IR 05000311/1987029

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Enforcement Conference Rept 50-311/87-29 on 880212. Violations Noted.Major Areas Discussed:Insp Rept 50-311/87-29 Re Safe Shutdown in Event of Fire
ML20151B254
Person / Time
Site: Salem PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 03/23/1988
From: Krasopoulos A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
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ML20151B252 List:
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50-311-87-29-EC, NUDOCS 8804080113
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{{#Wiki_filter:, , . . . U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Meeting No.

50-311/v7-29 Docket No.

50-311 License No.

DPR-75 Priority Category C - Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 03038 Facility Name: Salem Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 Meeting At: USNRC, Region I, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania Meeting Conducted: February 12, 1988 3 b3 88 Inspector: _A. G. Krasopou os, Reactor Engineer date Approved by: _,) __ __ 3 53 Y C. J. M nderson, Chief date Plant Systems Section, DRS Meeting Summary: Enforcement conference at NRC Region I on February 12, 1988 to discuss the findings identified in Inspection Report No. 50-311/87-29 which reviewed the licensee's ability to safely shutdown the plant in the event of a fire.

The items discussed were the violations identified in the report and the commitments made to NRC in a meeting held in King of Prussia on October 7, 1987 concerning the findings of the above inspection.

i GMBO4080113 880331 PDR ADOCK 05000311 DCD Q i ,

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. ! . DETAILS , , l 1.0 Participants ' 1.1 Public Service Electric and Gas (PSE&G) ! $ S. E. Miltenberger, Vice President, Nuclear Operations > J. W. Zupko, Sr. General Manager Salem Operations . B. A. Preston, Manager Licensing and Regulation

C. W. Lambert, Manager Nuclear Engineering Sciences R. Basha11, Supervisor, Systems Analysis i ' 1.2 U.S. Nuc1 car Regulatory Comission (NRC) i W. V. Johnston, Director (Actino) Division of Reactor Safety ! J. Richardson,DeputyDirector{ Acting)DivisionofReactorSafety .' J. Durr, Chief Engineering Branch E. Wenzinger, Chief Projects Branch No. 2

P. Eselgroth, Technical Assistant (Acting), DRS l

j A. Krasopoulos, Reactor Engineer i R. Laura, Reactor Engineer

T. Kenny, Sr. Resident Inspector

R. Summers, Project Engineer l D. Holody Enforcement Officer

J. Gutierrez, Regional Counsel e i 1.3 State of New Jersey

L. Hamersky, BNE/ NESS l 2.0 Purpose The enforcement conference was held at the request of NRC Region I, to . ! discuss the findings of the inspection conducted to assess the licensee's j compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

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3.0 Presentation and Discussion The Director of the Division of Reactor Safety opened the conference and

requested the licensee to present their perspective on the inspection findings.

The question was posed why a similar inspection performed in 1983 on Unit 1 with similar findings did not cause management to review ] the Unit 2 compliance in this trea earlier.

! The senior licensee representative, replied that PSE&G decs not dispute j the findings of this inspection as they relate to Appendix R cerpliance, f In addition, he acknowledged that the Appendix R compliance effort was

late in starting, however, since the integration of the Hope Creek l i i . . .. - ..--------.--- -- --- - -

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - , o ' . I

. nanagement team into the Nuclear Departrent, conbined with the Engineering and Plant Betterment reorganization, the Fire Protection and other programs

are being upgraded.

He explained that in the Appendix R. Fire Protection area an outside consultant was brought in, in the fall of 1966 to identify weaknesses and propose corrective actions.

This effort resulted in a number of LER's issued prior to the inspection.

The licensee's representatives proceeded to explain the safety signi-l ficance of the violations as mitigated by interim compensatory measures and the long term corrective actions.

The licensee's presentation , naterial appears as Attachment i to this report.

4.0 Concluding Statenents ! The Director of the Division of Reactor Safety thanked the licensee for ' their presentation and stated that this information would be considered in the NRC's determination of enforcenent actions related to these issues.

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, . , . ATTACHMENT 1 l - !

' l AGENDA -

NRC' ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ! FEBRUARY 12, 1988

i i l I.

INTRODUCTION S. Miltenberger j i

II.

OVERVIEW - PSE&G FIRE PROTECTION C.

Lambert PROGRAM

! i III.

DISCUSSION OF DEVIATION / POTENTIAL l VIOLATIONS l

Deviation - variation between R.

Bashall FHA and detector locations

i l Potential Violation - loss of R. Basha11

3 diesels due to CO2 discharge

Potential Violation - LERs 87-09 R. Basha11

, and 87-10 j l

Potential Violation - Loss of R. Bashall communication due to fire in ! relay room

. ! Potential Violation - Improper J.

Zupko

review of AOP-EVAC-2 (alternate I l shutdown) i IV.

Unresolved Items B. Preston ! V.

Summary S. Miltenberger j . i . l ' i l

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UNITS 1 & 2 - - FIRE PROTECTION ,

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM i < l

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- ___ . - -. . - . . . l . . . . . FIRE PROTECTION IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM PROJECTS < Fire Protection Commitment Verification Program

Update of Systems Interaction Analysis

Re-verification of the Fire Hazards Analysis

Appendix R - Breaker Coordination Program

Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Program

Incorporation of Hope Creek Documentation

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. y f } - ) . - t i i l FIRE PROTECTION

IMPROVEMENT ~ PROGRAM PROPOSED PRODUCTS i

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  • Fire Protection Program Plan

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  • Control Procedure

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' . l ' . PRO-ACTIVE FIRE PROTECTION EFFORT .

