IR 05000338/1982019

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IE Insp Repts 50-338/82-19 & 50-339/82-19 on 820608-11.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previous Insp Findings,Ie Bulletin 79-13 & Inservice Insp
ML20058B750
Person / Time
Site: North Anna  
Issue date: 06/30/1982
From: Crowley B, Economos N
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058B748 List:
References
50-338-82-19, 50-339-82-19, IEB-79-13, NUDOCS 8207260133
Download: ML20058B750 (8)


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y()

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101 MARIETT A ST., N.W.. SUITE 3100 C

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July 2, 1982 Report Nos. 50-338/82-19 and 50-339/82-19 Licensee:

Virginia Electric and Gas Company Richmond, VA 23262 Facility Name:

North Anna Docket Nos. 50-338 and 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4 and NPF-7 Inspection at NortF A si+ _ near Mineral, Virginia

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Inspector:

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Q, eley ate Signed Approvedby:~---/\\',

[dep rwi o (/.3 C [Y N. Economos', Te"ction Chief

'Date/igned Engineering Inspection Branch Division of Engineering and Technical Programs SUMMARY Inspection on June 8-11, 1982 Areas Inspected This routine, announced inspection involved 26 inspector-hours on site in the areas of previous inspection findings (Units 1 and 2), IE Bulletin 79-13 (Unit 2), and inservice inspection (ISI) (Unit 1).

Results No violations or deviations were identified.

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8207260133 820702 PDR ADOCK 05000338 G

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  • July 2, 1982

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REPORT DETAILS

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1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • W. R. Cartwright, Station Manager
  • R. Sidle, Supervisor - Maintenance Service
  • C. R. Gordon, Supervisor - NDE ( Acting)
  • H.

L. Travis, Level III NDE Examiner

  • M.

E. Fellows, Staff Assistant

  • V. Lawshe, Senior Engineering Technician Other licensee employees contacted included NDE inspection.

Other Organizations

  • R. H. Lofgreen, ET Data Reviewer, CONAM NRC Resident Inspector
  • D. Johnson
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 11, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below.

Inspector Followup Item 338/82-19-01, RC Pump Flow Splitter Indications, paragraph 5.

Inspector Followup Item 338/82-19-02, Specification of Penetrant Material Brand Names, paragraph 9.c.

Inspector Followup Item 338/82-19-03, Deformation of Steam Generater Tube Ends, paragraph 9.d.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item 339/82-09-03, Examination of Class 1 Integral Attachment Welds. The extent of coverage for these welds is covered in the licensee's ISI program as an exemption request. The program was approved by NRR letter to VEPCO dated December 9,197.

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July 2, 1982

(Closed) Unresolved Item 338/81-26-01, Replacement RC Stop Valve Bolt Pre-service Inspection Report. The licensee decided to perform a new preservice inspection on these bolts this outage.

The inspector reviewed the licen-see's ISI program to verify that these bolts are scheduled for inspection this outage.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5.

Independent Inspection Effort Prior to the inspection, the licensee notified RII that the Unit I reactor coolant pump elbow flow splitters had been inspected and the ultrasonic (UT)

indications at the flow splitter / elbow wall had grown since last inspection.

During the inspection, the inspector reviewed the data for the current inspection and previous inspections. Indications in all flow splitters have grown since the last outage except the reactor side of loop "C" The reactor side of loop "C" has not had any indicatons during any inspection.

The longest indications during previous inspections were on the wall side of loop "A".

These indications have grown more in total length since the last inspection than indications in the other loops. The total indication length on the wall side of

"A" loop is now 50" or approximately 63% of the total length of the flow splitter.

The inspector questioned the licensee relative to establishing a limiting condition for operating the plant with the defective flow splitters, i.e.,

what length can the UT indications grow before the flow splitters must be removed. The licensee stated that a decision has not yet been made.

The problem is being evaluated with their contractor, Westinghouse, to determine the proper course of action. Numerous analyses are being performed to try to determine expectation for flow splitter behavior during future opera-tions.

A preliminary report is tentatively scheduled for July 2, 1982.

However, based on the 1979 Safety Evaluation of this problem, the licensee considers the problem to be an economic problem rather than a safety prob-lem, i.e., severance of the flow splitter or a portion of the flow splitter from the elbow would not result in a safety issue that has not been analyzed.

