turbine from tripping on low vacuum and by the manual pushbutton. When the manual trip pushbutton wos pushed, however. the turbine did runback as the pushbutton olso causes the turbine overspeed protection control valve OPC-20 to open. The foi7ure of OPC-20 open caused a runback to NN megawatts os planned. When the fai7ure of all trips was removed. the turbine tripped as planned on low vocuum. Lastly, the bearing fai7ure molfunction worked to rapidly cause increasing vibrations ond oi7 outlet temperature at the fai7ed bearing.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDmONS None DEFICIENCIES EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.$

EVALUAllONlEAM SIMUlATOR CONRGURAllON REVIEW BOARD DAlE:

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TURKEY POINT SIMUlATOR CERllFICATION TEST PROCEDURE mIE: lVRBINE LUBE OIL PUMP AND MOTOR NUMBER: MTV<10 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 8.1.2 L28 PROCESS INSlRUMENTAllON, AlARMS, AND CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES DESCRIPTION This test will place various malfunctions on the feed pump lube oil system to insure that it properly responds. lhe low oil pressure trips, interlocks, and auto-start will be checked as weN as the thermodynamic response of the system to a loss of cooling and to a leak.

OPTIONS INlllALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDmONS Hot Standby. 1 main feed pump running. lhe run will be terminated after the test team has seen the desired system response.

APPROVED FOR USE TEST lEAM DATEs < <<< DAT& ~6//

SIMUlATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATE:

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TURBINE LUBE OIL PUMP AND MOTOR MTU-010 BASIS FOR EVALUATION

&pert Evaluation - The control room Indications. overall response, and specific relevent parameters wi7I be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS This test ran as planned with no deficiencies. A failed open relief valve, coupled with failure of the auxiTiary oil pump, caused the 'A'team Generator Feed Pump to trip on low o77 pressure. 7he 'A'GF pump trip caused the 'B'ump to automatically start. The tube fouling on the 'B'GF pump oil cooler caused the oi7 temperatures to nse rapidly. Shen the tube foufing malfunction was cleared. the temperatures returned to noimal. Ihe lube oi7 leak on the 'B'ump caused it to trip on low oi7 pressure. The 'A'ump then auto started when the malfunctions on it were cleared and its control switch was cycled from auto to off and bock to auto.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS None DEFICIENCIES EXCEP77ONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUA77ON 7KAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURAllON REVIEW BOARD DATE:

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TURKEY POINT SIMUIATOR CERllFICAllON TEST PROCEDURE TIRE: FAILURE OF TURBINE CONTROL VALVE SPRING NUMBER: MTU-011 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECllONS: 8.1.2 @21 PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION, ALARMS, AND CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES DESCRIPTION This test will simulate the failure of a turbine control valve spring. ibis failure will cause the valve to remain open when the turbine is romped off the line and wi7I make it difficult to bring the unit off line. Since the actual springs are not modelled in the simulator, the effects on the valve of spring failure will be simulated by fai7ing the valve full open at IRK power. lhe turbine will then be ramped down in order to see the failure's effects.

OPllONS Any of the control valves may be foi7ed open For this test, a valve which Ls already full open should be chosen so that no transient ensues when the valve is fa!7ed.

INlllALCONDlllONS FINAL CONDmONS IK% power. steody state. Unit at hot standby ofter the turbine trip.

APPROVED FOR USE SIMUIATOR ENGINEERING COORDINATOR DATEi

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FAILURE OF TURBINE CONTROL VALVE SPRING: MTU-011 BASIS FOR EVALUA77ON

&pert Evaluation - The control room Indications, overall response. ond specific relevent parameters w8 be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF lEST RESULTS 7he test went as eirpected with no new deficiencies Identified. As the turbine control n7 pressure was lowered. the control volves which weren't fai7ed closed while the failed valve stayed open. The turbine megawatts did not decrease as much as would normally be e rpected for the some governor switch movement due to the two valves having to be closed further than normal for the same power decrease. At about 430 MW. 3 valves were fully closed with the failed valve full open. At this point. control oi7 pressure was lowered even further, which then caused the intercept valves to begin closing. As the Intercept valves closed, megawatts began decreasing again. At a bit lower control oil pressure. the intercept valves were fully shut which resulted in the steam safeties opening and the turbine tnpping after 30 seconds on the anti-motoring trip. 'eheat OUT OF BOUNDS CONDI77ONS None DEFICIENCIES None EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 3.5 EVALUA77ON TEAM SIMUIATOR CONFIGURA77ON REVIEW BOARD

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W W W W W W W W W W W W W W APPENDIX A SAMPLE COMPLETE CER'TIFICA TION TEST PROCEDURE

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TURKEy POINT SIMUlATORCERTIFICATION TEST PROCEDURE TITLEr SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT NUMBER: MRC-003 ANS 8.5 REFERENCE SECTIONSr J. L2(I,B AND C) LOSS OF COOIANT: lARGE AND SMALL BREAKS, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT DESCRIPTION This test repNcates a Best Estimate Analysis (B&VSmall Break LOCA performed by the FP&L Fuel Resources Department using the RETRANQ2 program. As such the test is not intended to foNow in detaN the EOPs covering this type of transient. However. the operator action to turn off the RC pumps on low subcooling margin was programmed into the scenario. No other operator actions were taken during the course of the event. and several assumptions were made to make the Simulator and the RETRAN model consistent. Since the RETRAN model does not include charging and letdown models, or accumulators. these paths were isolated in the Simulator. The event is Inftiated from fuN power at beginning-of cycle conditions. A three inch diameter breakis assumed to occurin the hot leg of loop B. AN control systems are InitiaNy in automatic. safety systems function at fuN capabi%ty, and no additional malfunctions are included.

OPTIONS The simulator is capable of simulating RCS breaks of any size at several locations. The three inch hot leg break was selected because itis one of the standard hot leg breaks that is used for LOCA and pressurized thermal shock analyses.

INITIALCONDITIONS FINAL CONDITIONS IRK power steady state, beginning of core life, equi%'brium xenon The transientis analyzed for approximately 30 minutes. At this time, the safety Iry'ection flow rate is approximatety equal to the break flowrate and the system Is depressurized.

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SMALLBREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC~

BASIS FOR EVALUATION Best Estimate Analysis - The Simulator results willbe compared to a Turkey Point RETRAN model.

Expert Evaluation - The overall response and specific relevanf parameters wi7I be evaluated.

DISCUSSION OF TEST RESULTS The break flowprecfictions for the Simulator and RETRAN models agree very weII for the duration of the transient. The agreementin the RCS pressure responseis also very good although the Simulator doesdepressurize to a greater degree than the REI RAN model from about l5 to 20 minutes. The deviation reaches approximately 200 psI, but at this point in the transient it Is not significant from a training standpoint.

Preliminary runs showed that an excessive two phase natural circulalion flow in the Simulator resultedin cold leg temperatures that followed saturation throughout the test and did not exhibit the coofing due to stagnation of the irjection flow in the cold legs as did the RETRAN model. The first SCRB meeting that discussed this transient resultedin a directive by the SCRB to correct this shortcoming. Subsequent modifications to the Simulator models have resultedin a reasonable agreement of the cold leg temperatures between the Simulator and the RETRAN models. The Simulator does not exhibit as enatic a behavior as the RETRAN model asit cools.

but it does show a consistent overall magnitude and a tendency to return to saturation late in the transient when natural circulation begins to be restored.

The behavior of the balance of the secondary parameters Is as expected and the Simulator and RETRAN model results agree reasonably well.

OUT OF BOUNDS CONDITIONS DEFICIENCIES Oscillalions in the break flowrate occur in the 25 to 30 minute range, as the loops are starting to refilland begin natural circulation. The magnitude of the oscillations is not excessive and cannot be observed by the trainee. However. the problem deserves some attention and wiN be entered as a discrepancy.

EXCEPTIONS TO ANS 8.5 EVALUATION1FAM SIMUIATIONCONFIGURATION REVIEW BOARD DA~~ (O O DATEi Fo V 0 9-DATEr rr DAiF:~il( EG DATE: DAK~ii 8 Page 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. REFERENCES 1.1 Procedures 1.2 Industry &perience 1.3 Turkey Point Significant Event/Abnormal Occurrence 1.4 FSAR 1.5 Other

2. DESCRIPTION 2.1 Approach 2.2 Objectives 2.3 limitations and Assumptions

3. SCENARIO INPUT

4. CERTIFICATION TEST INSTRUCTIONS

5. ARCHIVE RECORDS

6. EVALUATION 6.1 Basis for Evaluation 6.2 Discussion of Results 6.3 Out of Bounds Conditions 6.4 Deficiencies 6.5 Exceptions to ANS 3.5 APPENDICES APPENDIX A - TEST TEAM COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS APPENDIX B - RETRAN02 VS SIMULATOR COMPARISONS SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC~ Page 3

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1. REFERENCES 1.1 Procedures 3-EOP-E0. Reactor Trip or Safety InJection 1.2 Industry &perience N/A 1.3 Turkey Point Significant Event/Abnormal Occurrence N/A 1.4 FSAR N/A 1.5 Other Ramos.J., Apa, J.. Small Break LOCA Analysis With the RETRAN Computer Code. NTH-TP-51-R3, Rev 0, February 12, 1990.

Cheung, AC., et. al., A Generic Assrmment of Significant Raw Extension, Including Stagnant Loop Condilions, From Pressurized 1hermal Shock of Reactor Vessels on Westingouse Nuclear Power Plants, WCAP-10319, December 19B3.

Report on Small Break Accidents for Westinghouse NSSS, WCAP-9600, June 1979.

Skwarek, R J., et.al., Westinghouse Emergency Core Cooring System Small Break Model, WCAP4971-P-A. October 1975.

SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC403 Page 4

2. DESCRIPTION 2.1 Approach test replicates a Best Estimate Analysis (BEA) Smail Break LOCA performed by the FP&L Fuel Resources Department using the RETRANQ2 program. As such This the testis not intended to use the EOPs covering this ~ of transient. However, the operator action to turn og the RC pumps on low subcooling margin was programmed into the scenano. No other operator actfons were taken during the course of the event. and several assumpt/ons were made to moke the Simulator and the RETRAN model consistent. Since the RETRAN model does not include charging and letdown models or accumulators, these paths were isolated in the Sfmu/ator. The event isinitiated from fullpower at beginnings cycle conditions. A threeinch diameter breakis assumed to occurin the hot leg of loop B. With the exception of the rod contra//er, a//control systems arefnftia/iyin automatic. The safety systems function at fullcapability. and no additional malfunctions are

/nciuded.