  • SELF-INITIATED IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

' COMPLETE RE-ASSESSMENT TO APPENDIX R UTillZING GENERIC LETTER 86-10 !

  • COMPLETE PENETRATION SEAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

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, ! ' PURSUING MODIFICATION FOR "GRAY AREAS' 0F THE REGULATION

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  • ESTABLISHMENT OF A LONG TERM CONTROL PROCEDllRE

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... - . . DETECTION (DEVIATION) . LACK OF DETECTION IN LOCATIONS IDENTIFIED IN FHA AS HAVING DETECTION AREAS CORRIDOR OUTSIDE COUNTING ROOM CORRIDOR TO MECH. PEN. AREA STORAGE AREA BEHIND COUNTING ROOM VENTILATION ROOM, ELEY. 113 BORIC ACID EVAPORATOR ROOM ISI CALIBRATION STORAGE ROOM

  • COMMITMENT MADE AT AUDIT TO INSTALL DETECTION
  • COVERED BY FIRE WATCH
  • DESIGN CHANGE. PACKAGE IN REVIEW CYCLE

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.. _ , . - , _ . - . . . . - . LERs 87-09 AND 87-10 _

  • SELF IDENTIFIED
  • RESULT OF IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM EFFORT

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  • PRUDENT ACTION TAKEN AT flME OF DISCOVERY I
  • SCHEDULE FOR MODIFICATIONS IN NOV. 25, 1987, CORRESPONDENCE

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AUX BLDG ELEV. 64 , (LER 87-09) I . . i , a A AND B RHR ROOM COOLER PANEL AND CABLING l , J a ONLY NEEDED FOR COLD SHUTDOWN i i i ' a MODIFICATION TO BE PROVIDED ! ! - ,

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  • i UPPER ELECTRICAL PEN. AREA (LER 87-09)

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  • CABLING FOR:

RHR ROOM COOLERS , i

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., l ' . j FUEL Oil TRANSFER PUMPS . . l - ! l

" DETECTION IN AREA ! !

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  • CABLE WRAP TO BE PROVIDED i

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. , , . . . . . . FUEL Dil STORAGE TANK ROOM (LER 87-09) . ' - '

  • B AND C D-6 PWR CABLES
  • DETECTION

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  • DIVERSE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS CO2 j

. , WATER , '

  • CABLE WRAP TO BE PROVIDED

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. FUEL DIL TRANSFER PUMPS l

(LER 87-10) i i !

i s . . . j " A AND B TRANSFER PUMPS (CABLING AND CONTROLS) ' .

  • DETECTION i

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  • AUTOMATIC SUPPRESSION

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  • MODIFICATION PENDING

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, , - . . . PIPE TUNNEL

i (LER 87-09) . .

  • CABLING FOR ALL SW TRAINS

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  • CONFINED SPACE f

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  • NOT SUBJECT TO TRANSIENT TRAFFIC

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  • DETECTION CURRENTLY BEING INSTALLED (40%)

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  • SUBJECT OF EXEMPTION REQUEST j

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i .} CO2 EQUIPMENT ROOM (LER 87-09) ,

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  • CABLING FOR:

"A" D-G l - B AND C SW PUMP PWR , ' A AND B FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMPS ' . VARIOUS A AND C SW COMPONENTS SW HVAC

  • DETECTION INSTALLED

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  • CABLE WRAP TO BE PROVIDED l

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  • SUBJECT OF AN EXEMPTION REQllEST i

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~ . - , a . . . . . . . INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF CO2 IN D-G AREAS (LER A7-09) . . ' SELF IDENTIFIED

' " UNDER REVIEW AT TIME OF AUDIT

  • UNDER GL 86-10 GUIDELINES ONLY 1 SPURIOUS SIGNAL / ACTUATION NEED j

BE CONSIDERED (NEED 3 UNIQUE SPURIOUS SIGNALS)

  • REPORTED FOR CONSERVATISM WITH RESPECT TO GL 86-10

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  • MODIFICATION IMPROVES PLANT DESIGN I

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COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM ! (LER 87-09) !

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  • DESIGN NRC REVIEWED AND APPROVED IN SER SUPP.6 APPENDIX G PG 14 i

i ! 'ONLY THE PORTABLE RADIO / REPEATER COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM IS IDENTIFIED AS IMMUNE

TO THE EFFECTS OF AN EXPOSURE FIRE IN THE

RELAY RODM.* ' (BASED ON 20 FT. SEPARATION) l F i , l ! " ELEVATING DESIGN TO CURRENT STANDARDS l

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l VIOLATION: LACK OF SORC REVIEU OF THE CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION PROCEDURE REPRESENTS A T.S.

' VIOLATION , l TECH. SPECS. - SORC SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR: ! REVIEU OF FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM AND IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES... AP 25 - FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE STATES: "THIS PROCEDURE ADDRESSES THE PROGRAM FOR i PREVENTION. DETECTION, AND CONTROL OF FIRES

. AND FIRE HAZARDS. SAFEGUARDING LIFE. AND PREVENTION OF PROPERTY LOSS / DAMAGE DUE TO FIRE."

