IR 05000324/1986016

Insp Repts 50-324/86-16 & 50-325/86-15 on 860601-30. Violations Noted:Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Action on Jumper Control & Failure to Declare Support Inoperable When Required

ML20204J399
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	07/14/1986
From:	Fredrickson P, Fredrickson R, Garner L, Mellen L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20204J372	List: ML20204J367 ML20204J382 ML20204J399
References
50-324-86-16, 50-325-86-15, NUDOCS 8608110078
Download: ML20204J399 (9)

Text

~

, - -

.

7, , .

.

p Krio UNITED STATES -

/ 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s [\ o R EGloN '11 101 MARIETTA STREET, *

g*. j .

• - 2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 ' '

'

k.....,/

'

, t

,

- . .

Report Nos. 50-325/86-15 and 50-324/86-1 *

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company t, P. O. Box 1551 t Raleigh, NC 27602

'

Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.:'DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: June 1-30, 1986 n

Inspectors: h b 7 //9!N fcRA.,H.Rulan(j j

Date Signed

/sWh_ 7/t9 /n Date Signed Ql)(W.Garnekj Xs Mt 7 //Wu M S. Mellen i Date Signed Approved by:

R 5Md E. Fredrickson, Section Chief 7//4/u Date Signed YDE \.Dvision of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine safety inspection involved the areas of followup on unresolved item, maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verification, and onsite followup of event Results: Two violations - failure to take adequate corrective action concerning jumper control; failure to follow procedures by not declaring a support inoperable when required.

,

PDR G

'

-

.A

.

.

REPORT DETAILS

.

1. Persons Contacted - Licensee Employees P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction E. Bishop, Manager - Operations L. Jeres, Director - Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC)

R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP J. Chase, Assistant tc General Manager J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance B. Hinkley, Manager - Technical Support R. Groover, Manager - Project Construction A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor W. Tucker, Engineering Supervisor B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)

R. Warden, I&C/ Electrical fiaintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

W. Dorman, Supervisor - Quality Assurance (QA)

W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist W. Murray, Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force member . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 3, 1986, with the general manager. The licensee acknowledged the findings without exceptio The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspectio . Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)

Not inspecte . Followup on Unresolved Item (92701)

(Closed) Discrepancies Found After In-service Inspection (ISI)

(324/86-15-02). This item identified two conditions on safety-related supports which required further review. As described in the subject report, fixed hanger 2E11-21FH62 located on the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) pathway was missing a nu The licensee has acknowledged that the

. .-

.

.

missing support item could impair proper functioning of the support. With the nut missing, there was no means to prevent the stud which attaches the hanger to the pipe clamp from coming out and rendering the hanger inoperable. The unit was in cold shutdown at the time the inspector observed the missing ite Procedure PT-91.0.37, Residual Heat Removal (Ell), Class 2, Loop B, VT-3/VT-4 Examination of Component Supports, step II.B.2, requires a support to be declared inoperable if there is a missing support item that could impair proper functioning of the suppor The safety-related support was not declared inoperable. This failure to follow procedure PT-91.0.37 is a violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.c, which requires procedures to be implemented for surveillance of safety-related equipment. This is a violation (324/86-16-01).

The second item involved anchor bolts associated with the base plate on the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) snubber support 2E41-61SS99. One bolt was found to be located such, that an unfilled hole partially overlapped with the one the bolt was in. The licensee verified the torque on the remaining three bolts and verified that the support was adequate to perform its function. However, because it did not conform to the present

'

installation specification No. 248-107, Installation of Seismic Pipe Supports and Miscellaneous Structural Steel, the licensee removed the base plate and re-oriented it such that all four anchor bolts would meet current criteri The work plans or other installation documentation which

'

installed the original support are not availabl I.E. Bulletin 79-02 and 79-14 inspection records note no deficiencies with the suppor The licensee could not provide any documentation showing that the support has been modified. The inspector has concluded that this was probably an original installation problem because that type of anchor was used only during construction. Subsequent modifications have used a different ancho The inspector also observed that the In-Service Inspection (ISI) performed on this support during the present refueling outage also failed to identify

