IR 05000324/1988034
| ML20205Q972 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1988 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Levis W, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205Q955 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-88-34, 50-325-88-34, NUDOCS 8811090412 | |
| Download: ML20205Q972 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES
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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
101 MARIETTA ST, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323 Report Nos.: 50-325/88-34 and 50-324/88-34 f
Licensee: Carolina Power and Light O:npany P. O. Box 1551
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Raleigh, NC 27602
Docket Nos.:
50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.:
DPR-71 and OPR-62
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Facility Name:
Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
September 1-30, 1988 l
Inspectors:_ M b - e t-M,
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i W. H. Ruland (/ ' r
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Date igner;_
Yd[("'+wYl dy
? S/ 98 W. Le9Th K
r Date Signed Approvtd By:
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_.Dite Signed
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/' //Mk P.
E. Fredrickson, Chief, Section IA Division of heactor Projects i
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SUMMARY
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Scope:
This routine safety inspection by tha resident inspectors involved
the areas of followup on previous enforcement matters, maintenance
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observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verifica-t tion, followup on inspector identified and unresolved items,
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10 CFR 21 followup, onsite followup of events - Unit 1, and onsite Licensee Event Reports (LER) review j
Results:
le the areas inspected, two violations were identified - Failure to i
adequately control the design of the RCIC steam exhaust check valve
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in that tue specified design pressure of the valve disk was incorrect and failure to perform an adequate channel check.
The second
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violation did not result in the issuance of a Notice of Violation, t
An issue regarding an anomaly in Unit I reactor vessel wide range level was discovered and will remain unresolved pending completion of l
t'.a licensee's investigation of root cause, j
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eni10904)7. 091104 I
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee F.mployees K. Altman, Acting Manager - Mainter ance W. Biggs, Engineering Supervisor F. Blackmon, Manager - Operations T. Cantebury, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
- G. Cheatham, Manager - Environment.1 & Radiation Control R. Crtech, I&C/Clectrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
W. Dorman, Supe' visor - QA K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance R. Groover, Manager - Project Construction
- J. Harness, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security
- A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations
"R. Helme, Manager - Technical Support J. Holder, Manager - Outages
- P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Projtet
M. Jones, Director - On-Site Nuclear Safety - BSEP R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Superviser (Unit 2)
- W. Martin, Principal engineer - On-Site Nuclear Safety - BSEP J. Moyer, Manager - Training G. Oliver, Manager - Site Planning and Control
"J. O'Sullivan, Project Manage. Valves - Projects B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor
- R. Poulk, Project Specialitt - NRC J. Smith, Director - Administrative Support V. Wagoner, Director IPBS/Long Range Planning
- R. Warden I&C/ Elect-" d Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor
- T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,
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engineers, technicians, operators, of fice personnel, and security force me m.be r s,
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"Attended the exit interview Note:
Acronyms and abbreviations used in the report are listed in i
paragraph 11, 2.
Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
( Cl.0S ED) Violation 324/S4-30-03, Failure to Implement procedures.
This violation, as documented in the CP&L response to the Notice of Violation BSEP/84-2S?S, dated November 30, 1934, was attributed to personnel error.
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The control room operad;or attemptec to drain the torus to radwaste while
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the affected RHR loop was in shutdown cooling. The operator incorrectly assumed that the RHR loop was in torus cooling and did not use a procedure to perfcrm the evolution.
As a result, reactor vessel level dropped to
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the point where an RPS trip occurred.
Once the trip occurred, the operator recognized his error, secured the draining evolution and re-established reactor vessel water level.
Corrcetive actior taken by the licensee in response to this event included
disciplinary actie against the operator along with training for appropriate shif t per'.onnel stressing the need for attention to detail,
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strict procedural compliance and Awareness of unit status at all times.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and selected supporting
documentation.
The inspector had no further questions.
No significant safety matters, violations or deviations were identified.
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3.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and i
reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with
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approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry
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codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that:
redundant I
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I components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts
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l were adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts wore
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used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate
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post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification i
j requirements were implemented. The inspu tors independently verified that l
selected equipment was oroperly returned to service.
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Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave l
I priority to safety-related maintenance.
The inspectors observed / reviewed
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i portions of the following maintenance activities:
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j 88-AK1J1 Diesel Generator No. 4 Inspection.
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88-AREA 1 Rebuild 1A CSW Pump.
t 88-AZ1K1 V-1, RCIC Troubleshooting.
