Letter Sequence Other |
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Initiation
- Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request, Request
- Acceptance...
- Supplement, Supplement
Results
Other: 05000206/LER-1981-013, Forwards LER 81-013/99X-0.Detailed Event Analysis Submitted, 05000206/LER-1981-013-99, /99X-0:on 810618,power Operated Relief Valve Controller Opened Twice During Normal Pressure Transient Following Reactor Trip.Caused by Setting Time Constant to Off to Satisfy NUREG-0737,Item II.K.3.9, L-81-029, Forwards Proposed Licensing Exam Schedule for 1981-82 for Reactor & Senior Operator Candidates,Per 810807 Request, L-82-002, Informs That Necessary Procedures Per NUREG-0737,Item I.A.1.3 Re Use of Overtime Required by Generic Ltr 82-12 Will Be Implemented by 821001.Tech Spec Will Not Be Submitted for Review Pending Receipt of Model Tech Specs, ML13308A671, ML13308B064, ML13308B821, ML13308B925, ML13310A775, ML13310A777, ML13310A778, ML13310A826, ML13310A828, ML13310A923, ML13310A926, ML13310B078, ML13310B081, ML13310B120, ML13310B280, ML13310B546, ML13310B619, ML13311B030, ML13316B714, ML13317A133, ML13317A134, ML13317A166, ML13317A190, ML13317A263, ML13317A267, ML13317A289, ML13317A367, ML13317A369, ML13317A377, ML13317A391, ML13317A427, ML13317A450, ML13317A454, ML13317A468, ML13317A478, ML13317A479, ML13317A484, ML13317A488, ML13317A490, ML13317A507, ML13317A512, ML13317A519, ML13317A553, ML13317A567, ML13317A581, ML13317A616... further results
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MONTHYEARML19261E3241979-05-13013 May 1979
Requests Time & Distance Parameters for Emergency Planning
Project stage: Request
IR 05000361/19790151979-06-25025 June 1979
IE Insp Rept 50-361/79-15 & 50-362/79-15 on 790529-0601.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Const Activities Involving License Actions on Previous Insp Findings, Preservice Insp,Instrumentation & safety-related Pipe Welds
Project stage: Request
ML13304A5631979-06-29029 June 1979
Notifies That NRC Will Not Respond to Applicant 790619 Response & Objections to Document Requests from Intervenors Friends of the Earth.Matter Relates Solely to Discovery Between Intervenors & Applicants
Project stage: Request
ML13333A5521979-10-17017 October 1979
Forwards Responses to NRC Requirements Established to Date Following TMI Accident, in Response to NRC 790913 Request. Includes Commitments to Actions Set Forth in NUREG-0578
Project stage: Other
ML13333A4221979-10-22022 October 1979
Forwards Responses to NRC post-TMI Requirements Re Design & Analysis,Operations,Rcs High Point Vents,Emergency Preparedness & Instrumentation to Monitor Containment Conditions
Project stage: Other
ML13303A7381979-10-30030 October 1979
Summary of 790927 Meeting W/Utils in San Clemente,Ca Re Emergency Plan Review
Project stage: Request
ML13329A1001979-10-31031 October 1979
Responses to NRC Requirements Established to Date Following TMI Accident
Project stage: Other
ML13308A6511979-10-31031 October 1979
Nuclear Power Reactors in Us
Project stage: Request
ML13322A6191979-11-15015 November 1979
Summary of 791108 Telcon W/Util Re Unacceptable Schedule for Implementing Lessons Learned Task Force Items
Project stage: Other
ML13333A4551979-11-15015 November 1979
Forwards NRC Generic & plant-specific Requirements for Auxiliary Feedwater Sys.Designs & Procedures of Facility Should Be Evaluated Against Requirements to Determine Degree of Conformity
Project stage: Other
IR 05000361/19790271979-11-15015 November 1979
IE Insp Repts 50-361/79-27 & 50-362/79-25 on 791001-05.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Allegation Re Factory Splices in GE Class IE Electrical Cable Installed at Facilities
Project stage: Request
ML13319A2121979-11-21021 November 1979
Submits Addl Info in Support of 791017 Responses to NUREG-0578 Requirements.Forwards Two Oversize Drawings, Available in Central Files Only
Project stage: Other
ML13333A4571979-12-14014 December 1979
Forwards Revisions to Util 790913 Commitments Re Compliance w/short-term TMI Lessons Learned Task Force Requirements Per NUREG-0578
Project stage: Other
ML13333A4561979-12-14014 December 1979
Responds to NRC Re Operation of Containment Purge & Vent Valves Pending Resolution of Isolation Valve Operability.Purge Valves Closed During Reactor Operation Until Operability Under Design Basis LOCA Is Proven
