IR 05000382/1988024

Insp Rept 50-382/88-24 on 881011-13.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Eight Deficiencies Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Performance & Capabilities During Annual Exercise of Emergency Plan & Procedures

ML20195F596
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	11/09/1988
From:	Everett R, Terc N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195F588	List: IR 05000382/1988024 ML20195F581
References
50-382-88-24, NUDOCS 8811220064
Download: ML20195F596 (7)

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APPENDIX (

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  !

REGION IV  !

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NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/88-24 Operating License: NPF-38  !

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Docket: 50-382  !

Licensee: Louisiana Dower & Light Company (LP&L) ,

317 Baronne Street .

New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 l Facility Name: Waterford-3 Steam Electric Station (W3SES)

Inspectior. At: W35ES near Killona, Louisiana [

Inspection Conducted: October 11-13, 1988 L

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Inspector: a, . @ __ //- f- ff

_ . erc, Emergency Preparedness Analys Date  ;

(NRC Team Leader), Security and Emerge y l Preparedness Section >

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Accompanying i Personnel: B. Murray, Chief, Reactor Programs Branch, NRC, Region IV  :

R. Haag, Resident Inspector, Arkansas Nuclear One l A. B. Earnest, Security Specialist, NRC, Region IV  ;

0. H. Schultz, Comex Corporation j G. R. Bryan, Comex Corporation j l

Approved:

R. J. Everett, Chief, Security and Emergency

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Preparedness Section

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Inspection Sumary Inspection Conducted October 11-13, 1988 (Report 50-382/88-24)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's performance  !

and capabilities during an annual exercise of the emergency plan and i procedures, j Results: Within the areas inspet.ted, no violations or deviations were identified. Eight deficiencies were identified by the NRC inspector l (paragraphs 4-93 . j

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i 8811220064 881117 PDR ADOCK 050003S2 l 0 PDC

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DETAILS Persons Contacted LP&L

• Davis, Manager, Event Analysis and Reporting

"F. Englebracht, Manager, Nuclear Emergency Planning and Records

" Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear

• Carns, Plant Manager

• Gerrets, Manager, Nuclear Services

• Dummond, Director, Nuclear Excellence

• Baker, Manager, Nuclear Operations Support Assessment

• Burski, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Reguistory Affairs

• Prasankumar, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Technological Services

• Packer, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance

• W. Labonte, Radiation Protection Superintendent

"J. Zabritski, Manager, Operations Quality Assurance

• J. Lewis, Onsite Emergency Planning Coordinator 3R_C

• Smith, Senior Resident Inspector, W3SES

• T. Staker, Resident Inspector, W3SES

• Denotes those present at the exit intervie The NRC inspector also held ciscussions with other station and corporate personnel in the areas of securt* r, health physics (HP), operations, training, and emergency reroons . Followup on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

(Closed) Deficiency (382/8723-01): Scenario Inadequacies - The NRC inspector noted only minor inconsistencies in the 1988 exercise scenario (typical of any complex emergency exercise scenario) which did not significantly adversely impact the emergency exercise.

(Closed) Deficiency (382/8723-02)

Inadequate Operational Support Center (OSC) Haoitability Determination - The NRC inspector observed that habitability determinations were carried out adequately throughout the 1988 exercis (Cloied) Deficiency (382/8723-03): Failure to Conduct Gas-Atmosphere fests in Closed Environments - The NRC inspector noted that the licensee had taken corrective actions since the 1987 emergency exercise in the form of classroom and practical hands-on training. These training activities were conducted based on a new lesson plan issued on February 27, 198 Forty-one persons were trained.

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(Closed) Deficiency (382/8723-04): Inadequate HP Coverage of In-Plant Teams - The NRC inspector observed that during the 1988 exercise, in plant '

4 repair / corrective action teams were accompanied by HP personne '

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3. P_rogram r Areas Inspected i L

The NRC inspector observed licensee activities in the Control Room,  !