88-AZLB1 Replace Low Channel pump on Stack kod Monitor.
No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.
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4.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
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The inspectors observed steveillance testing required by Technical I
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Specifications.
Through observation, interviews, and record review, the j
inspectors verified that:
tests conformed to Technical Specification
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i requirements; administrative controls were followed; personnel wer:
qualified; inst umentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and
complete. The inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return to service of equipment,
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The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:
1-MST-HPCl2/M HPCI and RCIC CST Low Water Level Instrument Channel Calibration.
2-MST-RCIC13M RCIC Steam Leak Detection Channel Functional Test.
2-MST-RPS21SA RPS Electrical Protection Assembly Channel Calibration.
01-3.1 C0 Daily Surveillance Requiromants - Unit 2 No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.
5.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspecturs verified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operated in compliance with Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements by direct observations of activities, facility tours, discussion with personnel, reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.
The inspectors verified that control room manning recuirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met. Control operator, shift supervi or, clearance, STA, daily and standing instructions, and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain informstion concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to ensure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operations.
Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to verify operability and that operating parameters were within Technical Specifi-cation limits.
The inspectors observed shif t turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained.
The inspectors verified the status of selected control room annunciscors.
Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature division was verified weekly by ensuring that:
each accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct position; each power supply and breaker was closed fo components that must activate upon initiation signal; the RHR subsystem cross-tie valve for each unit was closed with tne power removed from the valve operator; there was no leakage of najor components; there was proper lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.
Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve lineup, if accessibl _
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The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /
procedures were followed. This included observation of HP practices and a review of ares surveys, radias. a work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.
The inspectors also verified that: the security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area; vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; effective compensatory measures were employed when required; and security's response to alarms was adequate.
In addition, the inspectors also cbserved plant housekeeping controls, l
verified position of certain containment isolation valves, checked a
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clearance, and verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency pcwer sourcse, a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrument Anamolies
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The licensee noted on September 8,1988, that certain vessel level
actuation instruments (wide range) were not acting as previously i
recorded during initial startup testing. The wide range instruments normally agree with the narrow range instruments under low recircu-
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lation flow conditions.
Further, as recirculation flow increases,
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the wide range instrument readings should decrease relative to the l
narrow range instruments due to the venturi effect of recirculation
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flow on the variable tap for the instruments. However, the licensee l
found, during a power level change, that the wide range instruments l
were reading equal to and in some cases slightly greater than narrow i
range on Unit 1 only. This phenomenon occurs for both divisions of
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the wide range instruments.
On September 10, 1988, the licensee l
readjusted upward 10 inches the low level 2 trip setpoints for ECCS f
actuations and the group 1 isolation to compensate for this error l
while their investigation continues.
The licensee's investigation
includes teview of daily surveillance records, startup test data and i
plant modifications, and will include a walkdown of the drywell i
piping during the upcoming outage.
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The licensee accepted the raising of the setpoints under EER 88-0428.
The upward 10 inch readjustment was based on a comparison between the
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current Unit I wide range instruments (analog instrumentsi and the
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indications seen on the Yarways (wide range) during startup testing.
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The inspector reviewed the startup test data for water level measurements and the CD's 05R for the week of September 4-10, 1988, and found that the setpoint adjustmeit, coupled with the previous 6 i
inch adjustment for instrument drif t, appropriately compensates for i
the phenomenon. However, the licensee failed to document the basis
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for the 10 inches in the EER. plant management was notified of the
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ir.spector's fi ndi ng.
The EER did address through recalculation that the current low level 3 setpoint was correct since the TS number was
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2.5 inches and the current setpoint is 45 inches.
The 45 inch setpoint compensated for drywell ternerature effects on the reference legs as documented in GE SIL 299.
Ihe licenser showed in the EER that the assump'.icns made to compensate the low level 3 setpoint were conservative since 4/0 degrees F was assumed for drywell temperature vice the 340 deqrees F used for the drywell for EQ. The inspector has no problems with the licensee's actions based on the conclus;ons of the EER. However, this item remains unresolved until the licensee inspects the drywell instrumert piping, finds a root cause of the problem and the inspector reviews the licentee's final resolution.
