IR 05000348/2011003

IR 05000348-11-003 and 05000364-11-003; April 1, 2011, Through June 30, 2011; Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report

ML112160632
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	08/04/2011
From:	Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To:	Stinson L Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-11-003
Download: ML112160632 (29)

Text

UNITED STATES ust 4, 2011

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2011003 AND 05000364/2011003

Dear Mr. Stinson:

On June 30, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 14, 2011, with members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The NRC reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC public document room or from the publicly available records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the public electronic reading room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-348, 50-364 License No.: NPF-2, NPF-8

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000348/2011003 and 05000364/2011003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 05000348, 05000364 License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8 Report No.: 05000348/2011003 and 05000364/2011003 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Columbia, AL Dates: April 1, 2011, through June 30, 2011 Inspectors: E. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector J. Sowa, Resident Inspector R. Patterson, Physical Security Inspector (Section 4OA5.2)

R. Russell, Resident Inspector, Paducah (Sections 1EP2-6 and 4OA1)

M. Speck, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP2-6 and 4OA1)

Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000348/2011003 and 05000364/2011003; April 1, 2011, through June 30, 2011; Joseph

M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors and two regional inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December, 2006. No findings were identified during this inspection period.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings were identified.

B. Licensee-identified Violations None

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 started the report period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP). On April 29, 2011, the unit was ramped to 60 percent RTP for repairs to an oil leak on the 1B steam generator (SG) feed pump. The unit returned to 100 percent RTP on April 30, 2011. On May 21, 2011, the unit was ramped to 61 percent RTP for planned repairs to the 1B SG feed pump controller power supply. The unit returned to 100 percent RTP later that day, and remained at or near 100 percent RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 started the report period at 100 percent RTP. On April 8, 2011, the unit was ramped to 59 percent RTP to seal steam leaks on the moisture separator reheat shell drain tank. The unit returned to 100 percent RTP on April 12, 2011. On June 18, 2011, the 2A circulating water pump tripped, forcing control room operators to reduce power to 71 percent RTP. The unit returned to 100 percent RTP on June 21, 2011, and remained at or near 100 percent RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Offsite/Alternate AC Readiness: The inspectors reviewed the licensees station procedures to verify communication protocols existed between the transmission operator and control room to promptly identify issues impacting the offsite power system. The inspectors verified procedure adequacy to address measures to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of the offsite alternating current (AC) power system (Alabama Power Company) and the onsite alternate AC power system. The inspectors also reviewed the compensatory actions identified in station procedures to be performed when it is not possible to predict post-trip voltage at the site for current electrical grid conditions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walk-Down: The inspectors performed partial walk-downs of the following three systems to verify operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety equipment was inoperable. The inspectors attempted to identify discrepancies impacting the function of the system and therefore, potentially increasing risk. The walk-downs were performed using the criteria in licensee procedures NMP-OS-007, Conduct of Operations, and FNP-0-SOP-0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel. The walk-downs included reviewing the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR), plant procedures and drawings, checks of control room and plant valves, switches, components, electrical power, support equipment and instrumentation. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1, A train motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (MDAFWP) while B train was out of service (OOS)

• Unit 1 and Unit 2, A train residual heat removal (RHR) systems during planned maintenance to B train pumps

• Unit 2, A train component cooling water (CCW) while B train was OOS Complete Walk-Down: The inspectors conducted a complete walk-down of the accessible portions of the following system. The inspectors used licensee procedure FNP-1-SOP-7.0, RHR System, and Functional System Description (FSD) A181002, to verify system alignment of on-service equipment. The inspectors also interviewed personnel, reviewed control room logs, maintenance rule (MR) monthly reports, condition reports (CRs), quarterly system health reports, outstanding work orders (WOs) and industry operating experience (OE) to verify alignment and equipment discrepancies were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• Unit 1 RHR system

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Protection Area Tours: The inspectors conducted a tour of the four fire areas listed below to assess material condition and operational status of the fire protection equipment. The inspectors verified combustibles and ignition sources were controlled in accordance with the licensees administrative procedures; fire detection and suppression equipment was available for use; passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition and compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment were implemented in accordance with the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-36, Fire Surveillance and Inspection; FNP-0-AP-38, Use of Open Flame; FNP-0-AP-39, Fire Patrols and Watches; and the associated fire zone data sheets. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1, RHR heat exchanger room, fire zone 1

• Unit 1, spent fuel pool (SFP) room, fire zone 4

• Units 1 and 2, control room ventilation rooms, fire zone 51

• Unit 2, B train battery room, fire zone 16

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review:

a. Inspection Scope

On May 3, 2011, the inspectors observed portions of the licensed operator training and testing program to verify implementation of procedures FNP-0-AP-45, Farley Nuclear Plant Training Plan; FNP-0-TCP-17.6, Simulator Training Evaluation/Documentation; and FNP-0-TCP-17.3, Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program Administration.

