ML20236E647

Insp Repts 50-369/89-14 & 50-370/89-14 on 890422-0601. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operation Safety Verification,Surveillance Testing,Maint activities,10CFR21 Reviews,Followup on Previous Insp Findings & LERs

ML20236E647
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	07/13/1989
From:	Shymlock M, Vandoorn K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236E641	List: ML20236E638 ML20236E644 ML20236E647
References
50-369-89-14, 50-370-89-14, IEIN-87-024, IEIN-87-24, IEIN-88-051, IEIN-88-073, IEIN-88-51, IEIN-88-73, NUDOCS 8907270264
Download: ML20236E647 (13)

See also: IR 05000369/1989014

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S'~ -'t UNITED STATES

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• 2* NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.-

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o * REGION 11

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-[ 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.

% , , , *o ' ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323

Report Nos. 50-369/89-14 and 50-370/89-14

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242 +

i Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2

Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370

License Nos.: NPF-9 and-NPF-17

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Inspection Conducted: April 22, 1989 - June 1,-1989

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Inspettor:. 1/// ///r /

K.'YafiDoorn, Seniof Resident Inspector

7/)F f

Drte/Sigfied

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Accompanying Inspectors: T. Cooper, Reactor Inspector

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B. Bonser, Project Inspector

Approve y: -

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M. B. Shymlock, Section Chief

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations safety

i verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, Part 21' reviews,

and follow-up on previous inspection findings and Licensee Event Reports.

Results:

In the areas inspected, one cited violation was identified and' one non-cited

violations were identified as follows:

Violation 369,370/89-14-01: Inadequate Surveillance Procedures for

MSIV's. (paragraph 4.d)

Non-Cited Violation 369/89-14-02: Failure to Meet Design Basis Flow for

Chilled Water for Control Room Ventilation due to Inadequate Calibration.

(paragraph 6)

It was noted that the licensee is not making consistent progress with

correcting control room indication problems.

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It was also noted that the licensee has recognized that the persistent problems

with failure to follow procedures is a widespread problem. The licensee

appears to be making a concerted effort at improving managements role in

assuring procedure compliance.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

G. Addis, Superintendent of Station Services

D. Baxter. Support Operations Manager

J. Boyle, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling

D. Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager

J. Foster, Station Health Physicist

M. Funderburke, Station Chemist

• G. Gilbert, Superintendent of Technical Services

C. Hendrix, Maintenance Engineering Services Manager -

T. Nathews, Site Design Engineering Manager

• T. McConnell, Plant Manager

D. Murdock, McGuire Design Engineering Division Manager

W. Reeside, Operations Engineer

R. Rider, Mechanical Maintenance Engineer

• M. Sample, Superintendent of Maintenance

R. Sharp, Compliance Manager

J. Snyder, Performance Engineer

J. Silver, Unit 2 Operations Manager

• A. Sipe, McGuire Safety Review Group Chairman

• B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations

R. White, Instrument and Electrical Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians,

operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

• Attended exit interview

2. Unresolved Items

An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is

required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation

or deviation. There were no unresolved items identified in this report.

3. Plant Operations (71707, 71710)

The inspection staff reviewed piant operations during the report period to

verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room

logs, shift npervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment

l removal and restoration records were _ routinely perued. Interviews were

conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,

l and performance personnel.

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Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at

shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as

prescribed in applicable station administrative di"ectives. The complement

of 1 censed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required

by Technical Specifications.

Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not

limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2

electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the

station yard zone inside the protected area.

During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,

equipment status and radiation control practices were observed.

a. Unit 1 Operations

The unit began the pericd in mid-loop operation due to the steam

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generator tube rupture event described previously. Startup commenced-

on May 6,1989 and the unit was placed on-line on May 9,1989. The

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unit remained on-line the rest of the period ending the period at

100% power. Some off-gas problems were experienced in the Auxiliary

Building after the Unit 1 startup. The licensee aggressively pursued

and corrected the problem.

b. Unit 2 Operations

The unit generally ran at full power during the entire period with

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some power reductions for fuel conservation.

c. Housekeeping issues described in a previous report (369,370/89-11)

were corrected during this inspection period. During this period the

inspector noted an argon gas bottle with no housekeeping tag near the

2B Nuclear Service Water pump. The licensee appropriately responded

by removing the bottle. The licensee indicated that a more positive

control program for both bottles and scaffolding is being developed.

