IR 05000416/1987005

Insp Rept 50-416/87-05 on 870214-0313.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Enforcement Matters,Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observation & Surveillance

ML20205Q118
Person / Time
Site:	Grand Gulf
Issue date:	03/26/1987
From:	Butcher R, Dance H, Will Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205Q087	List: IR 05000416/1987005 ML20205Q083
References
50-416-87-05, 50-416-87-5, NUDOCS 8704030446
Download: ML20205Q118 (13)

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UNITED STATES

[Sa me: o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-p ~

n REGION 11 y j 101 MARIETTA STREET. * g ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 -

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Report No.: 50-416/87-05 Licensee: System Energy Resources, Inc.

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Jackson, MS 39205 I

Docket No.: 50-416 License No.- NPF-29 Facility Name: Grand Gulf Nuclear: Station Inspection Conducted: February 14 through March 13, 1987

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Inspecto s: .

7 5 7 f R. C. B~utcher, Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed dKAdm

, F. Smith, esident: Inspecto + ,/eds, Date Signed Approved by: -

b6 32-(c!87'

fi. C. Dance, Section/ Chief Dhte Signed Division of Reactor Projects

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SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted t'y the resident inspectors at the site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, 1 Operational Sa fety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Surveillance Observation, ESF System Walkdown, Reportable Occurrences, ~ Inspector Followup and Unresolved Items, Maintenance Program Implementation, and Design Changes and Modification : Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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REPORT DETAILS

. Licensee Employees Contacted

• J. E. Cross, GGNS Site Director

'C. R. Hutchinson, GGNS General Manager R. F. Rogers, Manager, Unit 1 Projects

• A. S. McCurdy, Manager, Plant Operations

• J. D. Bailey, Compliance Coordinator

• M. J. Wright, Manager, Plant Support

• L. F. Daughtery, Compliance. Superintendent D. G. Cupstid, Start-up Supervisor R. H. McAnulty, Electrical Superintendent

• J. P. Dimmette, Manager, Plant Maintenance W. P. Harris, Compliance Coordinator i J. L. Robertson, Licensing Superintendent L. G. Temple, I&C Superintendent J. H. Mueller, Mechanical Superintendent L. B. Moulder, Operations Superintendent J. V. Parrish, Chemistry / Radiation Control Superintendent

• S. F. Tanner, Manager, Nuclear Site QA

• S. M. Feith, Director, QA

• C. V. Hicks, Operations Assistant

• F. W. Titus, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering

• F. Mashburn, Civil Engineer, NPE

• D. L. Pace, Manager, Nuclear Design Other licensee e nployees contacted included technicians, operators, security force meubers, and office personne * Attended exit interview

- Exit inte view The inspection scope and findings were su;omarized on March 13, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 abov The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspectio . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 416/84-21-06. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the violation. Corrective Action Request (CAR) 885 was issued on June 6, 198 Advance Procedure Change Request No. 0002 to NPEAn 01-201, Revision 1 was issued to provide additional direction to Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE) personnel regarding the documentation of

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identified nonconformances. The Director of QA issued a memorandum dated August 31, 1984, to all QA personnel to make individuals aware of the NRC concerns regarding the quality review function. The licensee added three additional reviewers to the staff. The current QA staffing is considered adequate. QA Procedure (QAP) 6.10, Performance and Documentation of Reviews, was revised by addition of a checklist to assure quality require ments/ concerns are addressed during the revisw of procedures. QAP 2.40, Indoctrination and Training of QA Personnel, was revised to specify training of QA Personnel participating in quality reviews. QA also committed to conduct bi-annual internal audits of QA reviewer activitie The inspectors reviewed documentation of the bi-annual audits. No further action is require (Closed) Violation 416/86-39-07. Failure to follow procedures for the Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Monitor (IRM) range 6 to range 7 correla tion test. During performance of the test, the inspectors noted that the prerequisite plant conditions required by Step 6.4.1 of Technical Section Procedure (TSP) 09-S-02-20, Neutron Monitoring System Performance, were not being me The licensee responded to the Notice of Violation in letter AECM-87/0031 dated February 12, 198 In the response, the licensee referred to TSP 09-S-01-10 as the neutron monitoring system performance test. When the inspectors questioned this, the licensee stated that it was an editorial error, and that TSP 09-S-02-20 was correc The licensee identified the cause to follow procedure as the individual's inexperience with this test and a lack of understanding of test procedure requirement Corrective actions, besides disciplinary action taken against the individual who failed to follow the procedure, were implemented to ensure that the remaining tests were conducted with experienced personnel who were thoroughly familiar with their assigned tests, and to ensure that the procedures were clear and concise. The licensee conducted a review of all power ascension tests converted to TSPs; as a result, 6 out of 16 procedures were clarified. The inspectors verified completion of these actions by review of the associated documentatio Startup testing was completed without further similar incident No further action is required.

4. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant opera tion Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staf The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room such that it was visited at least daily when an inspector was on sit Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation,

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temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data ' sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls. This inspection activit included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisor Weekly, when the inspectors -were onsite, selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation is made by verifying the following

Accessible valve flow' path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, major component leakage, lubrication,.

cooling and general condition, and instrumentatio General plant tours were conducted on at least a biweekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, auxiliary building and outside areas were visited. Observations included safety related tagout verifi-cations, shift turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification systems, and containment isolation. At least monthly, the licensee's on-site emergency response facilities were toured to determine facility readines The following comments were noted:

The licensee initiated Technical Special Test Instruction (TSTI)

IE61-87-001-1-S to collect various containment environmental parameters to determine the effect on personnel entry into containment without any purge system operation. The TSTI is dated February 13, 1987, and was in effect on February 19, during the inspector's tour. Step 7.3 directs operations

to close E61-F014, CTMT CLG PURGE DAMPER. The valve is actually M41-F014.

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Operations closed the correct valve and issued tag 87-042 referencing the TSTI and the reason the valve is closed. The tag was also incorrectly labeled E61-F01 The licensee was made aware of the error and took corrective actio NRC Inspection Report 416/87-01 identified some examples of control room instrumentation and controls that were unsatisfactory from a human factors standpoint. The following are more examples of similar problems. These items will be followed as part of IFI 416/87-01-0 The handswitches for the fuel pool cooling and cleanup pump room cooler

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T51-HS-M607A and M607B on panel P870 are labeled Auto-Stop-Ru The convention used on all other handswitches reviewed by the inspector is i Stop-Auto-Star On panel P870, manual initiate push buttons have white lights above.the buttons that are normally illuminated. On panel P601 the manual initiate 1

- push buttons also have white lights above the buttons that are normally not illuminate _

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On panel P870, recorders T48-R601A and B have red and green pens for HEPA filter delta pressure and a blue pen for the charcoal filter delta pressur No label tells the operators what units the recorder scale indicates, i.e., inches of water colum No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspectors observed portions of the maintenance activities listed below. The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, ,

observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements, and adherence to the appropriate quality control MWO-M70734, Reactor Water Cleanup System demineralizer septum tube bundle changeou MWO-I70793, Retest of Hydrogen Analyzer A subsequent to replacement of solenoid valve SV MWO-E71133, Troubleshoot Diesel Generator 11 output breaker tri MWO-M71210, Replacement of governor oil hoses on Diesel Generator 1 No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed the performance of portions of the surveillances listed below. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to technical specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteri ME-1M23-V-0001, Revision 27, Containment and Drywell Airlock Seal Leak Tes P-1T48-M-0001, Revision 26, Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test (10-hour run).

06-IC-1E61-M-1004, Revision 26, Containment and Drywell Hydrogen Analyzer (PAM) Calibratio :

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06-CH-1N62-V-0051, Revision 21, Offgas Hydrogen Concentratio EL-1R21-M-0001, Revision 22, 4.16 KV Degraded Voltage Functional Test and Calibratio No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)

A complete walkdown was conducted on the accessible portions of the Feedwater Leakage Control System. Nearly all of the fluid portions of -

this system are inaccessible at power as they are located in the steam tunnel and the drywel The walkdown consisted of an inspection and verification, where possible, of the required system valve and switch alignment, including valve power available; electrical and instrumentation cabinets free from debris, loose materials, . jumpers and evidence of rodents, and system free from other degrading conditions. The inspectors also reviewed the applicable system operating and surveillance procedores, and verified that TS surveillance requirements were curren No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

The below listed event reports were reviewed to determine if the information provided met the NRC reporting requirement The determination included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of each even Additional inplant reviews and discussions with plant personnel as appropriate were conducted for the reports indicated by an asterisk. The event reports were reviewed using the guidance of the general policy and procedure for NRC enforcement actions regarding licensee identified violation The following License Event Reports (LERs) are closed:

