ML17347A785
| ML17347A785 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1988 |
| From: | FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17347A784 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8806280297 | |
| Download: ML17347A785 (77) | |
Text
FLORIDA POWER 8c LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT JUNE 1988
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V TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TTTTZ
" PAGE 1.0
~ 2 1.3 4
1.5
- 2. 0" 2.1
2.2 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION CONTENTS OF VKRGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT BACKGROUND REVIEW OF E'KRGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRICAL LOADS CHANC VKZ OPT'ONS REFERENCES FOR SECTION 1.0
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OVERVIEW:
PRESENT DESIGN AND ENHANCED DESIGN EXISTING EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM E%LQICED BKRGEiCY POWER SYSTEM 1-2 1-5 1-7 2-1 2-2 3.0 3.1
- 3. 1.1 3.1. 2 3.2 3.3 3,4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 ELECTRICAL/INSTR~TATIONAND CONTROL MODIFICATIONS DKRGENCY DIESEL GD/ERATORS Unit 3 Emer enc Diesel Generators
=
Unit 4 Emer eac Diesel Generators 4.16 kV SWING SWITCHGEAR 480V SWING LOAD CEhiERS 480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS (MCCs) 125V DC BUSSES LOAD SEQUENCERS PROTECTIVE RELAYING SYSTEMS FEEDER AND SUPPLY BRZhlURS 3-1 3-1 3-1
. 3-2 3"2
~ 3-2 3-2 3-3 3-3 3H 4.0 4.2 E."KRGENCY POWER SYSTEM OPERATION iXISTING EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCED EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM 4-1 4-1
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT
'ABLE OF CONTEÃZS (Continued)
SECTION 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.2.1 4.2.2.2 4.2.2.3 4.2.3 4.2.3.1 4.2.3.2 TITLE Detection of Loss of Normal Power Su 1
Startu and Loadi of Emer enc Diesel Generator Emergency Mode of Operation on Loss of Normal Pover Supply Normal Mode (Testing) in Parallel With Normal Pover Supply EDG Response to Safety In]ection Signal (SIS)
Load Se uencers 0
- ration, Loss of Normal Pover Supply Loss of Normal Pover Supply Folloved by PAGE 4-1 4>>2 4-2 4-2 4-3 4-3 4.2.3.3
'4.2.3.4 4.2.4 4.2.5 4.2. 6 4.2.7 4.2.8.
Actuation of SIS Actuation of SIS With Normal Pover Supply Available Actuation of High Head Safety In5ection Pumps 4.16 kV Swi Switc ear 480V Swi Load Center Includi 480V MCC 4-4 4-4 4-4 h
licable Codes and Standards Human Factors Review 4-5 4~5 Monitori of Emer enc Diesel Generator O erabilitv 4-5 4,3 5.0 5.1 5.1.1 5.1.2 5.1.3 5.1.4 EDG LOADINGS WITH THE ENHANCED DESIGN MECHANICAL AND STRUCTURAL ADDITIONS DESCRIPTION OF STRUCTURES Diesef Generator Buildi Diesel Oil Stora e Buildin Electrical Duct Banks Materials and alit Control 4~5 5"1 5-1 5-1 5-1 5-2 5-2
t TUMMY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT TABLE OP CONTEXTS (Continued)
SEC ION 5;2
- 5. 2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5 ~ 2 ~ 4 5.2. 5 5.2.6 5.2.7 5.2.8 5.3 5,4 5.5 TITLE
'ESCRIPTION 'OP MEQihNICAL EQUIPMENT Diesel Oil Stora e and Transfer S stem Emer enc Diesel E
ine Starti S stem Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Diesel Generator Buildi
. Class 1E Ventilation Service Water and Demineralized Water S stems Service hir Diesel En ine Cooli Water S stem Diesel En ine Lubrication S stem PIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW PAGE 5-2 5-2 5-4 5-5 5-5 5-5 5"5 5-9 6.0 b.a 6.2 LWLBKNTATIONPLAN AND OBJECTIVES PRE-OUTAGE ACTIVITIES OUTAGE ACTIVITIES 6-1 6-1 6-1 7.0 7.1 7 '
7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 BEEtEFITS OP PLANT ENHANCEN&iT INCREASE EDG CAPACITY REDUCE OPERATOR ACTIONS'CCOMMODATE SINGLE PAILURE MINIMIZEMAINTENANCE/TESTING DOWNTIME SAFEGUARDS TESTING ACCOMMODATE PLANT NEEDS MINIMIZE IMPLEMENTATION DOWNTROD CONCLUSIONS 7-1 7-1 7-2 7-2.
7-2 7-2 7-.3 7-3
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT TABLE OP CONTEElTS (Continued)
LIST OF TABLES TABLE NO.
1 2
TITLE LOOP PLUS LOCA PLUS EDG FAILURE - ONE EDG AVAILABLE EDG kW LOADS FOR LOOP PLUS LOCA, TWO-UNIT OPERATION LIST OF FIGURES FIC'm>>O.
TITLE. t'.:
1 3
4 5
6 7
8 9
AC ONE-LifE DIAGRAM DC ONE-LINE DIAGRAM NEW EDG
& DOST BUILDINGS - GROUND FLOOR PLAN NEW EDG
& DOST BUILDINGS - SECOND FLOOR PZAN NEW EDG
& DOST BUILDINGS - ROOF PLAN NEW EDG BUILDING - SECTION h - h NEW DOST BUILDING - SECTION B - B NEW EDG
& DOST BUILDINGS - SECTION C'- C ADDITIONALEQUIPMENT LOCATIONS
t TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND EMERGENCY POMER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
- 1. 1 INTRODUCTION
.his Emergency Power System Enhancement Report serves a three-fold purpose:
a) provide background information and descriptions,.of the existing Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 emergency power system; b) provide information regarding the enhancements Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) is implementing to upgrade the existing emergency power system; and c) provide information regarding the overall upgraded response to transients such as loss of offsite power (LOOP),,and the Design Basis Accident - DBA, which is LOOP, plus LOCA on one Unit and-a single active failure.
This introductory Section is structured to provide considerable background information which allows the reader to understand the sequence of events that led to the present Emergency Power System Enhancement Pro)ect, the details of which are given in Sections 2.0 through 7.0.
Subsection 1.2 provides an overview of the contents of this Report.
Subsection 1.3 provides a review of the earlier emergency diesel generator loading concerns and their resolution.
Subsection 1.4 describes the series of studies Florida Power and Light Company conducted to reach an optimum solution to upgrade the Turkey Point emergency power system.
This Report is being provided to the NRC to support NRC staff approval of the enhanced Emergency Power System.
A separate submittal containing the resultant proposed Technical Specification changes and No Significant Hazards evaluation will be docketed in 1989.
CONT&
S OF E.'KRGENCY P04&%
SYSTEM E%QDCE.'K4~
REPORT
.his Report contains the following major sections:
Section 1.0 provides an introduction and background for the proposed change s.
Section 2.0 provides an overview of the existing emergency power distribution system and an overview of the proposed modifications,to the emergency power distribution system.
The Electrical/Instrumentation 6 Controls portion of the upgrade is presented in Section 3.0.
'The ma)or topics within this Section are the discussions of the reproposed modifications and the operation of the enhanced emergency power system.
Section 4.0 discusses operation of the enhanced Emergency Power System during transients and accidents, and demonstrates that the prev'ous EDG loading concerns are alleviated with the upgraded design.
0124L/0027L
TURNKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT Section 5.0 details the Mechaaical/Structural. aspects of the proposed modifications.
The descriptioa of the new design foz both structuzes and mechanical equipment are presented.
Section 6.0 discusses the pleas for the sequence of installatioa of the nev equipment and tie-ins to thc existiag emergeacy power system.
Section
- 7. 0 describes the overall benefits of the zesulting pleat enhancemeat.
1.3 BACKGROUND
REVIEW.,OP EHERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ELECTRICAL LOADS INPO Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 81-10, "Event Sequences Not Considered ia Design of Emergency Bus Control Logic" recommended that planes reviev their control logic schemes for Emerge<<y Diesel Geaeratoz'EDG) breaker control, load shedding and,.load sequencing to ensure that the emergency pover system vould meet the design intent under all accideat conditions involving loss of offsite power prior to or folloving the actuation of engineered safety features (ESF) equipment.
In response to the.SOER, FPL initiated a review of Turkey Point Units 3 end 4 to determine if the plants were susceptible to the scenarios postulated in the SOER.
The review, completed in March 1983, c'oncluded that. Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 appeared to bc susceptible to one of the three scenarios postulated in the SOER.
The specific concern involved a postulated loss of offsite power vith no ESF actuation initially zequired.
In this scenario, the shutdovn loads vould be carried by each EDG aad vould include loads vhich automatically load oa the diesels and any manual loads added by the Control Room operatozs.
If an accident requiring automatic ESF actuation was to subsequently occur> the addition of the ESF loads to the emeigency buses could potentially lead to EDG overload since the existing nonesseatial loads vould not have automatically shed.
In December
- 1983, the scope of the reviev vas expended to iacludc a
determiaatioa of those loads not automatically stripped oa receipt of aa ESF actuation signal vhile offsite pover wes unavailable; Between September and October 1984, FPL's review raised questions regarding thc accuracy and completeaess of loading data tabulated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).
h revicv vae begun of aU. EDG-loads to establish the, method of actuation of each load start signal (manual or automatic, instantaneous or delayed, etc').
The reviev iacluded the reevaluetioa of design logic drawings and requirements specified in Emergency Operating Proccduree (EOPe).
In May 1985, the Nuclear Steam Supply System.(NSSS) vendor vas requested to review the FSAR loading table vith respect to the safety analysis to detezmine if the appropriate equipment, loading times, and operating times were showa.
This reviev vas completed in September 1985, ~ and vas made available for incorporation into the EDG loading evaluations previously implemented.
1-2 0124L/0027L
TUB(EY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT In December. 1985, a preliminary report shoved EDG loading higher than expected vith actual loading values different from those recorded in the FSAR.
An engineering evaluation of the situation in the format of a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) vas issued on December 15, 1985 (Reference 1).
The NRC vas informed of the problea and FPL's proposed corrective actions.
PPL believed that the EDGs vere in a condition that vas outside the design basis of the plant.
The administrative contzols specified in the JCO vere implemented.
On January 8, 1986, FPL met vith the NRC Region II staff to.discuss EDG'oading concerns.
The December 1985 JCO vas discussed as veil as long-tezm plans for corrective actions.
Administrative controls vere developed along vith changes made in the EOP to control the loads on the EDG buses.
With the changes
- made, the JCO for Unit 3 vas revised, vith Unit 4 to remain in cold shutdovn, in January 1986.
Various other changes vere instituted to provide for electrical load management for the EDGs in emergency situations.
In February 1986, the final report (as opposed to the December 1985 preliminary report) on EDG loading vas completed.
This report provided more accurate estimates of the kilovatt (kW) loads placed on the EDGs by equipment likely to be operated under accident conditions.
Additionally, the final report'utilized actual test data for the CCW and ICW pump kW load rating.
The loading estimatei for several components vere increased over those used in the December 1985 JCO.
'We loading estimates for other loads decreased or remained unchanged.
On March 29,
- 1986, FPL completed a second JCO (Reference
- 2) vhich
)ustified the operation of Unit 3 vhile requiring Unit 4 to remain in cold shutdovn.