The severity was calculated using the Simulator equation as follows:

XAREAHN = lVRHHLB 'CARE275 Wherer l=2 for LOOP B XCARE275= 4. 124705 sq ft XAREAH = .04909 sq ft (3 inch diameter break)

Hence. TVHHHLB=.0119 1he operator's response to turn off the RC pumps on low RCS subcooling per Reference 1. 1(1) was accomplished via the scenario. The scenario was set up to trip the pumps if there is an indication of an Sl signal and subcooling less than 25 degF. Two composites were used to accomplish this: (L30SSIPA OR L30SSIPB) AND JQATMRC LT 25.. and (L30SSIPA OR L30SSIPB) AND JQBTMRC LT25. gee Section 3.0 for the entire Scenario)

The trans/ent is analyzed for approximately 30 minutes. At this time, the safelyirjection flowrateis approximately equal to the break flow rate and the system

/s depressurized.

2.2 Objectives The objectives of this test are as follows:

- Evaluate the Simulator response to a Sma/i Break LOCA in the RCS. and

- Replicate the BEA Sma/I Break LOCA Analysis performed with RETRAN02.

2.3 Urn/tat/ons and Assumptions Charging and letdown, as well as accumu/ators, were isolated. Control rods were in manual.

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3. SCENARIO INPUT CAE.3(CERTIFPXSD005. DAT Prevkes user = JFH Scenario description = MRC~ SMALL BREAK LOCA - 3IN DIA LOOP B HOT LEG BRK 08/21/90 INI11AL CONDITION TO RESTORE IC NUMBER= 11 MODIFICATIONTO IC TFBVC23 T BMNVQ10A FAIL CLOSED TFBVC24 T BMCV-310B FAIL CLOSED TFBVC25 T BM-CV-311 FAIL CLOSED TFBVC01 T BH-LCV<60 FAIL CLOSED TFBVC 10 T BH387 FAIL CLOSED TFMVV49C T MH-MOV865A FAIL CLOSED TFMVV50C T MH-MOV465B FAIL CLOSED TFMVV51C T MH-MOV-865C FAIL CLOSED TIME MODE SELECTION NONE MONITORED PARAMETERS SELECTION lABEL NAME ~ HPPRES PRESSUQZER PRESSURE PS lABEL NAME~ H IB:0006 PRESSURlZER LEVEL CH 1 LT<59 lABEL NAME ~ HSTCL COLD LEG A TEMPERATURE DEG F lABEL NAME ~ HSTCLB COLD LEG B TEMPERATURE DEG F lABEL NAME ~ HSTCLC COLD LEG C TEMPERATURE DEG F lABEL NAME ~ SGPDOM PRESSURE OF STEAM DOME PSIA lABEL NAME ~ SGPDOM2 PRESSURE OF STEAM DOME PSIA lABEL NAME ~ SGPDOM3 PRESSURE OF STEAM DOME PSIA lABEL NAME= F 1LT4740 LT<74 OUlPUT lABEL NAME= F 1LT4840 LT<84 OUIPUT lABEL NAME= F 1LT4940 LT494 OUTPUT LABEL NAME ~ SGWDOM FLOW DOME TO MAINSTEAM LB/S lABEL NAME ~ SGWDOM2 FLOW:DOME TO MAINSTEAM LB/S lABEL NAME= SGWDOM3 FLOWDOME TO MAINSTEAM LB/S SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC 003 Page 6

lABEL NAME= FAW84 S/G-1 FEED FLOW lABEL NAME= FAWN S/G-2 FEED FLOW lABEL NAME= FAW96 S/&3 FEED FLOW lABEL NAME= HHWLHB LEAK FLOW HOT LEG LOOP B lABEL NAME= YNACTIME CURRENT AC CLOCK TIME PERFORMANCE INDICATORS SELECTION NONE PARAMETER CONTROLLER: SINGLE EVENT SELECTION lVHHHLB .Ol 1900 HH-HLB HOT LEG LOOP B LEAKAGE COND ~ YNACTIMEGT2.0 YNACTIME CURRENT AC CLOCK TIME DElAYTIME = 00:00 RAMP TIME = OEM COMPOSIlE MALFUNCllONSELECTION COMPOSITE NAME= RCPWFF1 COND = (L30SSIPA OR L30SSIPB) AND JQATMRC LT 25.

L30SSIPA SI PRZR PRESSURE LIGHT TRA L30SSIPB SI PRZR PRESSURE LIGHT TRB SQATMRC CET TEMP SAT MARGIN DElAYTIME ~ 00:30 COMPOSITE DESCRIP. = TURN OFF RCPS WHEN SI IS ON AND SUBCOOVNG LT25 TFH2FlRA T H2-3AAOI BKR 3AAO1 FAIL TRIP DIRECT TRIGGER DElAYTIME = 0000 RAMP TIME= 00:00 TFH2FTRB T H24ABOI BKR 3AB01 FAIL TRIP DIRECT mIGGER DElAYTIME = 0001 IWP TIME ~ 00:00 H24AB06 BKR 3AB06 FAIL TRIP SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT:MRC4M Page 7

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DIRECT TRIGGER DElAYTIME = N:02 RAMP TIME = 00:00 COMPOSllE NAME= RCPWFF2 COND = (L30SSIPA OR L30SSIPB) AND JQBTMRC LT25.

L30SSIPA Sl PRZR PRESSURE UGHT TRA L30SSIPB Sl PRZR PRESSURE UGHT TRB JQBlMRC CET TEMP SAT MARGIN DElAYTIME = 00:30 COMPOSITE DESCRIP. = TURN RCPS OFF ON Sl WllHSUBCOOUNG LT25 TFH2FTRA T H24AA07 BKR3AAOl FAIL TRIP DIRECT TRIGGER DElAYTIME = 00:00 IWP TIME= 00:00 TFH2FTRB T H2-3ABOl BKR 3AB01 FAIL TRIP DIRECT TRIGGER DEIAYllME= 00:Ol 14HP TIME = 00:00 TFH2FTRC T H2-DAB06 BKR 3AB06 FAIL TRIP DIRECT TRIGGER DEIAYTIME ~ N:02 RAMP TIME = 0090 GRAPHIC RECORDER ENTRY GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 1 HPPRES Ymfn= .ONNO Ymax; 2500.0NON PRESSURIZER PRESSURE PS HlB:N65 Ymln.= .NOON Ymax= 100000NO PRESSURIZER LEVEL CH 1 LT<59 JQATMAR Ymln.= -100.0OOON Ymax= 700.0NON RCS TEMP SAT MARGIN N 1D:A 128 Ymln= .000000 Ymax; 120.N0000 TOTAL AVERAGE NUCLEAR POWER Xaxis time: 00: 10:00 GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 2 SGPDOM Ymln.= .NONO Ymax= 1000.000000 PRESSURE OF SlEAM DOME PSIA SGWDOM Ymin.= .ON000 Ymax= 1000.0ONN FLOW:DOME TO MAINSTEAM LB/S FAW84 Ymin= .ONON Ymax= INOONON S/G-1 FEED FLOW SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT:MRC4N Rage 8

FlLT4740 Ymin= .ONNO Ymax= IN.NMM LT<74 OUTPUT Xam time: N: 10:00 GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 3 HSTCL Ymln. 200.RUON Ymax= 700.000000 COLD LEG A TEMPERATURE DEG F HSTHL Ymin.~ 200.NN60 Ymax= 7M.MONO HOT LEG A TEMPERATURE DEG F FFW13 Ymin= .OMON Ymax 10.009XU STEAM ONE 1 FLOW- FROM SG.A H 1B:0131 Ymin..ORXXUYmax= 100.0MNO RCS FLOW LOOP A CH 1 FTA 14 Xaxis time: N: 10:C6 GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 4 SGPDOM2 Ymln.~ .NQNO Ymax= 10N.RUC60 PRESSURE OF STEAM DOME PS!A SGWDOM2 Ymln..MONO Ymax= 1NQRSU FLOWDOME TO MAINSTEAM LB/S FAW90 Ymln .ONON Ymax~ lNONXN S/G-2 FEED FLOW F 1LT4840 Ymin~ .ONXU Ymax~ 100.00NN LT<84 OUTPUT Xaxfs time: N: 10:M GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 5 HSTCLB Ymin= 2CU.RXXUO Ymax.= 70QRUON COLD LEG B TEMPERATURE DEG F HSTHLB Ymin~ 20QORXXU Ymax.= 700.00NOO HOT LEG B TEMPERATURE DEG F FFW12 Ymln .OONN Ymax= 10.00NM STEAM VNE 2 FLOW- FROM SG.B H1B:0134 Ymin..NNOO Ymax= lOQONNO RCS FLOW LOOP A CH 1 FT424 Xaxis time: N: 10:N GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 6 SGPDOM3 Ymin..000000 Ymax= ION.ONNO PRESSURE OF STEAM DOME PSIA SGWDOM3 Ymln.= .RUNO Ymax= 100QONNO FLOW:DOME TO MAINSTEAM LB/S FAW96 Ymin .0000M Ymax~ INQRUON S/&8 FEED FLOW FlLT4940 Ymin~ .RUON Ymax= 100.009m LT<94 OUTPUT Xam time: N: 10:00 GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 7 HSTCLC Ymin. 200.000000 Ymax.= 700.00NOO COLD LEG C TEMPERATURE DEG F HSTHLC Ymln~ 2M.M0000 Ymax= 7M.MONO HOT LEG C TEMPERATURE DEG F FFW1 1 Ymi'n= .OXOM Ymax IO.NNN STEAM LINE3 FLOW- FROM SG.C H18:0137 Ymin..RXXUOYmax= 100.0MNO RCS FLOW LOOP A CH 1 FT<34 Xaxis time: N: 10:M GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 8 HHP08 Ymin 5N.SXOYmax 25M.NOON RCPCOLDLEGLOOPA PRESSURE SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC~ Page 9

