IR 05000416/1987006
| ML20205N790 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1987 |
| From: | Blake J, Girard E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205N592 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-416-87-06, 50-416-87-6, IEB-83-03, IEB-83-3, NUDOCS 8704030104 | |
| Download: ML20205N790 (8) | |
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UNITED STATES j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f.
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REGION 18 g
g g
101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
't ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
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Report No.:
50-416/87-06 Licensee:
System Energy Resources, Inc.
P.O. Box 23054
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Jackson, MS 39205 Docket No.:
50-416 License No.:
Facility Name:
Grand Gulf Inspection Conducted:
February 23-27, 1987 Inspector: [
dvAk 8 7 P7 E.
ar Date~51 ned
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f Approved by:
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7 67 J.
. B tke', Section Chief Ddte Signed En ine ing Branch i
DvisjnofReactorSafety SUMMARY t
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was. conducted in the areas of licensee action on previous enforcement matters, inservice testing of pumps and valves, inservice inspection records, microbe induced corrosion in the Standby Service Water System, Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 83-03 and inspector followup items.
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Results:
No violations or deviations were; identified.~
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8704030104 870320 DR ADOCK 05000416 PDR i
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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- C. R. Hutchinson, General Manager
- R. F. Rogers, Unit 1 Project Manager
- W. C. Eiff, Principal Quality Engineer
- J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator
- R. S. Lewis, Senior Quality Representative
- M. Meier, Engineer
- A. J. Malone, Inservice Testing Coordinator C. Ellsaesser, Operation Shift Superintendent NRC Resident Inspectors
- R. C. Butcher, Senior Resident Inspector W. F. Smitn, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 27, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in deta!1 the inspection i
findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The followindnewitemswereidentifiedduringthisinspection.
Inspector Followup Item 416/87-06-01:
Bolting Procedure, paragraph 6.
Inspector Followup Item 416/87-06-02:
Testable Check Valves, paragraph 3.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (0 pen) Unresolved Item (416/86-29-01):
Pump and Valve Testing Criteria.
This item identified four concerns with regard to the licensee's in-service testing (IST) of pumps and valves.
During the current inspection, the licensee provided the NRC inspector with responses to each of the concerns.
The concerns, the respective licensee responses and the inspector's conclusions regarding the responses are described below.
a.
Concern:
ASME Section XI requires periodic inservice testing of pumps.
For the testing, reference values of specified test para-meters, such as flow and differential pressure, are determined when a
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pump and its associated equipment' are known to be functioning acceptably.
Using these reference values and multiplication factors given in ASME Section XI, Table IWP-3100-2, allowable ranges of test values are determined and used to assess the results of the subse-quent periodic tests on the pump.
Table IWP-3100-2 specifies high
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and low Alert and Required Action Ranges 'for the tests results.
If test results fall in the Alert Range the test frequency is required to be doubled.
If they fall in the Required Action Range, the associated pump must be declared inoperable until the cause is determined and the condition corrected.
The high alert ranges for flow and differential pressure are speci-fied as 1.02 to 1.03 times their respective reference values.
The high requiod action ranges for flow and differential pressure are specified as greater than 1.03 times their respective reference
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values.
The licensee has modified these range limits for flow and
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differential pressure values determined for their pumps.
In place of 1.02, they use 1.05 and in place of 1.03, they use 1.07.
They have requested these changes in a relief request to the NRC and give as their basis:
" Pump testing is performed with 2% accurate instrumentation, but the high Alert Range is only 102 to 103% of the reference
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values and the Required Action Range is only greater than 103%.
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As pump failures that include increasing flow or discharge pressure as part of their indications are very rare, the very narrow ranges allowed are unrealistic."
ASME Section XI, IWP-3210, permits the license to alter the ranges specified in Table IWP-3100-2 provided that the specified ranges l
cannot be met and the revised ranges are such that the pumps may l
still fulfill their functions.
Based on his discussions with l
licensee personnel, it was the inspector's understanding that they had encountered no difficulty in meeting the ASME range requirements on many of their pumps, but that they had requested the relief to i
avoid any future problem.
The inspector was concerned that the licensee s use of such expanded limits would reduce the likelihood of detection of changes resulting from pump or piping system changes, j
instrument errors and/or test performance errors.
Licensee Response:
Similar relief has been granted to other licensees.
Also, ASME already is processing proposed changes that would permit even more liberal limits.
Inspector's Conclusions:
The inspector informed the licensee that l
he would review this matter further with cognizant NRC personnel
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before reaching a conclusion.
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b.
