IR 05000324/1986019
| ML20204J993 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1986 |
| From: | Cooper W, Hosey C, Weddington R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204J963 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-86-19, 50-325-86-18, NUDOCS 8608110255 | |
| Download: ML20204J993 (8) | |
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- jn raro, UNITED STATES
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'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11 p
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j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
't ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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JUL 2 51986 Report Nos.: 50-325/86-18 and 50-324/86-19 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos.:
50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.:
DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name:
Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection Co ucted: July 8-1986 Inspector Jb % f 4[n 7 "/8-d ii. Weddin'@to
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g Date Signed
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7-/8-L A
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W.' T. Cooper
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Date Signed Approved by:
7 2 'L (
C. M. HoseY, Section Chief Date Signed-Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This special, announced inspection involved a review of allegations related to the conduct of operations at the licensee's facility.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified'.
8608110255 860725 DR ADOCK 05000324 PDR
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- C. R. Dietz, General Manager
- A. G. Cheatham, Manager, E&RC
- d. D. Henderson, Supervisor, RC-2
- K. E. Enzor, Director Regulatory Compliance
- R. M. Poulk, Senior Specialist, NRC
- 4. Richards, Principle Engineer, Quality Assurance C. Barnhill, RC Foreman L. Tripp, Supervisor, RC-2 Other licensee employees contacted included four technicf ans, two security force members and three office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- L. Garner, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 10, 1986, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings and took no exceptions. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
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This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Allegation Followup (99014)
a.
Allegation (2860018001, 2860018002,2860018007)
Improper health physics (HP) practices in the Brunswick radwaste area; improper posting of high radiation areas in radwaste; improper storage of high level radwaste materials in low level radwaste storage area.
Health physics technicians contacted about these problems did not act responsibl.
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Discussion and Finding The inspectors interviewed the radwaste foreman and four health physics technicians assigned to the radwaste area.
The inspectors also reviewed smear survey and air sample data for August 5-9, 1985.
The radwaste drumn.ing area on the 23 foot elevation was maintained as a locked high radiation area except during periods of access by personnel on an approved radiation work permit (RWP).
Surveys of this area during the week of August 5-9, 1985, indicated general access area dose rates of less than one millirem per hour (mr/hr) to 60 mr/hr.
Smearable contamination results indicated levels of less than 1000 disintegrations per minute per 100 square centimeters (dpm/100cm )
2 to a maximum of 27,000 dpm/100cm, with an average of approximately
4,000 dpm/100cm. Two bays within the drumming room were designated as storage areas for high level waste drums with general area dose rates of 1.5 rem per hour (R/hr) to 7 R/hr. Shielding materials were placed across the entrances to those areas and access was restricted except for movement of the high radiation drums into and out of the area for processing. Air samples collected during the week of August 5-9, 1985, indicated that no air samples in the area exceeded 25 percent (%) of a maximum permissible concentration (MPC).
The area utilized by the licensee for storage of radioactive materials was also reviewed. Drums, resin liners and boxes were stored within a posted and barricaded area. A magenta and yellow rope with a radiation area sign attached was used to barricade the subject area. Within the radiation area, chain link fences and concrete shields were used to further restrict access to specific areas.
Surveys performed during the week of August 5-9, 1985, indicated general area radiation levels of less than 1 mr/hr to a maximum of 50 mr/hr.
The survey maps reviewed indicated the boundaries used to establish the radiation area boundary were pioperly positioned.
Two areas within the radwaste shield storage area were maintained as locked high radiation areas.
These were also properly posted and controlled.
The licensee stored drums of oil and water in the storage area behind radwaste.
The licensee stated that at one time, approximately 700 drums of this solution were stored in this area.
A review of survey data for the drums and the storage area did not indicate evidence of any abnormal smearable beta contamination.
A licensee representative did state that drums located in the drumming room could have high beta levels, but that a decontamination of the drums was performed prior to removal from the area. The area was controlled as a contaminated area.
Each licensee employee interviewed who had worked with the alleger during the alleger's time on site stated that at no time did the alleger bring any safety-type concerns to their attention.
The allegation was not substantiate ___
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b.
Allegation (2860018003, 2860018006)
CP&L covering up (did not report) a fuel rod rupture that highly contaminated seven or eight people several years ago at Brunswick.
CP&L, is (was) paying off personnel to keep this incident quiet.
