05000219/LER-1982-025, Forwards LER 82-025/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-025/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20054K448
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	06/17/1982
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20054K449	List: 05000219/LER-1982-025, Forwards LER 82-025/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8207020147
Download: ML20054K448 (3)

LER-2082-025, Forwards LER 82-025/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2192082025R00 - NRC Website

text

• GPU Nuclear U o ked ive . New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

June 17, 1982 Mr. Ronald C. Ihynes, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Dea r Mr. Haynes:

Su bjec t : Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-25/01T This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-25/01T in compliance with paragraphs 6.9.2.a.2 and 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

This event was initially identified as a 30 day report. While preparing the report , it was realized that during the repair period for the Reactor Triple Low Sensor in question, a simulated trip was not placed into the Auto Depressurization System logic. This constituted an immediately reportable event for which this report is a followup.

Very truly yours, Peter B. Fiedler Vice President & Director Oyster Creek PBF:1se Enclosures cc: Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Director (3)

Of fice of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa shing to n, D.C. 20555 NRC Resident Inspector (1) 7 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 s 7

hPDR GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Pubhc Utihties System j

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I OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, NJ 08731 Licensee Event Repurt Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-25/01T Report Date June 17, 1982 Occurrence Date May 6,1982 Identification of Occurrence During routine surveillance testing of Reactor Triple Low Sensor RE18D, its output circuit failed to provide the proper indication af ter the second attempt to adjust the instrument to its desired As Lef t setpoint. This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

During the review and preparation of the occurrence report, it was identified that a required simulated trip for RE18D was not placed into the Auto Depressurization System logic during the approximate nine hour time frame that RE18D's circuit was out of service for repair. The failure to establish a simulated trip for RE18D, as required by Section 3.1, Tabic 3.1.1, Item G.2, Note h of the Technical Specifications, constitutes a reportable occurrence as defined in paragraph 6.9.2.a.2 of the station's Technical Specifications.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The reactor was in steady state operation Mode Switch: RUN MWt: 1270 MWe: 410 Description of Occurrence The As Found trip point for RE18D was 125.5 inches of water. (The limit set forth by the Station's Technical Specifications is equal to or less than 126.4 inches of water, and the surveillance test procedure specifies an As Lef t level of between 115 and 119 inches.) RE18D's trip point is determined by an annunciator in the Control Room which is activated by a contact on a relay controlled by RE18D; when RE18D trips, its down stream relay is picked up and the annunciator is activated.

RE18D was depressurized, an adjustment was made to its trip setting, and the instrument was repressurized. This time , the trip point was approximately 120 inches of water. Again, the trip setting was adjusted; however, the control room annunciator did not respond to RE18D being pressurized to its trip point.

Licensee Event Report Page 2 Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-25/0lT Appa rent Cause of Occurrence The results of the investigation to determine the cause of the aforementioned failure indicated a badly corroded wire at an inline splice in a condulet between RE18D and the first termination point of RE18D's output, which is a wall mounted junction box approximately five feet from RE18D.

It was concluded from the evidence, that the wire junction f ailed due to a combination of corrosion and mechanical stress of the wire incurred during initial installation.

Analysis of Occurrence The failure occurred af ter two attempts to adjust RE18D to its desired setpoint, i.e., the complete circuit was intact for two complete operational cycles.

If the circuit failure had occurred between surveillance tests, the loss of RE18D would have been compensated for by redundant sensors of identical l qualities, which would have initiated the Auto Depressurization System, if required .

Corrective Action The immediate corrective action was to replace the entire length of wire between RE18D and its associated wall mounted junction box, with a continuous run of wire.

Following the replacement of the wire, RE18D was adjusted to an acceptable As Lef t trip setting per the surveillance procedure.

A review of similar installations indicated that no additional immediate corrective action was required.

During the next refueling outage, all similar splices in safety-related installations will be removed and replaced with continuous wire.

Existing procedures will be reviewed and revised to assure that inoperable safety-related instrumentation is placed in a tripped position when required during preventive or corrective maintenance.

Failure Data Corrosion of a no. 22 stranded wire at the inline splice where the #22 wire was overlapped with a no. 14 wire.