IR 05000416/1987031

Insp Rept 50-416/87-31 on 871116-19.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Insp:Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20237D431
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	12/16/1987
From:	Decker T, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237D419	List: IR 05000416/1987031 ML20237D417
References
50-416-87-31, NUDOCS 8712230268
Download: ML20237D431 (15)

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! E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION k <- *%p 8 f REGION 11 101 MARIETTA ST., ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

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DEC 161987 Report No.: 50-416/87-31 Licensee: System Energy Resources, In Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.: 50-416 License No.: NPF-29 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Inspection Conducted: November 16-19, 1987 Inspector: N ):L/M/87 W. M. Sartor Ddte 6igned Accompanying Personnel: A. Boland K. Clark l L. Modenos tein,(PNL)

Approved by: N A /2//4 7 T. R. Decker, Section Chief Date' Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: Routine, announced inspection of the Grand Gulf emergency preparedness exercise, involving observation by four NRC representatives of key functions and locations during this full participation exercis Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000416 0 DCD

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• 0. D. Kingsley, Jr., Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• J. E. Cross, Site Director

• C. R. Hutchinson, General Manager

• C. Morgan, Exercise Director

• L. Robertson, Chief Controller

• R. C. Fron, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

• J. V. Parrish, Chemical and Radiological Control Superintendent

• J. L. Robertson, Plant Licensing Superintendent

• C. W. Angle, Manager Operational Analysis

• R. G. Williams, Office Services Superintendent Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members, and office personne Other Organizations

• D. Schneck, VPA Corporation

• C. S. Anderson, Paragon Technical

• C. Shoemake, Paragon Technical NRC Resident Inspectors

• R. C. Butcher

• J. L. Mathis

• Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 19, 1987, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio . Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test the integrated capability and a major portion

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of the basic elements defined in the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.N of NOREG-065 The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and discussed with licensee representatives. While no major scenario problems were identified, several inconsistencies became apparent during the exercise.- The inconsistencies, however, failed to detract from the overall performance. of the licensee's emergency organization, with one exceptio The ' exception was the radiological field monitoring . '

measurements appeared to be delayed. Inconsistencies which contributed to this included old field monitoring team maps and overlapping time frames on the radiological. data: sheets in the scenarios. As a result, incorrect data was provided for some locations and some times. This was identified as an inspector followup item (50-416/87-31-01) and will be reviewed during subsequent exercise The scenario developed for' this exercise was detailed, and fully exercised the onsite emergency organization. The scenario provided sufficient information to the State, counties, local governments and Federal agencies consistent with their participation in the exercis The licensee demonstrated a significant commitment to training and personnel through the use of controllers, evaluators, and specialists participating in the exercis The inspector observed neither prompting nor undue interaction between controllers and player No violations or deviations were identifie . Assignment of Responsibility (82301)

This area was observed to assure that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1), Paragraph IV. A of Appendix E to .10 CFR 50, and specific i guidance promulgated in Section II. A of NUREG-0654.

i The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments were made for i the licensee's emergency response organization, and that adequate staff l was available to respond to the simulated emergency. The initial response

organization was augmented by designated licensee representatives; however, because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required. Discussions with licensee representatives and detailed review of the site Radiological Emergency Plan indicated that a sufficient number of trained technical personnel were available for continuous staffing of the augmented emergency organization, if needed. The inspectors observed activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations facility (EOF) and determined

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that required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan and approved Implementing Procedure No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

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The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.B of NUREG-0654: (1) unambiguous i definition of responsibilities for emergency response; (P) provision of adequate staffing to assure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times; (3) specification of onsite and offsite support organizational interaction The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined, and staff was available to fill key functional positions within the organization. Augmentation of the initial emergency response organization was accomplished through mobilization of available on-shift personnel. The on-duty Shift Superintendent assumed the duties of Emergency Director promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the. General Manage Required interactions between the licensee's emergency response organization and State and local support agencies were adequate and consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources were made, and that other organizations capable of auamenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0645,Section I Arrangements for requesting assistance resources are provided for in the Emergency Plan. Inspection disclosed that required arrangements appeared to be consistent with the Emergency Plan and scope of the exercis No violations or deviations were identified.

