IR 05000324/1989007

Insp Repts 50-324/89-07 & 50-325/89-07 on 890316-0417. Violation Noted Re Cracked Environmentally Qualified Cable Insulation on Acoustic Monitor.Major Areas Inspected:Onsite LER Review,Tmi Action Items & QA Program Implementation

ML20246J206
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	05/08/1989
From:	Dance H, Levis W, David Nelson, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246J196	List: IR 05000324/1989007 ML20246J192
References
TASK-2.K.3.57, TASK-TM 50-324-89-07, 50-324-89-7, 50-325-89-07, 50-325-89-7, NUDOCS 8905170017
Download: ML20246J206 (15)

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[' UNITED STATES g .j g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o,,

• REGION 11/

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101 MARIETTA ST., ^ %,

ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323 Report No. 50-325/89-07 and 50-324/89-07 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602

~ Docket No. 50-325 and 50-324 License No'. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: March 16 - April 17, 1989 Inspectors: [gdha 4/AM~ M8/87 Dhte' Signed WT H. Ruland / /

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W. Levis f f' D'a te'Si@ned f!D , n . -thy f/9/99

'D. J. Nelson ~

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g~~/ D6te 'Sig6ed Approved by: 'b W f P9 H. C. Dance, Shction Chie Da'te Sigined Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This. routine safety inspection by the resident inspector involved the areas of maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational

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safety verification, onsite licensee event report review, in office licensee event report review, TMI action. items, determination of reactor shutdown-margin - Unit 1, licensee quality assurance program

' implementation, and action on previous inspection finding Results: In the areas inspected, no programmatic weaknesses or deviations were identified. There was one violation identified involving cracked environmentally qualified cable insulation on a safety-relief valve acoustic monitor, paragraph 8.b.(1).

A potentially significant problem was found involving corrosion of supports associated with lubricating water for the service water pump The affected supports were repaired, however, corrective action was impaired by less than effective interplant communicatio Pending the results of licensee's operability analysis, this issue will. remain unresolved, paragraph _

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The need to provide additional guidance to operators was identified concerning delta T requirements when increasing recirculation pump speed, paragraph Key control inconsistencies were also identified, and are being addressed by the licensee, paragraph Although found .to be adequate, the licensee's control over systems aligned to support startup warrants further review by the licensee, paragraph 8.b.(4). The inspectors noted that, with minor exceptions, the licensee's maintenance of equipment in the drywell during the recent Unit i refueling outage was effective, paragraph 8.

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REPORT DETAILS l Persons Contacted Licensee Employees j l

K. Altman, Engineering Supervisor l W. Biggs, Engineering Supervisor j F. Blackmon, Manager - Operations J. Brown, Resident Engineer

• S. Callis, On-Site Licensing Engineer T. Cantebury, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

• G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)

W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA

• K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance R. Groover, Manager - Project Construction

• J. Harness, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project

• W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security A.'Hegler, Supervisor - Radwaste/ Fire Protection

• R. Helme, Manager - Technical Support J. Holder, Manager - Outages

• L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)

• M. Jones, Director - On-Site Nuclear Safety - BSEP R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)

J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Training B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor

• R. Poulk, Project Specialist - NRC

• J. Simon, Engineer, Operations J. Smith, Director - Administrative Support S. Smith, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)

• R. Starkey, Project Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project

• R. Warden, Manager - Maintenance B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor

• T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force member * Attended the exit interview Note: Acronyms and abbreviations used in the report are listed in paragraph 1 . Maintenance Observation (62703)

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The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures and Technical Specifications. The inspectors also I

verified that: redundant components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel were qualified;

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2 l correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification requirements were implemented. The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to servic Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave '

priority to safety-related maintenance. The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities: )

i 89-AGQM1 2A NSW Lube Water Pipe Support Repairs 89-IEV021 Diesel Generator 3 Trench Level Switch Route 89-NVI141 RCIC RSDP Flow Controller Route No violations or deviations were identifie . SurveillanceObservation(61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Specifications. Through observation, interviews, and record review, the inspectors. verified that: tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements; administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified; instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete. The inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return to service of equipmen The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:

IMST-BATT11M Battery 125 V DC Monthly Operability Test 2MST-RSDP21Q RSDP and RTGB Panel Reactor Water Level Indication Channel Calibration PT-11. ADS and SRV Operability Test PT-24. Service Water Miscellaneous Valve Operability Test No violacions or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspectors verified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operated in compliance with Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements by direct observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, reviewing of records, and independent verification of safety system

