05000219/LER-1982-054, Forwards LER 82-054/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-054/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20069P952
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	11/24/1982
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20069P956	List: 05000219/LER-1982-054, Forwards LER 82-054/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8212080388
Download: ML20069P952 (3)

LER-2082-054, Forwards LER 82-054/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2192082054R00 - NRC Website

text

. .

GPU Nuclear g g{ P.O. Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

November 24, 1982 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator Region I U.S. Nucicar Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

Subj ect: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-54/03L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-54/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, M

Peter B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek PBF:Ise Enclosure s cc: Director (40 copies)

Of fice of Inspection and Enf orcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washi ngton, D.C. 20555 Director (3)

Office of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washi ngton , D.C. 20555 NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 1

l t

8212080388 821124 l PDR ADOCK 05000219 S

l PDR

, GPU Nuclear is a part of the Genmi Pubhr Utihties System -k, v .

l

i OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ,-

Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-54/03L Report Date November 24, 1952 Occurrence Date November 5, 1982 Identification of Occurrence

./

Operation in a degraded mode permitted by limiting condition for operation as specified in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.5.A.3.a.1, when the in-shield limit switch for No. 3 TIP machine failed to operate thereby I preventing the ball valve from automatically closing on a containment isolation signal. .c '.

This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The plant was operating at steady state power.

Mode Switch Position: Run Power: Core - 1041 MWt Electrical - 319 MWe Description of Occurrence On Friday, November 5,1982 at 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br />, af ter completf.ng a TIP trace, the ball valve on No. 3 TIP machine failed to close. This ia a degradation of the requirements for maintaining primary containment isolation valve operability.

l The manually operated shear valve, an in-line valve in the TIP tubing, was i

opera t ional. Subsequent investigation revealed that the in-shield limit switca failed to operate and close the ball valve.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence j T

The apparent cause of this occurrence was moisture build-up around the ,

in-shield limit switch operating arm. This moisture bound up the arm and ,

prohibited the limit switch from moving to the in-shield position. The 1 sci of in-shield logic f rom this switch maintained the ball valve open. k i l

L

\

-e'

. ? j ,~ >

s +

-. r ,

a e / 't

~

s Licensee Event Report

! Page 2 Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-54/03L

< - i

)i ) i Analysis of Occurrence '

The primary containment isolation valves are provided to maintain primary containment integrity following the design basis loss of coolant accident. The safety significance of this event is minimized as primary containment integrity can be maintained followixg an isolation ' signal by control room operators who will manually fire the explosive shear valve -for No. 3 TIP ball valve. ,

e i t ,

Corrective Action <

The in-shield limit switch operating arm was cleaned and tested. The n'itrogen purge system valve line-up was checked and verified to be correct.1 TIP tubing fittings in the vicinity of the shield were tightened. The liwit switch was aligned, tested, and returned to service at 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> on November 6,1982, which was within the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> requirement of Technical Specification 3.5.A.3.a.1. A modification is planned for the 1983 refueling outage to upgrade the TIP system including replacement of the in-shield limit switches with a more reliable proximity type device.

Failure Data I t'

Micro Switch Company ,

i.

• BZE6-2RN l'

• i 15A-125 VAC/250/480 VAC -

Freeport , Illinois -.

Switch was repa' ired'end not replaced.

t <

l l

l ss l

U f f

s l

'l

< g

• /

i l

l k-f l

. . - ._. . .__ ...