The inspectors observed operations simulator scenario 11-S0602, conducted in the licensees simulator for a main steam break, resulting in a rapid ramp-down of reactor power, failures of on-service CCW and charging pumps, a malfunctioning of charging letdown malfunction and a reactor trip as a result of the worsening main steam break.

The inspectors observed high-risk operator actions, overall crew performance, self-critiques, training feedback and management oversight to verify operator performance was evaluated against the performance standards of the licensees scenario.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Operating Experience Smart Sample (OpESS) FY 2010-02 Sample Selections for

Reviewing Licensed Operator Examinations and Training Conducted on the Plant- Referenced Simulator.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted interviews with operations management, training department staff and licensed operators to determine the type and content of training performed related to complex transients and trips. The inspectors also discussed the inclusion of operating experience related to fires in electrical equipment similar to an event occurring at the H. B. Robinson Plant on March 28, 2010. The inspectors attended plant meetings and observed the presentation of operating experience, which included the H. B.

Robinson Plant event. The inspectors obtained and reviewed a copy of the licensees operator requalification training scenario, designed to mimic the H.B. Robinson Plant electrical fire event. The licensee conducted this scenario for all operations department crews during cycle four

(4) training in 2010.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Effectiveness

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Inspection Samples

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two activities for

(1) appropriate work practices; (2)identifying and addressing common cause failures;

(3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the MR;

(4) characterizing reliability issues for performance;

(5) trending key parameters for condition monitoring;

(6) charging unavailability for performance; (7)classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and

(8) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(1). In addition, the NRC specifically reviewed events where ineffective equipment maintenance resulted in invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems affecting the operating units.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• CR 2010110046, Q2HV3234B, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFWP)warm up valve failed to stroke fully closed

• CR 2011105288, technical support center (TSC) HVAC repairs

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 OpESS FY2010-01 Recent Inspection Experience for Components Installed Beyond

Vendor-Recommended Service Life

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted interviews with operations, maintenance and engineering staff to determine the licensees method of monitoring the service life of plant-installed components. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedure NMP-ES-003, Life Cycle Management, Version 11.0, to evaluate how the licensee implemented vendor-recommended service life for station components. The inspectors also conducted interviews with the licensees design modification department staff to identify their process for new equipment used in plant modifications.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following four activities to verify appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to taking equipment OOS for maintenance. The inspectors verified risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4),and were accurate and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified appropriate use of the licensees risk assessment and risk categories in accordance with requirements in licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.3, Mode 1, 2, & 3 Risk Assessment; FNP-0-UOP-4.0, General Outage Operations Guidance; NMP-GM-006, Work Management; and NMP-OS-007, Conduct of Operations.

• April 13, 2011 Unit 2, YELLOW risk condition concurrent with unavailability of the 2A MDAFWP

• May 6, 2011, Unit 1, YELLOW risk condition with concurrent unavailability of the 1B MDAFWP

• May 9, 2011, Unit 1, YELLOW risk condition with concurrent unavailability of the 1B SFP heat exchanger

• June 7, 2011, Unit 1, YELLOW risk condition concurrent with unavailability of the 1A MDAFWP and surveillance of the 1C emergency diesel generator (EDG)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following seven operability evaluations to verify the requirements of licensee procedures NMP-OS-007, Conduct of Operations, and NMP-AD-012, ODs and Functionality Assessments, were met. The scope of this inspection also included a review of the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of compensatory measures and the impact on continued plant operation.