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The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the Technical Specifications were met. Control operator, shif t supervisor, clearance, STA, daily and standing instructions, and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain information concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to ensure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operations. Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to verify operability and that operating parameters were within Technical Specification limit The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The inspectors verified the status of selected control room annunciator Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature division was verified weekly by ensuring that: each accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct position; each power supply and breaker was closed for components that must activate upon initiation signal; the RHR subsystem cross-tie valve for each unit was closed with the power removed from the valve operator; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not avist which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirement Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve lineup, if accessibl The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /

procedures were followed. This included observation of Hp practices and a review of area surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument calibratio The inspectors verified that: the security organi::ation was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area; vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted within the PA; persons within the pA displayed photo identification badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; and effective compensatory measures were employed when require The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified position of certain containment isolation valves, checked a clearance, and verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power source The inspectors found a valve between each Unit 2 instrument air compressor and its associated air receiver that was not shown on the system diagra The licensee issued an NCR to address the issue and issued a change notice for the appropriate drawing Since the system is non-saftey, no violation occurre Service Water Lube Water Support Operability On March 9,1989, the inspector found one of the three lube water piping supports broken for the 2A NSW pump. The problem was

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confirmed by the service water system enginee The engineer initiated the evaluation process to determine the operability of the service water pump. The licensee visually inspected the remaining

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pumps and found a problem with the 2A CSW pump lube water sur> ort These supports had corroded in two. The support baseplate was below floor level, collecting water. Grout covering the baseplate in the recess hid the corrosio On March 15, 1989, the engineering evaluation showed that the lube water supports were inoperable as a result of being corroded. The affected pumps were then declared inoperable and repairs were made to the supports. On March 31, 1989, plant services personnel prepared the 2A CSW pump lube water and strainer supports for painting by grinding. While grinding, plant services discovered several corroded areas. They found corroded areas on a lube water piping support and a pump strainer support. Trouble ticket 89-AICX1 was initiated to repair the lube water support and an engineering evaluation was begun on the strainer suppor The engineering evaluation concluded that the strainer support was still operabl The engineer told operations that the support and the pump was inoperable that afternoon. The unit was not placed in an ACTION statement since a sufficent number of pumps were operabl On April 5, 1989, the inspector questioned the system engineer about the status of the lube water support The inspector discovered that, of the three lube water supports inspected in detail (i.e., the 2A NSW,1B CSW, and 2A CSW supports), all three were found to be inoperable. The inspectors then questioned plant management on the acceptability of the remaining pumps and why an accelerated inspection program was not in effect. Tne plant manager stated that he thought all the supports were ir:pected and added that he was informed that in the case of the 2A CSW pump, it was still operable with the corroded suppor With the new information, the licensee started a more detailed inspection of the remaining service water lube water supports and started the evaluation process to determine if the piping could be qualified independent of the supports. The inspection results of the supports on April 6, 1989 and thereafter showed that supports of nine of the ten pumps had significant corrosion. The licensee immediately began repairs on these supports and ensured that the correct number of operable pumps existed to allow continued unit operatio Engineering performed a preliminary analysis and test to show that, in all likelihood, a complete analysis will demonstrate short-term qualificatio The licensee must do further analysis to verify the assumptions used in the preliminary assessment before the short term Pending the results of this

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l qualification of the piping is assure evaluation, this item will be Unresolved: Service Water Lube Water Support Operability, URI 325/89-07-02 and 324/89-07-0 The licensee's staff did not effectively communicate the nature of the lube water piping supports issue throughout the staff. Regard-less of the analysis outcome, the licensee must identify and correct the root cause of the communication proble The system engineer had judged a pump inoperable, a third consecutive example, and plant

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management failed to get the correct informatio The inspectors will followup on this issue when the URI is resolve b. Guidance to Operators Concerning Delta T Requirements On March 28, 1989, at 5:44 a.m., operations personnel secured the 2B recirculation pump MG set due'to a report of arcing and sparking near the generator end. The licensee found that the brushes required replacement. These repairs were accomplished and the MG set and recirculation pump were ready for restart approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> late The operator must verify certain differential temperatures specified in Technical Specification 3.4.1.3 within 30 minutes prior to startup of the idle recirculation loop. One of these requirements is that the temperature differential between the dome and the bottom head drain must be less than 145 degrees F. Unit 2 typically has difficulty in meeting this temperature differential requirement due to a partially clogged bottom head drai The operators, in order to meet the above requirement, reduced CRD flow to reduce cooling of the bottom head. They also reduced power by reducing flow in the operating loop, thereby reducing pressure /

