ML20213H173

Economic Benefits of Nuclear Phase Out

ML20213H173
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	08/31/1986
From:	Kriesberg J Public Citizen's Critical Mass Energy Project
To:
Shared Package
ML20213F158	List: ML20213F156 ML20213H155 ML20213H173
References
NUDOCS 8611190135
Download: ML20213H173 (14)

Text

'

.. , (y95

• /Vi h { lN [

THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF A NUCLEAR -

PHASE OUT W ghI[

By Joseph Kriesberg Public Citizen ECEticafWaYs", Energy Project 215 Pennsylvania Ave., SE Washington, DC 20003 202-546-4996 August 1986 In the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, Americans are looking to prevent a similar accidens from ever happening in the United States. Many citizen groups and government officials now realize that the only way to avoid,this danger is to rapidly phase out nuclear power by cancelling plants under con.ctruction and closing existing plants.

A Washington Post /ABC News poll taken a month after the Chernobyl accident found that 78% of the American public oppcsac any new nuclear plants, and 41% of the public supports phasing out existing plants.[1]

Is it possible to phase out nuclear power? Could we still meet demand for electricity? Can we afford to close already existing plants? A quick' review of some key facts suggests that the answer to these questions is yes.

Nuclear Power is Not Needed to Meet Current Demand:

• In 1985, Nuclear power supplied just 15.5% of the electricity consumed in the United States.[2] That was equivalent to just 5.6% of all the energy used in the United States.[3]

l

• In 1985, the utility industry also had 33.3% more This generating capacity than necessary to meet peak demand.[4]

figure might have been even higher had utilities not retired old but functional capacity in order to justify adding new nuclear plants to their rate base.[5]

• Even if no nuclear plants had operated in 1985, the l

utility industry would have had an average reserve margin of 16%.

l The industry considers a 15'20% reserve margin necessary to ensure reliable service.[6] While this figure does not account l

for regional variations, it does suggest that many plants could

! be closed immediately.

l

• The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) temporarily l closed its Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) nuclear unit WNP 2 for over three months earlier this year because excess hydroelectric power was less expensive. BPA expected to save 8611190135 861007 PDR ADOCK 05000250 I H PDR 1

4 . , ,

nearly $2 million during the shutdown.[7]

• In 1985, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) closed all five (5) of its nuclear plants for safety reasons, and was able All five to continue meeting demand without any shortages.[8]

plants were still closed as of August 1986.

• Some analysts in the nuclear industry argue that nuclear power is needed to meet demand for electricity which they project Yet even the electric will grow by 4-5% over the next decade.[9]about 2.1% [10] and some utility industry only projects growth at analysts forecast growth rates of 1% or lower.[ll]

Nuclear Power is no Bargain:

The nuclear industry claims that nuclear power is a cheap source of power, and that we cannot afford to cancel nuclear plants under construction, much less close down existing plants.

Numerous studies and facts, however, suggest otherwise.

• A 1984 study estimated that the 29 nuclear plants still under construction will ultimately cost consumers a total of $112 billion more than power from other sources.[12]

• In 1984, the Atomic Industrial Forum said that electricity from nuclear plants cost an average of 4.1 cents per kW-h compared to 3.4 cents per kW-h for coal.[13]

• New nuclear plants are even more expensive.

A 1984 study estimated that 24 of the 49 plants under construction at that time would cost 15 cents per kW-h or more.[14] The study estimated, for example, that power generated by the Shoreham nuclear plant on Long Island would, if it went on line, cost 26 cents per kW-h. Over the lifetime of the facility Long Island consumers would, according to the report, pay $5.9 billion more for their electricity than if power was supplied by other sources.[15]

Even Operating Plants are Expensive:

The nuclear industry claims that once a nuclear plant is completed it is relatively cheap to operate.[16] Although the industry is correct that construction costs are the single largest cost component for nuclear power, operating a plant once its complete is becoming inc,reasingly expensive:

• While nuclear plants were originally expected to operate approximately 80% of the time, the industry's actual experience has been that nuclear plants only operate 60.1% [17] Frequent outages require utilities to maintain large reserve margins (e.g.

extra plants to supply replacement power when nuclear plants are not operating) which, in turn, further increases costs to ratepayers.

