IR 05000254/1987025

Insp Repts 50-254/87-25 & 50-265/87-25 on 870922-1105. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Implementation of Generic Ltr 85-06 Re ATWS Mitigation Sys (25020) & Onsite Followup Events

ML20236S821
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Quad Cities
Issue date:	11/23/1987
From:	Gardner R, Westberg R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236S776	List: IR 05000254/1987025 ML20236S775 ML20236S799
References
50-254-87-25, 50-265-87-25, GL-85-06, GL-85-6, NUDOCS 8711300113
Download: ML20236S821 (9)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III

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( .4 Reports No. 50-254/87025(0RS); 50-265/87025(DRS)

Doc ket., No s . 50-254; 50-265 Licenses No. DPR-29; DPR-30 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company '

P.O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 1,

Facility Name: Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Q-}

Inspection At: Quad Cities Site, Cordova, Illinois

.3 Inspection Conducted: September 22-24; October 5-6 and 19-22; and

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November 2-5

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O U D Y , 1987 -

\\ '2 3 &r,i Inspector: Rolf Westberg i Date

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Approved By: Ronald N. Gardner, Chief Plant Systems Section IlfM/87

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g j Inspection Summary Inspection on September 22 through November 5, 1987 (Reports No.50-254/87025(CRjJDo. 50-265/87025(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Roetine, announced inspection of the licensee's implementation of Generic Letter 85-06 relative to ATWS mitigating systems (25020) and onsite fo Dowup of events at operating power reactors (98702).

Results: Tmocrary Instruction (TI) 2500/20 was closed. One violation (failure to implement an adequate procedure (Paragraph 2b(3)(b)) was identifie .

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco)

• R. Bax, Station Manager G. Spedl, Assistant Superintendent Tech Services D. Craddick, Master Electrician M. Kooi, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

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A. Scott, Quality Assurance Engineer R. Rustick, Electrical Group Leader - Tech Staff R. Thomann, Tech Staff Engineer C. Elsasser, Planner / Scheduler - Electrical Maintenance

• J. Wunderlich, Regulatory Assurance

• R. Robey, Services Superintendent

• D. Gibson, Quality Assurance Superintendent

• C. Norton, Quality Assurance Engineer U.S. NRC

• R. Higgins, Senior Resident Inspector Other personnel were contacted during the course of the inspectio * Indicates those attending the exit meeting on November 5, 1987.

2. Onsite Followup of Events Failure of IB Reactor Recirculation Motor Generator (MG) Field Breake On September 13, 1987, the IB Recirculation Pump was tripped at control panel 901-4 in preparation for a scheduled inspection. The indicating lights showed that the Recirculation Motor Generator (MG)

field breaker had failed to trip. The breaker, located in panel 2201-248, was subsequently tripped by an operator after manually freeing the armature in the closing linkage. The trip coil was apparently burned out as it tried to trip the breaker. Since this breaker is part of the Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

system, the Recirculation Pump may not have tripped if an ATWS trip signal had been receive The MG field breaker is a General Electric (GE) AKF-2-25 power circuit breaker. The AKF-2-25 is a special type of AK-2 breaker designed to switch shunt field circuits of synchronous generators and motor It is a three pole air circuit breaker with the center pole position modified to serve as a field discharge switch. The field breaker was modified in 1984 with the addition of another :

shunt trip coil (STC) to provide a recirculation pump trip (RPT)

function. This STC, which is dedicated to respond to ATWS, and the

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original STC are'not rated for continuous duty and will' overheat and

fail .if subjected' to full voltage .for more.than a few second Therefore,-if the closing linkage or.the armature binds or jams, the .

STC'will overheat and failure will resul (1)' Documents' Reviewed

.(a) General Electric Maintenance Instruction, No. GEI-50299,

" Power Circuit Breakers Types AK-2."

(b)j No. GEI-93863A, . "AK Power Circuit Breakers' Types ' AKF-2-25

' ' and AKF-2A-25."

(c) G.E. Nuclear Services Information Letter (SIL) No. 448

" Maintenance and-Lubricants for. G.E. Type AK Circuit Breakers."

(d) Procedure No.' QMS-200-32, "Recirc M/G Set Field Breaker Inspection and Test," Revision (e) NRC I.E. Information Notice No. 87-12 " Potential Problems With Metal Clad Circuit Breakers, General Electric Type AKF,-2-25."

(f) Schematic Diagram No. 4E-6577F, "ATWS Recirc. Pump Trip System, Division I and II."

(g) Schematic Diagram No. 4E-1426, " Recirculating Pump IB - MG Set Control."

(h) LER No.87-018 dated October 1, 198 (2) Inspection Results The inspector reviewed the recirculating pump MG set schematics, the inspection procedure, the G.E. vendor manuals, and NRC Information Notice No. 87 12. The inspector also interviewed selected personnel involved with the event and inspected breaker No. 179A5094-186LD in the warehouse. The reviews and interviews produced the following information: q (a) The AKF-2-25 circuit breakers were classified as safety related on September 17, 1987 as a result of CECO's review of NGC-NRR Generic letter 85-06, " Quality. Assurance Guidance for ATWS Equipment that is not safety related."