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MRWN26 Ymin= .000000 Ymax.= 100.00N00 MASS FLOW RHR LINK26 HHP09 Ymln= 500.000000 Ymax= 25N.NOUO RCP COLD LEG LOOP B PRESSURE MRWIC?7 Ymln= .ON000 Ymax= 100.NONO MASS FLOW RHR LINK27 Xaxis time: 00: 10:N GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 9 HHP10 Ymin= 500.000NO Ymox= 2500.NOON RCP COLD LEG LOOP C PRESSURE MRWN29 Ymin= .000NO Ymax= 100.NNOO MASS FLOW RHR LINK29 HSXQHLB Ymin= .0000N Ymox= 1.NONO HOT LEG B QUALIIYXQ HHWLHB Ymin= .000000 Ymax.= 5000.0Nm LEAKFLOW HOT LEG LOOP B Xaxis time: N: 10:N GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 10 SGMTOT2 Ymin..NNOO Ymax= 1N000.00NOO TOTAL STEAM GENERATOR MASS LB MRHN13 Ymin.~ .ON000 Ymax= 2N.000000 EMHALPYRHR NODE 13 MRHN15 Ymln..000000 Ymax.= 2N.NONO ENlHALPYRHR NODE 15 MRHN16 Ymin.~ .ONON Ymox= 200.000NO EMHALPYRHR NODE 16 Xaxis time: N: 10:N GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 11 SBW24 Ymin.= .NONO Ymax= ION.NOm CONDENSER STM DUMP 2827-28 (A24 LB SBW26 Ymin.~ .RXXm Ymox.= ION.NONO CONDENSER STM DUMP 2829-30 (A26) LB HRVILIQ Ymln~ .MONO Ymax~ 1000.0NNO RV-HEAD LIQUID VOLUME HRVIVAP Ymln.~ .NNN Ymax 10¹NONO RV-HEAD VAPOUR VOLUME Xaxis time: N: 10:N GRAPHIC RECORDER: MENU 12 DTHLIQ Ymln..000000 Ymax= 500.N0000 EMHALPYAT SGU A DTHLIQ2 Ymln..000000 Ymox= (BTU/LB'00.NOON EMHALPYATSGU B (BTU/LBM)

DTHLIQ3 Ymin.= .000000 Ymax.= 5N.NONO EMHALPYAT SGU C (BTU/LBM)

SGMTOT Ymin.~ .ONNO Ymax.= 1NON.NONO TOTAL STEAM GENERATOR MASS LB Xaxis time: 00: 10:N SCENARIO SEQUENCE NONE SCENARIO ABSTRACT NONE SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT:MRC403 Page 10

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4. CERTIFICATION TEST INSTRUCTIONS 1his fest is controlled completely by the scenarios shown in Section 3.0.

4.1 INlllATESCENARIO5. Activate the IC in the scenario, resolve the switch checks on the panels.

(From fhe control panel. set the rod control to manual, and the turbine runback switch to defeat.

In the future this can be handled via the Scenario, if the fest engineer chooses to do so.)

42 Activate the CDB OPTIONS via the Yistagraphics.

4.3 RESET THE SCENARIO via the Yisfagraphics.

4.4 Enter RECORDER, preprocess the MRC003.VAR tile, stab recording, and place the simulator in run.

4.5 The RECORDER willstop automaticalfy at 30 min. When it stops, save the output file.

(SEL File Name%2.Q.

SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE COMAINMENTi MRC~ Page 11

5. ARCHIVE RECORDS MRCN3.RUNF.OUT DATA RECORDED ON 08/21/90 AT 20:36:27 VARIABLESDEFINED IN FILE MRCI.VAR COMMON DATABASE USED WAS CAE. 1<CDB)FPTPXSL001 WORKACF A//NITASM.001 CPUO.SM FPlPB2.FOR.003 IPU3.$ N FPTPEI.FOR.M4 CPU2.$ 06 FPTPK3.FOR.N3 IPV 1.$ 01 AOINITASM.001 CPU0.$ 00 FPlPBB.FOR.M4 IPU3.$ 05 FPTPEL FOR.002 CPU2.$ 03 FPTPK4.FOR.RU IPU/.RU FPTPN.EXE.001 CPUGSN FPTPBH.FOR.003 IPU3.$ 03 FPTPF 1.FOR.005 IPU1.$ 05 FPlPK5.FOR.N2 /PU1.$ 01 FPTP03.EXE.001 CPU0.$ 00 FPTPBM.FOR.009 IPU3.SM FPTPF2.FOR M3 IPU1.$ 05 FPTPK6.FOR.002 CPU2.$ 08 FPlP05.EXE.001 CPUO.SN FPTPBT.FOR.003 IPU3.SN FPTPF4.FOR N3 IPU1.$06 FPlPK7.FOR.N2 CPU2.$ 08 FPTP22.EXE.001 CPUG SN FPTPBU.FOR.M2 /PU3.$ 03 FPTPF5.FOR M5 IPU1.$ 06 FPTPK8.FOR N2 CPU2.$ 07 FPTP24.EXE.001 CPUGSN FPTPBV.FOR 004 IPU3.$ N FPTPFA FOR006 IPU1.$05 FPTPKA FOR.004 IPUL $04 FPlP26.EXE.001 CPUQSN FPlPC l. FOR006 IPU2.$ 06 FPTPFB.FOR.N2 IPU1.$06 FPlPKB.FOR.M3 IPUL $03 FPTP28.EXE.001 CPUO.SN FPTPC2.FOR.002 IPU2.$06 FPTPFC.FOR.RU IPUL $06 FPTPKC.FOR.M3 IPULSM FPTP30.EXE.001 CPUO.SN FPlPC4.FOR.M5 IPU2.S06 FPlPFF.FOR.005 IPU1.$06 FPlPKD.FOR 003 JPU1.$ 01 FPTP32.EXE.001 CPUQSN FPTPCA FOR.008 IPU2.$ 06 FPTPFK FOR.004 / u1.$ 06 FPTPKE.F'R.OQ2 CPU2.$ 08 FPTP34.EXE.001 CPUO.SN FPTPCC.FOR.M3 IPU2.$ 06 FPlPFLFOR002 IPV 1.$ 06 FPTPKF.FOR004 IPU1.$ 01 FPTP36.EXE 001 CPUQSN FPTPCM.FOR.014 IPU2.S06 FPTPFV.FOR.M6 IPUL $05 FPTPKG.FOR.N2 CPU2.$ 08 FPTP38.EXE.001 CPUGSN FPTPCP.FORM3 IPU2.$ 06 FPTPFX.FOR.M5 IPU1.$ 06 FPTPKH.FOR.N2 CPU2.$ 07 FPTP40.EXE.001 CPUGSN FPTPC V.FOR.M3 IPU2.$ 06 FPlPFY.FOR.004 /PU1.$ 06 FPTPKI. F'R.RU CPU2.$ 08 FPTP67.EXE.M 1 CPUQSN FPTPCX FOR.OQ2 IPU2.$06 FPTPG 1.FORM5 CPU2.$ 06 FPTPKJ.FOR.M5 CPU2.$ 07 FPlP68.EXE.M 1 CPUO.SN FPTPD2.FOROQ2 IPU1.$ 02 FPTPGF.FOR OQ2 CPU2.$ 06 FPTPKK FOR.OQ2 IPUl.SM FPTP69.EXE.001 CPUO.I FPTPD3.FOR.OQ2 IPU1.$ N FPTPGG.FOR003 CPU2.I FPTPKN. FOROQ2 CPU2.$ 07 FPTP7O.EXE.001 CPUGSN FPTPDD.FOR.N5 IPU/.$ 02 FPTPH l. FOR.N9 IPU3.$ 01 FPTPKP.FOROQ2 CPU2.$ 07 FPTP71.EXE.001 CPUO.SN FPTPDF.F'R.M5 IPU1.$ 00 FPTPH2.FOR.N4 IPU3.$ 01 FPTPKQ.FOR.N2 CPU2.$ 08 FPlP72.EXE 001 CPUOSN FPTPDG.FOR.003 IPUl.SN FPlPHH.FOR.014 IPU3.$06 FPTPKR FOR.002 CPU2.$ 07 FPlP73.EXE.001 CPUQSN FPTPDQ.FOR.M3 IPUl.$02 FPTPHK FOR. N2 IPU3.$04 FPTPKT.FOR.OQ2 CPU2.S08 FPTP90EXE.001 CPUO.SN FPTPDT.FOR.096 IPU1.$00 FPTPHN.FOR.N9 IPU3.$ 04 FPTPKV. FOR.004 IPU1.$ 04 FPlP92.EXE.001 CPUO.SN FPTPE2.FOR.M4 CPU2.$ 04 FPTPHP.F'R.010 IPU3.$ 04 FPTPKX FOR N4 IPU1.$01 FPlP94.EXE.001 CPUO.SN FPTPE3.FOR.N6 CPU2.$ 04 FPTPHQ.FOR.M5 IPU3.$ 01 FPTPKY.FOR.M3 IPUl.S03 FPTPA 1.F'R.002 IPU2.$ 02 FPTPE4.FOR.N2 CPU2.$ 04 FPlPHR.FOR.Q20 IPU3.$ 05 FPTPRZ.FOR M5 /Pul.$ 01 FPTPA2.FOR.M6 IPU2.$ 02 FPlPE6.FOR.N5 CPU2.$ 04 FPTPHS. F'R M5 IPU3.$ 06 FPTPL 1.FOR.OQ2 CPUl.SOO FPTPAA FOR.002 IPU2.$ 02 FPTPE7.FOR.N2 CPU2.$ 04 FPlPHU.FOR007 /PU3.S04 FPTPl2.FOR.OQ2 CPU 1.$ 00 FPlPAB.FOR.005 IPU2.$ 02 FPTPE9.FOR.002 FPTPAV FOR.003 IPU2.$ Q2 CPU2.$ 04 FPTPHV. FOR.005 IPU3.$ 04 FPTPl2.FOR.OQ2 CPU2.$ N FPTPEB. FOR.002 CPU2.$ 06 FPTPJ5.FOR.N1 /PUG $ 03 FPTPL3. FOR.OQ2 CPU 1.$ 00 FPTPAW.FOR.005 IPU2 $02 FPTPEC.FOR.001 CPU2.$ 06 FPlPKl.FOR.N3 IPU1.$ 04 FPTPL3. FOR.OQ2 CPU2.$ 00 FPTPB 1.FOR006 IPU3.$ N FPTPEE.F'R.003 CPU2.$ 06 FPTPK2.FOR.N5 IPUI.SM FPTPV.FOR.N2 CPUl.SN SMALL BREAKLOCA INS/DE COMAINMENT: MRC~ Page 12