• The nuclear industry estimates that the average 2

L

." production costs" for nuclear power are less than 2 cents per kW-h.[18] However, the full cost to operate a completed nuclear plant, depending on the ultimate cost to close down the facility and to dispose of its waste, may be over 6 cents per kW-h.[19]

(see table opposite page)

• Fuel costs for nuclear power equal about .7 cents per kw-h.[20]

• Operating & maintenance costs average about $60 million per year for a 1000 MW reactor or approximately 1.1 cents per kW-

h. These costs are increasing by 12% a year above inflation.[21]

• The cost for undertaking major repairs totals approximately $50 million per year for a 1000 MW reactor. These repairs are called capital additions and their costs are added to the utility's rate base allowing the utility to earn a profio for these investments. As a result these repairs eventually cost ratepayers about 1.3 cents per kW-h. Moreover, the cost for

~

capital additions increasing by 12% per year above inflation.[22]

• The cost to permanently dispose of nuclear waste is uncertain but estimates range from 0.1 cents to 1.5 cents per kw-h.[23] The nuclear industry's past record for underestimating nuclear construction costs suggest the higher figure will likely prove correct.

• The cost to decommission nuclear plants (i.e. close them down after they stop operating) is unknown since no large nuclear plant has ever been decommissioned in the United States.

Estimates range from $50 million to $3 billion (1985 dollars) per reactor (depending, in part, on reactor size).[24] If decommissioning a 1000 MW reactor ultimately costs $3 billion this would equal nearly 2 cents for each kW-h generated over a thirty year lifetime assuming a 60% capacity factor.[25]

Other Costs Add to the Bill for Nuclear Power:

Society must also pay other costs for nuclear power which do not show up in utility bills.

• Eederal subsidi w to nuclear power equalled $15 billion in 1984 [26] alone or nearly 5 cents for each kW-h of electricity generated by nuclear power plants that year.[27]

• According to a 1980 department of Energy study, utility ratepayers would pay one and one-half to two times more for nuclear electricity if there were no federal subsidies.[28]

• A worst-case accident at a nuclear plant could cost over

$100 billion, not including loss of life and human suf fering, according to a 1982 government study.[29]

According to a former Pennsylvania Insurance Commisssioner, the government imposed cap on industry liability 3

for nuclear accidents via the Price Anderson Act seves utilities approximately $10 to $20 million per reactor year in insurance costs. This equals about 0.2 to 0.4 cents per kW-h.[301 Ratepayer Savings From Early Retirement:

By tiring nuclear plants early, utilities and thgir ratepayers cppkq g entially save millidE,Cofit g a[s1 While tttr1 tie's that close tEEii- Tauclear plaffts would have to obtain power from other sources, these costs would likely be less than the savings achieved by early retirement. (The costs for alternative energy sources are discussed on pages ???J, In short, the savings could pay for power from other sources. _ Early 7-[f I #

retirement would eliminate or reduce the following costs:

/;E sq

• Closing plants early would eliminate all costs for fuel, O&M and capital additions. These costs total approximately 3 cents per kW-h (see above). ppg gjg g

/* a -

cost to

• No additional dispose waste of this would waste couldbebegenerated avoided. and therefore While the the /*'9/Ml h-/{*

current DOE waste disposal fee equals just 0.1 cents per kW-h it could rise to as much as 1.5 cents per kW-h or more.[31]

Utilities would also save additional expenses for temporary storage of high level waste (which becomes more difficult and expensive as waste accumulates) and for disposing of low level waste.

i

• Decommissioning costs can be significantly reduced by early retirement. While these savings will be greater for new plants, even those that have operated for 10 or more years could achieve substantial savings. For example, a 1984 report found that retiring the 12 year old Robinson II Nu, clear plant would reduce decommissioning costs by 16%.[32]

• For some plants ratepayers could also receive savings because utilities would be unable to earn a profit on their nuclear investment if the plant were closed. Many states only allow utilities to earn a profit on investments that are "used and useful," that is they provide electrical service. For new and more expensive plants which required a large investment this could result in significant savings for ratepayers.[33]

4

v .. .,

SUPPLYING POWER FROM EXISTING NUCLEAR PLANTS THE TRUE BILL

• EXPENSE .