This JCO vas necessary because the final EDG loading report of February 1986 indicated pump kW loads in excess of those assumed to exist in the December 1985 JCO.
FPL estimated that during the assumed
- accident, the 2750 kW auto-connected Technical Specification (TS) surveillance limit and the 2950 kW limit incorporated in the EOPs could be exceeded.
Since Unit 4 vas in a refueling shutdovn condition, the first phase of the'arch evaluation centered on a basis for continued opezation of a single unit.
Consequently, the results of the evaluation 1imited Unit 4 to the cold shutdovn condition'dditionally, to provide the EDGe vith the load capacity for Unit 3 operation, the flov configuration of the Unit 4 intake cooling vatez (ICW) and component cooling vater (CCW) systems vere restricted such that one ICW pump and one CCW pump together place a 500 kW load on the EDG as opposed to the 639 kW the Unit 4 vould normally drav.
The Reference 2
JCO vas revised to reflect this information.
1-3 0124L/0027L
0 TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 BKRCENCY POWER SYSTPf BOiANCE".KHT REPORT Region II issued a Confirmation of Action Letter (CAL) oa April 2, 1986, which documented actions to be taken by FPL The CAL indicated (Reference
- 3) that FPL vould perform the following prior to restart of Units 3 and 4:
Total loads on emergeacy diesel generators will be reduced to no more than 2845 kilovatts per diesel generator and procedures will be chaaged, aad operators trained on these changes prior to assuming duties, to assure operatioa vithia this limitation.-
2.
A vritten safety evaluation performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 of the reduced diesel generator loadiag demonstrates that, vith Unit 4 ia a cold shutdovn condition:
Unit 3 can be operated safely, in accordaace with Technical Specifications, and vithin the bounds of currently approved accident analysis for the full range of accideat break spectra.
Unit 4 can be safely maintained in cold shutdovn..
This evaluation will be formally submitted to the NRC prior to Unit 3 entering mode 2 ~
3.
A safety evaluation of diesel generator loading for concurrent operation of Units 3 and 4 will be completed and approved by the NRC prior to restart of Unit 4."
FPL responded to the Reference 3 CAL with a JCO (Reference
- 4) which slloved Unit 3 to restart. vhile Unit 4 remained in cold shutdown.
Unit 3 was returned to power operation on April 9, 1986.
Unit 4 remained in the cold'hutdown condition vhile FPL evaluated a'cceptable methods of load reduction and management.
FPL discussed long term corrective
- actions, vhich could lead to the operation of Unit 4 at paver, vith the" "
NRC Region II staff on May 20, 1986.
Ia letters dated June 12, 1986 (Reference
- 5) and July 16, 1986 (Reference 6),
FPL provided to NRC aa EDG load evaluatioa aad aasvers to NRC questions detailing the EDG loads, the EDG capabilities and ratings, and the effects and corrective actions to be taken during a loadiag sequence to accommddate the single failure of one EDG.
The proposed corrective actions consist of manually applying or removing plant system loads to accommodate the defined.loading requirements within the EDC ratings.
By letter dated June 26, 1986 the NRC alloved concurreat operation of Units 3 and 4, subject to,completion of the corrective actioas.
At the same time, the staff revieved the FPL EDG load evhluation submittals to assess the operatioaal and accident conditions at the two Units, 1-4 0124L/0027L
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TURXEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT containment pressure and temperature conditions, diesel engine and diesel generator electrical capability and human factors considerations.,
These assessments were based on the 'information provided in FPL's submlttals on EDG load evaluation and several telecon discussions with FPL.
The !RC provided a Safety Evaluation (SE) la a letter dated December 15, 1986 (Reference 7).
The NRC's SE coacludes that the loads for tKe various conditions are,in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.9, Position C.2; the operator actions described are acceptable and are consistent with FPL'i accident anal'ysl's and emerg'eacy operating procedures; the containment pressure and temperature analysis is acceptable; aa adequate human factors analysis was performed; and
, therefore, the proposed corrective actions relating to the emergency diesel generator loads are acceptable.
1.4 2%VdiC~ OPTIONS paraiJ.el with the EDG loading evaluations being conducted ia 1986 as discussed in Section 1.3 above, in January 1986 FPL management authorized what became a three-phased Contractor study to review viable alternatives to the ezisting Turkey Point EDG arrangement taking into accouat the previously identified EDG load constraints, reliance on operator actions, applicable Safety Evaluations/JCOs, etc.
In late January
- 1986, as Phase I of the review, some twenty alternatives were presented against a matriz of seventeen considerations.
In early February
- 1986, as Phase II of the study, FPL chose siz of those alternatives for further analysis.
These alternatives, plus an alternative added later for considerat'on, were:
1)
Obtain a larger engine that willfit the ezisting skid 2)
Add one new Class 1E EDG (a swing EDG) 3)
Add one new Class IE EDG (a "slow-start", QX) 4)
"Separate" Turkey Poiat Unit's 3 and 4 AC system to the eztent practicable and add two new Class lE EDGs 5)
Provide auto-start capability for the cranking ("blackmtart")
EDGs 6)
Upgrade the existing EDGs by testing 7)
"Separate" Turkey Poiat Units 3
& 4 AC system to the eztent practicable and provide four new Class lE EDGs
.he Pease II letter report recommended further study of a'four-~
conflguratloa (alternatives 4 or 7).
1-5 0124L/0027L
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT jn May 1986, PPL authorized Phase III of the study, to consider the followiag optioas:
a) add one new Class 1E EDG or b) add two new Class
. IE EDGs to the Turkey Point site (in various electrical configuratioas)
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The final conceptual study on these two options was completed ia August 1986.
Thc options reviewed in this study (three EDGe or four EDGs) resulted in siz proposed electrical arrangemcnt
- schemes, which were critiqued as to how well each scheme mct the following goals:
2) 5)
/ 1)
(0 iY
)baal 3)
(CC
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p( ~'I' J
Iacrease EDG Capaci,ty Improve plant sai'ety by providing a scheme which affords, additional installed emergency AC capacity.
T Reduce Operator Actions - Improve plant safety by reducing operator actions associated with load management activities.
Single Failure Accomodation Improve plant safety by providing a design which is more impervious to single failure, (e.g.,
EDG failure to-start, loss of 4.16kV bus, battery fail'ure, etc.).
Minimize Maintenance/Testing Downtime - Improve plant safety by providing a desiga which requires the least amount of downtime aad least limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) on the noa-outage"."-"-.
Unit when performing maintenance/periodic testing on thi other Unit or reduadant electrical trains.
Safeguards Testing " Provide a design which will minimize'two-unit outage when performi.ng safeg'uards testing on either Unit.
6)
Accommodate Plant Needs - Provide a design which accommodates present aad future system changes and load increases.
7)
Minimize Implement'ation Downtime - Provide a scheme which affords the least amount of outage downtime ('eplacement power cost'),
on either or both Units to implement the given scheme.
In late 1986, FPL authorized a detailed design study, the Emergency Power System Enhancement Study, to provide a conceptual design for the option finally selected:
"separatiag" thc Turkey Poiat Uaits 3 and 4 AC power system to the eztent practicable and adding two new Class 1E EDGs to the site.
Note that complete separation of the Turkey Point Uaits is not possible due to the present common and shared systems (e.g.,
High Head Safety Ia]ection pumps and DC System) which presently ezist at the plant.
A conceptual design was completed in May 1987, and FPL authorized the implementation of this four - EDG scheme.
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0124L/0027L
0 t
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT The installation of two additional EDGs plus enhancements to the emergency power distribution system at Turkey Point. is a complex, carefully evaluated process which encompasses engineering,
- design, procurement and construction/installation activities spanning a
timeframe from 1987 to 1990.
Actual plant electrical reconfigurations of Train A and Train B on each'nit are tied to a dual Unit outage scheduled in 1990.
The required modifications are divided into several Engineering Packages (EPs), with the earlier EPs involving construction, installation and checkout of equipment without modifying the current electrical distribution system.
The later EPs involve electrical modifications requiring a dual-Unit outage.
REFERENCES FOR SECTION 1.0 L
1)
JPE-L-85-47 Revision 1, Justification for Continued Operation with Administrative Control of Diesel Generator Loads; Issue Date:
- December, 1985.
2}
JPE-L-86-59 Revision 0, Justification for Continued Operation with One Unit at"Power and One Unit in Cold Shutdown, Relating,to Emergency Diesel Generator Loads; Issue Date:
- March, 1986.
3)
Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC) to C.
O. Woody (PPL)> Confirmation of Action - Docket Nos.
50-250 and 50-251; dated April 2, 1986.
4)
C; O.
Woody (FPL) to Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC), Emergency Diesel Generators, L-86>>147 dated April 3, 1986; with
Attachment:
JPE"L-,86-59 Revision 1, Justification for Continued Operation with One Unit at Power
& One Unit in Cold Shutdown, Relating to Emergency Diesel Generator Loads; Issue Date:
April, 1986.
5),
C.
O.
Woody (FPL) to Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC), Emergency Diesel Generator Load Evaluation, L-86-243 dated June 12, 1986; with
Attachment:
[JPE-L-86-74 Revision 0) Safety Evaluation, Turkey Point Units 3
& 4 (PTPN) Emergency Diesel Generator Load, Evaluation.
6)
C. 0.Woody (FPL) to Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC), Request for Additional Information, Emergency Diesel Generator Load Evaluation, NRC TAC Nos.
61211 and 61212, L-86<<295 dated'July 16, 1983; with
Attachment:
PPL responses to NRC's July 8, 1986 Requests for Additional Information (RAIs), RA?-1 through RAI-ll.
7)
D. G. McDonald (NRC) to C. O. Woody (FPL), Emergency Diesel Generator Load Safety Evaluation - Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, dated
'ecember 15> 1986; with Enclosure.'SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT, TtHKEY POINT PLANTf UNITS 3 AND 4 >
DOCKET NOS ~ 50 250 AND 50 251
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( TAC NOS ~
61211 AND 61212).
1-7 0124L/0027L
I TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT 2,0 OVERVIEW:
EXISTLRG DESIGN AND E%iANCED DESIGN 2.1
~~STING EHERCENCY POWER SYSTEM The ezisting Turkey Point Units 3 and 4.emergency diesel geaerators (GXs) sad emergency electrical distributioa system provide for emergency power 'a the event of Boss of offsite power in order to bring borh Units to a safe (hot) shutdc'.wn condition.
This ie achieved using automatic "initiatioae and actuations as well as operator actions (see Subsection 1.3).
~14lq v
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- The emergency diesel generator load ratiags are 2500.kW for base contiauous operation with a 1/2 hour ezceptional ratiag of 3050 kW.
The worst case plant loads placed on an emergency diesel generator during an accident (requiring safety in)ection oa one plant and normal shut dowa on the other in con)unction with loss of power to both Uaits plus a failure of one EDG) result ia about 2750 kW of automatically connected loads and then approximately 2500 kW for the'durati'on of rhe accideat.'In the first half"hour of this postulated accident scenario, this requires short term loads in the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> rating of 2850 kW, and load management for loads approaching 2950 kW.
Refer to Subsection 1.3; Table 1 depicts the presently evaluated EDC t4 loads for the above scenario.
a 4i The ezisting emergency power generatioa system utilixee two diesel generator sets.
Each diesel eagine is a turbocharged, two cycle engine which is coupled to a generator.