AOP-EVAC-2 - IS AN OPERATING PROCEDURE THAT PROVIDES , INSTRUCTION ON SHUTTING DOUN THE UNIT WITH RESPECT TO THE OPERATION OF PLANT SYSTEMS.

- DOES NOT FALL UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF AP 25

FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM - APPROVED IAU STATION ADMINISTRATIVE j PROCEDURE AP 32 AS AN OPERATING PROCEDURE I - AP 32 STATES "NON-STATION GENERATED

PROCEDURES WHICH ARE PART OF OTHER SPECIFIC ' PROGRAMS, e.g., THE SECURITY PLAN EMERGENCY PLAN. AND FIRE PROTECTION ARE NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THIS PROGRAM AND WILL BE REVIEUED AND l APPROVED IAU THE PROVISIONS OF AP-4 STATION j OPERATIONS REVIEW COMMITTEE (SORC)."

POSITION: - IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY APPENDIX "R" ARE NOT CLEARLY DEFINED I - SALEM DOES NOT CONSIDER AOP-EVAC-2 AN j j IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE FOR APPENDIX R "FIRE i

PROTECTION PROGRAM.

i - THIS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED A VIOLATION ' -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -

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HOT SHUTDOWN REPAIRS I MAY 1981 SUPPLEMENT 6 APPENDIX G TO NRC SER RECOGNIZED USE OF JUMPERS AND REQUIRED PRESTAGING OF SUCH.

SEPT. 1981 PSE&G SAFE SHUTDOWN AND INTERACTION ANALYSIS STATES , j ALTERNATE EQUIPMENT OPERATING PROCEDURES REQUIRES JUMPERS.

JUNE 1982 PSE&G TO NRC "ALL MOTOR OPERATED VALVES ARE EOUIPPED

WITH HANDWHEELS, DUT EXISTING ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN i , I PROCEDURES INDICATE A PREFERENCE FOR THE USE OF i ELECTRICAL JUMPERS."

MAY 1983 NRC APPROVAL OF ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTDOWN REVIEWED , ABOVE LETTERS AND APPROVED PLAN.

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NUREG-0517 ' Supplement No. 6 - Safety Evaluation Repor': . re atec to t1e ooerat. ion o~ - Sa em \\uc ear Generatinc Station, Unit '\\ o. 2 , ) Docket No. 50-311 . Public Service Electric and Gas Company, et al.

. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation . May 1981 i /pc n%,% [[m-NI

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J l i APPE!401X G

l i REVIEW CF PSE&G's CABLE SEPARATION STUDY ' \\ . !

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_ _ _ . _ _ _. _.. -- - - - - -- -- --- . a' l //g UNITED STATES % NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e ! <; ! f , - t W A $ MING TON, D. C. 2055 5 - i f - 4.e[

,,. * MM i 1 1981

cket N:s.:

50-272/311 , APPLICANT: Pudlic Service Electric & Gas Company FACILITY: Salen, Units I and 2 SUBJECT: SUM.".ARY OF MEE INGS AND SITE '/ISIT TO RE'/IE'a' THE PSEAG CABLE INTERACTICM STUDY A series cf 4etings were held fr:m April 30,1931 to May 5,1931 at the Salem Station to review PSE1G's cable interaction study.

An exit interview was held on May 7,1951 to discuss the findings Of the review.

These findings are fcune in the attached report.

. ^A4 {AA44W anis Kerrigan, ProfehManager Licensing Brantn No. 3 Divisien,cf Iicensing , Encicsure: As stated

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I CJ i . , . . - 12 - . - [xample: In the auxiliary feedwater pump reem recundant equi; ent and cables are se;arated by less than 20 feet and are ;retected by redundant . aut:matic s rinklers.

ICr the reascns stated a:Ove, the team c:ncluces that a ene-hcur barrier should be previced for the caole trays associated with the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater ; ump.

This corrective acticn shculd be c mpleted in accorcance -ith the / licensee's caole wrap schedule.

E.

Catecery 5 Criterien Criterien 10 states that ";elay r:cm cable and ecui: rent and caoles in the viciniv cf tre ceiline of the 460 Y s<itchgear reem cannot be ;assively

retected, and, therefere, an alternate shu cewn systea is recuired f:e these areas."

Tre team agrees with this assum:tien.

An evaluatien of the' interim accepta:ility cf the licensee's alternate shutdown system follows.

PSE3G nas ac::ted a basic a;; reach to shutc0wn in the event of fire =nien involves maintaining c;erational centrol frem the unit centrol reem'as long as it remains habitable. Fcr these plant areas in which a single postulated fire could affect centrol or :perability of redundant equipment, alternative reans, through local operatien of available equiprent, ar.e previced in orcer to achieve cold shute:wn.

These alternative reans can be a: liec wrether centrol is P.aintained in the centrol reem er is transferree to ancther locati:n in the event, c:nsidered unlikely by the licensee, that cccucancy of the centrol reem reco es impossible.