Discussion and Finding The inspector reviewed two licensee incident reports which detailed the dropping of fuel bundles. The first, licensee incident report #76-11, dated March 31, 1976, detailed fuel bundle number 444, falling out of the fuel prep machine. A portion of this report is excerpted below:
At ~ 0240 fuel bundle 444 was removed from the spent fuel pool storage location, using the refueling bridge fuel grapple. The bundle was positioned over the
"B" fuel prep machine and lowered into the machine. At the same time the fuel prep machine carriage was raised, the refuel bridge operator received " hoist loaded"
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light off and a " slack cable" light on.
These indications gave the operator the opinion the fuel bundle was seated in the carriage.
The grapple was opened, raised, and the bridge traversed away from the fuel prep machine to a position above the fuel pool storage racks.
The refuel floor foreman again st eted raising the fuel prep machine carriage upward in order to position
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the fuel bundle for channel inspection. At this time the bundle fell out of prep machine to a horizontal position across the top of fuel pool storage racks. The refuel floor and reactor building were evacuated and EI-22 (Spent Fuel Damage) was implemented.
Surveys and samples indicated no fuel damage or increased radiation.
I Bundle 444 was lifted, using slings from the jib cranes and "C" hook from the overhead crane. The bundle was stored in its
designated spent fuel storage location. Bundle 444 was inspected and no visible damage was detected. The bail on bundle BR-107 was bent by bundle BR-444 when it fell.
Preliminary visual inspection of bundles BR-166 and BR-060 indicated localized scratch or crud removal on the bail of the bundles. No indication of deformation of the bail was detected on either bundle. These were the only bundles that were struck or could have been struck by the falling bundle.
Inspection of the fuel prep machine indicated the upper roller i
guide had separated from the fuel prep carriage. The reason the guide separated from the fuel prep machine appears to be caused by the fuel bundle being misaligned in the upper guide and not properly seating the bundle in the prep machine.
The inspector also discussed this incident with the health physics j
technician who was assigned to refuel floor job coverage in 1976. He stated that no increase in radiation levels or airborne radioactivity
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were noted due to this incident. Further, this incident was documented in IE Inspection Report Number 76-08, issued on April 23, 1976.
Licensee Incident Report Number 76-12, dated March 27, 1976, detailing the dropping of a second bundle is excerpted below:
l Fuel bundle #81 was inspected and rechannelled per the fuel Shuffling Sequence in Fuel Prep Machining "B".
Fuel bundle #81 was picked up with the east jib crane and air-operated CRD grapple. Bundle #81 was picked up and moved to Fuel Rack Space 3V2 for storage. The bundle was being lined up with space 3V2 and lowered into place.
The CRD grapple lost engagement with bundle
- 81 and bundle #81, which was partially inserted into space 3V2, leaned over toward the east and came to rest at about a 40 angle with the vertical. The bundle bail was hooked with a "C" hook and line and tied off to the hand rail. The Refuel floor and Reactor building were evacuated until surveys were completed. Surveys and samples indicated no leakage.
A special team was briefed, returned to the Refuel floor and uprighted the leaning bundle using the Auxillary hoist on the overhead crane.
Bundle #81 was lowered. into space 3V2.
The Fuel grapple was used to pull bundle #81 out of 3V2 and put it into the Fuel Prep Machine for boroscope inspection by GE.
The channel was found scratched and was replaced.
The fuel was not damaged.
As a precautionary measure, the bundles in 3V1 and 3V3 were removed and inspected.
No damage was observed.
This incident was also detailed in Inspection Report 76 08 issued on April 23, 1976.
The allegation was not substantiated.
c.
Allegation (2860067002)
Falsification of Form NRC-4.
Discussion and Finding
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The inspector discussed this allegation with licensee representatives at the Shearon Harris (SHNPP) facility and further discussed this issue with a member of the Office of Investigations staff. After reporting for duty at the SHNPP, the alleger was requested to fill out a
Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) Request Form. At the same time the alleger was requested to sign forms for the release of dosimetry data from prior employers.
After the data was received by SHNPP, a Form NRC-4 was completed and the alleger was called to the dosimetry office to sign the Form-4. The alleger informed the dosimetry foreman that the dose which North Carolina State University had supplied to SHNPP was incorrect in that NC State's letter indicated the alleger had received no whole body dose.
The dosimetry foreman instructed the alleger to sign the form, which the alleger did.
The alleger then
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called NC State snd requested that another search be made for the alinger's exposur e data.
A subsequent search made by the NC State staif produced an exposure summary for that facility of 20 millirem whole body exposure.
The alleger requested that this information be provided to the SHNPP. Upon receipt of this additional information, a new Form.NRC-4 was completed and the 20 millirem exposure documented.
The alleger signed a revised Form NRC-4.
The acceptance of dosimetry data transmitted by letter. from an
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individual's previous employers is consistent with regulatory requirements. The dosimetry supervisor stated that he had no reason to believe that the data provided by NC State was incorrect when he instructed the alleger to sign the first Form-4.