The inspector also noted many open locks in various locations at

Motor Control Centers (MCC's). The licensee indicated that these are

locks which are available when needed for various valve lineups, many

of which are needed during outages. The licensee's intent is to

store most locks in a central location near each MCC. The licensee

was asked to review this issue.

d. The inspector reviewed the Control Room Ventilation (VC) system

capabilities relative to degradation from smoke. This review was

prompted by the fire experienced at the licensee's Oconee Nuclear

Station. VC has two 100% capacity filtered trains with smoke

detectors. Outside air intake is provided from two well separated

locations. The system is capable of pressurizing the control room.

Also the system has the capability to purge the ductwork should it

become necessary. Air packs are also provided for operators in the ,

control room. l

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e.- During the Unit 1 outage the licensee discovered minor discrepancies

in vendor supplied flow control orificet . and discovered a

construction orifice in one train of the Auxiliary Feedwater (CA)

I system. This problem contributed to errors in the flow balance. The

l licensee replaced the construction orifice and conducted prototype

testing.- A Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) up to 20%

power was documented on May 8, 1989. A rebalance was accomplished at

approximately 15% power and a new JC0 issued (see paragraph 4.a).

The licensee inspected Unit 2 for construction orifices and found

none. The licensee's judgement was that the Unit 2 CA system was

operable.

f. Based on testing information from the licensee's Catawba Station

relative to Borg-Warner flexible wedge gate valves, the licensee ~was

required to evaluate operability of four.CA and four Main Feedwater-

(CF) system valves for each unit. The primary purpose of these

valves is to close under certain conditions to limit energy input

into containment during a faulted steam generator (e.g. feedline -

break) event. It is questionable whether these valves 'could close

under maximum postulated differential. pressure. Compensatory actions

were provided for the CA Valves ( 1 and 2'CA-38, 50, 54 and 66) on

May 16, 1989. The actions involved use of an air-operated valve in

the lines or a local manual valve. These compensatory actions

appeared viable since the. valves are accessible. The analysis for CA

assumes no operator action for 15 minutes and appropriate training

was provided to operators. The long term fix is under evaluation and

will probably include valve replacement.

The CF valves, normally shut during operation, were failed shut while

further testing and review could be accomplished. A short term or

long term fix had not been developed at the end of the inspection

period. Although the safe mode is closed, the-licensee would not be

able to startup with these valves inoperable. if shutdown occurred

since the valves are necessary for startup.

g. The inspector noted that the licensee is not making consistent

progress in correction of Control Room Indication Problems (CRIPS).

The number of CRIPS has been high for an extended period of time and

has been previously noted by the NRC. The number increased during

the period from 117 to 137. A dedicated' repair crew and site goals-

were previously established, however, it appears this problem may.

need more attention if consistent progress is not.more. forthcoming.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Surveillance Testing (61726)

Selected surveillance ' tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the

inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance

with applicable Technical Specifications.

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Selected tests were witnessed or reviewed to ascertain that- current

written approved procedures were available and.in use, that test equipment i

in use was calibrated, that test prerequisites were met. .that system-  !

restoration was completed and test results were. adequate.

Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:

PROCEDURE EQUIPMENT / TEST

PT/1/A/4252/15 CA System Flow Leakage Verification

PT/1/A/4252/13 Motor Driven CA System Flow Balance

PT/1/A/4252/14 Turbine Driven CA System Flow Balance

PT/0/A/4600/4 Incore Instrument Detector Calibration

IP/0/A/3207/07 Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range

Detector Current Calibration

a. The above Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) leakage test was performed

because previous testing had shown lower than expected flows to the

steam generators (SG). Leakage was determined to be occurring

through the valves which recirculate flow to the Upper Surge Tank

from the Motor Driven CA pumps (MDCAP). The original design basis

requires pump capacities to be 98% of manufacturers head curve.