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t13 uses stancard functional :;erating procedures (0;erating !nstructien I-3 3 iaintaining Hot Stan:ty,

erat'ng !nstruction I-3.5, Hot Stancry to Cold Sh

. . , ute:wn) anc Erargen:y ;recoeures (Emergercy Instruction a.9, Blackout) augmented by A;;encices =ni:n cetail alter 9ative reth:cs cf system c;eratien Explicit . irstructions for alternative C:erational Pethods are pr0vided in a single DOC r u tnt, incextd by system, -ni:n revices specific 1ccal cperating precedures for each valve, noter, Or ::m:enent ani:n may be recuired *: te Ocerated in creer to achieve cold snute:wn er to c:rrect a mis-c:eration : rect:itated by fire damage.

Each ty:e cf iccal teerating instruction aas revie ed by the teas to c:nfirm technical acecuacy.

Actual c;erati:n Of a 4 KV mot 0r, a 460 V m:::r, a meter c:erated , valve, and an air coerated valve were den rstrated using these ;r0cedures Local . start of a ciesel generater as reviewed fer technical adequacy based en a dra revi ew. Oe enstration cf this ca ability was ceferred until :SEAG completes a i cesign :nange in ;r:gress to ;r:vice alternate centr:1 ;0wer at each ciesel centrol T e :rececure ;resently recuires ;ulling tem: center.

0rary cable to provide.this alternative.

The team ::n:1ucec that FSE&G has available suf ficient cperatienal infe rra tion to acnieve cold shutecan in any ;ostulated fire which could affect equipme t n availability or centrol. The team also concluded that peer organization of i ) t$e pr:cecures ard la:k Of :replannirg were evicent which wculd result in signiH: art lest tire aere tPese ;r: erures ir;1e entec as :urrently written.

! Ac: r:iagly, the team concludes that the (011ewir; as;ects cf the alternate snut:own Or:cecure shculd te recuired te be c:rrected prior to Unit 2 c;eration 1:Ose 5% *atec nertal :0wer.

n accitien based :n tre licensee's re:edural
Pt:tt:es are the ::mm:ratility :f these r:cecures, inese c:r e:tive acti:ns neule :e taken f:r Unit '. ::rcur ently.

The as:e:ts f ge alternate snut:cwn . e 9*

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. a J l seedure that should be corrected are, . l The lack cf ecorcinatien in the precedures to ensure a: plication cf tne s:prepriate , . alternative reined hen cictated by plant circunstance er conditiens.

, . The lack of cirectien to tne Senice Shift Supervisce as to when centrei reem - evacuation is cictated, and lack of cefinition as t0 -nica precedures, keys, l

perater aids, and equi; ment will be required in the new control location;

! ine lack Of discussien of shift organi:atien and personnel de:1cyeent for , ! remote eperation.

I ' i Mest local cperating instructions recuire the use of special etui;sent er tecis,

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These ite9s are specifically identified jn the prececure but have not been '

re-staged in a cefined location. These items include hand t0015, Oneumatic jun
ers, j

pre:ared electrical jun;ers, and diesel centrol power caeles.

! He mechanism is provided to maintain syster status once local coeration has - ' l been initiated. Ne prevision to restore nomal function to cisturbed centrol . systeas has been cefined.

' $c incication of reacter' flux level is provided for the cedicated alternate - shutccwn system. Accorcingly, guicance for ensuring er verifying l adecVate shuteewn margin when Cutside the CCntrol r0CN shculd be Or0 Viced.

Dedicated alternate shutdown instramentation does not include loco er - core te perature. Ter het stancby operation, the licensee plans to use

steam generat:r saturatien pressure infer ation to infer primary tem;erature.

In cr:tr :: achieve cocid:=n, cirect tet;erature inf:r atien fr:m the het and cel legs snculd M retuired and can te achieved, if not therwise avai14: 1e.

by installatten of temporary instrumntation to the detector lead in the penetratien area.

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  • nly tre ::rtacle raci /Pe: ester c municatic95 syste s is ice 9ti'ite as

- iTure t: the effects Of an ext Sure fire in t?e relay recm.

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l .. .... i t N SEPTE!EER 1982 ! PSIEG " " " i f The Energy People i l ! SALEM GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 ! l ! l FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM

! SAFE SHUTDOWN , AND INTERACTION ANALYSES ,

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OPERATIOML CONSIDERATIONS , , This section provides information on the use of the alternate shutdr.sn , procedures and training of the personnel respcnsible for implementin; then.

It also discusses the plant Technical Specifications considerations which have evolved during the fire protection analyses.

VII.A.

Procedures and Training Detailed alternate operating procedures have been developed for .

' the components which may have to be operated locally in the event of a relay room fire which disables the normal control room control functions. These equipment procedures have been organized into a

  1. '7 reference document which is included as Appendix 1 of station opera-

' ting instruction 01-I-3.6, "Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown". Appendix 1 of OI-I-3.6 is entitled, "Remote Shutdown and Cooldown".

r I L The appendix has also been referenced in the following procedures: 01-I-3.8 "Maintaining Hot Standby" El-I-4.9 "Station Blackout" EI-I-4.10 "Control Room Evacuation" - Training for the use of these procedures is part of the norral job requirements for plant operators and instrument technicians.

The g electricians assigned to shif t work have received specific training

in the portions of the procedure which require their support.

Train- . ing of the fire brigade is a continuing process which emphasi:es fire response and minimization of plant damage.

Igggggurf!nde(Jate~ personnel availability for the proper response tot <.ggelternate equipent operation, the shif t minimum staf, $ JU6 fingshesibee Eincreased by the addition of one operator and one ' electrician.

