ML18016A826

LER 99-003-00:on 990123,noted That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to Isolation of Fire Protection Containment Sprinkler Sys.Caused by Human Error.Restored Containment Sprinkler Sys to Operable Status.With 990222 Ltr

ML18016A826
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	02/22/1999
From:	Brooke Clark, Ellington M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-99-030, HNP-99-30, LER-99-003, LER-99-3, NUDOCS 9902260069
Download: ML18016A826 (5)

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REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9902260069 DOC.DATE: 99/02/22 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH.NPPIE . AUTHOR AFFILIATION ELLINGTON,M. Carolina Power E Light Co.

CLARK,B.H. Carolina Power S Light Co.

RECXP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 99-003-00:on 990123,noted that plant was outside design basis due to isolation of fire protection containment sprinkler sys.Caused by human error. Restored containment sprinkler sys to operable status. With 990222 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED: LTR i TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc..

ENCL 1 SIZE E

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 0500040(P RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ~

ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL XD CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 FLANDERS,S 1 1 Y

INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 AEOD SPD RAB 2 2 AEOD/S PD/RRAB 1 1 FILE ANTE 1. 1 NRR/DRCH/HOHB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,Z H 1 1 D NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 0 NOTE'TO. ALL NRIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTZON LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER'F COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR ,

19 ENCL 19

Carolina Power 8 Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 FEB 22 1999 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-99-030 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk . 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 1999-003-00 Sir or Madam:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report describes a condition outside the design basis due to isolating the fire protection containment sprinkler system.

Sincerely, B.H. Clark General Manager

. Harris Plant MSE/mse Enclosure Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)

Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)

Mr. S. C. Flanders (NRC - NRR Project Manager) 9902260069 990222 PDR *DOCK 05000400 S PDR /pe~

5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill NC

APPROVED OMB No. 3150.0104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Estimated burden per resporee to comply viith this mandatory Information (6.1998) collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Information and Records Management Branch (T4 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) F33), U.S. Nuolear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 205554001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (31504104), Ofrroe of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not (Soo reverse for roquirod number of display a cunently v'alid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or digits/characters for each block) sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

FACILITYNAME ill DOCKET NUMBER I2I PAGE (3) 1 OF 3 Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 TITLE t4)

Plant outside the design basis due to isolation of the fire protection containment sprinkler system.

SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITYNAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 01 23 1999 1999 - 003' 00 02 22 1 999 FAGILITYNAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING MODE (9) 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a) (2)(v) 50.73(a)(2) (i) 50.73(a)(2) (viii)

POWER 82 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3) (il x 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2) (i) 20.2203(a)(3) (iil 50.73(a) (2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a) (2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2) (iv) OTHER 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a) (2)(v) Specify in Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2) (viil or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(al(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2)

TELEPHONE NVMBEA Bnoerde Ares Code)

Mark Ellington, Senior Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2057 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 13)

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE To EPIX To EPIX EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES NO (It yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

II At approximately 0230 on January 23, 1999, with the unit at 82% power, plant'personnel isolated the containment fire protection sprinkler system. Following isolation, the containment sprinkler system was inadvertently left inoperable for approximately four and a half days. The Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) safe shutdown analysis credits the containment sprinkler system to provide protection (in lieu of a fire barrier or the required distance for separation criteria) for the pressurizer heaters. The inoperability of the containment sprinkler system for an extended duration placed the plant in a condition outside the design basis.

The root cause of this event is human error by Operations personnel in that applicable plant procedures were not used to operate the containment sprinkler system. Contributing causes include: (1) Improper communications between watch stations (2) Procedure non-compliance (3) Inadequate training (4) Inadequate management oversight of the fire protection program. Completed Corrective Actions: (1) The containment sprinkler system has been restored to operable status.

(2) Interim measures have been established to heighten sensitivity to fire protection equipment inoperabilities and fire protection procedure usage. (3) Operations personnel involved were counseled. Planned corrective actions (1) Re-emphasize the expectations for Operations supervision and personnel that performance of, and adherence to, fire protection system procedures is to be commensurate with procedure performance and adherence expected for other plant systems. (2)

Perform training for appropriate plant personnel on proper operation of applicable fire protection components. (3) Complete a high level investigation into the inadequate management oversight of the fire protection program.