Each engine is started by two air motors which are automatically activated by respective signals representing either a loss of 4.16 kV voltage on either the A and/or B
4.16 kV buses or a safety in)ection signal on either Unit.
The ezisting EDCs are designed to artsia operating speed (900 RPM) aad voltage (4.16 kV) with the ability to assume load in 15 seconds or less.
The loading is done automatically by sequeacers in s predetermined sequential order.
Either EDG is capable of supporting those loads associated with achieving and maintaining a 'safe (hot) shutdown condition ia oae plant while mitigating the postulated accident oa the other.
he-EDCs are located'in separate rooms of a seismic Class I structure.
Each diesel generator system ie monitored to alert personnel of offmormal conditions.
Monitoring iastrumentation for each EDC is located on the main control board and on local control panels.
Each diesel engine uses No.
2 fuel oil from its own 4000 gallon day tank.
This tank is an ASME Section VIII tank with Class I requiremeats and is separated from the other diesel day tank by a concrete wall.
The tank feeds the engine through a solenoid valve by gravity feed to the associated diesel generator skid mouated 275 gallon fuel tank.
The. two day tanks are supplied by a common Diesel Oil Storage Tank (DOST).
Transfer of fuel oil from the storage tank to the day tank ie accomplished automatically by oae of two electric motor driven transfer pumps to maintain desired level in the day tank.
F111 connections for fillingfrom a mobile tank uait are provided should the normal supply via the diesel oil transfer pumps become unavailable.
2-1 0124L/0027L
EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT The emergency pover distribution system responds to undervoltage signals by trippiag all feeder breakers aad the main supply breakers of the affected 4.,16 kV'ue and by starting the diesel in the emergency mode of operatioa.
Mter the diesel generator has come up to speed and voltage and all the bus breakers are tripped, the sequencer automatically closes the generator o'utput breaker and energites the affected 4.16 kV bus.
The load sequencer then closes the circuit breakers to re"energize the load centers and Motor Control Centers.
Intake Cooling Water pumps and Component Cooling Water pumps are automatically started.
To continue the shutdova of each Unit on loss of offsite pover, further operations're performed manually by thc operator in accordaace vith Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).
If the diesel start involves safety infection with a lose of offsite
- pover, the load sequencer starts the engineered safety features (ESF) equipment at preset intervals.
In the eveat of a safety in]ection signal with offsite power available, the necessary ESF equipment is automatically connected to the power distribution buses by the action of the sequencer without any timing delay.
The safety in5ection signal, in this case, starts the EDGe but they are not connected to the plant distributioa system unless a loss of offsite power occurs also.
Under no circumetaaces are the EDGs operated ia parallel with each other. If one diesel generator is not available, it is automatically locked out.
The loading of the remaining diesel geaerator is accomplished to ensure safe shutdown of both Units.
2.2 ENHANCED EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM The enhanced emergency pover system includes the construction and/or installation of tvo nev emergency diesel generators vith all support systems (fuel oil, starting air, ventilation, etc),
a nev emergency diesel generator building, diesel oil s.orage
- tanks, and transfer pumps in an associated
- building, new 4.16 kV switchgears, nev 480V load
- ceaters, new 480V motor control centers, nev 125V DC transfer/
distribution panels, aew sequencers,
- breakers, battery chsrgers,
- etc, plus lighting distribution panels, traasformers, cabling aad numerous components necessary for modifying the existing equipment.
See Figures 1 aad 2 for a oae-line electrical diagram of thc AC aad DC systems, respectively.
The tvo ncv diesel generators include the capability of manual air start and self"czcitatioa vhich allovs startiag without depcndiag on outside AC or DC pover squrces.
The nev seismic Category I diesel building ie located northeast of the Unit 3 coatainment.
The buildiag is two stories high vith the diesel generators located on the lower elevation and thc aaziliaries such as air start skids, control panels, motor control centers, distribution
- centers, etc., located oa the upper level.
Also located on the upper level are the tvo new 4. 16 kV swing busses, oae for each Unit.
Figures 3 through 8 depict the nev EDG Building layout.
The new Dfesel Oil Storage Building Layout is shown on Figures 3 through 5, 7 and 8.
2-2 0124L/0027L
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TURXEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT r
hs part of thc Emergency Pover System eahaacemeat pro)ect, ezistlng EDC i3, presently supplyiag pover to the h system of both Units, ls reassigned to ahe Unit 3A power system, and relabeled EDG 3h.
Similarly, ezisting EDG t4 is relabeled EDC 3B and assigned to supply pover to the Unit 3B power system.
Thus, the tvo ezistiag EDGs arc aligned as thc emergency AC pover supplies for Unit 3 and certaln commoa or shared systems.
Thc tvo nev EDCs are aligned as the emergency AC pover supplies for Unit 4 aad certain caaaoa or shared systems.
Thc 4A 'EDC supplies pover to the Unit 4h power system and the 4B EDG supplies the Unit 4B power
'ystem.
The four existing sequencers are replaced with four nev qualified solid"state type sequencers.
The nev-sviag 4.16 kV svltchgear 3D supplies pover to to Intake Cooling..
Water (ICW) Pump 3C and Component Cooling Water (CCW)
Pump 3C; llkevlse, the new sving 'swltchgear 4D supplies pover to ICW Pump 4C and CCW Pump 4C.
These ICW and CCW Pumps are nov available as installed spares for either h or B pumps.
For ezample, if one of the normally ruanlag ICW Pumps on Unit 3, ICW Pump 3A (or ICW Pump 3B) is taken out of service for testing, malntenance or repair, the 3C ICW pump powered from the 3D svitchgear ls put into service by aligning the 3D svitchgear to the 3h (or 3B) svitchgear.
Refer to Figure 1.
During normal operation, the swing 4.l6 kV svitchgear power supply breakers caa be manually aligned to either the h or B svitchgear.
Each Unit has a nev 480V load center sving bus located on the (future) mezzanine floor ln the Auxiliary Building hot machine shop (vhlch is being converted to a Chemi,stry laboratory)
~
See Figure 9.
The nev swlng 480V Load Center 3H supplies pover to MCC 3D and to Charging Pump (CP) 3C; likevise, the nev svlng Load Ceater 4H supplies pover to MCC 4D and to Charging Pump 4C.
These Charging Pumps are nov available as installed spares for either A or B pumps.
For example, if one of the normally running Charging Pumps on Unit 3, CP"3A,'or CP 3B) is taken out of service, the 3C CP povered from Load Center 3H is put lnto service by aligning the 3H Load Center to the 3C (or 3D) Load Center.
Refer to Figurc l.
Each swing load center can be aligned to Train h or Train B of its associated Ualt.
However, during normal operation, thc alignment of these swing load ceatcrs is to the B Train of each Unit.
The'DG loading is acceptable vith either Train alignment.
For each 480V sviag load ceater, if the bus to vhich lt is aligned loses power, automatic circult breaker operatioa coaaects the bus to the other pover source if pover is availablc there.
2-3 0124L/0027L
TRUE!Y POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT
, A new Rotor Control Center (MCC) 3K is added to supply EDG 3B auxiliaries (presently supplied from Unit 4 MCC 4B).
Existing MCC D, (which presently supplies power to Unit 3 and 4 third service loads and plant common loads), is relabeled MCC 3D, and supplies power to Unit 3 loads and existing plant common loads (e.g., security system).
New MCC 4D is added to supply loads associated with Unit 4 that are presently fed from MCC D.
New MCCs 4J and 4K are added to power the auxiliary loads for the new EDGs.
Refer to Figure 1.
The existing EDG P3 (renamed EDG 3A) auxiliaries are powered from MCC 3A and are not affected.
The existing MCCs 3A and 4A have Telemand Transfer Systems which allows them to be powered fzom either existing Train A or Train B.
These existing Telemand operators will be deleted as there are no safety loads without redundant counterparts connected to these MCCs.
.he existing MCC D provides power to the Plant's
- common, shared and third service loads.
This MCC has a Telemand Transfer System which allows it to be powered from either Unit 3 (Train B) or 4 (Train A).
This existing Telemand operator will be deleted.
The enhanced design thus eliminates the complicated Telemand'ogic and replaces it with a, much simpler power-seeking transfer design.
Two battery chargers are added (see Figure 2) and the two existing spare chargers are being realigned.
This results in two chargers aligned to each DC bus, each powered from a different MCC to assure that at 'east one charger is always available per DC bus.
See Figures 1 and 2.
As a result of these additions and modifications, Turkey Point Units 3
and 4 have a safer, more flexible system with the capability of having one train out of service without significantly affecting the other Unit and by use of swing bus arrangements have additional loads available.
Components are more available for maintenance since the new plant alignments allow items to be taken out of service with lessened Tecnnical Specification impact.
The increase in emergency generation capacity and the addition of switchgear, motor control centers and distribution panels allows future load growth when required and the ability to add plant investment protection loads upon completion of the modifications.
0124L/0~2/T
t TURIN POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POSER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT 3.0 ELECTRICAL/INSTRUMENThTION hND CONTROL MODIFICATIONS This Section describes the electrical end instrumentetioa/controls modifications lying performed as part of the Emergency Pover System Enhancement Pro)ect.
3.1 EYZRGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS (EDGs)
The existiag emergency pover distribution system coafiguratioa consists of two diesel geaerators shared betveca the tvo Units.
Under this configuration oae diesel feeds thc 'h'us of each Unit aad the other diesel feeds the 'B'us of each Unit.
With the 'enhinccd coifiguratioa there is one di'escl generator assigned to each of the four safety busses (see Figurc 1); specifically, the nev diesel generators pover 4.16 kV busses 4h end 4B end thc existing diesels pover 4.16 kV busses 3h ead 3B.
Thc connections,.
between the existing (nov Unit 3) diesel generators and the Unit 4 4.16 kV buses, are removed uadcr the Emergency Power System Enhancement Pro)ect.
3.1.1 Unit 3 Emer enc Diesel Generators The tvo existing EDGs arc General Motors, Electro-Motive Division (END) Model 20 645E4 design coupled to a Model h20 EMD generator.
Each set vas supplied by h.G.*Schoonmakcr Company, Iac.
The output of each EDG is nominally rated as follovs:
3.1.2 Base continuous rating:
2500 kM Basic overload rating:
2750 kV The supplier has iadicetcd that. the EDG basic overload rating corresponds to the IEEE Standard 387-'1977 "short time" rating.
The rc-assignment of these EDGs to Uait 3 service requires modificetioas to thc original.EDG control schemes to delete the Unit 4 related control interlocks end their associated components end to achieve e similarity ia operation bctvcen EDGe of Unit 3 end Unit 4.
Unit 4 Emer enc Diesel Generators The aev Emergency Diesel Generators are supplied by Morrison-Knudsen, Iac.
Each set coasista of a General Motors Elcctr~tiw Division Model 2lHi45F4B "design, turbo charged, tvo cycle engine which is coupled to s Model f140 Electric Products generator.
= Yha output of each diesel generator sct is noainelly rated as follovst Continuous rating:
.2865 kM Short Time rating:
3150 Qf The acv EDG auxiliaries aad other support systems required to ensure safe ead reliable operation of the new EDGs.are discussed in Sectioa 5.0.
3-1 0124L/0027L
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 hND 4.
EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEHBV REPORT Moaitoring iqstrumcntatioa is provided for each nev EDC at the mai'n
,control board and at the nev local pan&a consistent with the existiag diesels.
