ML20235C495
| ML20235C495 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 09/16/1987 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Menning J, Randy Musser, Paulk G, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235C423 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-87-21, 50-366-87-21, IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8709240470 | |
| Download: ML20235C495 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1987021
Text
UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANT A, G EoRGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-321/87-21 and 50-366/87-21
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket Nos.:
50-321 and 50-366
License Nos.-
Facility Name:
Hatch 1 and 2
Inspection Dates: August 1 - August 28, 1987
Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia
Inspectors: /7H/k
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PrtET)(olmes-Rfy, Seni@ Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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Date Signed
Approved by:'
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MarM n V. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 2C
Da'te S'ignsd
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of
Licensee Action
on
Previous
Enforcement Matters,
Operational
Safety
Verification, Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification and Surveillance
Observation, Radiological Protection, Physical Security, Reportable Occurrences
and Operating Reactor Events.
Results: One violation was identified.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee Employees
T. Beckham, Vice President, Plant Hatch
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- H. C. Nix, Plant Manager
- D. Read, Plant Support Manager
H. L. Sumner, Operations Manager
P. E. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- T. R. Powers, Engineering Manager
- R. W. Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager
C. Coggin, General Support Manager
- M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager
- 0. M. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager
C. T. Moore, Training Manager
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S. B. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance
- R. L. Hayes, Deputy Manager Operations
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
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mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
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- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 6 and
August 28, 1987, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The
licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to
or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
The licensee
acknowledged the findings and took no exception.
(0 pen) Violation 50-321/87-21-01, Failure to Follow the Procedure for
Control of Byproduct Material. (Paragraph 5)
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed) Violation 50-366/86-36-01, Failure to Verify the Operability of
a LPCI Subsystem With Both Core Spray Subsystems Inoperable.
GPC letter of January 21, 1987 was reviewed.
The corrective actions of
the January 21, 1987 letter and the referenced LERs were reviewed and
found to have been corrpleted.
This event and another personnel error
reported in LER 321/86-36 were incorporated into Training Lesson Plan
LR-1H-00762-08. This item is closed.
(Closed) IFI 50-321/85-10-03, Control of Vendor Manuals.
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As was reported in Inspection Report 50-321,366/85-16, the issue of vendor
manual control was reviewed and the program was found to be adequate.
Administrative Control Procedure 20Ac-ADM-003-0S (Vendor Manual Control -
Revision 1) provides a system of adequate control for vendor manuals. The
licensee's- Quality - Control department is continuing to monitor the
effectiveness of the vendor manual control program.
This item is closed.
(Closed) IFI 50-366/85-16-02, Cause of Nitrogen Valve Being Shut.
This item was upgraded to a violation in Inspection Report 85-18 and
subsequently the violation. response was reviewed and the violation closed
in Inspection Report 85-34.
This IFI is closed.
(Closed) IFI 50-321,366/86-36-04, Procedural Method Not Established to
Supplement the QC Conformance Tag For "Q" Materials Stored in Unsheltered
Areas.
Procedure SEMC-MTL-001 has been revised to require adequate marking of
items stored in unsheltered areas.
This item is closed.
4.
Unresolved Item *
(Closed) 321,366/86-20-04, Cable Pulling Procedures Not in Conformance
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With Latest Industry Standards.
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The item discussed cable pulling procedures at the site and concerns that
the work procedures were too general to address design requirements. The
following procedures were reviewed to address the open item concern:
(a) Cehle and Raceway Installation (52GM-MEL-003-05)
(b) Cable Tray /Condt.it Fire Protection Material Installation and Repair
(c)
Installation and Repair of Silicone Foam Sesis (42FP-FPX-014-05)
Based on a review of the above procedures and discussion with plant
personnel this item is closed.
(Closed) 50-321/87-12-03, Disconnected LPRM Strings.
This URI was upgraded to a violation (50-321/87-19-01) in Inspection
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Report 87-19. This URI is closed.
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- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall
plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant
operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various
members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits
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to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints
and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on
equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to
limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily
journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access
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controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions
with operators and their supervisors.
Wee kly , when on site, selected
Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The
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confirmation was made by verifying the following:
accessible valve flow
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path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation,
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major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general condition.
General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions
of the control building, turbine buiiding, reactor building, and outside
areas were visited.