LER N Event Date Event

• 86-022 March 29, 1986 Monthly surveillance not performed due to personnel erro *86-031 September 1, 1986 APRM flow channel checks performed lat *86-037 October 22, 1986 Surveillance exceeds Technical Specification frequenc I

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• 86-042 November 5, 1986 New surveillance requirement not incorporated into

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' procedure *87-001 January 8, 1987 Unapproved air connection and failed valve causes invalid condenser offgas sample ,

• 87-002 February 3, 1987 Spurious control room-isolation and standby freah l.

' air unit start.

The inspectors reviewed the LERs associated with missed surveillances with licensee managemen Out of a total of 46 _ LERs submitted in 1986, approximately 12 (or 26 percent) were in the area of missed surveillances.

A review of each LER, and the root cause and corrective actions taken did

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not indicate a common root cause that previous corrective actions could have reasonably prevented. The LERs specifically discussed with the Plant

. Manager were 86-002,86-014, 86-016,86-022, 86-024,86-031, 86-037, 1 86-040, and 86-042. The licensee was also aware of the number of LERs in

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the surveillance area but that' appeared to be the only common thread in the LERs.

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Although no common root cause could be defined, the licensee has taken I actions to strengthen their surveillance program.' Some initiatives that j have been taken include the following:

i Surveillances that are only partially accomplished are being reviewed i to determine if they can be broken down into' portions that would allow complete performance. The elimination of partial surveillance packages will minimize possible errors in the ' recording or performance of surveillance Operations has been directed to issue- a separate Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for each late surveillance to prevent possible t

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confusio Management Standard 9, Surveillance Scheduling / Tracking, was issued on February 4, 1987, which instituted controls to ensure surveillances

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are performed as required. The Shift Superintendent must review '

i outstanding surveillances to ensure they are completed on time. A i SERI late date has been implemented to allow time before the TS late i date is exceeded.

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It was noted by the inspectors that during the January 1, 1987 to February 27, 1987 time frame, there were 1,284 surveillances conducted, not including daily or more frequent surveillances. Four thousand, eight hundred and fif ty-six direct man hours were expended on conducting those 1,284 surveillances, which did not include the man hours associated with surveillance, scheduling, verification, processing, et The manpower resources expended on surveillance activity compared to overall plant activity appears to help explain the above percentage of surveillance LERs. Based on the above review, the LERs noted were close (Cicsed) P2184-0 CFR 21 report regarding the wrong adjustment for low voltage shutoff and turnon voltage for dedicated Class 1E Topaz inverter GE Service Information Letter (SIL) 418, Revision 1, recommended licensees that use Topaz inverters in safety related applications to retest the low and high shutoff voltage and the auto restart voltr.ge and reset, such that the inverter does not trip between 100 and 140 Vde, and after tripping it shall resume operation when input voltage is increased to 108 Vdc and/or decreased to 132 Vdc. The licensee initiated Design Change Package (DCP) 85/3038 to reset affected inverter DCP 85/3038 was accomplished during the first refueling outage and corrected the Topaz inverter setting No further action is require (Closed) P2185-04 (PRD 85-02) and Inspector Followup Item 416/85-09-0 Followup on potentially defective diesel generator (DG) starting air check valve On March 11, 1985, during surveillance operational testing of DG 11, the lower guide pin on check valve P75-F079D failed and lodged itself in the air start valve damaging the seating surfaces and then depositing itself in one cylinde This caused blow-back into the air line and hot combustion gasses burned the flexible coupling. On March 12, 1985, Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) issued a 10 CFR 21 report identifying a potential generic defect with these check valves. On March 25, 1985, the licensee issued an interim 10 CFR 21 report identifying the same proble On April 26, 1985, the licensee issued a final 10 CFR 21 repor The report stated that P75-F079D had failed, P75-F079C had approximately a 180 degree crack on the same guide pin, and the other six check valves were not damaged (there are four check valves on each of the two DGs). An initial failure analysis revealed that the failure was due to low and high cycle fatigue. As an interim fix, the licensee replaced all Unit 1 DG starting air check valves with unused Unit 2 check valves and imposed a reduced in service time limi TDI later recommended replacement of the existing Clow Williams-Hagar valves with TRW Mission Duo Check II as permanent corrective action. During the first refueling outage, by November 20, 1986, the licensee replaced all eight Unit 1 DG starting air check valves with the new type (DCP 85/4028).