Present performance is 97.5%, 97.8% and 97% for the A MDCAP, B MDCAP

and Turbine Driven CA pump respectively. Given the lower than

required pump performance and the leakage a special flow balance was

i performed to assure optimal flow to each SG. A special analysis was

l completed and a Justification for Continued Operation was issued on l

May 11, 1989. There are no additional flow margins available in the  !

analysis. Therefore, the licensee will attempt to repair the leaking j

valves and rebalance the system,

b. A special inspection was performed which served to verify various

Technical Specification surveillance were being performed for Diesel

Generator Fuel Oil (See paragraph 8.)

c. The licensee identified that leakage surveillance for Containment

Purge (VP) valves may be inadequate based on NRC Information Notice I

88-73: Direction-Dependent Leak Characteristics of Containment Purge  !

Valves and vendor information. Leakage rate is direction dependent )

for the Fisher Controls Series 9200 butterfly valves and the inside j

valves have been tested in a non-conservative direction. While the i

surveillance is apparently inadequate, the licensee judged that their

valves were operable and documented the decision in an Operability )

Evaluation dated May 26, 1989. Operability was based on several '

facts. The licensee quarterly tests have all resulted in minimal

measured leakage. The valves are not opened during operations to

assure that the seating characteristics are not disturbed. The

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McGuire valves are 24-inches in diameter and the pressure requirement

is approximately 15-psig. The valves cited in the Information Notice

are 48-inches in diameter with an approximate 50-psig pressure

requirement. Satisfactory containment integrated leak rate test

results further assure acceptable leak rates for the penetrations.

Further evaluation is in progress relative to a long term fix.

d. On May 25, 1989 site personnel determined that the Main Steam

Isolation Valves (MSIV) for both Units may be inoperable based on NRC

Information Notice No.88-51: Failures of Main Steam Isolation

Valves. The valves are required to close within 5 seconds without

air assist per the FSAR, Section 10.3.2 and Technical Specification

l (TS) 3.7.1.4. Routine surveillance on the MSIVs has been performed

which allows air assistance per surveillance procedures PT/1 and

2/A/4255/03A and 03B, SM Valve Stroke Timing (Shutdown). The

licensee provided an operability evaluation that the valves were

operable based in part on the following information:

(1) The McGuire MSIVs, under the worst case flow / operating

conditions (full pressure, reverse flow) have an operator

closing margin of 2264 lb. or 24%,' assuming spring force only.

No credit is assumed for air assist.

(2) Atwood & Morrill (A&M), the manufacturer, has verified actuator

margins and stroke time by full flow testing, in both directions

at maximum pressure drop in both directions.

(3) The variables affecting stroke time are packing drag and the

l load imposed by the speed control cylinder.

i The values used for packing drag by A&M in the sizing

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cciculations are conservative and according to the licensee, the

packing system is original (0P-asbestos, graphite-& zinc).-

The speed control cylinders were rendered inoperative so they_

cannot adversely affect stroke times.

In addition, the licensee informed the inspector that like valves

were tested satisfactorily without air assist at the Catawba Station

and these valves had weaker springs and higher packing drag. This

operability evaluation was documented on May 26, 1989.

Corporate personnel documented the concern in Problem Investigation

Report (PIR-0-M 89-0122) on May 16, 1989. This PIR was signed out

and sent under a cover letter to the site on May 22, 1989. -Site

personnel became aware of the letter on May 25, 1989. The letter

stated, " Corrective actions need to be taken at MNS since current

surveillance testing of the MSIVs does not assure that they will

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close within 5 seconds with spring forces alone. The recommended

corrective action is for the MNS MSIVs to be surveillance tested

while closing with spring forces alone. The attached PIR was written

to initiate corrective actions and should be distributed

accordingly."

While the operability evaluation is appropriate, the inspector is

concerned that an inadequate surveillance was allowed to exist from

early August 1988 when the Information Notice was received until late

May 1989. The inspector is further concerned with the process of

notification of the site by corporate personnel of a possibly

significant operability issue. In that it took nine days to

identify an operability concern to site personnel and to initiate

corrective actions.

