05000219/LER-1982-042, Forwards LER 82-042/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-042/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20063B762
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	08/16/1982
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20063B765	List: 05000219/LER-1982-042, Forwards LER 82-042/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl 05000219/LER-1982-042-03, /03L-0:on 820716,during Surveillance Testing, Relay 16K118 & 15K14B Timers Failed,Preventing Automatic Actuation of Containment Spray Sys Ii.Caused by Instrument Drift.Relays Replaced & Tested
References
NUDOCS 8208260194
Download: ML20063B762 (4)

LER-1982-042, Forwards LER 82-042/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2191982042R00 - NRC Website

text

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N GPU Nuclear g{

P.O. Box 388 W

Forked River, New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

August 16, 1982 1

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator l

Region I l

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

1 Subj ect: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-42/03L This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report l

Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-42/03L in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.b.2 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, A

A Pet #r B. Fie'dler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek PBF:lce Enclosures cc: Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Director (3)

Of fice of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731

~

8208260194 820816 PDR ADOCK 05000219 S

PDR GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Public Utihties System j'

w 4

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION I

Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurronce No. 50-219/82-42/03L i

Report Date i

August 16, 1982 Occurrence Date July 16, 1982 Identification of Occurrence During surveillance testing, a relay timer failure prevented automatic actuation of Containment Spray System II.

In addition, on a separate occasion, a different relay timer failed during surveillance testing, preventing automatic start of Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump 52C in Containment Spray System II.

These events constitute operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation as specified in the technical Specifications, paragraphs 3 4.0 3 and 3 4.C.4, respectively.

These events constitute a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6 9 2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence The major plant parameters at the time of the occurrence vers:

Power:

Reactor Power

- 1440 MWt Generator Output.-

450 MWe D,escription of Occurrence On July 16, 1982 at approximately 1855 hours0.0215 days <br />0.515 hours <br />0.00307 weeks <br />7.058275e-4 months <br />, while performing the Containment Spray System Automatic Actuation Test, the system II "C" containment spray pump failed to " auto" start. Electricians were sent to investigate the problem.

The electricians found no problem with the pump breaker or motor. Instrument technicians found that the timing function of relay 16K14B failed. The relay

- was -replaced and tested and the Containment Spray System Auto Actuation Test was comple ted satisfactorily.

On July 17, 1982 at approximately 2010 hours0.0233 days <br />0.558 hours <br />0.00332 weeks <br />7.64805e-4 months <br />, while performing the Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water Pump Operability Test, an ESW pump failure alarm was received in the control room prior to pump "52C" start. The 4

instrument technician found the timing function of relay 16KllB failed. The relay timer was replaced, tested, and the Containment Spray and ESW System II was tested satisfactorily.

~.

w Licensee Event Report Page 2 Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-42/03L Apparent Cause of Occurrence The apparent cause of the occurrence was instrument drif t.

Relay 16K14B timed out at 32 seconds instead of 57 +/-3 seconds. Relay 16K11B timed out at 43 seconds instead of 65 +/-3 seconds. The relays were inspected and it was verified that the drift was too wide and would require relay replacement rather than to attempt to retime the relays.

Analysis of Occurrence The Containment Spray System is used along with the Emergency Service Water System to remove energy released to the primary containment in the event of a loss of coolant accident. There are two independent loops which can accomplish this, each of which utilizes two ESW pumps, two containment spray pumps, two heat exchangers, two drywell spray heaters, and all the necessary piping, instrumentation and valves. There is one automatically started containment spray pump and emergency service water pump in each of the two systems. Should any of the automatic pumps fail to start, the control room operator can start the manually operated pump in parallel with the failed pump.

The effect of the failed relays,16K14B and 16KilB, rendered Containment Spray and Emergency Service Water System II inoperable for automatic operation. The relays will prevent auto-start of pumps 51C and 520, respectively, if they fail to start within the preset time. However, it should be noted that the system is designed so that one ESW pump, one heat exchanger and one containment spray pump can provide the necessary cooling. Since Containment Spray and ESW System I was operable and the manually operated pumps in System II were operable, the safety significance of the event is considered minimal.

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to manually start alternate System II pumps 51D and 52D. Containment spray pump 51C was also started manually. Containment Spray and ESW System I were also tested and found operable. The cause of the failure of the pumps to start was investigated. Relay 16KllB was replaced with a new relay. A new time delay section was installed on relay 16K14B. Both relays were timed and tested per plant procedures. The System II containment spray and ESW pumps were tested and returned to service.

In an attempt to determine the cause of the excessive setpoint drif t, the relay was tested and disassembled; no obvious cause of failure was found.

l L

N Licensee Event Report Page 3 Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-42/03L Failure Data Manufacturer data pertinent to the failures are as follows:

General Electric Relay No. 16KllB CR2820B413AA41 ll5V/125V DC General Electric Relay No. 16K14B CR2820B414AA41 115V/125V DC