Concern: The inspector noted that the licensee's IST program did not include exercise tests for Residual Heat Removal System valves F094,
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96 and 98.- These valves are used to flood the' containment-from the
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Standby Service Water System for long term accident recovery.
ASME-Section XI requires exercising of valves that are required to change position to perform a specific function in' shutting down the reactor to the cold shutdown condition or in mitigating the consequences of
an accident.
The-inspector was' concerned that these valves a'ppeared to be intended to mitigate the consequences of.an accident but that.
they were not being exercised as required.
Licensee Response:
Responsible -licensee personnel stated that the '
basis for omitting these valves was that they were not required to mitigate any accident considered in the plant design.
Inspector's Conclusions: The inspector informed the licensee that he would review this matter further with cognizant NRC personnel before
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reaching a conclusion.
c.
Concern:
The-inspector was unable to determine if the licensee had
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implemented procedures to verify proper functioning of valve position indicators on their remote shutdown panel.
Licensee Response:
Licensee personnel informed the inspector that functioning of valve position indicators was verified in performance of surveillance procedure 06-0P-1C61-R-0002.
Inspector's Conclusions:
The inspector. reviewed the procedure identified-by the -licensee and determined that it accomplished the-ve-ification of the functioning of the valve position indicators.
d.
Concern:
The inspector was unable-to determined if the licensee's exercising of testaP,e check valves full-stroked ~ the valves as
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required by ASME Section XI, IWV-3522. The inspector indicated that he was specifically concerned with full-stroke ~ exercising of the
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valves to the open position.
Licensee Response: The licensee infomed the inspector that their investigation of this matter indicated that their testing did assure
full opening of these valves.
However, their investigation found-
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that, although they also specified testing to assure full closure of j
these valves, this was not adequately accomplished. They documented this finding on their Quality Deficiency Report 365-86.
Inspector's Conclusions: The inspector is satisfied that the licensee-does exercise the testable check valves to 'the full open position.
The inspector determined that, while his original ~ concern appeared satisfied, he intended to perform a more detailed review of the functioning and testing of these valves in a subsequent. inspection.
He informed the licensee ~ that this review would be identified as Inspector Foiiowup Item 416/87-06-02, Testable Check Valves.
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l Unresolved Item 416/86-29-01 remains open pending the inspector's l
completion of his review relative to a. and b. above.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves (61725,61700)
The NRC inspector examined selected aspects of the licensee's inservice
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testing (IST) of pumps and valves to determine if it was in accordance l
with licensee commitments and NRC regulations.
Based on NRC regulations, the code applicable to the IST is ASME Section XI (80W80).
The inspec-l tor's examination is described below:
l a.
Evaluation of Pump and Valve IST Data The inspector reviewed the practice used by the licensee in evalua-ting IST data through discussion with the IST Coordinator who evaluates the data and observation of the computer presentation of valve data which the Coordinator uses in performing evaluations.
The inspector found that the Coordinator was knowledgeable and that the evaluation he described appeared to satisty the Code requirements.
The inspector noted that there was no detailed description or guidance covering the performance of the evaluations and commented
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that it appeared desirable to describe the evaluation practice in l
writing.
b.
Control of IST Scheduling (61725)
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's control of IST scheduling through discussions with the Operation Shift Superintent and l
examination of the Control Room notebooks entitled " Operations Surveillances Weekly Schedule" and " Control Room Surveillance Log".
The former gives the current weekly schedule and the latter gives the record of each surveillance the last time it was performed.
The review was performed to verify that the licensee had an effective system for scheduling IST in accordance with Code requirements.
c.
Verification of Proper Functioning of Valve Position Indicators l
The inspector observed the licensee's Remote Shutdown Panel and
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reviewed the procedure and records for the checks performed during the last refueling outage on the functioning of Remote Shutdown Panel
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l valve position indicators.
The observation and review were conducted l
to determine that the position indicators had been verified to function properly as required by the Code.
The procedure reviewed l
was 06-0P-1C61-R-0002 and the records indicated the its performance was completed November 27, 1986.
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d.
Closu're Test for Testable Check Valves (61700)
The inspector verified the licensee's closure testing of emergency core cooling system testable check valves through a review of the completed test instruction TSTI 1E22-86-001-0-S, dated November 26, 1986.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Inservice ~ Inspection Records (73755)
The inspector reviewed examples of repair / replacement records to determine their compliance with applicable Code requirements.
For Grand Gulf 1, the applicable Code for inservice inspection -is ASME Section XI (77579).
In his review, the inspector examined records of two examples of repairs /
replacements performed during the last refueling outage.