This new shif t manning composition provides for control of the fire, safe shutdcan of the fire affected unit, and continucd operation or safe shutdown of the unaffe:ted unit.

In accordan:e with the requirements of t;UP.EG-0554, addition:1 personnel have bsen - - - - - - - - - -

- . + . - assigned to shif t duties for emergency preparedness considerations.

These personnel can also be used to augment the shift support func- ' tions during a fire.

The"al' ternate equipnent operating procedures require the use of some special equipnent such as sound powered phones, hand senders, ^ c2 / 9 jumpers and small_ tools.

These items have been provided and are currently located, ready for use, at the Hot Shutdown Panel. The i fire protection radios are maintained in the Shift Supervisor's 4 m Mffice and thFcontrol rocm.. evacuationyprgSedure directs:.that.these.; tie:taken^during an evacuation.

  • A complete revision of the procedures into a more efficient format was completed in August, 1931. These have been made available for location in the control roca, Shift Supervisor's office, Operating Engineer's office, Hot Shutdown Panel, and in the office of the p

Operating Staff as indicated in Section VI.C.

L VII.B. Technical Specifications The safe shutdown analysis has resulted in additional equipment used fcr overall plant resistance to fires.

The additional instru-f mentation included on the Hot Shutdown Panel, its associated inde-pendent power supply system, and the additional equipment barriers f and cable tray wrapping should be included in the Plant Technical Specifications to assure the operability of this equipment.

u l The new instrumentation can be included in the existing Tech Specs , for hot shutdown instrumentation.

The power supply system for this

instrumentation can be included in a specification similar to the one used for the vital instrument power systen but a 31-day surveillance ' period would be more consistent with t: a overall system design than the shorter surveillance period currently in force for the vital in-strument power system. The caole tray wrapping and fire barriers can-be included in a specification similar to the existing specification for penetration of fire barriers.

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. . . ~ The actual development and ir.clusion of these specificati0ns can be determined at a later date.

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80 Park P:aza Newark NJ 07101/201430-7000 MAILING ADDAESS / PO Box 570 Newark t4J07101 . June 16, 1982 . Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch fl Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20014 Gentlemen: SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT SAFE SHUTDOWN AND INTERACTION ANALYSES ' FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 The enclosed report is in response to your letter dated April 20, 1982, which required additional information on our fire protection program.

This report is supplemental to our original "Safe Shutdown and Analyses Report" submitted in September, 1981.

Should you have any additional questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours, . E A. Liden, Manager uclear Licensing and Regulation I RWB:rp Attachment . CC Mr. W. J.

Ross Licensing Project Manager Mr. Leif Norrholm Senior Resident Inspector i l _9 o Al,7 3 b 11M 4 r-c- - i y, a 1, 3 *,M,* , 6*

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! - JUNE 1982 PSRG m e w;, =+ - SALEM GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM SAFN SHUTDOWN ( AND INTERACTION ANALYSES SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION l i n l m_ amm._,, .

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_ .. <~ . . . W "Appendix R requires that the SNGS must have the capability to achieve cold hutdown conditions within 72 hcurs and maintain cold shutdown thereafter, hhe licensee's submittal should specifically address this item."

Response _ The Salem Units have been analyzed to ascertain that cold shutdown conditions can be achieved within 72 hours and maintained in that condition. The over-all resistance of the plant to debilitating fires and the protection provided as discussed in the "Safe Shutdown and Interaction Analyses" report ensure this capability even if no repairs are possible in fire damaged areas. The I 16 A.

alternative shutdown procedures used involve a limited amount of circuit modifications to achieve cold shutdown.

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__ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , . - . . . . , . ENCLOSURE 2 . M "The licensee's alternate shutdown procedure requires installation of electrical jumpers and pneumatic bypasses.

It is our position that systems and components used to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions must be free of fire damage and capable to maintain such conditions for the duration i of the hot standby condition. Systems and components used to achieve and maintain cold shutdown should be either free of fire damage or the fire damage to such system should be limited such that repairs can be made and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours. Repair procedures for cold shutdown systems must be developed and material for repair maintained onsite.

It is our position that electrical or pneumatic jumpers are not a suitable method of repair for cold shutdown."

Response The alternative shutdown procedures ased at Salem do not require the use of l electrical jumpers or pneumatic bypasses to achieve hot shutdown conditions.

Manual operation of the st am-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, associated , ( valves, and the steam generator relief valves provides hot shutdown capability for approximately 8 hours. Seal injection flow is established automatically by operation of any one of three charging pumps.

After approximately 8 hours, the plant can be maintained in a hot shutdown condition even if spurious operations of equipment occur since the alternate shutdown procedures provide a mechanism to disconnect control circuits from potential fire induced damage at any time during the shutdown if necessary.

% N 8t should be noted that the term "electrical jumpers" as used in this response, refers to a hard-wired connection of spade lugs to terminals which is tanta-mount to a permanent installation until such time as any damaged equioment can be replaced.

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. -_____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ' . I As stated above, neither electrical jumpers nor pneumatic bypasses are I LS.d ' required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown for approximately eight hours.

On May ;4,1982, the NRC Project Manager verbally requested additional ' inforaation related to this topic. A list identifying all valves required for hot and cold shutdown conditions, and the valves' backup operating mechanisms were requested.

