05000219/LER-1982-031, Forwards LER 82-031/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Forwards LER 82-031/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20054M438
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	06/28/1982
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20054M439	List: 05000219/LER-1982-031, Forwards LER 82-031/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
References
NUDOCS 8207130238
Download: ML20054M438 (3)

LER-2082-031, Forwards LER 82-031/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

Event date:
Report date:
2192082031R00 - NRC Website

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• GPU Nuclear U o ked ive . New Jersey 08731 609-693-6000 Wnter's Direct Dial Number: l June 28, 1982 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 l

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station l Docket No. 50-219 l Licensee Event Report I, Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-31/01T l l

l This letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Report to report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-31/01T in compliance with paragraph 6.9.2.a(2) of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

~

Peter B. Fiedler Vice President & Director Oyster Creek PBF:Ise Enc losure s cc: Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Director (3)

Office of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 NRC Resident Inspector (1)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 8207130230 820628 PDR ADOCK 05000219 ,

S PDR

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GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Public Utilities System

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-31/0lT Report Date June 28, 1982 Occurrence Date June 14, 1982 Identification of Occurrence While at power, with Control Rod Drive (CRD) Pump . out of service, the diesel generator associated with CRD Pump B was removed from service for monthly maintenance. In this configuration, if of fsite AC power was lost, both CRD pumps would be unavailable. This is in violation of Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.7.C.2 which requires that none of the engineered safety features normally fed by the operational diesel generator may be out of service, or the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.

This event is c :asidered to be a Reportable Occurrence as defined in Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.2.a(2).

Conditions Prior to Occurrence Mode Switch Position: Run Reactor Power: 1594 MWt Generator Output 538 MWe De scription of Occurrence On Sunday, June 13,1982 at 10:30 PM, CRD Pump A was taken out of service for maintenance. On Monday, June 14,1982 at 7:10 AM, Diesel Generator #2 was taken out of service for monthly maintenance. The violation was identified by a member of the plant staf f and called to the attention of the Plant Operations Director.

At this time, actions were taken to restore Diesel Generator #2 to service. No maintenance activities had been performed on the diesel generator; however, an operability test was commenccd at 8:37 AM on Diesel Generator #2. It was returned to service af ter successfully completing its operability test at 9:37 AM.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence The apparent cause of this occurrence was personnel error. The Technical Specifications are clear in this area with regard to other engineered safety f eature s; however, there is room for interpretation in its applicatio: t to the CRD pumps.

Licensee Event Report Page 2 Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/82-31/ 01T Analysis of Occurrence The Control Rod Drive puups are on the automatic load sequence of the emergency diesel generators, and will provide the only means of high pressure makeup to the reactor with a loss of offsite power. In the event of a small break accident, less than .002 f t 2, with a loss of offsite power, a single CRD pump can maintain water level above the triple low setpoint of 4'8" from top of active fuel to prevent the need for initiation of the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). The ADS initiates with a combination of triple low water level, high drywell pressure and core spray booster pump discharge pressure and will provide a rapid means of controlled blowdown of the reactor to reduce pressure to permit core cooling via the Core Spray System. Had a small break accident, less than

.002 f t2, occurred during the short period of time while both "A" CRD pump and Diesel Generator #2 were out of service, coincident with a loss of offsite power, neither CRD pump would be available to maintain water level. Under these circumstances, the Automatic Depressurization System and Core Spray System would respond as if the break were greater than .002 f t2 to provide core cooling, if a high drywell pressure signal was also present. If a high drywell pressure signal was not present, plant energency procedures require manual initiation of the ADS to permit core spray flow.

It should be noted that prior to taking Diesel Generator #2 out of service, an operability test was successfully performed on Diesel Generator #1, and all engineered safety features associated with Diesel Generator #1, with the exception of "A" CRD pump, were operable.

Corrective Action Immediate corrective action was to perform an operability test on Diesel Generator #2 and return Diesel Generator #2 back to service.

Additional corrective action will be to include this report in the required reading program for all licensed operators with emphasis that if there is any question as to interpretation of Technical Specifications, plant management should be consulted for resolution. In addition, a list of all engineered safety features that are fed by the diesel generators during a loss of offsite power will be developed. This list will be sent out as required reading to prevent a similar misinterpretation.

In addition, the surveillance procedures for diesel generators will be revised to reflect detailed prerequisites for removal of the diesel generators from service.

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