IR 05000338/1982014

IE Insp Repts 50-338/82-14 & 50-339/82-14 on 820506-0605.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Lers, post-implementation Review of NUREG-0737 Items,Licensee Conditions for Unit 2 & Plant Operations

ML20058G125
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	07/13/1982
From:	Julian C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058G112	List: IR 05000338/1982014 ML20058G107
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-3.D.3.3, TASK-TM 50-338-82-14, 50-339-82-14, NUDOCS 8208030212
Download: ML20058G125 (6)

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1. UNITED STATES E 4*t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

$ E REGION Il e 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 k e[ ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-338/82-14 and 50-339/82-14 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, VA 23261 Facility Name: North Anna Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7 Inspection at North Anna site near Mineral, Virginia Inspectors:

D. F. Johnson Date Signed

M. B. Shymlock Date Signed Approved by: b- #

C. Julian',sSection Chief, Division of Project 7//3/f2-Date Signed and Resident Programs SUMMARY Inspection on May 6 - June 5, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine inspection by the resident inspector involved 290 inspector hours on site in the areas of licensee event reports, post implementation review of NUREG-0737 items, license conditions for Unit 2, refueling activities, other outage items, surveillance and maintenance activities, and plant operation Results Of the eight areas inspected, no violations were identifie $$bD G

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

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• R. Cartwright, Station Manager

• E. W. Harrell, Assistant Station Manager

• J. A. Hanson, Superintendent - Technical Services J. R. Harper, Superintendent - Maintenance D. L. Benson, Superintendent - Operations G. Paxton, Superintendent - Administrative Services J. M. Mosticone, Operations Coordinator J. P. Smith, Engineering Supervisor F. Terminella, Engineering Supervisor P. T. Knutsen, Engineering Supervisor R. A. Bergquist, Instrument Supervisor J. R. Stratton, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor D. E. Thomas, Electrical Supervisor A. H. Stafford, Health Physics Supervisor

• A. L. Hogg, Jr. , Site QC Manager

• F. P. Miller, QC Supervisor

• M. E. Fellows, Staff Assistant K. A.'Huffman, Clerk Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 5, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

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Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

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l Not inspected.

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, Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not ' identified during this inspectio l Plant Status Unit 1 During this inspection period the unit operated at or near capacity load except for the following: On May 8, 1982 at 1642 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.24781e-4 months <br /> the unit was ramped down for repair of steam leaks on the A and C steam generators. The Unit

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t was ramped down on May 17,1982 at 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br /> because of noise detected in

the ' A' steam generator. It was also decided to commence'the scheduled refueling and maintenance outage at this time.

Unit 2 r

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During most of this inspection period Unit 2 was shutdown while undergoing

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the first refueling outage. The reactor was taken critical on June 2, 1982 j at 0536 hours0.0062 days <br />0.149 hours <br />8.862434e-4 weeks <br />2.03948e-4 months <br />. The unit then started low power physics testin . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup

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The following LER's were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that

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reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and j the LER forms were complete. Additionally, for those reports identified by

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asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee

had reviewed the event, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed ,

safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or technical j specification conditions had been identified.

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338/82-013 Dose Equivalent I-131 levels exceeded Technical Specification limits.

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l *338/82-015 Reactor Coolant unidentified leakage exceeded Technical l Specification limit.

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338/82-016 Containment average temperature exceeded 105 F.

Three Mile Island Task Action Plan Item III.D. (Closed) 338/80-32-03 and 339/80-30-03. Health Pnysics Procedure H. P. 3. " Emergency Radioiodine Sampling," section 4.0, describes the method for

< obtaining air samples which utilizes a silver zeolite cartridge to reduce

noble gas interference. Samples will normally be counted in the shielded

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. counting room with a multi-channel analyzer. To ensure timely analysis of

the cartridge in an emergency, a dedicated single channel analyzer is

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provided. Capability for field sampling and remote analysis are also

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provided. The equipment and procedures described above satisfy TMI Task Action Plan Item III.b.3.3 for inplant iodine monitoring. .