, the condition. PT-91.0.24, High Pressure Coolant Injection (E41), Class 2, VT-3/4 Examination of Component Supports, requires a support to be declared inoperable if there are cracks in the concrete greater than 1/16 inch in width, which emanate from the anchor bolt hole. However, the licensee's employee responsible for the ISI program indicated that an unfilled drilled hole is not a crack and thus not reportable under the ASME Section XI ISI progra No violation is being issued because the support was found operable based on the licensee's calculations. The inspectors discussed with management the inappropriateness of such a narrow interpretation of the regulation The inspector accompanied two structural engineers when they took measurements on the anchor bolt holes. One engineer stood on a 3 Kip hydraulic snubber to examine the anchor bolt holes. The inspector reported the unsound practice to licensee managemen One violation and no deviations were identifie __ _ _ . _ .-_ _ __ _ - ._ _ _ _ - . .

.

.

5. Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that: redundant components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel werel qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification requirements were implemente The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to servic Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenanc The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities:

MI-10-3G Traversing In-Core Probe Calibration Syste WR&A 85-ABFBI TIP Calibration Syste No violations or deviations were identifie . HPCI Overspeed Trip Unit Inoperability (62703)

On June 27, 1986, the licensee found the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system mechanical overspeed trip unit inoperable. The licensee had performed an inspection of the trip unit as a result of GE Rapid Information Communication Services Information Letter (RICSIL) No. 004 to detect swelling of the tappet assembly. The licensee had found on June 13, 1986, that the bottom of the tappet was gouged. They contacted the turbine vendor (Terry). Based on the gouge in the tappet, the vendor recommended an inspection of the governor weight assembly mounted on the turbine shaft. The licensee found that the upper adjusting screw and spring were no longer in place. These parts were found in the lower casing. The turbine and shaft were not damaged. A similar inspection on the Unit 2 turbine found the mechanical overspeed device intact. The licensee repaired the Unit 1 overspeed device with new parts. The licensee believes that the event was caused by failure of a set screw to retain the assembly. The set screw location made it difficult to tighten. The mecnanical overspeed trip had been modified on Unit 1 during the 1985 refueling outage and in 1984 on Unit 2 in response to GE Service Information Letter No. 39 No violations or deviations were identifie _ _ . _

.

.

4 Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications. Through observation and record review, the inspectors verified that: tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements; administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified; instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete. The inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return to service of equipmen The ir.spectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

PT-1 Post Accident Sampling System Valve Operability Tes PT-25.2P Triaxial Time-History Accelerographs Channel Chec PT-34.33. Fire Detection Instrumentation Operability Test, Administration Building, Switch Yard Relay Hous IMST-HPCI13M HPCI Steam Leak Detection Channel Functional Tes MST-HPCI15M HPCI Steam Leak Detection Channel Functional Test.

,

IMST-HPCI24R HPCI Steam Leak Detection Channel Calibratio MST-RCIC13M RCIC Steam Leak Detection Channel Functional Tes MST-RPS27R RPS Scram Discharge Volume High Water Level Channel Functional Test and Channel Calibration.

'

No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707) (71710)

The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system statu The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the technical specifications were me Control room, shift supervisor, clearance and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain information concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to ensure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting

'

Conditions for Operations. Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to verify operability and that parameters were within Technical Specification limits. The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintaine The inspectors verified the status of selected control room annunciators. Results of the jumper log review are contained in paragraph __ , __ _ ._

m

.

.

