ML17346A404

Rev 0 to Auxiliary Power Upgrade Summary & Design Evaluation. W/10 Oversize Figures.Aperture Cards Available in PDR

ML17346A404
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	05/31/1984
From:	Keller G, Oneill J FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17346A403	List: ML17346A402 ML17346A404
References
JPE-L84-12, JPE-L84-12-R, JPE-L84-12-R00, NUDOCS 8406260294
Download: ML17346A404 (198)

Text

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 AUXILIARYPOWER UPGRADE

SUMMARY

AND DESIGN EVALUATION DOCKET NOiS 50-250 AND 50-25l JPE-L84- I 2 May, I 984 Revision 0 840b2b0294 840b2b PDR ADOCK 05000250 I P PDR

FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 AUXILIARYPOWER UPGRADE

SUMMARY

AND DESIGN EVALUATION DOCKET NO'S. 50-250 AND 50-25l JPE-LN-I2 Revision 0 Prepared By<

. J Keller Date s /7 8c

. 0'eill ate Approved By:

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r Dat

-~i 7

. Sheetz, Supervising Engr~

Approved By:

7

. lid< gP gj.

. G. Flugger, Maha r Date Issue Date: May, I984

e JPE-LQ- I 2 Rev. 0 NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED Reviewed By:

. Vincent Date

. Reckfor Date

. F. Pabst Date JPE INTERFACES Non-Lead

~Disci line Yes No Lead Initials/Date Mechanical/Nuclear ~C- d ~(7s Sf Electrical

,Instrumentation Bc 8/~ 5'ig rt Control Civil X Krl 8 Technical Licensing .5 ~ n EXTERNAL INTERFACES No External Quality Assurance Interfaces General Engineering X Nuclear Analysis Nuclear Energy Security Nuclear Plant Nuclear mutual Limited (NML)

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page I of 25 TABLE OF CONTENTS I.O INTRODUCTION &

SUMMARY

I. I Background Information 2.0

SUMMARY

OF EXISTING AND ALTERNATIVEDESIGNS 2.I Original Plant Design Considerations 2.2 Original System Design 2.3 Auxiliary Power Modification Design Considerations 2.4 Alternative Designs 2.5 Selected Alternative - Auxiliary Power Upgrade 3.0 DESIGN

3. I Auxiliary Power Upgrade Design

3. I. I Station Blackout Subsystem 3.I.2 Switchyard Relay Protection 3.I.3 DC System and I 20VAC System Changes

3. I.4 Electrical Loads Transferred to C Bus 3.I.5 Auxiliary Power Upgrade, Partial Implementation 3.2 Comparison with NRC Requirements 3.2.I Comparison with FSAR and

.Technical Specifications Criteria 3.2.2 Impact on Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Equipment 3.2.3 Emergency Operating Procedures Review 3.2.4 Comparison with Technical Specification Operability Requirements 3.3 Failure Mode Effect Evaluation 3.4 Reliability (Fault Tree) Evaluation 4.0 SAFETY EVALUATION

4. I Criteria 4.2 Evaluation

5.0 CONCLUSION

S APPENDIX A Auxiliary Power Upgrade Related Plant Trips

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APPENDIX B - Evaluation of Compliance with FSAR Criteria APPENDIX C - Evaluation of Compliance with Technical Specification Criteria APPENDIX D - Tabulation of C Bus Loads APPENDIX E - Failure Mode Effect Analysis APPENDIX F - Reliability (Fault Tree) Evaluation

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 2 of 25 LIST OF TABLES TABLE I - Anticipated Electrical Load Growth Items From !98I to l990 TABLE 2 - Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment Reqyiring Evaluation TABLE 3 - Comparison with Technical Specification Operability Requirements TABLE 4 - Fault Tree Equipment Line-up Assumptions LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE I - Main One Line Diagram of Station Electrical System l973 FIGURE 2 - Main One Line Diagram of Station Electrical System For Auxiliary Power Upgrade FIGURE 3 - C Bus Auto Transfer Logic Diagram FIGURE 4- Main One Line Diagram of Present Auxiliary Power Upgrade

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 3 of 25 I.O INTRODUCTION 8 SUhhMARY On February l2, l984, a relay problem on the Turkey Point fossil units startup transformer led to a stripping of the switchyard's northeast bus.

Loss of the northeast bus resulted in a Unit 3 trip. While trying to re-energize one of Unit 3 s busses, a Unit 4 plant trip occurred. A trip of both Units, initiated by relay-related events, also occurred on February l6, l984. Appendix A provides a brief discussion of these trips.

Because of these plant trips, NRC Region II requested that FPL defer completion of implementation of the Auxiliary Power Upgrade pending NRC review. Upon completion of NRC review of the proposed change, FPL will complete implementation of the design changes. This report provides the design summary and evaluation of the Auxiliary Power Upgrade requested by the NRC.

The report is written primarily in the present tense to provide a clear, vndemtandabte presentation. dn-actual the majority of the Auxiliary Power Upgrade related work has been implemented. The major work yet to be implemented consists of the new electrical ties between the plant island.

and the switchyard.

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The Auxiliary Power Upgrade modification moves non-safety loads to a new non-safety related C train that derives its power from a new C Bus transformer. One C Bus and its associated transformer are provided for Unit 3 and one for Unit 4.

The non-safety related loads are loads that are not necessary (i.e., vital) to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure- boundary, the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe (hot) shutdown condition, or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in off-site exposures comparable to the-.

guideline exposures of IO CFR l00. This nuclear safety related definition is the basis upon which the plant was designed, licensed and is operated; The original plant design was such that loads that are nuclear safety related and non-safety related were powered from the vital A and B busses.

Only non-safety related loads are transferred to the new non-vital C Bus.

The C Bus transformer is powered by a separate feed from the switchyard.

Connections in the switchyard for Units 3 and 4 are made at opposite ends of the switchyard. Breakers are provided in the switchyard to isolate the C Bus'from the fossil units and from its respective units'tartup transformer.

A separate non-safety related DC system and l20V uninterruptible AC system is included in the design.

In February, l984 a demand for a unit runback to 509o power upon loss of C Bus Transformer occurred. Failure to successfully runback caused unit trip. This situation is prevented in the Auxiliary Power Upgrade design by a fast auto-transfer of the Unit 3 6 4 C Bus loads. The transfer logic is similar to the fast auto transfer that currently exists between the auxiliary and startup transformers. Each C Bus transformer has two secondary windings, each winding is designed to supply all C Bus loads on one unit.

0 JPE-L84- I2 Rev. 0 Page 4 of 25 The existing station cranking diesels (non safety-related) are directly tied (electrically) to the C Bus to enhance the Turkey Point Station's blackout capability. Heretofore they could only be connected to the nuclear units via the switchyard. Interlocks prevent the accidental closing of the cranking diesels onto the C Bus. The closing of the tie between the C Bus and nuclear safety related busses is also electrically interlocked and is restricted to only Station Blackout conditions. Breakers are also to be maintained racked-out to supplement C Bus interaction protection as described in Section 3.l.l.

The Auxiliary Power Upgrade has been reviewed against the plants'inal Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and Technical Specifications, and was shown to satisfy the plant's design basis. The design proposed offers several benefits, namely; o it improves the separation of safety related and non-safety related loads by moving non-safety related loads to the C Bus, o it eliminates AC system undervoltage operating constraints on the concurrent operation of certain major pieces of equipment that are required prior to completion of C Bus implementation, o it provides a direct electrical station blackout tie from the station's cranking diesels to the units'. I 6 kV busses, and o it provides additional electrical ties from the nuclear plants to the switchyard.

A failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) was conducted. Additionally fault trees were constructed to analyze the combinations of events that could result in loss of one or more of the 4. I6 kV busses. The fault trees model the 4.I6 kV system at the equipment level (i.e. breakers, transformers, etc.). The relays which control the fast transfer of bus power supply (Auxiliary to Startup Transformer for A and B busses; Auto-C Bus Transfer for 3C and 4C busses) were also included in the fault model.

The FMEA and fault tree evaluations indicate that the installation of additional circuit breakers in the switchyard will prevent a recurrence of the February l2, l984 incident where a fossil unit malfunction caused the trip of a nuclear unit. The fault tree evaluation indicates that the C Bus provides an additional reliable power source to the facility. The calculated unavailability of the 4. I 6 kV vital A Bc B busses and non-vital C Bus are:

UNIT 3 UNIT 4 A Bus 8.3 x l0-5 8.2 x IO-5 B Bus 8.l x IO-5 8.0 x l0-5 C Bus 6.l x IO-5 6.I x l0-5 AxBxC busses I.2 x I 0-7 I.2 x I 0-7 (Loss of all 4.I6 kV busses)

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 5 of 25 The unavailability of the C Bus with and without auto transfer is:

C Bus without auto'transfer I.8 x IO-3 C Bus with auto transfer 6.l x IO-5 The unavailability numbers do not reflect the ability of the A 8 B busses to be supplied from the emergency diesel generators, i.e., they reflect the ability to be supplied from either the auxiliary or startup transformers.

The unavailabilities do identify the increased reliability afforded by the existing fast auto transfer between the auxiliary and startup transformers, and the proposed fast auto transfers between C Bus transformers.

The design of the plant is such that sections of motor control centers (MCC) could be transferred to the C Bus as a whole. Transfer of individual 480 V loads are constrained by in situ physical and equipment constraints.

Accordingly, non-vital MCCs are transferred to the C Bus and individual loads are reviewed against NRC requirements that apply to both safety related and non-safety related equipment.

The results of the evaluation provided herein indicate that the Auxiliary Power Upgrade is implementable under IO CFR 50.59, and that a C Bus transformer availability technical specification is not required.

Back round Information The Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 electrical systems were designed prior to I970 to provide a simple arrangement of equipment and busses sized for anticipated loading conditions. Each unit s auxiliary transformer was designed to provide the normal source of auxiliary electrical power during plant operation. During unit startup, shutdown, or after plant trip the normal source of electrical power was the respective unit's start-up transformer. (The other ynit's startup transformer provided an alternate source of offsite power).

Prior to C Bus, the auxiliary load fully loaded the auxiliary transformers; certain electrical line-ups resulted in unacceptable voltage conditions; and procedural restrictions were placed on the concurrent operation of some electrical equipment. FPL originated projects for improvement of plant

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operations and NRC requirements necessitated the further loading of the station electrical system. As a result, the station's auxiliary and startup transformers, cable system and 4.I6 kV switchgear fault interrupting ratings approached their maximum allowable capacities. Table I provides a listing of electrical load growth anticipated from l98I to I 990.

The purpose of this report is to present the alternatives, design criteria, design, and safety evaluation for the electric plant modifications required for the expansion of the station s electrical system capability.

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 6 of 2S 2.0

SUMMARY

OF EXISTING AND ALTERNATIVEDESIGNS 2.I Ori inal Plant Desi n Considerations Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, received their operating licenses in l972 and l973, respectively. The design criteria by which they were licensed included the use of draft General Design Criteria proposed by the AEC. In addition to these requirements, FPL developed additional design considerations which were included in the FSAR (see Appendix B).

2.2 Ori inal S stem Desi n Based on the design considerations referenced in the previous section the following original design was developed and approved for the two plants.

The 240 kV switchyard arrangement provides east and west busses which connect off-site power from FP&L's transmission network with the two fossil and two nuclear unit power lines. This assures that even if both nuclear Units 3 and 4 are inoperative, power would be available at the 240 kV switchyard from Turkey Points Unit I and 2 or from one of the 240 kV circuits from off-site.

The basic components of the station electrical system of I 973 are shown on the main one line diagram, Figure I. Each nuclear unit had an auxiliary transformer to serve as a normal source of auxiliary electrical power during normal operation. Each transformer was capable of supplying all the electrical power requirements associated with its unit as well as some loads shared by both units (e.g. water treatment plant). Each auxiliary transformer provided power to an A and B 4.I6 kV nuclear safety related bus under normal operating conditions. These two busses (A & B) supplied power to all loads in the nuclear plant. Redundant trains of safety-related systems were separately powered from these busses.

In addition to the auxiliary transformer, a start-up transformer was provided for each unit. The start-up transformers were connected to the 240 kV busses on the primary side, and the A and B 4. I6 kV busses for its unit and the A 4. I6 kV bus for its adjacent unit on the secondary side. The start-up transformer was designe'd to normally serve the unit during start up, shutdown, and after unit trip. The start-up transformer of one unit was adequate to simultaneously supply minimum engineered safety features of one unit, and safely shut down the other unit, without assistance from on-site power generation. The startup transformer for the adjacent nuclear unit is available as a redundant source of emergency power for the A Bus only.

Each nuclear Unit's A & B 4. I6 kV Bus was fed from a separate secondary winding on its auxiliary transformer under normal operating conditions.

Loss of power from the auxiliary transformer initiated a fast automatic transfer to the startup transformer. Complete loss of power at both the A

& B 4.I6 kV busses of either unit caused the emergency diesel-generators to start and feed power directly to the affected busses.

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 7 of 25 The two 4.I6 kV busses (A & B) fed four 480 volt busses through four transformers. Two 480V transformers were energized from the 4.I6 kV A Bus, and two 480V transformers were powered from the 4.I 6 kV B Bus.

The Auxiliary Power Upgrade design discussed in this report does not alter the basic nuclear safety related design concept licensed in I973. It adds a new, independent, non-safety related subsystem to the system described above.

2.3 Auxiliar Power M'odification Desi n Considerations Design criteria associated with an upgrading of electrical system capability are:

Compliance with FSAR criteria and Technical Specification requirements.

Compliance with non-safety related NRC requirements, e.g.,

Appendix R.

0 Meet or exceed existing electrical load requirements.

0 Capability to provide for future electrical loads.

0 Adequate physical space to accommodate new equipment, and provide for required maintenance and surveil lance activities.

Accommodate load rating, undervoltage and short circuit capability requirements.

No single failure in the switchyard will cause a nuclear unit trip concurrent with the loss of its startup transformer.

No single failure shall cause the loss of both nuclear units, or the loss of-both startup transformers, or the loss of both C

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busses.

Loss of a C Bus with a subsequent reactor trip will not result in the loss of a startup transformer.

2.4 Alternative Desi ns In order to arrive at the design modification discussed hereinafter for Turkey Point, the available design alternatives are evaluated. Basically there are four alternatives available, namely; administrative controls, cross connect to fossil units, upgrade existing equipment, or provide new equipment. These alternatives are discussed in the following paragraphs:

Modify use of existing system with administrative controls. Use of this alternative would restrict the loadings on the A & B busses through a continuous review of equipment power priorities and reliance on a manual load management scheme. This alternative should normal ly be rejected because the potential for error introduced by complex load schemes is considerable, and at best the solution provides interim relief with the potential for only limited system growth.

Unit trips in February were Initiated because of loss pf the C Bus power supply to the 3B steam generator feed pump. This pump (7000

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 8 of 25 hp) and the 3C condensate pump (2500 hp) are two large non-safety related loads transferred to C Bus. They cannot be returned to the A

& B busses primarily due to undervoltage and short circuit considerations associated with the A & B busses. Removal of the motors from the A & B safety related busses reduces the short circuit current to these vital busses and reduces the likelihood of unacceptable under voltage conditions on the busses. With these motors powered from the A & B busses, there are combinations of motors that can't be run simultaneously, e.g.,

Case I B & C Condensate Pumps B & C Component Cooling Water Pumps A & B Intake Cooling Water Pumps Case 2 o A & C Condensate Pumps o B & C Component Cooling Water Pumps o A & B Intake Cooling Water Pumps Design margins are at a point where administrative controls are not a viable alternative.

II. Use the fossil units startup transformer to support additional Unit 3 and 4 loads. This alternative was rejected because it creates cross ties between the fossil and nuclear units, which introduce the potential for losing more than one unit due to equipment failure.

III. Upgrade existing Turkey Point system with larger size transformer, switchgear, etc. There is a basic disadvantage associated with this alternative, namely, higher rated switchgear and transformers are physically larger than those presently installed. This alternative was rejected because of space limitations, and the extensive downtime to remove and replace the plants'. I 6 k V system.

IV. Add an additional 4. I 6 kV bus (C Bus) to both Units 3 and 4 to provide power for additional auxiliary loads. This alternative would change the configuration which routes all loads through either the A or B safety'elated busses. It provides a non-safety related bus which.

would be used for non-safety related loads, either anticipated or presently on the system. It can be implemented in a manner that satisfies the design criteria cited above.

Several of the more viable options associated with this design approach are as follows:

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 9 of 25 (a) Feed C Bus from the high side of the main transformers.

Rejected because the C Bus would not be available for a unit startup. (There is insufficient space for a generator breaker.)

(b) Feed C Bus from the startup transformers. Unacceptable because loss of C Bus could cause a loss of the startup transformer concurrent with a unit trip.

(c) Provide new switchyard bays, which would feed the new C Bus for each unit.

2.5 Selected Alternative - Auxiliar Power U rade The evaluation of the available alternatives, discussed above, resulted in the selection of the C Bus, Alternative IV, option c. This alternative, is designated "Auxiliary Power Upgrade." The following considerations favor this alternative:

(I) The need for administratively controlling the load on the nuclear safety related busses is eliminated.

(2) Sufficient capacity is provided to power equipment backfitted on Turkey Point as a result of NRC requirements.

(3) Capacity is provided to power equipment being backfitted on Turkey Point to improve plant operability and reliability. For instance, the condensate polishing equipment, which has been added to improve steam generator water .chemistry, will be powered from the C Bus.

(4) Margin is provided for the addition of future safety and non-safety related loads.

(5) Loads on the nuclear safety related busses and switchgear are reduced.

(6) A readily accessible source of power to the plant's 4.I6 kV busses is provided to accommodate the postulated "Station Blackout" scenario (i.e., loss of both offsite power and the emergency diesel-generators). The power source for this operation is the existing Turkey Point Units I and 2 Cranking Diesel Generators.

(7) Additional flexibility is provided for powering non-safety related equipment.

(8) Some non-safety related loads are removed from the nuclear safety related busses thereby providing additional separation of nuclear safety related and non-safety related equipment.

JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page l 0 of 25 (9) The modification can be made within the existing physical (spatial) constraints at the facility.

(l 0) The modification can acceptability accommodate present NRC requirements applicable to the Turkey Point facility.

(I I) Removal of non-vital MCC's to the C Bus eliminates the need to automatically load shed these loads upon loss of offsite power.

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page I I of 25 3.0 DESIGN The function of the Auxiliary Power Upgrade is to augment the AC and DC auxiliary electrical power system by providing new non-safety related switchgear and load centers. This new equipment accommodates the removal of some existing non-safety related equipment from the safety related busses.

plants'uclear Existing motor control centers (MCC's) are designated vital (nuclear safety related) or non-vital (non-safety related). The physical limitations of the plant essentially preclude the physical relocation of MCC's, and the ability to install new MCC s is limited. Accordingly, a non-vital MCC is tranferred to the C Bus by removing the bus section that interconnects vital and non-vital sections of an MCC. The non-vital section is then connected to a C Bus power feed. In theory this process should be straightforward since it merely involves the physical separation of nuclear safety related and non-safety related sections of an in situ MCC. In practice, however, the separation is complicated by the fact that NRC requirements are associated with non-safety related equipment, e.g.,

Appendix R and TMI.

The basic design philosophy adopted for the, Auxiliary Power Ugrade is to:

(I) provide a non-safety related C Bus that is not powered from the plant's nuclear safety related busses (A & B busses),

(2) place loads on the C Bus that are:

(a) non-safety related, (b) not required to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe (hot) shutdown condition, and (c) not required to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in off-site exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of I 0 CFR l00.

(3) assure separation of the nuclear safety related busses and the "not" nuclear safety related C Bus, and (4) assure separation of the "not" nuclear safety related C Bus and the station's cranking diesels during operating configurations that do not require power from the cranking diesels.

The C Bus switchgear is non-safety related; located outdoors; not designed to the single failure criterion; and not procured to Class IE requirements.

3. I Auxiliar Power U ade Desi n Power for the Auxiliary Power Upgrade is from the Turkey Point 240 kV Switchyard (see Figure 2). Unit 3 receives power from a new Bay 3 through two oil circuit breakers; one from the Northwest Bus and one from the Northeast Bus. Unit 4 receives power from a new Bay IO through a breaker and a half scheme off the Southwest and Southeast busses. Each unit's 240 kV feeder from the switchyard provides. power to a C Bus

0 JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page l2 of 25 transformer. The Unit 3 and 4 feeders are well separated, originating from opposite ends of the switchyard.

The C Bus transformer is similar in rating to the existing startup transformer. The output of each C Bus transformer feeds the 3C and 4C busses through its two secondary windings. Normal operation provides power to the 3C Bus from the 3C transformer, and the 4C Bus from the 4C transformer. In the event that one transformer is not available, each transformer is sufficiently sized that it can supply all the 3C and 4C loads simultaneously through its dual secondary windings.

To maintain continuous power supply to important operational equipment, a fast automatic transfer between the two C Bus transformers is provided in the event that either C Bus transformer is lost. This transfer scheme is designed to occur within IO cycles following the loss of a "C" bus transformer. A description of the operation of the fast transfer is presented for Unit 3 (refer to Figure 3), Unit 4 is similar.

The fast auto transfer between C busses allows the plant to accommodate, without trip or runback, a disruption in the power supply to a unit s C Bus transformer. The fast auto C Bus transfer would have prevented the February, I 984 unit trips that resulted from loss of a C Bus transformer. It is also shown in the failure mode effect analyses (FMEA), of Section 3.3, that a fast auto transfer can prevent simultaneous runbacks on both units that could result from a,fault in either breaker 3ACOI or 4ACOI. The FMEA indicates that auto transfer eliminates turbine runback as a consequence of events that cause loss of the C Bus transformer.

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The fast transfer from the normal feed breaker 3ACI6 to the alternate feed breaker 3ACOI will occur when the feed from breaker 3ACI6 is lost due a C Bus transformer lockout or a C Bus transformer 240 kV bus lockout. The transfer will be prevented if: (I) the cranking diesel generator incoming breaker 3AC03 is closed, or (2) the tie breaker to the vital busses, breaker 3ACI3 is closed, or (3) the Unit 3 C Bus is locked out, or (4) the Unit 4 C Bus transformer is locked out or (5) the sync-check permissive is not present.

The design of the transfer scheme utilizes a fast sync-check relay which will monitor the Unit 3 "C" bus decaying voltage and the Unit 4 C Bus transformer voltage, which is the alternate supply. This relay will provide a permissive contact to allow the transfer to occur. A normally closed auxiliary contact from breaker 3ACI6 will initiate the transfer when the breaker is opened under the conditions described above. The transfer will be blocked if not performed within IO cycles after breaker 3ACI6 is opened. The sync-check relay is included as a protection feature which will prevent the transfer from occuring if out-of-phase conditions are present. The transfer back to the normal supply will be accomplished manually.

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page l3 of 25 The C busses are comprised of 4. I 6 kV switchgear, 3AC and 4AC for Units 3 and 4 respectively. This switchgear is non-safety related and accomodates only non-safety related equipment loads. Switchgear 3AC and 4AC, located outdoors just east of the discharge canal, are rated for a nominal interrupting capability of 350MVA.

The C busses provide power to 480V load centers 3E, 3F and 3G for Unit 3 and 4E, 4F and 4G for Unit 4. Load centers 3E and 4E were previously powered from the vital busses whereas 3F, 3G, 4F and 4G are new outdoor load centers. In general, loads between IOO hp and 300 hp will be connected directly to the 480V load centers. Smaller loads are connected to the Motor Control Centers (MCC) which receive power from the Load Centers.

3.l.l Station Blackout Subs stem A Station Blackout scenario can only be postulated assuming a concurrent loss of the offsite and onsite AC power supplies. To facilitate the plants capability to accommodate such an event, the Auxiliary Power Upgrade provides an additional source of power to the A and B 4.I6 kV nuclear safety related busses'(See Figure 2). The power is from the Fossil Units I and 2 Cranking Diesel Generators through a feeder to the Units 3 and 4 C busses. This feeder is rated at 5000KVA which is basically the equivalent of two nuclear plant emergency diesel-generators. The C Bus, in turn, is capable of providing power to the A and B busses through a feeder to the existing A and B bus tie.

The Station Blackout 4. I6 kV bus connections are installed for use during a station blackout condition. To prevent inadvertent breaker operation during normal operating conditions, the following design measures are provided. Electrical interlocks assure proper sequential operation of breakers to make the cross connections. In order to close the Cranking Diesel-Generator Output Breaker (4W26466), breakers 3AC03 and 4AC03 at the C busses must be open. Breakers 3AC03 or 4AC03 cannot close unless Bus 3C or 4C respectively is isolated from its transformer and breaker 4W26466 is closed. (Breakers 3ACOI and 3ACI6 or 4ACOI and 4AC I6 must be open to isolate the transformers from the Unit 3 or 4 C Bus.) Finally, the tie breakers, 3ACI3 or 4ACI3, to the nuclear safety related busses cannot be closed unless breaker 3AC03 or 4AC03 is closed. These nuclear safety related tie breakers cannot be closed if either 3ACI6 or 3ACOI is closed on Unit 3, or either 4AC I 6 or 4ACO I is closed on Unit 4. The design of the interlocks is such that the likelihood of an inadvertent, unintentional cross connection is minimal because the C Bus would first have to be de-energized before the C Bus could be connected to the cranking diesels.

ln addition, the normal operating conditions are such that Breakers 3AC03 and 4AC03 (C Bus input from the Cranking Diesel-Generators), 3ACI3 and 4ACI3 (connection from C busses to the A and B bus ties), 3AA09, 4AA09, 3AB22 and 4AB22 (A and B bus tie breakers) will be racked out.

JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page l4 of 25 3.1.2 ~RI P The Turkey Point Switchyard consists of East and West Operating busses as shown on Figure 2. Offsite transmission lines and onsite AC power systems are connected to these switchyard busses in a breaker and a half configuration. The east and west busses are further divided into North and South bus sections by normally closed breakers 6/7B and 5/6A. This switchyard bus segmentation scheme allows the switchyard to acceptably accommodate a fault on one of the power lines or bus sections. !t also provides the necessary flexibility for performance of switchyard maintenance and modifications.

Should a fault occur on one of the four busses, the relay protection system is designed to open and lockout all the breakers connected to the bus and open the appropriate tie breaker between the North and South sections; thereby isolating the faulted bus from the three operating busses. Backup relaying is provided for all the 240 kV breakers in case one should fail to open within a preset time. This backup protection opens the next set of breakers away from the bus to clear the fault.

Protection and isolation of the switchyard from a fault on one of the lines coming from the plants is provided by primary and secondary differential relay schemes which trip associated breakers in the plant and switchyard to isolate a fault.

The failure mode evaluation in Section 3.3 and the fault tree model in Section 3.4 include the busses and oil circuit breakers in the switchyard.

3.I.3 DCS stem and l20V AC S stem Chan e The Auxiliary Power Upgrade includes the installation of a new non-safety related DC system and a non-safety related l20V AC Uninterruptible Power Supply. The new l25V DC system provides DC control power for the Auxiliary Power Upgrade switchgear and future non-safety related DC loads. Additionally, some non-safety related loads transferred to the new DC system provide spare capacity to meet projected nuclear safety related load growth. The l20V AC Uninterruptible Power Supply provides for essential non-safety related loads such as the telemetering system.

3.I.4 Electrical Loads Transferred to C Bus The Auxiliary Power Upgrade augmented the capabilities of the onsite power distribution system by providing a new non-safety related distribution system. Appendix D provides a tabulation of the loads that were transferred from the safety-related distribution system to the new non-safety related distribution system.

A basic design premise on which the plant is licensed is that only nuclear safety related (vital) items are essential to;

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page IS of 25 o the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, o the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe (hot),.

shutdown condition, and o the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in off-site exposures comparable to the guideline exposure of IO CFR l00.

4 Items not essential to these functions are non-safety related, and are powered by non-vital power supplies, or can be separated electrically from a vita I power supply.

The loads in Appendix D are reviewed to ensure NRC commitments and requirements are still met (see Section 3.2). As a result of this review,,

some individual non-vital loads are relocated to derive their power supply from a vital A or B bus. These include:

o One CRDM cooler fan for Unit 4, o The sample pump associated with containment radiation monitors R-I I and R-I2, and o Wide range noble gas effluent monitors installed pursuant to NUREG 0737 requirements.

3.I.5 Auxiliar Power U ade Partial lm lementation Figure 4 shows the existing, interim, C Bus arrangement. It is operated with the Unit 3 C Bus transformer supplying the Unit 4 C Bus, and the Unit 4 C Bus transformer supplying the Unit 3 C Bus. The availability of the Unit 3 and 4 startup transformers is required by NRC in this operating configuration. Assuming Unit 3 is modified to derive its C Bus power source from Bay 3 of the switchyard and Unit 4 is in the interim configuration, then, normal operation would remain with the C Bus transformers cross-tied as in the interim configuration. The basis follows:

(I) loss of the Unit 3 C Bus transformer would cause Unit 4 to run back. If runback fails and the unit trips, Unit 4 would auto-transfer to its startup transformer. The Unit 3 startup transformer would not be affected, and Unit 3 would remain online, (2) loss of the Unit 4 C Bus transformer would cause Unit 3 to run back. If runback fails and the unit trips, Unit 3 would auto-transfer to its startup transformer. The Unit 4 startup transformer could become unavailable, but Unit 4 would remain online with power from the Auxiliary Transformer, (3) if the Unit 4 startup transformer were out of service and isolated, the Unit 4 C Bus transformer would be unavailable.

Thus, Unit 3 could not be run.without powering the, Unit 3 C Bus from the Unit 3 C Bus transformer.

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page I 6 of 2S (4) if the Unit 3 startup transformer were unavailable and isolated, both Unit 3 and 4 C Bus transformers would be available. There would be no physical power limitation on either unit.

A similar scenario results if Unit 4 is modified to derive its power from Bay IO of the switchyard, and Unit 3 is in the interim configuration.

From the above, it is concluded that the operation of the C Bus in the interim cross-tied configuration will be continued until both Unit 3 and 4 C Bus transformers feeds to switchyard Bays 3 and IO are placed in service.

3.2 Com arison with NRC Re uirements The C Bus design and loads transferred to C Bus are reviewed against:

o Electrical power system requirements cited in the FSAR o Electrical power system requirements cited in the Technical Speci fications o Appendix R fire protection safe shutdown equipment requirements.

o Equipment operability requirements set forth in the Technical Specif ication o Emergency Operating Procedures The comparison with-the above NRC requirements are provided in the paragraphs that follow.

3.2. I Com arison with FSAR and Technical S cification Criteria The FSAR and Technical Specification criteria provide for reliable, redundant power supplies to nuclear safety related equipment. The Auxiliary Power Upgrade was specifically designed to assure compliance with this criterion. The C Bus r'emoves some non-safety related loads from the A and B nuclear safety related busses. Since these non-safety related loads are further isolated from safety related busses, the modification improves the separation between those loads vital to nuclear plant safety and those that are not. In addition, the design improves the margin in the nuclear safety related electrical system for undervoltage and overcurrent conditions.

Power for the C Bus is provided from the switchyard and is independent of the plant operating condition.

The loads transferred to the C Bus are primarily loads powered from non-vital sections of the 480V MCC's. These loads would not normally be powered from the station's emergency diesels, and thus, are not vital to maintaining the plant in a safe shutdown. condition, and are not vital for

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page l7 of 25 mitigating the consequences of accidents. This notwithstanding, the C Bus is provided with alternate power supplies to assure power to it during non-normal conditions, namely, from a separate winding on the other unit's C Bus transfor'mer or from the station's cranking diesels.

A comparison of FSAR criteria and Technical Specification requirements associated with the Auxiliary Power Upgrade design is presented in Appendices B and C. The C Bus design acceptably accommodates these requirements.

The review included the Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Technical Specifications through Amendment l02/96 dated 3/l3/84.

3.2.2 tm act on Fire Protection Safe Shutdown E ui ment The fire protection modifications required by IO CFR 50 Appendix R Section lll.G (Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability) and Ill.i (Alternative Shutdown Capability) are in the process of being designed.

The schedule for completion of these modifications is presently being coordinated with the NRC. To assure that the Auxiliary Power Upgrade does not invalidate the Appendix R work, a review of the Auxiliary Power Upgrade was performed to identify its impact on the safe shutdown equipment power supplies identified in the Appendix R submittal.

Some equipment transferred to the C busses is assumed in Appendix R evaluations to be available for safe shutdown in the event of a concurrent loss of offsite power and a fire. A standby Steam Generator Feedpump is provided for each unit. It is powered directly from the C busses, and is provided to accommodate safe shutdown requirements for a fire in the Auxiliary Feedpump area. Credit was taken for powering these pumps from the cranking diesel generators in the Appendix R submittal.

The design criteria for fire protection does not assume a loss of both onsite emergency diesel generators so that the connection of the Unit I and 2 cranking diesel generators would be made up only to the C Bus. The safety related busses would still be separated from the C Bus with power being provided for A and B busses from the emergency diesel generator(s).

In this configuration C Bus tie breakers 3ACI3 and 4ACI3 remain racked out.

A review of Appendix R safe Shutdown equipment indicated that several loads (see Table 2) are powered from C.Bus, some as a result of transferring non-vital load blocks. These C Bus loads will be evaluated to determine if power supply changes are necessary. Any modifications identified will be consistent with the Appendix requirements.

R 3.2.3 Emer enc 0 eratin Procedures Review The modifications to the plant electrical distribution system described in this report have been reviewed against. the Emergency Operating

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page I 8 of 25 Procedures (EOP's) to ensure that these procedures were not adversely affected by the design changes.

The following EOP's were included in this review:

EOP 20000 (I 2/22/83) Immediate Actions and Diagnostics EOP 2000I (02/02/84) Loss of Reactor Coolant EOP 20002 (Ol/l2/84) Loss of Secondary Coolant EOP 20003 (04/07/83) Steam Generator Tube Rupture EOP 20004 (02/23/84) Loss of Offsite Power EOP 20005 (IO/27/83) Control Room Inaccessibility EOP 20009 (02/02/84) Containment Post Accident Monitoring System Operating Instructions The purpose of this review was to verify that emergency actions identified in the EOP's could be carried out without the C Bus energized.

Each EOP was reviewed assuming that offsite power was not available.

Each action required by these procedures was checked against the power availability of the emergency diesel generators. Any time a piece of equipment was called on to operate, its power source was checked to assure that it would be available when only diesel generators provided onsite power. All pump operations, valve manipulations and indication requirements were checked to ensure that power would be available during an accident recovery.

This review concluded that the minimum actions required to perform an orderly shutdown or respond to an accident could be performed when the emergency diesel generators are the only source of onsite power.

3.2 4 Com arison with Technical S cification 0 rabilit Re uirements C Bus loads have been reviewed with regard to their potential association with Plant Technical Specifications equipment operability requirements (see Table 3). The C Bus related equipment that would impose operating restrictions on the plant as specified in the Technical Specifications are the air particulate and gas monitors R-I I and R-l2 which monitor containment atmosphere for purging and RCS leak detection. Loss of this equipment will require remedial action or plant shutdown.

3.3 Failure Mode Effect Anal sis A failure mode effect analysis at the equipment level was conducted for the proposed C Bus design. Equipment from the switchyard grid down to the A, B and C 4.I6 kV busses was analyzed. The failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) is provided in Appendix E.

The FMEA was conducted for the plant condition where:

JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page l9 of 25 Both Units 3 & 4 are at full power The auxiliary, startup and C Bus transformers are aligned in their normal configuration Oil circuit breakers (OCB's) in the switchyard are in their normal position.

Plant loads are powered from their normal power supply.

The FMEA is a non-mechanistic, first contigency evaluation. For example, a breaker is assumed to go from its normal to its non-normal position regardless of relaying provided to prevent this action. Similarly the breaker is assumed to fault regardless of whether it is open or closed. The plant's reaction to 'such an event is then analyzed without additional failures. A resulting 4. l6 kV bus lockout is assumed to initiate trip signals to all 4. l6 kV breakers (and OCB's if necessary) required to achieve the bus lockout the breakers are assumed to open.

Multiple failures that could cause loss of a 4. I 6 kV bus are provided by the tree evaluation in section 3.4. 'ault From the FMEA and Figure 2 the following conclusions can be made:

A fault asso'ciated with the fossil unit's startup transformer will not affect the availability of the Unit 3 or 4 startup or C Bus transformers.

(2) A fault associated with the fossil Units I and 2 generator or main transformer will not affect the availability of the Unit 3 or 4 startup or C Bus transformers.

(3) A single failure will not allow the cranking diesel Station Blackout tie to be closed on to the C Bus while it is powered from either unit's C Bus transformer.

A single failure will not close the Station Blackout tie between the A and B, and C busses while the C Bus is powered from either unit's C Bus transformer.

(5) A fault associated with either unit's C Bus or its associated transformer, will not affect the availability of either unit's star tup transformer.

(6) A fast-auto transfer between C Bus transformers reduces the likelihood of turbine runback and unit trip.

The conclusions reached by the FMEA remain valid as long as the failures are random and independent. Common cause effects that can cause multiple equipment failures from a single event, such as the door-vibration-related trips of February l 6, l 984 are not addressed by an FMEA of this scope. The fault tree approach provided in Section 3.4 analyzes the effects of failure combination modes more effectively than the FMEA.

3.4 Reliabilit (Fault Tree) Evaluations An evaluation was performed on the C Bus design using fault tree analysis.

The fault tree technique provides a systematic method for studying the 4.l6 kV system that allows for the modeling of the interaction of

0 JPE-L80-I 2 .

Rev. 0 Page 20 of 25 components and subsystems. Evaluation of the overall system, can define failure combinations that are not apparent when a component or subsystem is evaluated as a separate entity.

The fault tree modeled the switchyard and the inplant 4.I6 kV electrical system to the equipment level. It did not model explicitly all associated relaying or the diesel generator auto-transfer. Modeling of 4.I6 kV and switchyard relay-related events was sufficient to define the interactions between components in the fault tree. Accordingly, the fault tree model provided by Appendix F is designed to identify combinations of events and failures that:

could cause loss of any 4. I6 kV bus (i.e., 3A or 38 or 3C or 4A or 48 or 4C),

could cause loss of both C busses (3C and 4C),

could cause loss of all 4.I6 kV busses on a unit (3A and 38 and 3C, or 4A and 48 and 4C).

Table 4 provides the equipment lineups assumed in the fault tree. The types of faults modeled include:

normally operating component fails in service, standby component fails when demanded or during subsequent service, spurious component action The fast auto-transfer between C Bus transformers and Auxiliary to

,Startup Transformers was modeled to the relay level. The objective of the modeling was to ensure that the C Bus transfer availability is comparable to the availability of the existing auxiliary to startup fast auto transfer.

The analysis further assumed the current technical specifications are followed; loss of busses 3A or 38 or 4A or 48 results in a reactor/turbine-generator trip; and loss of 3C or 4C results in a turbine runback requiring quick operator action to prevent a reactor trip.

The fault tree model provided in Appendix F was quantified and solved utilizing SETS, (CDC version 'I.02).

The cut sets for the 4. I6 kV system indicate that there are no cut sets of order 2 that could cause loss of the main generator and offsite power supply for all three 4. I6 kV busses on a unit. Or stated differently, at least 3 fault events are required to cause the concurrent loss of the A, 8 and C busses. The most probable concurrent three events on Unit 3 or 4 has a probability of 5.4 x IO-~. The following must occur concurrently for this scenario:

o C Bus local fault o Startup Transformer local fault o Unit trips after failure to runback

JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page 2l of 25 Even if this scenario were assumed, the A and B busses could still be supplied from the emergency diesel generators.

There are cut sets of order 3 that could cause loss of offsite power to all three 4.I6. kV busses. The combined probability of any one of the twenty-six (26) scenarios occuring is 9.7 x l 0-8.

The loss of main generator and offsite power to both 4.I6 kV C busses simultaneously cannot be initiated by a single event. There are forty six (46) cut sets of order two (2) that could cause this to occur. The combined probability of any one of these 46 cut sets occuring is 3.3 x l0-6. The most probable cut set of order two (2) has a probability of occurence of 2.56 x l0-6. All forty five (45) other cut sets are of order of magnitude l0-7 or less. The most probable cut set assumes the following occur simultaneously:

o Unit 3 C Bus Transformer fault o Unit 4 C Bus Transformer fault Even if both C Bus tranformers are assumed to fault concurrently, the C busses can be supplied from the station's cranking diesels.

0 JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 22 of 25 4.0 SAFETY EVALUATION

4. I Criteria The following criteria were used for performing a safety evaluation of the design of the Auxiliary Power Upgrade:

o Is there an increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

o ls there a possibility that an accident may be created which is of a different type than any previously evaluated?

o Is there an increase in the probability of occurrence or consequences of equipment malfunctions previously evaluated?

o ls there a possibility that an equipment malfunction may be created which is of a different type than previously evaluated?

o Will a reduction result in the margin of safety contained in the bases for Technical Specifications?

o Are new or modified Technical Specifications required?

4.2 Evaluation As is indicated in Section 3.0, the Auxiliary Power Upgrade is consistent with the General Design Criteria in the FSAR Sections l.3, 8.I and Appendix 5A. In addition, the review of Technical Specif ications associated with the electrical distribution system indicate that the Auxiliary Power Upgrade is consistent with the criteria in Sections l.2,

,B3.7, and B4.8. Additionally:

o Equipment transferred to the C Bus is not nuclear safety related. By design it is not relied upon to protect the public health and safety, and thus is not powered from the emergency diesel generators for accomodating design basis events.

The only inter-tie between nuclear safety related and non safety related busses incorporated in the design provides a backup power supply to the nuclear safety related busses for Station Blackout conditions.

The nuclear safety related system is separated from the non-nuclear safety related system by a nuclear safety related breaker at the A & B busses, and a C Bus non-safety related breaker. The latter is provided with a protective interlocking scheme to prevent closure unless Station Blackout conditions exist.

Component failure or loss of power to the C Bus could cause unit trip without fast auto-transfer of the C Bus.

JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page 23 of 25 o Removal of loads from the nuclear safety related busses increases the ability to accommodate undervoltage conditions that can be associated with the nuclear safety related busses.

o The C Bus design brings two new independent power sources to the nuclear plants, namely, direct ties to switchyard Bays 3 and l0, and a direct tie to the stations cranking diesels. This provides additional power sources to the nuclear units.

o More equipment is added to the non-safety related portions of the plant design. This increases, somewhat, the likelihood of a unit trip due to interruptions in the C Bus switchyard power supply. A unit trip is an anticipated operational occurrence that is routinely accommodated by the plant.

The C Bus design improves the nuclear safety related aspects of the plant design vital to protection of public health and safety. This is achieved with some small increase in the likelihood of unit trip associated with the unavailability of the C Bus. The fault tree analysis demonstrates that this increased probability is quite small, and that the C Bus availability is as good as the A or B busses switchyard availability. Accordingly, it is concluded that any increase in the frequency of a unit trip introduced by the C Bus addition is more than offset by the increased ability of the nuclear safety related busses to accommodate undervoltage conditions.

The Appendix R safe shutdown equipment identified hereinbefore will be evaluated to ensure that the NRC Appendix R commitments remain valid.

With regard to the RCS leakage monitoring function, the Technical Specifications place a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> inoperability limit on the containment gas and particulate monitor. This in effect puts a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> limit on the concurrent inoperability of the C busses. Movement of this monitoring function back to a power source from the A or B busses eliminates this C Bus Technical Specification interaction.

There has been no instance identified where the Emergency Procedures have been unacceptably impacted by the transfer of loads to the C Bus.

Prior to C Bus non-vital loads could be selectively aligned to the emergency diesel generators during a loss of offsite power provided sufficient diesel generator capacity was available. The non-vital loads currently powered from the C Bus cannot be aligned to the emergency diesel generators during a loss of offsite power because of the interlocking of the C Bus tie breaker(s). Since these non-vital loads are not designed to accommodate severe natural phenomenona, they are not relied upon for design basis events. A sustained loss of offsite power for other than the occurrence of severe natural phenomena, is not anticipated to last more than 'h hour. Thus, the C busses could be powered from either Bay 3 or Bay l0 of the switchyard shortly after the occurrence of the loss of offsite power event. Additionally, the cranking diesels provide a backup power supply to the C busses. The FMEA and fault tree analyses demonstrate that the C busses provide an additional reliable source of 4.I6 kV power.

For the majority of off-normal conditions the non-vital C Bus loads will be available.

JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page 24 of 25 Based on the above evaluation the following conclusions can be drawn.

o The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident previously evaluated will not be increased because the C Bus modification does not affect equipment associated with these events. Any loads required to follow the course, or evaluate the severity of an accident will remain on an appropriate source of power.

o An accident should not be created which is of a different type than any already evaluated because the original functions of the affected components have not changed. Although the auxiliary power source, originally supplied directly from the generator, is now supplied from both the generator and the switchyard, the types of accidents (loss of off-site power or loss of AC power) and their consequences remain unchanged.

o The probability of occurrence and consequences of equipment malfunctions vital to the nuclear safety related functions, which have already been evaluated is not increased because none of the affected components are associated with the C Bus.

o A malfunction of equipment vital to nuclear safety has not been created which is of a different type than any already evaluated because these components are not transferred to the C Bus and the design does not change the function of the components nor does it alter the consequences of their failure.

o There is some increase in the probability of a unit trip. Fast C Bus auto. transfer ensures that this increase in probability is acceptably low.

o As shown by Appendix C, the Technical Specifications are not changed by the Auxiliary Power Upgrade.

o The need for a new Technical Specification has not been identi fied.

o The margin of safety as defined in Technical Specifications B3.7 and B4.8 is not reduced because power requirements of the nuclear safety related loads are still met, and no increase in loads on the nuclear safety related busses has occurred. The reliability of the 4.l6 kV nuclear safety relapsed electrical system has not decreased since the modification reduced the loads on the nuclear safety related busses and the modifications do not effect the ability of the emergency diesel generators to supply nuclear safety related loads.

The result of this evaluation is that the C Bus design is implementable such that there is no unreviewed safety question and no modification of Technical Specifications associated with the Auxiliary Power Upgrade.

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 25 of 25

5.0 CONCLUSION

S The information included in this report outlines the steps taken by FPL in response to the need for modifying the plants electrical-distribution system. After the concerns regarding the adequacy of the system were identified, a review of available options was made. This review included; review of the design criteria, updating design requirements to cover new circumstances, investigation of design alternatives, and the selection of the best alternative design for the plant.

FPL believes this design meets all design criteria stated in the FSAR. The addition of the C Bus to the auxiliary power system has added a non-safety related bus to a system which previously powered all loads through nuclear safety related busses. Since only non-safety related loads will be powered by the C bus, nuclear safety related equipment will not be affected by the change.

The safety evaluation indicates that the design proposed herein is implementable under IOCFR50.59 since; (i) an unreviewed safety question has not been identified, and (ii) the need for a modification to the plants Technical Specifications has not been identified.

FPL requests that the NRC review and approve these modifications so that the final design changes can be incorporated.

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 TABLE I Anticipated Electrical Load Growth From l98I to l990 ITEM EXPECTED POWER REQUIREMENTS Condensate Polisher 50 K per unit Technical Support Center 500 KVA Cable Spread Room Air Conditioning I5 KVA Service Air Compressor 200 KVA per unit Warehouses 400 KVA Miscellaneous Motor Operated Valves 20 KVA per unit Sewage Treatment Plant 300 KVA Computer Room Air Conditioning 20 KVA Nuclear Administration Building I50 KVA Nuclear Stores Building 50 KVA Spent Fuel Pump New Power Supply l00 KVA per unit Instrument Air Compressors 70 KVA per unit Control Room HVAC Upgrade Undetermined Security System Expansion Undetermined Amertap System l40 KVA per unit

O 0

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 TABLE 2 APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT REQUIRING EVALUATION+

EtiuEi>ment Present Power Su I Standby Steam Generator Feedpumps C Bus Auxiliary Building Supply & Exhaust Fans MCC-D (Non-Vital Section)

VCT Low-Level Isolation Valves LCV I I SC MCC-3B (Non-Vital Section)

LCV~I I 5C MCC-4B (Non-Vital Section)

Excess Letdown Valves HCV I 37 and Lighting panel 50 (MCC-D

'HCV-4-I 37 Non-Vital Section)

+MCC feeder breakers for MCC's 3A,38, 3C, 3E, 4A, 4B, 4C; 4E, D, F are also referenced in the Appendix R safe shutdown report submitted to NRC and will be evaluated.

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page I of 3 TABLE 3 Com arison With Technical S cification 0 erabilit Re uirements Potential Tech. Spec C Bus Load Association Evaluation-Basis Rod Control System 3.2-4.a - "No more than A functional control rod Backup Transformers one inoperable control rod system is required for 3X I8; 4X I8 shall be permitted..." ~ normal plant operation.

(MCC's 3B & 4B) Loss of control rod power supplies wil I not impact safe shutdown or accident mitigation. In addition these serve as a backup power supply and loss will not affect even normal operation.

Rod Position Inverter 3.2-5" If... the rod Rod position indication is 3YO3; 4YO3 deviation monitor alarm is required for normal plant (MCC's 3C & 4B) not operable, rod positions operation. Loss of rod shall be logged..." position indication will not impact safe shutdown or accident mitig'ation. In addition, these serve as a backup power supply and loss will not affect even normal operation.

tn-core drive system 3.2-7.a "A minimum of This equipment is used to (MCC's 3B & 4B) I 6 thimbles... (and) conduct survei I lance of associated detectors nuclear instrumentation. Loss shall be operable..." of in-core instrumentation will not prevent safe shut-down or accident mitigation.

Steam Generator Feed 3.5 Instrumentation re- Loss of the C Bus causes a Pump 3B (4B) Breakers quirements include loss of power to the feed-Auxiliary Feedwater Ini- water pump and initiates tiation on "Trip of both Auxiliary Feedwater flow.

Main Feedwater Pump Operation of main feedwater Breakers" and Feedwater "

pump is not required for Line Isolation on "Safety safe shutdown or accident Injection". mitigation. Securing of main feedwater flow is assumed in main steam line break analysis.

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 2 of 3 TABLE 3 (con't.)

Potential Tech. Spec C Bus Load Association Evaluation-Basis VCT Charging Pump 3.6-b.l, 4; c.l,4 "A Manual operation of this Suction Valves reactor shall not be made equipment would be required LCV-3-I I 5C; LCV-4-I I SC critical unless... two on loss of C Bus to assure (MCC's 3B & 4B) associated charging pumps proper charging pump suction shall be operable... " path.

Startup Transformer 3.7- I a - "Either reactor This provides an alternate 3X03; 4X03 Cooling shall not be star'ted... source of power for trans-Equipment Alternate without: a. the associated former cooling. Normal Feed. 239kV/4I60 V startup trans- power supply is not from the former in service." C Bus. Loss of the C Bus wilI not af feet transformer availability.

