ML20149M126
| ML20149M126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/1988 |
| From: | William Orders, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149M113 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-87-43, 50-370-87-43, GL-81-21, NUDOCS 8802250345 | |
| Download: ML20149M126 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1987043
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LNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGl!LATORY COMMISSION
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Report Nos.: 50-369/87-43 and 50-370/87-43
Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.:
50-369 and 50-370
License Nos.:
Facility Name: McGuire 1 and 2
Inspection Condu ed: )}ovember
1, 1987 - January 20, 1988
Inspector:
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'W. Orders,SeniorRefdentInspector
at4 Signed
Accompanying Personnel: . . Nelson
Approvedby;[
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' T. A. Peebles, Sect)6n Chief
7Datsf Signed
Division of Reactof Projects
SUKVRY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced onsite inspection involved the areas of
operations, safety verification, surveillance testing, maintenance activities,
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and review of licensee actions pertaining to Generic Letter GL 81-21 Natural
Circi.lation Cooldown.
Results:
In the areas inspected, one violation was identified involving an
inaccurate electrical print and failure to follow procedure (see paragraph 9).
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8802250345 080219
ADOCK 05000369
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REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Person Contacted
Licensee Employees
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- T. McConnell, Plant Manager
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- B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations
- D. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance
B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services
N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer
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M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated
- L.
Firebaugh, OPS /NPE/MNS
- L. Weaver, McGuire Training
- D. Baxter, OPS /MNS/NPD
- D. McGinnis, McGuire Training Scheduling
R. Banner, Compliance
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J. Snyder, Performance Engineer
- N. Atherton, Compliance
- R. White, IAE Engineer
Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen.
technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office
personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspection scope and findings identified below were summarized on
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January 29, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
One
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violation consisting of two examples was discussed in detail.
The
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licensee representatives present offered no dissenting coments, nor did
they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the
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inspectors during the course of their inspection.
3.
Unresolved Items
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,here were no unresolved items identified in this report.
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Plant Operations (71707, 71710)
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The inspection staff reviewed plant operations durir.g the report period to
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verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room
logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment
removal and restoration records were routinely reviewed.
Interviews were
conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,
and performance personnel.
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Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at
shifi changes. Actions and/or activities observed' were conducted as
prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The complement
of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required
by Technical Specifications.
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not
limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2
electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the
station yard zone inside the protected area.
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During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,
equipment status and radiation control practices were observed,
a.
Unit 1 Operations
Unit 1 began the reporting period at full power.
On November 24,
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power was reduced to 90% due to vibrations / oscillations of main
turbine governor valve 4 (GV-4).
Licensee efforts to solve the
problem with the unit on line were unsuccessful and GV-4 was closed.
On November 25 power was raised to approximately 97%, the maximum
attainable with the three remaining turbine governor valves fully
open.
On December 28, during testing of steam generator water level
instrumentation, use of an incorrect print resulted in a reactor
trip.
Details concerning this incident are given in paragraph 9.
The unit was restarted the following day after a post trip review and
scheduled testing were completed.
Power operation continued without
interruption until the morning of January 7 when a main generator
voltage regulator failure resulted in a reactor trip.
The unit was
restarted the following day and operated through the end of the
report period,
b.
Unit 2 Operations
Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at 100 percent power.
On November 24, a 50 percent run back occurred when the A feedwater-
pump turbine speed controller malfunctioned causing speed oscilla-
tions.
The problem was corrected but the unit was maintained at 50
percent power due to grid demand.
Tha unit returned to full power
operation on November 30.
On November 30 an apparent spike in the main generator stator cooling
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flow caused a reactor trip.
The generator protection circuitry,
designed to initiate a turbine runback on low stator cooling flow and
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a turbine trip on low-low flow after a time delay did not operate
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correctly.
A wiring error had cross connected the low and low-low
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flow functions such that the turbine trip occurred first resulting in
the reactor trip. The unit was restarted December 1 and reached full
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power the following day,
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PT/2/A/4252/01
Turbine Driven Auxiliary feedwater Pump Test
PT/2/A/4252/01B
B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Test
PT/2/A/4601/01
SSPS Channel 1 Functiona'4 Test
PT/2/A/4200/28
Slave Relay Test
PT/2/A/4450/04A
Hydrogen Recombiners A & B
PT/1/A/4201/05A
Train A Containment Pressure Control Test
PT/1/A/4206/01A
A Safety Injection Pump Test
PT/1/A/4208/01A
A Containment Spray Pump Test
PT/1/A/4209/018
B Charging Pump Performance Test
6.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the
resident inspecticn staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy
and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.