(b) Breaker Inspection Procedure No. QMS 200-32, dated October I 1986, had not been updated to include the recommendations 1 of G.E. SIL No. 448 and NRC I.E. Information Notice l No. 87-12;-however, prior to September 1987, the breaker i was considered non-safety related. QMS 200-32 is

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performed at each outage and the involved breaker had been i'

overhauled by G.E. in November of 1986 at a non-nuclear facility.

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(c) The involved breaker and the spare from the warehouse were sent to G.E. for overhaul and determination of the root cause of failure. Pending review of the subsequent supplement to LER Nn.87-018, this is considered an open item (254/87025-01A).

(3) Conclusions l The inspector concluded that the intermediate failure cause, the binding armature, was typical of the previotfbly reported failures in AKF type breakers. The inspector concluded that the licensee's plan to send the AKF breakers to a G.E. noclear j facility for overhaul / maintenance was sound; however, procedure No. QMS 200-32 should be revised accordingly. Further, the recommendations of SIL No. 448 and Information Notice No. 87-12 relative to approved lubricants and the cycling of breakers not yet utilizing the approved lubricants should be incorporated in the procedure. Pending review of the corrective actions to prevent recurrence to be included in the final supplement to LER No.87-018, this is considered another part of the abnve open item (254/87025-01B).

b. Personnel Error Resulting in SCRAM and ECCS Actuation On October 19, 1987, an equipment operator (EO) was dispatched to .

open the circuit breaker for the 2A Circulating Water Pump. In l accomplishing this task, he inadvertently opened an adjacent breaker for the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Pump which was operating at the time. The resulting electrical arcing destroyed the breaker and caused the loss of several buses. The loss of Bus 23 caused a loss of the 2A and 2B Condensate Booster pumps which resulted in a trip of Reactor Feed Pumps (RFP) 28 and 2C on low suction. This caused reactor vessel level to decrease and a full reactor scram when the low level setpoint was reached. At the low-low reactor vessel setpoint of -59 inches, the Unit 2 Diesel Generator started, HPCI and RCIC initiated, and a full Group I Isolation and Recirculation Pump MG Set trip signal were received. RCIC reached full flow but HPCI did not inject because of the short duration of the low low signal. When RFP 2B was started, RCIC was terminated, vessel level was restored, and the event was terminate I (1) Documents Reviewed (a) Procedure No. QOP 6500-4, " Racking-0ut a 4160 Volt Manually Operated Air Circuit Breaker," Revision _ _

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p (b) General: Electric Vendor Manuals i

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1 No. GEI-88775A, "MC-4.76 Horizontal Drawout Metal-Clad j Switchgear."

2 No.' gel-887710, "Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker Type AMH-4.76-250-0D."

(c) Alarm'Typer Output from October 19, 1987 scra (d)' Sequence of Events / Event Description from October 19, 1987

' ' Even (e) HPCI Schematic Control Diagrams 1 4E-2438E Sheet 1, Revision Q 2 4E-2527, Revision S

' 3_ 4E-2532, Revision E 4 4E-2528 Sheet 1, Revision T 5 4E-2438C Sheet 1, Revision Q (2) Inspection Results The inspector reviewed the involved procedure, the G.E. vendor manuals, the alarm typer output, the sequence of events, and the HPCI schematic drawings. ' The inspector interviewed the involved E0 and selected personnel relative to the event. The inspector also inspected the damaged breaker in the plan (3) Conclusions The preceding reviews, interviews and inspections produced the following conclusions:

(a) The event appeared to be caused by personnel error and procedural and training deficiencie (b) Procedure No. QOP 6500-4 contained a precaution that was incorrect. It stated that oper.ing the racking screw shutter on a closed circuit breaker would trip the breaker. The G.E. AMH type breaker does not operate this way. Further, the procedure did not require the E0 to verify the Open-Close indicator on the breaker control pa'iel or to hit the manual trip button _ prior to attempting to rack out the breaker. Failure to implement an adequate procedure for cacking out 4160 volt breakers is considered a violation of Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B (254/87025-02; 265/87025-01).

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i e l (c) The interview with the E0 indicated that he was not specifically trained on the AMH type breaker interlock The interview of the training instructor responsible for this portion of E0 training indicated that 4160 volt

, ~ breaker operation is covered as part of the blueprint reading portion of the Electrical' Operator Certification Training (E0CT) course; however, it does not inclu'de racking out of a breaker physically unless one is available in the plan It is a requirement of the 0JT program, but the requirement is to rack out one vertical and one horizontal breaker while supervised by a senior operator. Training on interlocks / safety is verbal 'only and is not documented. Pending review of this item during a subsequent inspection, this is considered an unresolved item (254/87025-03; 265/87025-02).