Air Particulate & Gas 3. I-3e "Above 2% of rated These. monitors are required Monitors R- I I, R- I 2 power, two leak detection to monitor radioactive (MCC's 3B & 4B) .systems of different prin- releases during normal ciples shall be operable discharges and accidents.

one of which is sensitive R- I I and R- l2 provide signals to radioactivity." for isolation of containment 3.9-2.d, e. g.-d. purge, control room isolation "AII radioactive waste and RCS leak detection.

discharged thru the plant Isolation functions appear vent shal I be continuously in proposed TMI Tech. Specs.

monitored..." e. "The Loss of C Bus will affect the normal response of the operation of this equipment.

plant vent gas monitor Post accident vent monitoring shall be verified...". is provided by wide range

g. "Containment atmos- monitors as a backup to phere shall be sampled R-I I and R-I2.

"prior to purging..."

3. I 0.2. "The containment vent and purge system...

radiation monitors shall... be operable... "

Waste Disposal System 3.4-6 "Post Accident Con- Loss of C-Bus will impact Gas Compressor (MCC-3C tainment Vent System... operation of support equip-

& 4C); Auxiliary Building All valves, interlocks, and ment for Post Accident Con-Exhaust Fan (MCC-D) piping associated with the tainment Vent System. FSAR above components and re- specifically allows repairs quired for post-accident to necessary equipment be-operation are operab le." cause the system operation is many days after an acci--

dent.

JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page 3 of 3 TABLE 3 (con't.)

Potential Tech. Spec C Bus Load Association Evaluation-Basis Screen Wash Pumps 3. l4.2b "With one water The screen wash pumps provide supply below the minimum a backup source of fire specified limit for one suppression water in the event day, connect the spool that the normal source is below piece to make the screen its minimum level. Loss of the wash pumps available for C Bus affects this backup source.

fire water supply." Appendix R modifications that are presently being installed wilI eliminate reliance on this backup source of water.

JPE-L84- I 2 .

Rev. 0 TABLE 4 FAULT TREE EQUIPMENT LINEUP ASSUMPTIONS Mode Bus Bus Su I Rormal '333 f13 uxiliary Transformer 3B SE3 Auxiliary Transformer 3C PP3 C Bus Transformer 4A /P4 Auxiliary Transformer 4B SA Auxiliary Transformer 4C P/4 C Bus Transformer Star tup/Shutdown 3A PE3 Startup Transformer 3B /$ 3 Startup Transformer 3C f/3 C Bus Transformer 4A //4 Startup Transformer 4B 84 Startup Transformer 4C /34 C Bus Transformer Auto Transfer 3A and 3B Transfer to /j3 startup on a N3 Generator trip 3C Transfer to //4 C Bus trans-former on PP3 C Bus trans-former loss 4A and 4B Transfer to f74 startup on a 84 generator trip 4C Transfer to N3 C Bus trans-former on /$ 4 C Bus trans-former loss AlI switchyard oil circuit breakers assumed normally closed

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JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page I of 2 APPENDIX A AUXIL'IARYPOWER UPGRADE RELATED PLANT TRIPS Prior to agreements reached with NRC Region II on February 20, l 984, the Turkey Point electrical system was as shown on Figure 4 (in text) with normal power to the Unit 3 C Bus from the Unit 3 C Bus transformer. The Unit 4's C Bus was normally powered from the Unit 4 C Bus transformer.

At 6:38 AM, February l2, l984, a relay protecting the Unit's I and 2 startup transformer operated causing the de-energization of the complete Northeast Bus. This resulted in loss of the Unit 3 startup transformer and C Bus transformer. The loss of the C Bus subsequently resulted in a Unit 3 reactor and turbine trip. Loss of normal offsite power resulted and the plant was placed on natural circulation. Power was provided by the emergency diesel generators to the vital busses A and B.

At 9:45 AM on the same day, while attempting to re-energize the Unit 3 C-Bus from the Unit 4 C Bus transformer, Breaker 4ACOI was closed instead of breaker 3ACOI. This resulted in automatic opening of breaker 4ACI6 (normal supply to Unit 4 C Bus). Loss of the Unit 4 C Bus also resulted in a Unit 4 Reactor and turbine trip. The Unit 4 startup transformer was not lost during this event and the auxiliary transformer loads were automatically transferred to the startup transformer. (Note: Normally breaker 4ACOI should not close due to the sync-check relay interlock. This interlock apparently failed and allowed closure of the breaker.)

On February l6, l984, another plant trip (Units 3 and 4) occurred which was related to the previous plant trips on February l2, l984. At 9:26 AM while an operator was attempting to rack out.the alternate feed to the Unit 4 C Bus (breaker 4ACOI), the normal supply (breaker 4ACI6) opened, because of a relay actuated by jarring of the cubicle door. (Note: This relay was mounted on the door.) Loss of 4 C Bus subsequently tripped the plant. The operator then closed the door and jarred another relay causing back-up protection for breaker 4ACOI. This protection isolated the Unit 3 C Bus transformer by stripping the Northeast Bus. This resulted in a Unit 3 trip and loss of offsite power to the Unit 3 start-up transformer.

As a result of these trips which challenged the plant safety systems, FPL proposed interim changes to the electrical system prior to restart. NRC Region II concurred with these interim changes, and also required FPL to submit the safety evaluation of the Auxiliary Power Upgrade contained herein to the NRC for approval prior to completing all Auxiliary Power Upgrade modifications.

The changes incorporated prior to restart of the Units after February l6, l984 were transmitted to Region II by FPL letter L-84-36 dated February 2l, I 984. A list of these commitments is recopied here for information.

Appendix A JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 2 of 2 I. Switch realignments will be made in Bay 6 and on the Flagami K/2 line which will assure electrical isolation of the nuclear units and the fossil units, and isolation between the nuclear units in the switchyard.

2. Pending long term design changes and modifications, Units'3 and 4 will be operated with each units C Bus powered from the

'ther units C Bus transformer. The feed breaker from each units C Bus transformer to its respective C Bus will be maintained in a racked out configuration to preclude inadvertent operation.

3. Plant procedures for the alignment and administrative control of offsite and onsite power sources will be finalized, reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee, and required operator training will be complete.

4. Administrative controls will be in place which will assure that both startup transformers are operable whenever either nuclear unit is above 50% rated feedwater flow.

'

5. Three vibration sensitive relays on each of the 3C and 4C 4kV switchgear panels will be relocated to stationary panels.

6. In addition to reviews by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee, the Company Nuclear Review Board has reviewed and concurred with the C Bus modification and proposed interim operating configuration prior to returning either unit to power operation.

For the long term, changes will be incorporated which increase the reliability of the C Bus power supply, and which separate this supply from the Units startup transformer. Additionally, relays susceptible to vibration induced plant trip will be reviewed to minimize the reoccurrence of this type of event. Accordingly, there should be fewer challenges to the plant safety systems, and a loss of the Unit'3 C Bus transformer wil I not result in a loss of the Unit 3 startup transformer. The design modification is presented in Section 3.0

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page I of 6 APPENDIX B EVALUATIONOF COMPLIANCE WITH FSAR CRITERIA Criteria Page l.9-2 Section l.9 Quality Assurance Program l.9.2 Applicability "The systems and structures to which this program is applicable are set forth below. It is understood that such systems and structures include associated tanks, pumps, valves, piping, controls, instruments, supports, enclosures, wiring and power supplies. In general, these systems, components and structures have a vital role in the prevention or mitigation of the consequences of accidents which could cause risk to the health and safety of the public."

Page 5A-I Section Appendix 5A Seismic Classification and Design Basis for Structures, Systems and Equipment "The basic design criteria for the maximum hypothetical accident and earthquake conditions is that there be no loss of function if that function is related to public safety."

Evaluation The C Bus contains no loads (see Appendix D) which have a vital role in the prevention or mitigation of the consequences of accidents which could cause risk to the health and safety of the public. The safety related systems are powered from the A and B 4.16kV busses. The breaker between C Bus and the existing A and B 4.I6kV tie bus is interlocked to prevent its being closed,- except under a Station Blackout abnormal condition, to preclude interaction of the C Bus and the nuclear safety related busses during normal and emergency conditions. The C Bus was classified as a non-safety related bus because it contained no nuclear safety related loads vital to maintenance of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, vital to the prevention and mitigation of accidents, and vital to achieving and maintaining hot safe shutdown conditions.

Criterion Page l.3- I Section l.3. I Overall Requirements (GDC I-GDC 5)

"Class I systems and components are essential to the protection of the health and safety of the public... All systems and components designated Class I are designed so that there is no loss of capability to perform their safety function in the event of the maximum hypothetical seismic ground acceleration..."

Evaluation There has been no change in the power supply for any nuclear safety related (Class I) load. Some of the loads classified as non-Class I were removed from the A and B 4.16kV busses and put on the C Bus. Because there are no seismic class loads on the C Bus the design of the C Bus does not meet seismic criteria.

Appendix B JPE-L84-12 Rev. 0 Page 2of 6 Criteria Page 1.3-11 Section 1.3.1 Reliability and Testability of Protection Systems (GDC 19-GDC 26)

"The initiation of the engineered safety features provided for loss-of-coolant accidents is accomplished from redundant signals derived from reactor coolant system and containment instrumentation. The initiation signal for containment spray comes from coincidence of two sets of two-out-of-three high containment pressure signals. On loss of voltage at the 4160 volt busses, the diesel-generator will be automatically started and connected to the busses."

Page 1.3-12 "Redundancy in emergency power is provided in that there are two diesel-generator sets capable of supplying separate 4160 volt busses.. One complete set of safety features equipment is therefore independently supplied 'from each diesel-generator... The undervoltage relay scheme is designed so that loss of 4160 volt power does not prevent the relay scheme from functioning properly...

The ability of the diesel-generator sets to start within the prescribed time and to carry load can periodically be checked."

Evaluation The initiation logic for the engineered safety features (ESF) and containment spray are not affected by the Auxiliary Power Upgrade. The power supply for ESF equipment is still from the A and B 4.16kV busses. On loss of voltage on these busses, the loads are shed and the diesel-generators are started and connected. The Auxiliary. Power Upgrade merely removed some non-safety related loads from the A and 8 4.16kV busses. Periodic testing of the diesels is unaffected by the change. No new loads were added to the diesel-generators.

Criteria Page 1.3-19 Section 1.3.7 Engineered Safety Features (GDC 37-GDC 65)

"The units are supplied with normal, standby and emergency power sources as follows:

I. The normal source of auxiliary power during operation is the generator.

Power is supplied via the unit auxiliary transformer which is connected to the isolated phase bus of the generator.

2. Power required during startup, shutdown and after reactor trip is supplied from the plant switchyard which has multiple lines running to the transmission system. 4

3. Two diesel-generator sets are connected to the emergency busses to supply power in the event of loss of all other a.c. auxiliary power. Each of the two diesel-generator sets is capable of supplying automatically the engineered safety features load required for any loss-of-coolant accident.

4. Emergency power supply for vital instruments, for control and for emergency lighting is supplied from 125V dc batteries.

Appendix B JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page 3 of '6 The 4!60V bus arrangement and logic network provides the capability to transfer manually component loads to the remaining diesel following the failure of one diesel-generator unit to start."

Evaluation With the addition of the C Bus auxiliary power during operation is provided by the generator and the switchyard. All nuclear safety related equipment is still powered from the generator during normal operation. Several non-safety related loads were removed from the nuclear safety related A and B busses and placed on the C Bus. Only loads not vital to nuclear safety related functions are powered from the switchyard during normal operation.

Power required during startup, shutdown and after reactor trip is still supplied from the switchyard.

The connection of the diesel-generators to the vital busses, load sequencer and equipment needed for accident conditions is not affected by the Auxiliary Power Upgrade. Emergency power supply for vital instruments, for control and for emergency lighting is stil I the vital l 25V DC system.

Criterion Page 8.l-l Section 8.I. I Principal Design Criteria Performance Standards "Those systems and components of reactor facilities which are essential to the prevention of accidents which could affect the public health and safety or the mitigation of their consequences shall be designed, fabricated, and erected to performance standards that will enable the facility to withstand, without loss of the capability to protect the public, the additional forces that might be imposed by natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, flooding conditions, winds, ice and other local site. effects. The design bases so established shall reflect: (a) appropriate consideration of the most severe of these natural phenomena that have been recorded for the site and the surrounding area, and (b) an appropriate margin for withstanding forces greater than those recorded to reflect uncertainties about the historical data and their suitability as a basis for design."

(GDC 2)

Evaluation Systems and components which are essential to prevention and mitigation of accidents are still powered by the A and B 4.I6kV busses. The Auxiliary Power Upgrade removed some non-safety related equipment from these busses, thereby, providing additional margin for short circuit and undervoltage conditions.

Criterion Page 8. I-2 Section 8.I. l Principal Design Criteria "Alternate power systems shall be provided .and. designed vyith adequate independency, redundancy, capacity and testability to permit the functioning

'

Appendix B JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page 4 of 6 required of the engineered safety features. As a minimum, the onsite power system and the offsite power system shall each, independently, provide this capacity assuming a failure of a single active component in each system." (GDC 39)

Evaluation The criteria above is unaffected by the Auxiliary Power Upgrade. The onsite power system and the offsite power system still, independently, provide capacity for the functioning required of the engineered safety features. All engineered safety features are still supplied from the A and B 4.I6kV busses. The removal of non-safety related loads from the A and B busses and placement on the C Bus did not affect any of the engineered safety features. The interconnection of the C Bus to the existing A and B tie bus,provides two series breakers between the C and A bus and the C and B bus. interlocks prevent the inadvertent closing of the breaker at the "C" bus.

Criterion Page 8.2- I Section 8.2. l Network tnterconnections "Even when both nuclear Units 3 & 4 are inoperative, power will be available at the 240kV switchyard from Turkey Point Units I and 2 or from one of the 240kV circuits."

Evaluation The offsite circuits have ample capacity to supply power to the required safe shutdown loads via the startup transformers. This is not affected by the Auxiliary Power Upgrade.

Criterion Page 8.2-2 Section 8.2.2 Station Electrical System "The station electrical system is designed to provide a simple arrangement of busses, requiring a minimum of switching to restore power to a bus in the event the normal supply to that bus is lost."

Evaluation tn all cases a minimum of switching to restore power is still maintained. The C-Bus addition does not change the validity of this criterion. The C Bus is not loaded on the generator and would not have to be switched in the event of a unit trIpe

Appendix B JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 5 of 6 Criterion Page 8.2-3 Section 8.2.2 Electrical System Unit Auxiliary, Startup Transformers and C-Bus Transformer "Each of the two units has an auxiliary transformer connected to the generator isolated phase bus to serve as the normal souce of auxiliary electrical power."

Evaluation The auxiliary transformer still provides the normal source of auxiliary electrical power for all nuclear safety related equipment. Some non-safety related equipment which is not required to be powered from the generator is now powered from the grid via the C Bus transformer.

Criterion Page 8.2-3 Section 8.2.2 Station Electrical System Unit Auxiliary, Startup Transformers and C Bus Transformer "The startup transformer serves the unit during startup, shutdown, and after a unit trip. It also constitutes a standby source of auxiliary power in the event the loss of the unit auxiliary transformer during normal operation. In the event the turbine trips, an automatic transfer connects the 4.I6kV busses to the unit startup transformer."

Evaluation The startup transformer serves the unit's A & B busses during startup, shutdown and after plant trip. It still provides a standby source of power in the event. that the auxiliary transformer is lost. In the event of turbine trip the A and B 4. I6kV busses automatically transfer to the startup transformer. The C Bus transformer

'provides power to the C Bus for normal operation, startup, shutdown or plant trip. The C Bus also provides emergency power to the A and B 4.I6kV busses in the abnormal condition of station blackout. Interlocks prevent interaction between these busses during normal operations.

Criterion Page 8.2- I 5 Section 8.2.3 Emergency Power Of fsite Sources

'The offsite source of power for each unit is its associated 240 - 4.I6kV startup transformer. Each transformer is supplied through overhead cable leads from the 240kV switchyard which in turn is supplied by two 432 MW fossil fuel fired generating units and the two nuclear units...

Each startup transformer normally will be connected to a different 240kV bus.

In the event of a bus fault, at least one startup transformer could be quickly restored to service. Tie breakers in the east.bus,. and in the west bus, are .

located so that the Unit 3 startup transformer will be fed from the north section

Appendix B JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page 6 of 6 and Unit 4 transformer from the south section. Thus, a bus fault will result in the loss of only one star tup transformer."

Evaluation The offsite source of power for each unit is the startup transformer for safety related and some non-safety related loads, and the'C Bus transformer for only non-safety related loads. Each of these transformers is supplied from the switchyard. Each startup transformer is normally powered from different 240kV busses to assure that a single failure will not result in the loss of both startup transformers. Thus adequate electric power is available through offsite sources.

Additionally, the design of the C Bus power supply is such that a loss of the C Bus transformer will not result in the loss of a startup transformer.

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page I of 4 APPENDIX C EVALUATIONOF COMPLIANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CRITERIA Criterion Page I -6 Technical Specification l.20 Safety Related Systems and Components "Those plant features necessary to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in off-site exposures comparable to the guideline exposures of l0 CFR l00."

Evaluation:

The Auxiliary Power Upgrade does not change the power supply to any equipment which is necessary I) to assure integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, 2) for the safe shutdown of the reactor 3) to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition, or 4) to prevent or mitigate accidents which could result in off-site exposures comparable to the guidelines in IOCFR Part l00.

Appendix D is a tabulation of the loads on the C-Bus. The nuclear safety related systems meeting this technical specification definition are powered by the A and B nuclear safety related busses.

Criterion Basis page 3.7-l Technical Specification 3.7 Electrical Systems

'%he electrical system equipment is arranged so that no single contingency can inactivate enough safety features to jeopardize unit safety. The 480 is supplied from 4 load centers and the 4I60 volt equipment is volt'quipment supplied from 2 busses for each nuclear unit."

Evaluation The Auxiliary Power Upgrade is consistent with the design philosophy that no single contingency will inactivate enough safety features to jeopardize plant safety. No safety related equipment is provided power from the C-Bus. All safety related equipment is still powered from two nuclear safety related 4I60V Busses (A and B) and four nuclear safety related 480V Load Centers (A, B, C and D). This aspect of the plant design has not been altered.

Criterion "Multiple outside sources supply power to the nuclear units. The auxiliary equipment is arranged electrically so that multiple items receive their power from the two different sources."

Appendix C JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 2 of 4 Evaluation Power is available at the 240 kV switchyard from Turkey Point Units I or 2 or from one of several off-site 240 kV circuits. Normal power supply to nuclear safety related equipment is from the main generator, through the auxiliary transformer and two 4.I6 kV Busses. The alternate source of power is the startup transformer. This aspect of plant design has not been altered.

Criterion "One outside source of power is required to give sufficient power to run normal operating equipment. One transmission line can supply all the auxiliary power.

One 239-4.I6KV startup transformer can supply the auxiliary loads for its associated nuclear unit and emergency loads (MHA) for the other nuclear unit."

Evaluation The power requirements for safety related equipment was not affected by the Auxiliary Power Upgrade since no new safety related loads were added to the plant. As such, this criterion was not affected by the modification.

Criterion "The bus arrangements specified for operation ensure that power is available to an adequate number of safeguards auxiliaries. With additional switching, more equipment could be out of service without infringing on safety."

Evaluation The nuclear safety related bus arrangement specified by Technical Specification 3.7.I and 3.7.2 are not changed by the Auxiliary Power Upgrade since only non-safety related loads were transferred to the new AC and DC distribution systems.

Criterion "Each diesel generator has sufficient capacity to start and run the required engineered safeguards for a MHA in one unit and safe shutdown of the second unit. The minimum diesel fuel oil inventory at all times is maintained to assure the operation of either diesel carrying I 68 hour7.87037e-4 days <br />0.0189 hours <br />1.124339e-4 weeks <br />2.5874e-5 months <br /> rated load for seven days."

Evaluation The Auxiliary Power Upgrade neither added new safety related loads nor modified safeguard equipment. The addition of the C-Bus and associated equipment has no effect on the loading or loading sequence of the emergency diesel-generator. As such, this criterion is not affected by the modification.

Appendix C JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page 3 of 4 Criterion "With 4 battery chargers in service, the batteries will always be at full charge in anticipation of a loss-of-ac power incident. This ensures that adequate dc power will be available for emergency use."

Evaluation The Auxiliary Power Upgrade included installation of a new non-safety related DC system that is independent of the existing DC systems. Some non-nuclear safety related loads were transferred from the safety related DC system and thus provided additional capacity in the nuclear safety related DC power system.

Criterion "A unit can be safety shutdown without the use of off-site power sin'ce all vital loads (safety systems, instruments, etc.) can be supplied from an emergency diesel generator."

Evaluation The Auxiliary Power Upgrade neither added nor modified safe shutdown equipment. As discussed in Evaluation (S) above, this criterion is not affected by the modification.

Criterion Basis page B4.8-l Technical Specification 4.8 Emergency Power System Periodic Test "The tests specified are designed to demonstrate that the diesel-generators will provide for operation of equipment. They also assure that the emergency generator system controls and the control systems for the safeguards equipment will function automatically in the event of a loss of normal power.

The testing frequency specified is often enough to identify and correct any mechanical or electrical deficiency before it can result in a system failure. The fuel supply and starting circuits and controls, are continuously monitored. Any faults are annunciated. An abnormal condition in these systems would be signaled without having to place the diesel-generators themselves on test.

Each unit, as a backup to the normal standby AC power supply is capable of sequentially starting and supplying the power requirement'df the required safety features equipment. gacP gill assume full load within 60 seconds after the initial starting signal. < l)(2~(3~

The specified fuel supply will ensure power requirements for at least a week.

Station batteries will. deteriorate with time, but precipitous failure will not occur. The surveillance specified is that which has been demonstrated over the years to provide an indication of a cell becoming unserviceable long before it fails.

Appendix C JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page 4 of 4 The equalizing charge will maintain the ampere-hour capability of the battery."

Evaluation As discussed for the previous Tech. Spec. the Auxiliary Power Upgrade did not impact the emergency diesel-generator controls or loads. The station batteries were affected only in the sense that some non-safety related loads were removed from the nuclear safety related DC system. This provides additional capacity in the nuclear safety related DC system. This Technical Specification is not changed or adversely affected by the Auxiliary Power Upgrade.

