ML20247D724
| ML20247D724 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 09/06/1989 |
| From: | Blake J, Robert Carrion NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247D711 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-89-22, 50-325-89-22, NUDOCS 8909150053 | |
| Download: ML20247D724 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1989022
Text
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. UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
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,101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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Report Nos.: 50-325/89-22 and 50-324/89-22-
Licensee: Carolina Power.and Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
,
Raleigh, NC 27602-
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e
. Docket.Nos.:
50-325'and'50-324
License Nos.:
Facility Name: Brun swi ck :1' and ' 2 -
~ Inspection Co ucted: July 24-28, 1989
Inspector:
- # '87 -
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'R.
r
ior
Date Si
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Approved by:
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J Jf. Blake, Chief
Date Signed
aprials and Processes Section
ngineering Branch
Division of Reactor' Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine announced inspection was conducted in the areas of open items,
especially the issue of Service Water Lube Water Support Operability. A total
of eight open items were reviewed.
Results:
In the areas' inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.
Of .the open items reviewed, none were closed. However, the technical aspects
of the Service Water Lube Water Support Operability issue were satisfactorily
resolved.
The corrective action / management response to the issue will be
- addressed by the Resident inspector in a forthcoming report
8909150033 890907
ADOCK 05000324
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' REPORT DETAILS
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11.
Persons Contacted?
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. Licensee Employees
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- C. F. Blackmon, Manager of Operations
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S. Boyce, Project Engineer for ECCS
- A.1G..Cheatman, Manager - E&RC
R. Cowen, Structural Engineer
- W. J. Dorman,' Supervisor - Quality Assurance
- J. L. Harness, General Manager.
- W. ' Rt Hatcher . Supervisor of _ Security
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- R. E. .Helme, Manager of. Technical Support
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L. E.' Jones, Director of QA/QC
. H. A. Jones, Director af On-Site Nuclear Safety
R. :Knott, Senior Engineer (LED-Civil)
J. A. McKee,_ Quality Control Supervisor
- W. G. Monroe, Principal Engineer (NED)
- J. O'Sullivan, Manager of Training
M. J. Pastva,' Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- R. M. Poulk, . Project Specialist - Reguitory Compliance
- R. 'L. Warden, Manager of Maintenance
A. Washburn, System Engineer for_ Service Water
H. L. Williams, Principal Engineer (NED)
A. Woods, Service Water Engineering for Outage Management Interrated
Scheduling Section_(0MISS)
A. M. Worth, Engineering Supervisor, Technical Support
Other ' licensee employees contacted during this inspection included
security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.
- NRC Resident Inspectors
- W. Ruland, Senior Resident Inspector
W. Levis, Resident Inspector
D. Nelson, Resident Inspector
'* Attended exit interview-
2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
e.
Followup on Licensee Identified Violations (LIVs)
(1)
(0 pen) LIV 50-325, 324/88-24-05:
" Failure to Maintain
RHR SW Piping Temperature Below 120 F"
The 120 F limit was based on the original stress analysis for
the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water (SW) piping
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downstream of the RHR heat exchanger. Because the temperature
peaked at 215 F, the licensee. prepared Engineering Evaluation
Report 88-0365 and re-evaluated. the pipe stress model for -the
elevated
temperature
to
determine
piping
operability.
Additional analysis was done to determir.e. if the piping would
have remained operable at 215 F during a Design Basis Earth-
quake.
Also, a re-analysis of the pipe supports associated
with the affected piping was completed to qualify them as
operable .during a Design Basis Earthquake coincident with an
. operating temperature of 215 F.
The inspector reviewed Calculation No. 2SW-261-02, Revision F-0,
entitled . "Re-analysis of Pipe . Supports on Service Water ISO's
D-2846,. Sheets 261, 262, 263, 266, and 267." This calculation
includes 32 attachments which contain ' load summaries and other
pertinent:informat % as well as individual support evaluations.
