IR 05000348/2011012

07/12/2011-Summary of Public Meeting with Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, to Discuss Safety Significance of Preliminary White Finding Associated with One Apparent Violation Documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000348-11-012 and 05000364-11

ML111960460
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	07/15/2011
From:	Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To:	Stinson L Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-11-012
Download: ML111960460 (46)

Text

uly 15, 2011

SUBJECT:

PUBLIC MEETING SUMMARY - JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

Dear Mr. Stinson:

This refers to the Regulatory Conference conducted on July 12, 2011, in Atlanta, GA. The purpose of the Regulatory Conference was to provide opportunities to discuss the safety significance of the preliminary White finding associated with one Apparent Violation that was documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000348/2011012 and 364/2011012 (ML111590912).

The findings dealt with the failure to maintain the configuration of the 1A reactor coolant pump (RCP) oil lift pump system in accordance with plant design and drawings. This resulted in an electrical short on November 10, 2010 that caused a fire on the Unit 1 main control room (MCR)

1A RCP board handswitch. This conference also addressed whether enforcement action is warranted for the associated Apparent Violation.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this meeting, please contact me at (404) 997-4521.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-348, 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees 2. NRC Agenda 3. SNC Powerpoint Presentation

REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 Enclosure 1 FARLEY REGULATORY CONFERENCE Atlanta, GA July 12, 2011 Name (Print)

_____________J. Munday_____________

_____________R. Nease ______________

_____________G. McCoy______________

_____________L. Suggs ______________

_____________R. Fanner______________

_____________G. Wiseman____________

_____________D. Chung______________

_____________E. Crowe______________

_____________W. Rogers_____________

_____________W. Jones______________

_____________R. Croteau_____________

_____________L. Wert________________

_____________S. Sparks______________

_____________S. Shaeffer____________

_____________S. Rose_______________

_____________T. Lighty______________

Title and Organization Division Director NRC RII/DRS

_Branch Chief NRC RII/DRS/EB2_______

_Branch Chief NRC RII/DRP/RPB5______

_Inspector NRC RII/DRS/EB2__________

_Inspector NRC RII/DRS/EB2__________

_Senior Inspector NRC RII/DRS/EB2____

NRC NRR/DRA/PRA Operational Support

_Senior Resident Farley NRC RII/DRP___

_SRA NRC RII/DRP/RPB7_____________

_Deputy Division Director NRC RII/DRP_

_Division Director NRC RII/DRP _______

Deputy Regional Administrator NRC RII_

Senior Enforcement Specialist NRC RII__

_Branch Chief NRC RII/DRP/RPB2______

Sr. Project Engineer NRC RII/DRP/RPB2

_Project Engineer NRC RII/DRP/RPB2__

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 Enclosure 1 FARLEY REGULATORY CONFERENCE Atlanta, GA July 12, 2011 (Via Teleconference)

Name (Print)

_____________M. Ashley___________________

_____________S. Meng Wong_______________

_____________A. Klein_____________________

_____________S. Lee______________________

_____________J. Hyslop___________________

_____________N. Coleman_________________

_____________J. Circle____________________

_____________R. Gallucci__________________

_____________B. Martin___________________

_____________D. Harrison_________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

________________________________________

Title and Organization NRC HQ/NRR

_NRC HQ/DRA____________________________

_NRC HQ/DRA/AFPB______________________

_NRC HQ/DRA____________________________

_NRC HQ/DRA/FRB_______________________

_NRC HQ/OE_____________________________

_NRC HQ/NRR/DRA/APOB_________________

_NRC HQ/NRR/DRA/APLA__________________

_NRC HQ/NRR/DORL______________________

_NRC HQ/DRA____________________________

_________________________________________

_________________________________________

_________________________________________

_________________________________________

_________________________________________

_________________________________________

Enclosure 1

Enclosure 2 2 Enclosure 2 REGULATORY CONFERENCE AGENDASOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANYJULY 12, 2011NRC REGION II, ATLANTA, GEORGIAI.OPENING REMARKS AND INTRODUCTION II. NRC REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT POLICY III. STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND APPARENT VIOLATION IV. SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY V. TRANSITION TO CLOSED SESSION (If Required)a. PUBLIC QUESTIONSb. NRC REMARKS/BREAKc. SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANYVI. BREAK/NRC CAUCUS VII. NRC FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS VIII. CLOSING REMARKS IX. PUBLIC QUESTIONS (If Not Previously Performed)

Enclosure 3 Farley Nuclear Plant NRC Regulatory Conference July 12, 2011Mark J Ajluni, PE Nuclear Licensing DirectorJohn D Lattner, PEPrincipal Engineer -Fire ProtectionKen McElroy RIE Program Manager 2 Enclosure 3 Agenda*Introductions