For purposes of following this problem and review of the final disposition, the inspector indentified inspector followup item 338/82-19-01, RC Pump Flow Splitter Indications.

Within the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identfied.

6.

Inspector Followup Items (Closed) Item 339/79-39-02, Indications found in Feedwater Weld as a result of IEB 79-13 Inspections. As reported by VEPCO letter dated April 1, 1980, the indications were repaired.

(See paragraph 7 for additional comments relative to IE Bulletin 79-13).

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IE Bulletins (IEB's)

(0 pen) IEB 79-13, Cracking in Feedwater System Piping (Unit 2).

During review of the inspector followup item of paragraph 6 above. the inspector questioned the licensee relative to the completion of IEB 79-13, speci-(

fically the inspections requried at the first refueling outage.

The licensee investigated and found that the inspections required at the first refueling outage had not been performed.

The refueling outage had been completed and the plant was in the process of going back to power.

The licensee proposed and RII verbally agreed to delay the first refueling inpsections until the scheduled Octobe r/1982 maintenance outage.

The justification for the delay was (1) the acceptable test preformed af ter hot functional testing, and (2) the acceptable ISI inspections performed on the system since hot functional testing. The licensee agreed:

a.

to provide a letter to RII by COB on June 11, 1982 documenting justi-fication for the delay.

b.

that the required inspections will be by radiographic (RT) inspection supplemented by ultrasonic (UT) inspection.

8.

Inservice Inspection-Review of Procedures (Unit 1)

The inspector reviewed the ISI procedures indicated below to determine whether the procedures were consistent with regulatory requirements and licensee commitments.

Based on the licensee's Technical Specification and 10 CFR 50.55a, the applicable code for ISI is the ASME Code,Section XI, 1974 Edition, Summer 1975 Addenda.

a.

The following procedures were reviewed in the areas of procedure approval, requirements for qualification of NDE personnel and com-pilation of required records:

(1)

ISI-11, revision 9, amend. 03, " Liquid Penetrant Examination Procedure" (2) ISI-41, revision 4 amend. 02, " Manual Ultrasonic Testing of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels" (3) ISI-205, revision 2, amend. 03, " Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Full Penetration Circumferential & Longitudinal Butt Welds" (4)

ISI-8, revision 7, amend. 01, " Visual Examination Procedure" (5) NDE-ET-1, revision 1, " Eddy Current Examination (Multifrequency Steam Generators)"

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b.

In addition to the review above, UT procedure ISI-205 was reviewed in the area of procedure content relative to: type of apparatus, extent of coverage including be'm angles and scanning techniques, calibration requirements, search units. DAC curves, transfer requirements, refer-ence level for monitoring discontinuities, method of demonstrating penetration, levels for evaluation and recording indications, and acceptance standards.

c.

PT procedure 15I-11 was reviewed for technical content relative to:

method consistent with ASME code, specification of brand names of penetrant materials, specification of limits for sulfur and total halogens for materials, pre-examination surface preparation, minimum drying time following surface cleaning, penetrant application and penetration time, temperature requirements, solvent removal, method of surface drying, type of developer and method of application, examina-tion technique, technique for evaluation, acceptance standards, and requalification requirements.

d.

MT procedure ISI-70 was reviewed for technical content relative to:

examination method, use of color contrast particles, surface pre-paration, surface temperature, particle suspension, fluorescent viewing conditions, examination directions and overlap, pole or prod spacing, prod magnetizing current, technique for coil method and acceptance criteria.

e.

Eddy current examination procedure NDE-ET-1 was reviewed for technical content relative to equipment, frequencies, calibration, and reporting.

Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.

9.

Inservice Inspection-Observation of Work and Work Activities (Unit 1)

The inspector observed the ISI activities described below to determine whether these activities were being performed in accordance with regulatory requirements and licensee procedures. See paragraph 8 above for the appli-cable code.

a.

Personnel qualification records for two Level II examiners were reviewed.

l b.