COST IN CENTS PER KW-H Standard Operating and Maintancence 1.1 Fuel O.7 Capital Additions 1.3 Waste disposal O.1 - 1.5 Decommissioning 0.1 - 1.9**

Utility profits on construction costs 0.0 - ?.? ,

TOTAL 3.3 - 6.5 OTHER COSTS Insurance without Price Anderson cap O.2 - 0.4 Federal subsidies *** 4.8 +/ - - - ~ -

T

• This table does not include the cost to build a nuclear plant, nor the cost for transmission lines and other facilities necessary to get the power to the consumer. Rather, it represents the potential savings from closing a plant early or cancelling plants already completed. It offers a benchmark for comparing the cost to continue operating existing nuclear plants to the cost for alternatives such as conservation and renewable energy.

• • Once a p. ant has operated for even a few months shutting the plant down is unlikely to save 1.9 cents per kW-h, and forHowever, older plants the savings, if any, are likely to be much less.

such savings may be possible for utilities with plants which are complete but not yet operating (e.g. the Shearon Harris plant in North Carolina or the Seabrook plant in New Hampshire).

• • • Many of these subsidies are for building nuclear In plants fact, and could not be eliminated by retiring a plant early.

taxpayers may see increased costs if plants are shutdown because utilities will write off their nuclearAinvestments as losses 1983 report by the Energy thereby reducing their tax bills.

Information Administration (Nuclear Plant Cancellations: Causes, Costs and Consequences, April 1983, Washington, DC) found that

'. taxcavers absorb d 40% of the costs for investments in nuclear t

plants caEffe7

- -m - gy,gring honsTIuTt g,w a u samw ' E ." " ****" " " ",* * "

/

L k. O j

8 4 Improved Efficiency can Greatly Reduce Demand For Electricityr While closing nuclear plants would generate many sa.vings, utilities would still have to supply power to their customers.

This would require utilities to pay for other resources which can ensure reliable electrical service.

Energy effici f cheap and 7

abundant alTeiT5 h~ "

ye,AQ

,gncy ,mgas,ur,c,s,py puclear power.- vide a,sa eyNew fechnol'ogies, such as eW67~y~IifYEEiEnt 9 light bulb IEEd'EfpTisnces, reduce the demand for electricity while providing the same (or an improved) level of service to the consumer. These savings can reduce, and potentially eliminate, the need for nuclear power, and in many cases would cost less than just operating a nuclear plant.

Moreover, these measures can be brought on line much faster than conventional resources such as nuclear and coal fired power plants. A few examples illustrate the potential for energy conservation.

-

• A 1981 federal study found that energy efficiency improvements could eliminate the need for any new power plants from 1985 to 2000.[34]

• Improvements in energy efficiency technologies since the early 1980s suggest that total electrical demand could ultimately be reduced by 75% for less than 2 cents per kW-h.[35] The average cost for electricity in the U.S. is about 6.5 cents per KW-h. /

• By using the most efficient refrigerators, electric water heaters, and air conditioners now on the market, electrical demand could be reduced by the equivalent of 40 large nuclear ,,__)

plants.[36]

i

• According to a recent study, in Texas alone, 10 nuclear power plants could be replaced by implementing efficiency measures that cost under 8 cents per kW-h. (The average cost of these measures would be much lower.)[37] In contrast, power supplied by the South Texas Nuclear Project, which is scheduled to come on line next year, will cost over 20 cents per kW-h.

• A 1985 study found that by investing in energy efficiency, Commonwealth Edison in Chicago could reduce electrical demand by 44% at a cost below 2 cents per kW-h; less than average operating and fuel costs for a nuclear plant.[38]

• A recent study for Pacific Gas & Electric in California found that currently available technologies could reduce peak demand in the residential sector 31% by the year 2005.

Technologies likely to be developed in the future could reduce peak residential demand by 56%[39] '

• While all five of its nuclear plants are closed down, the Tennessee Valley Authority has implemented conservation programs which have so far saved over 1000 MW of capacity -- the 6

2

equivalent of one large nuclear plant. By 1990, TVA's programs are expected to save approximately $3.5 billion.[40]

Small Power Sources Provide More Power Than Ever Before:

Small power sources also provide safe and affordable options for replacing nuclear power. Since 1978, small power systems and cogeneration have been the fastest growing sources of electricity in the United States. That year, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) requiring utilities to buy power from independent producers whenever that power is less expensive than power generated by the utility itself.