• Objectives

• Presentation

• Wrap-Up and Conclusion 3 Enclosure 3 Objectives 1.To provide new information about the event2.To prove the handswitch fire that occurred on Nov. 10, 2010, in the Unit 1 control room was a non-challengingfire per the guidance of NUREG/CR 68503.To demonstrate that the event is not risk significantand should be characterized as green 4 Enclosure 3 The Event*Calibration of 1A RCP oil lift system

• Broken conduit found

• Repairs made under PM processes versus CM

• Operators later attempted start of the 1A RCP and detected burning inside the handswitch

• Operator responded by opening panel and blowing on the switch box enclosure

• At the same time the circuit opened and the burning stopped 5 Enclosure 3

6 Enclosure 3 Handswitch InternalsSpade TerminalsSpade Terminal RegionContacts Normally Open 7 Enclosure 3 Handswitch in Closed PositionContacts Closed 8 Enclosure 3 Handswitch Spring Returns to OpenArcing 9 Enclosure 3 Handswitch Damage 10 Enclosure 3 Testing ResultsBecause we are dealing with a specific wiring arrangement and switch all seven SNC tests of handswitch fault indicate the same location for damage and the repeatable nature of failure for this particular fault.

11 Enclosure 3 Handswitch Construction

• Fire resistive construction of switch block

• Does not melt or drip plastic

• Fire resistive construction of switch housing

• Objective of testing was to confirm how the switch responds to shorted conditions 12 Enclosure 3 Main Control Board Handswitch 13 Enclosure 3 Main Control Board Handswitch 14 Enclosure 3 Main Control Board Handswitch 15 Enclosure 3 Operator Intervention

• The operator action had no impact on putting out the fire *Switch is well placed in fire retardant enclosure making direct air flow to the point of combustion impossible*The Condition Report assumes what the operator initially believed at the time, that he blew out the fire*Switch will self-extinguish when current path becomes interrupted *Operator action was inconsequential, testing shows the fire will self-extinguish anyway 16 Enclosure 3 Main Control Board 17 Enclosure 3 No Potential for Fire Spread

• Handswitchfire self-extinguishes

• Confirmed by testing

• Handswitchfire not of sufficient duration or intensity to ignite secondary combustibles

• Test thermocouples

• CHRISTIFIRE test results

• Fire resistive properties of cables and handswitchmaterials*No hot gas layer formed within panel

• Conclusion: No potential for fire spread 18 Enclosure 3 NUREG/CR-6850 Appendix C Objective Classification CriteriaNUREG/CR-6850 Objective CriteriaFNP EventA hose stream, multiple portable fire extinguishers, and/or a fixed fire suppression system (either manually or automatically actuated) were used to suppress the fireNo automatic or manual suppression usedOne or more components outside the boundaries of the fire ignition source were affectedNo evidence of anycollateral damage outside of the fire ignition sourceCombustible materials outside the boundaries of thefire ignition source were ignitedNo ignition of secondary combustiblesIf any one of the following exist, the event is challenging 19 Enclosure 3 NUREG/CR-6850 Appendix C Objective Classification CriteriaNUREG/CR-6850 Objective CriteriaFNP EventActuation of an automatic detection system Event did notproduce sufficient smoke to actuate the main control room detection system. An ionization smoke detector is located on the ceiling directly behind Section C of the MCBA plant trip was experiencedEventdid not cause a plant trip. The unit was in cold shutdown.A reported loss of greater than $5,000Physical damage limited to the handswitch (< $1,000)A burning duration or suppression time of10 minutes or longerBurning duration was less than two minutesIf any two of the following exist, the event is challenging 20 Enclosure 3 NUREG/CR-6850 Appendix C Subjective Classification CriteriaNUREG/CR-6850 Subjective CriteriaFNP EventIt is apparent that active interventionwas needed to prevent potential spreadOperator blowingon the switch enclosure was insignificant intervention. Test data demonstrates the handswitchfire self-extinguishesThere are indications that heat was generated of sufficient intensity and duration to affect components outside the fire ignition sourceNo evidence of heat damageto any components outside of the fire ignition sourceThere are indications that flames or heat was generated of sufficientintensity and duration to cause the ignition of secondary combustibles outside the fire ignition sourceNo ignition of secondary combustiblesSubstantial smoke was generatedInsignificant amount of smoke If any of the following exist, the event is Challenging 21 Enclosure 3 NUREG/CR-6850 Appendix C Subjective Classification CriteriaNUREG/CR-6850 Subjective CriteriaFNP EventIt is apparent that active interventionwas needed to prevent potential spreadOperator blowingon the switch enclosure was insignificant intervention. Test data demonstrates the handswitchfire self-extinguishesThere are indications that heat was generated of sufficient intensity and duration to affect components outside the fire ignition sourceNo evidence of heat damageto any components outside of the fire ignition sourceThere are indications that flames or heat was generated of sufficientintensity and duration to cause the ignition of secondary combustibles outside the fire ignition sourceNo ignition of secondary combustiblesSubstantial smoke was generatedInsignificant amount of smoke If any of the following exist, the event is Challenging 22 Enclosure 3 NUREG/CR-6850 Appendix C Objective Classification CriteriaNUREG/CR-6850 Objective CriteriaFNP EventActuation of an automatic detection system Event did notproduce sufficient smoke to actuate the main control room detection system. An ionization smoke detector is located on the ceiling directly behind Section C of the MCBA plant trip was experiencedEventdid not cause a plant trip. The unit was in cold shutdown.A reported loss of greater than $5,000Physical damage limited to the handswitch (< $1,000)A burning duration or suppression time of10 minutes or longerBurning duration was less than two minutesIf any two of the following exist, the event is challenging 23 Enclosure 3 Non-Challenging Control Room Fires From Fire Events Database Involving InterventionFire IncidentNoDescriptionType of Intervention374SDV high level RPS relay burnedControl room personnel extinguishedthe burning relay425A relay burned due to its "old age"Portable CO 2extinguisherused815A relay burned up in the primary containment isolation panelPortable CO 2extinguisher used2224Defective insulation on windingsled to fault within current protection relayPortablefire extinguisher used2266Small fire found in control panel transformerOperator blew out flame 24 Enclosure 3 Conclusion: Non-Challenging