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page I of 9 APPENDIX D TABULATIONOF C-BUS LOADS Unit 3 C Bus Steam Generator Feedpump 3B Condensate Pump 3C 480V Load Center 3E 480V Load Center 3F 480V Load Center 3G Standby Steam Generator Feedpump Emergency Tie to Unit I/2 Cranking Diesel Generators Emergency Tie to Vital Busses 3A and 3B 480V Load Center 3E MCC 3G Amertap System MCC 3B43 Condensate Polishing Non-vital Section of MCC 3B 480V Load Center 3F MCC F, Water Treatment Area MCC RB, Radwaste Building Tie to L.C. 4F Non-vital Section of MCC D (Alternate Supply)

Tie to L.C. 3G 480V Load Center 3G Technical Support Center (Alternate Supply)

Non-vital Section of MCC 3C (Fuel Area)

Spent Fuel Pump Motor 3P2I2B Tie to L. C. 3F MCC 3B Non-Vital Section Welding Receptacles No's. I7 and l7A Rod Control System Backup Transformer 3XI8 C-Battery Room HVAC Control Building Kitchen Panel DPI 3 Primary Water Makeup Pump 3B (3P I 6B)

Containment Sump Pump 3A (3P23A)

Lighting Transformer 36A (3X036)

Panel 3P82 Battery Room A/C E I 6E Welding Receptacle No. 5 Main Steam Penetration Cooling Fan 3A (3V3I A)

RCS Drain Tank Pump 3A (3P2I8A)

Steam Generator Feedpump Room Exhaust Fan 3B (3V I4B)

Auxiliary Transformer Cooling Equipment 3 (Alternate Feed)

Startup Transformer Cooling Equipment.3. (Alternate Feed)

Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Blower 3B(3V6B)

Appendix D JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 2 of 9 RCP 3B Oil Lift Pump 3P232B Isolated Phase Bus Fan 3B (3VI 9B)

Steam Generator Feedpump 3B Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump (3P34B)

New Fuel Building Elevator 3H9 Air Particulate and Gas Monitor 3V36 Miscellaneous Containment Distribution Panel No. 2 (3P I I) including ln-Core Drive System Welding Receptable No.'s 6, 6A and 6B Sewage Pump B (PS I 8)

Lighting Transfer 3X3 I I Containment Lighting Transformer 36A Switchyard Distribution Transfer Switch DP-7, Alternate Feed Feedwater Penetration Cooling Fan 3A (3V32A)

Reheater 3C Steam Block Valve MOV-3-l433 Reheater 3D Steam Block Valve MOV-3-l434 VCT Charging Pump Suction LCV-3-I I 5C Condenser Pit Sump Pump 3B (3P28B)

Main Transformer Cooling Equipment 3 (Alternate Feed)

CRDM Cooler Fan 3A (3Y2A)

MCC 3C Non-Vital Section Gas Stripper Panel 3C30 Fuel Area Miscallaneous Power Panel DPI I (3P I2)

Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchanger Room Supply Fan 3VI2 Monitor Tank Pump 3 (P206A)

Waste Evaporator Condensate Pump 3 (P22IA)

RCS Drain Tank Pump 3B (3P2I8B)

Refueling Water Purifying Pump 3P209 Lighting Transfer 39 (Spent Fuel Pit)

Receptacle No. 8 Fuel Tilting Winch Panel 3C09 Space Heater Transformer 38 Deaerated Water Transfer Pump 3P I2 RHR Room B Area Sump Pump 3A (3P26A)

RHR Room Heat Exchanger Area Sump Pump 3A (3P24A)

RHR Room A Area Sump Pump 3A (3P25A)

Deaerator Vacuum Pump Oil Heater 3P35 Rod Position Inverter 3 (3Y03)

Lighting Transformer 37 Waste Disposal System Basement Sump Pump 3 (P27A)

Primary Water Makeup to Surge Tank MOV-3-832 Gas Stripper Feedpump 3P204A RCP 3C Oil Lift Pump 3P232C Miscellaneous Containment Distribution Panel'o. I 3P IO Boric Acid Evaporator Control Panel 3C33 Waste Disposal System Gas Compressor 3 (C200)

Deaerator Vacuum Pump 3P35 CRDM Cooler Fan 3B (3V2B)

New Fuel Storage Area Supply Fan 3VI3 Containment Sump Pump 3B (3P23B)

Spent Fuel Pit Exhaust Fan 3V2l Spent Fuel Pit Skimmer Pump 3P2I 3

Appendix D JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 3 of 9 MCC D Non-Vital Section Lighting Transformer X50 Containment Sampling Pump Lighting Transformer X43 Machine Shop Power Panel BI4 Auxiliary Building Air Supply Fan 3A (VIO)

Auxiliary Building Air Supply Fan 3B (Vl I)

Gas Stripper Feedpump 3S (3P204B)

RHR Room B Area Sump Pump 3B (3P26B)

Hold-up Tank Recirculation Pump 3 (P208)

RHR Room B Area Sump Pump 4B (4P26B)

Laundry Waste Water Pump P84A RHR Room HX Area Sump Pump 3B (3P24B)

Spare Ammonium Hydroxide Pump Hydrazine Pump P2 I RHR Room A Area Sump Pump 3B (3P25B)

Steam Generator B Addition Pump Waste Evaporator Feedpump 3 (P220)

RHR Room HX Area Sump Pump 4B (4P24B)

RHR Room A Area Sump Pump 4B (4P25B)

Laundry Waste Water Pump P84B Receptacle No. 9 Receptacle No. IO Lighting Transformer X80 Drumming Station Crane H2 I 0 Concentrates Holding Tank 3 Heater T2IO Spent Fuel Cask Crane H4 Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan 3B (V-8B)

Lighting Transformer 33 (Control Room Lighting)

Diesel Generator Building Lighting Transformer 3I5 Control Building Exhaust Fan V26 Code Cal I Transformer Recirculation Pump P53B Space Heater Distribution Transformer 303 Primary Water Makeup Pump 4A (4P l6A)

Auxiliary Building Exhaust Fan 3A (V8A)

Primary Water Makeup Pump 3A (3P I 6A)

MCC 3E MOV-3-14 I 6 Circulating Water Pump 3A I Discharge Valve MOV-3-l4I4 Circulating Water Pump 3BI Discharge Valve Circulating Lube Water Pump 3B Space Heater Transformer - MCC 3E Chlorinator Evaporator Heater A (S I A)

Chlorine Bottle Hoist Hl 3 Traveling Screen 3B I (3F IB)

Traveling Screen 3B2 (3F I D)

Screen Wash Pump 3 (3P I4)

Traveling Screen 3A I (3F I A)

Traveling Screen 3A2 (3F I C)

Intake Structure Bridge Crane H2

Appendix D JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 4of 9 Distribution Panel for Trash Rake Hoist HI2 Screen Wash Pump 3S (P I4)

MOV-3-1415 Circulating Water Pump 3A2 Discharging Valve MOV l4I 3 Circulating Water Pump 3B2 Discharging Valve Receptacle No. I I and No. I2 Lighting Transformer 3 I 4 (Lighting Panel LP3 I 4)

Chlorinator Evaporator Heater B (SIB)

MCC F Water Treatment Shack Air Conditioning Unit Water Treatment Elevator Hl OC Caustic Pump 3A (P48A)

Acid Pump 3B (P47B)

Mixed Bed Air Blower 3 (V22)

Brine Pump 3 (P45)

Raw Water Pump 3B (PI7B)

Demineralizer Feedpump 3A (P33A)

Demineralizer Feedpump 3B (P33B)

Treated Water Pump 3A (P!8A)

Treated Water Pump 3B (PI8B)

Caustic Pump 3B (P48B)

Acid Pump 3A (P47A)

Receptacle I 3 Chemical Storage Building Lighting Transformer (Lighting Panel LP3 I 8)

Coagulator Agitator 3 (T24)

Lime Feed Tank Agitator 3 (T46)

Space Heater MCC F Coagulator Recycle Pump 3 (P44)

Raw Water Pump 3A (P I7A)

Caustic Storage Tank 3 Heaters (TI6)

MCC RB Welding Receptables No.'s I and 2 and Trash Compactor Radwaste Exhaust Fan V36 Waste Evaporator Feedpump P229C Monitor Tank Discharge Pump P230A Waste Evaporator Feedpump P229A Lighting Transformer X60

'istribution Panel DP66 Tunnel Sump Pump P-62A Heat Tracing Transformer IA (X63)

MCC RC MCC RC Distillate Pump P232A Concentrate Pump P23I A Control Transformer for Waste Evaporator Panel No. I

Appendix D JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 5 of 9 MCC 3B43 Condensate Polishin Hold Pump 3P86A Hold Pump 3P86B Unit 4 C Bus Transformer Aux. Panel Alternate Feed (4X2l)

Transformer 3XACI (Space Heater for 3AC) .

Hold Pump 3P86C Hold Pump 3P86D Backwash Pump 3P88 Precoat Tank Agitator 3S69 Transformer 3x433 (Lighting Panel 3LP433)

Demineral izer Control Panel 3C I 00 Sample Cooler Chiller 3S72 Backwash Recovery Pump 3P95A and 3P95B Transformer 3X83 (For DP 3P83)

Receptacles 3RC434I A and B Transformer 3X I I I (Back-up to Auxiliary Power Inverter 4P3 I)

Monorail Hoist 3H3 I Transformer 3X25 (Backup to SPDS Inverter)

Condensate Polishing Room AC 3S3 I

,Unit 3 C Bus.Transformer Aux. Panel Feed (3X2I)

Secondary System Wet Layup Pump 3P92 Secondary System Wet Layup Pump 3P9I Demineralizer Water Degassifier Transfer Pump P80A Demineralizer Water Degassifier Vacuum Pump P8I A Condensate Backwash Recovery Tank Slurry Agitator 3S2I2 Precoat Room Sump Pump 3P96 C Bus Battery Charger 3D32 C Bus Battery Charger 3D33 Precoat Pump 3P87 Unit 4 C Bus Steam Generator Feedpump 4B Condensate Pump 4C 480V Load Center 4E 480V Load Center 4F 480V Load Center 4G Standby Steam Generator Feedpump Emergency Tie to Unit I/2 Cranking Diesel Generators Emergency Tie to Vital Busses 4A and 4B 480V Load Center 4E MCC 4G, Amertap System MCC 4B43, Condensate Polishing Area Non-vital Section of MCC 4B 480V Load Center 4F MCC 4E, Intake Area MCC RA, Radwaste Building Non-vital Section of MCC D Tie to L. C. 3F Tie to L. C.4G

Appendix D JPE-L84-I 2 Rev. 0 Page 6of 9 480V Load Center 4G Spent Fuel Pump Motor 4P2I2B Non-vital Section 4C (Fuel Area)

Tie to L. C.4F MCC 4B Non-Vital Section Welding Receptacles No.'s l7 and l7A Rod Control System Backup Transformer 4X I 8 Panel 4P82 Containment Lighting Primary Water Makeup Pump 4B (4P I6B)

Containment Sump Pump 4A (4P23A)

Lighting Transformer 46 (4X046)

Auxiliary Building AC Panel DP I4 Main Steam Penetration Cooling Fan 4A (4V3 I A)

RCS Drain Tank Pump 4A (4P2I8A)

Steam Generator Feed Pump Room Exhaust Fan 4B (4V I4B)

Auxiliary Transformer Cooling Equipment 4 (Alternate Feed)

Startup Transformer Cooling Equipment 4 (Alternate Feed)

Gland Steam Condenser Exhaust Blower 4B (4V6B)

RCP 4C Oil Lift Pump 4P232C Isolated Phase Bus Fan 4B (4V I9B)

Steam Generator Feed Pump 4B Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump (4P34B)

New Fuel Building Elevator 4H9 Air Particulate and Gas Monitor 4V36 Miscellaneous Containment Distribution Panel No. 2 (4P I I),

including In-Core Drive System Lighting Transfer 4 I I (4X3 I I)

Feedwater Penetration Cooling Fan 4A (4V32A)

Reheater 3C Steam Block Valve MOV-4-I433 Reheater 3D Steam Block Valve MOV-4-I434 VCT Charging Pump Suction LCV-4-I I5C Condenser Pit Sump Pump 4B (4P28B)

Main Transformer Cooling Equipment 4 (Alternate Feed)

CRDM Cooler Fan 4B (4V2B)

Rod Position Indicator Inverter No. 4 (4Y03)

MCC 4C Non-Vital Section Gas Stripper Panel 4C30 Fuel Area Miscellaneous Power Panel DP I I (4P I2)

Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchanger Room Supply Fan 4VI2 Monitor Tank Pump 4 (P206B)

Waste Evaporator Condensate Pump 4 (P22IB)

RCS Drain Tank Pump 4B (P2I8B),

Refueling Water Purifying Pump 4P209 Lighting Transformer 49 (Spent Fuel Pit)

Battery Room Air Conditioner EI6F Fuel Tilting Winch Panel 4B (4C09)

Space Heater Transformer 48 Deaerated Water Transfer Pump 4P I 2

Appendix D JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 7 of 9 RHR Room B Area Sump Pump 4A (4P26A)

RHR Room Heat Exchanger Area Sump Pump 4A (4P24A)

RHR Room A Area Sump Pump 4A (4P25A)

Deaerator Vacuum Pump Oil Heater 4P35 Boron Injection Tank to Boric Acid Storage Tank Transfer Pump Lighting Transformer 47 Waste Disposal System Basement Sump Pump 4 P27B Spent Fuel Pit Exhaust Fan Gas Stripper Feed Pump 4 (3P204C)

RCP 4A Oil Lift Pump 4P23A Miscellaneous Containment Distribution Panel No. I 4P I 0 Boric Acid Evaporator Control Panel 4C33 Waste Disposal System Gas Compressor 4 (C20I)

Deaerator Vacuum Pump 4P35 Control Rod Drive Mechanism Cooler Fan 4 (4V2A)

New Fuel Storage Area Supply Fan 4VI3 Primary Water Makeup to Surge Tank MOV-4-832 Containment Sump Pump 4B (4P23B)

Spent Fuel Pit Exhaust Fan 4V2I Spent Fuel Pit Skimmer Pump 4P2I3 MCC 4E Circulating Lube Water Pump 4A (4PI3A)

Acid Dilution Pump Control Board Receptacle No. I5 and No. I6 Traveling Screen 4A I (4F I A)

Traveling Screen 4A2 (4F I C)

Traveling Screen 4B I (4F I B)

Traveling Screen 4B2 (4F I D)

Space Heater. Transformer - MCC 4E MOV-4-l4I3 Circulating Water Pump 4B2 Discharge MOV I 4 I 4 Circulating Water Pump 4B I Discharge MOV I 4 I 5 Circulating Water Pump 4A2 Discharge MOV-4-l4I6 Circulating Water Pump 4AI Discharge Lighting Transformer 4 I 4 (Lighting Panel LP4 I 4)

Distribution Panel for Trash Rake Hoist Nitrogen Compressor NC2 Screen Wash Pump 4 (4P I4)

MCC RA Welding Receptable No. 3 Radwaste Exhaust Fan V37 Waste Evaporator Feed Pump P229B Monitor Tank Discharge Pump P230B Radwaste Dryer Radwaste Washer Tunnel Sump Pump P-62B Heat Tracing Transformer IB (X64)

MCC RD MCC RE

Appendix D JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 8of 9 MCC RD Distillate Pump P232B Concentrate Pump P23 I B MCC RE Utility Panel DP67 Overhead Crane HI5 Welding Receptacle No. I Resin Dewatering Pump P57A Resin Dewatering Pump P57B Truck Door S20 AC Fan Coil Unit E I 8 Air Cooled Condenser EI9 Hoist HI6 Evaporator Bottoms Holdup Mixing Tank Pump P54B Vibrator Cement Silo Rotary Feeder Cement Silo Roof Exhauster Cement Plant Vibrator Cement Batching Tank Rotary Feeder Cement Batching Tank Rotary Feeder Additive Tank Cement Mixer Feed Screw Conveyor Cement Mixer Spent Resin Holdup Mixing Tank Pump Vibrator Cement Silo Rotary Feed Cement Silo Vibrator Cement Batching Tank Rotary Feeder Cement Hatching Tank Rotary Feeder Additive Tank Cement Mixer Feed Screw Conveyor Cement Mixer Respirator Facility Air Handling Unit VSO MCC 4B43 Hold Pump 4P86A Hold Pump 4P86B Unit 3-Bus Transformer Auxiliary Panel Alternate Feed (3X2I)

Transformer 4XAC I (Space Heater for 4AC)

Hold Pump 4P86C Hold Pump 4P86D Backwash Pump 4P88 Precoat Tank Agitator 4S69 Transformer 4X83 (Distribution Panel 4P83)

Transformer 4X433 (Lighting Panel 4LP433)

Demineralizer Control Panel 4C I 00 Sample Cooler Chiller 4S72 Backwash Recovery Pump 4P95A Backwash Recovery Pump. 4P95B Receptacles 4RC434IA and B Transformer 4XI I I (Backup to Auxiliary Power lnverter AP3I)

Appendix D JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 9 of 9 Monorail Hoist 4H3 I Condensate Polishing Room AC 4S3I Unit 4 C Bus Transformer Auxiliary Panel Feed (4X2I)

Secondary System Wet Layup Pump 4P92 Secondary System Wet Layup Pump 4P9l Demineralizer Water Degassifier Transfer Pump P80B Demineralizer Water Degassifier Vacuum Pump P8I B Pr'ecoat Room Sump Pump 4P96 C Bus Battery Charger 4D32 Precoat Pump 4P87 Backwash Tank Agitator DC Control Center 3D3I Emergency Bearing Oil Pump 3P30 Air Side Oil Backup Pump 3P38 480V Load Center 3E, 3F, 3G Switchgear 3C (3ACO I)

C Bus Transformer (3X2l)

C Bus Transformer Relay Panel (3C260)

Inverter to I 20V Uninterruptible Power Supply (3YI I)

Ref lasher (C256)

SPDS tnverter (3Y25)

DC Control Center 4D3 I Emergency Bearing Oil Pump 4P30 Air Side Seal Oil Backup Pump 4P38 SPDS Inverter (4Y25) 480V Load Center 4E, 4F, 4G Switchgear 4C (4ACO I)

C Bus Transformer (4X2l)

C Bus Transformer Relay Panel (4C260)

Inverter to l20V Uninterruptible Power Supply (4YI I)

I 20V AC Uninterru tible Panel Boar'd 3P3 I Telemetering (C Bus Transformer)

Fire Detection for DC Enclosure Building C Bus Transformer Deluge Security System l20V AC Uninterru tible Panel Board 4P3 I Telemetering (C Bus Transformer)

DC Enclosure Building Ventilation C Bus Transformer Deluge System Security System

APPENDIX E JPE"L84-12 REV. 0 FAILURE MODE EFFECT AHALYSIS PAGE I OF 20 PART 'ODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT BREAKER 3AA02- <OSS OF POQER TO THE A BUS UHIT 3t D/G STARTS AND PICKS UP THE SUPPLY TO THE :

OPEH'ORMAL

-A BUS STRIPS LOADS A BUS LOADSf UNIT TRIPSI B BUS TRANSFERS 3A BUS TO THE SU TX UHIT 4t HONE BREAKER '3AA02" FAULT -LOCKOUT 3A BUS UHIT 3I UHIT TRIPS' BUS TRAHSFERS TO NORMAL SUPPLY TO THE H BUS DEAD THE SU TX 3A BUS -LOCKOUT 3 AUX TX UNIT 4I HONE BREAKER 3AA05- CLOSE -A BUS SUPPLIED FROM BDTH THE AUX AHD UHIT 3I NONE ALTERHATE SUPPLY TO THE SU TX UHIT 4I HONE THE 3A BUS BREAKER 3AA05- FAUL'T. W BUS LOCKOUT UNIT 3o LOCKOUT SU TXI D/G PICK UP B BUS ALTERHATE SUPPLY TO -A BUS DEAD LOADS'HIT TRIPS THE 3A BUS UHIT 4t HONE BREAKER 3AA09- CLOSE -HOHE UNIT 3e NOHE

"

TIE BETMEEH THE UHIT 4t NONE A BUS AHD THE B AHD.

C BUSSES BREAKER 3AA09- FAUlT;" -LOCKOUT OF A BUS UNIT 3t UHIT TRIPI B BUS AUTO TRANSFERS TIE BETHEEH THE -A BUS DEAD TO THE 3 SU TX A BUS AND THE B AHD UHIT 4! HONE C BUSSES BREAKER 3AA22- CLOSE -BUS FED FROM BOTH THE UHIT 3t HOHE ALTERHATE SUPPLY 4 SU TX AHD THE 3 AUX TX UHIT 4t NONE TO THE 3A BUS FROM THE 4 SU TX BREAKER 3AA22- FAULT ." -LOCKOUT OF 3A BUS UNIT 3 ~ UHIT TRIPI B BUS AUTO TRAHSFERS ALTERHATE SUPPLY -LOCKOUT OF 4 SU TX TO 3 SU TX TO THE 3A BUS -A BUS DEAD UHIT 4e NONE FROM THE 4 SU TX

APPEHDIX E JPE-L84-12 REVo 0 FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE, 2 OF 20 PART MODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT BREAKER 3AB02- OPEH:

" -LOSS OF POMER TO THE B BUS UHIT 3t UHIT TRIPSI A BUS TRANSFERS TO HORMAL SUPPLY TO THE -B BUS STRIPS LOADS THE SU TXI D/G STARTS AHD PICKS UP THE 3B BUS B BUS LOADS UHIT 4t HONE BREAKER 3AB02- FAUL'T -LOCKOUT 3B BUS UHIT 3t UHIT TRIPSI A BUS TRANSFERS TO NORMAL SUPPLY TO THE -B BUS DEAD THE SU TX 3B BUS -LOCKOUT 3 AUX TX UHIT 4! HONE BREAKER 3AB05- CLOSE -B BUS SUPPLIED FROM BOTH THE AUX AHD UHIT 31 HONE ALTERHATE SUPPLY TO THE SU TX UHIT 41 HONE THE 3B BUS BREAKER 3AB05- FAULT- -B BUS LOCKOUT UHIT 31 LOCKOUT SU TX1 D/G PICK UP A BUS ALTERHATE SUPPLY TO -B BUS DEAD LOADS'UNIT TRIPS THE 3B BUS UHIT 41 HONE BREAKER 3AB22- CLOSE -HOHE UHIT 35 HOHE TIE BETMEEH THE B UHIT 41 HOHE BUS AHD THE A AND C BUSSES BREAKER 3AB22- FAULT -LOCKOUT OF B BUS UNIT 3! UHIT TRIPi A BUS AUTO TRANSFERS TIE BETHEEH THE -B BUS DEAD TO THE 3 SU TX B BUS AHD THE A AHD UHIT 41 HONE C BUSSES BREAKER 3AC01- CLOSE < BUS SUPPLIED FROM BOTH THE UHIT 31 HONE ALTERHATE SUPPLY TO 3C TX AHD THE 4C TX UHIT 4t H0HE THE 3C BUS FROM THE 4C TX

0 APPENDIX E JPE-L84-12 REVo 0 FAILURE MODE EFFECT AHALYSIS PAGE 3 OF 20 PART MODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT BREAKER 3AC01- FAULT -LOCKOUT 3C BUS UHIT 31 TURBIHE RUHBACK ALTERHATE SUPPLY TO <OCKOUT 4C TX UHIT 4 HITHOUT AUTO TRAHSFERI LOSS OF THE 3C BUS FROM THE 4C BUS$ TURBIHE RUNBACK 4C TX UHIT 4 HITH AUTO TRANSFERS CLOSE 4AC01 BREAKER 3AC03 CLOSE -HONE UNIT 3t HONE SUPPLY FROM THE UHIT 4! HONE CRAHKIHG DIESELS BREAKER 3AC03 'FAULT "LOCKOUT OF 3C BUS UHIT 31 TURBIHE RUNBACK SUPPLY FRON THE UHIT 41 HOHE CRAeIHG DIESELS BREAKER 3AC13- CLOSE -HONE UHIT 31 HOHE TIE BETMEEH THE UHIT 41 HONE C BUS AHD THE A AHD B BUSSES BREAKER 3AC13- FAULT -LOCKOUT OF 3C BUS UHIT 31 TURBIHE RUHBACK TIE BETHEEH THE UHIT 4! HOHE C. BUS AHD THE A AND B BUSSES BREAKER 3AC16 OPEH -LOSS OF POHER TO THE 3C BUS UHIT 31 TURBIHE RUHBACK HORMAL SUPPLY TO THE UHIT 41 NOHE 3C BUS BREAKER 3AC16 FAULT <OCKOUT OF 3C BUS UHIT 31 TURBIHE RUHBACK HORNAL SUPPLY TO THE <OCKOUT OF 3C TX UHIT 4$ HONE 3C BUS BREAKER 4AA02- OPEH'. -LOSS OF POMER TO THE A BUS UNIT 41 D/G STARTS AHD PICKS UP THE HORMAL SUPPLY TO THE . -A BUS STRIPS LOADS A BUS LOADS1 UNIT TRIPSt B BUS TRANSFERS 4A BUS TO THE SU TX UHIT 31 NONE

APPEHDIX E JPE-LSh-12 REVi 0 FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE 4 OF 20 PART MODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT BREAKER 4AA02- FAOET -LOCKOUT 4A BUS UNIT 4o UHIT TRIPSI B BUS TRANSFERS TO HORMAL SUPPLY TO THE -A BUS DEAD THE SU TX 4A BUS <OCKOUT 4 AUX TX UNIT 3o HOHE BREAKER 4AA05" CLOSE -A BUS SUPPLIED FROM BOTH THE AUX AHD UHIT 3e HONE ALTERNATE SUPPLY TO THE SU TX UHIT 4'e HOHE THE 4A BUS BREAKER 4AA05- 'AULT -A BUS LOCKOUT UHIT 4>> LOCKOUT SU TXP D/G PICK UP B BUS ALTERNATE SUPPLY TO -A BUS DEAD LOADSr'HIT TRIPS THE 4A BUS UHIT 3'e NOHE BREAKER 4AA09- CLOSE UHIT 3t HONE TIE BETHEEH THE UNIT 4e NONE

. A BUS AHD THE B AHD C BUSSES BREAKER 4AA09- FAULT'. -LOCKOUT OF A BUS UHIT 44 UHIT TRIP) B BUS AUTO TRAHSFERS TIE BETHEEH THE H BUS DEAD TO THE 4 SU TX A BUS AND,THE B AHD UNIT 3o HOHE C BUSSES BREAKER 4AA22- CLOSE -BUS FED FROM BOTH THE UHIT 3s HOHE ALTERNATE SUPPLY 3 SU TX AHD THE 4 AUX TX .. UHIT 4s HONE TO THE 4A BUS FROM THE 3 SU TX BREAKER 4AA22- FAULT'.:: <OCKOUT OF 4A BUS UHIT 4 ~ UHIT TRIPI B BUS AUTO TRANSFERS ALTERHATE SUPPLY -LOCKOUT OF 3 SU TX TO 4 SU TX TO THE 4A BUS FROM -A BUS DEAD UHIT 3e HONE THE 3 SU TX

APPEHDIX E JPE-L84-12 REU>> 0 FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE 5 OF 20 PART MODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT BREAKER 4AB02- ~

OPEH -LOSS OF POBER TO THE B BUS UHIT 4>> UHIT TRIPS' BUS TRAHSFERS TO NORMAL SUPPLY TO THE. i . -B BUS STRIPS LOADS THE SU TXi D/G STARTS AHD PICKS UP THE 4B BUS B BUS LOADS UHIT 3t NONE BREAKER 4AB02- - FAULT <OCKOUT 4B BUS UHIT 4 ~ UHIT TRIPSI A BUS TRANSFERS TO NORMAL SUPPLY TO THE -B BUS DEAD THE SU TX 4B BUS -LOCKOUT 4 AUX TX UHIT 3>> HONE BREAKER 4AB05- CLOSE -B BUS SUPPLIED FROM BOTH THE AUX AND UHIT 3>> NONE ALTERNATE SUPPLY TO THE SU TX UHIT 4>> HONE THE 4B BUS BREAKER 4AB05- . FAUET- i.: -B BUS LOCKOUT UNIT 4>> LOCKOUT SU TXS D/G PICK UP A BUS ALTERHATE SUPPLY TO "B BUS DEAD LOADS> UHIT TRIPS THE 4B BUS UHIT 3>> HONE BREAKER 4AB22- CLOSE -HOHE UHIT 3t HONE TIE BETHEEH THE B UHIT 4>> NOHE BUS AND THE A AHD C BUSSES BREAKER 4AB22- FAULT" -LOCKOUT OF B BUS UNIT.4>> UHIT TRIPi A BUS AUTO TRAHSFERS BETHEEN THE

'IE

-B BUS DEAD TO THE 4 SU TX B BUS AHD THE A AHD UHIT 3>> HOHE C BUSSES BREAKER 4AC01- CLOSE -C BUS SUPPLIED FORM BOTH THE UHIT 4>> HONE ALTERHAME SUPPLY TO 3C TX AHD THE 4C TX UHIT 3>> NOHE THE 4C BUS FROM THE 3C TX BREAKER 4AC01- FAULT -LOCKOUT 4C BUS UNIT 4>> TURBIHE RUNBACK ALTERHATE SUPPLY TO <OCKOUT OF 3C TX UHIT 3 HITHOUT AUTO TRANSFER>> LOSS OF THE 4C BUS FROM THE 3C BUS1 TURBINE RUNBACK 3C TX UHIT 3 HITH AUTO TRANSFER>> CLOSE 3AC01

APPEHDIX E JPE<84-12 REVo 0 FAILURE NODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE 6 OF 20 PART MODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEH EFFECT BREAKER 4AC03 CLOSE +ONE UHIT 41 HOHE SUPPLY FRON THE UHIT 3t HOHE CRANKIHG DIESELS BREAKER 4AC03 FAULT -LOCKOUT OF 4C BUS UHIT 41 TURBINE RUHBACK SUPPlY FRON THE UNIT 3t HONE CRAHKIHG DIESELS BREAKER 4AC13- CLOSE -HONE UHIT 31 HONE TIE BETMEEH THE UHIT 4t HONE C BUS AHD THE A AHD B BUSSES BREAKER 4AC13" FAULT -LOCKOUT OF 4 C BUS UNIT 4t TURBIHE RUHBACK TIE BETMEEH THE UHIT 3t NOHE C BUS AHD THE A AHD B BUSSES BREAKER 4AC16 OPEH -LOSS OF POMER TO THE 4C BUS UHIT 41 TURBINE RUHBACK NORNAl SUPPLY TO THE UHIT 31 NONE 4C BUS BREAKER 4AC16 FAULT <OCKOUT OF 4C BUS UHIT 41 TURBINE RUNBACK HORHAL SUPPLY TO THE <OCKOUT OF 4C TX UHIT 31 HOHE 4C BUS BUS HORTHEAST SHORT) OR SHORT <OCKOUT OF HORTHEAST BUS BY OPENING UHIT 3t HOHE TO GROUHD OF BREAKERS 2Bt3Bi4Bi5B)6Bi6/7B UHIT 41 HOHE

0 APPEHDIX E JPE-L84-12 REVe 0 FAILURE MODE EFFECT AHALYSIS ,PAGE 7 OF 20 PART MODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT BUS HORTIQEST SHORTr OR SHORT <OCKOUT OF NORTlQEST BUS BY OPEHIHG UHIT 31 NONE TO GROUND OF BREAKERS 2Ar3ABr4Ar5Ar5/6A UHIT 41 HOHE BUS SOUTHEAST SHORTr OR SHORT <OCKOUT OF SOUTHEAST BUS BY OPEHIHG UHIT 31 HONE TO GROUND OF BREAKERS 10Br9Br8Br7Br6/7B UHIT 41 HOHE BUS SOUTHMEST SHORTr OR SHORT <OCKOUT OF SOUTHMEST BUS BY OPEHING UHIT 31 HOHE TO GROUHD OF BREAKERS 10Ar9Ar8Ar7Ar6Ar5/6A UNIT 4l NONE BUS 3A PHASE TO GROUHD -ALARM UNIT 31 HONE SHORT UHIT 41 HOHE-BUS 3A PHASE TO PHASE <OCKOUT OF 3A BUS UHIT 31 UHIT TRIPi B BUS TRAHSFERS TO SU SHORT TX UHIT 41 HONE BUS 3B PHASE TO GROUHD MARM UNIT 3t NOHE.