Unit 2 check valves will be replaced when construction activities resume, and are being tracked by Bechtel Management Corrective Action Report MCAR-15 There is additional discussion on this issue in paragraph 1 .

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(Closed) P2185-11. Cracked Stem Assembly in a 3/4 inch Yarway Welband Valve. Yarway discovered leakage during hydrostatic testing of some non-nuclear valves and upon investigating, a cracked stem assembly was detected in a 3/4 inch Yarway Welband valve. The leakage was caused by a void in the bar stock used to manufacture the stem. Yarway records indicate that valves supplied to GGNS also contained stems manufactured from the same heat of bar stoc The licensee issued Material Nonconformance Report (MNCR) 0494-85 regarding this proble Nuclear Plant Engineering (NPE) dispositioned the MNCR to rework the affected valves by replacing the existing stem assemblies with new stem assemblies provided by Yarway. The inspectors reviewed Maintenance Work Orders M58021 thru M58044 and M58046 thru M58052 which accomplished the replacement of the affected valve stems. No further action is require No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Inspector Followup and Unresolved Items (92701)

(Closed) Unresolved Item 416/84-21-07. Adequacy and effectiveness of the audit program to detect inadequacies in implementation of higher tier requirement As part of the corrective action taken for violation 416/84-21-06, Quality Assurance Procedure (QAP) 2.40 was revised to define the required training of reviewers before being allowed to perform quality reviews. QAP 6.10 was also revised to add a Procedure Quality Compliance Review Checksheet to reflect what a reviewer should consider when performing a review. QA committed to perform bi-annual internal audits of QA reviewer activities. These audit activities were documented by QA and addressed the adequacy of the audit progra No further action is require (Closed) Unresolved Item 416/84-47-0 Verification that the Safety Review Committee (SRC) reviewed Safety and Environmental Evaluation number SE062/83 as required by Technical Specification 6.5.2.7.a. The inspectors reviewed letter PMI-85/5080 which transmitted Safety Review Action Serial Number (SRASN) PST-84-105 to the SRC. PST-84-105 concerned revision to the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) Training Procedure 01-S-04-7, Revision 3. The corporate SRC logs do not reference the plant SRASN numbers, and thus the cross reference must be accomplished by document title, revision number and letter numbe IE Information Notice 87-08, Degraded Motor Leads in Limitorque DC Motor Operators, cautioned certain nuclear power facilities of a problem with certain Limitorque motor operators due to use of Nomex-Kapton insulated leads. The Nemex-Kapton leads are different than the leads with which Limitorque conducted their environmental qualification tests. The licensee researched their records and determined they did not have any Limitorque motor operators installed in the plant with the Nomex-Kapton leads. One spare motor for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

system was found to have the Nomex-Kapton leads and Material Nonconformance Report (MNCR) 4187 was written to identify this proble *

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(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/86-41-01. Correction of minor discrepancies identified during an ESF System Waikdown inspection of the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS). All discrepancies identified by the inspectors were corrected except for incorrect motor operated valve identification numbers, which are being tracked separately by Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 416/87-01-03. Previously, the inspectors noted that several HPCS motor operated valves were labeled on the adjacent insulation F004C (for example), but Piping and Instrument Drawing (P&ID) M-1086 identified them as F004-C, and the System Operating Instruction (SOI)

referred to them as F00 Upon inspecting to verify completion of corrective actions, the inspectors noted that HPCS valves had been corrected; however, when GGNS revised the P&ID under the drawing >