However, the pipe senss re-analysis was not available for.
review and there vie no way to verify the loads shown on the
summary sheets. Therefore, the pipe stress calculations must be
reviewed during a future . routine inspection to evaluate this
issue fully. This item remains open.
b.
Followup on Unresolved Items (UNRs)
(1) (0 pen) UNR 50-324/88-13-01:
"As-Building Drawing
Discrepancies for Torus External Piping Systems"
The inspector requested a status report on this item from the
cognizant licensee engineer and was told that the referenced
discrepancies would most probably be resolved in the Phase II
As-Built Piping System Walkdown Verification Program, rather
than doing it as a separate " stand-alone" effort. This would
allow the most ef ficient use of resources.
However, it also
means that this item will not be closed until the completion of
the Walkdown Verification Program, scheduled to be finalized in
1992. Therefore, this item remains open.
(2) (0 pen) UNR 50-325,324/88-36-01:
" Suppression Pool
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Temperature Monitoring System Adequacy"
The inspector held discussions with the cognizant licensee
engineer concerning this issue because the information presented
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for review was insufficient to close the item.
The inspector
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and the engineer agreed on what information is still needed and
the engineer began an effort to procure it.
This item
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remains open.
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'(3)
(0 pen) UNR 50-325,'324/88-36-04: " Accuracy of As-Built Phase 'II
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Piping Walkdown Verification"
]
The inspector monitored the progress of the Walkdown
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Verification' Program.
This effort is the result of modifying
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earlier programs 'and is designed to accurately reflect the
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as-installed configuration of the safety-related piping and
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supports. The Quality Control Supervisor informed the inspector
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that the program is on schedule..with over 40%.of .the walkdowns.
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complete.
Virtually a'11 of the walkdowns outside the drywells
have been completed and currently none are in_ progress.
They
.will resume with the upcoming Unit- 2 outage in September.
Therefore, this item remains open.
(4)
(0 pen)UNR 50-325,324/89-07-02:
" Service Water Lube' Water
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Operability"
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Upon arriving at the site, the inspector reviewed the referenced
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piping and supports to become familiar with the actual physical
configuration.
All ten of the Lube Water Piping Supports had
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been repaired by cutting away the corroded portions and
replacing 'them with new material.
This new material was then
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covered by a Belzona surface treatment to act as a corrosion
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barrier against future deterioration.
The inspector was told
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that this is a temporary fix until Plant Modifications 83-220L
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and 82-221-L are implemented.
These modifications will convert
the Service Water Pumps to " product-lube" pumps, i.e. internal
self-lubrication by the fluid being pumped, water in this case.
This conversion will allow the removal of all lube water piping,
valves, cyclone separators, lube water pumps, and existing
support structure.
Only two small (less than 1" d) lines, for
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the motor cooler supply line and its return, will remain to be
supported.
The new supports are to be " Christmas Tree" type, a
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vertical tube steel " trunk" with " branches" consisting of
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structural angles to support the lines.
The tube steel is
welded to base plates which are situated on 1" grout pads. The
grout pads are utilized to elevate the supports above the
general floor level, reducing their exposure to the corrosive
environment.
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The inspector reviewed Engineering Evaluation Report No.
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89-0128, which detailed the test done to determined if a short
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run of Lube Water piping at the Service Water Pump bearing could
withstand a deflection of plus of minus 1" for the duration of
Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) without failure, 12 seconds based
upon Section 3.7.1.2.1 of the Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR).
The preliminary analysis results indicated that the
fundamental frequency of the system is about 4 Hz.
Therefore,
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the system could expect about 48 cycles during a DBE.
The
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actual test was conducted through 50 cycles. Also, the test
specimen was hydrostatically tested to 1-1/2 times
of the
system's design pressure. The 225 psi hydro produced some slow
seepage around the threaded connection at the assembly but none
of the other joints showed any signs of leakage.