Project stage: Request
IR 05000206/19790011979-12-21021 December 1979
IE Insp Rept 50-206/79-01 on 790205-16.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Issue Procedures,Failure of Offsite Committee to Perform Required Audits & Failure to Issue Corrective Action Request
Project stage: Request
ML13333A4651980-01-0202 January 1980
Notifies of Intent to Respond to NRC by 800110, Requesting Addl Info Re Auxiliary Feedwater Sys.Response to May Require Six to Eight Months.Util Is Consulting W/Westinghouse
Project stage: Other
IR 05000206/19790161980-01-0404 January 1980
IE Insp Rept 50-206/79-16 on 791101-02 & 26.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Scope & Methods of Field Insp for IE Bulletin 79-14,repair of Shorted Electrical Buswork & Licensee Design Change Proposal
Project stage: Request
ML13333A4681980-01-14014 January 1980
Responds to NRC 800102 Show Cause Order Re NUREG-0578 & 800104 Request Re Power Reliability.Seeks Aid in Preparing Response.Forwards Analysis of Reliability Impacts Resulting from Facility TMI Backfit Outage. W/O Encl
Project stage: Other
ML13333A4731980-01-16016 January 1980
Submits Addl Info Requested by NRC Re Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Flow Requirements.Provides Completion Schedule of Six to Eight Months for Requested Info
Project stage: Other
ML13311B0321980-01-16016 January 1980
Forwards Lists of CA Resident Petitions Re Seismic Conditions at Facility.Petitioners Have Received Fr Notice Re Receipt of Petition Under 10CFR2.206
Project stage: Request
ML13311A2201980-01-17017 January 1980
Forwards Addl Info in Response to TMI Lessons Learned Task Force short-term Requirements Re Emergency Power Supply for Pressurizer Heaters & Relief & Block Valves.Seven Regular Size Drawings & 32 Oversize Drawings Encl
Project stage: Other
ML13311B0231980-01-18018 January 1980
Answer to NRC 800102 Order to Show Cause Why Licensee Should Not Implement Category a TMI Lessons Learned Task Force short-term Requirements by 800131.Requests Relief Due to Difficulty in Obtaining Equipment.W/Certificate of Svc
Project stage: Other
ML13311B0241980-01-18018 January 1980
Affidavit Attesting to Inability to Complete Implementation of Mods to Provide Capability for Individual Valve Operability After Containment Isolation Signal Reset &/Or Override
Project stage: Other
ML13311B0281980-01-18018 January 1980
Affidavit Attesting That Delay Until After 800601 in Implementation of long-term Mods to Provide Reset/Override Ability for All Automaticaly Isolated Valves Does Not Cause Undue Risk to Public Health & Safety
Project stage: Other
ML13311B0251980-01-18018 January 1980
Affidavit Attesting That Shutdown of Facility During Feb 1980 Will Adversely Impact Reliability in State of Ca. Analysis of Reliability Impacts Resulting from TMI Backfit Outage Encl
Project stage: Other
ML13311B0201980-01-20020 January 1980
Forwards Response to NRC 800102 Order to Show Cause Why Licensee Should Not Implement Category a TMI Lessons Learned Task Force short-term Requirements by 800131
Project stage: Other
ML13311B0301980-01-21021 January 1980
Discusses Response to NRC 800102 Order to Show Cause Re Implementation of NUREG-0578 Category a Requirements.Will Continue Operation Until 800315.Shutdown on 800131 Would Severely Impact Power Reliability in Pacific Northwest
Project stage: Other
ML13333A4781980-01-23023 January 1980
Advises That Responses to NRC Requesting Info Re Small Break LOCA Guidelines Will Be Submitted by 800228. Bulletin Response Will Be Sent by 800228
Project stage: Other
ML13333A4751980-01-23023 January 1980
Forwards Response to short-term & long-term Recommendations in Encl 1 of NRC Re Evaluation of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys.Five Drawings in Central Files Only
Project stage: Other
ML13333A4811980-01-24024 January 1980
Forwards Corrected Page 3 of App 10 to Enclosure a of Re Power Reliability Info.Omitted Info Sent to R Weiner of DOE on 800118
Project stage: Other
ML13333A4831980-01-29029 January 1980
Confirms 800124 & 25 Telcons Re Facility 800126 Shutdown for Implementation of Lessons Learned Task Force Category a short-term Requirements Re Reopening of Containment Isolation Valves
Project stage: Other
