Text

Insp Repts 50-321/87-21 & 50-366/87-21 on 870801-28. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters,Plant Mods,Operational Safety Verification,Maint Observation,Physical Security & ROs
	ML20235C495
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	09/16/1987
From:	Holmesray P, Menning J, Randy Musser, Paulk G, Sinkule M; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20235C423	List: ML20235C419; ML20235C449; ML20235C495;
References
	50-321-87-21, 50-366-87-21, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8709240470
	Download: ML20235C495 (10)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES

Sn pico,% NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ '" n REGION 11

101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

g j

e ATLANT A, G EoRGI A 30323

4

9...../

Report Nos.: 50-321/87-21 and 50-366/87-21

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366

License Nos.- DPR-57 and NPF-5

Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2

Inspection Dates: August 1 - August 28, 1987

Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia

Inspectors: /7H/k /ud6hO '///6/07

PrtET)(olmes-Rfy, Seni@ Resident Inspector Date Signed

Jo @ ning,

'

..

.b/ to

ent/ In spector

Ght,/87

Date Signed

/ 6-40 - tyXx0 .fB hll6 l87

R an&T71/M u s s e r ,/JR e s i d e r/t I n s p e c t o r Date Signed

G

LQJ/aulk,SyfiorRefidentInspector

]dwmo ]b Mtis7

Date Signed

Approved by:' / #Aude C 1 t($ /4 f7

MarM n V. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 2C Da'te S'ignsd

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety

Verification, Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification and Surveillance

Observation, Radiological Protection, Physical Security, Reportable Occurrences

and Operating Reactor Events.

Results: One violation was identified.

e7092y,hk

PDR

[

G

_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

__ ___ . _ _ _ _ _

-

,

I

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

i

Licensee Employees

T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch i

H. C. Nix, Plant Manager

D. Read, Plant Support Manager

H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager

P. E. Fornel, Maintenance Manager

T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager

R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager

C. Coggin, General Support Manager

M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager

0. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager

C. T. Moore, Training Manager '

S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance

R. L. Hayes, Deputy Manager Operations

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, l'

mechanics, security force members and office personnel.

Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 6 and

August 28, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The

licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to

or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee

acknowledged the findings and took no exception.

(0 pen) Violation 50-321/87-21-01, Failure to Follow the Procedure for

Control of Byproduct Material. (Paragraph 5)

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

(Closed) Violation 50-366/86-36-01, Failure to Verify the Operability of

a LPCI Subsystem With Both Core Spray Subsystems Inoperable.

GPC letter of January 21, 1987 was reviewed. The corrective actions of

the January 21, 1987 letter and the referenced LERs were reviewed and

found to have been corrpleted. This event and another personnel error

reported in LER 321/86-36 were incorporated into Training Lesson Plan

LR-1H-00762-08. This item is closed.

(Closed) IFI 50-321/85-10-03, Control of Vendor Manuals.

_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ - - _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _

,

2

As was reported in Inspection Report 50-321,366/85-16, the issue of vendor

manual control was reviewed and the program was found to be adequate.

Administrative Control Procedure 20Ac-ADM-003-0S (Vendor Manual Control -

Revision 1) provides a system of adequate control for vendor manuals. The

licensee's- Quality - Control department is continuing to monitor the

effectiveness of the vendor manual control program. This item is closed.

(Closed) IFI 50-366/85-16-02, Cause of Nitrogen Valve Being Shut.

This item was upgraded to a violation in Inspection Report 85-18 and

subsequently the violation. response was reviewed and the violation closed

in Inspection Report 85-34. This IFI is closed.

(Closed) IFI 50-321,366/86-36-04, Procedural Method Not Established to

Supplement the QC Conformance Tag For "Q" Materials Stored in Unsheltered

Areas.

Procedure SEMC-MTL-001 has been revised to require adequate marking of

items stored in unsheltered areas. This item is closed.

4. Unresolved Item *

(Closed) 321,366/86-20-04, Cable Pulling Procedures Not in Conformance !

'

With Latest Industry Standards.

The item discussed cable pulling procedures at the site and concerns that

the work procedures were too general to address design requirements. The

following procedures were reviewed to address the open item concern:

(a) Cehle and Raceway Installation (52GM-MEL-003-05)

(b) Cable Tray /Condt.it Fire Protection Material Installation and Repair

(42FP-FPX-011-0S)

(c) Installation and Repair of Silicone Foam Sesis (42FP-FPX-014-05)

Based on a review of the above procedures and discussion with plant

personnel this item is closed.

(Closed) 50-321/87-12-03, Disconnected LPRM Strings.