enhancement program, F001 and F023 were incorrectly identified as F001C and F023C when they should have been identified as F001-C and F023-C. The significar:ce of the added hyphen is that the "-C" identifies the power source and not the valve. The licensee is working on a solution to the overall problem, and thus IFI 416/87-01-03 remains ope (0 pen) Unresolved Item 416/87-01-04. Resolution of missing fasteners on control rod drive Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) 36-13. While on a routine tour the inspectors noted that the upper left outer mounting bolt was missing from HCU 36-1 The licensee was notified and was requested to provide documentation approving the installation and what effect this condition had on the seismic qualification of the HC It was apparent from inspection of the painted surfaces and misaligned holes that there never was a fastener installed at that location. The licensee initiated MNCR 0062-87 to identify the problem and provide a dispositio The missing fastener was replaced, and the licensee conducted a 100's inspection to ensure a similar condition did not exist on any of the other 192 HCUs. The inspection revealed approximately 20 loose bolts and '48 missing fastener Most of the missing or loose fasteners were compensated for by a weld between the HCU frame and the seismic foundation, as required by Bechtel approved Supplier Deviation Disposition Request (SDDR) M-316.0-016 dated January 22, 1982. During installation of the HCUs by Reactor Controls, Inc., it became necessary to replace some fasteners with an equivalent weld due to interferences and misaligned bolt holes. However, there were a number of missing and loose fasteners that were not provided for by the SDDR and attempts to replace or tighten were unsuccessful. A second MNCR 0079-87 was initiated, identifying only those fasteners that could not be corrected. The engineering analysis and di sposi tioti accepted the fasteners as is, but did not take all of the initially identified fastener deficiencies into consideration when determining whether or not the HCUs would have functioned if called upon during a seismic even The inspectors expressed concern to licensee management on March 6, 1987, that this problem was not being probed to the extent it should. A major effort was implemented over the next several days to review HCU installation records, to accurately document the as-found condition of the 193 HCUs, to perform proper engineering analyses

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of the condition as found and after repairs, and to review program requirements for handling such problems. As of the end of this reporting period, the licensee reported that all HCOs are presently mounted such that seismic Category I requirements are met, but that 11 HCUs are not yet confirmed to have been adequate prior to correction. The licensee is also evaluating the reportability of this deficiency in accordance with 10 CFR 21. Since the licensee was unable to produce any documentation to show that the as-found condition had been analyzed and approved for seismic qualification of the HCUs, it appears that about 36 of 193 control rod scram accumulators, which are an integral part of the HCOs, were operated in an unanalyzed condition from the time of plant licensing until February 1987, when the condition was corrected in accordance with the mounting requirements of General Electric drawing 105D4988, Outline Hydraulic Control Unit as amended by Bechtel SDDR M-316.0-016, or analyzed as seismically adequate. Pending receiving the results of the licensee's investigation, this item shall remain ope (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/87-01-07. Determination of the cause and followup on corrective actions related to the spurious control room ventilation isolation and standby fresh air unit start which occurred on February 3,1987. The licensee determined, by process of elimination, that the probable cause of the event was a spurious trip of the Channel A chlorine detector which was actuate 1 by a two-way radio transmissio This has happened in the past. The chlorine detectors were previously deleted from the TS by Amendment 25 on December 8, 1986. To prevent future spurious isolations from the chlorine detectors, the licensee is considering a design modification to delete the automatic isolation function of the chlorine detection subsystem. As an interim remedy, additional restrictions were imposed against using two-way radios in the vicinity of the chlorine detector room corrido See LER 87-002, dated February 27, 1987, for additional details. The LER was closed in paragraph 8 of this inspection repor (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 416/87-03-0 Resolution of action statement wording in Equipment Performance Instructions 04-1-03-T46-1 and 2. The licensee's flow monitoring program for ESF switchgear room coolers lacked the necessary degree of conservatism if Standby Service Water (SSW)

flow was found to be less than the minimum design value in any ESF switchgear room cooler. The above referenced instructions allowed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to recover flow before applying TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.1.1, which would allow another 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for recovery before commencing a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> plant shutdow The licensee corrected this by revising the above instructions and issuing TS Position Statement 101 which deleted the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and now requires the operators to enter an action statement equivalent to the TS 3.7.1.1. 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action statement upon discovery of deficient flow in the applicable ESF equipment room cooler *

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10. Maintenance Program Implementation (62700)

