IR 05000338/1984044

Insp Repts 50-338/84-44 & 50-339/84-44 on 841206-850105. Violation Noted:Svc Water Arrays Piping Lacked weather-resistant Coating & Failure to Perform Proper Shift Turnovers Re Annunciator Status

ML20127J670
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	02/07/1985
From:	Branch M, Elrod S, Luehman J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127J603	List: IR 05000338/1984044 ML20127J600 ML20127J625 ML20127J640 ML20127J653
References
50-338-84-44, 50-339-84-44, NUDOCS 8505210541
Download: ML20127J670 (9)

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UNITE 3 STATES

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[p880bo NUCLEAR RE"ULATORY COMMISSION g , REGloN11 g j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * e ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

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Report Nos.: 50-338/84-44 and 50-339/84-44 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company Richmond, VA 23261 Docket Nos.: 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos.: NPF-4 and NPF-7

> Facility Name: North Anna 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: December 6, 1984 - January 5, 1985 Inspectors: W M./W. Branch, enior S(sident Inspector w __spF4kB5 Date Signed

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.C.Luehmn,R(id/ntInspector 1-V wses Date Signed Approved by: [ 15ter (07AA S. Elrgd,'Section Chief /

b '7569 Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMiiARY Scope: This routine inspection by the resident inspectors involved 159 inspector hours onsite,in the areas of maintenance, surveillance, cold weather preparation, independent inspection, Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) system walkdown, opera-tional safety verification and licensee event reports (LER).

Results: Of the seven areas inspected, two violations were identified and are discussed in paragraphs 9 and 1 .

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REPORT DETAILS Licensee Employees Contacted E. W. Harrell, Station Manager G.-E. Kane, Assistant Station Manager M. L. Bowling, Assistant Station Manger L. Johnson, Superintendent, Technical Services J. R. Harper, Superintendent, Maintenance

.R. 0. Enfinger, Superintendent, Operations G.'Paxton, Superintendent, Administrative Services A. L. Hogg, Jr. , QC Manager S. B. Eisenhart, Licensing Coordinator J. R. Hayes, Operations Coordinator J. P. Smith, Engineering Supervisor R. C. Sturgill, Engineering Supervisor D. E. Thomas, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor A. H. Stafford, Health Physics Supervisor E. C. Tuttle, Electrical Supervisor R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor F. P. Miller, QA Supervisor F. T. Terminella, QA Supervisor ,

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings- were summarized on January 4,1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. Additionally, the inspectors discussed with~ the licensee, a recent problem that occurred at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station where through wall cracks were discovered in the 304 stainless steel piping used in the Post. Accident' Sampling System (PASS).

The cracks were determined to be caused by chloride stress corrosion and it was theorized that the chloride concentrated in the pipe due, in part, to standing water from a hydrostatic test being boiled by electric heat tracing set at approximately 270 The licensee acknowledged the inspectors findings and committed to evaluate

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.the possibility of chloride strass corrosion in their PASS pipin . Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspectio . Unresolved Items

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Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to i -determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or devia-l~ tions. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed

~in paragraph . Plant Status Unit 1 The unit began the inspection period at 100% power. On December 31, 1984, the reactor tripped from 100% power. The trip was due to high negative flux rate which was caused by dropped control rods which resulted from a failed circuit card in a control rod power supply cabinet. While trouble-shooting of the rod control system during the subsequent startup, another reactor trip occurred. The. unit was started up, reached 100% power on January 2, 1984, and ended the inspection period at or about that power leve Unit 2 The' unit was at 100% power at the beginning of the inspection period. On December 9, 1984, the unit was shutdown because both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were inoperable. The EDG's were repaired (see paragraph 8 for more details), the unit started up and on December 14, 1984, stabilized at 100% power. For the remainder of the inspection period the unit operated at or about 100% power except for periods when load following occurre ' Licensee. Event Report (LER) Followup The following LER's were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes. had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER -forms were complete. Additionally, for those reports identified by

asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that -the licensee had reviewed the event, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or Technical Specification conditions had been identifie /84-07 Cycle 4 Fuel Examination Results 338/84-08 Recirculation Spray Cooler Lap Ring Cracking 338/84-19 Reactor Trip due to loss of Vital Bus I-III 338/84-22 Fire Main Pipe Rupture 338/84-21 Reactor Trip due to Closure of "B" Feedwater ,

Regulating Valv (Closed) LER 338/84-07 Cycle 4 Fuel Examination Results. Members of the NRC Region II Test Programs Section reviewed much of the information used to compile this report.and viewed the video tapes made during the fuel inspec-tion Their observations are contained in inspection reports 338, 339/84-26.