Unit 2 License Conditions Licensee Condition 2.c.(12)(c) Diverse Power Supply for Th and T l This Design Change (DC)80-552 was completed and reviewed by the inspecto Item 339/82-08-09 is close License Condition 2.c.(15)(b) Each steam generator had a 2)" inspection port installed between the fifth and sixth tube support plates. DC 81-10B was completed and reviewed by the inspecto Item 339/82-08-11

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is close i

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3 License Condition 2.C.(15)(C) The inside recirculation spray pumps were removed, the bearings were replaced and optically aligned. The fina test-run package was reviewed by the inspector. Item 339/82-08-12 is close License Condition-2.C.(15)(d). The leakage test connections on the RHR isolation valves have been installed and are reported in Inspection

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Report 339/82-13, paragraph 10.b.9., which also identified that new test connections for valves M0V-2700 and M0V-2701 were ineffective because of the valve disc design. Further inspection would be required to determine adequacy of a plan to satisfy this license condition by modification of the test procedur The valve design, modification status and test plan were discussed by the NRR Licensing Project Manager (LPM) with the mechanical review group. The inspector has been informed by the LPM that test procedure modification is acceptable. Item 339/82-08-13 is closed.

i License Condition 2.c.(15)(g). Retest of all engineered safety features was performed in accordance with 2-PT-83.5 prior to startu Results were satisfactory. Satisfactory completion was verified by direct inspector observation and review of test result Item 339/82-08-16 is close License Condition 2.c(15)(h)(5) The seven day fuel oil. storage tank emergency fill lines were completed by DC-81-02 and reviewed by the

! inspector. Item 339/82-08-21 is closed.

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, License Condition 2.c.(15)(h)(6) The control and relay panels were

floor mounted per DC-81-04B. The final package was reviewed by the inspector. Item 339/82-08-22 is close . Plant Operation While conducting 2-PT-83.5 Emergency Bus Blackout and SI Functional Tests May 28, 1982 on Unit 2 in Mode 4 and primary system temperature approxi-mately 345 F the following sequence of events occurred. In accordance with the procedure the Train B pump controls were placed in the pull-to-lock position for pumps 2-RS-P-1B, 2-RS-P-2B and 2-QS-P-18. The train A pump controls, which had been previously tested, were in the Auto position. The next step in the procedure instructed the test personnel to install five jumpers in the Train B Solid State Protection output cabinet. These jumpers would ensure that Containment Depressurization Activation (CDA) loads, which are shed from the emergency bus, are reloaded onto the bus following restoration of bus voltag At 2243 test personnel installed these jumpers in Train A Solid State Protection instead of the intended Train B cabine These jumpers began starting the Train A Quench Spray and Recirculation Spray pumps because their control switches were in the Auto position. The pump discharge valves remained closed because no CDA signal was presen Operations personnel conducting the periodic test began placing the Train A

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.- . pump controls in the pull-to-lock position as their energization was annunciated in the control room. The Casing Cooling pump 2-RS-P-3A was held in the stop position, since the control switch has no pull-to-lock positio The breaker for the chemical addition tank Train A discharge valve M0V-QS-202A was deenergized and the associated manual valves close These actions were taken to prevent possible pump damage and to terminate an inadvertent actuation of the Containment Spray System. However at the same time the Train 8 pump controls were also in the pull-to-lock position per the PT procedure rendering both Trains out of automatic operation. All of the incorrectly installed jumpers were promptly removed. Train A was returned to fully operable status by 2300 and power was restored to MOV-QS-202A and the manual isolation valves were opened by 232 During this event operations personnel were aware of the problem when it first started and took proper corrective action to prevent an inadvertent Containment Spray actuation. However if an actual containment overpressure -

condition had occured (CDA Signal) all of the automatic valves would have positioned for system actuation. Also operations personnel had the capability in the control room to reposition Train A of Quench Spray and Recirculation Spray System to actuate by taking the control switches out of the pull-to-lock position. Since MOV-QS-202A is not designed to open until five minutes after a CDA signal, sufficient time was available to unisolated the chemical addition tanks if needed. Thus the systems were capable of readily being placed in operation in the event of a CDA signal. A CDA signal would have been a highly unlikely event, as the plant was making the first startup following a refueling outage. The matter was identified by the licensee, properly reported to the NRC and prompt corrective action taken. The licensee conducted an investigation to determine the causes of this event and is evaluating several courses of corrective action. The inspectors will evaluate the resulting long term corrective actio (Inspector Followup Item 50-338/82-14-01).

! Numerous containment entries were made during the current Unit 2 refueling outage. These entries were made to review work in progress, overall housekeeping and safety during work activities, and to assure adherence to licensee health physics policie On a regular basis, radiation work procedures (RWP's) were reviewed and the specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being conducted per the RWP' Radiation protection instruments were verified operable and calibration / check frequencies were reviewed for completenes The inspectors kept informed on a daily basis of overall status of both units and of any significant safety matter related to plant operation Discussiorswere held with plant management and various members of the -

operations staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of daily operating logs and operating data sheets were reviewed daily during this report perio (

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The inspectors conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included witnessing work activities in progress, status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment, confirming valve postions, instrument readings and recordings, annunciator alarms, housekeeping and vital area control No violations were identified in these areas.

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