3.2 4.1& kV SWING SMITCHGEAR Tvo new 4.16 kV svitchgear, one (3D) used as a Uait 3 swing bus and one (4D) as
~ Unit 4 sving bus,'re located in the nev Diesel Generator Building.
The sving svitchgear of each Unit cap be aaaually aligned to either 4.16 kV A or B train via a double ended.tic systca.
Iaterlocks ensure that the swing switchgear caa only be conaected to oac 4.16 kV bus at a time.
The sving switchgear povers installed spare loads (i.e the Component Cooliag Water or Intake Cooling QR'ter pumps) vhea they are required to replace a nonoperable h or B Compoaent Cooling Mater pump or an Intake Cooling Mater pump.
3.3 480V SMINC LOAD CENTERS Tvo nev 480V swing load centers are being added, onc (38) for Unit 3 and one (4H) for Unit 4.
These load centers arc located on thc (future) mezzanine floor in the Auxiliary Building hot machine shop.
Each sving load center has thc capability of beiag automatically coanected to either the h or the B bus of its Unit via a tie containing tvo breakers, to either the (3C) 4C load center or thc (3D) 4D load center.
3.4 480V MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS (MCCs)
Pour nev 480V MCCs are added to the AC system.
MCC 4J aad-4K are located in the nev EDG building.
MCC 4J is fed from Load Center 4h and is used to supply EDC 4h fans and auziliaries vhile MCC 4R is fed from Load Center 4D aad supplies EDG 4B fans and auziliaries.
Nev MCC 3R is located ia the czisting EDC buildiag and supplies thc EDG 3B auziliaries which vere.originally powered from MCC 4B.
This MCC is fed from Load Ceater 3D.
Nev MCC 4D is located next to present MCC "D (relabeled 3D)
'n the auxiliary building and is used to pover existing Unit 4 swing loads vhich arc being reassigned.
This MCC is fed from 480V sving load center 4H.
MCC 3D, previously normally fed from Load Center 3D, is nov povered from Load Center 3H.
All ezisting Telemaad transfer systems (for ezistiag MCCs 3h, 4h aad D) are being deleted.
3.5 125V DC BUSES The ezistiag plaat DC distributioa systems consist of four 125 volt DC buses shared by both Units, fed from batteries of tvo different ampere-hour capacities (sce Figure 2).
Each bus has a dedicated battery charger.
Tvo "sving battery chargers are installed, common to both Units, each one shared betveen the h and B bus of each Unit.
The modifications to the DC systems ss part of the Emergency Povcr System Enhancement Pro)ect are as follovs (see Figurc 2):
a.
The existing "sving" battery chargers are dedicated to a single 125 volt DC bus, and tvo nev battery chargers are added, each dedicated to a single 125 volt DC bus.
The recoafiguration of the "swing" battery chargers and the addition of tvo acw battery chargers provides each 125
t TURjKY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 KKERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT volt DC bus with two redundant (full capacity) battery chsrgers fed from diverse AC power supplies.
This ensures charging capability should one hC power supply not be availableo Figures 1 snd 2 show the battery charger power supplies.
b.
The ezisting cables to the swing charger provided a tie between the 3B and 4d batteries for teiting. Since this swing charger will be dedicated and the ezisting tie removed, a new tie vill be provided for battery testing.
The breakers associated with this tie-line are normally maintained in the open position.'efer to Figure 2.
c.
The power to the diesel generator. sets are distributed'such that each EDG is supplied DC power from the battery system of the s'arne designition; i.e.,
EDG 3A is associated with Battery 3Af etc.
d.
Two new DC breaker panels are provided (as eztensions'of buses 4A and 3B) to accommodate new loads.
Note that, below the main DC bus level, the DC distribution systems are not affected by this enhancement pro)ect.
3.6 LOAD SEQUENCERS New sequencers are provided for switchgear 3h, 3B, 4h and 4B to ensure an orderly automatic loading of essential equipment under the emergency mode. conditions.
The sequencer consists of timing devices that determine the steps for load applications.
The sequencer is provided with a test capability to verify proper sequencer operation.
A description of sequencer operation under various emergency conditions in the plant is provided in Section 4.2.3.
- 3. 7 PROTECTIVE RELAYING SYSTEHS A
I Nev 4.16 kV "swing" switchgear and 480 volt "swing" load centers are being added.
They are provided with overcurrent protection systems cons's:ent with those provided with the ezisting equipment, thereby maintaining the integrity of the overall system.
Protective an'd alarm relays are provided for the new emergency diesel generators as follows:
a.
Generator Differential Overcurrent b.
.Loss of Ezcitation c.
Reverse Power Time Overcurrent e.
Voltage Balance f.
Under Frequency g.
Over Voltage h.
Under Voltage All of the above protective relays, ezcept the ge'aerator differential overcurrent, are bypassed under emergency operation.
In addition to the generator differential overcurrent relay, the only other fault that will trip the EDG under emergency operation is engine overcpeed.
Refer to Section 5.0 for a discussion of mechanical protective devices.
3-3 0124L/0027L
t TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT 3.8, FEEDER AND SUPPLY BREAKERS This section addresses the operation of breakers that control the flov of power to the pover distribution buses that are required to be energized'uring plant ~peration.
The circuit breaker on the bus supplying power to another bue ie the supply breaker.
The breaker on the bue rccciving pover is the feeder breaker.
The Emergency Power System enhancement pro]ect adds supply and feeder circuit breakers as required to power nev buses. such as 4.16 kV switchgear 3D aad 4D, 480V load centers 3H and 4H, aad 480V MCCs 3K, 4D, 4J and 4K.
a.
EDG to 4.16 kV Bus Peeder Breaker The automatic operation of this breaker (which i.s not being changed) is tied to the start-up and operatioa requiremeats of the Emergency Diesel Geaerator, bus stripping and bus cleared relays aad permissivee.
During EDG load testing, this breaker ie manually closed after synchronizing vith the bus.
b.
4.16 kV Bus to '80V Load Center Transformer Feeder Breakers Each breaker is automatically tripped by the 4.16 kV Bus undervoltage
- relays, aad each breaker is automatically closed by the EDG loading.-
sequencer, as per the present desiga.
Each breaker is pro'vided vith overcurrent protection.
C ~
Each breaker can be cLosed/tripped with a control svitch at the svitchgear or with a control svitch in the Control Room.
Position indication is provided in the Control Room and locally at the svitchgear.
480V Load Center Prom 4.16 kV Bus Supply Breakers (Supply from secondary of 4.16 kV/480V transformer)
Each breaker. can be closed/opened at the 48QV Load Center.
The breaker is maintained in the closed position.
These breakers are opened only for maiatenancc
- purposes, under administrative controls.
The function of,these breakers remains unchanged from the present design.
d.
480V Load -Center to 480V MCC Feeder Breakers Each breaker can be closed/open vith a pushbutton located at. the Load Center and can be opened manually.
Each breaker is provided vith ovcxcuxreat protection.
The function of these breakers remains unchanged from the present design.
3-4 0124L/0027 L
TUMMY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT e.
480V MCC From 480V Load Ccntcr Supply Breaker Each breaker can be closed/opened at the 480V MCC.
The breaker is maintained in closed position, aad ia opened only for maintenance
- purposes, under administrative controls.
The functioa of these breakers remains unchanged from the present design.
f.
4.16 kV Sving Bus (3D/4D) Tie*Breakers Each ncv 4.16 kV Sviag Bus (3D/4D) is prov&ed vith tic lines to the 4.16 kV Buses d and B.
- Thus, a sving bus has capability to receive pover from either the h or B pover train.
The tie brcakcrs for each svitchgear are interlocked.so that the 4.16 kV Swing bus can be manually connected to only one source of emergency povcr supply at any given time.
Both breakers in the a'lteraate tie line are in the open position.
Each breaker is provided vith overcurrent protection.
Each breaker can be closed/tripped vith a local contro1 svitch or from the control room.
Position indication is provided in Control Room.
g.
480V Swing Load Center (3H/4H) Tie Breakers Each 480V Swing Load Center (3H/4H) is provided vith tie lines to 480V Load Centers (4C/4D,3C/3D) that are associated with the A and B power train.
- Thus, a Swing Load Center has a capability of receiving power from either po~er train.
The tie breakers arc iaterlocked so that the 480V Sviag Load Center is connected to only one source of pover at any given time.
Operation of the tie breakers is controlled through the use of a control svitch in the Control Room.
Mith the selector svitch in the
'A'osition, the tic breakers in line vith BCs 'B'eceive a trip signal and the tie breakers ia line vith Bus 'A'eceive a
close'ignal.
Once a pover source is selected the, tie breakers are sub]ect to an automatic transfer scheme as follovs:
If the voltage on the primary supply bus is not present, the auto-transfer circuit checks the voltage on the alternate supply bus....If the voltage on the alternate supply bus is availablc, the auto-traasfer action to the alternate supply bus is initiated.
The auto-transfer action issues a signal to trip the tie breakers to the prima+ supply bus aad, if at least onc of these breakers aie in an opea position, issues a sigaal to close thc tie breakers to the alternate supply bus.
Each breaker is closed/tripped as a result of any of the following actions:
operation of a local coatrol svitch; operation of a selector svitch in Control Room; or automatic transfer action; or overcurrent conditions.
Position indication is provided ia the main control room.
3~5 A1 247 /hn27V
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 hND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMPfT REPORT 4.0 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM (EPS).OPERhTION 4.1 iXISTING EMERCENCY POWER SYSTEM Presently, either ezistiag EDG i,e capable of supplying pover, in the event of-loss of off-site power (LOOP), to all the necessary eafeguarde equipment of one Unit ia an accident coadition, plus the auziliary loads for a safe (hot) ehutdovn of thc other Unit.
The mazimum auto-connect loading associated vith these coaditioae is about 2750 kW, vhich occurs in the first minute of EDG operatioa.
This eatails shbrt-term loads in the first 30 minutes in the 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> rating of 2850 kW, and transient load management loads ~proaching 2950 kW.
Table 1 (eee Subsections 1.3 and 2.1) provides the vorst-case EDG loading scenario for. the ezisting arrangement.
4.2 E%ihNCED EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM The operational requirements for the Eahanced Emergency Power System consist of thc followiag:
a.
Detection of lose of the normal pover supply.
b.
Clearing of pover distribution buses that are required for the emergency power application.
c.
Isolation of nonmafety related loads from the emergency pover supply.
d.
Start~p and loading of each Emergency Diesel Generator.
4.2.1 Detection of Loss of Normal Pover Su 1
Thc czisting scheme, prcecntly in service at the plant, is used for the purpose of detecting an undervoltage condition at the 4.16 kV svitchgea'r or the associated 480V Load Centers.
The ezistiag scheme coasists of voltage monitoring relays at the 4.16 kV svitchgear and associated 480V Load Centers, aad the undervoltage=detection relays interrelated as follovs:
Each,ezisting 4.16 kV switchgear is provided vith tvo voltage monitoring relays that monitor phase to phase voltage at the bus.
Each of the ayisting associated 480V Load Centers are also provided vith tvo pairs of voltage monitoring relays that moaitor phase to phase voltage at the 480V bus.