(d) Review of HPCI operation during this event through a review of the control schematics indicated that it performed as designe . TI 2500/20 - Compliance With ATWS Rule, 10CFR 50.62 The purpose of this inspection was to determine that ATWS mitigating systems that are not safety related comply with the 10CFR 50.62 rule, to determine whether.the QA controls applied to the design, procurement, installation, and testing for ATWS equipment ccmplied with Generic Letter No. 85-06, "QA Guidance For ATWS Equipment That is Not Safety Related,"

and to assess the operational readiness of the ATWS equipment that is not safety relate The inspector determined that the licensee installed the Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) and the Alternate Rod Injection (ARI) systems on modification No. M-4-1(2)-79-2. The Unit I modification was installed and final testing was completed August 8, 1984. The Unit 2 modification was installed and final testing was completed February 11, 1984. The Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) modification to install a second suction line to allow simultaneous pump operation was installed on .

modification No. M-4-1(2)-85-42. The Unit 2 modification was installed I and final testing was completed January 7,1987. The Unit 1 modification was installed and final testing completed on October 28, 198 Although the ATWS modifications were not required to be classified as safety related, the RPS, ARI, and SLCS were classified as safety related due to their interface with existing safety related equipment. Therefore, design, procurement, installation, and training was performed in accordance with the existing CECO Quality Assurance Progra Since the RPT, ARI, and SLCS modifications are complete and were accomplished in accordance with an Appendix B QA program, this inspection concentrated on the confirmation of completed work and reviewed the design,

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procurement, and installation based on completed modification packages and a selective walkdown of ATWS system Documents Reviewed (1) Modification Packages (a) M-4-1-79-2 (b) M-4-2-85-42  !

(2) Plant-Specific ATWS Review Guidelines and Implementation Schedule, dated January 27, 198 (3) Plant Specific ATWS Review, dated April 21, 198 (4) Schedule for Complying with ATWS Rule, dated October 10, 198 (5) Generic Letter 85-06, " Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS Equipment That is Not Safety Related."

(6) Safety Evaluation in support of the VWR Owners Group's licensing topical response to the ATWS rule, dated October 21, 198 (7) Surveillance Procedures (a) QIS 68-1, "ATWS Analog Trip System Calibration Procedure "

Revision (b) QIS 68-2, "ATWS Analog Trip System Functional Test,"

Revision (c) QIS 68-3, "ATWS Reactor Water Level Transmitter Calibration Procedure," Revision (d) QIS 68-4, "ATWS Reactor Pressure Transmitter Calibration Procedure," Revision (8) Drawings, l l

(a) 4E-1160, Revision A )

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(b) 4E-1582, Revision A j l

(c) 4E-6577C, Revision (d) 4E-1092B, Revision (e) 4E-6577F, Revision (f) 4E-6577A, Revision !

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(g) 4E-65778, Revision )

(h) 4E-6577D, Revision !

(i) 4E-6577E, Revision (j) 4E-1711A, Revision (9) Operating Procedures i

(a) 00P 1100-2, " Injection of Standby Liquid Control," i Revision i

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(b)- QGA 100-1, " Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Level Control,"

Revision (c) QGA 100-3, " Reactor Power Control," Revision b. Inspection Results (1) Design Engineering The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to 10 CFR 50.62,

"The ATWS rule," Generic Letter 85-06, and Design Change Packages M-4-1-79-2 and M-4-2-85-42. This review of selected portions of the licensee's design indicated it was properly implemented and did not compromise the safety features of the existing Reactor Protection Syste (2) Procurement and Installation of ATWS Mitigating Equipment At the time of this inspection, the ATWS system was completely installed which precluded inprocess inspection of the installation. The inspection verified the following aspects of the installation through review of the modifications and a system inspectio (a) Procurement packages were reviewed and found consistent with the technical requirements of the ATWS desig (b) A walkdown of a portion of the Division I ARI/RPT System indicated that it was located, oriented, and supported as specified. Physical and electrical separation was maintaine (3) Confirmation of Completed Work The inspector selected the ARI/RPT System for review and verified the following:

(a) The operating procedures that were affected by ATWS; QGA 100-1, QCA 100-3, and 00P 1100-2; were revised and the operators trained, t

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(b) Surveillance Procedures Nos. Q1S 68-1, 68-2, 68-3, and 68-4 were in place and implemented. Preventive maintenance had L been accomplished in accordance with QMS 200-3 (c) Review of the modification test for modification No. M-4-1-79-2 and the ATWS system functional test, No. Q1S.68-2, indicated that the system was tested at power following the installatio (d) Walkdown of the system verified the installation of the system bypass switches for maintenance and testing and the indication of system bypass (control room annunciator.)

(e) Review of the ATWS schematic control diagrams indicated that once the system was initiated the ARI system would complete its action and return to normal operation would require additional' deliberate action (f) Manual initiation capability of the ATWS mitigation system was verified in the control roo (4) Quality Assurance and Qualifications The ATWS mitigation system was designed, installed and tested under the CECO 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, QA program. Personnel contacted or interviewed during this inspection appeared knowledgeable and capable of implementing the syste . Open Items-Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further buy the inspector, and which involves some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Open items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2A(2)(c) and 2A(3).

5. Unresolvei Mms An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, an open item, a deviation, or a violation. An unresolved item disclosed during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 2.b(3)(b).

6. Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I during and at the conclusion of the inspection on November 5, 1987. The inspector summarized the scope and results of the inspection and discussed the likely content of this inspection report. The licensee acknowledged the information and did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.