The inspector observed the in process UT inspection of reactor coolant pump "B" flywheel periphery. The inspection was compared with applic-able procedures in the following areas:

(1) Avaliability of and compliance with approved NDE procedures (2) Use of Knowledgeable NDE personnel (3) Use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level (4) Recording of inspection results (5) Type of apparatus used (6) Extent of coverage of weldment

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(7) Calibration requirements (8) Search units (9) Beam angles (10) DAC curves

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l (11) Reference level for monitoring discontinuities (12) Method for demonstrating penetration I

(13) Limits for evaluating and recording indications (14) Recording significant inidcations (15) Acceptance limits

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c.

The inspector observed in process PT inspection of the bore of reactor coolant pump "B" flywheel. The inspection was compared with applicable procedures in the following areas:

(1) Availability of and compliance with approved NDE Procedures

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(2) Use of knowledgeable NDE personel (3) Use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level

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(4) Recording of inspection results (5) Method consistent with procedure

(6) Penetrant materials identified and consistent with ASME Code (7) Certification to sulfur and halogen content for penetrant materials

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(8) Surface preparation

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(9) Drying time following surface cleaning (10) Penetrant application and penetration time

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(11) Examination surface temperature

(12) Penetrant removal (13) Drying of surface prior to developing i

(14) Developer type, application and time interval after penetrant removal

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(15) Time interval between developer application and evaluation i

(16) Evaluation technique (17) Reporting examination results

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i During observation of the above PT inspection, the inspector noted that Sherwin brand penetrant materials were being used.

The applicable procedure. ISI-11, requires the use of the Magnaflux brand materials.

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The procedure allows the use of equivalent materials.

The licensee's

contractor, Westinghouse, stated that they had documentation showing i

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the equivalency of Sherwin and Magnaflux materials.

However, this documentation was not available on site. This matter is identified as inspector followup item 338/82-19-02, Specification of Penetrant

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Material Brand Names, for review of equivalency documentation and review of procedure change adding Sherwin materials.

l d.

The inspector observed in process eddy current (ET) examination of

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steam generator tubes and discussed the practices used with the exam-iners who operated the equipment and reviewed the data.

In addition, the tube deformation problem of paragraph (2) below was discussed extensively.

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(1)

Inspection of the following tubes was observed:

"B" Generator (From Hot Leg Side) - Tubes R43C37, R42C37, R37C30, R33C29, and R25C27

"C" Generator (From Cold Leg Side) - Tubes R21C82 and R17C81 The inspection war compared with applicable procedures in the following areas:

(a) Availability of and compliance with approved NDE procedures (b) Use of knowledgeable NDE personnel (c) Use of NDE personnel qualified to the proper level (d) Recording of inspection results (e) Use of proper equipmen'

(f)

Frequencies (g) Calibration (h) Acceptance Cr4 teria (2) Prior to this inspection, the licensee had identified a problem with deformation of the tube ends on the hot leg side of steam generators "A" and "C".

The damage is confined to the tube ends below the tube sheet and is estimated to affect approximately 74%

of the tubes.

The tube sheets had been photographed and the deformation did not appear to be severe. However, in many cases, the deformation precludes entry of the ET probe. The status of this problem at the conclusion of the inspection was as follows:

(a) The licensee had determined that the deformed tube ends presented two concerns.

First, there was a question about the integrity of the tube to tube sheet welds. Second, the problem with entry of the ET probe had to be resolved.

(b) For resolution of the question relative to the integrity of the welds, the licensee was in the process of setting up to obtain high magnification photographs of selected areas of the tube sheet to visually inspect the tube to tube sheet welds. This method has been used previously for inspection of the same welds at Zion where similar, but much worse, tube deformation had occurred. The inspector observed some of the photographs from Zion.

(c) Relative to entry of the ET probe, the licensee was in the process of inspecting the required sample of tubes from the cold -leg side of steam generators

"A" and "C" However, tubes in rows 1 thru 5 cannot be inspected from the cold leg side due to the tight bend radius. Therefore, the licensee plans to mechanically correct the deformed tube ends where

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required to obtain the proper ET sample. The present plans are to correct only the tubes in rows 1 thru 5 necessary to obtain the required ET sample. The ET for the remaining rows will be performed from the cold leg side.

For purposes of following this problem and reviewing the final resolution, the inspector identified inspector followup item 338/82-19-03, Deformation of Steam Generator Tube Ends.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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