I FPTPLK.FOR.OO2 CPU3.$ 00 FPTPU7.FOROD3 IPU2.SN FPTPX8ASM.OOl CPVO.AOO JBSOUT. FORODI IPUO.S03 FPTPM 1. FOR.004 CPU 1.$ 06 FPTPUB.FOR.002 IPU2.$ N FPTPX8ASM.OO1 CPUO.AOl JBSPEU.FOR.OOI IPUO.SN FPTPM2. FOR003 CPU 1.$ 06 FPTPU9.FOR.008 IPU2.$ 03 FPTPX8ASM.001 CPUO.A02 JBSREV.FOR.OD1 IPUOSN FPTPMC.FOR.005 CPU 1.$ 01 FPTPUA FOR.007 IPU2.$ 05 FPTPX8.ASM.001 CPUO.A03 JBSRRK FOR.OD1 IPUO.SN FPTPMH.FOR.OD3 CPU1.$ 01 FPTPUC.FOR.008 IPU2.$ 01 FPTPX8.ASM.001 CPVO.A04 JBSSPR.FOR.001 IPUO.RU FPTPMR.FOR.004 CPU 1.$ 01 FPTPUF.FOR.002 IPU2.$ 03 FPTPX8.ASM.OO1 CPUO.A06 JBSSTA FOR.DD1 IPU0.$ 03 FPTPMS.MR.O02 CPU 1.$ 05 FPTPUI.FOR.005 IPU2.$ 03 FPTPXB.ASM.OOI CPUO.A32 JBSSTO. FOR.001 IPVO.$03 FPTPMU. FOR.KU CPU 1.$ 06 FPTPUJ. FOR.002 /PU2.$ 03 FPTPX9.ASM.OO1 CPVO.AOl JBSSTS.FOR.001 IPVD.S03 FPTPMV. MR.003 CPU1.$ 06 FPTPUK FOR.OQ2 IPU2.$ 03 FPTPX9ASM.001 CPUO.A02 JBSTIM. FOR.ODI IPU0.$03 FPTPN 1.F'R.OO2 CPU1.$ 04 FPTPUT.FOR.OO5 IPU2.$ 03 FPTPX9.ASM.OO1 CPVO.AN JBSUDR.FOR.OOI CPUO.A 16 FPTPN2. FOR004 CPU1.$ 04 FPTPUV.FOR.OQ2 IPU2.$ 01 FPTPXB.FOR.OO1 CPUO.AOI JBSUDT.FOR.001 IPVD.$03 FPTPND FOR 002 CPU 1.$04 FPTPUZ FOR 003 IPU2.$ N 'PTPXC.FOR.OOl CPVO.A04 JBSVALFOR.OO1 IPVD.$03 FPTPP 1.FOR.OD2 CPV2.$ N FPTPVB.MR.O04 IPUO.SOO FPTPXE.FOR.OO1 CPUOA03 JBSWIP.FOR.DO1 IPUO.$ 03 FPTPPB.FOR.003 CPU2.$ 05 FPTPX2.FOR.OOl CPUO.A01 FPTPXG.FOR.001 CPVD.A07 YP ICOO.fOROOl CPU 1.$ 00 FPTPP9.FOR.OD2 CPU2.$ 05 FPTPX2.FOR.OO1 CPUO.AO2 FPTPXM. FOR.001 CPVO.A03 YP I CO/.MROD1 CPU1.$ 01 FPTPPC.FOR.M3 CPU2.$ 05 FPTPX2 FOR.001 CPUOA03 FPTPXO.fOR.001 CPUO.AOO YP ICO2.FOR.001 CPU1.$ 02 FPTPPG.FOR.OO2 CPU2.$ 05 FPTPX2.FOR 001 CPUO.A04 FPTPXR.FOR.OOl CPVO.A08 YP 1C03.FOR.001 CPU 1.$ 03 FPTPQ 1.FOR.002 CPU2.S06 FPTPX2.f'R.001 CPUO.A05 FPTPXS.FOR.001 CPUO.A01 YP IC04.FOR.001 CPUL $04 FPTPQ4 FOR.O05 CPU2 $04 FPTPX2.FOR.001 CPUO.A06 FPTPXT.FOR.001 CPUO.A09 YP IC05.FOR.001 CPU1.$ 05 FPTPQ5.FOR.006 CPU2.$ 04 FPTPX2.FOR.001 CPUO.AO9 FPTPYB.MR.OOI CPUO.A 16 YP 1C06.FOR.OO1 CPU/.$ 06 FPTPQ6.FOR006 CPU2.$ 01 FPTPX2. FOR.001 CPU3.$ 00 FPTPYB.FOR.OO1 IPUO.SOO YP 180.FOR.DOl IPUI.SOO FPTPQ6. FOR006 CPU2.$ 06 FPTPX4. FOR. ON CPUO.AOO FPTPYB.FOR001 IPVO $ 03 YP 18 1.FOROO1 IPU1.$ 01 FPTPQD.MR.I CPU2.S04 FPTPX4.F'R.003 CPUO.A01 FPTPYE.FOR.003 IPUO.SOO YP 182.FOROD 1 IPU1.$ 02 FPTPQE.MR.OO3 CPU2.SO4 FPTPX4.fM'R.I CPUO.AO2 FPTPYL FOR.OO2 IPUO.SOO YP 183.FOR.OOI IPU1.$ 03 FPTPQF.FOR.I CPU2.$ 04 FPTPX4.FOR. ON CPUO.A04 FPTPYN. FOR.004 IPVD.RU YP 184.FOR.OOI IPU1.$ 04 FPTPQG.FOR.RU CPU2.$ 04 FPTPX4.FOR. ON CPUO.A06 FPTPYS.FOR 111 IPUD.$ 02 YP 185.FOR.OD1 IPU1.$ 05 FPlPQS.FOR.002 CPU2.S06 FPTPX4. FOR.O03 CPUO.A32 J5PAPS.MR.OO1 /PVD.SCU YP 1/06.FOR.OOI IPU1.$ 06 FPTPRA.FOR.OO2 CPU 1.$ 02 FPTPX5.FOR001 CPUO.A01 J5SAPS.FOR.001 IPUO.I YP2CDO.FOR.001 CPU2 $00 FPTPRLFOROQ2 CPU 1.$ 03 FPTPX5.FOROO1 CPUO.AO2 JB$AlA.FORQD1 IPVD.$03 YP2C01.FOR001 CPU2.$ 01 FPTPRR. MR.006 CPU 1.$ 02 FPTPX5.FOR.OOl CPUO.A03 JBSALR FOR.OOl /PVO.S03 YP2C02.FOR.001 CPU2.$ Q2 FPTPS 1.FOR.009 IPU3.$ 02 FPTPX6ASM.OOl CPUO.AOI JBSCDA. FOR.OD1 IPVDSQ3 YP2CO3.FOROO1 CPU2.$ Q3 FPTP$ 2MR.O02 IPU2$00 FPTPX6.ASM.001 CPVO.A02 JBSCEU. FOR.971 IPUO.SN YP2C04.FOR.DOI CPU2.$ 04 FPTPSB.FOR.OQ3 IPU2.I FPTPX6.ASM.001 CPUD.A03 JBSCLE.FOR.OOI IPUO.SN YP2C05.FOR.001 CPU2.S05 FPTPSD.FOR.005 IPU2.$00 FPTPX6ASM.001 CPVO.A04 JBSCPW FOROD1 IPVD.SN YP2CO6.MR.OOI CPU2 $06 FPTPSG.MR.O08 IPU2.$ 00 FPTPX6ASM.001 CPVD.A05 JBSCSG.FOR.001 IPV0 $03 YP2CO7. FOR.001 CPU2.$ 07 FPTPSR.MR.004 IPU2.$ 04 FPTPX6.ASM.001 CPVO.A06 JBSGET.FOR.OD1 IPUO.SN YP2COB.FOR.001 CPU2.$ 08 FPlPSV.MR.M3 IPU3.$ Q2 FPTPX6ASM.OOl CPVO.A07 JBSLDV.FOR.001 IPU0.$ 03 YP280.FOR.OOI IPU2.$ 00 FPTPSW.FOR.003 IPU2.$ 00 FPTPX7ASM.001 CPUO.AOl JBSLED. FOR.OO1 CPUQA 16 YP28 L FOROOl IPU2.$ 01 FPTPU1.FOR.RU IPU2.$ 01 FPTPX7ASM.OD1 CPUO.AO2 JBSLSD.FOR.OO1 CPUOA 16 YP282.FOR.DOI /PU2.$ 02 FPTPU4.FOR N3 IPU2.$ 05 FPTPX7.ASM.001 CPVD.A03 JBSLSS.FOR.001 IPUO.SN YP283.FOR OD1 IPU2.m SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC~ Rage 13