ML13308B0641980-01-30030 January 1980
Concludes That Inadequate Justification Exists to Extend Util 800131 Deadline to 800315 for Response to 800102 Order to Show Cause Why All Category a Lessons Learned Requirements Should Not Be Implemented
Project stage: Other
ML13322A6971980-01-31031 January 1980
Reload Safety Evaluation,Unit 1,Cycle 8
Project stage: Other
ML19290E8091980-02-0101 February 1980
Denies Request for Shutdown Extension Until 800315 to Complete Category a Requirements W/Available Equipment. Reopening of Containment Isolation Valves Until Further Mods Completed Acceptable
Project stage: Other
ML13322A6911980-02-0808 February 1980
Forwards Amend 88 to Ol,Consisting of Proposed Changes 86, 87,88 & 90 to Tech Specs.Nrc Review of Proposed Change 88, Supporting Documentation Requested Prior to Resumption of Power Operation & Fee Encl
Project stage: Request
ML13333A4981980-02-0808 February 1980
Submits Addl Info Re Commitment Schedule for short-term Lessons Learned Task Force Requirements.Circuitry to Close Auxiliary Feedwater Motor Operated Discharge Valve Will Be Installed During Apr 1980 Refueling Outage
Project stage: Other
ML19296C2141980-02-0808 February 1980
Forwards IE Bulletin 80-04, Analysis of PWR Main Steam Line Break W/Continued Feedwater Addition. No Written Response Required
Project stage: Other
ML13322A6931980-02-0808 February 1980
Amend 88 to Ol,Consisting of Proposed Changes 86,87,88 & 90 to Tech Specs.Certificate of Svc Encl
Project stage: Request
ML13322A6961980-02-0808 February 1980
Proposed Changes 86,87,88 & 90 to App a Tech Specs Re Auxiliary Feedwater Sys,Control Group Insertion Limits & Containment Integrity & App B Tech Specs Re Plankton Studies
Project stage: Request
ML13333A5031980-02-13013 February 1980
Forwards Justification for RCS Subcooling Setpoint,In Response to NRC 791227 Request.Addl Info Will Be Forwarded in Response to IE Bulletin 79-27 by 800228
Project stage: Other
ML13333A5071980-02-14014 February 1980
Forwards Addl Info Re Conditions & Results of Endurance Testing Performed on Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Pumps in Support of Responses to NRC Lessons Learned Task Force Requirements
Project stage: Other
ML13316B7141980-03-0707 March 1980
Advises NRC of Delay in Responding to Item 4 of as Part of Response to IE Bulletin 79-27.Submittal Rescheduled from 800228 to 800701
Project stage: Other
ML13330A0251980-03-25025 March 1980
Forwards Addl Info for Implementation of TMI short-term Lessons Learned Task Force Requirements.Describes Mods to Backup Nitrogen Pneumatic Supply & Valve Position Indication.Drawing Available in Central Files Only
Project stage: Other
ML13330A0271980-03-28028 March 1980
Responds to NRC 800117 Request for Review of Draft Evaluation of SEP Topic XV-20, Radiological Consequences of Fuel Damaging Accidents,(Inside & Outside Containment). Review Confirms Facts as Correct
Project stage: Request
IR 05000206/19800041980-04-11011 April 1980
IE Insp Rept 50-206/80-04 on 800128-0229.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Rept Reactor Protection Sys Setpoints Less Conservative than Those Established by Tech Specs & Use of Nonstandard Fitting
Project stage: Request
ML13330A0321980-04-11011 April 1980
Confirms 800410 Telcons W/Regulatory Personnel Re Implementation of Several Category a TMI Lessons Learned Task Force Requirements Described in
Project stage: Other
IR 05000206/19800051980-04-18018 April 1980
IE Insp Rept 50-206/80-05 on 800310-13.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Document Control & Records Programs
Project stage: Request
ML14107A2611980-04-18018 April 1980
Provides Preliminary Info Re Impact of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Automation on Main Steam Line Break Safety Analysis,In Response to NRC 791221 Request.Revised Scoping Studies Will Be Completed by 800516
Project stage: Other
ML13330A0381980-04-29029 April 1980
Responds to NRC Re Item 2.1.7.a,NUREG-0578, Automatic Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater Sys. Commits to Installation of safety-grade Sys During Outage on or After 810101
Project stage: Other
ML13331B3711980-05-0707 May 1980
Ro:On 800506,during Refueling Operations,After Lowering of Reactor Internal Instrumentation Package,Incore Instrumentation Package for Thimble Location D-7 Found Bent Outward.Caused by No Provision for Thimble Passage to Core