This is an Unreso'ved Item *-
Reactor Vessel Water Level Wide Rarge Indication Anomalies (325/88-34-02)
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Operator Inattention The inspector cbserved, at approximately 7:30 a.m.
on August 31, 1983, that the pump motor it.o'cating light for containment atmosphere radiation monitor instruments 1-CAC-AQH-1262-1, 2, 3 was off.
The pump motor indicating light, the meter indication and the chart recorders are located in the back panel area of the control room.
These instruments are part of the Containment Atmospher9 Control System and monitor the contair. ment for noble gas, particulate and iodine activity.
The other instruments used to monitor these parameters, 1-CAC-AQH-1260-1, 2,
3 and 1-C AC-AQH-1261-1, 2, 3, were operable during this time.
The MCC which supplies power to the pump, 1XA, had been de-energized the previous day for the repl cement of silicon bronze bolts in the M C.
The MCC was re-energi:ed at 6: 44 p.m.
on August 30, 1988.
However, the puup for the detector was not restarted.
The C0 performed two channel checks between 6:44 p.m.
on August 30, 1988, and the inspector's discovery. TS 4.4.3.1.4 requires that a channel check be performed at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The CO periorming the channel check did not realize that the pump motor was not running when he performed the checks.
When informed of the condition, the licensee started the pump motor and inititted a trouble ticket to determine why the alarm associated with the no flow Condition did not alsrm in the control room.
The licensee st ill met the operability requirements of TS 2.4.3.1, RCS Leakage Detection Systems, since only ene operable channel is required.
The f ailure to perform an adequate channel check is a violation, with the root cause being lack of attention by the operator.
However, earlier eunts involving operator lack of attention resulted in a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Fenalty being
' Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involse violations or deviation _ _ _ _ _
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issued on July 25, 1988. Since the licensee's supplemental response to this Notice, dated September 26, 1988, describes those corrective actions to be taken with respect to operator lack of attention, no notice of violation is being issued for the inadequate channel check.
One violation and no deviations were identified.
6.
Followup on Inspector Followup and Unresolved Items (92701)
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(OPEN) Inspector Followup Item 325/84-07-02 and 324/84-07-03; Revise PT-46,4 to Incorporate Acceptance Criteria Required to Verify the One Eighth Water Gauge Positive Pressure in the Control Room Eve y 18 Months. This item had been previously reviewed in Inspection Report Nos. 325/87-31 and 324/87-35.
This matter is still being evaluated by the NRC in the review of the licensee's submittal for NUREG-0737, Item 111.0.3.4. This item remains open pending the completion of the NRC review, the establishment of an acceptable value for control room positive differential pressure, and its incorporation into PT-46.4 b.
(OPEN)
Inspector Followup Item 325/84-31-01 and 324/84-31-01; Licensee to Develop and Submit a Technical Specification Change Request for Rod Sequence Contrcl System Testing. This item had been previously reviewed in Inspection Report No. 325/87-31 and 324/87-35.
The licensee plans to install the new RWM in Unit 1 this upcoming refueling outage and submit the proposed TS near the end of the year, c.
(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 324/84-31-06; Installation of Nitrogen Accumulators for Safety Equipment Requiring Non-interrup-tible Air.
The inspector his observed, during his normal plant tours, that the subject nitrogen accumulators have been installed.
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(CLOSED)
Inspector Followup Item 324/86-15-03; Inspection Schedule
Implementation and Correcting Unplanned Flow Paths.
The inspector
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reviewed the implementation of OER 2-86-19 findings which includ.d an
inspection of wetted components and the identification and correction I
of unplanned flow paths.
The inspections were performed, unplanned j
flow paths identified, and appropriate corrective actions taken to i
correct the deficiencies.
This item is closed. However, failure of I
the service water gasket will be tracked in URI 324/87-43-0%.
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(CLOSED)
Unresolved Item 324/86-22-01; Maintenance Activities May Affect System Response Time.
The inspector reviewed licensee
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activities and their affect on systen response time.
The original j
inspection item resulted from maintenance on a HPCI valve which
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affected the valve stroke time, but was not factored into the overall l
system response time. When factored into the system response time, l
the required response time was met.
In response to this item, the licensee performed an evaluation, documented in FACTS 86B0276, which
examined each of the HPCI components that affect system response time
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along with an acceptance criteria for each of the parameters to ensure that system response time is still acceptable. In addition, a list of potential maintenance tasks which could affect system response time was generated by the licensee's technical support group and then provided to maintenance and operations.