Upon
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completion of the test, the specimen was re-examined.
The
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seepage around the threaded connection was slightly increased
while the other joints remained water tight.
The inspector
judged the test to be an accurate, conservative representation
of the actual physical configuration under seismic loading
conditions.
Upon the successful
completion of the test, with its
conservative assumptions, a rigorous quantitative analysis,
Calculation 0-01534A-148, Revision
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was done.
A finite
element model which incorporated the worst conditions of all the
structures on the analyzed structure was used.
The model
included the attached piping, and an attached ladder in addition
to the pipe support structure itself. All sources of stiffness
were utilized, even though they may not have been originally
designed as part of the support systems, due to the urgency of
the situation.
As-found field data was gathered for the
corroded support legs, piping configuration, support attach-
ments, supports members and their configuration. This informa-
tion was used to established nodal coordinates, members sizes,
connection fixities, and other model properties.
Stiffness
associated with 1/2" ( pipe attached to the pump bearing was
determined from information from the previously-conducted test.
Stiffness associated with the cyclone separator nozzles was
determined based on tests conducted previously and documented in
Calculation 82-218A-01, Revision F1, dated August 14, 1986. The
purpose of that calculation was to seismically age the cyclone
separator and qualify it for piping loads.
The computer input was reviewed by the inspector, especially
noting and spot checking coordinates of nodes, member materials,
member beginning and ending nodes, member releases (as appropriate),
member properties, and support points.
The output was also
reviewed for madal information, especially frequency and related
displacements for a given mode, as well as member forces and
member stresses under the postulated seismic event. The natural
frequency of the analysis piping / support structural system was
5.8 Hz, while the deflection corresponding to the 1 inch assumed
deflection used in the laboratory simulation was 0.4 inch.
The
stress levels of some of the members proved to be well above
those nomally accepted as allowable, but they did remain in the
elastic range, indicating that no plastic deformation should be
expected even under the most severe postulated loading
conditions.
Therefore, from the strictly technical standpaint,
operability of the Service Water Pump Lube Water Piping and its
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associated support was maintained.
However, it must be
emphasized that its success was based on the ability to
incorporate structural properties of the piping itself and an
attached ladder into the analysis, which is rather unorthodox in
general, but most fortuitous in this particular case.
Corrective actions and management's response to this issue will
be addressed in an upcoming Resident Inspectors Report.
Therefore, this issue remains open.
c.
Followup on Inspector Following Items (IFIs)
(I) (0 pen) IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-02:
" Final Safety Summary
Report For IEB 79-02"
(2) (0 pen) IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-03:
"Hilti Anchor Bolt
Allowable Review and Justification Per IEB 79-02, NRC
Information Notices 86-94 and 88-25"
The inspector discussed these two open items with the cognizant
licensee engineer. The final summary report is being prepared
and will address the Hilti Anchor Bolt issues as well as those
of the original IEB 79-02. Therefore, pending completion of the
report, these two items remain open.
(3) (0 pen) IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-05:
"QA Auditing of the Supports
in As-Built Phase II Piping System Walkdown Verification Program
and the Modified Systems with QC Inspections"
This item is closely associated with UNR 50-325, 324/88-36-04
(See paragraph 2.b.(3)). The inspector spoke to the Director of
QA/QC and the QC Supervisor, who said that they preferred to use
the term " surveillance" rather than " audit" to describe their
on going efforts in reviewing the walkdown Verification Program
throughout is life. An audit is usually conducted after the
fact and is more formal in nature.
The surveillance is
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proceeding on schedule and no significant breakdowns of the
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program were cited. It is scheduled to be continued through the
end of the Walkdown Verification Program in 1992. Therefore,
this item remains open.
3.
Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and results were summarized on July 28, 1989, with
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those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas
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inspected and discussed in detail the inspection re sul t s . Proprieta ry
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information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments were not
received from the licensee.
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