• Since 1980, dozens of nuclear power plants totalling approximately 60,000 have been cancelled. During the same period private entrepeneurs have filed thousands of projects with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) totalling 28,641 megawatts of capacity.[41]

• Since 1979, nearly 3,000 MW of small power capacity, the equivalent of 3 nuclear power plants, has come onInline in contrast, California alone at a cost of 6 cents per kW-h.

California's two Diablo Canyon nuclear plants, which will supply just 2200 MW of capacity, took more than twice as long to build and will cost nearly 12 cents per kW-h.[42]

• In Maine, the Public Utilities Commission now expects small power sources to supply 30% of the state's energy needs by 1988.[43]

• In Texas, after Houston Lighting and Power announced a need for 600 MW of cogeneration (i.e. the simultaneous production of electricity and heat by private industries), it received offers for over 6000 MW [44] at an average cost below 5.3 cents per kW-h.[45]

• In 1985, cogeneration supplied 7% of the electricity consummed in the U.S., up from just 5% the year before.[46]

• A recent report estimated that small scale cogeneration j

could potentially supply 77,300 MW of capacity -- enough to replace all currently operating nuclear plants. While t

forecasting that at least 4000 MW of capacity will actually be on line by 2000, the report found that most systems are cost effective wherever electric, rates are above 6 cents per kW-h.[47]

• Small scale renewable energy technologies -- not counting cogeneration or large hydro -- now provide the equivalent of more i than 2 nuclear power plants. By 1990, these sources are expected to supply the equivalent of 15 large nuclear plants.[48]

The U.S. Can Phase Out Nuclear Power With Sound Energy Planning:

l The high cost of nuclear power and the widespread avail-

ability of low-cost alternatives suggest that closing existing i

! 7 L

nuclear power plants is not just possible, but could save consumers, businesses and taxpayers millions of dollars. This was the conclusion of a-1984 study by Energy Systems Research Group (ESRG) which found that immediately closing the 12 year old Robinson 2 nuclear plant would save ratepayers at least $50 million.[49]

The most effective and cost-efficient way for utilities to phase-out nuclear power is through "least-cost" energy planning.

A least-cost energy strategy uses the cheapest options available for meeting electrical demand, including conservation and renewable energy. In several states, such as Wisconsin, Nevada and California, utilities already use least-cost strategies for meeting future demand growth.[50]

In Austin, Texas, for example, the local utility is building a " conservation power plant"; that is, the city is implementing These a

series of programs designed to reduce electrical demand.

programs will replace power that was expected to come from t he city's 16% share of the South Texas Nuclear Project (400 MW) which Austin currently plans on selling.[51] The conservation power plant is expected to reduce demand by 553 MW over the next 15 years. The programs are already providing 56 MW of savings,[52] while the South Texas project, originally intended to go on-line in 1980, will not produce power for at least another year.[53] ,__  ;

Despite the potential savings from closing nuclear plants early, most utilities do not examine this option. Even those utilities that develop least-cost energy plans tend to focus on the need for new capacity and not the potential benefits of closing down existing plants. When existing plants are examined, utility cost-benefit studies generally ignore many costs As a result, existing nuclear associated with nuclear power.

plants are included in least-cost plans even though their true cost to ratepayers, and society in general, is much higher than the cost of available alternatives.

While calculating the exact cost of nuclear power may be difficult, least-cost planning does provide a mechanism for comparing how much electricity would cost if nuclear plants were closed down. Comparing the true cost of nuclear power to the costs for a full range of available options will likely show that retiring nuclear plants early would actually lower electricity bills. The total costs to society would certainly be reduced.

5 8

t NOTES

[1] "78% of Americans Balk at New Nuclear Reactors," The Washington Post, May 24, 1986. ,

[2] Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF), " Nuclear Power Facts and Figures," April 1986, p. 1-2, 7101 Wisconsin Ave., Bethesda, MD 20814, (301-654-9260).

[3] Atomic Industrial Forum, Supra N. 2.