YP2I04.FOR.OD 1 IPV2$04 FPTPXPC.FOR.003 CPUD.A06 XV45OVT.FOR.M1 CPUO.AOD AS YNC NF2. ASM. 001 YP265.FOR.M1 IPV2.$ 05 FPTPXPW.FOR.001 CPVD.AOB XV45OVT.FOR.N1 CPUQAOl CPUD.AOB YP266.FOR.M 1 IPV2.$06 FPTPXRB.FOR.001 CPVD.AOB XV45OVT.FOR.N1 CPUD.A07 AS YNCNF2.ASM.001 YP31M.FOR.M1 IPV3.SN FPTPXRP.FOROQ2 CPVO.A09 XV45OVT.FOR.NI CPUD.A09 CPUDAM YP3101.FOR.M I IPV3.$ 01 FPTPXRT.FOR.001 CPUD.A23 XV45OVT.F'R.N1 CPUO.A31 AS YNC NF2. ASM. 001 YP3102.FORM 1 IPV3.$ 02 FPTPXSO.F'R.M 1 CPUD.AOl XV45OVT.FOR.N 1 CPUD.A32 CPUOA23 YP3103.FOR.N1 IPV3.$03 FPTPXS 1.FOR.N1 CPV 1.AOO XV45OVT.FOR.001 CPVQA34 AS YNCNF3.ASM.001 YP3I04.FOR.001 IPV3.$ 04 FPTPX$ 2.FOR.M1 CPV2.AOD ASYNCOOD.ASM.001 CPUD.AOO CPVOA 10 YP3105.FOROD1 IPU3.$ 05 FPTPXS3.FOR.M1 CPV3.AOO AS YNCM1.ASM.OD 1 CPUD.A01 AS YNCNF3.ASM.001 YP3106.FOR.M 1 IPV3.$ 06 FPTPXSAFOR004 CPUD.A04 AS YNC002ASM.001 CPUO.A02 CPVQ All DCVFORG.FOR.001 CPUD.A 10 FPlPXSE.FOR.001 CPUD.A05 ASYNCOD3ASM.001 CPVQA03 ASYNCNF3.ASM.001 FPTPX10.FOR.N 1 CPUD.A02 FPlPXSL.FOR.M 1 CPVQAQ2 ASYNCN4.ASM.001 CPUD.A04 CPVO.A 12 FPlPXlO.FOROD1 CPUDA04 FPlPXSS.FOR.001 CPUD.AD2 ASYNCM5.ASM.001 CPUD.A05 AS YNC N F3. ASM. 001 FPlPX10.FOR.OD1 CPUD A05 FPTPXTC.FOR.001 CPVQA07 AS YNCN6.ASM.OD1 CPUD.A06 CPVQA 13 FPTPXIO.FOR.M 1 CPUQA06 FPlPXTD.FOR.001 CPUO.A04 ASYNCM7.ASM.001 CPUO.A07 AS YNC NF3. ASM.001 FPTPXlO.F'R.N1 CPVD.A07 FPlPXlF.FOR.M1 CPUD.A03 ASYNCNB.ASM.OD1 CPVQAOB CPUDA 14 FPTPX3M.FOR.M1 CPUD.A03 FPlPXTI.FOR.004 CPV3.$ 00 ASYNCON.ASM.NI CPVD.AN AS YNCNF3.ASM.001 FPTPX3S.FOR.001 CPUD.AOO FPTPXTP.FOR.M1 CPV3.$ 00 ASYNC010.ASM.001 CPVO.A 10 CPVQA 15 FPTPX3S.FOR.DD1 CPUD.A03 FPTPXTS.FOR.001 CPUD.AQ2 AS YNC01 l. ASM.OD1 CPUD.All AS YNCNF3.ASM.001 FPlPX3S.FORM 1 CPUD.A04 FPTPXlT.F'R.N1 AS YNC012ASM.OD 1 CPUD.A 12 CPVD.A 16 CPUOAK'PUD.A06 FPTPX4A.FOR.N I CPVDAOl FPTPXVS.F'R.001 ASYNC013ASM.001 CPUD.A 13 AS YNCNF4.ASM.001 FPTPXCD.FOR.M 1 CPVO.A06 FPTPYAI.FOR.001 CPVQSN ASYNC014ASM.001 CPUD.A 14 CPUD,A31 FPTPXFS.FOR.001 ~ CPVOA07 FPTPYAO.FOR.OM CPUO.SOD AS YNC015.ASM.001 CPUD.A 15 AS YNCNF4.ASM.001 FPTPXGT FOR.M 1 CPUQAOl FPTPYDI.FOR.001 CPV3.$ N ASYNC016ASM.OD 1 CPUQA 16 CPUDA32 FPTPXHO.FOR.M3 CPUD.A03 FPTPYDO.FOR.001 CPV3.$ N ASYNCQ23ASM.001 CPUO,A23 AS YNC NF4. ASM. 001 FPTPXHS.FOR.004 CPUDAOD FPTPYTO. FOR.001 CPUD.SOD ASYNC03 lASM.001 CPUD.A31 CPUD.A33 FPTPX S.FOR.M I CPUD.A01 FPTPYWI.FOR.001 CPUO.SOD ASYNC032.ASM.001 CPVO.A32 AS YNCNF4.ASM.001 FPTPXJB.FOR.001 CPUOA34 FPTPYWO.FOR.OD 1 CPUO.SM AS YNC033.ASM.001 CPUD.A33 CPVQA34 FPTPXJD.FOR001 CPVO.A31 J5CKLOW.FOR.OD1 IPUD.$ 03 ASYNC034.ASM.001 CPUD.A34 ASYNCNF6.ASM.001 FPTPXJG.FOR.OD 1 CPUO.A34 J5VAVD.FOR.001 IPUO.S03 ASYNC 100 ASM.001 CPV 1.AOD CPV 1.AOO FPTPXJMASM.001 CPU QA32 JBMAPAN.FOR.M1 IPUD.$ 01 AS YNC20D.ASM.001 CPV2.AOD ASYNCNF7.ASM.001 FPTPXJQ.FOR.M1 CPVD.A33 JBMAPDI. FOR.OD 1 IPUD.$ 01 ASYNC3N.ASM.M1 CPU3.AOD CPV2.AOD FPTPXJT FOR.M1 CPU3.$ 00 PARVGIO.ASM.001 CPVO.AN ASYNCNF1.ASM.OD1 CPUD.AOO AS YNC NF8. ASM.001 FPTPXJV.FOR.N1 CPVQA32 PARVGIOASM.001 CPVO.A01 ASYNCNF!.ASM.N1 CPVO.A01 CPV3.AOD FPTPXJX FOR.001 CPUD.A31 PARVGIOASM.001 CPUO.A07 ASYNCNF1.ASM.MI CPVQA02 CPVD AOD.EXE.322 CPUD.AM FPTPXOD.FOR.M 1 CPUD.AO1 PARVGIOASM.001 CPVQA09 ASYNCNF1.ASM.OD1 CPUD.A03 CPVD AOI.EXE205 CPUDAOl FPTPXOE.FOR.001 CPUD.A01 PARVGIO.ASM.001 CPVOA31 ASYNCNF I.ASM.M1 CPUD.A04 CPUD A02.EXE. 142 CPUD.AQ2 FPTPXOH.FOR.M1 CPVO.AOP PARVGIO.ASM.001 CPVO.A32 ASYNCNF1.ASM.M1 CPUD.A05 CPVOA03EXE.113 CPUDA03 FPTPXPl.FOR001 CPVO.A02 PARVGIO.ASM.001 CPVO.A34 ASYNCNF1.ASM.N1 CPVO.A06 CPUD A04.EXE.266 CPVQA04 FPTPXP2.FOR.001 CPUDA02 SDCFORG.FOR.001 CPUO.A 10 AS YNCNF2.ASM.N1 CPUD.A07 CPUD A05.EXE 160 CPVQA05 SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT:MRC~ Page 14

CPV0~06. EXE.035 CPVO.A06 DSPCONF.ASM.001 CPUO.SOO DSPCONF ASM.001 IPU3.$ 01 DSPRTOM ASM 00/ CPU2 $02 CPU0~07.EXE. 176 CPUO.A07 D5PCONF ASM.001 CPUl.RU DSPCONF.ASM.001 IPU3.$ 02 DSPRTOM.ASM.001 CPU2.$ 03 CPUO AOB.EXE. 163 CPVO.AOB D5PCONF.ASM.001 CPU 1.$ 01 DSPCONF.ASM.001 IPU3.$ 03 D5PRTOM.ASM.001 CPU2.S04 CPVO AOR EXE.268 CPUOA09 DSPCONF.ASM.001 CPUl.SQ2 D5PCONF.ASM.001 IPU3.$ 04 DSPRTOM.ASM.001 CPU2.$ 05 CPUO~ 10. EXE.033 CPVO.A 10 DSPCONF.ASM.001 CPU 1.$ 03 D5PCONF ASM.001 IPU3.$ Q5 D5PRTOM.ASM.001 CPU2.$ 06 CPU0~1 1.EXE.Q22 CPUO.All D5PCONFASM.001 CPU 1.$ 04 DSPCONFASM.O01 IPU3.$ 06 D5PRTOM.ASM.001 CPU2.$ 07 CPVO A 12.EXE.077 CPVO.A 12 D5PCONF.ASM.001 CPV 1.$ 05 DSPDUM Y.FOR.O01 CPU 1.$ 00 DSPRTOM.ASM.O01 CPU2.$ 08 CPUT 13.EXE.031 CPVO.A 13 D5PCONFASM.O01 CPU1.$ 06 DSPRTOM.ASM.001 CPVO.RU DSPNOM.ASM.931 CPU2.AOO CPUT 14.EXE.Q28 CPVO.A 14 DSPCONFASM.001 CPU2.SM D5PI?TOMASM.001 CPVO.AOO D5PI?TOM.ASM.001 CPU3.$ 00 CPUO j\ 15. EXE.034 CPVO.A 15 D5PCONFASM.001 CPU2.$ 01 DSPRTOM.ASM.001 CPUO.AOl DSPRTOM.ASM.001 CPU3.AOO CPVO A 16. EXE.078 CPVO.A 16 D5PCONFASM.001 CPU2.$ Q2 D5PRTOM.ASM.001 CPVO.A02 DSPRTOM.ASM.001 IPUO.SOO CPVO A23.EXE.Q27 CPVO.A23 D5PCONFASM.001 CPU2.$ M DSPRTOM.ASM.O01 CPUO.A03 D5PRTOM.ASM.001 IPU0.$ 01 CPLU A31.EXE. 124 CPVO.A31 D5PCONFASM.001 CPU2.$ 04 DSPNOMASM.O01 CPVO.A04 DSPRTOMASM.001 IPUOSQ2 CPVOjQ2.EXE. 1 1 1 CPVO.A32 DSPCONFASM.001 CPU2.$ 05 DSPNOMASM.O01 CPUO.A05 D5PNOMASM.001 IPUO.SM CPU0~33.EXE. 165 CPVO.A33 DSPCONFASM.001 CPU2.$ 06 D5PRTOM ASM.O01 CPVO.A06 DSPRTOMASM.001 IPU0 $04 CPU0~34. EXE.076 CPVO.A34 D5PCONF.ASM.001 CPU2.$ 07 D5PRTOM.ASM.O01 CPUOA07 DSPRTOMASM.OOI IPU0.$ 05 CPVO SOO.EXE.213 CPUO.SOO D5PCONF ASM.OO1 CPU2.RS D5PRTOM.ASM.001 CPUO.AOB D5PRTOM.ASM.001 IPU0.$06 CPU 1 AOO. EXE.033 CPUl.AOO D5PCONF ASM.O01 CPU3.$ 00 DSPRTOM.ASM.O01 CPVO.A09 DSPRTOMASM.OOI IPU1.$ 00 CPU 1 $00 EXE. 120 CPUl.SOO D5PCONFASM.001 IPUQSOO D5PRTOM.ASM.001 CPVO.A 10 DSPRTOMASM.OOI IPU1.$ 01 CPU 1 $ 01.EXE. 147 CPU 1.$ 01 D5PCONFASM.001 IPVO.SQl D5PRTOM.ASM.O01 CPVO.A I I DSPRTOM.ASM.O01 IPU1.SQ2 CPUl $02.EXE.081 CPU 1.$ 02 D5PCONF.ASM.001 IPVO.SQ2 D5PRTOM.ASM.001 CPVO.A 12 D5PRTOMASM.001 IPU1.S03 CPU1 SM.EXE.051 CPU1.$ 03 DSPCONF.ASM.O01 IPUO.SM D5PRTOMASM.O01 CPUO.A 13 DSPRTOMASM.001 IPU1.$04 CPUl $04.EXE.N6 CPUl.S04 D5PCONFASM.001 IPV0.$ 04 DSPRTOMASM.O01 CPVO.A 14 DSPRTOMASM.OOl IPU1.$ 05 CPUl $ 05.EXE.077 CPU 1.$ 05 DSPCONF.ASM.001 IPVO.SQ5 DSPRTOMASM.001 CPVO.A 15 D5PNOM ASM.001 IPU1.$06 CPUl $06.EXE. 100 CPU 1.$06 D5PCONFASM.001 /PVQSO6 D5PRTOMASM.931 CPVO.A 16 D5PRTOM ASM.OOI IPU2.$ 00 CHOO. EXE.030 CPU2.A00 D5PCONF.ASM.001 IPUl.$00 D5PRTOM.ASM.001 CPUO.A23 D5PRTOM.ASM.001 IPV2.$01 CPU2 SOO.EXE.068 CPU2.RU DSPCONF.ASM.O01 IPUl.SOl D5PRTOM.ASM.001 CPUO.A31 D5PRTOMASM.001 /PU2.$ Q2 CPU2 SOI.EXE.070 CPU2.$ 01 D5PCONF.ASM.001 IPU1.$ Q2 D5PRTOMASM.O01 CPVO.A32 D5PRTOMASM.931 IPU2.$ M CPU2 $02.EXE.015 CPU2.$ 02 DSPCONFASM.001 IPU1.$03 DSPRTOMASM.O01 CPVO.A33 DSPRTOM.ASM.O01 IPU2.$04 CPV2 SM.EXE. 105 CPV2.$ M D5PCONFASM.001 IPU1.$04 DSPNOM.ASM.O01 CPVO.A34 D5PRTOM.ASM.001 IPU2.$ 05 CPV2 $04.EXE.238 CPV2.S04 D5PCONF.ASM.001 IPU1.$ 95 DSPRTOM.ASM.O01 CPU1.$ 00 D5PRTOM.ASM.O01 IPU2.$ 06 CPV2 $05.EXE.1 18 CPU2.S05 D5PCONFASM.001 IPU1.$ 06 D5PNOM.ASM.001 CPU/.$ 01 D5PNOM.ASM.001 IPU3.$00 CPlf? $ 06.EXE. 139 CPU2.S06 DSPCONF.ASM.O01 IPU2.SN D5PRTOM.ASM.O01 CPUl.SQ2 D5PRTOM.ASM.001 IPU3.$ 01 CPV2 $ 07.EXE.054 CPU2.$ 07 DSPCONF.ASM.001 IPU2.$ 01 D5PRTOM.ASM.O01 CPU 1.$ M DSPRTOM.ASM.001 IPU3.$ Q2 CPV2$08.EXE.068 CPU2.$ 08 DSPCONF ASM.001 IPU2.$ Q2 D5PRTOM.ASM.O01 CPU 1.$ 04 D5PRTOM.ASM.OO/ IPU3.$ 03 CPU3~00 EXE.013 CPU3.AOO DSPCONF.ASM.001 IPU2SM DSPRTOM.ASM.O01 CPU1.$ 05 D5PRTOMASM.OOI IPU3.$ 04 CPU3 SGO.EXE.076 CPU3.SOO D5PCONF.ASM.O01 /PU2.$ 04 D5PRTOMASM.001 CPU 1.$06 DSPNOM.ASM.001 IPU3.$ 05 CTSFPENS.FOR.022 CPVO.SOO D5PCONF.ASM.001 IPU2.$ Q5 DSPRTOM.ASM.001 CPU 1.AOO DSPRTOMASM.M1 IPU3.$06 CTSFPLTS.FOR.036 CPVOSOO D5PCONF.ASM.001 IPU2.$06 DSPRTOM.ASM.O01 CPU2.$ 00 FPTPJBAP.FOR.001 IPVQSOI CTSFRMPS.F'R.022 CPV0.$ 00 D5PCONF.ASM.001 IPU3.RU D5PNOM.ASM.Q) 1 CPU2.$ 01 FPTPJBEC.F'R.001 IPVO.SM SMALL BRFAK LOCA INSIDE COMAINMENT: MRC~ Page 15

