ML18016A811

LER 99-002-00:on 990114,RT Due to Not Removing Temporary Device from Relay Following Calibration Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Counseled Personnel Involved in Event.With 990212 Ltr

ML18016A811
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	02/12/1999
From:	Brooke Clark, Ellington M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-99-016, HNP-99-16, LER-99-002, LER-99-2, NUDOCS 9902190035
Download: ML18016A811 (8)

Text

CATEGORY REGUL T RY INFORMATION DISTRIBUT 0 SYSTEM (RIDS) 4 ACCESSION NBR:9902190035 'DOC.DATE: 99/02/12 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH.,NAME . AUTHOR AFFILIATION ELLINGTON,M. Carolina Power & Light Co.

CLARK,B.H. Carolina Power &, Light Co.

.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 99-002-00:on 990114,RT due to not removing temporary device from relay following calibration was noted. Caused by human error. Counseled personnel involved in event. With 990212 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 'NCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc..

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed.. 0500040(Q RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID COD%/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 FLANDERS,S 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 A JD~BQ~ 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 ILE CE ER 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOHB 1 1 ~/DRY QMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD NOAC POORE,W.

NRC PDR 1

1 1

1 1

1 LITCO BRYCE, J H NOAC QUEENER,DS NUDOCS FULL TXT 1

1 l.'

1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION-LZSTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROZ DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 19 ENCL 19

Carolina Power & light Company Harris Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-99-016'0CFR50.73 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1999-002-00 Sir or Madam:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. The report describes a reactor trip caused by human performance during a maintenance activity.

Sincerely, B.H. Clark General Manager Harris Plant CWF Enclosure Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)

Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)

Mr. S. C. Flanders (NRC - NRR Project Manager) 9902k'F0035 990212 PDR ADGCK 05000400 8 PDR 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill NC

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

~ Document Control Desk / HNP-99-016 Page 2 of 2 bcc: Ms. D. B. Alexander Mr. G. E. Attarian Mr. R. H. Bazemore Mr. T. C. Bell Mrs. P. P. Burns Mr. H. K. Chernoff (RNP)

Mr. B. H. Clark Mr. W. F. Conway Mr. J. M. Curley Mr. G. W. Davis Mr. W. J. Dorman (BNP)

Mr. R. J. Field Ms. J. P. Gawron (BNP)

Mr. K. N. Harris Ms. L. N. Hartz Mr. J. D. Henderson Mr. W. J. Hindman Mr. C. S. Hinnant INPO Mr. W. D. Johnson Mr. M. B. Keef Mr. G. J. Kline Ms. W. C. Langston Mr. R. D. Martin Mr. J. W. McKay Mr. R. O. Moore .

Mr. T. C. Morton Mr. P. M. Odom (RNP)

Mr. P. M. Sawyer (BNP)

Mr. J. Scarola Mr. F. E. Strehle Mr. J. M. Taylor Harris Licensing File(s)

Nuclear Records

APPRO MB NO. 3150.0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information I6.1998) collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Information and Records Management Branch (T+

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555400).

and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. It an information collection does not (See reverse for required number of display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or digits/characters for each block) sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITYNAME l1) DOCKET NUMBER I2) PAGE I3) 1 OF 3 Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 TITLE t4)

Reactor trip due to not removing a temporary device from a relay following calibration.

SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FAGILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER 01 14 1999 1999 002' 00 02 1 2 1 999 FAcILITYNAME 05000 OPERATING MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2) (v) 50.73(a)(2l(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 100 20.2203(el(1) 20.2203(a) (3)(il 50.73(a) (2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a) (2)(i) 20.2203(a) (3)(ii) 50.73(e) (2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(iil 20.2203(e)(4) X 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) Specify in Abstract below 5

20 2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(e)(2)(vii) or in NRC Form 366A

20. 2203(e) (2) (iv)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBEA IInctude Area Code)

Mark Ellington, Senior Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2057 COIVIPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13l COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM To EPIX To EPIX EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES X No (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 09:18 on January 14, 1999, with the unit at 100% power, personnel performing a relay calibration failed to remove a temporary blocking device prior to reinstalling the relay. This blocking device simulated a continuous trip signal. on the output of the undervoltage timing relay; therefore, reinstalling the relay simulated an undervoltage trip. signaI to the associated bus. Loads powered from this bus included one of the plant's three Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) and the feeder breaker for another bus, which also powered one Reactor Coolant Pump. This loss of power to two of the plant's three RCPs (while above 10% power) satisfied the logic for an automatic reactor trip. Safety systems functioned as required, including the automatic start of the three auxiliary feedwater pumps.