Operability of the Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal System Loop B and the Unit 2 Core Spray Loop A trains was verified by insuring that: each accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct position; each power supply and breaker, including control room fuses, were aligned for components that must activate upon initiation signal; removal of power from those ESF motor-operated valves, so identified by Technical Specifications, was completed; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist which might ~ prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirement Instrumentation essential to systein actuation or performance was verified operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve lineup, if accessible. One item involving improper locking of valves is discussed in paragraph 1 The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies / procedures were followed. This included a review of area surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument calibratio i The inspectors verified that: the security organization was properly manned ,

and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area (PA); vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; effective compensatory measures were employed when required; and security's response to alarms was adequat The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified position of certain containment isolation valves, and verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power source During routine tours of the facility, the following items were observed and

,

called to the Licensee's attention:

On June 29, 1986, the inspector determined that the 18 conventional service water pump motor upper bearing oil cooler discharge line was abnormally warm as compared to the others in service. The licensee determined that there was little or no flow through the cooler and secured the pump. The cyclone separator which supplies water to the cooler was found to be blocked. The pluggage was most likely oyster shells. Auxiliary operators are now checking operation of the separators on their normal round Removal of the pump from service, left four pumps in servic Technical Specifications were met in that only three pumps are required for operability.

i In addition, the inspector observed that 2A nuclear service water pump appeared to show excessive vibration. The licensee took measurements and determined that the vibration had approximately quadrupled since the last reading. Data is taken monthly. Disassembly revealed that the bearings

l

- . - - - - . ,. . _ - -

- - , - . , . - - - ,

.

.

were severely worn. The licensee attributed the condition to normal end of life. This left four pumps in service on Unit During the month, the inspector observed a condition in which equipment which was free to move was left in the vicinity of safety-related equipmen A battery discharge tester approximately 3'x3'x6' and weighing several hundred pounds was left within 3 feet of the 2A battery, the 250 volt emergency Division I D.C. suppl The tester is on rollers and was unsecured. The licensee chained the tester to the wall. A recommendation to provide a seismically designed restraining device for the tester was discussed in a memorandum from R. E. Helme, Director of Onsite Nuclear Safety (ONS), to J. L. Harness, Manager Plant Operations, dated April 26, 198 The item is still ope Additional inspection is necessary to determine what actions were taken in response to the ONS concer This subject will be addressed in next month's resident inspector repor No violations or deviations were identifie . Jumper and Wire Removal (71710)

A review of the electric jumper log was conducted June 9,1986. Jumper No. 2 was missing from the storage cabinet but was not signed out. This condition had previously been identified by Quality Assurance and a Non-Conformance Report (NCR) No. S-86-028 had been issued on May 29, 198 Notations in the log indicated that jumpers Nos. 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 46, 76 and 79 had been missing prior to September, 1984. A log entry dated April 4, 1986, listed jumpers Nos. 201, 293, 330 and 345 as missin With the assistance of a licensed operator, the inspector performed a field verification of jumpers installed in the Unit 2 control room back panel The inspector located in panel P604, jumpers 33 and 46, which were listed as missing prior to September, 198 These were tagged as having been installed on May 3,1983, per plant modification 77-032. Subsequent review by the licensee revealed that these were in a non safety-related

,

applicatio The inspector discussed the above items with the muager of operations. At that time, in response to the NCR, the licensee was in the process of

'

searching for jumper No. The search was expanded to locate and record installed jumpers and wire lifts in safety-related applications. The search included pa,els in the control room, Unit I and 2 reactor buildings and the diesel generator building. The search resulted in locating four additional jumpers and more than 50 wire lifts which were not documented properl None of the jumpers found were determined to be in safety-related application The jumpers not located have been presumed to have been destroyed or installed in some non-safety-related applicatio The wire lift data is still being reviewed. To date, all the wire lifts researched appear to have been authorized per a plant modification, a maintenance work request or an engineering work reques Results of the search are documented in the response to the NCR.

I

- _ - . _ _ _

- , , _ , . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - -

,

.

.