This URI was upgraded to a violation (50-321/87-19-01) in Inspection l

Report 87-19. This URI is closed. j

I

An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to

determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

!

<

l

,

!

l

1

_ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

,

3

1

5. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall

plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant

operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various

members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits

I

to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints

and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on

equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to

limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily

,

journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access

l controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions

with operators and their supervisors. Wee kly , when on site, selected

Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The

confirmation was made by verifying the following: accessible valve flow

{

! path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation,

I

major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.

General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions

of the control building, turbine buiiding, reactor building, and outside

l areas were visited. Observations included general plant / equipment

l conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shif t turnover, sampling

program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection

equipment, control of activities in progress, raciation protection

controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile

hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment

isolation.

During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's use

of overtime for compliance with the requirements of Technical Specifi-

, cation 6.2.2.g. The i

nspector reviewed time sheets for selected

operations personnel for June and July of 1987 and determined that

l technical specification requirements were met for these individuals. The

'

inspector also noted that the licensee has recently formalized require-

ments for the review of overtime by plant management personnel. The

inspector reviewed these requirements that are contained in Section 8.4.

of Revision 2 of procedure 30AC-0PS-003-05, " Plant Operations"

i

In the area of housekeeping the following discrepancies were observed by

l the inspectors and brought to the attention of licensee personnel:

-

Equipment and some anti-contamination clothing were left in the

vicinity of the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)

turbir.c following work. These items were found within the

contamination control barrier. This discrepancy was noted on

August 25, 1987.

-

On August 25, 1987 a 4X4 inch section of wood was found jammed

between a Unit 1 HPCI room wall and the HPCI pump discharge

line. The licensee determined that the wood had likely been

used as part of scaffolding and removed it oromptly.

___ _ _ _ __ _ _ - _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _

~

.

4

-

On August 26, 1987, fire retardant material was found to be

flaking from cable trays in the southwest corner of the Unit 1

reactor building at the 148 feet elevation. The cable trays are

in a contaminated area and some of the detached fire retardant

material was found in a clean area.

The inspectors rev b ed the licensee radioactive material control program

to assure regulatory requirements had been met. Technical Specifications

(T.S.) 3/4/7/5 (Unit 2), T.S. 3/4.8 (Unit 1), T.S.6.10 Unit 1/2),10 CFR

30, and Site Radiation Protection Procedure 63RP-RAD-007-0S (Radioactive

Sources). Inspection tours of byproduct material storage and in-use

areas were conducted to evaluate adequate program implementation. Several

program concerns were brought to the attention of cognizant plant managers

during the coura of the inspection and reiterated to plant management at

the inspection exit on August 6, 1987.

a. Specific generic programmatic concerns are listed below. These

concerns taken individually would not be considered a major program

deficiency; however, taken in the conglomerate they are indicative

of a potential program area weakness which should be addressed by

management to assure adequate control.

(1) Two quality assurance audits conducted during the past year in

this program area were_ not extersive enough in depth to

adequately identify real potential program weaknesses.

(2) The plant surveillance tracking system for surveillance

scheduling and completion status appears to be deficient. The

inspector requested a copy of the last surveillance conducted

in the byproduct material control area that was used to verify

that the technical specification requirements were adequately

met. The surveillance (62RP-RAD-007-OS) is conducted every six

months. After some searching the cognizant manager found the

surveillance in the back of a chemistry laboratory file cabinet.

The surveillance had not been reviewed and forwarded by the

responsible manager to document control until found during the

search on August 4, 1987. The inspector questioned whether the

surveillance was noted as missing or not completed by the

surveillance control group. The surveillance was conducted

April 14, 1987, and stayed in the file cabinet, without being

croperly documented and completed, until August 4,1987, when

the inspector requested to see it. Generically, failure to

identify missing or incomplete surveillance could lead to

failure to meet QA record retention and document control

requirements and failure to identify technical specification

requirements as being adequately complete.

(3) The inspector reviewed the site procedure relating to the

inventory and transfer control of Special Nuclear Material

(42FH-RNG-030-OS). The inspector had a specific concern in

relation to the licensee definition of byproduct versus Special

E----___________ _ _ _

-

__

.

5

Nuclear Material (SNM). The SNM plant procedure (section 7.5)

states that "after fission detectors are spent, they are

considered as sealed sources (no longer SNM)," and transferred

to the byproduct material control program under plant procedure

62RP-RAD-007-0S, The inspector pointed out thai SNM material

is spect /ically defined in 10 CFR 70 and does :ot meet the

definition requirements of 10 CFR 30 byproduct material. The

licensee should evaluate this item for other licensee

facilities. Lost of adequate SNM control could lead to more

significant regulatory concerns if not addressed.