Project stage: Request
1980-01-21
[Table View] |
Text
Southern California Edison Company P. 0. BOX 800 2244 WALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEMEAD. CALIFORNIA 91770 K. P. BASKIN TELEPHONE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING, March 6, 1981 (213) 572-1401 SAFETY, AND LICENSING Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: D. M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch'No. 5 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Docket No. 50-206 Automatic Initiation of Auxiliary Feedwater System San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1
References:
(1) D. G. Eisenhut letter to J. H. Drake dated November 15, 1979 (2) D. L. Ziemann letter to J. H. Drake dated December 21, 1979 (3) K. P. Baskin letter to D. G. Eisenhut dated January 16, 1980 (4) IE Bulletin No. 80-04 dated February 8, 1980 (5) H. L. Ottoson letter to R. H. Engelken dated May 19, 1980 (6) H. L. Ottoson letter to R. H. Engelken dated August 4, 1980 (7) K. P. Baskin letter to D. M. Crutchfield dated June 10, 1980 (8) K. P. Baskin letter to D. M. Crutchfield dated October 16, 1980 (9) K. P. Baskin letter to D. M. Crutchfield dated January 14, 1981 (10) D. L. Ziemann letter to J. H. Drake dated September 12, 1979 (11) K. P. Baskin letter to D. L. Ziemann dated February 14, 1980 (12) K. P. Baskin letter to D. M. Crutchfield dated November 25, 1980 Reference (1) provided an NRC request for information regarding Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS) flow requirements at San Onofre Unit 1 resulting from the NRR Bulletins and Orders Task Force review of operating reactors following the accident at Three Mile Island, Unit 2 (TMI-2).
Reference (2) provided an NRC determination that the modifications necessary to implement an automatically initiated AFWS be delayed until the impact of early initiation of AFWS flow (either automatic or manual) is determined for the main steam line break or main feedwater line break accident analysis. In Reference (3), it was indicated that in order to supply the information a complete reanalysis of the applicable transients and accidents would have to be performed.
Reference (4) was a request from the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement for information similar to that requested in Reference (2).
Reference (5) indicated that the response to the request in Reference (4) would be supplied in conjunction with submittal of the results of the reanalysis being performed in response to References (1) and (2).
D. M. Crutchfield, Chief March 6, 1981 Reference (6) provided a partial response to the requests of References (1), (2) and-(4) by submitting the results of our evaluation of the reactivity increase (core response) which results from a main steam line break with the addition of automatic AFWS flow as required by Item 2 of Reference (4).
The results indicated that the core response following a main steam line break is very insensitive to continued feedwater addition at San Onofre Unit 1. Therefore, the conclusions documented in the previously submitted main steam line break core response analysis remain valid and applicable.
Reference (7) provided the NRC with a report on the information presented at the meeting held on May 13, 1980 regarding the preliminary results of the main steam line break analysis and the Safety Injection Actuation System (SIAS) logic modifications which have now been installed to minimize the peak containment pressure. In addition, this report included preliminary results of the main steam line piping integrity evaluation and a review of the containment design and integrity tests. The final results of the main steam line piping integrity evaluation were submitted to the NRC by Reference (11).
The purpose of this letter is to provide the remaining information necessary to completely respond to the requests documented in References (1),
(2) and (4). to this letter provides the information requested in References (1), (2) and (4) which has not been previously submitted. The text of Enclosure 1 follows the format of Enclosure 2 to Reference (1) since the responses provided cover all the information requested in References (2) and (4) which has not been previously submitted.
