ML18017B271

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Interim Deficiency Rept Re 800903 Discovery of Unclear & Incorrect Weld Symbols on Bergen-Patterson Seismic Class 1 Pipe Hanger Drawings.Caused by Design Drawings Reaching Field W/O Corrections.Corrections Will Be Made by 810501
ML18017B271
Person / Time
Site: Harris  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/03/1980
From: Chiangi N
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8011070413
Download: ML18017B271 (10)


Text

REGULATOR NFORMATION DISTRIBUTION S EM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8011070413 DOC DATE! 80/11/03 NOTARIZED: NO DO ¹ FACIL:50 400 Shearon Herr is Nuclear

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Power Planti Planti Unit Unit ii Carolina 2i Carolina 500040 50-001 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power 05000401 50-402 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit 3r Carolina 05000402 50 403 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti Unit 4i Carolina 05000403 AUTH INANE AUTHOR AFFILIATION CHIANGIiN.J~ Carolina Power L Light Co.

REC IP,NAME RKC IP IENT AFFILIATION O'REILLY'S J.P ~ Region 2i Atlantean Office of the Director

SUBJECT:

Interim deficiency rept re 800903 discovery of unclear 8 incorrect weld symbols on Bergen-Patterson seismic Class hanger drawings, Caused by design drawings reaching 1.'ipe field w/o corrections'orrections will be made by 810S01 ~

DISTRIBUTION CODE: 8019S COPIES RKCEIYED:LTR ~ ENCL. SIZE o TITLE; Construction Deficiency Report (10CFR50 ~ 55E)

NOTES:

REC IP IENT COPIES RECIPIENT> COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ACTION: A/D LICENSNG 00 1 YOUNGBLOODiB 05 1 1 RUSHBROOKiM ~ 06 1 1 ll'fILSONiJERRY 07 1 1 INTERNAL: AD/RCI/IE 17 "

1 1 AEOD 18 1 1 ASLBP/JeHARD 1 1 D/DIR HUM FAC15 1 1 EDO 8 STAFF 19 1 1 EQUIP QUAL BR11 1 1 HYD/GEO BR 22 1 1 ICE 09 1 LIC QUAL BR 12 1 1 MPA 20 1 1 NRC PDR 02 1 OKLD 21 1 REY 13 QA" BR 14 PR C EG 01 1

1 1

1

'. RUTHERFORDIUMIE 1 1

1 1

STANDRDS DEY 21 1 1 EXTERNAL; ACRS 16 16 16 LPDR 03 NSIC 08 1 1 NOV Z tt?980 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 39 ENCL 39

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FORM 21-SOM Carolina Povser & Light Company RaIeigh, N. C. 27602 File: SH N-2/18 I!>~

Item 48 03 g%)

~C November 3, 1980 +O Mr. James P. O'Reilly QD United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission IM Region II ccB 101 >Iarietta Street, Northwest Atlanta, Georgia 30303 SIIEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1, 2, 3 AND 4 DOCKET NOS. 50-400, 50-401, 50-402 AND 50-403 WELD SYIIBOL ERRORS AND MISAPPLICATION OF HELD ON BERGEN-PATTERSON PIPE HANGERS

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with 10CFR50.55(e), the Region II office (Mr. R. McFarland) was officially notified of the subject deficiency as being "potentially reportable" on September 8, 1980. On October 7, 1980, the Region II office (Mr. J. K.

Rausch) was officially notified that the subject deficiency was considered reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e). The intent of this letter is to inform you that due to the extensive nature of the problem, all investi-gation/corrective action on the sub)ect deficiency has not yet been completed.

Attached is an interim report which describes the problem and corrective action taken to date. It is expected that all corrective action will be completed by May 1, 1981, at which time the final 10CFR50.55(e) report will be submitted.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me.

NJC/mt (970121) Yours very truly, Attachment Original Signa~ BJJ cc: Mr. V. Stello (2) W/A~

Mr. G. ~lamell H/A N. i. Chiangi N. J. Chiangi Hanager Engineering 6 Construction Quality Assurance lt 110<'0 /I~

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0 CAROLINA POWER I% LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. 1 WELD SYMBOL ERRORS AND MISAPPLICATION OF WELD ON BERGEN-PATTERSON PIPE HANGERS INTERIM REPORT OCTOBER 28, 1980 PREPARED BY:

CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT .COMPANY

INTRODUCTION Seismic Class I Bergen-Patterson pipe hangers are detailed on design drawings which specify location, geometry, and joint welding requirements. Welding processes, filler, metal, etc. are described in procedure tlP "General Welding Procedure for Structural Steel (Seismic and Non-Seismic) and Hangers";

and weld inspection requirements are specified in Site Specification No. 034-

"Nondestructive Examination, Visual Inspection, and Testing Requirements for Code Class 1, 2, 3, Balance-of-Plant Piping Systems, Seismic and Non-Seismic Structures for Permanent Plant Construction".

Work Procedure WP-110 "Xnstallation of Safety Related or Seismic Class I Pipe Hangers" provides instruction to the craft regarding the installation of the pipe hangers.

Meld types most often used in the installation of pipe hangers are the fillet weld and the flare-bevel weld. Occasionally, a full-penetration groove weld is used.

DESCRIPTION On September 3, 1980, the Resident NRC Inspector identified a problem with unclear and incorrect weld symbols on Bergen-Patterson Seismic Class I pipe hanger drawings. Also, field inspection by the Resident NRC Inspector identified cases where the welds actually applied on the pipe hangers differed from that required by the design drawing; (i.e. over-welding, and over-sized fillets).