• CR 2011105276, computer room air conditioning unit shutdown during troubleshooting of computer room Halon system

• CR 2011105597, 2B component cooling water (CCW) pump did not start when the start switch was operated from the main control board

• CR 2011106318, 2A battery charger failed to swap from float to equalize

• CR 2011106641, 1C EDG oil temperature high (OTH) and coolant temperature high (CTH) temperature switches not terminated in accordance with approved design

• CR 2011106792, CCW supply valve to 1A RHR heat exchanger was demanded closed with no appropriate change in flow parameters

• CR 2011107041, CCW leak on 1B CCW pump mini-flow line

• CR 2011107156, lower than expected flow to SW pond when unit 2 service water (SW) recirculation was established

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following plant modification to ensure the safety functions of important safety systems were unaffected. The inspectors also verified design bases, licensing bases and performance capability of risk-significant SSCs had not been degraded through modifications. The inspectors verified any modification performed during risk-significant configuration did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors evaluated system operability, availability, configuration control, post-installation test activities, documentation updates and operator awareness of the modification. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• TM 1111087101, temporary mounting and connection of a dual power supply for the 1A SG feed pump electro-hydraulic controller

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the criteria contained in licensee procedures FNP-0-PMT-0.0, Post-Maintenance Test Program, to verify post-maintenance test procedures and test activities for the following five systems/components were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed the test data to verify test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• FNP-1-STP-4.2, 1B Charging Pump Quarterly Inservice Test (IST), following maintenance to the 1B charging pump electrical breaker

• FNP-1-STP-10.5, Emergency Boration Valve Quarterly Inservice Test following troubleshooting activities to establish reason for loss of position indication

• FNP-2-STP-24.1, 2A, 2B, and 2C Service Water Pump (SWP) Quarterly Inservice Test following repairs to 2B SWP discharge check valve

• Maintenance and troubleshooting of 2B CCW handswitch after pump failed to start

• Leakage test of the 1B SFP heat exchanger following repairs to leaking tube plugs

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following seven surveillance tests and either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met technical specifications (TS) requirements. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-24, Test Control; FNP-0-M-050, Master List of Surveillance Requirements; and NMP-OS-007, Conduct of Operations, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Surveillance Tests

• FNP-1-STP-16.1, 1A Containment Spray Pump Quarterly Inservice Test

• FNP-1-STP-913.0, Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Bus Reactor Trip Underfrequency Relay Test

• FNP-1-STP-912.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Bus Reactor Trip Undervoltage TDAFW Start Relay Test

• FNP-2-STP-201.19, RCS Q2B13TE0422B1, Q2B13TE0422B2, Q2B13TE0422B3, and Q2B13TE0422D Loop Calibration and Operational Test In-Service Test (IST)

• FNP-1-STP-16.1, 1A Containment Spray Pump Quarterly Inservice Test Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Detection

• FNP-1-STP-9.0, RCS Leakage Test

• FNP-2-STP-9.0, RCS Leakage Test

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)

1EP2 Alert and Notification System (ANS) Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees operation, maintenance and periodic testing of the Alert and Notification System (ANS) using NRC IP 71114, 02, Alert and Notification System Evaluation. The inspectors gathered information through document reviews and interviews, and reviewed monthly trend reports and siren test failure records. Additionally, the inspectors observed a weekly siren silent test and tone alert radio (TAR) test conducted from the Houston County Emergency Management Agency (EMA) Emergency Operations Center (EOC), to verify the test was conducted in accordance with the approved procedures. The inspectors used the applicable planning standard of 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(5) and the related requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D, as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, was also used as a reference.

The inspectors reviewed various documents as listed in the Attachment. The inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ANS on a biennial basis as defined in IP 71114.02-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP3 Emergency Preparedness Organization Staffing and Augmentation System

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees Emergency Response Organization (ERO)augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from unannounced off-hour augmentation drills or system tests performed since the last inspection were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the records from the unannounced off-hour recall drill conducted August 12, 2009, to verify the ERO members were alerted and mobilized and the response facilities were staffed and activated in a timely manner.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC IP 71114, Attachment 03, Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System. The inspectors used the applicable planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and the related requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, as reference criteria.

The inspectors reviewed various documents as listed in the Attachment. The inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ERO staffing and augmentation system on a biennial basis as defined in IP 71114.03-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

Since the last NRC inspection, the licensee implemented revision 52 of the Joseph M.

Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. The inspectors conducted a review of the emergency action level changes and sampled the revisions to the emergency plan and the implementing procedure made between December 1, 2010, and April 30, 2011, to evaluate the changes identified in the revisions for potential decreases in effectiveness of the emergency plan. The inspection included a review of the 10 CFR 50.54(q)change process documentation. The licensee determined the changes resulted in no decrease in the effectiveness of the emergency plan and the revised plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC review of the revisions does not constitute formal approval of the changes and was not documented in a safety evaluation report; therefore, the emergency action level and emergency plan changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 04, Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes. The inspectors used the applicable planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) and the related requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, as reference criteria.