The records were examined to verify that work and inspection functions were properly sequenced and recorded, material control and traceability was correctly maintained, welders and welding procedures were identified and required examinations were performed.
The two examples examined by the inspector were as follows:
a.
Maintenance Work Order (MW0) M68102, Replace 1.5 inch Safety Valve b.
MWO F58199, Install Piping, Valves and Hangers In reviewing the records for replacement of the 1.5 inch safety valve (MWO M68102), the inspector ndted that bolt torquing requirements for installation of this flanged valve were specified in accordance with maintenace instruction 07-5-14-281 (Revision 6).
The inspector reviewed this instruction and found that it appeared to contain the fol. lowing deficiencies:
The instruction indicated that it was intended for correction of
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leakage by tightening leaking flanges or replacing gaskets or bolts.
It had been used to replace a valve that had been removed for maintenance.
A table referred to in the instruction-specified torque values to
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achieve bolt stresses of 30, 45 and 60 ksi.
The instruction did not indicate how the user would determine which bolt stress to use.
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Attachment III to the instruction depicted information for use in f
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identifying bolting materials.
The information was not fully legible.
It appeared that the data had been reduced in sizt exces-sively in transferring it from reference material.
l The inspector discussed the instruction with the individual responsible for its preparation and concluded that a knowledgeable properly qualified individual could satisfactorily use the procedure, though it might be j
necessary to obtain material identification information from another i
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a source due to the ' illegibility of Attachment III.
The responsible
individual agreed that tne instruction should be improved and stated that the three concerns identified by the inspector would be addressed in the next revision to the instruction.
The inspector indicated that he would.
examine the instruction to verify the changes and identified the matter as Inspector Followup Item 416/87-06-01, Bolting Procedure.
7.
Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins (IEBs) (927038).
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(Closed) IEB 83-03:
Check Valve Failures in Raw Cooling Water Systems of Diesel Generators
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This IEB' deals with generic aspects of multiple swing check valve failures identified in raw cooling water systems for diesel' generators (DGs). -The licensee's initial response to this IEB, dated June 7,1983, was reviewed and determined acceptable by Region II.
The IEB requested that licensees verify the integrity of valve internals for check valves in the direct flow path of raw cooling water for DGs.
Grand Gulf I does not have any check valves in a the raw cooling water flow path directly serving their DGs. However, the licensee committed to voluntarily verify the integrity of check valves in their Standby Service Water System, which indirectly provides raw water to cool. the DGs.
In confonnance with the IEB request and their commitment, the integrity verification was completed by the licensee during their first refueling outage, which ended in January 1987.
As requested by the IEB, the licensee submitted the results of the verification to the NRC in a letter, dated December 23, 1986. This final submittal was reviewed and determined acceptable by Region II.
In the current inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed the records of the IEB 83-03 valve integrity verification.
This review was performed to confirm that the licensee's commitment had been accomplished. The records reviewed were identified as MW0s M65388, M65389 and M51778. The inspector noted 'that M51778 indicated a failure of one of the valves - to satis-factorily close in a different test that had been conducted previously.
The inspector found that the record of the M51778 check showed the valve to be functioning properly.
This matter is considered closed.
8.
Inspector Followup Items (IFIs) (92701, 73052)
a.
(Closed) IFI (416/86-33-01):
Administrative Corrections Needed for Radiographic Procedure M-RT-XG-2.
This item identified an NRC inspector's concern that the licensee's radiographic examination precedure needed several corrections..
During the' current inspection, the inspector verified that the
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licensee had made the subject corrections.
The procedural changes had been approved and the procedure was in the process of being issued.
The inspector concludes that this matter may be considered closed, b.
(0 pen) IFI (416/85-05-01):
Clarification of Responsibilities for Coordination of Closing of Open Items.
This item identified an NRC inspector's concern that he was encoun-tering difficulty in obtain information from the licensee to complete reviews of previously identified NRC open items. The inspector noted that the difficulty appeared to stem from the licensee's failure to clearly assign responsibilities for gathering the information required to address NRC items.
During the current inspection, the NRC inspector was shown that procedural requirements had been issued which assigned responsi-bilities to licensee personnel to ensure that NRC open items were adequately responded to.
These requirements are described in Licensing Procedure No. 5.4, paragraph 5.12, dated November 26, 1986.
Also, in his inspection of previously identified items, the inspector found that all needed information was satisfactory provided by the licensee.
On the basis of the subject procedural requirements and his experience in satisfactorily obtaining needed information, the inspector concludes that this IFI may be considered closed.
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