The following lists identify valveskssociated with the shutdown conditih No more than a limited number of valves can , be affected by a given fire and require the use of alternate shutdown procedures. The valves' functions can be reviewed by consulting Section III.C f fgg j of the "Safe Shutdown and Interaction Analyses" report. All motor operated gare equipped with handwheels, but the existing alternate shutdown procedures indicate a preference for the use of electrtcal jumpers.

L' HOT SHUTDOWN VALVES (UP TO 8 HOURS) Auxiliary Feedwater 21AF11 fianual Operator 22AF11 " " 23AF11 " " 24AF11 " a Main Steam 2MS132 a a 21MS10 " " 22MS10 " " 23MS10 " " 24MS10 " "

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HOT / COLD SHUTDOWN (8 TO 72 HOURS) (The valves listed below are used for long-tem hot shutdown and/or prepara- , tion for cold shutdown).

Auxiliary Feedwater 21AF21 Manual Operator 22AF21 " " 23AF21 " " l 24AF21 " " Comoonent Coolino 2CC71 Manual Operator 2CC113 Pneumatic Bypass 2CC215 " " 2CC117 Manual Operator 2CC118 " " 2CC131 " " 2CC136 " " - 2CC187 " " 2CC190 " " Chemical and volume Control 2CV2 Pneumatic Bypass 2CV3 " " 2CV4 " " 2CVS " " 2CV7 " " 2CV277 " " 2CV40 Manual Operator 2CV63 " " 2CV69 " " 2CV18 " " 2CV55 " " 2CV71 " " l 2CV77 " " 2CV79 " " E - 10 - . ._ - _... .- . - - - .-

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_ , . . Safety Injection 2SJ1 Manual Operator ' " " 2SJ2 " " = 2514 " " 2SJ5 " " 2SJ12 " " 2SJ13 " " 2SJ78 ! " " 2SJ79 " " 2SJ108 Service Water 21/225W17 Manual Operator 22/245W20 " " 21/225W21 " " 21/225W22 " " 21/225W23 i " " 21-235W39 " " 21-25SW57 " " ?l-25SW58 " " 21-25SW65 " " 21-25SW72 " " 21/225W122 " " 25W185 " " , 25W199 " " ~ 21-25SW223 " " % The following valves are not required but are deemed desirable during long-term hot-shutdown or preparation for cold shutdown during the 8-72 hour period.

Auxiliary Feedwater 21-23AF52 Manual Operator - Chemical and Volume Control a 2CV35 Manual Operator ~ , I 11 - - I . - - _ _ - - - - - w- _,_.,,,,,,,w.,_,__,v,__ ..,.., _. _ _, _...m, _ .. _ _ _... _ - - _,, - - -. _. - _ ,, - _.. _ - -.. -.

- . ~ . . . Chemical and Volume Control - 21-24CV104 Pneumatic Bypass " " 2CV114 2CV116 Manual Operator 2CV139 " " 2CV140 " " 2CV284 " " Precsurizer 2PRI Pnetenatic Bypass 2PR2 " " 2PR6 Manual Operator 2PR7 " " Samoling 21/235532 Pneumatic Bypass 2SS33 " " 2SS48 " " 2SS49 " " 2SS104 " " 235107 " " l COLD SHUTDOWN VALVES Comoonent Cooling 21/22CC16 Manual Operator Chemical and Volume Control 2CV8 Pneumatic Bypass 2CV75 " " 2CV175 Manual Operator Main Steam 21-24MS167 Manual Operator - 12 -

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Pressurizer ' 2PS1 Pneumatic Bypass 2PS3 " " Residual Heat Removal 2RH1 Manual Operator 2RH2 " " 21/22RH4 " " 21/22RH19 " " I 2RH26 " " 21/22RH29 " " 21/22RH18 Pneumatic Bypass 2RH2O " " Safety Injection 21/22SJ49 Manual Operator 21-24SJ54 " " ' " - . 2SJ69 " " IC

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. . , . F>n ne%%"g UNITED STATES i ' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y ,

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e a wasmNoToN. o. c. 2csss MAY 3 1 I M '....' . ' - - -- ,:n __ , Cocket Nos. 50-272 W"'iN'F"'O ' ' A ' ' "" M i and 50-311 i E. A.

GEN .atu } j tii

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! ' Mr. R. A. Uderitz pf; g, g ! Vice President - Nuclear

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' Public Service Electric and Gas Company Post Office Box 236 f*E . [- , Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 . Cear Mr. Uderitz: SUBJECT: FIRE PROTECTION RULE-ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTD6WN CAPABILITt-SECTIONS III.G.3 AND III.L OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50-SALEr GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 We have completed our review of the subject as noted above based on your subnittals dated Seotember 1981 and in letters dated March 19, August 4 and December 4,1981. Additional infomation and clarification was obtained l frt a June 16, 1982 response and a Decenber 22, 1962 response.to a staff request for additional infomation. Our enclosed Safety Evaluation incer-porates the technical input provided by our consultant, the Brookhaven National Laboratory. The &lternate safe shutdown capability of Salem Units 1 and 2, in the event of a fire, was evaluated against the requirenents of Sections III.G and III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

Based on our review, we conclude that Salen Units 1 and 2 are in compliance with Title 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, Itens III.G.3 and III.L regarding safe shutfown in the event of a fire in the relay room, the cable spreading roonr, or the control room. The schedule for . is specified in 10 CFR Part 50.48(c)(4)you to complete required modifications Compliance with the Fire Protection . Rule will be the subject of future Ccumission inspections.