The inspectors reviewed various documents listed in the Attachment. The inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the emergency action level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis as defined in IP 71114.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP5 Correction of Emergency Preparedness (EP) Weaknesses and Deficiencies

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions identified through the EP program to determine the significance of the issues and to evaluate the licensees efforts to identify, track and resolve deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed the fleet oversight audits and assessments of the EP program to determine if the independent assessments met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t). The inspectors also reviewed critique reports and samples of CAP records associated with the 2010 biennial exercise, as well as various EP drills conducted in 2010, to determine if the licensee fulfilled drill commitments and to assess the completeness and effectiveness of related corrective actions.

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 05, Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses. The inspectors used the applicable planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and the related requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, as reference criteria.

The inspectors reviewed documents which are listed in the Attachment. The inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the correction of EP weaknesses on a biennial basis as defined in IP 71114.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The NRC evaluated the conduct of routine licensee emergency drills on the following date to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification and protection action recommendation (PAR) development activities. The NRC observed emergency response operation in a simulated control room to verify event classification and notifications were performed in accordance with FNP-0-EIP-9.0, Emergency Classification and Actions. The NRC used procedure FNP-0-EIP-15.0, Emergency Drills, as the inspection criteria. The NRC also evaluated the licensee critique of the drill to compare any inspector-observed weaknesses with those identified by the licensee in order to verify whether the licensee was properly identifying issues.

• May 25, 2011 - General Emergency due to containment leak to the lower equipment room coincident with a 1000 gallon per minute RCS leak and fuel cladding failure.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee data for the performance indicators (PIs) listed below to verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during the period listed. For the emergency preparedness cornerstone, the period included the fourth quarter 2010 through first quarter 2011. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 6, was used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

• Unplanned scrams with complications

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

• Mitigating systems performance indicator (MSPI), heat removal system

• MSPI, emergency AC power system The inspectors reviewed samples of raw PI data, licensee event reports, and monthly operating reports for the period covering March, 2010 through March, 2011. The data reviewed was compared to graphical representations from the most recent PI report.

The inspectors also examined a sampling of operations logs and procedures to verify PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report, as well as ensuring the individual PIs were calculated correctly.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

• Alert and Notification System Reliability (ANS)

The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151, Performance Indicator Verification. For the specified review period, the inspectors examined data reported to the NRC, procedural guidance for reporting PI information, and records used by the licensee to identify potential PI occurrences.

For the ANS indicator, the inspector reviewed of a sample of the licensees records of periodic system tests. The inspectors reviewed the records of the licensees reported number of successful siren operability tests as compared to the number of siren tests conducted during the reporting period, to validate the accuracy of the PI submittals.

This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the Alert and Notification System as defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily CR Reviews

As required by IP 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the NRC performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program (CAP). This review was accomplished by reviewing hard copies of CRs, attending daily screening meetings and accessing the licensees computerized database.

.2 Selected Issue Follow-up Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

In addition to the routine review, the inspectors selected the one issue listed below for a more in-depth review. The inspectors considered the following during the review of the licensees actions:

(1) complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner;

(2) evaluation and disposition of operability/reportability issues; (3)consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;

(4) classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem; (5)identification of root and contributing causes of the problem;

(6) identification of CRs; and

(7) completion of corrective actions in a timely manner.

• CR 2011103701, trip of 1C EDG during 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> surveillance run

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

As required by IP 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, the inspectors performed a review of the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors reviewed repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues, and also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item-screening discussed above. The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP process, including system health reports, corrective maintenance WOs, component status reports and MR assessments.

The inspectors review nominally considered the six-month period of January 1 through June 30, 2011, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees latest integrated quarterly assessment report.