Observations included general
plant / equipment
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conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shif t turnover, sampling
program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection
equipment, control of activities in progress, raciation protection
controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile
hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment
isolation.
During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's use
of overtime for compliance with the requirements of Technical Specifi-
cation
6.2.2.g.
The
nspector reviewed time sheets for selected
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operations personnel for June and July of 1987 and determined that
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technical specification requirements were met for these individuals.
The
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inspector also noted that the licensee has recently formalized require-
ments for the review of overtime by plant management personnel.
The
inspector reviewed these requirements that are contained in Section 8.4.
of Revision 2 of procedure 30AC-0PS-003-05,
" Plant Operations"
In the area of housekeeping the following discrepancies were observed by
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the inspectors and brought to the attention of licensee personnel:
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Equipment and some anti-contamination clothing were left in the
vicinity of the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)
turbir.c following work.
These items were found within the
contamination control barrier. This discrepancy was noted on
August 25, 1987.
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On August 25, 1987 a 4X4 inch section of wood was found jammed
between a Unit 1 HPCI room wall and the HPCI pump discharge
line.
The licensee determined that the wood had likely been
used as part of scaffolding and removed it oromptly.
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On August 26, 1987, fire retardant material was found to be
flaking from cable trays in the southwest corner of the Unit 1
reactor building at the 148 feet elevation. The cable trays are
in a contaminated area and some of the detached fire retardant
material was found in a clean area.
The inspectors rev b ed the licensee radioactive material control program
to assure regulatory requirements had been met. Technical Specifications
(T.S.) 3/4/7/5 (Unit 2), T.S. 3/4.8 (Unit 1), T.S.6.10 Unit 1/2),10 CFR 30, and Site Radiation Protection Procedure 63RP-RAD-007-0S (Radioactive
Sources).
Inspection tours of byproduct material storage and in-use
areas were conducted to evaluate adequate program implementation. Several
program concerns were brought to the attention of cognizant plant managers
during the coura of the inspection and reiterated to plant management at
the inspection exit on August 6, 1987.
a.
Specific generic programmatic concerns are listed below.
These
concerns taken individually would not be considered a major program
deficiency; however, taken in the conglomerate they are indicative
of a potential program area weakness which should be addressed by
management to assure adequate control.
(1) Two quality assurance audits conducted during the past year in
this program area were_ not extersive enough in depth to
adequately identify real potential program weaknesses.
(2) The plant surveillance tracking
system for surveillance
scheduling and completion status appears to be deficient. The
inspector requested a copy of the last surveillance conducted
in the byproduct material control area that was used to verify
that the technical specification requirements were adequately
met.
The surveillance (62RP-RAD-007-OS) is conducted every six
months.
After some searching the cognizant manager found the
surveillance in the back of a chemistry laboratory file cabinet.
The surveillance had not been reviewed and forwarded by the
responsible manager to document control until found during the
search on August 4, 1987. The inspector questioned whether the
surveillance was noted as missing or not completed by the
surveillance control group.
The surveillance was conducted
April 14, 1987, and stayed in the file cabinet, without being
croperly documented and completed, until August 4,1987, when
the inspector requested to see it.
Generically, failure to
identify missing or incomplete surveillance
could lead to
failure to meet QA record retention and document control
requirements and failure to identify technical specification
requirements as being adequately complete.
(3) The inspector reviewed the site procedure relating to the
inventory and transfer control of Special Nuclear Material
The inspector had a specific concern in
relation to the licensee definition of byproduct versus Special
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Nuclear Material (SNM).
The SNM plant procedure (section 7.5)
states that "after fission detectors are spent, they are
considered as sealed sources (no longer SNM)," and transferred
to the byproduct material control program under plant procedure
The inspector pointed out thai SNM material
is spect /ically defined in 10 CFR 70 and does :ot meet the
definition requirements of 10 CFR 30 byproduct material.
The
licensee should evaluate this
item for other
licensee
facilities.
Lost of adequate SNM control could lead to more
significant regulatory concerns if not addressed.
(4) Management control of the byproduct material control program
was not as effective as it should have been to assure adequate
program implementation.
This is evidenced by the violation
that follows this section of the report and the following
observed remarks:
(a) One apparent root cause of the program control deficiencies
was evidenced during the inspection as there was no single
person fully accountable or knowledgeable of the byproduct
material program direction, requirements, or implemen-
tation.
