NL-16-0388, September 22, 2016, Public Meeting Presentation Slides

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September 22, 2016, Public Meeting Presentation Slides
ML16260A116
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 09/22/2016
From:
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
WILLIAMS S A, DORL/LPL2-1, 415-1009
Shared Package
ML16260A083 List:
References
NL-16-0388
Download: ML16260A116 (8)
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Alternative Source Term Implementation Farley Nuclear PlantNRC Pre-submittal MeetingSeptember 22 nd , 2016 1 Why Are We Here?Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) will be requesting a License Amendment to -Implement the Alternative Source Term (AST) Methodology for Design Basis Accident (DBA)

consequence evaluationKey Goals for This Meeting: Brief NRC on LAR and Supplemental Information ScopeEnsure Common Understanding of FNP Request, Technical Scope and Regulatory

ExpectationsObtain Feedback Prior to Formal SubmittalSubmittal Highlights At A Glance:

  • Submittal pursuant to Regulatory Guide 1.183, Alternative Radiological Source Terms For Evaluating Design Basis Accidents At Nuclear Power Reactors
  • Addresses implementation of AST for the 6 Design Basis Accidents
  • No Plant Modifications Are Included
  • 12 Month Review Requested(October 2017 Target)We appreciate your participation and feedback as we prepare for a "no surprises" transition to the NRC review process
  • Pre-Submittal Meeting TODAY*Submittal for Review Oct. 2016*Approval Oct. 2017*Implemented At Site Feb. 2018 2 LAR Content Provides discussion of each DBAIncludes Implementation of Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) Traveler, TSTF-448, Revision 3
  • License Condition affecting CRIP (Testing)
  • Basis for Proposed Change
  • Operating Licensing and Technical Specification Changes
  • Technical Specification Bases Changes*RegGuide 1.183 ConformanceMap
  • Calculation Summaries for Each DBA
  • Accident Analysis Input Values Comparaison Tables 3

DBA Dose SummaryCREABLPZDesign Basis AccidentREM TEDEREM TEDEREM TEDELOCA4.713.26.0 FHAContainment 1.02.40.9Spent Fuel Pool 0.20.50.2 MSLBPre-Accident Iodine Spike0.20.90.4Concurrent Iodine Spike 0.51.00.5SGTRPre-Accident Iodine Spike0.84.11.5Concurrent Iodine Spike 0.42.10.8Control Rod Ejection3.73.83.7Locked RotorLess than 51.20.8Acceptance Criteria Normal Limits52525Well Within (25%)N/A6.256.25Small Fraction (10%)N/A2.52.5 Key Points

  • DBA LOCA is most limiting for total dose
  • Fuel Handling Accident continues to bound

scenarios allowed by

TSTF-312 (implementation

under review)

  • All events demonstrate reasonable margins to

acceptance criteria

  • Locked Rotor Control Room dose not reported, non-limiting
  • TSC doses evaluated incorporating fission product barrier guidance of

NEI 99-01 4 DBA Highlights -LOCA*Most Limiting Accident for Total Dose*Doses from potential leak to Refueling Water Storage Tank are included*Provides Operations & Testing Margin Improvement

  • NOTE:Update in Progress (Complete Prior to Submittal)-Need to reconcile normal CR unfiltered intake to meet Control Room Integrity Program (CRIP) Requirement*Current calculation has 1950 cfm vs. 2340 cfm for CRIP*Preliminary conclusion is insignificant increase in doseKey InputCurrent BasisWith ASTUnfiltered In-Leakage (CRPressurization Mode)43 cfm (+10 cfm)315cfm (+10 cfm)ECCSLeakage Outside of Containment6,000 cc/hr20,000 cc/hr 5

DBA Highlights -FHA*Evaluates doses from containment accident and spent fuel pool accident scenarios*Addresses open containment hatch and open personnel airlock configurations*Addresses doses from ingress/egress to the CR-Addresses potentially contaminated Auxiliary Building-Bounds doses from open containment penetrations per TSTF-312*Provides operator action time relief for manually initiating CR pressurization mode-CLB Analysis supports 10 minute Action Time-AST Analysis supports 20 minutes 6

DBA Highlights -Other EventsSteam GeneratorTube Rupture*Closest to the limit for Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) dose

  • Both pre-accident and concurrent iodine spike evaluated
  • Continues to support existing operator action time requirement
  • Required Action: Terminate break flow within 30 minutes
  • Accident releases evaluated for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> with acceptable dose results
  • Assumes no SG overfill (margin-to-overfill not in Farley licensing basis)

Control Rod Ejection

  • Closest to the limit for Low Population Zone (LPZ) dose
  • DG-1199 Gap Fractions are usedMain SteamLine Break*Not a limiting dose event
  • Both pre-accident and concurrent iodine spike evaluatedLocked Rotor
  • Not a limiting dose event
  • CR dose being not reported
  • Expect dose remain well less than 5 Rem TEDE 7

What Feedback Do You Have?Scope of Submittal Regulatory Expectations LAR Content Analysis Results 8

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