05000219/LER-1982-043, Forwards LER 82-043/03L-0.Detailed Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-043/03L-0.Detailed Analysis Encl

ML20066K856
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	11/03/1982
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20066K864	List: 05000219/LER-1982-043, Forwards LER 82-043/03L-0.Detailed Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8211290671
Download: ML20066K856 (3)

LER-2082-043, Forwards LER 82-043/03L-0.Detailed Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2192082043R00 - NRC Website

text

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_ c' Mw - 4 ps g GPU Nuclear

(,g QQg7 P.O. Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

November 3, 1982 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Repilatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subj ect: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Doeket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-43/03L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-43/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, U

Peter B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek PBF:lse Enclosure s cc: Director (40 copies)

Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dire ctor (3)

Of fice of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 8211290671 821103

{DRADOCK 05000219 PDR GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Public Utihties System h

.~ .

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-43/03L Report Date November 3,1982 Occur re nc e Da te October 4,1982 Identification of Occurrence Operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation per Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.B.3, when it was discovered that an inspection port cover plate was not in place on Standby Gas Treatment System No . 1.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence Mode Switch Position - Run Thermal Power - 1156 MWt Generator Load - 370 MWe Description of Occurrence While performing routine surveillance testing of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS), a low flow indication was noted on SGTS Train No. 2. A technician was dispatched to rezero the pitot tube flow indicator, but no change was evident in system flow. The technician subsequently found an inspection port cover plate out of place in the ductwork of SGTS Train No.1.

The inspection port is located between the absolute filter and charcoal adsorber. The cover plate was found laying in the ductwork and was put back into place. Upon remeasurement, a normal flow rate was indicated.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence The apparent cause was attributed to improper installation of the access port cover af ter a HEPA filter DOP test was performed on September 23, 1982, to verify filter ef ficiency.

Licensee Event Report Page 2 l Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-43/03L Analysis of Occurrence l The function of the Standby Gas Treatment System is to filter and exhaust the reactor building atmosphere to the stack during secondary containment isolation conditions, thus minimizing the relense of radioactive effluent from the

, reactor building to the environment. Under these circumstances, the SGTS replace the Reactor Building Ventilation System which exhausts directly to the i j stack. The SGTS consists of two separate filter trains, each capable of providing 100% treatment capacity. The two filter trains are interconnected via a cross-connect valve which opens along with an inlet and a discharge valve for each system upon an automatic initiation signal. Both exhaust fans start upon initiation as well. Af ter a 2-4 minute delay, the standby train will automatically shut of f and isolate, while the selected train will remain in operation with the cross-connect valve open to provide cooling flow via a restricting orifice through the standby filter train. After a delay of a few minutes, the cross-connect valve closes.

In this case, the inspection port which was open was located in the standby

system (Train No.1) . SGTS No. 2 was placed manually into operation for a ten (10) hour surveillance run with the cross-connect valve remaining open. As the interconnection is downstream of each filter train and the pitot tube is upstream in the common inlet duct, air drawn through the open inspection port and cross-connect valve short-circuited the train being tested and low inlet flow was indicated. Upon replacement of the inspection port cover plate, normal flow rate through Train No. 2 resumed.

If this situation had occurred during secondary containment isolation conditions, when radioactive ef fluent was released into the reactor building, the ability of SGTS No.1 to perform its intended function would have been degraded. As SGTS No. 2 remained fully operable, the safety significance of this event was minimized.

i Corrective Action The inspection plate was replaced and SGTS No. I was declared operable.

Review of the surveillance procedure verified that instructions were j incorporated to address the closing and dogging of the covers. A review of the completed surveillance forms verified that this step had been completed.

Further investigation raised concerns regarding the adequacy of the procedure to assure proper dogging. The dogging mechanism operation will be reviewed to determine whether or not additional instructions should be incorporated into the procedure to prevent this event f rom recurring.

Failure Data No component exhibited failure.

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