The analysis provided in Enclosure 1 was based on the design details of the AFWS submitted to the NRC in Reference (8).
Since the submittal of Reference (8) the design of the system has progressed such that the following additional details became available and were used in the analysis.
The AFWS automatic initiation will occur on low steam generator level with the setpoint at 5% of the narrow range level instrument.
An automatic trip of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump will be installed for pump runout protection on low discharge pressure.
A quick start rotor will be installed for the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
The location of the AFWS initiation setpoint at 5% of narrow range indication was established to prevent spurious actuation within the bounds of the safety analysis. The trip of the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump assures the availability of the pump for manual operation following depressurization of the steam generators. Though the results of the analysis discussed below indicate that acceptable performance is obtained using the existing rotor of the turbine driver for the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the quick start rotor provides improved system performance by minimizing the AFWS delay time.
With the exception of the quick start rotor, all of the aboye discussed design details will be implemented prtor to startup. The. qu4O.
start rotor will be installed as soon as practicable.
D. M. Crutchfield, Chief March 6, 1981 The information provided in Enclosure 1 documents the analysis of plant transients and accidents impacted by the modifications for automation of the AFWS. The existing design basis conditions as documented in the San Onofre Unit 1 FSAR were used. Since the objective of the analysis was to evaluate the response of the AFWS with regard to present day criteria, all of the events identified in Item 1 of Enclosure 2 of Reference (1) were reviewed. Though the Main Feedline Break Accident is not a design basis event for San Onofre Unit 1, it was evaluated to determine the response of the AFWS as designed.
The results of the analysis documented in Enclosure 1 indicate that for the design basis transients and accidents the AFWS is of sufficient capacity to meet current day criteria. In addition, the results of the analysis of the feedwater line break accident indicate that for the conservatively assumed sequence of events, the manual restart of the AFWS provides sufficient decay heat removal capacity so that for this event, present day criteria are also met. The impact of AFWS flow addition to the main steam line break accident is negligible.
The previous analysis provided in Reference (7) for main steam line break identified the worst case since the additional low power cases analyzed were less limiting.
The results of Enclosure L, in conjunction with the final results of the main steam line integrity evaluation submitted by Reference (9),
substantiate the conclusion preliminarily obtained and documented in Reference (7).
It is, therefore, concluded that there is reasonable assurance that a double-ended guillotine rupture of the main steam line is not credible, that the probable consequences of a MSLB accident are no more severe than the previously calculated peak temperatures and pressures for the containment following a LOCA (considering a best estimate calculation with respect to mass and energy generation and containment heat transfer), and in the event that post MSLB temperatures and pressures exceed those previously calculated following a LOCA, containment integrity will be maintained by virtue of the as-built strength of the containment. Based on this determination, no additional measures are required to assure containment integrity following postulated transients and accidents.
Reference (10) provided a request for information regarding the impact that the automation of the AFWS would have on the probability of inducing steam generator water hammer at San Onofre Unit 1. In Reference (11) it was indicated that the requested evaluation would be provided in conjunction with our submittal of the analysis results for automation of the AFWS. Accordingly, the evaluation of Enclosure 2 is provided which concludes that the automation of the AFWS will not impact the probability of inducing steam generator water hammer at San Onofre Unit 1.
In Enclosure 2 it is indicated that in order to further reduce the probability of water hammer at San Onofre Unit 1, new low flow indicators will be installed on the main feedwater lines.
These are not required as part of the TMI Lessons Learned.
As such, the TMI Lessons Learned implementation schedule is not applicable to this modification; however, the new flow meters will be installed as soon as practicable in order to minimize the probability of water hammer.
D. M. Crutchfield, Chief March 6, 1981 Also related to the subject of water hammer, Reference (12) provided the results of the evaluation to determine the effects of "classical" type water hammers on the feedwater piping system at San Onofre Unit 1. The first page of the enclosure to Reference (11) included a reference to the ASME Section III Code which should have been the ASME Section I Code. In order to correct that error, please replace the first page of the Enclosure to Reference (11) with Enclosure 3 of this letter.
If you have any questions or require additional. information, please contact me.
Very truly yours, 2:V Enclosures cc:
R. H. Engelken (NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region V)
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection (NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.)