This list is documented in a technical support memo dated January 13, 1987, t
Although the potential maintenance items are identified, licensee procedures have not been updated to include these items. Affected procedures would include both maintenance procedures 'and operations e
procedures pertaining to post maintenance testing requirements.
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Therefore, the unresolved item is closed and an inspector followup
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item is opened.
Inspector Followup Item:
Incorporttien of
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Maintenance Activities Affecting System Response Time Into Licensee
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Procedures (325/88-34-03 and 324/88-34-03).
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(CLOSED)
Unresolved Item 325/86-24-02 and 324/86-25-02; Otesel l
Generator Jacket Water Cooler Service Water Outlet Valve - Required
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Position.
This item concerned the operability of the OGs with the service water cooler outlet valves partially shut. The licensee had i
operated the DGs in the past with the cooler outlet valves partially l
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shut rather than full open as their procedures required. The service i
j water system supplies cooling water for the DG jacket water system.
i High Jacket water temperature will alarm at 190 degrees F and cause a
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trip of the CG at 200 degrees F when the DG operates under normal t
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Under emergency conditions, high jacket water tempera-l
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ture will result in an alarm only. Based on the above, and the fact
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that the licensee's procedures require an auxiliary operator to be
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j present at the DGs during all DG starts, the licensee concluded that I
operability of the DGs with the service water outlet partially shut
was not a concern.
If a high temperature condition had existed, the
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operator would have received an alarm and taken the appropriate i
actions, which would include verifying the lineup of the service
i water system, to clear the alarm condition.
The inspector had no l
further questions.
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(CLOSED)
Unresolved Item 325/86-32-03; DG HVAC Supply Dampers l
l Subject to Single Failure.
The inspector's review found no
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enforcement issues, based on the licensee's extensive analysis and the ability of the operators to take compensatory measu es. See LER
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1-86-33 in this report for further followup.
No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified, t
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10 CFR 21 Followup (36100)
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?eerless Lead Wire Insulation Failures (325/P21860;).
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inspector reviewed licensee activities with respect to the Limitorque i
Corporation 10 CFR Part 21 report dated December 19, 1986, which described
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lead wire insulation failures on certain Peerless-Winsmith Nuclear Grade
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DC motors.
The licensee's evaluation is documented in evaluation
10 CFR 21 87-02A, dated July 31, 1987 The licensee determined, after
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notification from Limitorque and review of CP&L procurement records, that they had received two motors with the serial numbers of the type that
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could have the deficient motor leads.
One motor had previously been
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installed on the 2-E4)-F006 valve.
Its motor leads were examined by a (
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Limitorque representative and found to have the correct type of motor lead
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wire insulation. The second motor, which was still in stores and han not
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eeen installed, was found to have the defective leads described it the 10 CFR Part 21 notification. The licensee provided documentation showing
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that the motor in stores had been scrapped.
8.
Onsite Followup of Events - Unit 1 (93702)
At 1:25 a.m. on September 15, 1988, the licensee experienced an isolation
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i on the Unit 1 RCIC system while attempting to run PT-10.1.1, RCIC
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i Operability Test. The C0 noted that he received the isolation logic trip
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"B" alarm and the RCIC turbine exhaust high pressure alarm.
The RCIC
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outboard steam isolation valve, E41-F008, was observed to be shut.
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other annunciations or unusual indications were noted. The isolation was
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reset and two additional attempts to run RCIC were made.
On both i
j occasions the turbine tripped on high exhaust pressure.
No isolation
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occurred on these two attempts and no other annunciations or unusual indications were noted. RCIC was declared inoperable and the appropriate
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LCO action statement entered.
Based on the trip information recorded in the C0's log, the licensee began to troubleshoot possible causes of the isolation and turbine trip.
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i the limited information available, troubleshooting efforts were difficult
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and no conclusive determination could be made regarding the trip.
The
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licensee did determine that the isolation function was operable and i
unisolated the system, instrumented several points and attempted to run i
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J RCIC again.
During this run the following annunciations were noted:
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(1) RCIC Steamline Break Delta P; (2) RCIC Pump Discharge Low; (3) RCIC
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Turbine Tripped; and (4) RCIC Isolation Trip B.
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In addition, there was no indication of turbine speed in the RTGB. With J
this new information, the licensee found that the magnetic speed sentor l
for the RCIC turbine had become damaged. With this speed input to the EGR i
i not functioning, the RCIC turbine would experience high steam flow and
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high exhaust pressure conditions; thereby causing a system isolation i
and/or turbine trip.