SHORT UHIT 4! HOHE BUS 3B PHASE TO.PHASE <OCKOUT OF 3B BUS UHIT 3! UHIT TRIPS A BUS TRANSFERS TO SU SHORT TX UNIT 4C HONE

, BUS 3C PHASE TO GROUHD -ALARM UHIT 31 HOHE SHORT UNIT 41 HONE

APPEHDIX E JPE-LBh"i2 REVo 0 FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE 8 OF 20 PART MODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT BUS 3C PHASE TO PHASE -LOCKOUT OF 3C BUS UHIT 3o TURBINE RUHBACK SHORT UHIT 4o HONE BUS 4A PHASE TO .GROUHD UHIT 3o HONE SHORT UHIT 4e HONE BUS 4A PHASE TO'PHASE -LOCKOUT OF 4A BUS UHIT 4t UHIT TRIPt B BUS TRANSFERS TO SU SHORT TX UNIT 3e HONE I

BUS 4B PHASE TO GROUHD UHIT 3I HO)'E SHORT UHIT 4e HONE BUS 4B PHASE TO PHASE <OCKOUT OF 4B BUS UHIT 4 ~ UHIT TRIPt A BUS TRANSFERS TO SU SHORT TX UHIT, 3I NONE BUS 4C PHASE TO GROUHD UHIT 3$ HONE SHORT UHIT 4o HOHE BUS 4C PHASE TO PHASE <OCKOUT OF 4C BUS UHIT 4e TURBIHE RUHBACK SHORT UHIT 3o HOHE

t APPEHDIX E JPE<84" 12 REU>> 0 FAILURE NODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE 9 OF 20 PART NODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEN EFFECT GEHERATOR UHIT 3 OPEH OR'SHORT -GEHERATOR LOCKOUT BY OPEHING OF UHIT 31 UHIT TRIPI A AHD B BUSSES AUTO BREAKERS 7B)7ABt3AA02i3AB02 TRAHSFER.TO SU TX

-CLOSE SIGHAL TO BREAKERS 3AA05t3AB05 UNIT 4t HONE GEHERATOR UHIT 4 .OPEN OR SHORT <EHERATOR LOCKOUT BY OPEHING OF UNIT 41 UNIT TRIP1 A AHD B BUSSES AUTO BREAKERS 9Bi9ABs4AA02t4AB02 TRAHSFER TO SU TX

-CLOSE SIGHAL TO BREAKERS 4AA05t4AB05 UHIT 31 HONE ISO PHASE BUS UHIT 3 SHORT <OSS OF 3 AUX TX UNIT 31 UHIT TRIP

-TRANSFER TO 3 SU TX UNIT 41 HONE

-OPEH BREAKERS 7ABi7B ISO PHASE BUS UHIT 4 SHORT <OSS OF 4 AUX TX UNIT 4! UHIT TRIP

-TRAHSFER TO 4 SU TX UHIT 3! NONE MEH BREAKERS 9ABr9B LINE< BUS TX UHIT 3 SHORT OR SHORT TO -OPEH BREAKERS 3ABt3Bt3AC16 UHIT 3 MITHOUT AUTO TRANSFERS LOSS OF TO BAY 3 GROUHD <PEH SIGHAL TO BREAKER 4AC01 C BUSS TURBIHE RUNBACK UHIT 3 MITK AUTO TRAHSFERt CLOSE 3AC011 C BUS POMERED FRON 4C TX UHIT 4t NONE LIHE"C BUS TX UHIT 4 SHORT OR SHORT TO <PEH BREAKERS 10AeiOABi4ACI6 UHIT 4 MITHOUT AUTO TRANSFERI LOSS OF TO BAY 10 GROUND -OPEH SIGHAL TO BREAKER 3AC01 C BUSr'URBINE RUHBACK UHIT 4 MITH AUTO TRAHSFERI CLOSE 4AC011 C BUS POMERED FROH 3C TX UHIT 31 HOHE LIHE-DADE SHORT OR SHORT TO <PEH BREAKERS 8AiGAB UHIT 31 HONE GROUHD UNIT 41 HOHE LINE-DAUIS 1 SHORT OR SHORT TO -OPEN BREAKERS 2Al2AB UHIT 31 HOHE GROUHD UHIT 41 NONE

~

APPENDIX E JPE<84-12 REVo 0 FAILURE MODE EFFECT AHALYSIS PAGE 10 OF 20 PART MODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT LINE-DAUIS 2 SHORT OR SHORT TO <PEH'BREAKERS 5Ar5AB UHIT 3t NONE GROUHD UNIT 41 HOHE LINE-DAVIS 3 SNORT OR SHORT TO <PEH BREAKERS 7Av7AB UHIT 3t HOHE GROUHD UHIT 41 HONE LIHE-DORAL SNORT OR SHORT TO <PEH BREAKERS 9As9AB UHIT 31 NOHE GROUND UHIT hl NONE LINE-FLAGAMI 1 SHORT OR SHORT TO <PEH BREAKERS 4At4AB UHIT 3t HONE GROUND UHIT 41 HOHE LIHE-FLAGAMI 2 SHORT OR SHORT TO <PEH BREAKERS 6A)6AB UHIT 3t HOHE GROUHD UHIT 41 HONE LIHE-FLORIDA CITY SHORT OR SHORT TO -OPEN BREAKERS 10AB~10B UHIT 31 HOHE GROUND UNIT 41 HONE LIHE-MATH TX UHIT 1 SNORT OR SNORT TO -OPEH BREAKERS 2AB)2B UHIT 31 NONE TO BAY 2 GROUHD -OPEN APPROPRIATE LOHSIDE UHIT 1 UHIT ht HONE AUX TX BREAKERS UHIT lt UHIT TRIP

APPENDIX E JPE-L84-12 REVo 0 FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE 11 OF 20 PART MODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT LINE-MAIN TX UHIT 2 SHORT OR SHORT TO -OPEN BREAKERS 5AB)5B UHIT 3l NONE TO'BAY 5 GROUND <PEH APPROPRIATE LOMSIDE UHIT 2 UHIT 41 HOHE AUX TX BREAKERS UHIT 2t UHIT TRIP LIHEMIH TX UNIT 3 SHORT OR SHORT TO <PEN BREAKERS 7AB)7Bt3AA02)3AB02 UHIT 31 UHIT TRIPi TRANSFER A AND B TO BAY 7 GROUND AROSE BREAKERS 3AA05t3AB05 BUSSES TO SU TX UHIT 41 HOHE LINE-MAIN TX UHIT 4 . SHORT OR SHORT TO <PEH BREAKERS 9AB)9B)hAA02)4AB02 UNIT 41 UHIT TRIPt TRANSFER A AHD B TO BAY 9 GROUHD <LOSE BREAKERS 4AA05)4AB05 BUSSES TO SU TX UNIT 31 HONE LINE-SU TX UNIT 3 SHORT OR SHORT TO -OPEH BREAKERS 6AB)6B UHIT 31 HOHE TO BAY 6 GROUND -TRIP SIGHAL TO EHSURE OPEHIHG OF UHIT 41 HOHE BREAKERS 3AA05)3AB05)4AA22 LIHE-SU TX UHIT 4 SHORT OR SHORT TO -OPEH BREAKERS BAB)GB UHIT 31 HONE TO BAY 8 GROUND -TRIP SIGHAL TO EHSURE OPEHING OF UNIT 41 HOHE BREAKERS 4AA05)4AB05)3AA22 LIHE"SU TX UHITS 1!2 SHORT OR SHORT TO <PEH BREAKERS 4AB)4B UNIT 31 HOHE TO BAY 4 GROUND -OPEH APPROPRIATE LONSIDE SU TX BREAKERS UNIT 41 HONE OCB 2A OPEH -HOHE UNIT 31 HONE UHIT hs HOHE

-OCB 2A SHORT TO GROUND <OCKOUT OF HORTHMEST BUS BY OPEHING OF UHIT 31 HONE BREAKERS 2AB)3AB)4A)5A)5/6A UHIT 41 HOHE

-LOSS OF DAUIS 1 LIHE

0' APPEHDIX E JPE<84-12 REVo 0 FAILURE NODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE 12 OF 20 PART NODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEN EFFECT OCB 2AB OPEH +ONE UHIT 31 HOHE UHIT 41 H0HE OCB 2AB SHORT TO GROUHD <PEHIHG OF BREAKERS 2Ar2B UHIT 31 HONE

-OPENIHG OF LOMSIDE UHIT 1 AUX UHIT 41 HOHE TX BREAKERS UHIT 11 UHIT TRIP

<OSS OF DAVIS 1 LINE OCB 2B OPEH -HOHE UHIT 31 HOHE UHIT 41 HONE UHIT 31 HOHE OCB 2B SHORT TO GROUND BREAKERS 2ABr3Bt4Br5B ~ 6Bt6/7B 'NIT

<OCKOUT OF HORTHEAST BUS BY OPEHIHG OF 41 HOHE 1'>>

-OPEHIHG OF LOMSIDE UHIT 1 AUX UHIT UHIT TRIP TX BRFNERS OCB 3AB OPEH -HONE UHIT 3o HONE UHIT 41 NONE OCB 3AB SHORT TO GROUND <OCKOUT OF NORTNMEST BUS BY OPEHIHG OF UNIT 3 MITHOUT AUTO TRANSFERS TURBINE BREAKERS 2Ar3Br4Ar5Ar5/6Ar3AC16 RUNBACK

<PEH SIGHAL TO BREAKER 4AC01 UNIT 3 MITH AUTO TRAHSFERI CLOSE 3AC01 UHIT 41 HONE OCB 3B OPEH +ONE UNIT 3t HONE UHIT 4t HONE

0' APPEHDIX E JPE<G4" 12 REVs 0 FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE 13 OF 20 PART MODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT OCB 3B SHORT TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF HORTHEAST BUS BY OPEHIHG OF UHIT 3 llITHOUT AUTO TRANSFERS TURBINE BREAKERS 2Bt3ABt4Bt5Bt6Bt6/7Bt3AC16 RUHBACK

-OPEH SIGHAL TO BREAKER 4AC01 UHIT 3 IIITH AUTO TRANSFERS CLOSE 3AC01 UHIT 41 HOHE OCB 4A OPEH UHIT 31 HOHE UNIT 41 HONE OCB 4A SHORT TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF THE HORTNHEST BUS BY OPEHIHG UNIT 31 HONE BREAKERS 2At3ABt4ABt5At5/6A UNIT 41 HONE

-LOSS OF FLAGAMI 1 LINE OCB 4AB OPEN HONE UHIT 31 HONE UHIT 41 HONE OCB 4AB SHORT TO GROUND -OPEHING OF BREAKERS 4At4BtLOMSIDE UNIT 31. NOHE BREAKERS OH THE UNIT 122 SU TX UHIT 41 HONE

<OSS OF FLAGANI 1 LINE OCB 4B OPEH -HOHE UHIT 31 NONE UHIT 41 HONE OCB 4B SHORT TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF THE NORTHEAST BUS BY OPEHIHG UNIT 3! HONE BREAKERS 2Bt3Bt4ABt5Bt6Bt6/7BtLOHSIDE UHIT 41 HOHE BREAKERS OH UHIT 112 SU TX OCB 5/6A OPEH UHIT 31 HOHE UHIT 41 NOHE.

APPEHDIX E JPE<84-12 REVo 0 FAILURE NODE EFFECT AHALYSIS PAGE 14 OF 20 PART lOCAL EFFECT SYSTEH EFFECT OCB 5/6A SNORT TO GROUHD -LOCKOUT OF MEST BUS BY OPEHIHG OF UHIT 3t HONE BREAKERS 2Ar3ABrhArSAr6Ar7ArBAr9Ar10A UHIT 4! HOHE OCB SA OPEH -HONE UHIT 31 HOHE UHIT 41 HONE OCB 5A SHORT TO GROUND <OCKOUT OF THE HORTHMEST BUS BY OPEHING UHIT 3t HONE BREAKERS 2Ar3ABr4Ar5ABr5/6A UHIT 41 HOHE

-LOSS OF DAVIS 2 LINE OCB SAB -HONE UHIT 31 HONE UHIT 41 HONE OCB 5AB SHORT TO GROUHD -OPEHIHG OF BREAKERS SArSB UHIT 34 HOHE

-OPENIHG OF LOMSIDE UNIT 2 AUX UHIT 41 HOHE TX BREAKERS UHIT 21 UHIT TRIP

-LOSS OF DAVIS 2 LIHE OCB 5B OPEN -HONE UHIT 31 HOKE UNIT 41 NOHE OCB 5B SHORT TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF THE NORTHEAST BUS BY OPENIHG UHIT 31 HONE BREAKERS 6/7Br6Br5ABr4Br3Br2B UHIT 41 NONE

-OPEHIHG OF .LOMSIDE UNIT 2 AUX UNIT 21 UHIT TRIP TX BREAKERS

APPENDIX E JPE-LGI-12 REVi 0 FAILURE NODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE - 15 OF 20 PART NODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT OCB 6/7B -HOHE UHIT 3'ONE UNIT 41 HONE OCB 6/7B SHORT TO GROUND <OCKOUT OF EAST BUS BY OPENING OF ~

UHIT 31 HOHE BREAKERS 2Bt3Bt4Bt5Bt6Bt7BtGBt9BtiOB UHIT 4 ~ NONE OCB 6A OPEH UHIT 31 HONE

~

UNIT 41 NONE OCB 6A SHORT TO GROUND <OCKOUT OF THE SOUTlmEST BUS BY OPENING UHIT 31 HONE BREAKERS 10At9AtBAt7At6ABr5/6A UNIT 41 HOHE

<OSS OF FLAGAMI 2 LINE

-HOHE UHIT 31 HOHE UHIT 41 HONE OCB 6AB SHORT TO GROUHD <PEXIXG OF BREAKERS 6At6B UNIT 31 HONE MSURE LOCKOUT OF 3 SU TX BY OPEHIHG OF UHIT 41 HONE BREAKERS 3AA05t 3AB05

-OPEH SIGNAL TO BREAKER 4AA22

<OSS OF FLAGAHI 2 LIHE OCB 6B OPEH UHIT 3f XONE UNIT 4! XONE OCB 6B SHORT TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF THE HORTHEAST BUS BY OPEHING UNIT 31 HOXE BREAKERS 6/7Bt6ABt5Bt4Bt3Bt2Bt UNIT 41 NONE

-EHSURE LOCKOUT OF 3 SU TX BY OPENIHG 3AA05t3AB05

<PEN SIGHAL TO BREAKER 4AA22

APPEHDIX E JPH.84-12 REVi 0 FAILURE NODE EFFECT AHALYSIS PAGE 16 OF 20 PART MODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEN EFFECT OCB 7A OPEH -HOHE UHIT 31 HOHE UNIT 41 HOHE OCB 7A SHORT TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF THE SOUTHMEST BUS BY OPEHIHG UHIT 31 HONE BREAKERS 10At9At8At7ABt6At5/6A UHIT 41 HOHE

<OSS OF DAVIS 3 LINE OCB 7AB OPEH UNIT 3! HOHE UHIT 41 HOHE OCB 7AB SHORT TO GROUHD <PEHIHG OF BREAKERS 7At7B UHIT 31 UHIT TRIPt A AHD B BUSSES AUTO

<OCKOUT OF 3 AUX TX BY OPEHIHG OF TRAHSFER TO SU TX BREAKERS 3AA02t3AB02 UHIT 41 HOHE

-CLOSE BREAKERS 3AA05t3AB05

<OSS OF DAVIS 3 LINE OCB 7B OPEH UHIT 31 NOHE UNIT 41 HONE OCB 7B SHORT TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF THE SOUTHEAST BUS BY OPENING UHIT 31 UHIT TRIPt A AHD B BUSSES AUTO BREAKERS 10Bt9BtBBt7ABt6/7B TRANSFER TO SU TX

-LOCKOUT 3 AUX TX BY OPENIHG BREAKERS UHIT 41 HOHE 3AA02t3AB02

<LOSE 3AA05t3AB05 OCB GA OPEH UNIT 31 HOHE UNIT 41 HOHE

APPENDIX E JPE-L84-12 REV>> 0 FAILURE liODE EFFECT AHALYSIS PAGE 17 OF 20 PART NODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEN EFFECT OCB GA SHORT TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF THE SOUTHQEST BUS BY OPEHIHG UNIT 3>> HOHE BREAKERS 10Ar9Ar8ABr7Ar6Ar5/6A UHIT 4>>-HONE

<OSS OF DADE LIHE OCB GAB OPEH UNIT 3>> NOHE UNIT 4>> HONE OCB 8AB SHORT TO GROUND MEHING OF BREAKERS 8ArGB UHIT 3>> NOHE MSURE LOCKOUT OF 4 SU TX BY OPEHIHG UNIT 4>> HOHE OF BREAKERS 4AA05r4ABOS

<PEH SIGNAL TO BREAKER 3AA22

<OSS OF DADE LINE OCB GB OPEH -HOHE UHIT 3>> HOHE UNIT 4>> HOME OCB 8B SHORT TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF THE SOUTHEAST BUS BY OPEHIHG UHIT 3>> HONE BREAKERS 10Br9BrGABr7Br6/78 UHIT 4t NOHE MSURE LOCKOUT BY OPEHIHG OF BREAKERS 4AA05r4AB05

<PEH SIGNAL TO BREAKER 3AA22 OPEH UHIT 3t HOHE.

UHIT 4>> HOHE OCB 9A SHORT TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF THE SOUTNMEST BUS BY OPEHIHG UNIT 3>> NOHE BREAKERS 10Ar9ABrBAr7Ar6Ar5/6A UHIT 4>> NOHE

<OSS OF DORAL LIHE OCB 9AB OPEH UHIT 3t HONE UHIT 4>> HOHE

APPEHDIX E JPE<G4-12 REVo 0 FAILURE NODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE 18 OF 20 PART LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEH EFFECT OCB 9AB ; SHORT. TO GROUND MENIHG OF BREAKERS '9Ar9B UHIT 41 UNIT TRIPI A AND B BUSSES AUTO

<OCKOUT OF 4 AUX TX BY OPEHIHG OF TRAHSFER TO SU TX BREAKERS 4AA02r4AB02 UNIT 31 HONE MUSE BREAKERS 4AA05r4AB05

<OSS OF DORAL LIHE OCB 9B OPEN UHIT 31 HONE UHIT 4$ HOHE OCB 9B 'HORT. TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF THE SOUTHEAST BUS BY OPEHIHG UNIT 41 UHIT TRIP1 A AND B BUSSES AUTO BREAKERS 10Bt9ABrBBt7Br6/7B TRANSFER TO SU TX

<OCKOUT 4 AUX TX BY OPEHIHG BREAKERS UHIT 31 NOHE 4AA02t4AB02

-CLOSE 4AA05r4AB05 OCB 10A OPEH UHIT 31 HONE UHIT 41 HOHE OCB 10A SHORT TO GROUHD -LOCKOUT OF SOUTHMEST BUS BY OPEHIHG OF UNIT 4 MITHOUT AUTO TRANSFERI TURBINE

~

BREAKERS 10ABr9ArGAr7At6Ar6/7At4AC16 SIGNAL TO BREAKER 3AC01 RUHBACK UHIT 4 MITH AUTO TRANSFERI CLOSE 4AC01 UHIT 31 NOHE OCB 10AB OPEH UHIT 31 HONE UNIT 41 NONE OCB 10AB SHORT TO GROUHD <PENING OF BREAKERS 10AtiOBr4AC16 UHIT 4 MITHOUT AUTO TRANSFERS TURBIHE WEH SIGNAL TO BREAKER 3AC01 RUHBACK

-LOSS OF FLORIDA CITY LIHE UHIT 4 MITH AUTO TRAHSFERI CLOSE 4AC01 UHIT 3l HOHE

APPEHDIX E JPE-L84"12 REVo 0 FAILURE NODE EFFECT AHALYSIS PAGE 19 OF 20 PART NODE LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEN EFFECT OCB 10B OPEH -NOHE UHIT 31 HOHE UHIT 41 HONE OCB 10B SHORT TO GROUHD <OCKOUT OF THE SOUTHEAST BUS BY OPEHING UNIT 31 HONE BREAKERS 10ABt9BtBBt7Bt6/7B UHIT 41 HOHE

<OSS OF 'FLORIDA CITY LIME TX AUX UHIT 3 OPEH .OR:SHORT -LOCKOUT 3AUX TX BY OPENING OF BREAKERS UNIT 31 UNIT TRIPt A AHD B BUSSES AUTO 7Bt7ABt3AA02t3AB02 TRAHSFER TO SU TX

-CLOSE BRMERS 3AA05t3AB05 UHIT 41 NONE TX AUX UHIT 4 . OPED OR:SHORT -LOCKOUT 4 AUX TX BY OPEHIHG BREAKERS UHIT 4'HIT TRIPS A AHD B BUSSES AUTO 9Bt9ABt4AA02t4AB02 TRAHSFER TO SU TX

-CLOSE BRMERS 4AA05t4AB05 UNIT 31 NONE TX C UHIT 3 OPEH OR SHORT <OCKOUT C TX BY OPEHIHG OF BREAKERS UHIT 3 NITHOUT AUTO TRANSFERS LOSS OF 3Bt3ABt3AC16 C BUS't TURBIHE RUHBACK

<PEH SIGHAL TO BREAKER 4AC01 UHIT 3 ARITH AUTO TRANSFER>> CLOSE 3AC01 UNIT 41 HOHE TX C UNIT 4 OPEH OR SHORT <OCKOUT C TX BY OPEHIHG OF BREAKERS UHIT 4 IIITHOUT AUTO TRAHSFERI LOSS OF 10At10AB t 4AC16 C BUSt TURBIHE RUHBACK MEH SIGHAL TO BREAKER 3AC01 UHIT 4 UITH AUTO TRANSFERS CLOSE 4AC01 UHIT 31 HONE TX HAIN UNIT 3 OPEH OR. SHORT <OCKOUT OF HAIN TX BY OPEHING OF UHIT 31 UHIT TRIPI A AHD B BUSSES AUTO BREAKERS 7Bt7ABt3AA02t3AB02 . TRANSFER TO SU TX

<LOSE BREAKERS 3AA05)3AB05 UHIT 41 HOHE TX HAIN UNIT 4 .:OPEH OR 'SHORT <OCKOUT OF HAIN TX BY OPENIHG OF UHIT 41 UHIT TRIPt A AHD B BUSSES AUTO BREAKERS 9Bt9ABt4AA02t4AB02 TRAHSFER TO SU TX

<LOSE BREAKERS 4AA05t4AB05 UHIT 31 HOHE

APPEHDIX E JPH.84-12 REVo 0 FAILURE MODE EFFECT ANALYSIS PAGE 20 OF 20 PART LOCAL EFFECT SYSTEM EFFECT TX SU UHIT 3 OPEH OR SHORT <OCKOUT SU TX BY OPENING OF BREAKERS UHIT 3I HOHE 6Br6ABr3AA05r3AB05 UHIT 4e HOHE MEN SIGHAL TO BREAKER 4AA22 TX SU UNIT 4 OPEH OR SHORT <OCKOUT SU TX BY OPEHIHG OF BREAKERS UHIT 3t HOHE BBrGABr4AA05r4AB05 UNIT 4t HOHE MEH SIGNAL TO BREAKER 3AA22

JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page I of 7 APPENDIX F RELIABILITY(FAULT TREE) EVALUATION INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE This appendix provides the results of a reliability evaluation performed for the Turkey Point 4.16 kV electric power distribution system. A fault tree model of this system was constructed, quantified and solved in order to identify the combinations of events and equipment failures leading to loss of the normal offsite power supply to the plant's 4.I6 kV busses. While the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (Appendix E) identifies the effects of single equipment failures, the fault tree process provides a deeper understanding of the interactions between equipment and the effect of multiple failures on the system. The assignment of probability values to the fault tree events provides an estimate of the system's numerical availability and also of the relative importance of the components comprising the system.