NRC FORM 366 la-1888I

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (B.BB)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (B) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 YEAR ~

NUMBER NUMBER 2 OF 3 1999 003 00 TEXT fifmoro space is required, use eddfdonal coplos of NRC Form 366AJ (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT At approximately 0230 on January 23, 1999, with the unit at 82% power, plant personnel isolated the containment fire protection sprinkler system. Following isolation, the containment sprinkler system was inadvertently left inoperable for approximately four and a half days. The Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) safe shutdown analysis credits the containment sprinkler system to provide protection (in lieu of a fire barrier or the required distance for separation criteria) for the pressurizer heaters. The inoperability of the containment sprinkler system for an extended duration placed the plant in a condition outside the design basis; The HNP containment sprinkler system is a multi-action system that uses a fire detection system to automatically open a sprinkler header isolation valve (deluge valve). The open deluge valve fills the sprinkler header with water. The sprinkler system does not emit water until the sprinkler nozzle head fusible link is melted by a fire. The HNP containment sprinkler system has a backup mode of operation, called the low pressure mode, that allows continued operability of the containment sprinkler system should the containment fire detection system become inoperable. The low pressure mode of operation monitors air pressure in the containment sprinkler header. The containment sprinkler header is normally pressurized to 20 - 25 psig by a small air compressor connected to the sprinkler system piping. During operation of the containment sprinkler system in the low pressure mode, if a fire should melt a sprinkler head fusible link in containment, the air pressure in the sprinkler header would be reduced below a preset limit which would in turn open the containment sprinkler header deluge valve.

At 2219, on January 22, 1999, HNP received an erroneous fire detection system alarm in containment which actuated the containment sprinkler system deluge valve. There was no fire in containment therefore the sprinkler heads did not melt and water was not emitted from the containment sprinkler system. Shift personnel, entered containment and verified that there was no fire. Shift personnel isolated the sprinkler system until Maintenance could repair the containment fire detection system. A fire protection specialist recommended to the main control room that the containment sprinkler system be drained and placed in the low pressure. The main control room directed the containment sprinkler system be drained and placed in the low pressure mode. The fire protection specialist attempted to place the sprinkler system in the low pressure mode but left the containment sprinkler header isolated until Maintenance on the fire detection system could be completed.

The action to isolate the containment sprinkler system was unnecessary because maintenance on the fire detection system would not impact sprinkler operation in the low pressure mode. Additionally, the fire protection specialist only partially drained the fire protection header. The containment sprinkler system contains a check valve located inside containment close to the containment wall. The fire protection specialist drained the containment sprinkler system from outside containment and did not drain water downstream of the check valve. A fire inside containment would melt the applicable sprinkler head but would not release air pressure in the sprinkler header upstream of the check valve and thus actuate the deluge valve. Leaving water in the system disabled the low pressure mode of operation and prevented the containment sprinkler system from being capable of performing its required function. The fire protection specialist informed the main control room that the containment sprinkler system was in the low pressure mode with the sprinkler system isolated. The maintenance on the fire detection system was stopped but the system was left isolated. At approximately 2100 on January 24, 1999, an auxiliary operator discovered the sprinkler system isolated and reported this information to the main control room. At approximately 2343 on January 24, 1999, the sprinkler system was unisolated. On January 25, 1999, the fire protection specialist and the fire protection engineer discussed placing the containment sprinkler system in the low pressure mode. The fire protection engineer questioned the method of draining the containment sprinkler header given the check valve located inside containment. At approximately 1230 on January 27, 1999, the remainder of the sprinkler header inside containment was drained. On February 4, 1999; the fire protection engineer, after consulting with the manufacturer, determined that the containment sprinkler system would not have operated in the low pressure mode with the sprinkler header inside containment filled with water. As a result, the containment sprinkler system was inoperable from 0230 on January 23, 1999 to 1230 on January 27, 1999.

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (6.98)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITYNAME (1) DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION Harris Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000400 YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 3 OF 3 1999 003 00 TEXT (Ifmore spece Is reqofred, use eddf donaf cop)os of ifRC Form 386f(f (17)

II CAUSE OF EVENT The root cause of this event is human error by Operations personnel in that applicable plant procedures were not used to operate the containment sprinkler system. Contributing causes Include: (1) Improper communications between watch stations (2) Procedure non-compliance (3) Inadequate training (4) Inadequate management oversight of the fire protection program.

III. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE The containment sprinkler system was inoperable for approximately four and half days. In the event of a fire in containment, the pressurizer heaters may not have been available for HNP to achieve and maintain safe shutdown.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Completed Corrective Actions:

(1) The containment sprinkler system has been restored to operable status. (2) Interim measures have been established to heighten sensitivity to fire protection equipment inoperabilities and fire protection procedure usage. (3) Operations personnel involved were counseled.

Planned Corrective Actions:

(1) Re-emphasize the expectations for Operations supervision and personnel that performance of, and adherence to, fire protection system procedures is to be commensurate with procedure performance and adherence expected for other plant systems. (2) Perform training for appropriate plant personnel on proper operation of applicable fire protection components. (3) Complete a high level investigation into the inadequate management oversight of the fire protection program.

V. SIMILAR EVENTS HNP has previously reported outside design basis conditions in Fire Protection due to not maintaining separation criteria.

These previous reportabie events were caused by design or construction deficiencies rather than mal-operation.

NRC FORM 366A (6-96)