When there is a loss or deterioration of voltage at the 4.16.kV svitchgear or at, the 480V Load Centers, the voltage monitoring relays vill actuate the undervoltage actuati.on system.
n~ y4L/0027L
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 hND 4
&URGENCY POWER SYSTEM MQNCEMENT REPORT 4,2.2 Startu
'and Loadin of Emer enc Diesel Generator The control logic of each new EDG provides for emergency and normal modes of operation of the EDG, with the emergency mode assigned a
priority over the nozmal mode.
4.2.2.1 Emer enc Mode of 0 ration on Loss of Normal Power Su 1
h loss of normal power supply is detected by the undervoltage
- system, which initiates the bus stripping action by energizing bus stripping relays.
The bus stripping relays open all bus supply breakers and all safetymelated load feeder breakers, energize-the bus isolation relays, and start the diesel.
'The bus isolation relays, when energized, open all non-safety related load feeder breakers and establish the emergency mode oz operation for the EDG.
In the emergency mode of operation the diesel achieves its normal operating speed and voltage in fifteen seconds and the trip functions of all protective devices, with ezception of overspeed and generator differential relay> are deactivated.
There is no automatic or manual reset provided for the bypass of trip functions of, the-normal EDG protective devices.
These trip functions remain deactivated as long as the EDG remains in the emergency mode of operation.
The emergency mode of operation foz an EDC is defined as the condition when the EDG i,s the sole souzce of power connected to the 4.16 kV bus and consequently the bus isolation relay is operated.
When the frequency and voltage of the EDC are within the acceptable limits, an automatic closure signal is issued to close the EDC breaker.
When the normal power supply is re-established, the 4.16 kV bus may be transfered to the start-up transformer.
The synchronization of the EDG and transfer of the 4.16 kV bus to the start-up transformer can be performe'd from the'main control board or locally.
hs soon as the 4;16 kV bus supply from start-up transformer breaker is closed, the operating mode of EDG is changed from emergency to nozmal.
Subsequently, the EDG may be unloaded,"
disconnected from the 4.16 kV power bus and shut down.
4.2.2.2 Normal Mode (Testing) in Parallel With Normal Power Supply During the normal mode of EDG operation the point of control - local control panel or main control,board - is determined by the position of a Master Selector Switch.
However, the change in point of control during the operation has no effect on tbe operation of EDC.
4-2 0124L/0027L
EMERCENCY POMER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT In the normal mode the diesel is started manually by depressing the start push button.
During the start-up period the diesel operates at a predetermined idle speed to allow an" orderly warm up of the engine to'inimize wear.
After the warm up period ia completed, the diesel speed increases to the level of normal operation in preparation for loading.
An uadervoltage signal or safety in]ection signal vill take precedence over the aormal mode of operation (as
'iscussed above).
Vhen the diesel is at normal speed and voltage is established, the operator may proceed with synchroaization of the generator voltage with the 4.16 kV bus voltage aad manually close the generator breaker.
Oace the EDG is tied to the 4.16 kV bus, it is manually-loaded.
To initiate the normal shutdown process, the load on the EDC is first reduced to a preset minimum value before thc generator breaker is manually opened vith a control svitch.
Rhea the EDC is disconnected from the 4.16 kV power bus, the stop push button is depressed to initiate the normal diesel shutdovn.
During the shutdovn period the diesel vill operate for a period of time at a predetermiaed idle speed to allov the cngiae heat to dissipate in aa orderly manner.
After this period of cooldovn, idle operation is completed and the diesel will stop.
An "emergency stop" push button is provided for a fast stop of the diesel.
By depressing the push button, the period of engine cooldowa, at idle speed, is eliminated from the diesel shutdown process thus resultiag in a fast stop of thc diesel.
The stop signal is effective only ia the normal mode of diesel operation.
EDC Response to Safety Ia]ection Signal (SIS)
On actuation of SIS on either Unit, a31. diesels are started automatically in the emergency mode of operation.
The EDCs receive the auto-start signal, due to SIS actuation, until the diesels attain normal operating speed.
The diesels continue to operate in a no-load condition at normal operating speed unless an uadervoltage signal is received or until they arc stopped manually.
The normal or emergency diesel shutdown process may be initiated by depressing the related push button on thc coatrol panel.
- However, if SIS is actuated
- agaia, the diesel will bc started in the same automatic mode as delineated above.
In case.a loss of normal paver supply occurs subsequent to SIS actuatioa, thc normal mode of EDC operation is immediately superseded by the emergency mode of operation.
The EDG continues its operation from that point on ia accordance with the requirements of the emergency mode of operation as delincat'hd in Section 4.2.2.1.
Load Se ueacer 0 aration The folloving Subsections describe operation oi the load sequeacers.
4~3 0124L/0027L
0 e
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT 4.2.3.1 4.2;3.2 Loss of Normal Power Supply Upon detection of a degraded voltage condi'tion (see Subsection 4.2.1),
the sequencer starts automatically upon closure of the EDG breaker.
The timing contacts of the sequencer close the breakers" of-the equipment-required for the safe shutdown of the plant in a predetermined sequential order.
g;hh~
~)
~
Loss of Normal Power Supply Followed by Actuation of SIS Actuation of SIS resets the timing contacts of the'equcncer to the zero time condition regardless of the state of progress for'the 4.16 kV bus loading operation.
Those loads that have been already connected to the 4.16 kV bus by the sequencer action, in response to loss of normal power supply, remain connected if they are required in response to an SIS.
4.2.3.3,
.-;ctuation of SIS With Normal Power Supply Available The sequencer closes all breakers of equipment required for the mitigation of consequences of an accident immediately and simultaneously.
4.2.3.4 Actuation of High Head Safety Injection Pumps The High Head Safety Inject'on (HHSI) Pumps are a shared
- system, which provide high-pressure safety injection following a LOCA on either Unit.
On receipt of an SIS on either Unit, all four HHSI Pumps receive a start signal.
This ensures the operation of at least tvo HHSI Pumps, vhich provide sufficient safety injection (along vith the passive accumulators) t'o satisfy the design basis accident analyses.
4
~ ~
~ 4 4.16 KV Swin Switc ear The pover to the 4.16 kV sving svitchgear is supplied from either the 4.16 kU Bus A or from the 4.16 kU Bus B.
When the-4.16 kV swing svithgear is connected to either 4.16 kU supply bus it is considered an extension of that power supply bus.
The control logic of the pover supply. bus, (utilized or the bus stripping of loads on loss of bus voltage and development of a bus cleared signal to permit application of emergency pover to the bus), is extended to the sving svitchgear through the interlocks with the 4.16 kU swing bus breakers.
4,2.5 480V Svi Load Center Includi 480V MCC
.he power to either-or the 480U sving load centers (3H/4H) is supplied from either the 480U Load Center C (Traid A) or from the 480V Load Center D (Train B).
When the 480U swing load center is connected to either 480V supply bus, it is considered to be an extension of that 480V supply bus.
4-4 0124L/0021L
TURKEY'POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POLER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT However, thc control logic of the 480V supply bus is not extended to the 480V swiag load center;
- instead, the 480V eviag load center is provided vith the automatic transfer capability which allovs the sving bus tb transfer from a de-energized bus to an energized bus.,
Thc automatic transfer takes place if the 480V supply. bus fails to be eaergized, provided that pover is available at the 480V alternate, bus.
A timing circuit is also provided to allov for loading of the load center oato the EDG. before transfer occurs.
Thc 480V'CC ie povcred from the 480V swing load center'ad thus follovs it as to supply bus alignmc'nt.
'I J
An alarm is provided ia the control room to annunciate the automatic transfer of the 480V swing load center to,the 480V alternate bus.
4.2.6 Monitorin of Emer enc Diesel Generator 0 erabilit The diesel generator is periodically started and loaded in parallel with the plants normal power supply for the purpose of proving its operational reliability.
An alarm annunciator is provided on th' local control panel to both monitor the operatioa of the EDG and to annuaciate aa alarm in case an off~ormal condition is detected.
Aay alarm at the local annuaciator vill also alarm in the control rooms 4.2.7 A
licabl'e'Codes and Standards Nev structures,
- systems, and components (SSC) are being installed to interact vith those ezisting, vhich vere licensed in the early 1970e.
Iadividual Engiaeering Packages (EPs) are developed for site preparation, SSC installation, pre-op testing etc.
These individual EPs delineate the specific Codes aad Standards utilized in each design package (as work progresses).
To the eztent practicablc, the latest Codes and Standards arc invoked for the nev SSC.
4.2.8 Human Factors Review The enhancement prospect activities are being evaluated with respect to NUREG&700 Human Factors requirements aad guidelines via the controlled EP process.
The nev equipment maintains similarity to
. the mazimum ezteat possible, of thc nomenclature aad arrangement for ezisting systems and components.
The control logic and the associated control components and monitoring instrumentation are designed as similarly as possible for the EDGe in both Units.-
4,3 EDG LOADINGS WITH THE ENHANCED DESIGN As discussed previously in Subsections 1,3 and 2.1, Table 1 represents the EDG loading for the postulated DBA with the existing design.
4~5 0124L/0027L
~
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT Table 2 presents the EDG loading for a LOCA and LOOP on Unit 3 arid a LOOP on Unit 4 vith the enhanced design.
Resultant loads oa each EDC are shovn for bottt automatically loaded componeats, such as eagineered safety features (e.g.
HHSI pumps,'Containment Spray pumps,, etc),and manually loaded components such as plant i+vestment loads (e.g,,'turbine loads) aad desired loads such as pressurizer heater banks and charging pumps.
On Table 2, components which are powered from the sviag Load Centers 3H (and 4H) and from MCCs 3D and 4D'are-.normally aligned to EDGs 3B.(snd 4B). If a single active failure (SAP) of the normal pover source (Load Center 3D or 4D) occurs, the MCC 3D or MCC 4D loads vi11 automatically sviag to the alternate Load Ceater (3C or 4C) and thea be povered from EDC 3A or 4A.
For EDG loading purposes, both the sving alignment and normal alignment
'oads o" each EDG are shovn in an (r/y) format, where x is the swing alignment, i.e.,
the Load Center 3D failure result or the Load Ceater.
4D failure result; and y is the normal alignment.
Thc loads on EDGs 3A and.
4A are shown as if MCC 3D and MCC 4D have swung to the A power train.
The loads on EDCs 3B and 4B are shova as if the loads vere normally aligaed to the B povcr train.
By inspection of Table 2, it can be seea that:
a) no single EDG is overloaded, let alone loaded to its continuous rating, if all four EDCs function properly and as expected (even vith a full complement of a sviag Load Ceater);
and b) the worst single train failure (e.g., failure of aa EDG to start) still leaves at least the minimum number of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) operable, plus common/shared equipment, and additional investment loads such as turbine-related loads.
A comparison of the Table 2
EDG 3B loads vith thc Table 1 (eiisting)
EDG t4 loads shovs that potential EDG loading conceras have been alleviated with the enhanced design.
Table 2 presents the loads oa thc four EDGs for the case of an SIS on Unit 3 (with LOOP on both Uaits).
For the case of SIS on Unit 4 (vith LOOP on both Unite), thk"sam'e c'onclusions derived from Table 2 for the previous case hold true!
a) ao single EDG is overloaded, lct alone loaded to its continuous rating (evea vith a full complement of a swing Load Center);
and b) the vorst single train failure (e.g., failure of an EDC to start) still leaves at least the minimum number of ESP equipment
- operablc, plus comaan/shared equipment, and additional investment loads.
