05000219/LER-1982-015, Forwards LER 82-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20054E037
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 04/14/1982
From: Fiedler P
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20054E038 List:
References
NUDOCS 8204260041
Download: ML20054E037 (3)


LER-2082-015, Forwards LER 82-015/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2192082015R00 - NRC Website

text

GPU Nuclear g gf P.O. Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

April 14, 1982 co Mr. Ibnald C. Haynes, Administrator e c)

Region I ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ommission 9 ~

Q 631 Park Avenue '

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King of Prussia, PA 19406 p-E f, aev,A,4 ]I ,

Dear Mr. Haynes:

, i f ~ ~ ' ~ y

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Sta $o[, j v.4 [

Docket No. 50-219 'cd -

Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-15/03L

'Ihis letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-15/03L in cmpliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.1 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, W/ eh Peter B. Fiedler Vice President & Director Oyster Creek PBF/kdk Enclosures cc: Director (40)

Office of Inspection and Enforement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ommission Washington, D. C. 20555 Director (3)

Office of bbnagement Information and Program Centrol U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Camission Washington, D. C. 20555 NRC Resident Inspector (1)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N. J. 08731

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&s 82042600%\ cru nuciea, ,s a na,i or ine oe,e,ai euenc ut,ai,es system ,

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OYSTER CREEK NUCIEAR GENERATING STATION Ebrked River, New Jersey 08731 l

Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-15/03L l Report Date April 14, 1982 Occurrence Date March 15, 1982 Identification of Occurrence During surveillance testing the delay time for air ejector isolation valve clo-sure was found to be greater than the value given in the Technical Specifica-tions, Note (e) to Item I. of Table 3.1.1.

'Ihis event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Tech-nical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.l.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

'Ihe plant was in the cold shutdown wndition.

4 Description of Occurrence During performance of the "Off-gas Holdup valve V-7-31 Isolation Test" (Surveil-lance Procedure 630.2.002) on March 15, 1982, timer RN28 timed out in ex ss I

of the Technical Specification limits. 'Ibe desired time delay is 15 +0/-1 min-utes. 'Ihe as found condition was 15 minutes and 28 seconds, or 28 seconds in excess of Technical Specifications limits.

l Apparent Cause of Occurrence l

The apparent cause of occurrenm was attributed to instrunent setpoint drift and inadequate surveillance procedure guidelines.

Surveillance procedure 630.2.002 instructs the instrunent technician that the required setpoint is to be 15 +0/-l minutes. While this setpoint acceptance criteria fulfills Technical Specification requircments at the time of calibra-tion, it does not provide any leeway for possible future instrunent drift.

The timer was last calibrated during the 1980 refueling outage and was left at the "as found" setpoint of exactly fifteen (15) minutes. Since the timer setpoint was left at the uppermost boundary specified in the surveillance pro-l

\ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ __ _ , -

r Reportable Occurrence Page 2 '

Report No. 50-219/82-15/03L cedure, which also wrresponded to the maximum Tedinical Specification setpoint limit, the instrment drift that occurred bet 7een surveillance tests resulted in the Technical Specification violation.

+ Analysis of Occurrence The Off-gas mnitoring systs mntinuously monitors the radioactivity of the effluent gases rmoved from the main condenser by the steam jet air ejector system. Trip settings alarm high radiation levels and initiate a time delay assembly for closure of the off-gas system isolation valve, V-7-31.

When the radiation levels of the off-gas approach the average stack release rate limit, an alarm is activated. At approximately ten times this limit, a signal is initiated to close the isolation valve, V-7-31, after a 15 minute delay.

'Ihe volume of the off-gas line prvvides a 30 minute holdup time. Therefore, automatic isolation occuring up to 30 minutes after t;.a high radiation signal prevents high activity frm being discharged frm the stack. 'Ihe time delay allows time for the operator to evaluate the data and prevent an unwa ranted isolation and reactor shutdown. Since the delay time for is ration valve clo-sure exceeded the 15 minute delay by only 28 seconds the safety significance of this event is considered nunimal.

Corrective Action The timer (RN28) was reset to trip within the Technical Specification limit of 15 minutes.

'Ihe schedule for the "Off-gas Hold-up valve V-7-31 Isolation Test" (Procedure 630.2.002) has been modified so that the surveillance will be performed prior to each startup ard the surveillance procedure will be changed in order to account for future possible setpoint drift.

Failure Data Timer: T N del No. TSA-21.