ML20149M126

Insp Repts 50-369/87-43 & 50-370/87-43 on 871121-880120. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Safety Verification,Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities & Review of Licensee Actions Re Generic Ltr 81-21

ML20149M126
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	02/18/1988
From:	William Orders, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149M113	List: ML20149M111 ML20149M122 ML20149M126
References
50-369-87-43, 50-370-87-43, GL-81-21, NUDOCS 8802250345
Download: ML20149M126 (7)

See also: IR 05000369/1987043

Text

.

Sa msog LNITED STATES

D NUCLEAR REGl!LATORY COMMISSION

& I R EGION 11

h,

101 M ARI ET T A ST R E ET, N."'.

, ,e ATL ANT A, G EOR GI A 30323

% ,/

9 .w ..

7

Report Nos.: 50-369/87-43 and 50-370/87-43

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9 and NPF-17

Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2

Inspection Condu ed: )}ovember 1, 1987 - January 20, 1988

Inspector:

'W.

g/ h /

at4 Signed

Orders,SeniorRefdentInspector

Accompanying Personnel: . . Nelson

Approvedby;[ ,MW/-

' T. A. Peebles, Sect)6n Chief

/ Y

7Datsf Signed

Division of Reactof Projects

SUKVRY

Scope: This routine, unannounced onsite inspection involved the areas of

operations, safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities, ,

and review of licensee actions pertaining to Generic Letter GL 81-21 Natural  !

Circi.lation Cooldown.

Results: In the areas inspected, one violation was identified involving an  !

inaccurate electrical print and failure to follow procedure (see paragraph 9).

1

-

\

l

8802250345 080219

PDR ADOCK 05000369

G PDR

.

l

-!

REPORT DETAILS

,

1. Person Contacted

Licensee Employees ,

• T. McConnell, Plant Manager _

• B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations l

• D. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance

B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services  ;

N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer  !

M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated

• L. Firebaugh, OPS /NPE/MNS

• L. Weaver, McGuire Training

• D. Baxter, OPS /MNS/NPD

• D. McGinnis, McGuire Training Scheduling

R. Banner, Compliance

J. Snyder, Performance Engineer

'

• N. Atherton, Compliance

• R. White, IAE Engineer  ;

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen.  ;

technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office  ;

personnel. *

• Attended exit interview  :

2. Exit Interview (30703) {

The inspection scope and findings identified below were summarized on l

January 29, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. One ,

violation consisting of two examples was discussed in detail. The  !

licensee representatives present offered no dissenting coments, nor did  !

they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the i

inspectors during the course of their inspection.  ;

3. Unresolved Items l

1  :

,

,here were no unresolved items identified in this report.  ;

4 ,

4 Plant Operations (71707, 71710)  ;

l

I

The inspection staff reviewed plant operations durir.g the report period to  ;

verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room '

logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment

removal and restoration records were routinely reviewed. Interviews were

conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,

,

and performance personnel.

J

4

--- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ o

_

,

l

2

Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at

shifi changes. Actions and/or activities observed' were conducted as

prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The complement

of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required

by Technical Specifications.

Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not

limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2

electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the

station yard zone inside the protected area.

l

During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,

equipment status and radiation control practices were observed,

a. Unit 1 Operations

l Unit 1 began the reporting period at full power. On November 24,

power was reduced to 90% due to vibrations / oscillations of main

turbine governor valve 4 (GV-4). Licensee efforts to solve the

problem with the unit on line were unsuccessful and GV-4 was closed.

On November 25 power was raised to approximately 97%, the maximum

attainable with the three remaining turbine governor valves fully

open.

On December 28, during testing of steam generator water level

instrumentation, use of an incorrect print resulted in a reactor

trip. Details concerning this incident are given in paragraph 9.

The unit was restarted the following day after a post trip review and

scheduled testing were completed. Power operation continued without

interruption until the morning of January 7 when a main generator

voltage regulator failure resulted in a reactor trip. The unit was

restarted the following day and operated through the end of the

report period,

b. Unit 2 Operations

Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at 100 percent power.

On November 24, a 50 percent run back occurred when the A feedwater-

pump turbine speed controller malfunctioned causing speed oscilla-

tions. The problem was corrected but the unit was maintained at 50

percent power due to grid demand. Tha unit returned to full power

operation on November 30.