Corrective actions associated with the sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend report were reviewed for adequacy. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

b. Assessment and Observations The inspectors evaluated performance data provided by the Farley performance improvement group for the period of time from January 1 through April 30, 2011. The inspectors noted the continued licensee focus on procedural adherence and continued improvement in the trend of procedure use and adherence. The inspectors also noted the licensees trend of identifying procedural issues continued to have the same low threshold, and station personnel continued writing CRs to identify needed procedural enhancements. In addition, the licensees central procedure group has worked to reduce the backlog of open procedure items. The inspectors additionally noted an increase in the licensees identification of inadequate corrective actions associated with CRs, although the inspectors did not discover any inadequate corrective actions with significant safety significance. The inspectors noted the licensee identified two new trends in its CAP, in the control of combustibles and quality of physical work. The inspectors did not identify any adverse trend from the licensees CAP, or from their review of issues documented outside the normal CAP process, including system health reports, corrective maintenance WOs, component status reports, and MR assessments.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure the activities were consistent with licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors normal plant status reviews and inspection activities.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Protected Area (PA) Expansion

a. Inspection Scope

June 29 through July 1, 2011, an NRC Region 2 security inspector performed a site visit to review and observe the licensees PA expansion. The inspector evaluated the licensees security force training, change management and action plan to implement the changes to the PA boundaries and PA personnel access point (PAP). The inspector observed the licensees searches and sanitization of the new PA area to include all buildings incorporated into the PA. The inspector attended security force shift briefings and walked down the new PA boundary, intrusion detection zones, and new security positions. These inspector observations of the licensees PA expansion and associated activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples.

.3 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/183, Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi

Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the activities and actions taken by the licensee to assess its readiness to respond to an event similar to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant fuel damage event. This included

(1) an assessment of the licensees capability to mitigate conditions that may result from beyond design basis events, with a particular emphasis on strategies related to the spent fuel pool, as required by NRC Security Order Section B.5.b issued February 25, 2002, as committed to in severe accident management guidelines, and as required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh);

(2) an assessment of the licensees capability to mitigate station blackout (SBO) conditions, as required by 10 CFR 50.63 and station design bases;

(3) an assessment of the licensees capability to mitigate internal and external flooding events, as required by station design bases; and

(4) an assessment of the thoroughness of the walkdowns and inspections of important equipment needed to mitigate fire and flood events, which were performed by the licensee to identify any potential loss of function of this equipment during seismic events possible for the site.

b. Findings

Inspection Report 05000348,364/2011011 (ML111330097) documented detailed results of this inspection activity. Following issuance of the report, the inspectors conducted detailed follow-up on selected issues. No findings were identified during this follow-up inspection.

.4 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/184, Availability and Readiness Inspection of

Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs)

a. Inspection Scope

On May 27, 2011, the inspectors completed a review of the licensees severe accident management guidelines (SAMGs), implemented as a voluntary industry initiative in the 1990s, to determine

(1) whether the SAMGs were available and updated,

(2) whether the licensee had procedures and processes in place to control and update its SAMGs,

(3) the nature and extent of the licensees training of personnel on the use of SAMGs, and

(4) licensee personnels familiarity with SAMG implementation.

The results of this review were provided to the NRC task force chartered by the Executive Director for Operations to conduct a near-term evaluation of the need for agency actions following the Fukushima Daiichi fuel damage event in Japan. Plant-specific results for Farley Nuclear Plant were provided as an Enclosure to a memorandum to the Chief, Reactor Inspection Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, dated June 02, 2011 (ML111530328).

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

The inspectors presented the interim emergency preparedness program inspection results onsite to T. Youngblood and other members of licensee management on May 12, 2011 and final inspection results by phone to J. Horn and other members of licensee management on June 3, 2011. The inspectors confirmed none of the potential report information discussed was considered proprietary. Proprietary material received during the inspection was returned to the licensee.

On July 14, 2011, the NRC presented the inspection results to you and members of your staff who acknowledged the results. The NRC confirmed proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

C. Boone, Fleet EP Manager

B. Boyd, EP Specialist

D. Gilbert, EP Assistant

B. Griner, Engineering Director

J. Horn, Site Support Manager

F. Hundley, Fleet Oversight Supervisor

J. Jerkins, Corrective Action Program Supervisor

R. Martin, Engineering Programs Manager

S. Odom, Emergency Preparedness (EP) Supervisor

W. Oldfield, Licensing Engineer

T. Pelham, Performance Improvement Supervisor

D. Reed, Operations Support Superintendent

R. Roberson, Fleet Oversight

D. Simmons, EP Specialist

L. Smith, Maintenance Manager

S. Varnum, Chemistry Manager

C. Westberry, Engineering Systems Manager

T. Youngblood, Plant Manager

NRC personnel

Scott

M. Shaeffer, Chief, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Opened

None

Opened and Closed

None

Closed

2515/183 TI Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event. (Section 4OA5.3)

2515/184 TI Availability and Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). (Section 4OA5.4)

Discussed

None