[4] This information was supplied by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) based on data Data from will the North American Electric be published in the 1985 Reliability Council (NERC).

Electric Power Annual Report. Contact Mr. Tobic at EEI, 1111 19th St., NW, Washington, DC 20036 (202-828-7457).

[5] Charles Komanoff, " Electric Utility Demand in1985, the Coming12, Decades," Electric Potential, Volume 2, No. 1, p.

Komanoff Energy Associates, 270 Lafayette St., Suite 902, New

- York, NY 10012, (212-334-9767).

[6] According to the data supplied by EEI (see Note 3), The installed capacity margin in 1985 was 153,266 MW. Nuclear power

. supplied 78,799 MW of capacity. Without nuclear Based capacity the on a national installed margin would have been 74,467 MW.

peak load of 460,503 MW the reserve margin would have equaled 16.1%.

[7] "BPA Moves to Slash Rates to Calif.; Falling Fuel Prices 3.

Spur Electric Utility Week, March 24, 1986, p.

Competition,"

[8] Tennessee Valley Authority, 1985 Power Program Summary Volume 1, December 1985, p. 22, Director of Information, TVA, Knoxville, TN 37902.

[9] Statement of John R. Siegel, Atomic Industrial Forum and John O. Sillin, Alexander' Grant Co. before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, July 25, 1985, 385 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510.

[10] Survey of electric utilities conducted by National Electrical Manufacturers Association as reported in Inside EPA, June 6, 1986, p. 13, 2101 'L' St., NW, Washington, DC 20037.(202-457-8400).

[11] Statement of Jan Beyeal National Audubon Society before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, July 25, 1985, 950 3rd Ave., New York,.NY 10022 (212-852-3200).

[12] Alan Nogee, Rate Shock Confronting the Cost of Nuclear Power, October 1984, appendix B, Environmental Action Foundation, 1525 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036, (202) 745-4778. (The study found that total excess costs for all 49 plants under construction at that time would equal $191 billion.)

9 u

k

[13] Atomic Industrial Forum, supra N. 2.

[14] Alan Nogee, supra N. 12, Appendix A. .

[15] Alan Nogee, Supra N. 12, Appendix A and Appendix B.

[16] Atomic Industrial Forum, News Release, September 13, 1985, (AIF states "the nuclear fuel-cost advantage . . . motivates utilities to operate their nuclear units preferentially over coal units.")

[17] Atomic Industrial Forum, supra N. 2, (While nuclear plants are available for operation 65.1% of the time they actually operate just 60.1% of the time. In contrast, coal units are available to operate over 80% of the time.

[18] Atomic Industrial Forum, supra N. 2. The AIF estimates that fuel plus operating and maintenance costs total 1.7 ce'nts per kW-

h. This figure is based on the lower estimates for waste

- disposal (e.g. 0.1 cents /kWh) and decommissioning (generally Also, the below 0.1 cents /kWh and in some cases 0.0 cents /kW-h).

figure does not include costs for major repairs or capital additions, because these costs are added to the utility's rate

. base.

[19] This figure is based on totaling the costs for operating and maintenance (1.1 cents /kW-h), fuel (0.7 cents /kW-h), capital additions (1.3 cents /kW-h), waste disposal (1.5 cents /kW-h) and decommissioning (1.9 cents /kW-h). See notes 20 - 25.

The costs for waste disposal and decommissioning represent the upper range of current cost estimates (see notes 22, 23).

The nuclear industry uses the lowest current estimates for these costs. However, in the past, the industry has greatly underectimated future costs. According to the Worldwatch Institute, "[20ecent U.S. nuclear power plant construction costs total 5 to 10 times original projections." Moreover, the Rand Corporation estimates that large scale engineering projects generally cost four time more than initial estimates. (Edward Merrow, et. al., A Review of Cost Estimation in New Technologies:

Implications for Energy Process Plants, Rand Corporation, 1970).

Therefore, the higher cost estimates used here could very well prove more accurate.-

[20] Atomic Industrial Forum, supra N. 2.

[21] Personal communication with Charles Komanoff, August 5, 1986, based on data presented in testimony to the Illinois Commerce Commission on behalf of the Illincts Citizen's Utility Board, in the Clinton 1 investigation on July 9, 1986. (see note 5 for address)

[22] Charles Komanoff, Supra N. 21.