The kM loadiag on each EDG, for this Unit 4 accident scenario,
's as follows:
EDC 3A:
2100 kM (assuming lose of LC 3D, and LC 38 swinge to LC 3C)
EDC 3B:
2200 kN (assuming LC 3H is aligned to LC 3D)
EDC 4A:
2085 W (assumiag loss of LC 4D, and LC 4H>svings to LC 4C)
EDG 4B:
2135 kM (assuming LC 4H is aligned to LC 4D).
0124L/0027L
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY FOIE SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT 5.0 MECHANICAL AND STRUCTURAL ADDITIONS This Section<describes the new structures and the nev mechanical equipment being installed in support of the Emergency Pover System Enhancement project.
5.1 DESCRIPTION
OF STRUCTUiHS Various civil/structural modifications are being made to accommodate the new EDGs and their auxiliaries, including nev blectrical duct banks, installation of equipment on'the Auxiliary'uilding mexzanine floor, etc.
The major structures are discussed belov.
The electrical duct
- banks, the Diesel Generator Building and the diesel oil storage building are Seismic Category I structures, and are designed to vithstand design basis natural phenomena, including earthquake, wind, tornado and flooding.
Tornado design requirements include. protection from tornado-generated missiles.
Missile protection for structures
's provided by reinforced concrete walls; heavy steel grating, and steel missile doors.
Diesel Generator Building The nev Diesel Generator Building is a seismic Category I reinforced concrete structure, located northeast of the Unit 3 Containment and the Auxiliary Building, which contains the diesel generators and auxiliary equipment.
The dimensions of the building are approximately 55 feet wide by 56 feet long by 51 feet high, with the top of roof at, elevation 61.0'.
See Figures 3 through 8.
The building is partitioned by a reinforced concrete vali, such that the redundant diesel generators and associatea auxiliary equipment are separated by a three hour rated fire barrier.
Each division of the building has tvo floors:
the ground floor, approximately at elevation 18.00', contains the diesel generators, and the second floor, approximately at elevation 42.00',
encloses the auxiliary equipment.
The second floor is partly reinforced concrete and partly structural steel vith steel grating.
5.1. 2 Diesel Oil Stora e Buildin The Diesel Oil Storage Building is also a seismic Category I reinforced concrete structure, connected to the Diesel Generator Building and sharing the vest wall of the latter.
The structures have a common foundation mat.
The dimensions of the diesel oil storage build'ing vill be approximately 29 feet vide by 38 feet long by 39 feet high, vith the top of roof at elevation 49.0'.
See Figures 3 through 5, and Figures 7 and.8.
The Diesel Oil Storage Building is also part(.tioned by a reinforced concrete vali such'that the two Diesel Oil Storage Tanks (DOST) and their associated oil transfer pumps are separated by a three hour rated fire barrier.
Each division of the building houses a
DOST>
which is a steel lined concrete pool.
In each half oi the building>
the oil transfer pump is installed in a room separate from the enclosure housing its associated tank.
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT 5,1,3 Electrical Duct Banks New underground electrical duct banks are constructed for the routing of'new cables.
5.1.4 Materials and Oualit Control structures are. reinforced concrete and structural steel.
The fundamental design and quality requirements for these materials is in accordance with ACI 349-85, "ACI Standard, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety Related Concrete Structures,"
and the Eighth Edition of the AISC Manual of Steel Construction'.
Applicable industry standards and regulatory documents are also considered in the design of the building as delineated in each EP.
All design work and procurement of materials for these buildings is performed according to and in strict compliance with Florida Power Light's Quality Assurance Program.
J
5.2 DESCRIPTION
OP MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT
- 5. 2.1 Diesel Oil Stora e and Transfer S stem The Diesel Oil Storage and Transfer System transfers diesel fuel oil from the new onsite storage tanks to the day tanks which supply the new emergency diesel generators.
The-system consists of one diesel oil storage
- tank, one transfer
- pump, one day tank, interconnecting piping, valves and associated instrumentation and control for each EDG ~
a, Diesel Oil Storage Tanks Each Diesel Oil Storage Tank (DOST) has an approximate capacity of 38,000 gallons, which is sufficient to operate a diesel at continuous load rating for a minimum of seven days.
Additional capacity is added to each tank, to provide the capability. of receiving a diesel'oil load (8,000 gallons) from.a transport vehicle without having to reduce the tank's inventory below the minimum Technical Specification requirements.
The concrete steel lined DOSTs are fabricated in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code Section VIII and meet seismic Category I requirements.
Materials or coatings containing aluminum add/or sine are not used for the construction or coating any tank surface that may be in contact with the fuel oil.
.The tanks are enclosed in a Seismic Category I building designed for protecting the tanks against posulated missiles.
The building is also designed for retaining the entire capacity of a tank in'he unlikely event of tank failpre.
5-2 0124L/0027L
TUMMY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERCENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT b.
Diesel Oil Transfer s
Onc Diesel Oil Transfer Pump is provided for each diesc2-generator.
The Diesel Oil Transfer Pump is designed ia accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III for Class 3 componeats aad meets se'iemic 'Category I requirements.
The pumps take suction from the diesel oil storage tanks'nd discharge into the diesel day tanks.
The nev pumps have enough capacity (approximately 10 CPM) for supplying diesel oi1 for at least tvo diesels at continuous load rating.
"I>
~ 'et
~ W
~
Each Diesel Oil Transfer Pump is povered from its associated diesel"generator.
h pump starts aad stops automatically on lov and high level signals respectively from its associated day tank.
h pump also can be operated manually, if required.
The acv (for Unit 4) and existing (for Unit 3) Diesel Oil Transfer Pump discharge lines are interconaected, which provides flexibilityof operat'on.
c.
Pi i and Valves The system pipiag external to the engiae skid is designed ia accordaace vith the requirements of the ASME Code Section III for Class 3 components aad meets Seismic Category I requiremeats.
The eagine mouated pipiag, as'a minimum, is desigaed and ana3.yted to meet the stresses specified by ANSI B31.1 Pover Piping.
Thc engine mounted pi,ping is designed to accommodate mechanical,
- pressure, thermal and seismic loads.
d.
Instrumentation and Control The folloving iastruneatatioa and controls are provided:
Local oil level aad temperature indication for each diesel oil storage tank aad loca1 oil level indication for the day tank.
Day Teak oil level svitches for providing Diesel Oil lov aad high level alarm in the Coatrol Room.
iii. Oil leve1 svitches for lov, lov-lov, high and high"high sigmdls ia the day tanks.
These signals are used to start and stop the Diesel Oil Transfer Pump and for thc opening and closing of the solenoid valve at the inlet of'ach day tank.
Thc lov-lov and high-high levels in the day tank are locally alarmed, vith a "Diesel Trouble" alarm in the Coatrol Room.
iv.
Oil prcssure and flov indications at'he Diesel Oil Traasf er Pump discharge.
5-3 0124L/0027L
TURRET POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EHERGZNCY POWER SYSTEH ENHANCEHENT REPORT Emer enc Diesel En ine Starti S
s tem The starting system for each diesel is comprised of two redundant systems which includes two air compressors (one diesel and one electzic motor driven), four air zeceivers, four air motors for cranking the engine, piping, valves and the requized instrumentation.
The electric motor driven air compressors operate automatically to maintain the required pressure in the air receivers Tha diesel driven compressor serves as backup for the electric motor driven compressor.
A filter, is provided at the compressor suction for preventing dust and foreign matter from entering the system.
The air receivers are sized to eniure that each redundant system has enough capacity, at the design pzessure setpoint, for cranking the cold diesel engine five times without the need for recharging.
The air receivers are designed in accordance with the requirements of the ASIDE Code Section III for Class 3
components and meet Seismic Categozy I requirements.
The start'ng system piping external to the engine skid is designed in accordance with requirements of the ASME Code Section III for Class 3 components, and meets Seismic Category I requirements.
The engine mounted piping> as a minimum, is designed and analyzed to meet the allowable stresses permitted by ANSI B31.1 Power Piping.
The analysis includea mechanical,
- pressure, thermal and seismic loads.
The material used for the fabrication of the air receivers and associated piping off the engine skid for the air starting system is stainless steel type 304 or 316.
Four aiz motors, two 100Z seta, are provided for cranking the diesel engine.
Each set of two motozs is supplied with air from a sepazate set of air receivers.
The following instrumentation is provided:
a.
Pressure indication at the compressor discharge, on each set of two air receivers, and at the headers supplying.the engine air motors.
b.
A pressure switch for each set of two air receivezs, providing s low pressure alarm.
Diesel Generator Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust S stem The air intake is located at approximately 32 feet above grade (see Figure 6).
The i+take is provided with multiple turns to prevent air entrained water from entering the diesel aiz intake.
Provision for draining the entrained water from the air intake is provided.
'I The air intake is designed and located as far as possible from the exhaust to ensure that dilution or contamination, of the intake air by the exhaust products will not preclude operation of the diesel engine at rated power output.
0124L/0027L
TtHKEf POINT UNITS 3 AND EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT Thc exhaust piping ie designed-ia accordance with requirements'f ANSI B31.1 and is seismically supported.
The exhaust pipe is eised in accordance vith the diesel-engine manufacturer recommendations to avoid excessive back pressure.
The portion of the exhaust piping located outside the Diesel Geaerator Building ie protected against missiles and possible clogging.
Diesel Generator Buildi Class 12 Ventilation Tvo redundant fans arc pxovided for supplying.the required ventilation of each svitchgear room ia the biesel Generator Building.
The faas are provided vith Class 1E motors end control power and are seismically qualified.
Air filtration. is provided with these ventilation systems.
A Class 1E fan is provided for the ventilation of each of thc control panel/MCC rooms.
Service Water and Demineralized Water S stems These systems are designed.in accordance vith ANSI $31.1 requirements.-
The service vatex piping is routed above ground outside the Diesel Generator Building aad thc demineralixcd vater system ie routed in trenches iaside the building.
The piping ia thc pipe trenches ie designed'o retaia structural integrity folloviag aa earthquake.
Service Air A service air ring header is pxovided in the Diesel Generator Building, vith a conaection outside the building for receiving air from.a portable compressor.
Diesel En iae Coolia Water S stem The diesel eagine cooling vater system consists of an expansion tank, circulating pumps,.threemay thermostatic control valve, water to air heat exchanger (radiator),
three electx'ic, direct-coupled, motor'riven cooling fans, standby immersion heater, piping, valves aad the xequired instrumentatioa.
Tvo engine-driven centrifugal pumps cix'culate vater through the closed loop system.
Aa electrical immereioa heater is provided for recirculating hot
- water, by convection, through the oil coolex'or staadby heating.
The temperature of the vater in the oil cooler is controlled automatically.by temperature svitches duriag standby.
An expaasion-tank is provided in the system to allov fox'xpansion and contraction of the vater due to changes ia temperature and also for water makeup capability.
The expansion tank is dcsigaed in accordaace vith the requirements of thc ASME Code Section VIII,aad meets seismic Category I requirements.
5 5 0124 L/0027L
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 hND 4 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHhNCEMENT REPORT The radiator ie designed in accordaace vith requirements of the hSME Code Section.VIII and meets seismic Category I requircmeats.
Piping ezterael to the engine skid aad radiator is designed ia accordance vith the requirements of 'thc hSME Code, Section IIIfor Class.3 componeate and meets seismic Category I rcquiremeats.
l The following instrumentation ie provided for monitoring the eagine.
cooling water system operation:
a.