W W W W W W W W W FPTPSBIF.FOR.N I CPUO.A 16 FPTPJQIL.FORM I IPUO $04 FPTPXMOV.ASM.OD I CPUO.A08 IPUI $04.EXE. /11 /PU1.$ 04 FPTPJBLS. FOR.001 CPUO.A 16 FPTPSQ2A.FOR.N I IPV0.$04 FPTPXMOV ASM.NI CPUOA32 IPUI $05.EXE.205 IPV I.$05 FPTPJBMV.FOR.M I IPUO.SOI fPTPJQ2B.FOR.OOI IPUD.$04 FPTPXMOV ASM.NI CPUO.A34 IPUI $06.EXE.260 IPV 1.$ 06 FPTPJBOI. f'R 001 IPUO.S03 FPIPJQ3A.FOR.OD I IPU0.$04 FPTPXQIO.FOR.ODI CPUD.AN IPU2 SOD.EXE.360 IPU2.$ 00 FPTPJBPF.FOR.M I CPUO.A 16 FPTPJQ3B.FOR.OOI IPUD.$04 FPTPXQIO.FORM I CPUDAOI IPU2 SOI.EXE. 137 IPU2.$ 01 FPTPJBR2.FOR.M I CPUO.A 13 FPIPJQAN.FOR.OD I IPU0.$ 04 FPIPXQIO.FOR.OOI CPUD.A03 /PCS? $02.EXE. 152 IPU2.$ 02 FPTPJBR3.FORM I CPVO.A 13 FPTPSQDAFOR001 IPU0.$ 04 FPTPXQIO.FOR.ODI CPUOA04 IPV2 $ 03.EXE.219 IPU2.$ 03 FPTPJBR4.FOR.OOI CPLU.A 13 FPTPJQDB.FORM I IPU0.$ 04 FPTPXQIO.FOR.001 CPUOAO5 /P~$ 04.EXE.085 IPU2.$ 04 FPTPJBI?P.FORM I CPUO.A 14 FPIPJQFD.FORM I IPV0.$04 FPTPXQIO.FOI?.001 CPUO.A09 IPV2 S05.EXE. 143 IPU2.$ 05 FPTPJBSC.FORM I IPVO.S03 FPTPJQRI.FOR.ODI IPUD.S04 FPIPXQIO.FOR.001 CPUD.A31 IPU2 $06.EXE.345 IPU2.$ 06 FPIPJBSLFOROOI CPUD.A 16 FPIPJQSA FOR.M I IPUD.$04 FPTPXQIO.FOR.ODI CPUD.A32 IPU3 SOD.EXE. 138 IPV3.$ 00 FPTPJBSR.FOR.M I CPUO.A 14 FPIPJQSB.FOROOI IPUDS04 FPIPXQIO.FOR.OD I CPUO.A33 IPU3 SOI.EXE.211 IPU3.$ 01 FPTPJBUT.FOR.OD I CPUO.A 15 FPTPJTAQ.FOR.OOI IPUD.$ 04 FPIPYGPT.FOR.001 CPUOA 12 IPU3 $02.EXE. I 15 IPU3.$ 02 FPTPJBW2FOR 001 IPUO.SOI FPTPJTFL FOR.OD I IPUD.$04 FPTPYGRD.FORM I CPUOA 12 IPU3 $03.EXE.192 IPU3.$ 03 FPIPJBW3.FOR.OOI IPUD.$ 01 FPTPJTIA.FORM I IPUO.SN FPIPYHPT FORM/ CPUD.A 12 /PU3 $04.EXE419 IPU3.$04 FPTPSBW4.FORM I CPVO.A I I FPIP JTPS.FOR.N I IPV0.$ 04 FPTPYHRD.FOR.OOI CPVO.A 12 IPU3 $05.EXE.374 IPU3.$ 05 FPTPJBW5. FOR 001 CPVO.A I I FPTPJIPP.FOR.OD I IPU0.$04 FPIPYIPT fOR.001 CPUI.AM IPU3 $06.EXE. 172 /PU3.$ 06 FPIPJBW6.FORM I CPVO.A I I FPTPJTUC.FORM I IPU0.$ 04 FPTPYIRD.FORM I CPU I.AOO S5CKHIGH.FOR.N I . /PU0.$ 03 FPTPJBWA.FORM I /PUO.SOI FPTPJTUH.FOR.OD I IPUO.$ 04 FPTPYMDD.FOR.M3 IPCIO.SM J5CKHILO.FORM I IPVO.$03 FPTPSBWP.FOR.N I IPUD.SOI FPTPTPIO.FOR.N2 CPUOA04 FPIPYMDI.FOR.ODI CPU3.$ M J5GAVDTY.FOR.N I IPV0.$03 FPTPJD IO.FOR.M I IPU0.$05 FPTPTPIO.F'R.002 CPUOA09 FPTPYPALFOR.M I IPUO.SN J5/NGLOB.FOR.OOI IPVD.S03 FPIPJD20.FOR.OD I IPUO.$05 FPIPXFIO.FOR.M I CPUD.A04 FPTPYPCM.FOR.M I CPUD.A23 J5INITCB.FOR.OOI IPUD.$03 FPIPJD30.FOR.M I /PVO.$ 06 FPIPXFIO.FOR.M I CPUD.A07 FPTPYPCP.FORM I CPUOA23 J5POSTPR.FORM I IPU0.$03 FPTPJD40.FOR.M I IPUO.SN FPTPXfIO.FORM I CPUD.AOB FPIPYPEP.FOR.001 IPU2.$ 04 J5PURSAS.FOR.N I IPUO.m FPTPJD4 I.FORM I IPU0.$06 FPTPXFIO.FOR.OD I CPVO.A09 FPTPYPES.FORM I /PV3.$ 06 J5RATOCH.FORM I IPV0.$03 FPTPJD42.FORM I IPUCC $06 FPTPXFIO.FORM I CPUD.A23 FPTPYRND.FOR.N I CPUD.SOD J5RVLUM I.FOR.N I IPU0.$03 fPTPJD43.FOR.OD I IPU0.$ 06 FPTPXHIO.FORM I CPUD.A03 FPTPYSDC.FORM I CPU3.$ 00 J5RVLUM2.FOR.OO I /PUO.S03 FPTPJD50.FOR MI IPOQ $05 FPTPXJG I.FOR.OOI CPUD.A34 FPTPYSN I.FOROOI CPUO.SM J5RVLUM3.FORM I IPUO.SO3 FPIPJD5 I.FOR.M I IPUD.$05 FPTPXJG2.FOUNT CPUD.A34 FPIPYSN2.FOR.OOI CPUO.SM J5RVLUM4.FOR.M I IPUO.$ 03 FPTPJD52.FOR.M I IPUO.S05 FPTPXJG3.FOR.001 CPUD.A34 IPVD SN.EXE.222 IPUD.SOD J5$ RGION.FOR.N I IPUO.m FPIPJD53.FOR.OD I IPUD.$ 05 FPTPXJQV.FOROOI CPUD.A32 IPUD $01. EXE.042 IPVO.SOI J5TRNPRO.FORM I IPUD.$03 FPTPJD60.FOR.N I IPUD.$ 05 FPIPXJQV.FOR.OOI CPVO.A34 IPUD $02 EXE.079 IPV0.$02 JBCALPNT.FOR.N I IPUO.SO I FPTPJD6 I.FOR.OD I IPUD.$06 FPIPXJS I.FOR.OOI CPUOA33 IPVO S03.EXE.091 IPVO.SM SYNCOSN.ASM.M I CPU0.$ 00 FPTPSD62.FORM I IPV0.$06 FPTPXS$ 2.FORM I CPUO.A33 IPUO S04.EXE. 152 IPUD.$04 SYNC)SN.ASM.NI CPU1.$ 00 FPTPJD63.FOR.N I IPUD $06 FPIPXJUI.FOR.OOI CPUD.A32 /PUD $05 EXE 133 IPUD.$ 05 SYNC 1$ 01.ASM.N I CPULSOI FPTPSD64.FOR.M I IPV0.$06 FPIPXJVG.FOROO I CPUO.A31 IPUD $06.EXE. 120 IPUD.$ 06 SYNC 1$02.ASM.N I CPU I.SQ2 FPTPJDBO.FOR.001 IPUD.$05 FPTPXMOV.ASM.OD I CPUO.AOO IPUI SOO.EXE. 125 IPU1.$ 00 SYNC /$03.ASM.N I CPU/.$ 03 FPTPJDPT. FOR.001 CPVO.A 15 FPTPXMOV ASM.OD I CPUO.AOI IPUI SOI.EXE. 138 IPU1.$ 01 SYNC 1$ 04.ASM.M I CPU1.$ 04 FPIPJQ IA.FOR.M2 IPL6.$ 04 FPTPXMOV ASM.MI CPUO.AO2 IPUI $02.EXE.053 /PU1.$ 02 SYNC 1505.ASM.N I CPUI.S05 FPTPJQ IB.FOR.OQ2 IPVO.$ 04 FPTPXMOV ASM.MI CPUO.A03 IPU1$03.EXE.091 /PUI.m SYNC ISO6.ASM.M I CPU 1.$ 06 SMALL BREAKLOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC403 Page 16