As noted in the NCR, failure to control jumper No. 2 is a failure to follow procedure AI-59, Jumper, Wire Removal and Designated Jumper Administrative Instruction. This is a violation of Technical Specification 6.3.1.a, which requires procedures listed in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, November, 1972, be implemented. The eight above-mentioned jumpers listed as missing prior to September, 1984 (the time of discovery), also involved failure to follow AI-5 CFR 2, Appendix C,Section V.A., says a Notice of Violation will not generally be issued if the violation was identified by the licensee and that it was not a violation that could reasonably be expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a previous violation. The corrective action for the September,1984 events should have prevented the violation discovered in May, 198 Thus a Notice of Violation is being issued. Normally, the violation would be concerning failure to follow procedures; however, in this case because the licensee has made two attempts at corrective action within two years concerning controlling jumpers and maintaining proper records in this area and yet continues to have difficulty as exerplified by jumper No. 2, a Notice of Violation will be issued for failurc to take adequate corrective action. The first corrective action was taken in September, 1984. This, including moving the jumper cabinet to the Shift Operator Supervisor's (SOS) office and assigning the responsibility for maintaining the jumpers to the shift support staff in the SOS's offic The second corrective action occurred approximately a year later in response to an internal operations audit. On September 3, 1985, an audit reported that jumpers Nos. 92,109,118, 214 and 215, were each assigned twice and that duplicate jumper logs existed. Again, the licensee re-assigned the responsibility for maintaining the jumper program and provided training in the are CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires conditions adverse to quality be promptly identified and corrected. Furthermore, it states that, "In case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition." The inability to determine if a jumper is installed in a safety-related application, installed in a non-safety-related application or destroyed is a significant condition adverse to qualit The failure of the above-mentioned measures to preclude the violation associated with jumper No. 2 is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (325/86-15-01 and 324/86-16-02).

One violation and no deviations were identifie . Locked Valves (71707)

On June 13, 1986, during walkdown of the Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Loop B, the inspector found the E11-F018D Valve not locke This is the manual isolation of the minimum flow line for the D RHR pump. The valve was open as required. Operating proceiure OP-17, Residual Heat Removal System

,

.

.

Operating Procedure, valve lineup checklist page 118 of revision 8 dated May 5,1986, requires the valve to be locked open. The checklist completed September, 1985, prior to unit startup from refueling, shows on page 128 of revision 6 of OP-17, that the valve was locked open and had been independently verified as such. The time at which the valve was unlocked is not know Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.5.3.2.a.2, requires each valve in , the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position be verified once every 31 days to be in its correct positio PT-08.1.3, LPCI/RHR System Component Test, which implements the surveillance, assumes that E11-F0180 is locked and thus does not include it in the 31 day verification. Hence, failure to maintain the valve as locked, can result in the surveillance not being performed correctly. The licensee has determined that the minimum flow line must be operable for the RHR pump to be operable. A Surveillance Field Report (SFR)

No.86-016 issued June 9, 1986, was amended by Quality Assurance (QA) to incorporate this unsecured valv Cause and corrective action will be tracked under the SF No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on Events at Operating Reactors (93702)

On June 18,1936, at 8:11 a.m. , Unit 2 reactor scrammed from 55% power due to low water level . All engineered safety features functioned as designe No automatic or manual initiation of emergency core cooling systems were required. Reactor pressure and water level were controlled using the steam dumps and condensate /feedwater systems. The unit was placed in cold shutdown for a scheduled six day outage to recouple a control rod and balance air flows inside the drywel The trip was caused by partial diversion of feedwater while attempting to place the second feedpump in service. The discharge check valve of B feedpump was stuck open. When the B discharge valve was opened, flow from the A pump flowed through the B discharge valve and recirculation valve back to the condenser. The partial loss of feedwater caused the low level scra Disassembly of the check valve revealed the set screw which holds the hinge pin in place was not longer sufficiently engaged to prevent the hinge pin from working ou The hinge pin had slipped out of position thereby allowing the disc to cock to one side and not seat properly. The inspector has no further questions concerning this event. The unit was restarted on June 27, 198 The inspector witnessed portions of the reactor startu The inspector verified that: the control rod withdrawal sequence was approved; the startup was conducted using approved procedures and that activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedure .,

,

.

..

,

In addition, the inspector reviewed the control board for abnormalitie All abnormalities were clearly marked on the board with corrective actions the operator should take in the event the tagged out or malfunctioning equipment was neede No violations or deviations were identified.

i

I l

,

e E