'

On November 30 an apparent spike in the main generator stator cooling

flow caused a reactor trip. The generator protection circuitry,

designed to initiate a turbine runback on low stator cooling flow and ,

a turbine trip on low-low flow after a time delay did not operate 7

correctly. A wiring error had cross connected the low and low-low i

flow functions such that the turbine trip occurred first resulting in l

the reactor trip. The unit was restarted December 1 and reached full i

power the following day, t

a

~

o

4

PT/2/A/4252/01 Turbine Driven Auxiliary feedwater Pump Test

PT/2/A/4252/01B B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test

PT/2/A/4601/01 SSPS Channel 1 Functiona'4 Test

PT/2/A/4200/28 Slave Relay Test

PT/2/A/4450/04A Hydrogen Recombiners A & B

PT/1/A/4201/05A Train A Containment Pressure Control Test

PT/1/A/4206/01A A Safety Injection Pump Test

PT/1/A/4208/01A A Containment Spray Pump Test

PT/1/A/4209/018 B Charging Pump Performance Test

6. Maintenance Observations (62703)

Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the

resident inspecticn staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy

and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.

The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where

applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use,

that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and

maintenance results were adequate.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. AE0D Diagnostic Evaluation Observations (37702, 35702, 40700)

During the first two weeks in Decenher, an 18 member AE00 team evaluated

the McGuire facility and Duke corporate support to the station. On

January 22, a meeting was held in the Duke corporate offices during which

the AE0D team management relayed to the licensee the results of the

evaluation. ,

I

The tean observed a number of strengths and identified some weaknesses in  ;

the McGuire prog *ams, i

Program strengths observed by the team included:

Overall Corporate Leadership /0versight/ Involvement

Staff Technical Capabilities

Functional Area Technical Programs ,

l

Programs For Improved Engineeri.ig Support

Organizational Climate / Culture / Attitude

Weaknesses identifieo by the team included:

Design Engineering Involvement at McGuire

QA Contributions to Enhancing Plant Safety Performance

i

-4

"

.

5

Specific Operations, Maintenance, and Testing Issues

• Specific Management and Organizational Issues

The specifics of the evaluation will be documer.ted in a report to the

licensee.

8. Natural Circulation Cooldown (25586)

During the inspection period, the licensee's actions to implement Generic

letter GL 81-21, Natural Circulation Cooldown were reviewed. This review

included the following documents:

Licensee response to GL 81-21, dated 1/20/82

NRC response'to licensee's letter of 1/20/82, dated 9/30/83

Employee Training & Qualification System Manual, Standards:

301.0 Rev 1 Operations Training and Qualifications Overview

302.1 Rev 3 Basic Operations Training Program

303.0 Rev 2 License Preparatory Reactor Operator Program

304.0 Rev 2 License Preparatory Senior Reactor Operator Program

306.0 Rev 2 Periodic Training Licensed Operator Requalification

310.0 Rev 0 Periodic Training SR0/R0 Certified Inspector

Requalification

312.0 Rev 2 Maintenance of an Active NRC License (R0/SRO)

Licensed Operator Requal Training Schedule, 1-86

Hot License Preparatory Clast 1087 Training Schedule

Licensed Operator Training Schedule, 1-86

Licensed Operator Requal Training Segments 87-1,-2,-3,-4

OP-MC-SA0-A09, dated 6/14/83, Instructor Simulator Exercise Guide

For Abnormal Procedure on Natural Circulation

OP-MC-SE0-E02, dated 10/16/84, instructor Simulator Exercise

Guide for Emergency iceration during Natural Circulation

Cooldown

OP-MC-SIM-T03, dated 11/27/84 Instructor Simulator Exercise Guide

for St. Luice Natural Circulation Cooldown Event .

OP-MC-SRT-R01, dated 1/4/85, NRC License Requalification Exercise

Guide Worksheets Segment 2 day 2

Personnel (SR0/RO) Training Records

OP-MC-TA-AM, dated 2/8/82, Accident Mitigation Lesson Plan

OP-MC-TA-PTS, dated 4/28/83, Reactor Material & Pressurized

Thermal Shock lesson Plan

OP-MC-EP-EP1, dated 8/14/84, Emergency Procedure 1 (SI,

NC SIT) Lesson Plan

OP-GA-SPS-THF-HT, dated 2/29/84 Heat Transfer lesson Plan

OP-CN-THF-TI, dated 5/15/86, Heat Tran*fer Lesson Plan

EP/1/A/5000/1.1, dated 11/6/87, Naturt' Circulation Cooldown

.

y . .

,

-

6

EP/2/A/5000/1.1, dated 6/6/86, Natural Circulation Cooldown .

f

EP/1/A/5000/16.3, dated 8/22/86, Response to Void in Reactor

Vessel

EP/2/A/5000/16.3, dated 6/6/86, Response to Void in Reactor

Vessel

AP/1/A/5500/09, dated 12/3/84, Natural Circulation l

Response to Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, Vol. 2, PGP

EPG ES-0.2, Rev. 2, Natural Circulation Cooldown

EPG FR-1,3, Rev. 1, Response to Void in Reactor Vesse'  !