(b)
Failure to reconcile known differences in the radioactive
source material control computer data base versus the
source inventory control logs by cognizant personnel
indicated lack of management perseverance on correcting
known problems.
(c) The byproduct material control training program was
deficient in that chemistry supervisors charged with the
responsibility of evaluating the EXEMPT /NON-EXEMPT status
of material made errors of misclassification on the source
inventory logs and the computer data base.
b.
The following specific violations of plant procedure 62RP-RAD-007-0S
(Radioactive Sources) was noted during the inspection and discussed
with plant management during the exit meeting on August 6,
1987.
The below items will be grouped as one violation of T.S.6.8.la for
ft' lure to follow the plant radiation procedure. (321/366/87-21-01).
(1) No disposal records were available for the following byproduct
materials:
SN113-35; MX 340-342; and, MX 344-348.
(2) The procedural requirements for EXEMPT /NON-EXEMPT material
determinations, data base updates, and review of source
inventory logs for accuracy and completeness were not met.
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(a) Examples of errors in the status determination on the
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current inventory of August 5,
1987 include:
Cd-109-16;
C0-57-18; C0-57-19; SR-90-183A; C0-60-11; and, C0-60-7.
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(b) Data base entries not being correct with inventory log
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included:
SR-90-86
on
current
inventory
although
previously disposed; MX-305 was sent to Vogtle' Plant but
still on inventory list; and, SR-90-86 was listed with assay
activity of 1.8 cpm which was different on source inventory
master log.
(c) Source inventory log errors included: SN-113-35 log sheets
on file although previously disposed; no laboratory
-supervisor review of- inventory and leak test check
completed on October 19, 1986; numerous identification
data missing on master inventory log sheets (i.e. solid /
liquid / gas, exempt / nonexempt, etc.); periodic reviews of
source usage log for accuracy and completeness was not
apparent as required by procedure section 7.7.1.4; and,
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CO-60-5/7/11 were not listed in master source usage log.
It should be emphasized that the above deficiencies were noted during
a brief cursory inspection.
It is expected the licensee will
thoroughly evaluate the program area to assure all pertinent
regulatory and licensee requirements are met.
6.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
During the report period, the inspector (s) observed selected maintenance
activities.
The observations included a review of the work documents for
adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical
specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the
actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements,
and adherence to the appropriate quality controls.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Surveillance Testing Observations (61726)
The inspector (s) observed the performance of selected surveillance. The
observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy,
conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument
calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillance,
removal from service and return to service of the system or components
affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the
acceptance criteria.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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8.
ESF Syste n Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems.
Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly
verified both locally and in thc control room to ensure that lineups were
in accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material
conditions were satisfactory. Portions of the Unit 2 Plant Service Water
system within the Incake Structure and Diesel Generator Building were
walked down in detail.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Radiological Protection (71709)
The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological
protection program in the course of the monthly activities.
The
performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various
shifts to include:
involvement of health physics supervision, use of
radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of
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high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors,
and posting and labeling.
No violations or deviations were noted.
10.
Physical Security (71881)
In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included
a review of the liceraee's physical security program. The performance of
various shifts of the recurity force was observed in the conduct of daily
activities to include:
availability of supervision, availability of
armed response personnel, protected and vital access controls, searching
of personnel, packages and vehicles, badge issuance and retrieval,
escorting of visitors, patrols and compensatory posts.
The resident inspector verified the absence of obstructions in the
isolation zone area on each side of the protected area (PA) fence that
could conceal an unauthorized entry or interfere with the capability of
the detection / assessment system. The adequacy of illumination in the PA
was also verified.
On August 26, 1987, the resident inspector visited
the central and secondary alarm stations and determined that surveillance
equipment was functioning properly.
No violations or deviations were noted.
11.
Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700)
A number of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential
generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective
actions appeared appropriate.
Events which were reported immediately
were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical
Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of
utmost consideration. The following LERs are closed:
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Unit 1:
85-52, Safety Relief Valves Found Out of Tolerance During
Testing.
The safety relief valves (SRVs) were refurbished and
reset at Wyle Laboratories, reinstalled on the Unit I steam
lines and functionally tested satisfactorily.
Unit 2:
None
12. Operating Reactor Events (93702)
The inspectors reviewed activities associated with the below listed
reactor events.