Temperature Iadicatore f'r engine discharge-vater, lube oil cooler inlet aad outlet water, and radiator ialet aad outlet vater.
b.
Temperature Switches for engine water outlet high alarm, engine water outlet high temperature
- shutdovn, and lmmersioa heater control.
c.
Pressure Switch for low engine water pressure alarm aad shutdova.
d.
Level Switches for ezpaneion tank lov level alarm.
e.
Level Gauge for ezpaasion tank level.
Iastrumeatation ie provided vith readouts on the diesel coatrol paael or locally.
Diesel E
ine Lubrication S stem The engine lubrication system is a combinatioa of three systems:
the scavenging oil system, the main lubricating system and the piston cooling system.
Each system has its ovn positive displacement pump, driven from the accessories gear train at the froat of the engiae.
h soak back oil system is also provided, and each system is described belov.
a.
Scaveaging Oil System The scavenging oil system pump takes oil through the scavenging oil strainer from the oil sump.
The pump then forces the oil through the oil filter and oil cooler.
OQ. thea returns to the etraiaer housing to supply the main lube oil pump and piston cooling oil pump with cooled filtered oil.
Ezceee oil spills over a dam in the strainer housing and returns to the oil sump.
b.
Maia Lube Oil System The main lubricating system supplies oil under pressure to most of 'the moving parte of the engine.
The main lube oil pump takes oil from its strainer ia the strainer housing.
OQ. from the pump goes into 'the main oil manifold vhich ie located above the crankshaft, and ezteads thc length of the engine.
The ma)ority of the moving parts receive their oil from passages directly off 0124L/0027L
1 TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERCENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT the manifold.
An oil pressure line to the engine protective device and pressure gauge located on the engine panel is connected'to the top of the turbocharger oil manifold ad]oining the filter.
A Low Lube Oil pressure alarm sounds in the engine panel whenever pressure drops below approximately 40 psig.
c.
Piston Cooling Oil System The piston cooling oil system pump receives oil from its strainer and delivers oil to the two piston cooling oil manifolds extending the length of the eQine, one on each side.-
A piston cooling oil pipe at each cylinder directs a stream of oil to cool the underside of the piston crown and the ring belt.
Some of this oil enters the oil grooves in the piston pin bearing; the remainder drains out through holes in the carrier skirt to the sump.
d.
Soak Back Oil System In addition to the three lube oil systems discussed
- above, electric motor diiven (AC and DC) external lube oil pumps (the soak back pumps) are provided.
These run continuously to supply lube oil to the turbocharger bearings. for proper lubrication during emergency starts and coasting down of the unit, and also to maintain flow through. the main lube oil filter and cooler to pick up heat during standby condition.
To prevent possible overheating of the turbocharger, oil is autaaazically supplied to the turbocharger after stopping the engine.
The system design ensuies continuous oil flow through each of the supply headers.
The following instrumentation is provided for monitoring the engine lubricati.. " system operation:
a.
Temperature Indicators for lube oil cooler inlet and outlet.
I b.
Temperature Switches for low lube oil temperature and high lube oil temperature.
c.
Pressure Indicators'for"Standby Lube Oil Pressure and Lube Oil Pilter Inlet and Outlet.
d.
Pressure Switches for low standby pressure alarm, low engine pressure
- a1arm, low engine pressure shutdown and crankcase pressure.
'eadouts are provided on the diesel control panel or locally.
Engine lube oil piping is designed in accordance with the requirements of the ANSI B31.1.
This piping meet's Seismic Category I requirements.
5-7 0124L/0027L
TtlR3KZ POINT UNITS 3 AND BKRGKNCY POMER SYSTEH ENHANCEMENT REPORT 5'3 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM The existing plant fire protection system is extended to include the ncv structures and systems.
Thermal and ionization detectors are located at strategic points in the nev buildings for fire detection.
The fire water system for the-Diesel Generator Building is a completely automatic pre-action system vith capability for manual actuation.
Thc sprinkler system is pressurized only upon a signal( s) frow the detectoz(s).
The system for the diesel oil transfer pump rooms is of the vet pipe type.
The sprinkler systems azc designed ia accordance vith NFPA 13 aad designed to zetain structural integrity follovi~ an earthquake.
The fire detection system and the fire detectors arc ia compliance with NFPA 72D and 72E respectively and give an audible aad visual alarm aad annunciation in the maia control room.
The fize suppression system piping material,
- design, and installation are ia accordaace with NFPA 13 as veil as being seismically designed and supported.
Fire extinguishers, in accordance with NFPA 10, arc provided in areas that could present a fire exposure hazard to safety related equipmeat.
Redundant trains of safety related systems are separated fzom each other so both are not sub)ect to damage fzom a single fire hazard.
The diesel generators are separated from each other by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire -barriez and thc Diesel Generator Building is physically located remote from the other plant structures.
The construction of the enclosure's for the diesel oil transfer pumps provide a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rating.
The diesel generator day tanks have a capacity of 1'ess than 660 gal.
aad are designed ia accordance with the requirements of NFPh 37.
The Diesel Oil Storage Taaks are equipped vith a leak collectioa system draining to the associated diesel oil traasfer pump room oil collection sump.
The volume of'ach diesel oil traasfcr pump room is such that, combiaed vith thc associated ma'in diesel oil storage tank residual volume, they can contain the coatents of the maia storage tank.
Personnel access and escape routes are provided for in each fire area and fire exit routes arc clearly marked.
'ixed self"contained lightiag consisting of scaled beam uaits with minimum 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> battery povcr are provided in accordaace with 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.J The existing alteraate shutdown communication system is extended to iacludc the new buildiag.
The enhanced electrical power system is desigaed aad installed to ensure hat the capability for safe and alternate shutdovn (in ac'ccrdaace with IOCFRSO Appendix R, Sections III.G and III.L) is maintained.
h re-re'viev of the Appendix R Safe Shutdova Analysis, 'essential equipment listi cable routing/protection, etc., is conducted as thc design progresses to ensure this capability is maintained.
Aay specific fire protection (Appendix R) requiremeats are delineated within each EP.
0124L/0027L
TUN(KV POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 DKRQENCY PSKR SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT 5.4 APPLICABLE CODES AND STANDARDS Applicable Codes aad Standards are discussed above.
In addition, each Engineering Package (EP) villdetail the applicable codes and standards used for the design, installation, testing aad operation of the.new mechanical systems aad components.
5.5 HUMAN FACTORS REVIEW The enhancement prospect activities are being evaluated vith respect to NUREG&700 Human Pactors requirements and.guidelines via the controlled EP process.
The aev,equipment maintains similarity to the auuimum eztent possible of the nomenclature and arrangement for,ezistiag systems and components.
The control logic and the associated control components and monitoring instrumentation are designed as similarly as possible for the EDCs ia both Units.
0124L/0027L
TURK~ POINT UNITS 3 AND EMERGENCY POMER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT
- 6. 0 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND OBJECTIVES Thc implemeatatioa plan and ob]cctivcs are aa follovs:
a)
Install the two ncv EDCs with all support systems in the aev EDC building vithout impacting operation of the Uaits; b)
Install all thc nev equipment aad racevays to be located ia ezistiag buildiage without impacting the operation of the Units; c)
Tie-ia the acv EDGs, modify the ezisting EDCs *and modify the electrical trains during scheduled
- outages, thus minimizing the downtime of the Units, the impact oa operations, traiaiag, etart-up,-
. end complexity for implemeatation.
In order to meet the ob)ectivee of the'lan, the activities have been separated into pre-outage and outage activities.
Thc pre-outage activities include site preparation, construction of the nev EDG building and diesel oil storage tanks, installation of the aev EDGs and their auxiliary systems, and installation of electrical equipment, etc.
Pm outage activities include the tie-in of the nev EDGs, modification of the ezieti,ag EDGe and the modification of the electrical trains, plus compoaent/system testing aad safeguard testing.
i
- 6. 1 PRE-OUTAGE ACTIVITIES The pre-outage vork covers the site preparation for the construction of the nev building, building constructioa, iasta11atioa of diesel generators, diesel oil storage
- taake, fuel transfer system and electrical auziliary equipment to be located in the aev building.
The construction of the building aad, installation of thc equipment (EDGe, 4.16 kV Svitchgears, HCCs, etc) can bc accomplished independently aad vithout affecting pleat operations.
Construction pover, for powering loads duriag erectioa aad testing, vill be provided from noamital buses or aa outside source such that ao aev plant loads are added.
The pre-outage vork also includes the insta1lation of the aev equipment that viU. be located in the ezisting buildings.
This equipment iacludes new 480V Load Centers, Motor Control Centers, and 125 V DC distribution panels.
Racevay installation, cable pulliag and terminations for the above described equipment caa also bc implemented to a certain extent, ia preparation for the outages.
I The testing of the aev compoaents including the Emergency Diesel Generators vill.be discussed ia a later submittal.
- 6. 2 OUTAGE ACTIVITIES Both Units vill be shut dovn in order to tie-in the nev ZDGe, modify the ezistiag EDGe and separate aad iasta11 thc load eequeacers.
The implcmeatatioa of these modifications is requited oa a pcr-train basis (train A and thea train B) to ensure the availability of equipment required for plant conditions.
6-1 0124L/0027L
EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT The tie-in of the 4A EDG to the Unit 4 Train h electrical auxiliary system also includes the associated tie"ins of the 4.16 kV svitchgear 4D, 4SOV Load Center 4H, the connection of MCCs 4J to Load Centers 4A and the relocytion of associated Train A LZids to load center 4H, and switchgear 4D.
Simultaneous to the tie-in of the 4A EDC the EDC (f3) presently supplying power to buses 3h and 4A vill be modified and sequencers 3A and 4A repLaced.
The train 3A modifications vill include the associ'ated Train A tie-ins of the 4.16 kV switchgear 3D, 480V Load Center 3H, and the relocation of loads.
Upon completion of train 3h and 4A modifications, including satisfactory system testing, the tie-f.n of the diesel generator to the electrical system and the modifications to the Unit 3 Train B electrical system can be initiated.
The activities for modifying trains 3B and 4B are similar to those described for trains 3A and 4A except for the relocating of the loads to MCC 4D.
Following completion of the modifications required, an integrated safeguards test will be performed prior to returning either Unit to service.
P a.
~
6-2 0124L/0027L
TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EMERGENCY POMER SYSTEH ENHANCEMENT REPORT 7.0 BENEFITS OF PLANT ENHANCEMENT Section 1.4 of thih report provided background information as to how FPL arrived at the tfecision to install two new 'additional EDGs at the Turkey Point site,'and the goals envisioned for the enhanced electrical configuration.
Based on the descriptions and discussions provided in Sections 2.0 through 6.0,'his Section summarizes how the enhanced design meets the goals set for the pro)ect.
7.1 INCREASE EDG CAPACITY As indicated in Section 4.3, and as depicted on Table 2, the addition of two new emergency diesel generators improves overall plant safety by essentially doubling the installed emergency power capacity for Units 3 and 4.
This enables the addition of loads desired to be backed up by emergency power such as plant investment loads without approaching the established load limits for the EDG-'s.
The automatic swing bus arrangement allows the loading of specified Engineered Safety Features equipment even with the failure of one emergency diesel.
As indicated in Section 4.3, and as depicted on Table 2, each required safeguards load remains on its existing train, each of which is now supplied from an emergency diesel generator.