SYNC2$ 0O.ASM.001 CPU2.$ 00 XV45QOUT.FOR.OOI CPUO.A34 SYNC2SOl.ASM.001 CPU2.$ 01 SYNC2$02 ASM.OOI CPU2.$ 02 SYNC2$ 03.ASM.001 CPU2.$ 03 SYNC2$04.ASM.OOl CPU2.$ 04 SYNC2$05.rUM.001 CPU2.$ 05 SYNC2$ 06.ASM.001 CPU2$ 06 SYNC2$07.ASM.971 CPU2.$ 07 SYNC2$OBASM.001 CPU2.$ 0B SYNC3m.ASM.OO1 CPU3.$ 00 SYNIOSOO.ASM.OOl IPUO.SOO SYNI0$01.ASM.001 IPUO.$ 01 SYNK$02.ASM.OO1 IPUO.$ 02 SYN 0$03ASM.001 IPUO.$ 03 SYNI0$04ASM.001 IPU0.$ 04 SYNK$05.ASM.001 IPU0.$ 05 SYNIO$06.ASM.OO1 IPU0.$ 06 SYNI ISOO.ASM.OOI IPU1.$ 00 SYNI1$01ASM.OOI IPU1.$ 01 SYNI 1$02ASM.OOI IPU1.$ 02 SYNIISN.ASM.OOI IPU1.$ 03 SYNI1$04ASM.OOI IPU1.$ 04 SYNI1$ 95.ASM.001 IPU1.$ 05 SYNI1 $06.ASM.OOl IPU1.$ 06 SYNI2$00.ASM.001 IPU2.$ 00 SYN12$01.ASM.001 IPU2.$ 01 SYN12$02 ASM.001 IPU2.$ 02 SYN 2$03.ASM.001 IPU2.$ 03 SYN12$04.ASM.001 IPU2.$ 04 SYNI2$05 ASM.001 IPU2.$ 05 SYNI2$06.ASM.OOl IPU2.$ 06 SYNI3$00 ASM.001 IPU3.$ 00 SYNQ$01.ASM.OOl IPU3.SOl SYNQ$02 ASM.001 IPU3.$ 92 SYNQS03.ASM.001 IPU3.$ 03 SYNQ$04 ASM.001 IPU3.$ 04 SYNQ$05.ASM.001 IPU3.$ 05 SYNQ$06.ASM.001 IPU3.$ 06 XV45QOUT.FOR.001 CPUO.AOl XV45QOUT.FOR.001 CPUO.A32 SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC~ Page 17

RECORDING IMERVALS

.0 .4 300.0 1.0 900.0 2.0 leOO.O -1.O LABELS RECOR DED HHWLHB LEAKFLOW HOT LEG LOOP B HSXQCL COLD LEG A QUALIIYXQ HSXQCLB COLD LEG B QUALIlYXQ HSXQCLC COLD LEG C QUALITYXQ HSXQHL HOT LEG A QUALITYXQ HSXQHLB HOT LEG B QUAVlYXQ HSXQHLC HOT LEG C QUALITYXQ HRVTLIQ RV-HEAD LIQUID VOLUME ft3 HRVIVAP RV-HEAD VAPOUR VOLUME ft3 HSXVRC CORE NODE 01 VOID FRACTION HSXVRC2 CORE NODE 02 VOID FRACTION HSXVRC3 CORE NODE 03 VOID FRACTION HSXVRC4 CORE NODE 04 VOID FRACTION HS)M?C5 CORE NODE 05 VOID FRACTION HSNfRC6 CORE NODE ob VOID FRACTION HSXVRC7 CORE NODE 07 VOID FRACTION HSXVUP UPPR PLNM A VOID FRACTION HSXVUPB UPPR PLNM B VOID FRACTION HSXVUPC UPPR PLNM C VOID FRACTION HPPRES PRESS UI?IZER PRESSURE PSIA HIB:0006 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CH 1 LT<59 %LEVEL JQATMRC CET TEMP SAT MARGIN HRSWT TOTAL CORE THERMAL POWER MWt H1B:0131 RCS FLOW LOOP A CH 1 FTA 14 %FLOW H1B:0134 RCS FLOW LOOP A CH 1 FT424 %FLOW HIB:0137 RCS FLOW LOOP A CH 1 FT434 %FLOW SGPDOM PRESSURE OF SlEAM DOME PSIA SGWDOM FLOW:DOME TO MAINSTEAM LB/S FFW13 SlEAM VNE 1 FLOW - FROM SG.A LB/S FAW84 S/G-1 FEED FLOW Ib/s DTHLIQ ENTHALPYAT SGU A (BTU/LBM)

F 1LT4740 LT<74 OUTPUT SGMTOT TOTAL SlEAM GENERATOR MASS LB SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC403 Page 18

HSTCL COLD LEG A TEMPERATURE DEG F HSlHL HOT LEG A TEMPERATURE DEG F H2:TI28 PROT Tave LOOP A IND. AOQ221 H2:TI12 PROT DELTA T LOOP A IND. AO0190 SGPDOM2 PRESSURE OF STEAM DOME PSIA SGWDOM2 FLOW:DOME TO MAINSTEAM LB/S FFW12 STEAM LINE 2 FLOW- FROM SG.B LB/S FAW90 S/G-2 FEED FLOW Ib/s DTHLIQ2 ENlHALPYATSGU B (BTU/LBM)

F 1LT4840 LT<84 OUlPUT SGMTOT2 TOTAL SlFAM GENERATOR MASS LB HSTCLB COLD LEG B TEMPERATURE DEG F HSTHLB HOT LEG B TEMPERATURE DEG F H2:T130 PROT Tave LOOP B IND. AOQ222 H2:TI18 PROT DELTA T LOOP B IND. AO0 193 SGPDOM3 PRESSURE OF STEAM DOME PS!A SGWDOM3 FLOW:DOME TO MAINSTEAM LB/S FFWl 1 SlEAM LINE 3 FLOW- FROM SG.C LB/S FAW96 S/&3 FEED FLOW Ib/s DTHLIQ3 ENlHALPYAT SGU C (81U/LBM)

FlLT4940 LT<94 OUTPUT SGMTOT3 TOTAL SlEAM GENERATOR MASS LB HSTCLC COLD LEG C TEMPERATURE DEG F HSlHLC HOT LEG C TEMPERATURE DEG F H2:TI32 PROT Tave LOOP C IND. AO0223 H2:TI24 PROT DELTA T LOOP C IND. AO0196 HHP08 RCP COLD LEG LOOP A PI?ESSUI?E PSIA MRWIC?6 MASS FLOW RHR LINK26 LBM/S MRHN13 EMHALPYRHR NODE 13 BTU/LBM HHP09 RCP COLD LEG LOOP B PRESSURE PSIA MRWN27 MASS FLOW RHR LINK27 LBM/S MRHN15 EMHALPYRHR NODE 15 BTU/LBM HHP10 I?CP COLD LEG LOOP C PI?ESSURE PSIA MRWN29 MASS FLOW RHR LINK29 LBM/S MRHN16 EMHALPYRHR NODE 16 BTU/LBM SBW24 CONDENSER SlM DUMP 2827-28 (A24) LB/S SBW26 CONDENSER STM DUMP 282&80 (A26) LB/S CAPATM CTMT PRESSURE, PSI HRPHEAD ,PRESSURE IN RV-HEAD COMROL VOLUME psla HRMVAP RVREAD VAPOUR MASS SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC403 Page 19

HRHSVAP SP ENlH IN RV-HEAD VAP PHASE Btu/8 HRHV WATER VAPOUR SP EMH IN RV-HEAD Btu/8 HRIVAP RV-HEAD VAPOUR TEMPERATURE deg F HRTLIQ RV-HEAD LJQUID TEMPERATURE deg F HRWAKV RV-HEAD CORE BARREL FlANGE VAP FLOW P/s HNVAKL RVAEAD CORE BARREL RANGE UQ FLOW 8/s HNVCEAV RV-HEAD CRDM VAP FLOW 4/s HRWCEAL RV%EAD CRDM UQ FLOW 4/s HRWHUPV RV-HEAD UPPER SUP PLATE VAP FLOW 8/s HRWHUPL RV-HEAD UPPER SUP PLATE UQ FLOW - P/s HRWVENlV RV-HEAD VAP VENT FLOW 4/s HSWEML RV-HEAD LIQ VENT FLOW 8/s HNVALKEY FLOW FROM INLET NO22LE TO RV-HEAD ss/s HNVRVHUP FLOW FROM RV-HEAD TO UPPER PLNUM 4/s HRWEVAP RV-HEAD EVAPORATION FLOW 8/s HRWCOND RV-HEAD VAPOUR CONDENSATION FLOW 4/s SMALL BREAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC403 Page 20

6. EVALUATION 6.1 Basis for Evaluat/on This test will be evaluated based on e~ examinat/on and comparison to best estimate analysis performed with the RETRAN02 program. The results will be evaluated using the guidelines in ANS 3.5. examined for consistency and reasonableness for the physical processes occuning, and their importance with respect to training.