- 5jr carely,[ l , - . , t Steven. /arga C Operating Reactors nch #1 Division of Licensing Enclosure: Safety Evaluation ec w/ enclosure: - Saa next page , 0 7 pl ' G b Wl V /Vyi im I _ - _ - - , - _ _ _ _. . _, -. -

- . . , . . . . . _ Duclic Service Electri and Gas Comoany - c:: Marx J. Wetternann, Escuire Mr. Ecwin A. Liden, Vanager - Conner and We::ernann Nuclear Lf:ensing Suite 1050 Puolic Service Elec:ric ano 1717 3 enn~s'y l va n i a avenue, NW Gas 0:moany Wasnington, D. C.

20006 Dos: Of fice Box 235 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Ricnard Fryling, Jr., Esquire Assistant Generai Solicitor Dublic Service Electric and Gas Cemoany Regional Administrator - Region I Maii Code T5E - P.O. Box 570 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccemission Newarx, New Jersey 07101 531 33rx Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19A05 Gene Fisner, Bureau of Chief Bureau of Radiation Protection Mr. Charles P. Johnson 320 Sco:cn Road assistan: :o Vice Dresident - Nuclear Trenton,New Jersey 08628 Dublic Service Electric and Gas Comoar.y P.O. Box 570 Mr. R. L. Mitt 1, General Manacer 30 Park Plaza - 15A Nuclear Assurance and Requietion Newark, New Jersey 07101 Puolic Service Electetc ane Gas Comoany - Ma f i '. ode T150 - P.O. Box 570 Newark, New Jersey 07101 Mr. Henry J. Micura, Manager - Salen Ocerations Pubite Service Electric and Gas - C0 meany D. G. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Leif J. Norrholm, Resident Inspecter Salem Nuclear Generating Station U. T. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Drawer C Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 .

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. . . . . SAbut GENERATING STATIOM UNITS T AND 2.

. SAFETY EVALUATIO4 REPORT FOR APPENDIF R TO TC CFR' 52, ITEMT III.G.3 ANS III.L .., - .- , rmo nucTra w-The. ^f re protection rule for nuclear power plants,. Appendi x. R ~ . to. TE CFit 50, became effectfwe February 19,1987.

This rule requf red att. tfernsees of plantz Licensed prior to January t, 19M, to subof t by March T7,19&T; CT). plans and schedules.

for seeting: the apptfcable requirements of Appendi a R, CZ7 m design descriptfort af any sodifications proposed to-provtde alternatfwe safe shutd'owrr capabi.Lity pursuant to Paragraph-III.E.1 of Appendiz 4, and C3) exemptierr requests.

for whf ch the toLLf ng provtsf ort of section 50'.48Cc) C6J was to be invokwd.

Sections III.Gi and: III.L of Appendix R are retro-fi t frees to aLL pre-19N plants regardless of previous * SER positions.and.resolutiont , , The Lf censee'has described the post fire shutdowrr capability i for the Sales facility irt subetttals. dated September 1981 and in Letters dated Marek 19, August 4,and December 4,1981.

The September 198T submittal also addressed the Staf f's con-cerns engendered by the NRC site audit and SER of May 1981.

' Additional information and. clarifi catiert war obtafned free a h ._ __ _ . _ - . - - -. - _ __

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June 16,.1982 response te a. staff' request for additional informattorr,, through. telephone conferences of December 16,. 19&t and Octobec 24 1982,. and a Ray 14,. T982 seatins with - '- e. - the Licensee.

-, ,, The Licensee has provided a safe, shutdown analysis for a fi re event,. and. has demonstrated that adequate redundancy and/or g an alternatf we safe shutd'owrr method exist for those systems.

requfred to assure safe shutdown.

No regatrs or modi fi cati ons.

are required tar affect' hat. or col & shiatdownr uti Li zing the . alternate shutdours methods SYSTEMS U S E S FO R POST = FT e F rAFF M W HT,gg,jdj(, x Tvse. s reeufe.+ <er n <. shne w Safe shutdown of the reactor is initially performed by the insertfort af control rods froe the control room.

Insertion cars aLse be accomplished by removing power to the motor generator sets try the switchgear room.

R e s sto r- ,, coolant inventory and reactor shutdowrr margirt are main- ' tatnet by one at three chemical and volume control syster CCVCS) charging. pumps taking suction from the volume control tank, boric acid tank or the refueling water storage tank (RWST) Primary syster pressur e can be main-tained by the pressurizer heaters and pressurizer spray or by use of tho' chargin's pump combined with Letdown.

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, . __ heat removal can be accompLfshed by releasing stese f rom the stess. generators-wia the atmospheric dues valves.

Rakeup to the stese generatoes carr. be provided by the ' suzt Lf ary feedwater system, which takes. suction free the aumf Liary feedwater storage tank.

col & shutdown conditions, can be achieved and maintained through the use of the residual heat removal (RHRJ systee Cooling is effected in the RHR' heat exchanger-by componene coolf ny water whicht i s. i rt turn, cooled by service water trt the component cooling, heat eschenger.

Reactt wity con tro L durin s.co LA. s. hat down. f s., mai n t ai n ed., -

, by the CVC5 e R.