The revi.ew included determination of cause, safety
significance, performance of personnel and systems,and corrective action.
The inspectors examined instrument recordings, computer printouts,
operations journal entries, scram reports and had discussions with
operations maintenance and engineering support personnel as appropriate.
On August 3, 1987, Unit 2 SCRAMed on low water level caused by feed system
run back caused by loss of Vital AC power. Vital AC was operating on its
alternate power supply while repairs were being made to the Vital AC
inverter. The loss of Vital AC occurred when the circuit breaker between
the Vital AC- bus and its alternate supply (600/125 VAC transformer)
tripped OPEN.
The cause of the breaker opening is unknown.
Tests
performed on the breaker showed that an applied force of 0.8 to .2.7 pounds
would cause the breaker to open. In the critique following the SCRAM the
workers that were in the area at the time of the SCRAM stated that they
were aware of the consequences of loss of Vital AC power and were taking
precautions not to touch the breaker.
They were positive that they did
not trip the breaker.
The lowest water level was -77.1 inches with the top of the active fuel
at -164.44 inches.
The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HCPI) system started upon command
but tripped on low suction pressure, reset and functioned as designed.
The low suction trip was caused by air in the instrument sensing line.
A Notice of Unusual Event (NUE) was declared at 1155 CDT, as required
when HPCI automatically injects, and the NUE was terminated at 1210 CDT.
Unit 2 was tied to the grid at 2029 CDT August 5, 1987.
On August 12, 1987 power was reduceo P Unit 2 to make a water box entry
to look for leaking condenser tubes.
The inspection attempt was
unsuccessful due to butterfly isolation valve leakby.
The decision was
made to shut down over the weekend to fix tube leaks.
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On August 15,1987 Unit 2 was shut down for condenser tube leak repairs.
Scheduled startup was set for August 17, 1987.
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On August 17,1987 at 0558 CDT Unit 2 was critical. Neutron monitoring
problem with the intermediate range monitors (IRMs) prevented power
increase and the drywell de-inerting for repairs commenced at 2116 CDT.
The reactor had reached normal operating pressure and temperature at 1950
CDT and the require recirculating pipe walkdown had commenced. At 2300
CDT LC0 for pipe leak inside containment (pressure boundary leakage). TS 3.4.3.2 was entered.
Proper notification was made.
The reactor was
manually SCRAMed at 0050 CDT August 19, 1987.
The pipe leak was from a
one inch level instrument line which connected to the recirculating system
on the discharge side of .the pump and non-isolable frcm the reactor
vessel. The pipe was cracked about 180 degrees and leaking about one half
gallons per minute.
Analysis was done to determine the proper repair method with two root
cause conditions considered.
The crack could be from inter granular
stress corrosion (IGSCC) or from fatigue. Without cutting the cracked
pipe out for analysis the failure cause could not be determined.
The
more conservative overlay
repair was
performed
and
appropriate
nondestructive testing completed.
The faults in the IRMs were repaired and on August 21, 1987 the reactor
was critical at 0302 CDT and tied to the grid August 22 at 0352 CDT.
On August 3, 1987, Unit 1 SCRAMed on low water level caused by failure of
- electrical components in the feed control system. A NUE was declared at
2020 CDT and terminated at 2030 CDT in response to HPCI automatic
injection. The lowest water level reached was -57 inches with the top of
the active fuel at -164 inches.
The feed control system was repaired and Unit i returned to critical
operations an tied to the grid at 1922 CDT August 5,1987.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
13.
IE Bulletin Followup (92703)
The response to IE Bulletin (IEB) 80-06, Engineered Safety Feature (ESP)
Reset Controls, was submitted by the licensee by letter of June 12,1980.
Georgia Power Company (GPC) recent y determined that two dampers in the
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Main Control Rovm Environmental Control system returned to their normal
mode upon signal reset.
A supplemental Response to IEB 80-06 was
submitted on May 4, 1987.
In addition to performing a modification to
the offending dampers (which is complete), the licensee committed to have
the AE re-review IEB 80-06 for compliance with the IEB requirements. The
coupletion date of this review by the AE is at this point indeterminate.
The NRC review and closecut of IEB 80-06 cannot be scheduled until after
the resuits of the licensee's re-review and the completion of any
corrective action necess,avy~,. '
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