Since this activityinvolves comparing one model against another, neither model willau/orna/ical/y be presumed to be the best representation of the plant response.

The bash for any significant differences willbe determined.

6.2 Discussion of Results The test results are presented graph/ca//y in Appendix B.

1he fo/lowing parameters are plotted:

HHWLHB LEAK FLOW HOT LEG LOOP B LBM/S HPPRES RCP COLD LEG LOOP A PRESSURE PS!A HSXQCLB COLD LEG B QUALITyXQ The break /low predict/ons for the Simulator and RETRAN models agree very well for the duration of the transient. At approximately 20 minutes. the Simulator flow rate drops below the RETRAN model. The pressure agrees reasonable well although the Simulator predicts a lower pressure in the 20 to 30 minute period. 1he magnitude of the deviation is acceptable from a training standpoint particularly considering the time frame when it occurs. 1he Simulator break qua/I/y follows the some trend as the RETRAN model but doesn't reach the same magnitude.

The oscillations in the break flow and break quality near the end of the transient are a result of the Simulator beginning to reSI the break node and re-establish natural circulation. The magnitude of the oscillations are not overwhelming and cannot be observed in the pressure or other measured parameters.

H 1B:0006 PRESSUR/7ER LEVEL CH 1 LT<59 %LEVEL HRSWT TOTAL CORE THERMAL POWER MWt The pressurizer level and core thermal power comparisons are unremarkable.

JQATMRC CET TEMP SAT MARGIN 1he saturation margin comparison is difficult to interpret because the transient progresses so quickly initially. The trends and magnitudes are comparable.

SMALL BRFAK LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC403 Page 21

m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m H 1B:0131 RCS FLOW LOOP A CH 1 FTA 14 %FLOW H 1B:0134 RCS FLOW LOOP B CH 1 FT<24 %FLOW H 1B:0137 RCS FLOW LOOP C CH 1 FT<34 %FLOW The RCS flow rates compare reasonably well. Because of the nature of the modelling, the Simulator does not show the erratic behavior in the flow rate that the RETRAN model does. In the range of 400 to 1600 seconds the natural circulation flowis completely broken in the simulator. After 1600 seconds the loops begin trying to re-establish a natural circulation loop.

MRWN26 MASS FLOW RHR LINK26 LBM/S MRWN27 MASS FLOW RHR LINK27 LBM/S MRWN29 MASS FLOW RHR UNK29 LBM/S 1he Sl flow vs pressure characteristic is determined from the simulator and input to RETRAN as a boundary condition. Hence, the differences in this comparison reflects the difference in RCS pressure.

SGPDOM PRESSURE OF STEAM DOME PSIA SGPDOM2 PRESSURE OF STEAM DOME PSIA SGWDOM FLOW:DOME TO MAINSTEAM LB/S SGWDOM2 FLOW:DOME TO MAINSTEAM LB/S FAW84 S/G-1 FEED FLOW Ib/s FAWN S/G-2 FEED FLOW Ib/s DTHLIQ ENTHALPYAT SGU A (BTU/LBM) DTHLIQ2 ENTHALPYAT SGU B (BTU/LBM)

SGMTOT TOTAL STEAM GENERATOR MASS LB SGMTOT2 TOTAL STEAM GENERATOR MASS LB SBW24 CONDENSER STM DUMP 2827-28 (A24) LB/S SBW26 CONDENSER STM DUMP 282940 (A26) LB/S The secondary parameters for both the broken and intact loops are pretty much unremarkable. The difference in the initial steam generator mass and the difference in steam dump capacity were discussed in MFW4Q2, Loss of Normal Feedwater. As of 03/03/90, the steam dump capacity has been corrected. A deficiency on the steam generator moss is in process. In this transient. the steam generator pressure is following the RCS down. Both of the models seem to agree on the path this process should follow. The feedwater flow rate and enthalpy are both boundary conditions taken from the Simulator to the RETRAN model. The spikein the RETRAN model enthalpy is a result of the RETRAN code logic selecting the steam enthalpy when the flowis zero. Therefore. it is of no consequence.

HSTCLB COLD LEG B TEMPERATURE DEG F HSTHLB HOT LEG B TEMPERATURE DEG F HSTCL,COLD LEG A TEMPERATURE DEG F HSTHL HOT LEG A TEMPERATURE DEG F The loop temperature comparisons illustrate the two phase hydraulic model differences between Ihe Simulator and the RETRAN model. The hot leg temperatures to occur. Once the circulating loop is broken. the cold legs begin cooling from the cold Sl flow. As can be seen in the figures, the Simulator models don'I demonstrate the enatic behavior as the flow begins to break. The Simulator shows both the A and B loops beginning to re-establish natural circulation at approximatety 1400 seconds. The RETRAN model B loop follows at roughly 1600 seconds and the A loop isjust beginning at the end of the test.

/

SMALL BREAK- LOCA INSIDE CONTAINMENT: MRC403 Page 22

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APPENDIX A - TEST TEAM COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS DATE: 08/2 I/N MEMBERS OF TEST TEAM INITIALS James F Harrison JFH COMMENTS The FATHER configuration was copied to WORK and the following updates were included: HH.OIL H LOOP. HR.020, and HQ.005. These modifications addressed previously reported discrepancies regarding break flow rate and cold leg temperatures during safety injection. Variable XCWFRAC2 was set to 40. in Module HQ.005 using RTD. The oscillations in break ttow rate at the end of the transient are not parlicularly significant from a training standpoint, but should be addressed at a low pribrity.

t SMALL BREAK LOSS OF COOlANTACCIDENT: MRC~ APPENDIX A - TEST TEAM COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS

SMALL BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT: MRC~ APPENDIX B - RHPAN02 VS SIMUlATOJP COMPAR5ONS

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NRC883RF 88/Z 1/88 28:36 SMALL BREAK LOCA 0.60 HS qHIB I

0.50

~

• Q 4Q Ch'.30 0.10 0.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time lsec)

I gRC883RF 88/2 1/98 28:36 @MALL BREAK LOCA 2500.00 4 2000.00 HP RES RE RAN N 1500.00 D

Q 1000.00 500.00 0.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

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MRC883RF 88/8 1/98 28:38 gNALL BREA'OCA 60.00 H1 8886

~~ 50.00 I

+~ 40.00 430.00

~

tq 4~ 20.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Tnne (sec)

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gRC'888RF 88/Z 1/98 28:88 8hfALL BREAK LOCA 2500.00 HR O'T RE RAN 2000.00 O

Q

~1500.00 g

1000.00 500.00 0.00 0.00 400,00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

I NRC'883RF 88/2 1/98 28:38 glSALL BREAK LOC'A 800.00 JQ TNRC RE RAN 600.00 400.00 200.00 0.00

-200.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

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MRC888RF 88/2 1/98 28:88 SMALL BREAK I,OCA 120.00 100.00 H1 '8184 80.00 60.00 40.00 20.00 0.00

-20.00 0.0 0 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

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MRC883RF 88/21/98 28:36 SQUALL BREAK LOCA 120.00 O

H1:8181 R 100.00 H1:8187 I 80.00 4,

60.00 D

D 40.00 O

20.00 0.00

-20.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

ORC883RF 88jZP/98 28:38 SMALL BREAK LOCA 50.00 NR N27

+40.00

~

Cq

~~ 30.00

~ 20.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M NRC883RF 88/81/98 28:36 ggALL BREAK LOCA 50.00 NR N26 NR N29

+~ 40.00

~

~30.00

~ 20.00 b

10.00 0.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

W m NRC883RF 88/21198 28:38 SMALL BREAK LOCA 1200.00 SG'ON RE RAN 1000.00 800.00 600.00 400.00 200.00 0.00 400.00 800 .00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

MM'888RF 88/8 1/88 Z8:38 SMALL BREAK LOCA 1200.00 1000.00 SG-'ONz RE RAN 800.00 600.00 400.00 200.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W NRC883RF 88/2 1/98 28:38 SMALL BREAK LOCA 1000.00 SG DOM 800.00 600.00 400.00 200.00 0.00

-200.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

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W W W W W W W W W W W M W NRC883RF 88/Z1/98 28:38 gMALL BREAK LOCA 1000.00 SG-'ON2 800.00 600.00 400.00 200.00 0.00

-200.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

NRC883RF 88/Z 1/98 28:38 gkfALL BREAK LOCA 1000.00 800.00 600.00 4,

400.00 Eq I

200.00 0.00

-200.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200. 0 0 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

W W W W W W W W W W W W W W O'RC883RF 88/Z 1/98 Z8:38 SMALL BREAK LOCA 1000.00 800.00 600.00 400.00 I

200.00 0.00

-200.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

O'RC883RF 88/2 1/98 Z8:38 SMALL BREAK LOCA 1200.00 I IQ Q 1000.00 800.00 600.00 400.00 200.00 0.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W W MRC883RF 88/21/98 28:38 SMALL BREAE LOCA 1200.00 DT IIQZ

> 1000.00 800.00 600.00 400.00 200.00 0.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

NRC'888RF 88/E 1/88 a8:ae @MALL BREAK LOG'A 1 60000.00 SG'OY' RE RAN

~140000.00 g

E U 120000.00

~~ 100000.00 80000.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

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NRC883RF 88/2 1/'98 88:38 SMALL BREAK LOCA 1 60000.00 TOT2 RAN

~y 140000.00 D

V 120000.00

~100000.00

~

80000.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

MRC883RF 88/2 1/88 28:36'MALL BREAK LOCA

~ 600.00 L

SB

< 500.00 R 400.00 Q

Q 300.00 4 200.00 Cq

~ 100.00 0.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

W W W W W W W W W W M NRC883RF 88/21/98 38:3g ggAII, BRE> g yoga

~ 600.00 L

SB ZG 500.00

% 400.00 Cq Q 300.00 4 200.00

~ 10000 0.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

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NRC888RF 88/8 1/88 88:86 @BALL BREAK LOCA 650.00 HS HLB

~ 600.00 550.00 500.00 4 450.00 400.00 350.00

0. 00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

MRC883RF 88i2$ /'S8 28:38 SMALL BREAK LQCA 650.00

@ 600.00

~ 550.00 500.00 4 450.00 400.00 350.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

MRC883RF 88/2 1/98 88:38 SMALL BREAK LOCA 600.00 500.00 HS CJB RE RAN g~ 400.00 300.00 200.00 100.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

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W W W W W W W W M M M M M MRC883RF 88/Z 1/98 28:38 SMALL BREAK LOG'A 600.00 HS CI.

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@ 400.00 300.00 200.00 100.00 0.00 400.00 800.00 1200.00 1600.00 2000.00 Time (sec)

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