(4) Management control of the byproduct material control program

was not as effective as it should have been to assure adequate

program implementation. This is evidenced by the violation

that follows this section of the report and the following

observed remarks:

(a) One apparent root cause of the program control deficiencies

was evidenced during the inspection as there was no single

person fully accountable or knowledgeable of the byproduct

material program direction, requirements, or implemen-

tation.

(b) Failure to reconcile known differences in the radioactive

source material control computer data base versus the

source inventory control logs by cognizant personnel

indicated lack of management perseverance on correcting

known problems.

(c) The byproduct material control training program was

deficient in that chemistry supervisors charged with the

responsibility of evaluating the EXEMPT /NON-EXEMPT status

of material made errors of misclassification on the source

inventory logs and the computer data base.

b. The following specific violations of plant procedure 62RP-RAD-007-0S

(Radioactive Sources) was noted during the inspection and discussed

with plant management during the exit meeting on August 6, 1987.

The below items will be grouped as one violation of T.S.6.8.la for

ft' lure to follow the plant radiation procedure. (321/366/87-21-01).

(1) No disposal records were available for the following byproduct

materials: SN113-35; MX 340-342; and, MX 344-348.

(2) The procedural requirements for EXEMPT /NON-EXEMPT material

determinations, data base updates, and review of source

inventory logs for accuracy and completeness were not met.

i

l

i

l

a

_ _ - _ _ _ _

1

-

.

l

.

i

> .

6

1

l

(a) Examples of errors in the status determination on the ]

current inventory of August 5, 1987 include: Cd-109-16; '

C0-57-18; C0-57-19; SR-90-183A; C0-60-11; and, C0-60-7. l

(b) Data base entries not being correct with inventory log '

included: SR-90-86 on current inventory although

previously disposed; MX-305 was sent to Vogtle' Plant but

still on inventory list; and, SR-90-86 was listed with assay

activity of 1.8 cpm which was different on source inventory

master log.

(c) Source inventory log errors included: SN-113-35 log sheets

on file although previously disposed; no laboratory

-supervisor review of- inventory and leak test check

completed on October 19, 1986; numerous identification

data missing on master inventory log sheets (i.e. solid /

liquid / gas, exempt / nonexempt, etc.); periodic reviews of

source usage log for accuracy and completeness was not

apparent as required by procedure section 7.7.1.4; and, i

CO-60-5/7/11 were not listed in master source usage log.

It should be emphasized that the above deficiencies were noted during

a brief cursory inspection. It is expected the licensee will

thoroughly evaluate the program area to assure all pertinent

regulatory and licensee requirements are met.

6. Maintenance Observation (62703)

During the report period, the inspector (s) observed selected maintenance

activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for

adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical

specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the

actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements,

and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Surveillance Testing Observations (61726)

The inspector (s) observed the performance of selected surveillance. The

observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,

conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument

calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillance,

removal from service and return to service of the system or components

affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the

acceptance criteria.

No violations or deviations were identified.

_

__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ ._ -- --. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ __-

'

.

l

.

7

8. ESF Syste n Walkdown (71710)

The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems.

Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly

verified both locally and in thc control room to ensure that lineups were

in accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material

conditions were satisfactory. Portions of the Unit 2 Plant Service Water

system within the Incake Structure and Diesel Generator Building were

walked down in detail.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

9. Radiological Protection (71709)

The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological

protection program in the course of the monthly activities. The

performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various

shifts to include: involvement of health physics supervision, use of

radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of !

high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors,

and posting and labeling.

No violations or deviations were noted.

10. Physical Security (71881)

In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included

a review of the liceraee's physical security program. The performance of

various shifts of the recurity force was observed in the conduct of daily

activities to include: availability of supervision, availability of

armed response personnel, protected and vital access controls, searching

of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval,

escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.

The resident inspector verified the absence of obstructions in the

isolation zone area on each side of the protected area (PA) fence that

could conceal an unauthorized entry or interfere with the capability of

the detection / assessment system. The adequacy of illumination in the PA

was also verified. On August 26, 1987, the resident inspector visited

the central and secondary alarm stations and determined that surveillance

equipment was functioning properly.

No violations or deviations were noted.

11. Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)

A number of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential

generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective

actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately

were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical

Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of

utmost consideration. The following LERs are closed:

_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ .

_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _. _ _ _ _ _ - _ - . ._

. - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

f-

l

8

[

Unit 1: 85-52, Safety Relief Valves Found Out of Tolerance During

Testing. The safety relief valves (SRVs) were refurbished and

reset at Wyle Laboratories, reinstalled on the Unit I steam

lines and functionally tested satisfactorily.

Unit 2: None

12. Operating Reactor Events (93702)

The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed

reactor events. The revi.ew included determination of cause, safety

significance, performance of personnel and systems,and corrective action.

The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts,

operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with

operations maintenance and engineering support personnel as appropriate.

On August 3, 1987, Unit 2 SCRAMed on low water level caused by feed system

run back caused by loss of Vital AC power. Vital AC was operating on its

alternate power supply while repairs were being made to the Vital AC

inverter. The loss of Vital AC occurred when the circuit breaker between

the Vital AC- bus and its alternate supply (600/125 VAC transformer)

tripped OPEN. The cause of the breaker opening is unknown. Tests

performed on the breaker showed that an applied force of 0.8 to .2.7 pounds

would cause the breaker to open. In the critique following the SCRAM the

workers that were in the area at the time of the SCRAM stated that they

were aware of the consequences of loss of Vital AC power and were taking

precautions not to touch the breaker. They were positive that they did

not trip the breaker.

The lowest water level was -77.1 inches with the top of the active fuel

at -164.44 inches.

The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HCPI) system started upon command

but tripped on low suction pressure, reset and functioned as designed.

The low suction trip was caused by air in the instrument sensing line.

A Notice of Unusual Event (NUE) was declared at 1155 CDT, as required

when HPCI automatically injects, and the NUE was terminated at 1210 CDT.

Unit 2 was tied to the grid at 2029 CDT August 5, 1987.

On August 12, 1987 power was reduceo P Unit 2 to make a water box entry

to look for leaking condenser tubes. The inspection attempt was

unsuccessful due to butterfly isolation valve leakby. The decision was

made to shut down over the weekend to fix tube leaks.

l 9

On August 15,1987 Unit 2 was shut down for condenser tube leak repairs.

'

Scheduled startup was set for August 17, 1987.

l

o

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

l

l c

-

1

'

I

i

On August 17,1987 at 0558 CDT Unit 2 was critical. Neutron monitoring

problem with the intermediate range monitors (IRMs) prevented power

increase and the drywell de-inerting for repairs commenced at 2116 CDT.

The reactor had reached normal operating pressure and temperature at 1950

CDT and the require recirculating pipe walkdown had commenced. At 2300

CDT LC0 for pipe leak inside containment (pressure boundary leakage). TS 3.4.3.2 was entered. Proper notification was made. The reactor was

manually SCRAMed at 0050 CDT August 19, 1987. The pipe leak was from a

one inch level instrument line which connected to the recirculating system

on the discharge side of .the pump and non-isolable frcm the reactor

vessel. The pipe was cracked about 180 degrees and leaking about one half

gallons per minute.

Analysis was done to determine the proper repair method with two root

cause conditions considered. The crack could be from inter granular

stress corrosion (IGSCC) or from fatigue. Without cutting the cracked

pipe out for analysis the failure cause could not be determined. The

more conservative overlay repair was performed and appropriate

nondestructive testing completed.

The faults in the IRMs were repaired and on August 21, 1987 the reactor

was critical at 0302 CDT and tied to the grid August 22 at 0352 CDT.

On August 3, 1987, Unit 1 SCRAMed on low water level caused by failure of

- electrical components in the feed control system. A NUE was declared at

2020 CDT and terminated at 2030 CDT in response to HPCI automatic

injection. The lowest water level reached was -57 inches with the top of

the active fuel at -164 inches.

The feed control system was repaired and Unit i returned to critical

operations an tied to the grid at 1922 CDT August 5,1987.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

13. IE Bulletin Followup (92703)

The response to IE Bulletin (IEB) 80-06, Engineered Safety Feature (ESP)

Reset Controls, was submitted by the licensee by letter of June 12,1980.

Georgia Power Company (GPC) recent y determined that two dampers in the

l

Main Control Rovm Environmental Control system returned to their normal

mode upon signal reset. A supplemental Response to IEB 80-06 was

submitted on May 4, 1987. In addition to performing a modification to

the offending dampers (which is complete), the licensee committed to have

the AE re-review IEB 80-06 for compliance with the IEB requirements. The

coupletion date of this review by the AE is at this point indeterminate.

The NRC review and closecut of IEB 80-06 cannot be scheduled until after

the resuits of the licensee's re-review and the completion of any

corrective action necess,avy~,. ' ,

w ^; ' <

ht s ~ -

.. ,

_ _ _ _ _ -

ML20235C495

Text

Navigation menu

Search