Failure of one emergency diesel generator leaves the remaining diesel generators providing power to those loads on the unaffected train's.
Therefore with the enhanced design more EDG capacity is available for the operation of engineered safety'eatures.
Thus, overall plant safety is improved.
7.2 REDUCE OPERATOR ACTIONS As noted in Section 1.3, the existing Safety Evaluation for EDG loading (Reference
- 7) includes, among other items, several operator actions for the manual control of specified plant system loads to accommodate defined loading limitations (e.g.,
securing an RHR pump on the accident Unit at 30 minutes etc.).
In addition, the Safety Evaluation takes, credit for several plant modifications which ensure that previous'uto-connected loads would be disabled (e.g.,
the Instrument Air Compressors, the turbinemelated loads, etc.).
Some of these disabled loads require operator action to restore thea onto the EDG(s) when the EDG loading scenario allows such additional loads.
The enhanced design provides more capacity, as depicted on Table 2, to allow automatic loading of equipment onto the EDGs without approaching the established load limit. In addition, the enhanced design allows the operator to manually load equipment-on the EDGe without an undue concern of'exceeding the established load limit.
The extra capacity provided will enable fewer operator actions to be required if additional loads are changed over to become automatic loads (which FPL is reviewing as the design progresses);
By reducing operator action associated with load management activities, overall plant safety is enhanced.
7-1 0124L/0027L
0 TUMZY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 EHERGENCY POWER SYSTEH ENHANCEMENT REPORT 7.3 ACCOMMODATE SINGLE FAILURE By inspectioaiof thc AC aad DC oae-linea (Figures l,and 2) in con]unction with a reviev of.thc four"EDG loading results givea in Table 2, 'and based on the diecueeiona provided in Section 4.3, it caa be seen that a single failure ia more easily accommodated.
With the enhanced configuration, a postulated single active failure under design basis accident conditions during two%nit operation vould leave at least thzee 4.16kV busses energized betveen the tvo Unite.
During tvo-Unit operation, it v0uld take tvo single failures td result in only one energized 4.16 kU bue on each Uait.
Bccausc of this capability, overall plant safety is cnKanced.
The design is undergoing zeviev to cnsurc that if equipmcnt is taken out of service each Unit can etiU. meet thc single failure criterion.
,7. 4 MINIMIZE MAINTENANCE/TESTINC DQWNTLW From a reviev of the AC aad DC one"linc diagzams (Figures 1 and 2) it caa be seen that the enhanced electrical coafiguration provides the capability to rcmove a component'rom service for maiatenance'r testing without affecting the availability of redundant counterparts.
The nev design vill thereby minimize the potential for forced plant outages which arc necessary vith the czisting electrical system configuration.
By zcducing the impact on redundant counterparts aad increasing the potential for periods of stable pleat operation, overall plant safety is enhanced.
- 7. 5 SAPECUARDS TESTING At present, both Units are shutdown to perform an integrated Safcguards test oa either unit since the availability of loads required for normal plant operation may be affected by testing.
With the enhanced
- design, safeguards tcstiag is morc eisily accommodated since the operability of the other unit ie not affected.
The enluLnced EPS with its increased capacity and load distribution diversity ensures that thc non-tested unit vill have sufficient equipment available for
'oth normal operation and accident mitigation while thc other unit is undergoiag testing.
7.6 ACCOMMODATE PIhNT NEEDS Table 2 aad the discussions in Sectioa 4.3 indicate that the enhanced design allovs manual or automatic loads to be imposed oa each EDC vithout approaching evea the short time rating (llOX of the continuous rating).
For ezample, up to 300 kW of plant investment loads, both ICW
- pumps, both RHR pumps, ctc. arc assumed loaded ontq the EDGs with margin still available to reach the coatiauoue rating kW loadiag.
Since Table 2 vas geacratcd to show potentially heavy loads
'on each EDG, and since it can be seen that additional margin exists even with the loadings postulated, it is apparent that present and fu'ture pleat needs for.
EDC-supported loads can be accommodated.
7~2 0124L/0027T
TUMum POINT UNITS 3 ue 4 EHKRCENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT
- 7. 7 MINIMIZEIMPLEHENThXION DOWNTIME hs can be seen from the discussions in the previous Section 6.0, the Unit and/or pleat dovntime required to install and to implement the modificationa ia being ainimised~to,.t~gaat;-~aetiea1-';~fm"=;tu -..
Section 6.0
7.8 CONCLUSION
S
,jul Based on the information presented'n this r'epor't, it can be.concluded; that the EPS Zahmcesent.Pro)ect vive-'-:further serve-to"ensure the safe and reliable operation of Turkey Point Unita 3 p.4.
hdditionally, ita'.
implementation can be-performed in a manner vhere5j 'safety of the units is assured at all times.
I It'is expected that. future~analysis vill demonst'rate that plant operation under the enhanced"EPS=MX~X"--be"bounce'Q current FRQC accident, analyses.
Detailed evaluations supporting this conclusion together vith revised" plant Technical Specifications vill be the sub)ect of future submittals.
7-3 0124L/0027L
\\
TnuQY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4
'MERGENCY POWER SYSTEM ENHANCEMENT REPORT 4w TABLE'1 LOOP PLUS LOCA PLUS EDG FAILURE ONE EDG AVAIIABLE 0 - 30 MINUTES n
HHSI RHR CS CCM (Accident Unit)
CCM (Hot Shutdown Unit)
ICV (Accident Unit)
ICV (Hot Shutdown Unit)
Normal Containment Coolers Emergency Containment Coolers Emergency Containment Filters Battery Chargers Charging Pump Pressurizer Heaters Turbine Loads Emergency Lighting Control Room AC Bh Heat Tracing 8DG Auxiliaries Miscellaneous Loads Load Center Transformer Losses Battery Room AC H2 Analyzer Related Security Building Transformer Computer Room/Cable Sprdg.
Room AC Boric Acid Pump EDC LOAD*
EVALUATION 604 e~~~,,~,.224!
223 380 380 265 265 0
44 104 0
114 0
0 31 54 40 17 8
14 22 14 8
0 0
95Z Total Pump le Correction 2811
-51 2760 PTPN 3 4
4 at Pover, SIS on PTPN 3, EDC h fails; see Subsections 1.3 and 2'
0124L/0027L
eeeee 1
EDG IM LOAM FOE LOOt rLVS LOCA TWO-NNIT OpcRATION (II
)
ONPOMINT ldl LOADS I A
D rOE
)
acna TO'IIECTIO<<4.3 DISCNSSIO<<5 IQc LOOP + 515 EPC 3A EPG 3b Pcs LOOP OHLT EPG iA EDG ib ISISI CS CCM (Acc14eac Unit)
CCN (Hoc Sbucdnw Qaic)
ICM (Accideac Daft)
ICM (Hot 5hucdona Daft)
Hocael Onataf meac Coolers Eaorgescy Cootofmost Coolers
~serg>>say Coatefcaeat yfltore battery Cbergero Cbergfsg puap praesuriaer Heaters Turbine leeds lee cgascy Lightiag Coatcol Eeos AC
~A Heat Trscfag EDC Auaf if aries Itfscoliaaseuo Loads Leod Coster Transformer Loosen battery Esca)
AC H2 Aaalyber Heisted Sfarfty g ildiag was toa r
Ceaputer Ha/Cebfs gpcdg goo>> Au
~orle Acid 30$
22$
225 350 N/A 270 N/A N/A 50/2$
130/4$
75/2$
N/A NIA
~oe plaat 20 30/0 N/A 20 2$
10 2$/0 10 N/A 30$
21$
115 380 N/A 270 NIA NIA 25/$0 45/130 1$/75 N/A NIA I>>vest>>eat 30/40 N/A 20 15 10 0/25 10 (40)
N/A 12$
N/A NIA 340 NIA 270 19$ /130 N/A NIA 7$I2$
(11$ )
(150)
~ee pleat 20IO 30 (1$/0) 110 2$
10 10 10 (40)
(40/30) 30$
115 N/A N/A 340 N/A 270 45/130 N/A N/A 15/75
'115)
(1$0)
Iarea Iseat 0/20 (0/15) 110 1$
10 10 (0/30)
Vnrfeo depea4fag oa loa4 Higher LM oa EDC 3A It lose ot LC 3D esfags getci Ea.
One Train per Qait required independent toe4 tres offelte peer~r One Train Annually loede4 Henwfly loededf Ines ot LC iP suf ago SA afar pasp 4 ~
(
AC A (IHX 30)
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(IHX iD)
Only coo IOISI puspe requfred tor eccfdeac llafc Oofy on<<EHE puap per Unit required Paly one CS puap requfred on occident Daft Only one CCM pvsp required Paly ono CCM pusp ro9 fred Only onn ICM pyap required 7~-
Paly one ICM pusp ro)Iufred Nigher LV loe4 oa EDC iA lt lose ot LC iD sufags, NCC ig (NCC gg)
Hfgher kV os EDC 3A ft lose of LC 3D e)))fags ECC 3C (IgeC 3D)
)
'igher kM oa EDC 3A it loss ot LC 3D eufnge ECy Q (ICC 3D)
HCCe 35, 3C, 3D, ig, iC, iD poser b battery chirgers (4 retuf'i>>~)
)"i.
Henually loede4 tor bot ahutdow ECS Inventory coatrolf one rc)f.
Ifenuelly'oede4 tor bot ehutdcwa RCS pc>>cours co>>troll osa reg.
plant fnveteat loe4s iacl turbine loads, both aasuel 4 process-auto.
Hfghr bM load oa EDC iA it lone of LC iD <<)ags larg Ltg UIO 412 (HCC 40)f Higher IM on EDC 3A it lose ot LC 30 ssfags CEAC C (ICC 3D)
Noc ro)iufrode seouel load; lose ot LC iD sufags EA Ht Tr E (NCC iD)
J Eecfanced Eetfantnd e)eee reeeeeeeee toale (eee.)
~))n
))N)
LAECEST tOTAL EN LOADINGI 1950 2170 (facludlsg mouel loads)
(loon ot (Trois g LC 3D) elfga.)
))50)
<)00) 1235 (loco of IC iD) 2190 (Trsfa ~
aliga.)
EDC Coatf<<roue Eatfag (ac<<.)
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~ctunlly coacurreat loe4e.
- 4) Actor to Sectfos ie3o
- 5) The aeofg)<<nnt ot loads tp LCe ea4 CCe fs still befog evaluated tor
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Multiple addresses October 2, 1989 The Electrical Systems Branch has been, and will continue to be, deeply involved in reviewing the licensee s submittals and is preparing necessary SER(s).
Our January 11, 1989 memorandum alerted you that there may be review needed in other disciplines also, although we have not identified any specific area needing review (other than ESB).
However, possibilities include. Plant Systems, Structural, IKC, Fire Protection, Reactor
- Systems, and Safeguards.
I request you provide by October 20, 1989 a memorandum which either confirms that no additional staff review is required in your area, or identifies the review required and the name of the reviewer assigned.
A copy. of the licensee's 6/23/88 design report 'is enclosed for your information.
Enclosures:
1.
Li'censing Approach 2.
FPL Design Report cc w/enclosures:
F.
Rosa C. McCracken S.
Newberry P.
McKee C.
Y.
Cheng L. B. March G. Bagchi F. Miraglia Gordon E. Edison, Sr. Project Manager Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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