METHODOLOGY The Turkey Point Plant electric power distribution system is typical in that it employs an arrangement of relaying designed to ensure a high availability of power at the 4. I6 kV busses and to provide reliable, localized isolation of faulted equipment. The fault tree modeling process was chosen for this reliability evaluation due to its ability to explicitly and graphically depict combinations of equipment failures which may initiate a bus/supply fault and may result in its further propagation. The failure events identified by the model were assigned probabilities based primarily on generic, industry-wide, data sources (References I, 2 and 4). The fault tree was solved and quantified by application of the Set Equation Transformation System. (SETS) computer code. This analysis code has been used in NRC-sponsored Probabilistic Risk Assessments, such as the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program, and is a powerful tool for the solution of large fault models.

ASSUMPTIONS The 4.I6 kV distribution system fault tree was constructed in accordance with the general guidelines defined by NUREG 0492, Fault Tree Handbook (Reference 3). In general, the following types of faults are considered:

normally operating component fails in service standby component fails when demanded or during subsequent operation spurious (premature) component action The specific equipment failures identified are typical in that they include shorts, open circuits and ground faults. Unspecified faults of normally operating equipment (e.g., transformer fault) are assumed to result in a demand for protective relay action. The following list of assumptions are specific to this fault tree:

Appendix F JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 2 of 7 The 4. I 6 kV busses are normally aligned and auto-transfer as shown in Table 4 of the report.

All switchyard oil circuit breakers (OCB's) are normally closed Component unavailability contributions due to test or maintenance are not included.

External Events (e.g., Lightning) are not explicitly included Turbine Runback is assumed operable, but requires rapid operator action. However, for this analysis, a failure probability of I.0 is assigned to this event.

Pipe Cable Cooling System faults are not included

4. I6 kV bus unavailability is defined as:

4. I 6 kV bus fault or, Loss of offsite and/or generator supply to the bus Passive components (such as bus bar, transmission lines) are grouped together where possible (e.g., the overhead line to the switchyard includes the cables, supports, insulators, etc.)

The only relays identified as tripping circuit breakers or inhibiting auto-transfer are those which appear on the circuit breaker elementary diagrams Operator action to restore power to a dead bus is not included Potential Interactions between Units and the grid are not included (e.g. Unit trip results in grid instability).

ELECTRIC POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FAULT TREE The fault tree constructed for this system appears as Figure Fl. The top event depicted is the unavailability of any nuclear unit 4. I6 kV bus (3A, 3B, 3C, 4A, 4B, 4C). For the purposes of this analysis, however, the following combinations of

4. I 6 kV bus failure were considered and minimal cutsets obtained for each:

4. I6 kV Bus 3A Unavailable (Table F3.)

4. I 6 k V Bus 3B Unavailable (Table F4.)

4. I6 kV Bus 3C Unavailable (Table F5.)

4. I6 kV Bus 4A Unavailable (Table F6.)

4. I 6 kV Bus 4B Unavailable (Table F7.)

4. I6 kV Bus 4C Unavailable (Table FS.)

AlI Unit 3 4. I 6 kV Busses Unavai lab le (Table F9.)

All Unit 4 4. I6 kV Busses Unavailable (Table FI 0.)

3C and 4C Busses Unavailable (Table F I I.)

In addition, a comparison of C Bus unavailability was made with and without the automatic bus transfer.

The fault tree was initially constructed to include the major equipment fault combinations leading to 4. I6 kV bus unavailability. Inclusive in the definition of major equipment are:

o Transformers o Circuit Breakers o Bus Bar

Appendix F JPE-L84- l 2 Rev. 0 Page 3 of 7 Disconnect Switches Cable Overhead Transmission Lines Pipe Cable Events which challenge the automatic transfer capability of bus power supply are explicitly included (i.e. Reactor/Turbine Generator Trip results in demand for transfer of A and B bus supply from the Auxiliary to the Startup Transformer).

The relays which effect this auto-transfer were also included in the fault model.

The intent of this additional level of detail is to identify combinations of protective relay failures leading to bus unavailability and potential common mode failures such as occurred on the February l2, l984 Turkey Point Unit 3 and 4 trips.

The fault model boundaries are identical to those of the FMEA. tncluded are the

4. I 6 kV busses, their normal and alternate power supplies, the Turkey Point Plant switchyard and the offsite transmission lines. Bus or supply faults in combination with a single stuck circuit breaker were considered. A fault in combination with failure of the primary and secondary fault clearing breakers was not considered and not modelled.

FAULT TREE STRUCTURE This section describes the structure of the electric power distribution system fault tree (Figure Fl). 4.I6 kV busses 3A, 3B, 4A and 4B have similar equipment arrangements (supply components, protective and auto-transfer relaying) as do busses 3C and 4C. The fault logic is described below for busses 3A and 3C and is typical of the other busses.

Bus 3A Fault Lo ic Bus 3A is normally supplied through the No. 3 Auxiliary Transformer when the unit is on-line. Any event causing Reactor/Turbine-Generator (RTG) trip will result in an attempt to automatically transfer supply- to the No. 3 Startup Transformer. However, local bus faults or certain signals resulting in spurious opening of circuit breaker 3AA52 will deenergize the bus and not permit auto-transfer. The top logic of the bus sub-tree reflects this arrangement. The event "Bus 3A Deenergizes/Lockout" identifies th'e single failures and spurious relay actions which do not allow auto-transfer. The event "3A Supply Failure" then develops the combinations of events which result in failure of both the normal (Aux. Transformer) and alternate (Startup Transformer) supplies. As discussed above, any event leading to RTG trip will result in an auto-transfer attempt. An interaction between busses exists here since failure of the normal 3A or 3B bus supply or failure of 3C bus supply (with turbine runback failure) will result in RTG trip and subsequent loss of the 3A bus normal supply. This logic is modeled under the event "Unit 3 RTG Trip (3A)".

The alternate supply to bus 3A can fail if the normal supply breaker (3AA iIl2) sticks closed, if there are faults in the auto-transfer circuitry, or if the alternate supply is unavailable. Faults developed under these events include relay failures (auto-transfer), alternate supply breaker (3AA95) opens spuriously following auto-transfer and Startup Transformer and its.supply. faults..

Appendix F JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 4of 7 Supply failures to both the Startup and Auxiliary Transformers are developed back to the Switchyard bays. The protective relay logic is modeled implicitly here. A fault occurring on a switchyard bus is assumed to result in opening of all oil circuit breakers (OCB's) required to clear the fault. If one OCB sticks closed (in response to a fault event), the next (OCB's) required to clear the fault is assumed to open. Using this implicit logic, single and double faults resulting in loss of Transformer supply are identified. In addition, to identify potential common mode failures, single and double faults which result in loss of the east or west bay supply to a transformer were modeled. For example, a fault on the Units I and 2 Startup Transformer in combination with a stuck OCB 4B will result in a loss of east supply to both the /83 Startup Transformer and the N3C Transformer. The west supply of these transformers remains energized, however, and additional faults are required to lose the west supply.

Bus 3C Fault L ic Bus 3C is similar to 3A in that there are a number of local bus or spurious relay action faults which may result in deenergization of the bus without permitting auto-transfer. The 3C bus supply does not auto-transfer on RTG trip. Loss of the 3C transformer or its supply will initiate an auto-transfer to a secondary winding of the 4C transformer. The fault sub-tree develops faults of the normal and alternate supply as well as faults of the auto transfer circuitry. The switchyard bay faults developed are similar to those of Bus 3A.

FAULT TREE EVENT QUANTIFICATION The fault tree allows an estimate of the numerical system failure probability to be calculated by combining the system s equipment failure probabilities. For this analysis, the distribution system average unavai lab ility is the parameter calculated. Unavailability. is defined as the probability that the system or equipment is unable to perform its intended function. For this system, most of the equipment is normally energized with some equipment in standby (Startup Transformers and associated circuit breakers). To calculate the average unavailability of a normally in-service component the following equation is used:

A xADT BBBII where Average Unavailability Equipment Failure Rate (failure/year)

ADT = Average Equipment Down Time (hours)

The primary data source for both failure rates and down time was IEEE-STD-493-l980 (Reference I). Turkey Point Plant Startup/Shutdown Logs were used to obtain information about the Reactor/Turbine-Generator trip frequency and subsequent outage duration. EPRI-NP-2230 (Ref. 4) was used to obtain the spurious Safety Injection frequency.

Appendix F JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page S of 7 For components which must change state on demand (circuit breakers, control relays), a per demand failure probability was obtained from the Interim Reliability Evaluation Program data base. Table Fl provides a summary of the unavailability values obtained for the various equipment and events appearing in the fault tree. Table F2 lists the event specific failure probabilities.

FAULT TREE QUANTIFICATION The electric power distribution system fault tree was solved and quantified by use of the Set Equation Tranformation System (SETS) code (CDC Version I.02).

Minimal cutsets were obtained for the bus failure combinations listed above. For each bus, minimal cutsets (combinations of events leading to the top event) were obtained up to and including order 4 (4 fault events occurring simultaneously) regard to cutset probability. The remaining events (loss of all Unit 3 and'ithout busses, loss of all Unit 4 busses, and loss of both C busses) were limited to cutsets of order 4 and to probablllt'y of greater than I x I0-I I RESULTS The fault tree analysis performed for the 4.I6 kV electric power distribution system provides two types of results: numerical unavailability estimates and qualitative system failure insights. The calculated unavailabilities for the events modeled are as follows:

Unit 3 Unit 4 4kVBus A 8.3 x l0-5 8.2 x IO-S 4kV Bus B 8.l x lo-5 8,0 x Io-S 4kV Bus C 6.I x IO-5 6.I x IO-S Lass of all busses I.2 x I0-7 l.2 x IO-7 Loss of both C Busses 3.3 x IO-6 Tables F3 through Fl I provide listings of the dominant cutsets and their probabilities. Table FI2 identifies each primary event abbreviation and its description. Table FI3 summarizes the cutsets obtained through the truncation process described above.

The fault tree neglects the ability of the diesel generators to supply power to the A and B busses. Although single failures of the offsite transmission lines appear in the model, the total loss of all 8 offsite circuits (loss of grid) is not included.

Thus the fault tree examines the availability of power at the 4.I6 kV bus level based on the availability of the unit and the switchyard and is conditional on the availability of the offsite grid.

From the table above, it is seen that the A and B bus unavailabilities are not significantly different. The C Bus is shown to be slightly more reliable (from offsite power sources). Examination of the cutsets reveals that the loss of the Auxiliary Transformer supply to A and B busses on Reactor/Turbine-Generator (RTG) trip provides the primary difference in availability.

0 Appendix F JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 6 of 7 The dominant cutsets for A and B busses of both units are identical. The following six events contribute 88% of the total bus unavailability:

a) Inadvertent Opening of the Normal Supply Breaker (4I%)

(3AAg2SPR, 3AB92SPR, 4AA92SPR, 4ABg2SPR) b) Local Bus Fault causing Bus Lockout (30%)

(B3ALF, B3BLF, B4ALF, B4BLF) c) Unit Trip with Startup Transformer Unavailable (6%)

(U3TR x 3SUXMERF, U4TR x 4SUXMERF) d) Unit Trip with Failure of Startup Feeder Breaker To Close (4%)

(U3TR x 3AA95LCL, U3TR x 3AB95LCL, U4TR x 4AA95LCL, U4TR x 4AB95LCL) e) Unit Trip with Failure of Auxiliary Transformer Feeder Breaker to Open (4%)

(U3TR x BK3AAg2SC, U3TR x BK3AB92SC, U4TR x BK4AA52SC, U4TR x BK4ABg2SC) f) Startup and Auxiliary Tran'sformer Unavailable (3%)

(3AXMERF x 3SUXMERF, 4AXMERF x 4SUXMERF)

The remaining cutsets each contribute less than 2% to the total bus unavailability. Cutsets 24 through 3I (2l through 28 for Busses 4A and 4B) represent spurious relay actions which open the normal supply breaker and do not permit auto-transfer to take place.

The dominant cutsets for the C Busses are also identical. They include the fol lowing:

a) Inadvertent Opening of the Normal Supply Breaker (55%)

(3AC I 6SPR, 4AC I 6SPR) b) Local Bus Fault (3 I%)

(B3CLF, B4CLF) c) 3C and 4C Transformers Unavailable (4%)

(4CXMERF x 3CXMERF) d),Faulted Normal Supply Transformer and Alternate Supply Breaker Fails to Close (3%)

(3CXMERF x 3ACSILCL, 4CXMERF x 4ACSILCL) e) Faulted Normal Supply Transformer and Normal Supply Breaker Fails to Open (3%)

(3CXMERF x BK3AC I6SPR, 4CXMERF x BK4AC I6SPR)

The remaining cutsets contribute, less than l% each to the total bus unavailability. Note that cutsets IO through l6 are single events leading to bus unavailability. These events are spurious relay actions which trip the normal feed breaker without allowing auto-transfer.

0 Appendix F JPE-L84- I 2 Rev. 0 Page 7 of 7 Simultaneous loss of offsite power to the three 4.I6 kV busses of a unit is dominated by the following two scenarios:

a) Inadvertent Opening of Normal Feeder Breaker to 3C Bus, Failure of the Unit to Runback (Unit Trips) and Unavailable Startup Transformer (47%)

(3AC I6SPR x U3TRF x 3SUXMERF, 4AC I 6SPR x U4TRF x 4SUXMERF) b) Local C Bus Fault/Lockout, Failure of the Unit to Runback and Unavailable Star tup Transformer (26%)

(B3CLF x U3TRF x 3SUXMERF, B4CLF x U4TRF x 4SUXMERF)

The remaining major cutsets are similar to the above in that they involve a faulted C Bus (with no auto-transfer permitted), failure of turbine runback and an unavailable Startup Transformer or its supply. As noted above, the turbine runback failure probability was assumed to be I.O for this study. Since all dominant cutsets contain this term, an improvement in the reliability of runback would have a major benefit in preventing loss of offsite power to the 4.I6 kV busses.

The simultaneous unavailability of both C busses is dominated by'he unavailability of both C transformers(78%) (4CXMERF x 3CXMERF). The remaining cutsets generally involve the unavailability of one C transformer in combination with faults in the supply to the other C tranformer.

Although a fault tree was not constructed for the C Bus without auto-transfer, the unavailability of such a scheme can be estimated by consicaering the major equipment unavailabilities:

Failure Event ~Probabilit C Bus Local Fault 1.9 x IO-5 Supply Breaker Opens (Spur.) 3.4 x I 0-5 Transformer Unavailable l.6 x IO-3 Pipe Cable 2e5 x IO-5 Disconnect Switch (x2) l.2 x I 0-4 I~8x lg Comparing this value to that of a C Bus with auto-transfer shows an unavailibility improvement of almost two orders of magnitude by utilization of the auto-transfer feature.

References I. IEEE-STD 493-I 980, IEEE Recommended Practice for Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems.

2. Component Failure Rates for Nuclear Plant Safety System Reliability Analysis, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Draft report issued 9/23/80 for use by IREP).

3. NUREG - 0492, Fault Tree Handbook, January I 98l.

4. EPRI-NP-2230, ATWS: A Reappraisal, Part 3: Frequency of Anticipated Transients. Electric Power Research Institute, January l982.

Appendix F JPE-L84-12 Rev. 0 E i ment/ Failure Mode Unavailabilit /

~Com nent BA Failure Probabili Bus: A 2.5 x 10-5 B 2.3 x 10-5 C 1.9 x 10-5 Iso Phase 3.6 x !0-6 Switchyard 6.0 x 10-6 Circuit Breaker Stuck (Fail to Open) 1.0 x 10-3 (AII) Failed in Service 3.4 x 10-5 Failed To Close 1.0 x 10 3 Transformer:

Main 1.9 x 10<

Auxiliary 1.6 x 10-3 Startup 1.6 x 10-3 C 1.6 x 10-3 Cab le: Swgr-Xmer (Aux., C) 8.4 x 10-7 Swgr-Xmer (S/U) 1.8x 10 6 Overhead to Swyd. 2.5 x 10-5 Pipe Cable 2.5 x 10-5 Disconnect Switch 6.1 x 10-5 Relays: Active Fail To Transfer 1.0 x 10-4 Passive NC Contacts Fail Open I.I x 10-7 Fuses Fail Open 1.2x 10 5 Unit 3 RTG Trip 3.3 x 10-3 Unit 4 RTG Trip 3.1 x 10-3 Spurious Safety Injection 1.8 x 10-5 Turbine Runback Failure 1.0 Offsite Power Supplies 3.5 x 10-4 (Single Circuit)

Unit I TG Trip 3.6 x 10-3 Unit 2 TG Trip 3.3 x 10-3 E i ment Unavailabilit Assumed or ault ree Quantification Sht. I of I

Appendix F JPE-L"84-12 Rev. 0 1+ 9E-5 B3CLF 1 ~ 6E-3 3CXMERF 2i3E-5 B3RLF iebE-3 4CXMERF 2o5E-5 B4ALF 1 ~ 6E-3 3AXMERF 2o3E-5 R4RLF ii9E-4 3MXMERF 1+ 9E-5 B4CLF 1 ~ bE-3 4SUXMERF 2+5E-5 B3ALF 1~bE-3 3SUXMERF 1 6E-3

~ 4AXMERF 1.9E-4 4MXMERF 4.16KV Bus Faults iobE-3 12SUXFT

/

Transformer Faults biOE-6 SERFT

3. 1E-3 U4TR boOE-6 SMBFT biOE-6 HEBFT 3.3E-3 U3TR boOE-6 N4IBFT 3+3E-3 U2FT 3+3E-3 U1FT Switchyard. Bus Faults Unit Trip Unavailability 3 'E-4 DAV3FT 3e5E-4 FLORFT iiO U3TRF 3.5E-4 FLAG2FT 1 oO U4TRF 3o5E-4 DA VlFT 3oSE-4 FLAG1FT Turbine Runback Failure 3 'E-4 DAV2FT 3s5E-4 DORFT 3i5E-4 DAD1FT Transmission <<Leone Faults Table F2 - Electric Power Distribution System Fault Tree Basic Event Probabilities (Sheet 1 of 4)

0 Appendix F JPE-L-84"12 Rev. 0 6o 1E-5 DSE3ABF 8.4E-7 3AATCF 6o iE-5 DSM3RF Bo4E-7 3C3CTCF 6 'E-5 DSM10ABF So4E-7 3C4CTCF 6 'E-5 DSE10*F Bo4E-7 3RATCF 6.1E-5 DSW7RF Bo4E-7 4RATCF bo 1E-5 DSE7ABF 8 'E-7 4AATCF 6 ~ f E-5 DS23FT Bo4E-7 4C4CTCF bolE-5 DSM7ARF 8.4E-7 4C3CTCF 6 ~ 1E-5 DSE7RF loSE-6 3BSUCF 6 o 1E-5 DSE6ARF loBE 6 3ASUCF bofE-5 DSM6RF USE-6 4RSUCF 6oiE-5 DSM6ARF 1.8E-b 4ASUCF boiE-5 DSE6RF 2+5E-5 3CPCF 6o iE-5 DSM3ABF 2 'E-5 4CPCF 6o 6~

1E-5 1E-5 DSE3RF 9SElOARF 2 'E-5 3NTB7QF 2.5E-5 2 'E-5

'STB60F SolE-5 DS24FT 4SURBOF 6olE-5 DSESARF 2o5E-5 4HTB90F 6o lE-5 DSWSRF 6 'E-5 DSWBABF Cable Faults 6o iE-5 DSESRF bo 1E-5 DSW9RF 6o 1E-5 DSE9APF 6olE-5 DSW'9ARF 6'1E-5' DSE9RF 1& OE-4 3AA02-R Disconnect Switch Faults 1 ~ OE-4 162-3A2 1 oOE-4 152Z-3A5 1 ~ OE-4 3AR02-R loOE-4 162-3B2 1 OE-4 152Z-3R5 io2E-5 3AAOSFU 1

~

~ OE-4 4AA02-R 1 o2E-5 3AB05FU 1 OE-.4 162-4A2 lo2E-5 4*A05FU 1 o

OE-4 152Z-4A5 1.2E-5 4AB05FU 1 o

~ OE-4 4AB02"R 1 ~ OE-4. ib~-4Ro Fuse Faults 1.0E-4 152Z-4R5 1, oOE-4 162-3ACfb ioOE-4 3AC16-R 1 ~ OE-4 125-3C 1 o SE-5 U3SISPR 1 ~ OE-4 f52Z-3Cl 1 ~ SE-5 U4SISPR ioOE-4 f. 62-4 A C16 1 o OE-4 4AC16-R 1 o OE-4 125-4C 1 ~ OE-4 152Z-4C1 Spurious Safety Injection Relay Active Faults Table F2 (Sheet 2 of 4)

Appendix F JPE-,L-84"12 Rev. 0

.OE-3 RK3AA02SC

.OE-3 RK3AB02SC

.OE-3 BK3AC16SC

~ OE-3 07RSC

.OE-3 07ARSC o OE-3, 07ASC oOE-3 067BSC oOE-3 08RSC 3+4E-5 03RF iOE-3 09RSC 3o4E-5 03ABF iOE-3 010BSC 3o4E-5 010AF iOE-3 06RSC 3i4E-5 010ARF

+OE-3 06ABSC 3o4E-5 07ARF oOE-3 06ASC 3+4E-5 07BF

+OE-3 05RSC 3 'E-5 06ARF

+OE-3 04BSC 3o4E-5 06RF iOE-3 02BSC 3.4E-S 08hBF oOE-3 03BSC 3o4E-5 08BF

.OE-3 03ARSC 3o4E-5 09ARF

.OE-3 02ASC 3i4E-5 09BF

~ OE-3 04ASC 3.4E-5 3AA02SPR OE-3 05ASC 3o4E-5 3AA05SPR

~

+OE-3 056ASC 3i4E-5 3ARO>SPR oOE-3 010ASC 3o4E-5 3AROSSPR

+OE-3 010ARSC 3i4E-5 4AA02SPR oOE-3 08ASC 3+4E-5 4AA05SPR iOE-3 ~ 09ASC 3.4E-5 4AB02SPR iOE-3 RK4AA02SC 3e4E-5 4AB05SPR iOE-3 08ARSC 3.4E-5 3AC16SPR

.OE-3 BK4AC16SC 3o4E-5 3AC01SPR

~ OE-3 BK4AR02SC 3 'E-5 4AC16SPR oOE-3 09ARSC 3.4E-5 4AC01SPR h

~ OE-3 3AA05LCL

. OE 3AR05LCL

~ OE-3 4AA05LCL Circuit Breaker Faults

~ OE-3 4*B05LCL (fail in service, spurious

~ OE-3 3AC01LCL opening)

~ OE-3 4AC01LCL Circuit Breaker Faults (fail to transfer)

Table F2 (Sheet 3 of 4)

Appendix F JPE-L-84"12 Rev. 0 1 ~ 1E-7 86GT-G3 fofE-7 2 27Z1-4AR3

1. 1E-7 286-G3 1. 1E-7 150-S4R 1 1E-7

~ 186X-3h 1.1E-7 151-S3R4 ~

fofE-7 150A3R fofE-7 151-S3R14 iofE-7 151-A3A 1 1E-7

~ 4R51 52-HH fofE-7 151-A3Ai fofE-7 186-3C

l. 1E-7 SI3-2 1X fiiE-7 186-3CRT 1 ~ 1E-7 186-ST3 foiE-7 127X-3C1 foiE-7 127X1-3AR3 fofE-7 86-EE 1.1E-7 86RU-ST3 iofE-7 86-FF 1.2E-7 86G 1 o 2E-7 150-3CRTX fofE-7 150-S3A 2 o 1E-7 25f-3CRTX 1 1E-7

~ 1 51-S313 2 i 2E-7 152-3CRTXl fofE-7 2 51-S3A13 2 iiE-7 3152- TOC 2 iE-7

"