The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where
applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use,
that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and
maintenance results were adequate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
AE0D Diagnostic Evaluation Observations (37702, 35702, 40700)
During the first two weeks in Decenher, an 18 member AE00 team evaluated
the McGuire facility and Duke corporate support to the station.
On
January 22, a meeting was held in the Duke corporate offices during which
the AE0D team management relayed to the licensee the results of the
evaluation.
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The tean observed a number of strengths and identified some weaknesses in
the McGuire prog *ams,
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Program strengths observed by the team included:
Overall Corporate Leadership /0versight/ Involvement
Staff Technical Capabilities
Functional Area Technical Programs
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Programs For Improved Engineeri.ig Support
Organizational Climate / Culture / Attitude
Weaknesses identifieo by the team included:
Design Engineering Involvement at McGuire
QA Contributions to Enhancing Plant Safety Performance
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Specific Operations, Maintenance, and Testing Issues
Specific Management and Organizational Issues
The specifics of the evaluation will be documer.ted in a report to the
licensee.
8.
Natural Circulation Cooldown (25586)
During the inspection period, the licensee's actions to implement Generic
letter GL 81-21, Natural Circulation Cooldown were reviewed. This review
included the following documents:
Licensee response to GL 81-21, dated 1/20/82
NRC response'to licensee's letter of 1/20/82, dated 9/30/83
Employee Training & Qualification System Manual, Standards:
301.0 Rev 1 Operations Training and Qualifications Overview
302.1 Rev 3 Basic Operations Training Program
303.0 Rev 2 License Preparatory Reactor Operator Program
304.0 Rev 2 License Preparatory Senior Reactor Operator Program
306.0 Rev 2 Periodic Training Licensed Operator Requalification
310.0 Rev 0 Periodic Training SR0/R0 Certified Inspector
Requalification
312.0 Rev 2 Maintenance of an Active NRC License (R0/SRO)
Licensed Operator Requal Training Schedule, 1-86
Hot License Preparatory Clast 1087 Training Schedule
Licensed Operator Training Schedule, 1-86
Licensed Operator Requal Training Segments 87-1,-2,-3,-4
OP-MC-SA0-A09, dated 6/14/83, Instructor Simulator Exercise Guide
For Abnormal Procedure on Natural Circulation
OP-MC-SE0-E02, dated 10/16/84, instructor Simulator Exercise
Guide for Emergency iceration during Natural Circulation
Cooldown
OP-MC-SIM-T03, dated 11/27/84 Instructor Simulator Exercise Guide
for St. Luice Natural Circulation Cooldown Event
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OP-MC-SRT-R01, dated 1/4/85, NRC License Requalification Exercise
Guide Worksheets Segment 2 day 2
Personnel (SR0/RO) Training Records
OP-MC-TA-AM, dated 2/8/82, Accident Mitigation Lesson Plan
OP-MC-TA-PTS, dated 4/28/83, Reactor Material & Pressurized
Thermal Shock lesson Plan
OP-MC-EP-EP1, dated 8/14/84, Emergency Procedure 1 (SI,
NC SIT) Lesson Plan
OP-GA-SPS-THF-HT, dated 2/29/84 Heat Transfer lesson Plan
OP-CN-THF-TI, dated 5/15/86, Heat Tran*fer Lesson Plan
EP/1/A/5000/1.1, dated 11/6/87, Naturt' Circulation Cooldown
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EP/2/A/5000/1.1, dated 6/6/86, Natural Circulation Cooldown
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EP/1/A/5000/16.3, dated 8/22/86, Response to Void in Reactor
Vessel
EP/2/A/5000/16.3, dated 6/6/86, Response to Void in Reactor
Vessel
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AP/1/A/5500/09, dated 12/3/84, Natural Circulation
Response to Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, Vol. 2, PGP
EPG ES-0.2, Rev. 2, Natural Circulation Cooldown
EPG FR-1,3, Rev. 1, Response to Void in Reactor Vesse'
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The inspectors determined from their review of the training program, that
classroom and simulator training on natural circulation cooldown is
included in R0 and SR0 certification training and in the operator
retraining program. The inspectors also noted that this training includes
other power reactor operating events.