The speed sensor was replaced and the RCIC
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operability test was performed satisfactorily.
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The inspector concluded that the C0's inability to accurately note i
and record system annunciators and operating parameters hampered the l
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licensee's efforts to find and correct the problem with RCIC.
The
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importance of noting and recording control system malfunctions so that j
they can be quickly and correctly repaired was discussed with licensee j
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management, j
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Ouring the inspector's review of this issue, it was noted that the design pressure for the RCIC steam exhaust line lif t check angle globe valve disk.1/2-E51-F040, was established at 25 psig as per drawing FP-9700.
This valve, while not listed as a containment isolation valve in TS, does provide part of the primary containment boundary and is tested as such
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during ILRT.
These valves were replaced more than three years ago under
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I plant modifications81-274 and 81-275.
At that time, the modifications invoked the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, indicating that l
j containment design pressure must be considered. As stated in TS 3.6.1.2
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the calculated peak contair, tent internal pressure related to the design basis accident, Pa, is 49 mig.
Since the F040 valve design, as docu-y mented in drawing FP-9700, c'j not meet the design requirement of 49 psig,
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this item is a Violation: Inadequate Jesign Control Related te RCIC Steam
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Exhaust Check Valve (325-88-34-01 and 324-88-34-01).
The inspector reviewed the LLRT results and determined the safety significance of the inadequate control on the F040 valve was small since the valve passed the ILRT and LLRTs.
One violation and no deviations were identified.
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9.
Onsite Review of Licensee Evert Reports (92700)
k The below listed LERs were reviewed to verify that the information i
provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The vertftcation included l
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adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned,
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existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety :,ignifi-
cance of the event.
Inspectors performed onsite reviews and concluded that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance with
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existing requirements, licensee conditions and commitments, unles.
otherwise indicated.
Unit 1 (OPEN)
LER 1-86-33, Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Design l
Deficiency Identified During Probabilistic Risk Assessment. The inspector i
j reviewed the design assumptions and results of the UE&C re; ort. "Environ-
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mental Responses in Diesel Generator Cells", January 27, 1987, and
verified that immediate and interim corrective actions were implemented.
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The inspector concluded that the licensee's actions were appropriate. The
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licensee reports that plant modification PM 86-084, designed to j
j permanently solve the problem, has been approved.
The PM implementation
is expected by the end of the next Unit I refueling outage, scheduled for l
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j completion by February 1989.
This LER will remain open pending the PM
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completion.
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1 Unit 2
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(CLOSED) LER 2-85-02, Inoperability of High Pressure Coolant Injection i
System.
Tne licensee submitted a supplement to LER 2-85-02, dated
August 11, 1988, to address additional items noted by the inspector in nis review of the original LER as documented in inspection report Nos. 325/87-31 and 324/87-35.
The supplemental LER noted the additional l
reporting requirement of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) and provided additional q
information regarding the failure of 2-E41-F006 during the event.
(CLOSED) LER 2-86-21. Inadvertent De-energization of Recctor Protection
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System Bus 2A. The licensee experienced a loss of the 2A RPS bus while at i
100% power due to a qualified operator opening the wrong unit's bus output
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breakers. The operator opened the Unit 2 EPA 1 and 2 breakers instead of
tha Unit 1 EPA 1 and 2 breakers as he was instructed.
The required ESF i
j systems parformed as designed.
The operator was counseled by the
operations manager concerning this matter.
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j No significant safety matters, violations, or dtviations were identified, i
10.
Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on Sep'. ember 30, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed i
i below Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
The
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inspector reviewed documents labeled proprietary by GE; however, no proprietary information was included in this report.
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Item Number Description /Referenta Paragraph (
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325, 324/88-34-01 VIOLATION - Inadequate Design Control Related to i
l RCIC Steam Exhaust Check Valve (paragraph 8).
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325/88-34-02 URI - Rt actor Vessel Water Level Wide Range Indication Anomalies (paragraph 5.a),
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l 325, 324/88-34-03 IFI - Incorporation of Maintenance Activities
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l Affecting System Response Time Into Licensee
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j Procedures (paragraph 6.e).
j 11.
List of Abbreviations for Unit 1 and 2 f
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j A0 Auxiliary Operator
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BSEP Brunswick Steam Electric Plant l
CAC Containment Atmospheric Control
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j CC Control Operator
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