The licensee intends to perform the adequate surveillance during the

next available outage since the surveillance is not possible at

power. It is noted that Unit I has had two extended outages since

the fall of 1988 which afforded the. opportunity to test the MSIVs had

the problem been addressed earlier.

l Because the NRC wants to encourage and support licensee initiative

for self-identification and correction of problems, the NRC will not

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generally issue a Notice of Violation for a violatior that meets

specific criteria. However, a violation for inadequate surveillance

procedures to test the MSIVs is being cited because corrective

actions were not accomplished in a reasonable time period. This is i

Violation 369,370/89-14-01: Inadequate Surveillance Procedures for 1

MSIVs.

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One violation was identified as described above. l

S. Maintenance Observations (62703)

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Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the '

resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy

and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.  !

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The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where j

applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use, j

that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and ,

maintenance results were adequate.  ;

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ACTIVITY WORK REQUEST / PROCEDURE l

Valve Operator Testing of 2CF126 96698 NSM

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Trouble Shoot Spurious OP Delta T WR 138606 OPS

Runback / Rod Stop Alert Alarm

Replace Control Room Switch for WR 88828 MNT

IND4B ,

1A NI Pump Couplino Alignment WR 097076PM/MP/0/A/7150/44

a. The inspector noted during observation of the activities listed above

that procedures were being referenced and followed. The Safety- l

Injection (NI) pump alignment procedure was a broad procedure written I

for complete teardown. Specific sections to be used were referenced. '

on the work request and were being followed. It was noted that the

mechanic had to push in on the turning bar to obtain consistent )

readings on the coupling face. Also the motor side flange was wired )

back to keep from interfering with the dial indicator mounting. The I

mechanics attempted to use a specially made NI Pump socket for the

motor bolts which would no longer work because heavier washers were

apparently being used since the socket was manufactured. Also this

special tool was not referenced in the procedure. These observations

were passed on to the licensee for consideration of improvements in l

tooling and procedure guidance. During the NI pump inspection a

mechanic indicated the Quality Assurance (QA) inspectors sometimes

require bolt torque to be verified by simply checking torque and l

other times by requiring bolts to be untorqued and retorqued while

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being observed. The inspector inquired of QA Supervision why the j

inspections varied. The inspector was informed that -the general

inspection procedure only requires verification of minimum torque,

however, some inspectors choose to occasionally verify that bolts are.

not being overtorqued and require the loosening and retorqueing to be

accomplished. This is an acceptable practice to QA management.

i b. The inspector also discussed maintenance goals with the Maintenance j

Superintendent. While a nuniber of goals are being met, those 4

involving outstanding work requests and control room indicators are j

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not being met. The licensee indicated that management attention is j

being placed on these issues and improvement is expected.  !

l c. The licensee appears to have recognized that the general problem of j

procedural compliance is a cultural one and appears to be making a i

concerted effort at improving managements role in assuring procedural ^

compliance. This comment is based on discussions with licensee 4

management and a review of information presented by the licensee'in

recent line staff meetings.

No violations or deviations were identified. "

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6. Licensee Event Report (LER) and Part 21 Followup (90712,92700)

a. The below listed Licensee Event' Reports (LER) were reviewed to i

determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The

determination included: adequacy of description, verification of

compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, I

corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, i

reportieg requirements satisfied, and the relative safety

significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and

discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for ]'

those reports indicated by an (*). The following LERs are closed:

369/87-22, Rev. 1: Fire Barrier Blanket Breached Without-

Compensatory Action. Since this event occurred additional problems

have occurred. However, the licensee has taken generic corrective

actions and problems in this area have diminished (see NRC Report

369,370/89-01).

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369/87-27: Entered Hot Shutdown Without Containment Spray Heat

Exchanger 1B Cooling Water Inlet Valve Being Retested Due To .,

Personnel Error. Appropriate procedure chtnges were made and the ]

retest of the valve was satisfactory. In addition, due to a

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violation which occurred since this event (369,370/88-29-01), the

licensee has strengthened the retest program.