[23] Paul Raskin, Electric Rate Consequences of Retiring the 10 L

j '.

!- Robinson 2 Nuclear Power Plant, January 20, 1984, p. 72, Energy System Research Group (ESRG). 120 Milk St., Boston, MA 02109,

(617-426-5844). .

I [24] Cynthia Pollock, Decommissioning: Nuclear Power's Missing Link, Worldwatch Paper 69, April 1986, p. 6, Worldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036.

[25] There are 8760 hours0.101 days <br />2.433 hours <br />0.0145 weeks <br />0.00333 months <br /> in a year and a 1000 MW power plant operating at a 60% capacity factor generates 600,000 kilo-watts per hour or 5,256,000,000 kW-h per year. $3 billion divided by 30 years equals $100 million per year. $100 million divided by 5.256 billion kW-h equals $0.0190 per kW-h. The actual impact on rates would depend on several factors including when money is

collected, what accounting methods are used, inflation rates and

,! interest rates.

[26] H. Richard Heede, et. al., The Hidden Costs of Energy, October 1985, p. 10, The Center for Renewable Resources, 1001 i

- Connecticut Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036, (202) 466-6880.

l f

[27] By dividing the estimated subsidy ($15.56 billion) by the

, number of kW-h generated in 1984 (317,225,268,000 kW-h) one

-obtains the figure of 4.9 cents per kW-h.

[28] Joseph Bowring, " Federal Supsidies to Nuclear Power,"

l unpublished report, March 1980, p. 72, Office of Economic j Analysis, Energy Information Administration, 1000 Independence i Ave., SW, Washington, DC 20585 (202-252-8800).

[29] D.C. Aldrich, et.al., " Technical Guidance for Siting Criteria Development", Sandia National Laboratory, for the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission; D.R. Strip, " Estimates of the Financial Consequences of Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents,"

Sandia National Laboratory, November 1, 1982.

1 l [30] H. Denneberg, Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner, testimony before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board during hearings on j

the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, November 7, 1973 as

' cited in Richard Heede, et. al., supra N. 26.

[31] As noted above estimates for waste disposal costs range from 0.1 to 1.5 cents per kW-h. If the higher estimates prove correct l

DOE's fee may actually be more than 1.5 cents per kW-h. Under l

l current law, utilities that generated waste before 1983 (when the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act went into effect) would be assessed l

a one-time fee of 0.1 cents per kW-h. No provisions are made to i

assess an additional fee if disposing of their waste costs more than expected. Thus, fees collected in the future would have to j

make up the difference.

l [32] Paul Raskin, supra N. 23.

i

[33] All prudently incurred investments made by a utility are l

included in its rate base. Utilities are allowed to earn a i

11 L . _ - - - - - . - - _ _ - - _ . _ - . - _ - , _ - - - - . - - , -

. - __ .. _ ._ _ _. - . _ . _ _ _.._ _ . ----- _ _ _ _ _ _ -~ _ _ _ _ _ __

i

• \

certain rate of return or profit (generally around 15%) on their

]

rate base (the larger the rate base the large the profit). Some

! states only allow utilities to earn a profit on those investments

considered "used and.useful." In other words, they must provide necessary electricity at a reasonable cost. The utility, i therefore, may not be allowed to earn a profit on their closed

, nuclear plant. In some cases, utilities might be prevented from

even recovering their initial investment costs, thereby shifting j significant costs from ratepayers to utility stockholders.

l Some new plants cost over $3 billion dollars to build removing $3 billion from their rate base (or at least eliminating

the profit for this investment) would represent a significant >

i savings for ratepayers. These savings would be much less for

, older plants, however. Older plants cost less to build and have j already depreciated for several years and therefore represent a smaller portion of a utility's rate base. No savings would be l

available for customers of municipal utilities. ,

1

[343 Building a Sustainable Future, Prepared by the Solar Energy i

Research Institute for the Committee on Energy and Commerce, j Volume 1., p. 154., April, 1981, (2125 Rayburn House Office j Building, Washington, DC 20515), (The report found that energy 1

efficiency investments could eliminate the need for any new power l' plants from 1985 to 2000 even if "all older fossil fuel plants are retired; . . . 80% of all oil and gas capacity is retired; .

or solar electric capacity is added.")