Arean Where At*eenmee thuedawn 4.

a ana r.d .s The Lfcensee has provided alternattve shutdown capability independent af the cabling and equipment in the relay room, the cahie spreading: room and; the control roost.

The attemate shutdowrr eethod mill be accomplished by pro-cedural means, uttle actions performed at Local shutuower stations or Locally at the equipment.

The Licensee has also provided a summary of the functions for which alter- - . . nate shutdown methods aar be needed, and the manual - actions required. to accomplishr each. of the identified .

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. I funsttons have been described.

In additicJ tar the controts anck instrumentation currently swailable at the existing hat shutdewrs panet., additional instrumentation has been provtded at another remote panel for process mo nitoring.

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Resa4 n4ne Wtant Areas ALL other areas of the plant not required te have an aLeeenate safe shutdowtr system mi LL comply with the requf rements at sectiers III.G.2 of Apperidis R, unt.ess an exeestiere request has bem approved by the staff.

EVALUATTOM Perfo[tance Goals The performance goals. for post fire saf e shutdown can be set using the entseing systees and equipment Listed in Section A above.

The contrsL of these functions can be accomplished using the alternate shutdown methods or the control room . d2 sending on the Location of the ftre.

The Licensee's sLternate shutdown method reLier on procedures and actions at Local shutdown stations or equipment.

The transfer of control capability between the sentrol race and the hot . shutdown panel wiLL be accomplished via s keyed interlock.

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Annun ci atf ort wiLL accur in the contral room upon transfer of control., . The process sanf ter-fng instruments tai be used for e post ffre shutdowra includes reactor hat-Leg and cold Les tempera-tures, pressurizer pressure and Level, steam generator pres-sure and Levet, and, the aust Lf ary feedwater tank and re- _ _

fontfeg wrtar storsgrtank leeets. Howevers a remotte electricaTTy 1-L A ; source range fTur montter nneded to 60 provided. By-1etier m datadi Cecenher 22,1982) the licensee stated-that.such. instrumentation ~ ' .gj E bi p=.+ %.i,t s a m m pan W n unsts t and z: :.. ; ~. - . ~ - ,' ,---{~ -. - _. _,, , . -- -_ _ The avai Lable support systess for post ff re safe shutdowrt are the redundant diesel generators, vital buses, servt ce water-sys.tes, component cooling water systes and room-coolers.

Renai er/72.Hou r eseuf esean+- . The mLeernate shutdourt methods have the capahit.1ty o.t achieving cold shutdown withf rs 7Z hours after a fire event and no repairs are planned try order to achieve cold shutdown con-ditions.

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, Assoefsted Cfreuftr an# reetme4an Att circuitry, indicators, instruments and power supplies assocf ated with the reente penels are independent from those identified fire zones for which alternative shutdown cas-abf Lity is resurred.

The Licensee has stated that nonsaf ety related circuits de not rum from one redundant train to another and thus negates the possibility of propagating a fire between redundant circuits.

The Licensee's methods of protecting the safe shutdown capabf Lity are consistent wi t.Y the guidelines provided by the staff.

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- . The alternate shutdown instrumentation has a dedicated power source and its cabling tz separated from those associated with the norest shutdown instrumentation.

ALL of the normal power and control ctreutts are provided isolation via electrically coordinated circuit breakers or fuses.

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esssem enetenure The power sources needed for alternate shutdown, the dedi-cated source for new instrumentation, and switchgear and estor control centers for required devices are not Located . . in the postulated fire zones needing alternate shutdown ~ ~ ,,, e

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7- - e . _ _. _ methods.

Non-safety related, circuits do not run f ree one redundant traits. toi another.

Further, aLL cables of concern see protected by circuit breakers or fuses.

.T Tourieur efenat deeration, The devices whose inadvertent operation by spurious signals could adverseLr affect safe shutdower5 ave been identi fied.

Methods of protecting the safe shutdown capabi L.ity are consistent uitfn the severf tr of thof e effects.

The Licensee has evaluated the effects of the spurious operation of reactor coolant pressure bounday valves and has pro-wided assurance that eithee the power to the valves wi LL be removed. during normal plant operations to prevent spurious operatf orr, Ct e.,. at the RNR systes hi / Low pressure interf ace) or ttrat operator interventiert of a spurious operatierr whicit cars cause delayed effects, can be perforeed within a time frame whicir does not compromise safe shutdown capabi Li ty.

. r Tafe Shutdown Preceduree and emannw m The Licensee has developed and implemented detailed written J proceduree for' obtaining a safe shuttlowrt condition givon a fire event.

These procedures are part of the current

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operational instructions. and emergency instructions.

The

senoower necessary for accomplishing the operations rer4 aired, for-the alternate * shutdown is avaf table at the i p Lont: at a L L tt se s.

Members of the fire brigade are not l fneLuded in the shutdown sanoower requirements.

co N e t u s r,g3., Based: orr our review,. we conclude titat the Sa ter Generattng j statton Units 7 and a desf gn provides one train of systems necessary tot achieve and maintaf n safe shutdown conditions l by utf Lf ting e+ther the control room or the alternate l I snutdower 1rethods, and--thus meets i:heurequtrements:sfy - . l Assentin R to 7Q CFM 50, Items III.T..T and. III.L uith . - ---_:_.. -_.. respect ta. safe.shutdoerr in the avent<of a-fire fn the relay rom. '.~ j ~

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