The objectives of this inspection are to determine whether the GGNS maintenance program is being implemented in accordance with regulatory requirements, and to determine the ability of the licensee to conduct an effective maintenance program on important plant equipmen The inspectors selected records and procedures pertaining to safety related and non-safety-related equipment failure leading to a plant shutdown, equipment failure leading to reduced capability of a safety related system, and a recurring safety related equipment failur Part of this inspection was conducted in April and May 198 The inspectors reviewed maintenance activities associated with safety related equipment failure leading to a plant shutdown. The partial failure of the B reactor recirculation pump shaft seal resulted in a forced plant shutdown on February 12, 1986, due to exceeding the TS limit of 5 gallons per minute for unidentified leakag The results of this part of the inspection were documented in NRC Inspection Report 416/86-11. The review of the qualification and training of maintenance staff personnel was discussed in NRC Report 416/86-1 The inspection was resumed in January 1987 with additional reviews of plant operating history and interviews with plant personnel. This was documented in Report 416/87-01. Up to the end of that inspection, there had been no adverse inspection findings identifie During this reporting period, the inspectors completed a review on equipment failure leading to reduced capability of a safety related system. The inspectors selected at random, a diesel generator (DG) air start check valve failure for review. In March'1985, during operational surveillance testing of the Division 1 OG, the licensee noticed flames coming out of a flexible coupling on the air start header assembly. This is usually indication of an air start valve failure; however, upon removal of the air start valve the licensee discovered that the upstream air start check valve disk guide pin had broken off and lodged itself in the air start valve preventing seating, thus the high pressure and temperature combustion gasses backed up through the air start valve to the upstream flexible couplin The failed check valve was P75-F079D. On March 22, 1985, Transamerica Delaval, Inc. (TDI) submitted a 10 CFR 21 report of the potential defect in all TOI DGs supplied with this valve. Details of the incident and correction actions are contained in NRC Inspection Report 416/85-09. The inspectors reviewed the records associated with correction of the above check valve failure and noted that the evaluation as to cause, and corrective action taken was adequate. The procedures specified in the maintenance packages, MW0s M51621 and M51645 appeared to be adequate and referenced the vendor technical manual where appropriat Provisions for control of equipment, cleanliness, plant impact, retesting, and other administrative requirements appeared adequat ..

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For non-safety related equipment failure leading to a plant shutdown, the

.following event was reviewed. On July 3,1985, with Unit 1 operating at 99.9 percent rated thermal power, circulating water pump B received a lockout trip. This event was reviewed as part of.the post trip analysis

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for scram number 29. The investigation into the cause of the circulating water pump trip was conducted under Maintenance. Work Order (MW0) E5414 The trip circuit Rotor Cagi High Temperature Trip (300 C) was erroneously tripping due to faulty thermocouple circuitr The licensee's investation found that the rotor temperature monitor was giving erroneous trips to a lockout device resulting in the pump trip. Also, a field monitor relay was found wired incorrectl The licensee modified the A and B circulating water pumps per temporary alterations 85-0018, 0019, 0020 and 0021. The licensee, with the manufacturers concurrence, deleted the rotor temperature trip function and corrected the wiring discrepancies. A Design Cha.nge Request (DCR 85/109) has been initiated to make the modifications permanent since the Rotor Cage High Temperature Trip would only be needed during pump startup, and operators can monitor this parameter. The licensee's machinery history log was searched and the event was properly documented. The vendor manuals were available and controlled by the licensee. The MWO and associated paper work appeared to be in order. The Measuring and Test Equipment used was identified and in calibration when use . Design, Design Changes and Facility Modifications (37700 & 37701)

The inspectors have been conducting document reviews and hardware inspections to ascertain that design changes and facility modifications associated with TS License Conditions were in conformance with the requirements of the facility license, TS, and 10 CFR 50.59. Part of the reviews were conducted during the previous reporting periods and are documented in NRC Inspection Reports 416/86-32. 416/86-37, and 416/86-4 The following additional Design Change Packages (DCPs) were reviewed during this reporting period:

(Closed) Design Change Packages (DCPs) 81/5006 and 81/5006- License Condition (LC) 2.C.(21), Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System, states that if spent irradiated fuel is placed in the spent fuel pool prior to installation and operability of the safety related backup fuel pool cooling pump room coolers, the plant shall be placed in the shutdown condition and remain shutdown with the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system dedicated to the fuel pool cooling mod The licensee directed the contractor (Bechtel) to stop work on the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FPCCU) system during construction and delayed completion of the work until needed during the first r2 fueling outage. The licensee initiated DCP 81/5006-1 to install the remaining piping and pipe supports for Standby Service Water (SSW) supply and return to the FPCCU room coolers and DCP 81/5006 to install the FPCCU pump room coolers. The inspectors reviewed Design Change Implementation Packages (DCIPs) 81/5006 and 81/5006-1. Safety evaluations were complete and retest requirements signed off as accomplished. Procedures for operation and surveillance have been issued and drawings have been updated. This completes LC 2.C.(21).

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