1 [35] Amory Lovins, written comments on "Least-Cost Planning ,

Project, Docket #CE-RM-86-ll," Office of Energy Conservation and Renewable Energy, Department of Energy, March 16, 1986, Rocky j Mountain Institute, PO Drawer 248, Old Snowmass, CO 81654, (303-927-3851).

t I [363 Personal communication with Howard Geller, American Counici

! for an Energy Efficient Economy, May 22, 1986, 1001 Connecticutt l

Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036, (202-429-8873).

I l

[373. Technical Potential for Electrical Energy Conservation and j

Peak Demand Reduction in Texas Buildings, Report to the Texas Public Utilities Commission by the Center for Energy Studies, l

! University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78758, February 1986,

} p. xix. This figure represents the technical potential for i conservation, not what is likely to be achieved.

i i

[383 Amory Lovins, Least-Coat Electrical Services as an Alternative to the Braidwood Project, 1985, (see note 75 for l

j address) l l' [39] Howard Geller, Residential Conservation Power Plant Study:

i Phase 1 - Technical Potential, Prepared for Pacific Gas and j ElectrTc Company by The American Council for an Energy Efficient l Economy, February 1986.

l

[40] Tennessee Valley Authority, 1985 Power Program Summary

(

12

~

Volume 1 1 December 1985, p. 14, (see note 8 for address)

[41] Scott Fenn et. al., Power Plays: Profiles of America's

~

Leading Renewable Electricity Developers, Apri1 T986, investor f Responsibility Research Center, Suite 600, 1755 Massachusettes Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036, (202) 939-6500.

[42] Jan Hamrin, Press Statement, May 22, 1986, Independent Power Producers Association, 1001 G Street, Suite 103, Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 448-9499.

[43] David Moskovitz, presentation at National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners' Advanced Regulatory Course, March 6, 1986, p. 12. Contact Commissioner Moskovitz at the Maine Public Utilities Commission, State House, Station 18, Augusta, ME 04333., (207-289-3831).

[44] Scott Spiewak, "Can Nuclear Power Survive the Free Market,"

- Press Statement, May 22, 1986, c/o Cogeneration and Small Power Monthly, PO Box 33458, Farragut Station, Washington DC 20033, (703-759-5060).

-[45] Scott Spiewak, " Cogeneration in Texas," Cogeneration and Small Power Monthly, June 1986, p. 9, (see note 44 for address).

[46] Amory Lovins, "Negawatts: A Practical Remedy for Megagoofs," Address to Energy Conservation Panel, 97EE Annual Convention National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, November 20, 19857-

[47] Market Potential for Small Scale (15kw to 500 kw)

Cogeneration Systems by Mueller Associates Inc., for the U.S.

Department cd[ Energy, November 27, 1985, p. MD Meuller ii, 21227.

Associates, 1401 S. Edgewood St., Baltimore, The report found an upper potential of 77,300 MW or capacity " prior to severe dis Eunting for the reaTities of 3 e marketplace."

[48]. Scott Fenn, supra N. 41.

i

[49] Paul Raskin, supra N.,23.

l

[50] Congresswoman Claudine Schneider, " Survey on Regulatory l

Utility Commissions' Electrical Resource Planning and l

Conservation Activities," November 1985, U.S. House of l Representatives, Washington, Dji 20515 (202-225-2735)!-

[51] Jim Schermbeck, Risky Business: The Impact of Nuclear Power on Economic Growth in Texas, Public Citizen, July 1985, p.9, 1611 E. First St., Austin, TX 78702, (5f2-477-1155), available from Public Citizen in Washington, DC for $5.00.

13

i f

d

[52] Peter Dupont, " Austin's Conservation Power Plant," nergy

• Conservation Bulletin, January / February 1986, g. 1-2, Energy conservation Coalition, 1525 New Hampshire Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036, (202-745-4S77)

[53] " Status of Reactors Under Construction", uclear Monitor, June 30, 19867 p.4, Nuclear Information Resource Service, 1616 P-St., Suite 160, NW, Washington, DC 20036, (202-328-0002).

0 6

14

-.