l Emergency Classification System (82301)

This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action level was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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An inspector observed that the emergency classification system was in effect as stated in the Radiological Emergency Plan and the Implementing Procedures. The system appeared to be adequate for the classification of the simulated accident and the emergency procedures provided, for initial and continuing mitigating actions during the simulated emergenc No violations or deviations were identifie . Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and means to prov'de early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),

10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established to provide information concerning the si.mulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organization Inspection disclosed that notification methods appeared to be consistent with the Emergency Plan and respective implementing procedure )

No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Communications (82301)

This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications amnng principal response organizations and emergency personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's emergency response facilities (Control Room, TSC, OSC, E0F), the licensee and offsite response organizations, and the offsite environmental monitoring teams and the Site Access Point (SAP)/E0F. The inspector also observed information flow among the various groups within the licensee's emergency organizatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Public Education and Information (82301)

This area was observed to assure that information concerning the simulated emorgency was made available for dissemination to the public pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section I _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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Information was provided to the media and public' in advance of the exercis The information included details on how the public would be

. notified . and the initial actions which should be taken during an emergenc A rumor control program was also in place; however,-the information being provided by the Jackson location was not timely. For-example, when an inspector placed a call at 11:55 am the individual on the phone indicated the plant was in an Alert status, whereas a Site Area Emergency had been declared at 10:18 am. The lack of timely information available via rumor control was identified as an inspector followup item-(50-416/87-31-02).

The licensee activated and fully staffed the Emergency News Media Center (ENMC) in Port Gibson, MS. The facility was used by the licensee for coordination and dissemination of emergency news information. Written press releases were prepared and' issued for the ENMC. Releases appeared to be timely but the inspector noted that News Bulletins did not contain the time of day when issued. The . licensee also noted this finding and identified it for corrective action. A corporate spokesman was designated to conduct periodic press briefings. The briefings were technically accurate and presented in a manner readily understood by layme Similarly, State, Federal and county representatives assigned to the_ENMC, fully participated in planning and presentation of periodic press briefings held during the exercise. Operation and management of the ENMC was effectively implemented, and was consistent with emergency plan requirements and approved procedure One equipment problem was noted in that no telephones were available in the NRC work area of the media cente This was identified as an inspector followup item (50-416/87-31-03).

No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

This area was observed to assure that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspectors observed activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency response facilities, and observed the use of equipment therei Emergency response facilities used by the licensee during the exercise included the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Site Access Point, and Emergency Operations Facility. Within the scope of this exercise, the emergency facilities appeared to be staffed and functioned in accordance with the licensee's Emergency Plan and Procedure No violations or deviations were identifie _ _ - _ _ _ _ -

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13. Accident Assessment (82301)

This area was observed to determine that adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section I The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident. Dose assessment activities were conducted by the E0F staff and coordinated with the States of Mississippi and Louisian No violations or deviations were identifie . Protective Responses (82301)

This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section I The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the ten mile EPZ. The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with EPA and other criteri No violations or deviations were identifie . Exercise Critique (82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise were brought to the attention action pursuant to 10 CFRof50.47(b manag)ement and documented (14), Paragraph for corrective IV.F of Appendix E, 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section I The licensee conducted a player's critique immediately following the exercise and a comprehensive Controller / Evaluator critiqu The Licensee /NRC critique was conducted on November 19, 1987, with exercise controllers and observers, licensee management, and NRC representative The licensee's critique was detailed and comprehensive. Following the management critique, the NRC inspector provided preliminary findings observed during the exercis No violations or deviations were identifie _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

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1 Inspector Followup (92701) (Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-416/86-40-02: Failure to consistently report offsite releases in initial and followup notifications per Procedure EPP-10-S-01-06, Attachment IV. All notifications appeared to be made in accordance with procedure (Closed) IF1 50-416/86-40-03: Failure to conduct periodic habitability surveys of entire SAP for Procedures EPP-10-S-01-17 and EPP-10-S-01-15. The inspector noted SAP habitability surveys were conducted in accordance with procedure . Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and Federal Emergency Management Agency) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondenc Attachment:

Grand Gulf Exercise Objectives and Narrative Summary of Events

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n GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION (j~

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OBJECTIVES NOVEMBER 1987 Onsite Response Objectives Actions to be Demonstrated Recognition and classification of emergency conditions Activation of emergency plan Knowledge, implementation, and use of appropriate emergency procedures Notification and response of plant emergency response personne . Notification of offsite agencies Recognition of more severe conditions and escalation of emerger.cy classification Activation of Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation of Operations Support Center (OSC) Activation of Site Access Point (SAP)

10. Transfer of control and Emergency Director duties from Shift Superintendent to appropriate plant management personnel 11. Control and management of emergency response personnel 12. Ability of Control Room operations and technical staff to take appropriate actions to control, mitigate, and terminate the

. emergency and limit releases of radioactive materials to the environment 13. Ability to perform onsite and offsite radiological monitoring and dose assessment 14. Ability to adequately communicate between onsite and offsite emergency facilities 15. Response to simulated offsite radiological release involving offsite agencies 16. Activation of search and rescue team Actions Not to be Demonstrated Shift staffing for long-term operations J18 MISC 87081701 - 1

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i Evacuation of Control' Room, TSC, OSC or SAP l( ) Total site evacuation, evacuation of any personnel not normally associated with GGNS or essential outage personnel Decontamination of personnel or vehicles on or departing site

• 5. Medical team response and transportation for a simulated contaminated and injured individual

• 6. Actual use of Post Accident Sampling System

• These items are tested in separate drill .

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II. Offsite Response Objectives Actions to be Demonstrated Notification and response of offsite emergency response personnel . Response and assembly of offsite emergency response personnel .at appropriate emergency facilities Activation of the Corporate Emergency Center (CEC) Knowledge, implementation and use of appropriate emergency procedures Ability to adequately communicate between onsite and offsite emergency facilities Timely release of coordinated news information from CEC and performance of rumor control functions Control and management of emergency response personnel at CEC 4 Ability to transfer emergency response personnel to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Emergency News Media m Center (ENMC) Activation of the E0F 10. Activation of the ENMC 11. Communication and coordination between the TSC and EOF 12. Ability of E0F to perform technical support services l 13. Ability of E0F to direct offsite radiological monitoring and perform dose assessment 14. Ability of EOF to provide timely and accurate notifications and ,

information to offsite agencies 15. Ability of ENMC to provide timely and accur b information to news media personnel 16. Security and access controls at EOF and ENMC Actions Not to be Demonstrated l 1. Notification or requests to non-SERI organizations to provide l technical or logistical support and assistance j Notification of elected public officials Shift staffing for long-term operations j

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p lL^ 4. . Provision for lodging and meals in local area for emergency l; .

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response personnel Transfer from EOF and ENMC back to CEC due to de-escalation o emergency classification Use of backup EOF Performance of offsite radiological monitorino from aircraft or watercraft Decontamination of personnel or vehicles on or departing site O

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GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION L EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE l

l Narrative Summary of Events - Day 1 This scenario takes place in November, shortly before a scheduled shutdown for the second refueling outage. The plant is in operation at 100% power with the Division 1 Diesel /Generatoi inoperable to perform required inspections. In accordance with the surveillance requirements, the Division 2 Diesel / Generator was run at 0700 toda Dose equivalent iodine levels are high due to fuel leaker TWo 7500 gallon tanker trucks containing diesel fuel arrived late last night. Fuel sampling was conducted as required to ensure the quality of the fuel before unicading. However, the trucks were unknowingly confused and one unsampled truck containing large amounts of water was ,

