ML16260A116
| ML16260A116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 09/22/2016 |
| From: | Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| WILLIAMS S, DORL/LPL2-1, 415-1009 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16260A083 | List:
|
| References | |
| NL-16-0388 | |
| Download: ML16260A116 (8) | |
Text
Alternative Source Term Implementation Farley Nuclear Plant NRC Pre-submittal Meeting September 22nd, 2016 1
Why Are We Here?
Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) will be requesting a License Amendment to Implement the Alternative Source Term (AST)
Methodology for Design Basis Accident (DBA) consequence evaluation Key Goals for This Meeting:
Brief NRC on LAR and Supplemental Information Scope Ensure Common Understanding of FNP Request, Technical Scope and Regulatory Expectations Obtain Feedback Prior to Formal Submittal Submittal Highlights At A Glance:
Submittal pursuant to Regulatory Guide 1.183, Alternative Radiological Source Terms For Evaluating Design Basis Accidents At Nuclear Power Reactors Addresses implementation of AST for the 6 Design Basis Accidents Also Implements TSTF 448 Rev. 3, Control Room Habitability No Plant Modifications Are Included 12 Month Review Requested (October 2017 Target)
We appreciate your participation and feedback as we prepare for a no surprises transition to the NRC review process
- Pre-Submittal Meeting TODAY
- Submittal for Review Oct. 2016
- Approval Oct. 2017
- Implemented At Site Feb. 2018 2
LAR Content Provides discussion of each DBA Includes Implementation of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF-448, Revision 3 License Condition affecting CRIP (Testing)
Changes to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.10, Control Room, and 5.5.18, Control Room Envelope Habitability Program Information Only To facilitate review process Under Development Comparison of Current Licensing Basis Analyses to Proposed AST Analyses Basis for Proposed Change Operating Licensing and Technical Specification Changes Technical Specification Bases Changes Reg Guide 1.183 Conformance Map Calculation Summaries for Each DBA Accident Analysis Input Values Comparaison Tables 3
DBA Dose Summary CR EAB LPZ Design Basis Accident REM TEDE REM TEDE REM TEDE LOCA 4.7 13.2 6.0 FHA Containment 1.0 2.4 0.9 Spent Fuel Pool 0.2 0.5 0.2 MSLB Pre-Accident Iodine Spike 0.2 0.9 0.4 Concurrent Iodine Spike 0.5 1.0 0.5 SGTR Pre-Accident Iodine Spike 0.8 4.1 1.5 Concurrent Iodine Spike 0.4 2.1 0.8 Control Rod Ejection 3.7 3.8 3.7 Locked Rotor Less than 5 1.2 0.8 Acceptance Criteria Normal Limits 5
25 25 Well Within (25%)
N/A 6.25 6.25 Small Fraction (10%)
N/A 2.5 2.5 Key Points DBA LOCA is most limiting for total dose Fuel Handling Accident continues to bound scenarios allowed by TSTF-312 (implementation under review)
All events demonstrate reasonable margins to acceptance criteria Locked Rotor Control Room dose not reported, non-limiting TSC doses evaluated incorporating fission product barrier guidance of NEI 99-01 4
- Most Limiting Accident for Total Dose
- Doses from potential leak to Refueling Water Storage Tank are included
- Provides Operations & Testing Margin Improvement
- NOTE: Update in Progress (Complete Prior to Submittal)
- Need to reconcile normal CR unfiltered intake to meet Control Room Integrity Program (CRIP) Requirement
- Current calculation has 1950 cfm vs. 2340 cfm for CRIP
- Preliminary conclusion is insignificant increase in dose Key Input Current Basis With AST Unfiltered In-Leakage (CR Pressurization Mode) 43 cfm
(+10 cfm) 315 cfm
(+10 cfm)
ECCS Leakage Outside of Containment 6,000 cc/hr 20,000 cc/hr 5
- Evaluates doses from containment accident and spent fuel pool accident scenarios
- Addresses open containment hatch and open personnel airlock configurations
- Addresses doses from ingress/egress to the CR
- Addresses potentially contaminated Auxiliary Building
- Bounds doses from open containment penetrations per TSTF-312
- Provides operator action time relief for manually initiating CR pressurization mode
- CLB Analysis supports 10 minute Action Time
- AST Analysis supports 20 minutes 6
DBA Highlights - Other Events Steam Generator Tube Rupture
- Closest to the limit for Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) dose
- Both pre-accident and concurrent iodine spike evaluated
- Continues to support existing operator action time requirement
- Required Action: Terminate break flow within 30 minutes
- Accident releases evaluated for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with acceptable dose results
- Assumes no SG overfill (margin-to-overfill not in Farley licensing basis)
Control Rod Ejection
- Closest to the limit for Low Population Zone (LPZ) dose
- DG-1199 Gap Fractions are used Main Steam Line Break
- Not a limiting dose event
- Both pre-accident and concurrent iodine spike evaluated Locked Rotor
- Not a limiting dose event
- CR dose being not reported
- Being updated to account for manual operator actions
What Feedback Do You Have?
Scope of Submittal Regulatory Expectations LAR Content Analysis Results 8