369/87-33: Four Main Steam to Auxiliary Feedwater Valves Were

Omitted From The Inservice Valve Testing Program. This problem was

identified during an NRC inspection and an Unresolved Item has been

established for followup (See UNR 369,370/88-31-18)

369/87-37: Waste Gas Surveillance Sample Was Not Obtat.ed Within

Technical Specification Time Limit. Appropriate procedure changes

have been made to require verification of sampling requirements by

two individuals and no similar events have occurred in recent

history.

• 369/88-17, Rev.1, A Containment Isolation Valve Was Inoperable Due

To Defective Procedure. The inspector reviewed the corrective

actions taken as a result of this item and found them complete and

adequate to address the issue.

• 369/88-27, Rev. 1: Surveillance Requirement Was Not Performed Prior

To Entering Mode 4. This event was caused in part by weaknesses in

the work request program. The licensee has made appropriate program

changes.

• 369/88-36: Units 1 and 2 Diesel Generators Were .Potentially-

Inoperable Due To A Design Deficiency With Starting Air System.

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Followup inspection of this issue has previously identified a

possible violation (see 369,370/89-05-03). Further followup will be

accomplished through followup of the violation.

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369/88-48: Shrinkage of Boraflex Neutron Absorbing Material Could  !

Cause A Resultant Increase In Reactivity Not Previously Considered

(Voluntary Report). l

369/88-49: Residual Heat Removal Pump 18 Manually Stopped Due To Air i

Binding Causing A Loss of RHR (See Violation 369,370/89-11-01).  !

• 369/89-02: Design Basis Nuclear Service Water Flow To The Control

Area Chilled Water System Cannot Be Justified Between December 8,

1987 And February 24, 1989 As Required By Technical Spec. Licensee

Performance personnel' identified this problem. Control Room 4'

Ventilation remained operable during the time period. This violation

is not being cited bei.ause the criteria specified in Section V.G. of

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the Enforcement Policy were satisfied for Sever"y Level .IV or V

violations identified by the licensee. The lic.asee has performed

adequate retesting using properly calibrated equipment. Also, the

licensee reviewed this event with appropriate personnel. Corrective  ;

actions are considered complete. This is Non-Cited Violation j

369/89-14-02: Failure to Meet Design Basis Flow for Chilled Water l

for Control Room Ventilation due to Inadequate Calibration. l

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• 369/89-05, Charging Pump Recirc Valves for Unit 1 And Unit 2 Were Not

Being Tested As Specified By Inservice Test Requirements. Corrective

actions were reviewed and were determined to be adequate to resolve

the issue.

• 370/87-09, Rev. 1: Reactor Trip Breaker Failure Due To Mechanical

Failure. A detailed NRC Augmented Inspection Team previously )

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reviewed this issue (see Report 369,370/87-22). In addition an NRC

Bulletin 88-01 was issued. The licensee changed the Reactor Trip

i procedure to require a local verification of the breaker trip and

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added appropriate inspections to the maintenance procedure which the )

l inspector verified. Additional inspections will be performed l

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relative to the Bulletin. l

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• 370/88-02, Rev. 1: Both Trains Of Annulus Ventilation System Were

Made Inoperable Due To Deficient Communication And Planning /Schedu-

ling Deficiencies. Analysis showed that the systen would have  ;

functioned to prevent significant radiation releases. The plant was

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in Mode 3 and shutting down at the time of the event. Licensee

Operations personnel discovered and reported the event. The licensee

has revised standing work requests to provide adequate control of '

controlled access door (CAD) readers and reviewed this event with

appropriate personnel. Corrective action is considered complete.

• 370/89-01: Unit 2 Reactor Trip Because Of An Unknown Cause. The

reactor tripped on High Negative Neutron Flux Rate during a routine

rod movement test. While the root cause was not determined the

licensee have done all that could be reasonably expected to find the

cause and provided appropriate management review prior to start up.

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• 370/89-03: Reactor ' Trip Occurred Due To Failure' 0f Positioner.For:

Cteam Generator 2C Main Feedwater Regulating Valve.