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(Closed) LER 338/84-08 Recirculation Spray Cooler Lap Ring Cracking. This

.istue had been previously reviewed in inspection reports 338, 339/84-38 and 338, 339/84-3 (Closed)'LER 338/84-19 Reactor Trip due to Loss of Vital Bus 1-III. The inspectors have reviewed the licensee's followup of this event and at the time of LER one item remained open. That item was to determine why the auxiliary feedwater pump did not start as required. Further investigation revealed that the relay that should have started the pump was powered from the bus that was lost. Because the operator recognized that one pump had not started and manually started it before the bus was regained (which would have auto started the pump) the cause of the failure of the pump to start was not immediately identifie . -ESF System Walkdown

'The following selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems were verified operable by performing walkdowns of the accessible and essential portions of the systems-on December 19, 198 Unit #1 Casing Cooling System (1-0P-7.10A)

Unit #2 Casing Cooling System (2-OP-7.10A)

The inspectors identified that' for a large amount of time the two annun-ciators on each unit for the Casing Cooling System (High/ Low Temperature and High/ Low Tank Level) were illuminate The illuminated annunciators were not due.to out of specification para-meters. In the case of the temperature alarm on Unit 1, the annunciator was identified for repair because the alarm would not reset. For the tank level annunciators on both units the alarms were illuminated because the tanks were " overfilled"-(which is not prohibited by plant specifications).

The danger -in having these alarms illuminated continuously is two fol First, readout of the monitored parameters is not immediately available to operators because of meter location and second, continuously alarming annunciators lead to situations such as the inadvertent draining of the Unit

<2 Casing Cooling System described in inspection report 339/84-3 . Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)

On' December 9, 1984, North. Anna Unit 2 was forced to shutdown per the action of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 when the 2H and 2J emergency diesel 1

. generators were declared inoperable. A description of the diesel problems as well as a chronology of the events leading up to the diesel generators being declared inoperable,'is porvided belo . .

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At 0719 on December 7,1984, the 2H EDG was removed from service for preventive maintenance due to a high crankcase pressure and an air start system proble '

At 1321 on December 7,1984, the 2J EDG failed during the TS required _ testing when a high crank case pressure condition tripped the engine. At this time both EDGs were inoperable and restora-tion of 2H EDG was expedite At 1655 on December 7, 1984, the 2H EDG was restored to operation after repairs which included: cleaning of the oil strainer, verification of proper pressure setting on the crank case pressure switch and verification of starting air. system operability. Prior to declaring the EDG operable, a satisfactory surveillance test was complete At 1719 on December 7, 1984, another unsuccessful attempt-to start the 2J EDG occurred when it' took approximately two minutes to star Subsequently, the EDG was started while being observed by-the EDG vendor technical representative and again tripped on high

. crankcase pressure. It was determined that the number 2, 3 and 11 upper pistons were leaking-requiring replacement, additionally, the number 11 cylinder liner was determined to need replacin At 0652 on December 9, 1984, during the sixth TS operability run, the 2H EDG failed on-high crank case pressure. This resulted in both EDGs being inoperable and, at 0830, a ~ unit 2 ramp-down was started. The number 10 lower piston was found to have a shattered ring and a new piston and rings were installe On December 11, 1984, both EDG were declared operable after the above repairs and extensive - testing. The primary system was heated up and unit 2 was placed on line December 16, 198 The failures of the EDG required the plant conduct more frequent (weekly)

testing of each EDG. The cause of the piston cracking problem is still being evaluated by the licensee with preliminary indication being that rapid

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loading, i.e., within 60 seconds, of the EDG every surveillance test may be the caus In response to Generic Letter 84-15 (Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability) the licensee stated, in ~ their August 16, 1984 letter (S/N 439), that comments on present testing v proposed testing will be provided by January 31, 1985. The licensee has indicated that information gained during the resent EDG outage will be a factor in their response with recommendations-to reduce the effect of rapid loading on the EDG reliabilit . Service Water Reservoir Spray Piping