, Technical Support Center (TSC), OSC, and Emergency Operations  ;

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Facility (EOF) during the exercise. The NRC inspector also observed i emergency response organfration staffing, facility activation, detection,  !

lassification and operational assessment, notifications of licensee 3 personnel, notificatior.s of offsite agencies, formulation of protective t q action recommendations, offsite dose assessment, in plant corrective j j actions and rescue, security / accountability activities, and recovery r eperation {

No violations or deviations were identifie I i

4. C_ontrol Room (82301)(1)

Although, in general, the control room staff performed efficiently, they [

delayed actions to sti ; shutdown cooling from aproximately 2:04 p.m. to  :

i 4 on the October 12, 1988, emergency exercise. This delay prevented  ;

j a timely cooldown of the reactor which would have minimized the leakage j i from the main feedwater line. As a consequence, radioactive releases  ;

continue The following fa. tors contributed to this delay:

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The Auxiliary Operator was given the wrong part of the procedure [

on his first attempt to perform the required valve lineu }

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• The Control Room Operators changed the desired train of shutdown l cooling from "A" to "B," adding some confusion about which action t a should be take i

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Preplanning for shutdown cooling was not evident in the control room l l when conditions (e.g., reactor coolant system pressure reduction to j j less than 350 psig) existed at 2:04 j

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HP resources, needed to accompany repair teams that were to perform f

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valve lineups in preparation for shut-down cooling, were diverted l to other activities indicating that proper priority was not given to

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the task of starting shutdown coolin [

• Lack of prior preplanning and coordination with the chemistry staff I was evident when a delay of about five minutes occurred due to not

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{ having access to liquid sample result '

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i No violations or deviations were identifie l

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5. Technical Support Center (82301)(2)

On two instances, the TSC staff failed to assess plant conditions l properly, &nd as a result did not classify emergency conditions into the l proper emergency class in a timely manner. One instance occurred during '

the Site Area Emergency (SAE), and the other during the General Emergency (GE). During these events, the NRC inspector observed the ,

following weaknesses in the licensee performanc ,

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• Escalation to the SAE was delayed about 15 minutes because the TSC staff did not recognize the applicability of SAE Emergency Action Level (EAL) TAB E-A.2, "Explosion of a Bomb," in Procedure EP-1-001, ;

"Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions." !

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At 10:15 a.m. the TSC staff knew that a bomb threat existed. A ,

suspect bomb had been located attached to the feedwater line L inboard the containment isolation valve where it could cause substantial damage to the reactor cooling system. After the bomb !

exploded, the reattor vessel tripped and the staff received the (

Containment Isolation Actuating Signal, ard the Safety Injection +

Actuating Signal. In addition, the TSC staff received signals of actuation of the Area Radiation Monitoring System near the Main Steam Isolation Valve, and the control room ventilation inle * Procedure EP-1-001, "Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions." (EAL TAB E-A.2) requires SAE classification for an explosion causing damage to any safety system such as the feedwater system inboard the containment isolation valv * The SAE was not declared until 10:30 a.m. and then it was based on a different EAL, namely, the loss of reactor coolant inventory, i * At 10:30 a.m. conditions based on offsite air sampling results would

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declared until 11:43 a.m. and then only when the controller directed i the classification at 11:37 a.m.

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• The scenario anticipated escalation to a GE based upon i Procedure EP-1-001, "Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions," (GE EAL TAB A E-A.2), when offsite projections of thyroid dose rates at the Exclusion Area Boundary were greater 1 than 5 rem / ,

• At 11:11 a.m., the TSC status boards indicated an iodine projection

dose of 12.9 rem /h at the Exclusion Area Boundary, based upon a 10.30 a.m. air sample. Instead of considering this dose as an indication that it was necessary to escalate to a GE, the TSC staff

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spent time discussing other natters.

l The above is a defic' , (382/8824-02)

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The TSC staff did not provide the dose assessors with adequate and frequent data regarding plant status that was necessary for adequate dose projectient (e.g., a broken feedwater line, ruptured steam generator tubes). As a consequence, the dose assessors wrongly assumed that the release point emanated from a broken steam line and based their calculation on this error. The dose assessors continued relying on the in plant effluent monitors to identify airborne releases, and did not focus on the unmonitored release poin The above is a deficienc (382/8824-03)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Offsite Monitoring Team and Dose Assessment (82701)(6)