• None of the objective or subjective criteria was met*Event is non-challenging 25 Enclosure 3 SNC Risk Significance Determination 26 Enclosure 3 Fire Ignition ProbabilityWill Fire Propagate?Fire Severity FactorNon-Suppression ProbabilityShutdown outside MCRRisk Not Significant NoControl Room AbandonmentSDP FactorsHRA Dominated(Unit 2)Suppression before propagation to cable bundle Unit 1 MCR PanelUnit 2 27 Enclosure 3 Phase III SummaryFire IgnitionProbabilityPropagation ProbabilitySuppress before propagationto cable bundleMCR Abandonment ProbabilityShutdown outside MCRCCDPNRC1.00.51.0**1.1E-3 (upper)5.6E-4 (lower)9.9E-35.5E-6 (white)2.8E-6 (white)SNC1.00.5*1.0** (upper)0.01 (realistic)6.3E-56.4E-43.1E-31.0E-7 (green)1.0E-8 (green)** SNC Position -fire not challenging***Considered in MCR abandonment probability 28 Enclosure 3 MCR Abandonment -HVAC

• HVAC Operation-HVAC allows Main Control Room (MCR) to remain manned for larger fires-Larger fires are less likely to occur-Risk of Abandonment reduced by a factor of 20

• Both NRC and SNC used NUREG/CR-6850 methods 29 Enclosure 3 MCR Abandonment (cont.)

• NRC assumed HVAC inoperable

• SNC determined HVAC was operating normally and would continue to operate

• HVAC controls/circuitry physically separated from fire location

• Operators and Fire Brigade would not trip HVAC 30 Enclosure 3 Farley Common MCRFire LocationHVAC Controls 31 Enclosure 3 Shutdown from Outside MCRNRC ValueSNC ValueComments9.9E-33.1E-3

• Dominatedby loss of aux feedwater due to human error

• Equipment failure of AFW negligible

• Difference is due to modeling of human error 32 Enclosure 3 SDP Summary

• Even assuming a "challenging" fire and an event probability of 1.0, the CCDP is green-HVAC was a operating normally making the likelihood of control room evacuation less-SNC performed a more realistic HRA reducing the calculated risk 33 Enclosure 3 Corrective Actions 34 Enclosure 3 Root Cause of the Event

• No written work package generated for the replacement of the flex conduit. We stepped out of process mixing CM with PM

• No lift sheet

• No pre-job brief

• Management has not been successful in getting Maintenance to internalize Human Performance tool usage 100% of the time.

• No discussion of human performance tools when problem identified

• Skill-of-the-craft is accepted behavior 35 Enclosure 3 Corrective Actions

• Revised fleet procedures to define allowable work scope for minor maintenance, tool pouch work, and CR initiation.

• Maintenance personnel were trained using dynamic training methods.

• Implemented leadership action plan for Maintenance Superintendents. Accomplished with the assistance of leadership expert.

36 Enclosure 3 Conclusion and Wrap-Up

• The event is non-challenging as it does not meet the NUREG / CR 6850 criteria for challenging

• Tests revealed that the handswitch consistently fails at the same location, resulting in a self-extinguishing condition

• Target cables will not catch fire because heat rates are low.

• Modeling control room HVAC results in "green "

risk.*The event is not risk significant

• The event should be characterized as green