The allegation was not substantiated.
d.
Allegation (2860067003)
Unqualified oersonnel performing audits of the health physics area.
Discussion and Finding The inspector reviewed the licensee's Quality Assurance (QA) audit program and discussed the program with licensee representatives.
Each of the atility's sites has an Onsite QA Group with the responsibility for the performance of surveillances at the site. The Corporate QA group has the responsibility for tiie performance of programmatic type audits such as those required in the licensee's technical specifications.
The inspector reviewed the resume and qualifications of the Lead QA Auditor in charge of health physic audits for CP&L.
The Lead Auditor appeared to have the experience and education necessary to conduct audits of adequate scope and depth consistent with technical specification requirements.
The allegation was not substantiated.
Allegation (2860018004, 286001805)
e.
j General allegation that CP&L falsifies radiation exposure reports and that specifically the alleger's exposure records for August 1985 were falsified.
Discussion and Finding During the period August 5-9, 1985, the alleger was assigned to the Brunswick site to observe health physics activities in the licensee's radioactive waste handling facility. A licensee representative stated
that the alleger was scheduled to stay at Brunswick for two weeks, but was directed to return to the Shearon Harris site a week early because of personnel relations type problems which developed the first week.
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Subsequent to the alleger's return to Shearon Harris, a radiation exposure report was requested and sent to the alleger on August 20,
1985. The exposure report-stated that no exposure had been received during the monitoring period July 1 to August 9, 1985, and that an exposure of 29 millirem to the whole body and 33 millirem to the skin had been received during the previous monitoring period April 1 to June 30, 1985. The alleger stated that this report was not factual.
During the first fou days the alleger was at Brunswick, exposure as measured by self re - ing pocket dosimeter (SRPD) totaled 61 millirem.
On August 9, 10'
the alleger's SRPD was noted to indicate
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approximately 400 millirem and the licensee's dosimetry office was directed to read the alleger's thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD). The inspector reviewed the results of the TLD processing. When TLDs are processed on the automatic reader, a printout is generated indicating the TLD serial number, dose indicated by each of the four TLD elements and the background that had been subtracted from each. The printout for TLD No. 03226, which was issued to the alleger during the period August 5-9, 1985, indicated a whole body dose of 29 millirem and a skin dose of 33 millirem.
The inspector reviewed records of checks performed on the TLD prior to and subsequent to being issued to the alleger and determined that they indicated proper functioning of the TLD.
The licensee also checked the SRPD that had been worn by the alleger. A drift check performed on August 15, 1985, was within the acceptance criteria of less than two percent of full scale drift within a 24-hour period. The SRPD was response checked on August 16, 1985, by exposing it to a CS-137 source. The SRPD was tested twice and failed both tests.
The acceptance range was 338 to 412 millirem and the SRPD read 330 millirem on both tests.
The SRPD was then removed from service. The SRPD had previously been satisfactorily response checked on June 5, 1985.
The inspector reviewed the special exposure report that had been sent to the alleger on August 20, 1985.
The report did indicate that 29 millirem whole body and 33 millirem skin had been received during the monitoring period April 1 to June 30, 1985, and that no exposure had been received during the monitoring period July 1, 1985, to August 9, 1985.
Licensee representatives stated that the two line entries had been inadvertently transposed due to a clerical error, however, the total dose indicated on the report was accurate.
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The alleger also stated that the August 20, 1985, exposure report did not apnear to be complete in that readings of two TLDs, the replacement TLD given to the alleger on August 9,1985, at Brunswick and the TLD that had been worn at Shearon Harris, were not shown on the report.
Licensee representatives stated that those two TLDs were still in service at the time of the report and had therefore, not been read.
The inspector reviewed the termination exposure report that had been sent to the alleger on September 10, 1985. That report indicated the results of all TLD readings for the period of the alleger's employment
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and corrected the clerical error that had appeared on the previous report.
The inspector interviewed three licensee health physics technicians who had worked in the radioactive waste area with the alleger during the period August 5-9, 1985.
The inspector also reviewed records of radiological surveys performed in the radioactive waste area and health physic technician logs for that time period. The inspector determined that there was no indication of any unusual radiological condition or event during that time period that could have caused an unexpected exposure.
Based on the above, the inspector determined that the. alleger's exposure during her period of employment had been accurately determined and factually documented.
As for the general charge that Cp&L
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falsifies radiation exposure reports, no. evidence of -inaccurate
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exposure records have been discovered during routine reviews at the
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Brunswick and Shearon Harris facilities.
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The allegation was not substantiated.
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