• 370/89-02: Reactor Trip on B S/G Lo-Lo Level Following Loss of 2B

CFPT Because of Equipment Failure (Suction Pressure Switches). The:

inspector verified completion of work requests -associated with _ this-

event.

b. The inspector verified that_ the licensee- had received and evaluated'

10 CFR.21 reports applicable. to the plant and had .taken corrective t

actions as necessary. .The following Part 21 items are closed:

P2188-03 (Both Units): ' Gamma-Metrics Cable _ Assemblies Installed As'

Part Of The Neutron Monitoring System May Possibly Leak.

P2188-06 (Unit 1 Only): Inconel 600 Steam ' Generator Tube Plugs

Susceptible To Stress Corrosion Cracking Supplied By B and W.s

P2189-01 - (Both Units): Brown Boveri K-Line - Circuit L Breakers l

Delivered Prior To-1974 Need Rebound Spring Added To Slow Close Pin. '1

No other violations or deviations were identified.

7. Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

The.following previously identified items were reviewed to ascertain that-

the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in

compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been

completed. Selective verification. included record review, observations,

and discussions with licensee personnel.

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a. (Closed) Violation 370/87-35-01: Failure To Establish Or Implement  !

An Adequate Procedure To Control The Installation Of CRDM Shield 1

Blocks. The licensee committed to do a generic review of civil-

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i structures in containment and to assure these structures were-being l

l maintained. The inspector verified that this review was ~ accomplished  ;

and appropriate inspections had been implemented., '

b. (Closed) Violation 369,370/88-33-01: Failure To Follow Proceoure. l

For Diesel Generator Testing. . The response to this item was

submitted on March 16, 1989. The inspector verified implementation-

of corrective actions which included _ appropriate procedure _ changes:

and training,

c. (Closed) Violation 369/88-33-08: Failure -To Follow TS For.-

Containment Integrity. The response to this item _ was submitted on

March 16, 1989. The inspector verified implementation of corrective

actions which included appropriate procedure changes and program

enhancements. i

No violations or deviations were identified. l

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18.

Special Inspection

Diesel Generator Of Oil

Fuel Prop (er Receipt, Storage,' And Handling Of Emergency

TI 2515/100).

The inspector performed a special inspection.to assure that the licensee.

was properly receiving, storing and handling emergency Diesel Generator '

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(DG) fuel oil; that Technical- Specification surveillance were' being -

performed and covered by appropriate procedures; and.that the licensee had'

appropriately addressed NRC Information' Notice No. 87-04: Diesel.

Generator Fails Test Because Of Degraded Fuel.

The licensee did evaluate the Notice and verify appropriate design' and

controls were in place to assure quality fuel'and an ope _r able flow path.

A storage tank recirculation system with filters is regularly utilized

(monthly). Water accumulation is checked and removed from a low point off

the storage tanks and day tanks once per month.and in from the day-tank

whenever the DG is run for greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Storage tanks'.are cleaned

and inspected at 10 year intervals.

Fuel oil is sampled and analyzed prior to. addition to.the storage tanks-

and the storage tanks are sampled for particulate - monthly. Fuel-

additives are used to prevent oxidation and bacterial growth.-

The fuel oil system utilizes transfer filters and. duplex fuel? oil filters

on each engine. Differential pressure is monitored on the fuel oil

filters whenever the DG is run and filters are in the preventive

maintenance program. Storage Tank and Day Tank levels are alarmed in the

DG rooms with a DG trouble alarm in the control room. Level-instrument' -1

tubing is seismically qualified, however, instruments.are not since.their

primary purpose is to assure enough fuel prior to an event. A tygon tube

or a dipstick could be utilized if necessary.

No violations or deviations were icentified.

9. ExitInterview(30703)

The inspection scope and findings identified below' were summarized 'on

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June 1,1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The

following items were discussed in detail:

Violation 369,370/89-14-01:

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Inadequate Surveillance Procedures For:MSIV's  !

(paragraph 4.d.)  !

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Non-Cited Violation 369/89-14-02: Failure To Meet Design Basis Flow For .

Chilled Water For Control Room Ventilation Due To Inadequate Calibration:

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(paragraph 6.)

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The licensee representatives present offered no' dissenting comments, nor-

did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the'- 1

inspectors during the course of their inspection. l

l

!

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I

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