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5 The piping used for the service water arrays at North Anna is fiberglass-reinforced plastic pipin (North Anna Power Station UFSAR section 9.2.1.2.1) Pursuant to North Anna Power Station, Unit 2 Facility Operating License NPF-7 dated August 21, 1980, condition 2.c.(5) the licensee com-mitted to a surveillance program that is consistent with the regulatory position in Revision 2 of Regulatory Guide 1.72. This position states that the inspection frequency for the piping should be increased to once annually if an exterior weather-resistant coating is not provide Review of the piping manufacturer's literature reveals that the piping used is only provided with improved protection from ultraviolet radiation and, as far as the licensee can determine, has no weather-resistant coating. This is a violation and is identified as item 339/84-44-0 Further investigation into the requirements of the regulatory position of Regulatory Guide 1.72 revealed two other issues. The position states that the design temperature for the spray pond piping should be 212 F (100 c).

Review of the manufacturer's specifications for the piping in use at North Anna shows the maximum recommended temperature is 210 This small dif-ference by itself is not significant considering the maximum temperature of the service water system will not exceed 110 F (UFSAR 9.2.1.2.2) but, the 210 F recommended temperature is based on using only water in the pipin Service water at North Anna is treated with a number of different chemicals and their effects on the piping need to be considered in that some chemicals are not recommended for use with this piping and the use of others lowers the maximum recommended temperature. The safety analyses performed by the licensee for use of chemicals in this system does not consider the effects on the fiberglass piping. Manufacturer's test data shows that, at higher concentrations (5%), at least one of the chemicals used by the licensee (sodium hyporchlorite) is not recommended for use with this pipin The second issue involves the purchase classification of the pipe. North Anna Power Station Administrative Procedure (ADM 2.1), Classification of Systems, Components, and Structures states that the service water spray system is a quality assurance Category I system. Review of purchase records for replacement fiberglass piping reveals it is being bought under a lower classificatio The effects of chemicals and purchasing of replacement piping are identified as ' unresolved item 338, 339/84-44-02 pending evalua-tion by the licensee and further review by the inspecto . Unavailability of Unit 1 B Charging Pump During the period 4-5, December 1984, maintenance was performed on the Unit 1 C charging pump and it was tagged out electrically for most of that period. The Unit 1 A charging pump was running, providing nominal makeup and seal water flow while the Unit 18 charging pump was designated as the operable standby pum On at least two occasions during this period the 1 C charging pump elec-trical isolation tags were cleared and the pump was run for short periods in conjunction with the maintenance being performed. In both cases the isola-J

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tion tags were rehung after completion of the pump runs. The first of these runs occurred on the 4 p.m. to midnight shift of December.4, 1984, while the second occurred on the 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift on December 5, 198 LThe electrical logic for the charging pumps is such that anytime the C charging pump alternate power supply breaker is racked in, lockout of the B charging pump occurs (North Anna UFSAR'Section 8.3.1.1.1). The licensee has -

verified through interviews with the operators involved that the alternate power supply breaker for the IC charging pump was not only racked in during the December-4th pump run but was also the power source used to run the p ump '. During the second pump run it was clear that the alternate power supply breaker was. not used to run the pump, however, whether the breaker was. racked in and subsequently racked out is not clea Each time the IC charging pump power supply breaker was racked out, the annunciator response for the IB charging pump lockout needed to be followed in order to reset the lockout. . After the final rack out of the alternate power _ supply breaker, the' annunicator response was not followed leaving IB charging pump locked ou In summary, the racking in of the IC charging pump alternate power supply breaker caused the lockout of the IB charging pump. The short periods when this lockout occurred during testing of the IC charging pump are not considered significant because they were under direct control of the oper-ator. ~ However, failure to follow the annunciator response after the final rackout of the IC alternate power supply breaker ~ left IB charging pump locked out from the 8:00 a.m. to 4 p.m. shift on December 5, 1984, until early on the midnight to 8 a.m. shift on December 6, 1984. During this time the IB charging pump was not available for automatic start and the IC charging pump was in a similar condition because of the electrical isola-tion. _ These circumstances left the 1A charging pump as the only available charging pump placing the plant in the Action a. of Technical Specification 3.5.2 without the-operating staff's knowledge. Failure to recognize the lit annunciator and to follow the annunciator response procedure and failure to perform proper shift turnovers regarding annunciator status as required by administrativce procedure 19.3 paragraph 1.1.a are identified as violation 338/84-44-0 . Cold Weather Preparations (71714)