3A5152-HH 1.1E-7 186-4CRT o

1. 1 E-7 186X-3R fofE-7 3AC03-R foiE-7 15093R fofE-7 3AC13-R 1 1E-7 252-R3A fofE-7 86-M 1

~

~ 1E-7 151-B3Ai fofE-7 86- Y 1 ~ 2E-7 SI3R2 iofE-7 150-4CBTY 2 ~ 1E-7 f27Zi-3AR3 2 1E-7

+ f 51-4CBTY 2 ~ 2E-7 150-S3R 1 lE-7

~ 152-4CRTY1 fifE-7 151-S383 2 iE-7 o 186-4C 2 ~ 1E-7 151-S3R13 1 iE-7 o 127X-4C1 2 iiE-7 3R5252-HH 2 iE-7 o 150-4CBTX fofE-7 86GT-G4 ioiE-7 151-4CRTX iofE-7 286-G4 2+2E-7 151-4CBTXl 1 2 E-7 186X-4A iiiE-7 4152- TOC 2 i o

1E-7 150A4R iofE-7 4AC03-B 1 1E-7 152-A4A iofE-7 4AC13-B

~

1 1E-7

~ f51-A4A1. fofE-7 152-3CRTY1 foiE-7 S14-12X 2 iE-7

+ 150-3CBTY 1 f,E-7 o 186-ST4 1. 1E-7 151-3CRTY ioiE-7 127X1-4AR3 1.1E-7 174-4C2

'.1E-7 86BU-ST4 1 o iE-7 174-4C6 f.fE-7 86K 1 ~ 2E-7 174-3Cf

1. 1E-7 150-S4A 1. 1E-7 174-3C6 1.2E-7 151-S3A4 1. 1E-7 174-3A2

1. 1E-7 151-S3A24 fifE-7 174-3A5 2.1E-7 4A5252-HH feiE-7 174-3R2 foiE-7 186X-4R 2+2E-7 174-3R5 fofE-7 250-R4R 2 1E-7 o 274-4A2 1+ iE-7 2 51-R4A 2 1E-7 o 174-4A5 2 iE-7 o 152-R4A2 fofE-7 174-4R2 2.1E-7 SI4R2 2+iE-7 174-4B5 Relay (passive) faults Table F2 (Sheet 4 of 4)

Appendix F JPE-L"84-12 Rey. 0 4KU3h 1 3.4000E-05 3hA02Sl"R 2 ".5000E-05 B3hLF 3 5.2SOOE-06 3SUXMERF '4 U3TR 4 3.3000E-06 U3TR 0 3AAOSLCL 5 3.3000E-05 U3TR 8K3AA02SC 6 2 '600E-06 3hXMERF f 3SUXHERF 7 1.6000E-06 3AXMERF f 3hA05LCL 8 lo6000E-06 3hXYiERF 4 BK3hA02SC 9 3.3000E-07 U3TR f 1.52Z-Ph5 10 3.3000E-07 U3TR 0 152-3h2 11 3.3000E-07 U3TR il'AA02-B 12 3o0400E-07 3HXMERF 0: 3SUXHERF 13 2.0130E-07 BSM6BF '4 U3TR 14 ~oOliOE-07 DSE6ABF 4 U3TR 15 2+ 0130E-07 DS23FT 4 U3TR 16 io9000E-07 3MXMERF f 3AA05LCL 17 1.9000E-07 3HXMERF 4 BK3AA02SC 18 ii6000E-07 3*XMERF 4 1 2Z-3A5 19 le 6000E-07 3hXHERF '0 162-3h2 1.6000E-07 3AXMERF 0 3AA02-8 +

21 le1220E-07 U3TR 0 3AAOSSPR +

l . 1220E-07 06BF f. U3TR +

1.1"20E-07 06ABF 0 U3TR +

lolOOOE-07 SI3-liX 1,1000E-07 150A3B 26 1.1000E-07 127Xi-3AB3 Table F3

'

4KV Bus 3A Cutsets (Sheet 1 of 2) t

hppendix F JPE-L-84-12 Rev. 0 27 1.1000E-07 174-3A5 28 1.1000E-07 5 55 -h3h1 +

29 5 o 1000E-07 186X-3h 30 iiiOOOE-0? 574-3A2 31 1 i 1000E-0? 151-P.'3h 32 9.7600E-OS 3AXHERF 0 DSMbBF 33 9o?600E-OB 3AXNERF f. DSEbABF 34 9,7600E-OS 3AXNERF 0 DS23FT +

35 9.7600E-OS DSE?ABt P 3SUXMERF 36 9.7600E-OS DSM7BF f. 3SUXHERF +

37 8>2500E-08 3STB60F 0 U3TR 38 6.1000E-08 DSE7ABF t. 3AA05l.CL 39 6~1000E-08 DSM7BF t 3hA05l.Cl.. +

40 6.1000E-OB DSE7ABF 0 BK3hA02SC

45. 6olOOOE-08 DSM7BF 0 BK3AA02SC 42 5.4400E-OS 3AXHERF 4 3AA05St" R 43 5i4400E-08 3AXNERF 0 06BF +

44 5.4400E-OS 3AXHERF f. 06ABF +

45 5.4400E-OB 3SUXHERF 0 3AB02SPR 46 5o4400E-08 0?RF 4 3SUXNERF 47 5o4400E-OS 07ABF 0 3SUXNERF 4 'a 440'OE-0 3SUXHERF ~: U.TRF 8 3hC56SF'R 49 4.0000E-OS 3hXNERF 4 3&iTB60F 50 4oOOOOE-08 3HTB70F 0 3SUXNERF Table F3,(Sheet 2 of 2)

Appendix F JPE-L-84"12 Rev. 0 4KV3B 1 8.4000E-05 3AB02SPR 2'000E-05 B3BLF 3 5.2800E-06 3SUXMERF 0 U3TR 3.3000E-06 U3TR 0 3AB05LCL 5 3.3000E-06 U3TR 0 BK3AB02SC +

6 2i5600E-06 3AXMERF 0 38UXMERF 7 1.6000E-06 3AXMERF '4'AB05LCL 8 1.6000E-06 3AXMERF 0 BK3AB02SC

\

3.3000E-07 U3TR 4 152Z-3B5 10 3 8000E-07 U31R 0 lb"-~B" 11 3o3000E-07 U3TR t. 3AB02-B 12 3.0400E-07 3HXMERF '4 38UXMERF 13 2. 0130E-07 DS4lbBF 4 U3TR 14 ", i 0130E-07 DSE6ABF 4 U3TR 15 2 i 0130E-07 DS23FT 0 U3TR +

16 1.9000E-07 3MXMERF 0 3AB05LCL 17 li9000E-07 3MXMERF 0 BK3AB02SC 18 1+6000E-07 3AXMERF '4 152Z-385 19 iobOOOE 3AXMERF 0 162-382 20 libOOOE-07 3AXMERF e 3AB02-B +

21 1 1220E-07 o U3TR t. 3AB05SPR +

22 1 . 1220E-07 06BF 0 U3TR +

23 . 1.1220E-07 06ABF 0 U3TR 24 ieiOOOE-07 SI3B2 25 1 1000E-07 e 150B3B 26 1.1000E-07 i27Z]-3AB3 +

Table F4 4KV Bus 3B Cutsets (Sheet l of 2)

Appendix F JPE-L-84-12 Rev. 0 27 lo1000E-07 174-3B5 28 ls2000E-07 151-B3A1 29'.1000E-07 1S6X-3B 30 1 i 1000E-07 l?4-3B2 31 1 i 1000E-07 151-B3A 32 5' 7600E-08 3hXMERF '4 DSM6BF 33 5'.7600E-08 3AXMERF 0 DHE6ABF

'34 5'.7600E-08 3AXMERF DS23FT 35 9.7600E-OS llSE?hBF 0: 3SUXMEPF 36 9.7600E-OS DSM?BF 0 3SU>,'MERF +

37 8+2500E-08 3STB60F 0 U3TR 38 6 1000E-08 DSE7ABF f. 3hB05LCL 35'.

~

1000E-08 DSM?BF 0: 3hBOSLCL 40 6. 1000E-08 DSE7ABF 0 BK3hB02SC 41 6.,1000E-OS DSW?BF '4 BK3AB02SC 42 5 '400E-08 3AXMERF 0 3AB05SPR 43 5o4400E-08 3hXMERF t 06BF 44 5 '400E-08 3AXHERF f. 06ABF +

45 5i4400E-08 3SUXMERF '4 3hAO2SPR 46 5,4400E-08 07BF 0 3SUXMERF 47 5+4400E-08 07ABF f 3SUXHERF 4S 5.4400E-OS 3SUXMERF 0 U3TRF 4 3ACibSPR 45'iOOOOE-08 3AXHERF 0 3STB60F 50 4 i OOOOE-08 3SUXHERF 0 B3ALF Table F4 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Appendix F JPE"L"84"12 Rev. 0 4KV3C 1 3 '000E-05 3AC26SPR 1 ~ 9000E-05 B3CLF 2 '600E-06 4CXMERF 4 3(:XHERF iibOOOE-06 3CXMFRF 4 3AC02LCL iobOOOE-06 3CXHERF 0: RK3AC16SC 6 lebOOOE-07 3CXMERF 0 252Z-3C2 7 1.6000E-07 3CXHERF f l25-3C +

iibOOOE-07 3CXMERF 4 3AC26-B 2 i6000E-07 3CXMERF '4 162-3hC26 10 io2000E-07 252-3CRTX

1. 1000E-07 150-3CBTX 2

'7 2oiOOOE-07 127X-3Cl 13 1.1000E-07 186-3C +

14 ii2000E-07 174-3C6 15 iilOOOE-07 151-3CBTX1 16 1.2000E-07 174-3C1 17 9 '600E-08 DSE1 OAF 0 3CXHERF 28 9+7600E-08 DSW10ABF f. 3(:XHERF 19 9i7600E-08 4CXHERF t. DSW3BF +

20 9.7600E-OS 4CXMERF 0 DSE3ABF 6.1000E-OS. DSW3BF 0 3AC01LCL 6 1000E-08 DSE3ABF 0 3AC01LCL 23 6.1000E-OS DSW3BF 0 BK3AC16SC +

24 6 1000E-OS DSE3ABF t BK3AClbSC 5.4400E-OS 020ABF f. 3(:XHERF 26 5.4400E-08 020AF f. 3(:XMERF +

Table F5 4KV Bus 3C Cutsets (Sheet 1 of 2)

Appendix F JPE-L-84"12 Rev. 0 27 bi4400E-08 3GXNERF f 3hCG1SPR 28 5.4400E-08 4CXNERF f. 03ABF 29 5+4400E-08 4CXMERF 0 03RF 30 4.0000E-08 4CPCF '4 3CXNERF 31 4iOOOOE-08 4CXHERF '4 3CPCF 32 3i4000E-08 03ARF 0 3hC01LCL 33 > 3i4000E-08 03RF 4 3ACOiLCL 34 3o4000E-08 03ARF 0 RK3hCibSC 35 '3.4000E-08 O3RF f. BK3AC16SC 36 ~.5000E-08 3CPCF 0 3AC01LCL 37 2i5000E-08 3CPCF 0 Rfi3AC16SC 38 bo1000E-09 DSM3RF 'f 1522-3Cl 39 belOOOE-09 DSE3ABF 0 1527-3f:1 40 6.1000E-09 DSM3RF 0 125-3C 41 . biiOOOE-09 DSE3ABF t 125-3C 42 bo1000E-'09 DSM3RF f 3AC16-B 43 boiOOOE-09 DSE3ARF f 3AC16-B 44 boiOOOE-09 DSM3RF 0 162-3AC16 45 6.1000E-09 DSE3ABF f 162-3AG16 46 3o7210E-09 DSM3BF 4 DSE10AF 47 3i7210E-09 DSE3ABF 0 DSE1 OAF 48 3,7210E 0 DSW3BF f DSM.'.OABF 49 . 3 i7210E-09 DSE3APF 0 D&MiOARF 50 3i4000E-09 03ARF >l: 1:?5-3C Table F5 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Appendix F JPE-L-84-12 Rev. 0 4KV4A 3o4000E-05 4AA02SPR 2i5000E-05 B4ALF 4+9600E-06 4SUXMERF t U4TR +

4 3iiOOOE-06 U4TR 0 4AAOSLCL 3ifOOOE-06 U4TR 0 BK4AA02SC 6 2.5600E-06 4SUXMERF 0: 4AXMERF 7 ii6000E-06 4AXMERF f. 4AAOGLCL 8 1.6000E-06 4AXMERF 4 BK4hA02SC +

9 3ifOOOE-07 U4TR 4 1"'<~Z-4C'I f0 3 '000E-07 U4TR 0 162-4A2 ll 3.1000E-07 U4TR 4 4AA02-B 3.0400E-07 4SUXMERF 0 4MXMERF 13 1.9000E-07 4MXMERF 0 4Ah05LCL 14 1.9000E-07 4MXMERF 8 BK4hh02SC 15 1.8910E-07 U4TR t. DSMBRF 16 ii8910E-07 U4TR 0 DSEBABF 17 ie8910E-07 U4TR 4 DS24FT +

f8 fibOOOE-07 4AXMERF f 152Z-4A5 1.6000E-07 4AXMERF 0 162-4A2

'0 0 1.6000E-07 4AXMERF 4 4AA02-B 1+fOOOE-07 '50A4B 1.1000E-07 SI4-1 f~

1 ~ 1000E-07 127Xf-4AB3 24 f.fOOOE-07 174-4A5 g C' sl iefOOOE-07 186X-4A 1.1000E-07 f 51-h4A1 Table F6 4KV Bus 4A Cutsets (Sheet 1 of 2)

I Appendix F JPE"L-84-12 Rev. 0 27 ioiOOOE-07 151-A4h 28 1 1000E-07

~ 174-4A2 29 li0540E-07 U4l R 4 4AA05SF'R 30 io0540E-07 U4TR f OBBF 31 1,0540E-07 U4TR e OHABF 32 9+7600E-08 4AXMERF 4 DSLJBBF +

33 9o7600E-08 4AXMERF 0 DSEPABF +

34 9i7600E-08 4AXMFRF 0 DS24FT 35 9.7600E-OS 4SUXMERF 0 DSE9ABF 36 9i7600E-08 4SUXMERF 4 DSW9BF 37 7i7500E-08 U4TR 0 4SURSOF +

38 6. 1000E-08 DSE9ABF 4 4AA05LCL 39 6 o 1000E-08 DSW9BF 0: 4AA05LCL 40 6.1000E-OS DSF9ABF 4 BK4hAO SC +

.41 6+ 1000E-08 DSM9BF '4 BK4AA02SC 42 5o4400E-08 4AXMERF 0 4AA05SPR 43 5.4400E-OS 4AXMERF 0 OSBF 44 5o4400E-08 4AXMERF 0 OSABF 45 5+440OE-08 4SUXMERF 0 4hB02SF'R 46 5 '400E-08 4SUXMERF 0 09BF 47 5o4400E-08 4SUXMERF 0 09ABF 48 5i4400E-08 4SUXMERF 0 U4TRF 4 4AC16SPR +

49 4.0000E-OS 4AXMERF 4 4SUBSOF 50 4.0000E-OS 4SUXMERF 4 4MTB90F Table F6 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Appendix F JPE-L-84-12 Rev. 0 4KV4B 1 3 o 4000E-05 4AR02SPR 2 2o3000E-05 84RLF 3 4i9600E-06 4SUXMERF 0 U4TR 4 3.1000E-05 U4TR 0 4AR05LCL 5 3i2000E-06 U4TR f RK4hB02SC +

6 2e5600E-06 4SUXMERF 4 4hXMERF 7 iibOOOE-06 4AXMERF 0 4AR05LCL 8 2,5000E-C6 OAXMERF 0 RK4hR02SC +

9 3+2000E-07 'U4TR f 152Z-4R5 2 0 3. 1000E-07 U4TR 0 162-4R2 +

ll 3o2000E-07 U4TR t 4AB02-B 12 3.0400E-07 4SUXMERF 0 4MXMERF 13 2+900OE-07 IMXMERF f. 4AR05LCL 14 f.9000E-07 4MXMERF '4 RK4AB02SC 15 1.8910E-07 U4TR f. DSW8BF +

16 1.8910E-07 U4TR 0 DSEBABF 17 ii891OE-07 U4TR 4 D824FT 18 3+6000E 07 4AXMERF 0 152Z 4R5 19 1+6000E-07 4AXMERF 0 162-4R2 20 2 '000E-07 4AXMERF f 4AB02-R,+

21 iiiOOOE-07 250-R4R 22 ii2000E-07 Sr4R2 +

23 ii2000E-07 127Z1-4AR3 24 2,2000E-07 174 25 .2iiOOOE-07 186X-4R 26 1 i 1000E-07 151-R4Ai Table F7 4KV Bus 4B Cutsets (Sheet 1 of 2)

Appendix F JPE-L"84-12 Rev. 0 1, 1000E-0? 151-B4A l i1000E-0? 174"4P2 l9 1.0540E-07 U4TR 0 4hBOSSPR 30 ' i 0540E-07 U4TR 0 OBBF +

io0540E-07 U4TR 0 08ABF +

9o?600E-08 4AXHERF 0 DSMBRF 33 9.7600E-OB 4AXHERF 0 DSEBABI-34 9+7600E-08 4AXRERF 0 DS24FT 9.7600E-OB 4SUXMERF 4 DSE9ABF 36 9i?600E-08 4SUXtlERF 0 DSM98F +

37 ?i?500E-08 U4TR 4 4SUBBOF 38 6.1000E-OS DSE9ABF 0 4ABOSLCL 39 6 i 1000E -08 DSM'9BF 4 4AB05LCL 40 b. 1000E-08 DSE9ABF f BK4AB02SC 41 6 1000E-08 o DSM9BF 0 BK4AB02SC 42 5i4400E-08 4AXHERF 4 4ABOSSPR 43 5+4400E-08 4AXHERF 0 088F +

44. 5i4400E-OB. 4AXNERF 0 OBABF 45 5i44QOE-08 4SUXMERF 4 4AA02SPR 46 5.4400E-OB 4SUXllERF 'k 09BF 47 5.4400E-OB 4SUXMERF 0 09ABF 5.4400E-OB 4SUXNERF 4 U4TRF f 4AC16SPR 49 4eOOOOE-08 4AXNERF 0 4SUBBOF 50 4oOOOOE-08 4SUXNERF 0 B4ALF Table F7 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Appendix F JPE-L-84-12 Rev. 0 4KV4C 3 '000E-05. 4AC16SPR 1 i 9000E-05 R4CLF 3 2.5600E-06 4CXMERF 0 3CXMERF iobOOOE-06 4CXMERF 0 4A(:01L(:L 5 iobOOOE-06 4CXMERF '4 BK4AC16SC 6 1 ibOOOE-07 4CXMFRF 0 152i-4C1 7 1+6000E-07 4CXMERF 0 125-40 8 lobOOOE-07 4CXMERF 0 4AC16-R 9 1.6000E-07 4CXMERF f. 162-4AC16 +

10 liiOOOE-07 151-4CRTX loiOOOE-07 150-4CRTX 1 iiOOOE-07 127X-4C1 13 loiOOOE-07 186-4C 14 1 ~ 1000E-07 174-406 15 1 i i OOOE-07 151-4CBTX1 16 1 i 1000E-07 1'74-4C1

-17 9+7600E-08 DSEiOAF f 3CXMERF 18 9o7600E-08 DSM10ARF 0 3CXMERF +

19 9 '600E-08 4CXMERF 0 DSM3BF 20 9e7600E-08 4CXMERF 0 DSE3ARF 6+1000E-08 DSE10AF 4 4hC01LCL 6 '000E-08 IISE10AF 4 BK4hC16SC

)3 boiOOOE-08 IISM10ARF 0 4ACOlLCL 6 '000E-08 IISMi OARF f BK4hC16SC 25 5i4400E-08 010ARF f 3CXMERF 26 5.4400E-08 010AF 0 3(:XMERF Table F8 4KV Bus 4C Cutsets (Sheet 1 of 2)

Appendix p JPE L"84-12 Rev. 0 5 4400E-08 4CXMERF f. 4hCOiSPR 28 5.4400E-08 4CXMERF f 03ABF 29 5,4400E-08 4CXMERF f. 03RF 30 4iOOOOE-08 4CPCF 4 3CXMERF 31 4+OOOOE-08 4CXMERF 0 3CPCF 32 3.4000E-08 010ABF f. 4hC01LCL 33 3e4000E-08 010ABF 0 RK4hC16SC 34 3.4000E-08 010AF 4 4ACOlLCL 35 3.4000E-08 010AF 0 BK4AC15SC 36 r?i5000E-08 4CPCF 4 4hCOiLCL 37 2.5000E-08 4CPCF 0 BK4AU16SC 38 6+ 1000E-09 DSE10AF 0 152Z-4C1 39 6+ 1000E-09 DSEiOAF 4 125-4C 40 6.1000E-09 DSE10AF 4 4hC16-R 41 6 i 1000E-09 DSE10AF 0 162-4AC16 42 6oiOOOE-09 DSMiOABF 0 1. 2Z-401 43 6 1000E-09

~ DSMiOABF 0 125-4C 44 6olOOOE-09 DSW10ARF 4 4ACi 6-B 45 6+1000E-09 DSM10ARF '4 162-4hC16 46 3i7210E-09 DSM3RF 0 DSEiOhF +

47 3.7210E-09 DSE3hBF 4 DSE10AF 48 3.7210E-09 DSM3RF 4 DSW10ABF 49 3. 7210E-09 DSE3ABF e DSb!10ARF +

50 3i4000E-09 010AF 4 152Z-4C1 Table F8 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Appendix F JPE"L-84"12 Rev. 0 UNI T34KV 1 5,4400E-OS 3SUXNERF >!: U3TRF 0 3AC1 SPR 3+0400E-OS 3SUXMERF,f U3TRF f B8CI.F 0960E-09 4CXMERF 4 3SUXJIERF ".: 3CXMERF 4 2.5600E-09 U3TRI-'SUXHERF 4 0 8CXMERF 8 U3TRF:K 3AC011 CL 5 2i5600E-09 3SUXNERF 0 3CXHERF 0: U3TRF 0 BK3ACibSC 6 2,0740E-09 DSP!6J<F 4 U3TRF 0 3hC16SPR 7 2o0740E-09 DSEbh&F '4 U8TRF 4 3AC26SPR S 2i0740E-09 DS 3FT e U3TRF e 3AC26SPR

> ~ 1590E-09 DSEb*PF 0 U3TRF 0 83CLI:

10 io2590E-09 DS23FT f U3TRF 0 B3CI.F 11 ii2590E-09 DSMbRF 4 U3TRF, 4 B3CI,.F 12 ii2560E-09 06BF 0 U3TRF 4 3AC2 6SPR 13 io2560E-09 06ABF f U3TRF t. 3hC16SPR 14 Si5000E-20 3STB6VF 4 U3TRF 0 3hC16SI"R 15 6. 4600E-10 06ABF. 0 U3TRF 0: B8CLF 16 bi4600E-20 06BF 0 U3TRF f. B3CI F 17 4 ~ 7500E-10 3STB60F U3TRF 0 &3CLF 1S 2o5600E-20 3SUXMERF 0 3CXMERF f U3TRF 0 152Z-3Cl 19 2i5600E-10 . 3SUXMERF 4 3CXHERF 0 IJ3TRF 0 225-3C 2+5600E-20 3SUXMERF 0 3CXMERF 0 U3TRF 0 3hC26-B 2o5600E-20 3SUXMERF 0 3CXMERF f U8TRF 0 262-3hC36 1 7'952E-2 0 3SUXMERF 4 U3TR 0 3AC16SPR 23 ii7600E-20 3SUXNERF 0: U3TRF 4 lbi-3CBTX 2 i7600E-20 3SUXMERF' U3TRF 0 lbl-3CR'!Y2 25 io7600E-20 3SUXHERF f UBTRF 4 1: 7X-3C1 2.7600E-10 3SUXHERF 4 U3TRF f 286-3f:

Table F9 Unit 3 4KV Busses'All) Cutsets (Sheet l of 2)

~

Appendix F JPE-L-84"12 Rev. 0 l7 fi7600E-10 3SUXNERF '4 U:3TRF 4 174-301

'1 8 fo7600E-10 3SUXMERF 4 U3TRF 4 174-806 fo7600E-10 3SUXHERF 4 U3TRF 0 150-3CRTX 30 fo5616E-10 4CXMERF f DSW3BF 4 3SUXMERF 0 U3TRF 31 ii5616E-10 4CXNERF 0 DSE8hBF 4 3SUXMERF 0 U3TRF I i 561 6E-1 0 DSE10AF 0 3SUXMERF 0 3CXMERF 0 U<TRF 33 ii56fbE-iO DSMiOARF 4 3SUXMERF 4 3CXMERF' U8TRF 34 1+5616E-10 4CXMERF 4 DSMbRF 4 3CXHERF f. U3TRF 1 i 563 6E-10 4CXMERF 0 DSE6ARF 4 3CXMERF 0 U3TRF 36 f i5616E-10 4CXMERF 0 DS23FT f. 3CXMERF 0 LI;3TRF 37 fi0032E-10 3SUXMERF I U8TR 0 R;3CLF 9e/600E-ff DSM3BF 0 3SUXMERF 0 U3TRF 0: 3AC01LCL 39 9e7600E-if DSE3ARF 4 3SUXMERF 0 U3TRF 4 3ACO1LCL 40 5'i7600E-ff DSW3BF 0 3SUXMERF 0 U3TRF 0 BK3hCibSC 41 9 o 7600E-1 1 DSE3ARF 0 3SUXMERF 0 LIHTRF 4 RK3AC]6SC 4o 9.7600E-ii DSW6BF 0 3CXMERF U3TRF '4 3ACOlLCL 43 9i7600E-ii DSE6ABF 0 3CXMERF 0 U3TRF f. 3AC01LCL 44 9s7600E-if DS23FT 4 3CXMERF 0 U3TRF 4 3AC01LCL 9.7600E-11 DSW6RF 0 3CXMERF '4 U3TRF 0 RK3AC16SC 46 9o7600E-ff DSE6ARF 0 3CXMERF 0 U3TRF 4 BK3AC16SC 47 9.7600E-fi DS23FT 4'CXMERF 4 U3TRF ~ RK3ACibSC 48 8.7040E-11 4CXMERF t 03BF 4 3SUXMERF 4 U3TRF 49 8.7040E-11 010ARF 0 3SUXMERF f 3CXMERF I U8TRF 50 8o7040E-if 010AF 0 3SUXMERF 0 3CXMERF 4 U3TRF Table F9 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Appendix F JPE-L-84"12 Rev. 0 UNIT44KV 1 5i4400E-08 4SUXMERF f. U4TRF f- 4AC16SF'R 2 3o0400E-08 4SUXMERF 0 U4TRF 0 B4CI F 3 4e0960E-09 4CXMfRF 0 4SUXMERF 4 U4TRF 8 3f:XI"fRF 4 2.5600E-09 WCXHERF 0 4SUXMEI<F 0 IJ4TRF f AAC01LCL 5 2o5600E-09 4CXHERF 0 4SUXMERF 0 U4TRF '4 Bl<4AC16SC 6 2o0740E-09 U4TRF 4 DSM8BF 0 4AC16SF'R 7 2i0740E-09 U4TRF 4 DSESABF 4 4ACibSI"R 8 2i0740E-09 U4TRF '4 DS24FT f 4AC16SPR 9 1 i 1590E-09 IJ41RF 4 DSEBABF 0 B 'ICI F 10 1.1590E-09 U4TRF f. DS24FT f. B4CI. F li io1590E-09 U4TRF 0 DSMSBF 0 B4CLF 1 2560E-09

~ ll4TRF f. QBBF 0 4AC16SI"R 1 i 1560E-09 U4TRF 0 QfsABF 0 4AC16SI" R 8.5000E-10 U4TRF f. 4SUBBOF 0 4AC16SI'R +

15 6.4600E-10 U4TRF 0 QBABF 0 B4CI..F 16 6+ 4600E-10 U4TRF 0 OSBF 0 B4CLF.