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unloaded into all three fuel oil storage tanks. Since the Division 2 Diesel / Generator was run after the fuel oil was added, the Division 2 day tank now contains large amounts of wate In addition, hydrogen loss from the main generator has been higher than normal, and maintenance personnel are attempting to determine the caus The first activity associated with this scenario concerns performing the required surveillance run of the Division 3 Diesel / Generator. The

\- diesel is started at 0817; however, at 0820 a fire is observed in the generator electrical cabinets, resulting in a Diesel / Generator trip and a loss of the Division 3 DC bus 1DC1. An ALERT is declared due to a fire that defeats one ESF electrical division. The fire brigade responds and extinguishes the fir Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 requires commencement of a plant shutdown due to Division 1 and 3 Diesel / Generators inoperable; therefore, a normal plant shutdown is begu The three power lines connecting Grand Gulf to the remainder of the grid are lost at 1015 due to sabotage offsite. Since Division 1 and 3 Diesel / Generators are inoperable, the associated busses 15AA and 17AC loose power. The Division 2 Diesel / Generator starts, but is then lost due to the quantity of water in the fuel oil. A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared due to a loss of offsite and onsite power for greater than 15 minute The loss of power causes the reactor to scram. The only system available to supply water to the reactor is RCIC, which is manually initiated and slowly returns water level to norma O

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At 1045, the chemist reviewing fuel oil truck san:ple results Q(,e becomes aware that a mistake may have been made and that one truck may not have been sampled. This provides the OSC with some information as to the cause of the Division 2 Diesel / Generator failure. Emergency repair teams begin to work on sampling the fuel oil storage tanks and removing the water accumulatio At 1215, the steam supply line to RCIC ruptures in the Auxiliary Building Steam Tunnel upstream of outboard isolation valve E51-F06 Since power has been lost to the isolation valves, steam flows from the reactor through the RCIC steam line to the Auxiliary Building Steam Tunnel. The steam tunnel blowout shaft ruptures, causing an unmonitored release to the environment. Unsealed penetrations in the-steam tunnel walls allow contamination to spread into the Auxiliary Building. Since RCIC has been lost, reactor water level drops rapidl A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared due to loss of two of the three fission product barriers (RPV and containment) with the potential loss of the third (inadequate makeup to cool the core).

Efforts are begun to make the proper connections to pump fire water into the vessel, since the diesel driven fire pumps are availabl At 1255, a member of one of the OSC teams is discovered missin Security locates the individual with the aid of the Security Computer,

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and a Search and Rescue Team is organized. The individual had entered a room in the Auxiliary Building to check the status of a breaker and O the door would not allow him to exit. He is located and returned to the OSC uninjure At 1350, the Division 2 Diesel / Generator is restored to service and bus 16AB re-energized. RHR B and C inject into the vessel and fuel damage ceases. Valves E51-F063 and F076 close, terminating the release. Also, Standby Gas Treatment System B initiates causing fission products remaining in the Auxiliary Building to be treated before release. At 1410, one 500 RV offsite power source is restored.to service, allowing restoration of drywell cooling, instrument air, and various other systems. The emergency may be downgraded by 1430 and the exercise terminated by 1500.

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Narrative Summary of Events - Day 2

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Today is the second day of the emergency preparedness exercise; however, for purposes of the exercise, the events of yesterday are assumed to have occurred three days ag Plant events occurring since 1500 on Day 1 are as follows:

Day 1, 1500-2400 The reactor has been placed in a cold shutdown condition with the leak isolated. Secondary Containment Integrity has been re-established with the use of a temporary but physically sound cove Shutdown Cooling is placed in operatio Release rates have fallen to negidgible amount Day 2, 0000 - 0800 All offsite power has been re-establishe Instigators of the power interruption have been apprehended by law enforcement official Many technical (NRC, General Electric, Bechtel, etc) and political personnel converge on GGNS to offer assistance and advice, and to begin

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%J collecting data for investigative purpose All onsite diesel / generators are restored to operabilit Day 3 Plans are discussed for cleanup of the gaseous fission products within the vessel head, in preparation for vessel head remova Day 4 (Today) Expect to continue making plans for vessel head remova i l

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