Using the . licensee's Mechanical Department Administrative Procedure ( ADM 20.0) " Plant Winterization Program" as a guide, the inspectors reviewed the plant's cold weather preparations ' and had the following observation First, the auxiliary feedwater pump buildings should be added to M.D. ADM

'20.0. Pressure transmitter 2 -PI-QS-203 off of the Refueling Water Storage

~ Tank (RWST) has frozen and subsequently leaked two winters in a row. Though the instrument does not serve a safety function, the' leakage of borated and potentially contaminated water onto the ground is undesirable. The insula-tion wrapped around the piping leading to the Unit 2 RWST level transmitters should be adequate protection, however a permanent enclosure would be even e bette ,. -

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The inspectors will reinspect freeze protection as necessary during an extremely cold weather or extended winter plant shutdow . Previously Inspected Inspector Followup Items The following Inspector Followup Item (IFI) and Licensee Event Report (LER)

items were reviewed in inspection report 338, 339/83-11 to determine the completeness and appropriateness of licensee corrective action take Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie Due to an administrative oversite, these items were omitted from inspection report 338, 339/83-11 however, these items were closed for Units 1 and 2 based on inspector review of licensee actions and status as of the issuance of the subject repor Unit 1 (Docket No. 338)

78-11-07 79-33-02 79-37-01 79-41-06 79-45-01 80-20-03 80-21-10 80-32-01 80-32-02 80-32-03 80-32-06 80-32-07 81-05-07 81-11-01 81-11-04 82-10-01 80-07-04 LER83-25 LER82-22 LER82-49 LER82-04 LER82-13 P2182-01 79-21-01 Unit 2 (Docket No. 339)

82-29-04 LER81-10 LER83-21 Included in the same administrative oversite, items P2-82-01 and LER83-21 were erroneously listed as closed for Unit The following Inspector Followup Item (IFI) and Licensee Event items were reviewed in inspection report 338, 339/83-13 to determine the completeness and appropriateness of licensee corrective action taken. Within the areas inspected, no violations were identified. Due to an administrative oversite these items were omitted from inspection report 338, 339/83-13 however, these items were closed for Unit 1 based on inspector review of licensee actions and status as of the issuance of the subject repor CI-21 80-26-03 80-41-01 81-09-01 82-29-01 80-29-01 80-41-03 81-11-03 82-29-06 L 80-29-02- 80-38-01 81-11-05 82-20-01 80-29-03 79-48-01 81-15-01 82-33-01 80-30-01 79-48-02 81-15-03 82-25-01 80-30-02 79-48-03 81-22-04 82-20-01-80-35-01 79-49-01 81-25-04 82-33-01 80-35-05 79-49-02 80-38-03 LER80-44 80-35-06 79-49-03 82-10-02 LER80-58 LER81-10 LER81-64 LER83-04 LER81-69 LER81-62 LER81-19 LER82-82

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1 Routine Inspection By observations during the: inspection period, the inspectors verified th'at-the control room manning - requirements were being met. In. addition, the inspectors -observed shift _ turnover to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The inspectors periodically questioned shift per-sonnel. relative to their awareness of plant condition Through log review and plant tours, the inspector verified compliance with selected T. S. and LC During the course of the inspection, observations relative to protected and-

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- vital area security were made, including access controls, boundary integ-rity,. search, escort, and badgin n a regular basis, radiation work procedures (RWPs) were reviewed and the

- specific work actifity was monitored to assure -the activities were being conducted per the RWPs. Radiation protection instruments were verified operable and calibration / check frequencies were reviewed for completenes .The inspector kept informed, on a daily basis, of the overall status of both units and of any significant safety matters related to plant operation Discussions were held with plant management and various members ofc the

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' Operations staff on a regular basi Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed dail The inspectoriconducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the-control room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in pro-gress, verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment, confirming valve positions, instrument and recording readings, annunciator alarms, housekeeping and vital area control No violations or deviations were identified in these area ...

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