1? 4 '500E-10 .U4TRF f. 4SURSOF 4 B4CLF

, 18 2 i 5600E-,10 4CXMERF 0 4SUXHERF 0 U4TRI' 152Z-4Ci 19 2i5600E-10 .4CXMERF 0 4SUXMERF U4TRF 0: 125-4C 20 2 i 5600E-10 4CXHERF 0 4SUXMERF U4TRF f 4AC16-B 21 2i5600E-10 4CXHERF '4 4SUXMERF 0 U4TRF 0 162-4AC16 1 i 7600E-10 4SUXMERF 0 U4TRF f. 151-4CR1X 1.7600E-10 4SUXMERF 0 U4TRF 151-4CBTX1

1. 760OE-10 4SUXMERF 8 O'ITRF 127X-4C1 25 ii7600E-10 4SUXMERF 0 U4TRF f. 186-4C 26 ii7600E-20 , 4SUXMERF 0 U4TRF 4 174-4Ci

,Table F10 Unit 4 4KV Busses'All) Cutsets (Sheet 1 of 2)

Appendix F'PE-L"84-12 Rev. 0 27 1.7600E-10 4SUXMERF '4 U4TRF + 174-4C6 28 1.7600E-20 4SUXHERF 4 U4TRF 8 150-4CBTX 29 1.6864E-10 4SUXMERF 4 U4TR f. 4AC36S(-"R 30 1 5616E-10 DSE10AF I('8UXMERF 0 U4TRF f. 3(:XHERF 31 1.5616E-10 DSM10ABF 0 48UXMERF 0 U4TRF 4 3CXHERF +

32 io5616E-10 4CXHERF 0 DSM3RF 4 48UXHERF ~ U4TRF 33 1+ 5616E-10 4CXMERF 0 DSE3ABF 8 4SUXMERF 0 U4TRF 34 I 5616E-10

~ 4CXHERF t U4TRF 4 DSMBBF 0 3(:XHERF 35 1 5616E-10 o 4CXMERF 0 U4TRF 0 DSEBARF ~ 3(:XHERF h

36 1 o 5616E-10 4CXHERF '4 U4'(RF 0 D824FT 4 3CXMERF 37 9.7600E-ii DSE10AF 0 48UXHERF 4 U4TRF t. 4ACOiLCL 38 9.7600E-li DSM10ARF e 4SUXHERr- e unTRF e 4AC01LCL +

39 9 i 7600E-11 DSE10AF '4 4SUXHERF 0 U4TRF f. BK4ACf 6SC 40 9 7600E-11 DSMlOABF '4 48UXMERF '4 U4TRF 0 BK4AClbSC 41 9 o 7600E-11 4CXHERF 0 U4TRF 0 DSM8RF 4 4AC01LCL 42 9.7600E-ii 4CXMERF 4 U4TRF 4 DSE8ABF 0 4ACOlLCL +

43 9 7600E-11 4CXMERF 4 U4TRj 0 D824FT, 0 4AC01LCL 44 9o7600E-11 - 4CXHERF f U4TRF 0 DSM8RF f BK4AC16SC 45 9o7600E-li WCXHERF 0 U4TRF 0 DSEHABF 8 RK4AC16SC 46 9e7600E-11 4CXHERF 0 U4TRF 0 DS24FT 0 RK4ACibSC 47 9 o4240E-11 4SUXMERF f. U4TR 0 R4CLF 48 8.7000E-ll 010AF 0 CSUXHERF '0 U", TRF '4 3CXHERF 49 Bi/040E-li 4CXHERF 0 03ABF '4 4SUXMERF 0 U4TRF 50 8.7040E-11 4CXHERF 4 03RF 0 48UXHERF 0 U4TRF Table F10 (Sheet 2 of 2)

'Appendix F JPE"L-84-12 Rev. 0 CBUSSES 1 2o5600E-06 4CXMERF 0 3CXMERF 2 9 '600E-08 4CXMERF 0 DSM3RF 3 9+7600E-08 4CXMERF 0 DSE3ARF 4 9i7600E-08 DSE10AF 0: 3CXMERF 5 9+7600E-08 DSMIOARF 'K 3CXMERF 6 5,4400E-08 4CXMERF '4 03RF 7 5e4400E-08 010ARF 0 3CXMERF 5i4400E-08 01 OAF 0 3CXMERF 9 '5i4400E-08 4CXMERF 0 03ARF 10 4oOOOOE-08 4CXMERF 0 3CPCF 11 4oOOOOE-08 4CPCF f. 3CXMERF +

3 '210E-09 DSW3RF 0 DSE10AF 3o7210E-09 DSE3ABF 0 DSEiOAF 14 3 7210E-09 o DSM3BF 0 DSM10ARF +

3+ 7210E-09 DSE3ABF 0 DSM10ARF +

16 2i0740E-09 DSW3RF 0 010ABF 17 2+0740E-09 DSE3ARF, 4 010*BF +

18 2+0740E-09 DSW38F 8 010hF 19 2+0740E-09 DSE3ARF 0 010AF 90 2.0740E-09 03ABF 4 DSE10AF 2i0740E-09 03RF 0 DSElOAF 2.0740E-09 03ABI-', DSM10ARF

)3 2o0740E-09 03BF 0 DSMiOABF ii5250E-09 4CPCF 0 DSW3RF 1.5250E-09 4CPCF 0 DSE3ABF +

io5250E-09 DSE10AF 4 3(:I-'CF Table Fll Unit 3 & 4C Busses'utsets (Sheet 1 of 2)

Appendix F JPE-L-84-12 Rev. 0 27 1 o5250E-09 DSM10ABF 4 3(;P(:F 28 ] 1560E-09 o 03ABF 4 010AF 29 io1560E-09 03BF 0 010AF 30 1o15bOE-09 03ABF 4 010ABF 31 1.1560E-09 03BF 0 010ABF 32 1 i 1560E-OY 3AC16SPR '4 4AC16SPR 33 So5000E-10 4CPCF 0 03ABF 34 Bo5000E-10 4CVCF '4 03BF 35 8 500OE-10 o 010ABF 0 3(:V(:F +

36 8 o 5000E-10 010AF 0 3UPCF 37 6 4600E-10 e 84CLF 4 3AC16SVR 38 6 4600E-10

~ B3CLF f 4AC16SVR +

39 6 2500E-10

~ 4CPCF 4 3(:VCF 40 5,6000E-10 FLORFT 0 010ABSC f. 3(:XMERF 41 3+610OE-10 B3CLF 4 B4CLF 42 io7600E-10 3CXMERF 0 86-Y 43 ii7600E-20 4CXMERF '4 86-EE 44 1 ~ 7600E-10 3CXMERF 0 18b-WCBl +

45 1.7600E-10 4CXMERF 4 Sb-FF +

46 1.7600E-10 4CXMERF f. 186-3CBT 47 $ .7600E-10 3CXMERF f. Sb-b!

48 5.4400E-11 4CXMERF f 3AC16SPR f. 4ACOiLCL 49 5o4400E-ii 3CXMERF 4 3AC01LCL '. 4AC1 6SPR 50 5.4400E-ii 3CXMERF 4 BK3AC168(' 4AC16SPR Table Fll (Sheet 2 of 2)

Appendix F JPE-L-84-12 Rev. 0 LIST OF THE 255 PRI'NARY EVENTS AND THEIR DESCRIPTIONS BK3Ah02SC BKR 3AA02 STUCK CLOSED RK3AR02SC BKR 3A802 STUCK CLOSED BK3AC16SC BK 3AC16 STUCK CLOSED BK4AA02SC BKR 4AA02 STUCK CLOSED BK4A802SC BKR 4A802 STUCK CLOSED BK4AC16SC 4AC16 STUCK CLOSED R3ALF RUS 3A LOCAL FAULTS 83RLF BUS 3R LOCAL FAULTS 83CLF BUS 3C LOCAL FAULTS 84ALF BUS 4A LOCAL FAULTS 84BLF BUS 48 LOCAL FAULTS 84CLF RUS 4C LOCAL FAULTS DAD1FT DADE-1 FAULT DAV1FT DAVIS 1 FAULT DAV2FT DAVIS 2 FAULT DAV3FT DA VI S-3 FAULT DORFT DORAL FAULT DSE10ARF DISC SM E10AB FAULT DSE10AF DISC SM E1OA FAULTS DSE3ARF DISC SM E3AB FAULTS DSE3BF DISC SM E 38 FAULTS DSE6ARF DISC SM E6AR FAULTS Table F12 Fault. Tree Primary Events & Descriptions (Sheet ] of 12)

Appendix F JPE-L-84-12 Rev. 0 DSESRF D'XSC SM E68 FAULTS DSE7ARF DISC SM E7AB FAULTS DSE78F DISC SM E78 FAULTS DSE8ABF DISC S4l E8AR FAULTS DSE88F DISC SM E88 FAULTS DSE9ARF DISC SM E9AB FAULT DSE98F DISC SM E9R FAULTS DSMlOARF DISC SM W10AB FAULTS DSM3ARF DISC SM M3AB FAULTS DS4I3RF DISC SW M38 FAULTS DS4ISABF DISC S4l MSAB FAULTS DSM68F DISC SM MSB FAULTS DSM7ABF DISC SM M7AR FAULT DSM7RF DISC SW M78 FAULTS DSW8ABF DISC SM M8AB FAULTS DS4I88F DISC SW MGR FAULTS DSM9ABF DISC SM M9AB FAULTS DSM9RF DISC SM W9R FAULTS DS23FT DISC SM 240 J26423 FAULTS DS24FT DISC SM 240J26424 FAULTS

. FLAGlFT FLAGAMI-1 FAULT FLAG2FT FLAGAHI-2 FAULT Table F12 (Sheet 2 of 12)

Appendix F JPE"L-84-12 Rev. 0 FLORFT FLORIDA CITY FAULT NERFT NE RUS FAULT (LOCAL)

NMBFT NW RUS FAULT (LOCAL) 010ABF 'OCR 10AR FAULTS 010ABSC OCR 10AR STUCK CLOSED 010AF OCB 10A FAULTS'CB 010ASC 10A STUCK CLOSED 010BSC OCR 10R STUCK CLOSED 02ASC OCB 2A STUCK CLOSED 02RSC OCR 2R STUCK CLOSED 03ARF OCR 3AB FAULTS 03ARSC OCB 3AB STUCK CLOSED 03BF OCR 3B FAULTS 03RSC OCB 3B STUCK CLOSED 04ASC OCR 4A STUCK CLOSED 04BSC OCB 4B STUCK CLOSED 05ASC OCB 5A STUCK CLOSED 05BSC OCB 5B STUCK CLOSED'CB 056'ASC 5/6A STUCK CLOSED OCB 6AB FAULTS

'6ABF 06*BSC OCR 6AB STUCK CLOSED 06ASC OCB 6A STUCK CLOSED Table F12 (Sheet 3 of 12)

Appendix F JPE-L-84-12 Rev. 0 06BF OCB 6R FAULTS 06RSC OCB 6B STUCK CLOSED 067BSC OCB 6/7B STUCK CLOSED 07ABF OCR 7AB FAULTS 07ABSC OCR 7AB STUCK CLOSED 07ASC OCB 7A STUCK CLOSED 07BF OCB 7R FAULTS 07BSC OCR 7R STUCK CLOSED 08ABF OCB 8AB FAULTS 08ABSC, OCB 8AB STUCK CLOSED 08ASC OCR 8A STUCK CLOSED 08BF OCB 8B FAULTS 08BSC OCR 8B STUCK CLOSED 09ABF OCB 9AB FAULTS 09ABSC OCB 9AB STUCK CLOSED 09ASC OCB 9A STUCK CLOSED 09BF OCB 9B FAULTS 09BSC OCB 9R STUCK CLOSED SERFT SE BUS FAULT (LOCAL)

'I SI3B2 RELAY 3R2 SI3-iiX S I RELAY 3-1 i X SI4B2 SI RELAY 4R2 SI4-iix S I RELAY 4-1 i X Table F12 (Sheet 4 of 12)

Appendix F JPE-L-84-12 Rev. 0 SWBFT SW BUS FAULT (LOCAL)

U1FT UNIT 1 FAULT U2FT UNIT 2 FAULT U3SISPR UNIT 3 SPURIOUS S I U3TRF UNIT 3 TURB RUNBACK FAILS U3TR UNIT 3 RX-T-G TRIPS(GEMS)

U4SISPR UNIT 4 SPURIOUS SI U4TRF UNIT 4 TURB ~ RUNBACK FAILS U4TR UNIT 4 RX- T-G TRIPS ( GEMS )

12SUXFT UNIT 1 r2 S/U XMER FAULT 125-3C SYNCo CHKo 125-3C 125-4C SYNCo CHKo 125-4C

'27X1-3AB3 LOSS OF VOLT o 127Xl-3AB3 127xl-4AB3 LOSS OF VOLT>> 127Xi-4AB3 127X-3Cl LOSS OF VOLTo 127X-3Ci.

127X-'4Ci LOSS OF VOLTo 127X-4C1 127Z1-3AB3 LOSS OF VOLT. 127Zi-3AB3 127Z1-4AB3 LOSS OF VOLT. 127Z1-4AB3 150A3B FAULT PROTo 150A3B AND A3B-GF 150A4B FAULT PROTo 150A4B AND A4B-GF 150B3B FAULT PROT, 150B3B AND B3B-GF 150-B4B FAULT PROTo 150B4B AND B4B-GF 150-S3A FAULT PROTo 150-S3A 'AND S3A-6F Table F12 (Sheet 5 of 12)

0 Appendix F JPE"L-84"12 Rev. 0 150-S3R FAULT PROT'50-S3B AND S3B-6F 150-S4A FAULT PROT'50-S4A AND S4A-6F 150-S4R FAULT PROT'50-S4B AND S4B-6F 150-3CBTX FAULT PROT+ 150-3CBTX~ GF 150-3CBTY FAULT PROT 150-3CBTY GF 150-4CBTX FAULT PROT'50-4CBTXr GF 150-4CBTY FAULT PROT'50-4CBTY~ GF 151-A3A1 BU OVERCURRENT 151-A3ki 151-A3A OVERCURRENT 151-A3A 151-A4A1 RU OVERCURRENT 151-A4A1 151-A4A OVERCURRENT 151-A4A 151-B3Ai BU OVERCURRENT 151-B3A1 151-R3A OVERCURRENT 151-R3A 151-B4A1 BU OVERCURRENT 151-B4hi 151-B4A OVERCURRENT 151-B4A 151-S3A13 8U OVERCURRENT 151-S3A1-3 151-S3A14 BU OVERCURRENT 151-S3A1-4 151-S3A3 OVERCURRENT 151-S3A-3 151-S3A4 OVERCURREHT 151-S3A-4 151-S3B13 BU OVERCURRENT 151-S3Bi-3 151-S3B14 RU OVER CURRENT 151-S3Bi-4 151-S3B3 OVERCURREHT 151-S3B-3 Table F12 (Sheet 6 of 12) r

il Appendix F JPE"L-84-12 Rev. 0 151-S384 OVERCURRENT 151-S38-4 151-3CBTX1 BU OVERCURRENT 151-3CBTXi 151-3CBTX OVERCURRENT 151-3CBTX 151-3CBTYi BU OVERCURRENT 151-3CBTY1 151-3CBTY OVERCURRENT 151-3CBTY 151-4CBTX1 BU OVERCURRENT'51-4CBTXi 151-4CBTX OVERCURRENT 151-4CBTX 151-4CBTY1 BU OVERCURRENT 151-4CBTYi 151-4CBTY OVERCURRENT 151-4CBTY 152Z-3A5 152Z-3A5 SHORT CIRCUIT 152Z-385 152Z-385 SHORT CIRCUIT 152Z-3C1 RELAY 152Z-3C1 SHORT

'152Z-4A5 152Z-4A5 SHORT CIRCUIT 152Z-485 152Z-485 SHORT CIRCUIT 1522-4C1 RELAY 152Z-4Ci SHORT 162-3AC16 162-3AC16 BLOCK RELAY FAULT 162-3A2 162-3A2-IC-TDDO FAULT 162-3P2 162-382-IC- TDDO FAULT 162-4AC16 162-4AC16 BLOCK RELAY FAULT 162-4A2 162-4A2-I C-TDDO FAUL" T 162-4P2 162-482-IC- TDDO FAULT 174-3A2 3A LOCKOUT INITIATOR-174-3A2 174-3A5 3A LOCKOUT INITIATOR-174-3A5 Table F12 (Sheet 7 of 12)

Appendix F JPE"L-84"12 Rev. 0 174-3R2 3B LOCKOUT INITIATOR-174-3B2 174-3R5 3R LOCKOUT INITIATOR-174-3R5 174-3ci 3C LOCKOUT INITIATOR 174-3Ci 174-3C6 3C LOCKOUT INITIATOR 174-3C6 174-4A2 4A LOCKOUT INITIATOR-174-4A2 174-4A5 4A LOCKOUT INITIATOR-174-4A5 174-4B2 'B LOCKOUT INITIATOR-174-4R2 174-4R5 4B LOCKOUT INITIATOR-174-4B5 174-4C1 4C LOCKOUT INITIATOR 174-4Ci 174-4C6 4C LOCKOUT INITIATOR 174-4C6 186X-3A 3A RUS LO 186-3A 185X-3B 3R BUS LO 186-3B 186X-4A 4A BUS LO 186-4A 186X-4R 4B BUS LO 186-4R 185-ST3 3 SU XMER LO 186-ST3 186-ST4 4 SU XMER LO 185-ST4 186-3CBT 3C XMER LO 186-3CBT 185-3C RUS C LO 186-3C 186-4CBT 4C XMER LO 186-4CRT 186-4C BUS 4C LO 186-4C 286-G3 GENo3 LO 286-G3 (SECONDARY) 286-G4 GEN+4 LO 286-G4 (SECONDARY)

Table F12 (Sheet 8 of 12)

Appendix F JPE"L"84"12 Rev. 0 3AATCF 3A-3 AUX T CABLE FAULTS 3AA02SF'R RKR 3AA02 OPENS SPURIOUSLY 3AA02-R CONTACTS 3AA02-8 FAIL TO CLOSE 3AA05FU 3AAOS CC FUSE FAILS OPEN 3AA05LCL RKR 3AA05 FAILS TO CLOSE (LOCAL) 3AA05SPR BKR 3AA05 OPENS SPURIOUSLY 3A802SPR RKR 3AR02 OPENS SPURIOUSLY 3A802-8 CONTACTS 3AR02-8 FAIL TO CLOSE 3A805FU 3A805 CC FUSE FAILS OPEN 3A805LCL BKR 3A805 FAILS TO CLOSE (LOCAL) 3ABOSSPR BKR 3A805 OF'ENS SPURIOUSLY 3AC01LCL BKR 3ACOi FAILS TO CLOSE 3ACO f SF'R BKR 3AC01 OPENS SPURIOUSLY 3AC03-8 AUX CONT 152-3AC03-8 3AC13-8 AUX CONT 152-3AC13-8 3AC16SPR BKR 3AC16 OPENS SPURIOUSLY 3AC16-8 AUX CONT 3AC16 3ASUCF 3A-3S/U CARLE FAULTS 3AXNERF 3 AUX XMER FAULTS 3A5 1 52-HH 3A5-fS2-HH 2-2T CONTACTS FAIL OPEN 38ATCF 38-3 AUX T CABLE FAULTS 3RSUCF 38-3S/U CABLE FAULTS 385152-HH 385-152-HH 2-2T CONTACTS FAIL OPEN Table F12 (Sheet 9 of 12)

(

A'ppendkx.F, JPE"L-84-12 Rev. 0 3CPCF 3C PIPE CARLE FAULTS 3CXMERF 3C XHER FAULTS 3C3CTCF 3C-3C XMER CABLE FAULTS 3C4CTCF 3C 4C XMER CARLE FAULTS 3ISOPFT 3I SOPHASE BUS FAULTS 3MTR70F 3 MT-BAY 7 OVHD FAULTS 3MXMERF 3 MAIN XMER FAULTS 3STB60F 3S/U-BAY6 OVHD FAULTS 3SUXMERF 3 S/U XMER FAULTS (LOCAL) 3i52-TOC AUX CONTo 3-i52-TOC 4AATCF 4A-4 AUX T CABLE FAULTS 4AA02SPR BKR 4AA02 OPENS SPURIOUSLY 4AA02-B CONTACTS 4AA02-B FAIL TO CLOSE 4AAOSFU 4AAOS CC FUSE FAILS OPEN 4AA05LCL BKR 4AA05 FAILS TO CLOSE (LOCAL) 4AA05SPR BKR 4AA05 OPENS SPURIOUSLY 4AB02SPR BKR 4AB02 OPENS SPURIOUSLY 4AR02-B CONTACTS 4AR02-R FAIL TO CLOSE 4AB05FU 4AR05 CC FUSE FAILS OPEN 4AB05LCL BKR 4AR05 FAILS TO CLOSE (LOCAL) 4ABOSSPR RKR 4AB05 OPENS SPURIOUSLY 4ACOiLCL BKR 4ACOi FAILS TO CLOSE 4ACOiSPR RKR 4ACOi OPENS SPURIOUSLY Table F12 (Sheet 10 of 12)

Appendix F JPE-L-84-12 Rev. 0 4AC03-B AUX CONT 152-4AC03-B 4AC13-B AUX CONT 152-4AC13-B 4AC16SPR BKR 4AC16 OPENS SPURIOUSLY 4AC16-B AUX CONT 4AC16 4ASUCF 4A-4S/U CABLE FAULTS 4AXHERF 4AUX XHER FAULTS 4A515o-HH 4A5-152-HH 2-2T CONTACTS FAIL OPEN 4BATCF 4B-4AUX T CABLE FAULTS 4BSUCF 4B-4S/U CABLE FAULTS 4 B5152-HH 4B5-!52-HH 2-2T CONTACTS FAIL OPEN 4CPCF 4C PIPE CABLE FAULTS 4CXHERF 4C XMER FAULTS 4C3CTCF 4C-3C XMER CABLE FAULTS 4C4CTCF 4C-4C XHER CABLE FAULTS 4ISOPFT 4 ISOPHASE BUS FAULTS 4HTB90F 4 MT-BAY 9 OVHD FAULTS 4HXMERF 4 ..HAIN XMER FAULTS 4SUBSOF 4S/U BAY 8 OVHD FAULTS 4SUXMERF 4 S/U XHER FAULTS (LOCAL) 4152-TOC AUX CONTi 4-152- TOC 86BU-ST3 RELAY 86BU-ST3 86BU-ST4 RELAY 86BU-ST4 Table F12 (Sheet ll of 12)

Appendix F JPE"L-84-12 Rev. 0 86GT-G3 GEH. 3 LO 86GT-G3 (PRIMARY) 86GT-G4 BEN+ 4 LO 86GT-G4 (PRIMARY) 86G RELAY 86-G OR 86-R 86K RELAY 86-K 86-EE C XMER PRI. LO 86-EE 86-FF C XMER SEC. LO 86-FF 86-M 4C XHER PRI+ LO 85-M 86-Y 4C XMER SEC. LO 86-Y Table F12 (Sheet 12 of 12)

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