The inspectors determined from their review of the training program, that

classroom and simulator training on natural circulation cooldown is

included in R0 and SR0 certification training and in the operator

retraining program. The inspectors also noted that this training includes

other power reactor operating events.

-

Additionally, Emergency ~ rocedures (EP) procedures were reviewed to ensure

they followed the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Guidelines with respect-

to step content, addition of specific plant parameters, cooldown rates,

',

subcooling temperatures, temperature limitations, and documentation of

step deviations. The inspectors determined from their review of the EP

that the licensee had implemented the requirements to GL 81-21.

l l

Three examples of procedural deficiencies were noted during the review. '

Step 13 of EP/1/A/5000/1.1 (Initiate NC System Depressurization) had

substeps b and c reversed. This would cause the operator to establish a

100 degree subcooling margin and then reduce the margin to a 50 degree

< subcooling margin. This is not the intent of these steps. The licensee

indicated that they had previously identified this discrepancy. Ste i

of EP/1/A/5000/16.3 and EP/2/A/5000/16.3 (Charging Flow Established) does p 2b

a not contain the IF NOT, THEN statement which would direct the operator to

establish excess letdown and skip the next step if charging cannot be

established. Step 14 of EP/1/A/5000/16.3 ard EP/2/A/5000/16.3 (Prepare l

Containment for Reactor Vessel Venting) does at contain the Action /

Expected Response substep for checking the Containment Hydrogen concentra-

tion less then 6 %. The incorporation of these changes into the [

)! - procedures will be tracked as an inspector followup item (50-369/370-

) 87-43-01) and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection, j

No violations or deviations were identified in this area. '

!

l 9. Unit 1 Reactor Trip of December 28, 1987 *

Unit 1 tripped at 1:22 p.m. on December 28, 1987 due to a false Low-Low

t level in B steam generator. Instrumentation and Electrical (IAE)

tc:hnicians had been performing calibration testing on channel II of

narrow range 8 steam generator level instrumentation. During the test it

circuit was

was determined

required. that an adjustment

The electrical schematic to the channel's

drawing lead-lag

for channel II (MCM 1399.03-

0368 001) incorrectly identified the channel II lead-lag card as being .

located in the channel IV cabinet. The IAE personnel questioned this

.

L

"

.

7

arrangement, but proceeded with the adjustment. In actuality, the card in

the channel IV cabinet was a channel IV component. When the adjustment

was made, the 2 of 4 logic for the unit trip on low-Low steam generator

level was satisfied (channel II was in a tripped condition) and the

reactor tripped. After the trip the IAE technicians realized the error

and informed Operations (OPS) of the cause of the trip. The correct

lead-lag card was subsequently located in the channel 11 cabinet therefore

verifying the error on the drawing. The licensee has determined that the

drawing error occurred when the drawing was revised for a Nuclear Station

Modification to add the lead-lag circuit. The same error existed on the

corresponding drawing for Unit 2. The drawing errors constitute a viola-

tion for inadequate procedures.

During the restart effort on December 24, an additional trip occurred

during the source range detector calibration. At approximately 10:14 p.m.

IAE and OPS personnel were conducting pre-startup testing on Nuclear

Instrumentation (NI) channel N-31 and the Manual Reactor Trip systems

simultaneously. Operations personnel racked in and closed the B Train

Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker which gave a train B General Warning signal on

the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). When IAE personnel completed

testing on NI channel N-31 their procedurc PT/0A/4600/14C, Nuclear

Instrumentation System Source Range Functional Test, required that a check

be made to verify that General Warning lamps are not lit on SSPS trains A

or B prior to positioning the train A Multiplexer Test Switch from A + 6

to NORMAL. In doing so, the switch must pass through the INHIBIT

position, momentarily generating a General Warning. Two simultaneous

General Warning signals will generate a trip signal. The IAE technician

determined that a train B General Warning was present due to OPS testing

but believed that rotating the switch quickly through the INHIBIT position

would not generate an A train General Warning. This was based on their

experience that rotating the switch quickly would not illuminate the

'

General Waraing light. The train A Multiplexer Test Switch was rotated '

rapidly enough not to illuminate the General Warning lamp, but tne general

~

warning circuitry still generated a Reactor Trip Signal. This constitutes l

a violation for failure to follow a procedure.

These two examples, incorrect drawings and failure to follow a procedure

collectively constitute a violation. This is Violation 369/87-43-02.

l

l

!

!

.. -

l