Although the procedure for performing the calibration activity directed the technicians to remove the blocking device, the individuals failed to do so. The root cause of this event is human error attributed to the way the technicians were using the procedure (i.e., although one of the technicians had a copy of the procedure in his hand, the technicians were performing some steps from memory). Corrective actions taken have been: 1) Counseled the personnel involved in this event, including their supervision; 2) Conducted a stand-down meeting for site personnel on this and other recent human performance events, and; 3) Created a high-visibility device to be used as a blocking device when calibrating relays. Planned corrective actions include: 1) Revision of the applicable procedure (PIC-E070) to provide more specific guidance on steps applicable to these types of relays.

NRC FORM 366 I6.1998)

NRC FORM 366A U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I6.98)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITYNAME I1) DOCKET LER NUMBER IB) PAGE I3)

Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 2 OF 3 1999 002 00 TEXT iffmore space is rerioired, trse additional copies of NRC Form 366A) I17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT At approximately 09:18 on January 14, 1999, personnel performing a relay calibration failed to remove a temporary blocking device prior to reinstalling the relay, which caused an automatic reactor trip from 100% power. The type of relay was a timing relay (EIIS: RLY 62; General Electric 12SAM11B22A) for a 6.9kV Auxiliary Bus unde)voltage trip circuit. If left in place, the blocking device simulates a continuous trip signal on the output of the undervoltage timing relay; therefore, reinstalling the relay simulated an undervoltage trip signal to the associated bus. Loads powered from this bus include one of the plant's three Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs), the 1A.-NNS Reactor Coolant Pump.

Another of the toads on the bus was a feeder breaker for a separate 6.9kv bus, which powered another Reactor Coolant Pump. This loss of power to two of the plant's three RCPs (while above 10% power) satisfied the logic for an automatic reactor trip due to an undervoltage signal on two of the three RCP buses. Safety systems functioned as required. In addition to the reactor trip, an automatic start of the three auxiliary feedwater pumps occurred (i.e., an Engineering Safety Features actuation signal). This actuation is an expected response following a trip from full power.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT The root cause of this event is human error attributed to the way the technicians were using the procedure. The procedure for performing the calibration activity (PIC-E070) directed the technicians to remove the blocking device; however, the individuals failed to do so. Although one of the technicians had a copy of the procedure in his hand, the technicians were performing some steps from memory. They were aware that the device needed to be removed, but forgot to do so. Contributing causes were: overconfidence on the part of the technicians; blocking device not being constructed of a highly-visible material, and; the lack of specific procedure guidance regarding which steps were applicable to the specific type of relay.

III. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE This event resulted in a loss of forced circulation in two of the three RCS loops. This occurrence resulted in a decreased margin to safety, from a Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) perspective; however, the margin was not reduced to the design limit. The plant was maintained within its design basis for the postulated loss of flow scenarios.

Section 15.3 of the Harris Final Safety Analysis Report includes analyses for partial loss of RCS flow events. The plant safety systems responded as required. There was no degradation in the protection of the public health and safety.

This event did not result in any radiological release.

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)( iv) for an unplanned Reactor Protection System and Engineering Safety Features (RPS/ESF) actuation.

NRC FORM 366)6.98)

~0 NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6.96)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 3 OF 3 1999 002 00 TEXT Ilfmore space Is reriulred, use addiu'onal copies of NRC Form 3864J (17)

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Completed corrective actions:

1. Counseled the personnel involved in this event, including their supervision;

2. Conducted a stand-down meeting for site personnel on this and other recent human performance events, and;

3. Created a high-visibility device to be used as a blocking device when calibrating relays.

Planned corrective actions include:

1. Revision of the applicable procedure (PIC-E070) to provide more specific guidance on steps applicable to these types of relays.

V. SIMILAR EVENTS A search of the Harris corrective action program data base and a separate industry event search has yielded no similar occurrences dealing with failure to remove relay blocking devices.

NRC FORM 366A (6-98)