The problems identified above prompted an investigation of other pipe hanger drawings and reinspection of selected completed pipe hangers. Approximately 1,000 pipe hanger drawings whose installation was complete and 170 pipe, hanger drawings which were in the process of installation were reviewed.

Twenty hanger drawings were identified that had incorrect weld symbols. Seven hanger drawings were identified that had unclear weld symbols. Due to the recently identified problem of failing to weld full penetration welds when called for, the pipe hanger drawings which required full penetration welds were also identified. Ten such drawings were found. However, of these ten, seven were later declared to be shop welds rather than field welds. This was determined during a reinspection of these thirty-seven hangers by QA inspectors.

The QA inspectors r einspected the above thirty-seven pipe hangers plus an additional randomly selected seVenty-seven .pipe hangers in order to investigate .

the misapplication of weld. Results of their reinspection reveal: welds larger and smaller than required; fillet welds applied where 'full penetrations are required; no evidence of burn through on the back side of other full penetration welds thereby making them questionable; welding more sides and fewer sides than required.

t t SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Those hangers welded with smaller fillets and less sides welded than specified (under-welding) pose a potential safety concern. 'The fact that QA Inspectors had passed these welds as acceptable will require 'that other completed welds be reinspected. All hangers determined to have under-sized fillets and under-welding will have to be rewelded. Rewelding may be necessar,'y in order to restore design margins. Those hangers welded on more sides than specified pose a potential safety concern. Some hangers require flexibi3.ity at specific joints in order to not transmit large moment loads. Flexibility is obtained by not welding on certain sides of the joint. Those hangers identified as having flexible joints will have to be reworked. This item is considered re-portable due to design errors by Bergen-Patterson, failure to correctly trans-late design requirements by the field personnel, and failure of QA to trans-late design requirements to insure proper construction.

CORRECTIVE ACTION The cause of the problem is three-fo3.d. l) Design documents that are incor-rect or unclear are being provided by the vendor and, passing through all checking stages, are allowed to go to the field uncorrected.~2) Field person-nel failed to weld the pipe hangers in accordance with the design drawings. 3)

QA failed to insure that the proper welds were applied.

The welding unit is now reviewing hanger design drawings for missing, unclear, and incorrect weld symbols prior to issuance to the field. Those drawings with problems are returned to the mechanical unit who returns them to the vend-or for correction by way of pipe hanger problem memos (PHPs).

Weld symbol identification training classes were conducted. Superintendents, general foremen, foremen, and welders of pipe and pipe hangers attended. Also, construction inspectors, QA inspectors, and mechanical unit personnel involved with pipe hangers attended the classes. In addition to instruction on weld sym-bol identification, emphasis was given on the importance of welding the pipe hanger exactly as the design drawing requires. In those instances where this is not possible, the hanger drawing'is to be returned to the mechanical unit.

We are confident this emphasis will decrease the problems found in the field with welding. If trend analysis indicate otherwise, we will take additional corrective action. Current trend following training is positive.

In addition to attending the classes referenced above, QA personnel also attend-ed similar classes given within the.QA organization. This was done in order that they may be better able to know when the proper welds have been applied.

Ebasco discussed the weld symbol problems with Bergen and Bergen agreed to re-vise procedures to assure that design drawings include proper weld symbols.

Bergen identified the problems .to their personnel. All drawings being issued from Bergen's three design offices are now routed through the Hempstead office to provide more consistent review by Bergen engineer-ing personnel.

FCR-H-258 has been conditionally approved by Ebasco to allow fillet welds to be 1/8 inch greater than design and to allow a 1/4 inch fillet rein-forcement weld on bevel welds. The FCR also requested, but Ebasco did not approve, overwelding of a joint. This is due to certain joints re-quiring flexibility t so as to not impar large moment loads to the embed plates. Ebasco provided us with a list of the hangers with this require-ment. Me will reinspect the hangers to assure compliance with the draw-ings. FCR-H-272 has been written requesting approval of over-welding for those hangers which do not have flexibility requirements.

Due to the underwelding and small fillet welds found in QA's reinspection of 114 pipe hangers. One hundred percent (100(<) reinspection of pipe hang-ers previously completed will be necessary to verify the actual work. This reinspection began October 16,. 1980. As of October 28, 1980, 78/ (102 of 131) of the installed hangers inspected by QA have been found to be re-jectable. A hanger will be rejected for the following reasons:

1. Drawing Problems
a. Unclear symbols
b. missing symbols
c. incorrect symbols
2. Morkmanship Problems
a. missing welder's symbols g slag
b. oversize welds (greater than 1/8") h. porosity portedd c. undersized welds i. undercut
d. weld type applied not the same as drawing j ~ ~ overlap
e. overweld k. arc strikes f . missing welds , l. weld splatter The problems identified by QA will be resolved. Drawing errors will be re-to Ebasco by pipe hanger memos (PHPs). Nor kmanship errors will be corrected by field rework or will be accepted to "use-as-is" by permanent waivers. Any rework done to any hanger will be reinspected for drawing com-pliance.

>le expect that our corrective action of 100/. hanger reinspection will be com-pleted by March 1, 1981. Rework, reinspection of rework, and resolution of PHPs, PMs, and FCRs will be necessar y befor e total, completion of this effort can be claimed. With 78jo rejection rate, much rework and evaluation will be necessary. Expected overall completion date is Hay 1, 1981.