One of the three offsite monitoring teams tracking the plume did not provide air sampling results to decision makers in a timely manner. Since the largest and most critical radioisotope released to the environment was radiciodine, the lack of air sampling results contributed to the delay in recognition of GE conditions, and issuance of the required Protective Action Recommendation The above is a deficiency. (332/8324-04)

Radiation levels indicated by in plant radiation monitors were not provided to the Oose Assessment Coordinator (OAC) in the TSC. At 10:13 a.m., radiation levels near the Post-LOCA "A" monitor increased from 0.7 mr/h to 682 mr/h. This information was not given to the DAC. This information would have made decision-makers aware that an airborne release point existed at the +46 foot level of the Reactor Auxiliary Building near the feedwater line. As a consequence of not having this information, the TSC staff did not , identify with certainty the true release path of the radioactive release to the environment until much late The above is a deficienc (382/8824-05)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Corrective Actions / Rescue (82301)(7)

Two emergency repair / corrective action teams were not briefed in accordance with approved written procedures. As a result, one team was unable to accomplish their tas Both teams could have bien exposed to hazardous conditions unnecessarily. Events were as follows:

• At 9:55 a.m., an emergency repair team was sent to correct the l component cooling water level switch which had caused the component cooling water header isolation valves to close, splitting the system into separate header This occurred after an explosive device had been observe The TSC and OSC staff in charge of directing team activities did not coordinate actions with the sesucity officers as

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required by paragraph 5.4.2.d of Procedure EP-2-130, "Emergency Team Assignments." As a result, the security officer prevented the repair team access to the work are *

Personnel in charge of directing and coordinating the actions of Repair Team 6, dispatched at 11:25 a.m. to locate a missing person in the general vicinity of the bomb explosion, did not address existing radiological ha:ard The above is a deficienc (382/8824-06) Security /AcLountability (82301)18]

Personnel accountability activities performed at the Alert declaration j were not accomplished in a timely manner, nor in accordance with Procedure EP-2-190, "Personnel Accountability." The Alert declaration was

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made at 8:51 a.m. but the accountability readers were not activated until 9:05 a.m. Following reader activation, personnel were directed to "card in." The NRC inspector noted thst several persons had already done so

[ prior to the accountability key card activation announcemen This is l contrary to written procedural recuirements. As a consequence, at least two persons were noted ' missing" in the initial accountability check.

, In addition, the NRC inspector noted that personnel were not waiting for l the green signal when leaving the card reade The above is a deficienc (382/8824-07)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Medical _ Team (82301)(10)

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} During the medical emergency simulated at 1:45 p.m., the NRC inspector noted that direction and coordination of the various activities was i lacking. As a result, irrportant actions (e.g. , transportation of victim to the hospital) were delaye In addition, rescue activities were deficient in that the rescuers did not remove a 400-pound contaminated l package laying over the injured person. This action prevented the proper

handling and care of the victim.

1 The above is a deficienc (382/8824-08)

No violations or deviations were identifie . Scenario l

For the most part, the scenario developed for the observed annual exercise was technically sound and challenging to the player No violations or deviations were identifie _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

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, 11. l.'.censee Self-Critique

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The NRC inspector attended the post-exercise critique by the licensee I

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on October 13, 1988, to evaluate the licensee's identification of deficiencies and weaknesses as required by 10 CFR 50.4*/(b)(14) and ,

10 CFR 50, Appendix E. paragraph IV.F.5. The NRC inspector noted that the

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licensee properly described and characterized most of the significant i

deficiencies observed by the NRC team during the exercise. Additionally,  ;

the licensee has initiated a search for root causes and has identified i most of the corrective actions they will take in the near future to l correct all deficiencies identified during the exercis [

Corrective actions taken by the licensee will be examined during a future  !

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No violations or deviations were identified, i t

) 12. Exit Interview e

, The NRC inspector met with the NRC resident inspector and licensee  !

representatives indicated in paragraph 1 on October 13, 1988, and  !

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su narized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this ,

report. The NRC inspector noted that most of the same findings had also  !

been identified by the licensee in their critiqu Furthermore, the !

I licensee acknowledged their understanding of deficiencies and agreed to  ;

] examine all weaknesses to find root causes in order to take adequate '

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corrective actions, i i f i [

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