Additionally, Emergency ~ rocedures (EP) procedures were reviewed to ensure
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they followed the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Guidelines with respect-
to step content, addition of specific plant parameters, cooldown rates,
subcooling temperatures, temperature limitations, and documentation of
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step deviations. The inspectors determined from their review of the EP
that the licensee had implemented the requirements to GL 81-21.
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Three examples of procedural deficiencies were noted during the review.
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Step 13 of EP/1/A/5000/1.1 (Initiate NC System Depressurization) had
substeps b and c reversed.
This would cause the operator to establish a
100 degree subcooling margin and then reduce the margin to a 50 degree
subcooling margin.
This is not the intent of these steps. The licensee
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indicated that they had previously identified this discrepancy.
Ste
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of EP/1/A/5000/16.3 and EP/2/A/5000/16.3 (Charging Flow Established) p 2b
does
not contain the IF NOT, THEN statement which would direct the operator to
a
establish excess letdown and skip the next step if charging cannot be
established.
Step 14 of EP/1/A/5000/16.3 ard EP/2/A/5000/16.3 (Prepare
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Containment for Reactor Vessel Venting) does at contain the Action /
Expected Response substep for checking the Containment Hydrogen concentra-
tion less then 6 %.
The incorporation of these changes into the
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procedures will be tracked as an inspector followup item (50-369/370-
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87-43-01) and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection,
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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
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9.
Unit 1 Reactor Trip of December 28, 1987
Unit 1 tripped at 1:22 p.m. on December 28, 1987 due to a false Low-Low
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level in B steam generator.
Instrumentation and Electrical (IAE)
tc:hnicians had been performing calibration testing on channel II of
narrow range 8 steam generator level instrumentation. During the test it
was determined that an adjustment to the channel's lead-lag (MCM
circuit was
required.
The electrical schematic drawing for channel II
1399.03-
0368 001) incorrectly identified the channel II lead-lag card as being
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located in the channel IV cabinet. The IAE personnel questioned this
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arrangement, but proceeded with the adjustment.
In actuality, the card in
the channel IV cabinet was a channel IV component.
When the adjustment
was made, the 2 of 4 logic for the unit trip on low-Low steam generator
level was satisfied (channel II was in a tripped condition) and the
reactor tripped.
After the trip the IAE technicians realized the error
and informed Operations (OPS) of the cause of the trip.
The correct
lead-lag card was subsequently located in the channel 11 cabinet therefore
verifying the error on the drawing.
The licensee has determined that the
drawing error occurred when the drawing was revised for a Nuclear Station
Modification to add the lead-lag circuit.
The same error existed on the
corresponding drawing for Unit 2.
The drawing errors constitute a viola-
tion for inadequate procedures.
During the restart effort on December 24, an additional trip occurred
during the source range detector calibration. At approximately 10:14 p.m.
IAE and OPS personnel were conducting pre-startup testing on Nuclear
Instrumentation (NI) channel N-31 and the Manual Reactor Trip systems
simultaneously.
Operations personnel racked in and closed the B Train
Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker which gave a train B General Warning signal on
the Solid State Protection System (SSPS).
When IAE personnel completed
testing on NI channel N-31 their procedurc PT/0A/4600/14C, Nuclear
Instrumentation System Source Range Functional Test, required that a check
be made to verify that General Warning lamps are not lit on SSPS trains A
or B prior to positioning the train A Multiplexer Test Switch from A + 6
to NORMAL.
In doing so, the switch must pass through the INHIBIT
position, momentarily generating a General Warning.
Two simultaneous
General Warning signals will generate a trip signal.
The IAE technician
determined that a train B General Warning was present due to OPS testing
but believed that rotating the switch quickly through the INHIBIT position
would not generate an A train General Warning.
This was based on their
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experience that rotating the switch quickly would not illuminate the
General Waraing light.
The train A Multiplexer Test Switch was rotated
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rapidly enough not to illuminate the General Warning lamp, but tne general
warning circuitry still generated a Reactor Trip Signal.
This constitutes
a violation for failure to follow a procedure.
These two examples, incorrect drawings and failure to follow a procedure
collectively constitute a violation.
This is Violation 369/87-43-02.
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