temperature of the dome. The operator then verified at the RTGB that his temperature parameters were satisfied and then started the 2B recirculation MG set. After the recirculation pump started, the operator then began to increase power by increasing recirculation pump speed. The operator also restored CRD flow to its normal valu The increase in CRD flow and recirculation flow caused the delta T between the dome and bottom head drain to exceeded 145 degrees The licensee stated that the 145 degrees F delta T requirement applied only to startup of the idle recirculation pump and did not apply after both pumps are runnin Technical Specifications do not list a delta T requirement when increasing recirculation pump speed. However, Service Information Letter 251, dated October 31, 1977, recommended that recirculation flow should not be increased if the delta T between the dome and bottom head drain was greater than 145 degrees F to avoid over-stressing the CRD stub tube and in-core housing welds. Supplement I to SIL 251, dated July 1980, identified four conditions in which thermal stratification may occur which would require that the 145 l degrees F delta T requirement be met:

o Operation of the reactor at less than 30% rated power without forced recirculation flow in both loops, o During heat up of the reactor with only one recirculation loop in operatio o Operation at any power level with only one recirculation loop in operation at less than 40% flo o During startup of the recirculation pumps or when increasing reactor power following a reactor scram with recirculation pump

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trip unless the reactor has been depressurized to atmospheric pressur The SIL further states that thermal stratification would not be a problem with both recirculation pumps operating at 20% speed. At Brunswick the minimum speed setting of the recirculation pumps is 28%.

OP-02, Reactor Recirculation Operating Frocedure, Rev. 63, Section D.3, states that recirculation pump speed should not be increased if the delta T between the bottom head region and vessel saturation temperature exceeds 145 degrees F. The operators assumed that this limit applied to the startup of the idle loop only and not to dual pump operatio Based on a review of the two SIls and recent correspondence between the licensee and GE, the thennal stratifica-tion concern and the corresponding 145 degrees F delta T requirement should not apply during dual pump operation even with a partially clogged bottom head drain. The limit would apply, however, when increasing recirculation pump speed while operating in single loo The licensee plans to make the appropriate changes to their operating procedures and training to clarify this requirement. This is an Inspector Followup Item: Provide Additional Guidance to Operators Concerning Delta T Requirements IFI 325/89-07-03 and 324/89-07-0 Key Control During an inspection of the 'Jnit 1 Reactor Building on April 4, 1989, the inspector noted that keys were installed in the control switch for SRVs B21-F013B and F013G at the remote shutdown panel. The switches were positioned to the NORMAL position which is the correct position for standby lineup of the system. These valves are not part of the ADS syste The testing of local control of the SRVs was. accomplished by procedure SP-85-023, which was completed on April 3, 198 Volume 1, Book i of the Operating Nanual, Administrative Procedure, Revision 119, Section 4.1.13 and 01-21, Operations Shift Key and Portable Dose Rate Instrument Control, Revision 9, define the licensee's policy for the control of keys. The inspector could not determine which portion of the policy requires shif t operators to complete a key checkout tag. The licensee issued NCR S-89-042 to address this procedural inconsistency and key control. The inspector will monitor the closecut of this item in future inspection A potentially significant problem with service water lubricating water supports was found. No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)

The below listed LERs were reviewed to verify that the information provided met NRC reporting requirement The verification included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety i

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significance of the even Onsite inspections were performed and concluded that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance with existing requirements, licensee conditions and commitment (CLOSED) LER 1-88-13, Failure of Service Water System Nuclear Header Supply Isolation Valve SW-117 to Open Due to 0xidation of the Valve Geared Limit Switch Electrical Contacts. The inspector reviewed the documenta-tion package and verified that MI-10-25 was revised to provide for periodic cleaning of the actuator geared limit switch contact The licensee has had other problems with dirty limit switch contacts as detailed in LER 1-88-1B and Inspection Report 89-0 As stated in Inspection Report 89-02, MI-10-25, Rev. 3, dated November 9,1988, contains appropriate guidance for proper cleaning of limit switch contact (CLOSED) LER 1-88-24, TCV Fast Closure Reactor Scram After PLU Testing Due to Suspected Electrical Fault. The inspector reviewed the original report dated December 8,1988, and the supplement dated March 15, 198 The inspector reviewed the licensee's 01-22 (Post Trip Investigation)

report in detail to verify conformance with the LER informatio The inspector verified that the root cause determination - noise from the Power Load Unbalance test relays - appeared appropriate. The licensee installed diodes across the PLU test relays in Unit 1 under PM-89-012 after discussion with GE - Schenectady. The licensee also increased the PLU test timer from 5 to 8 seconds to further preclude re-enabling the circuit prior to dropout of the test relays. The PM was declared operable on March 23, 1989. The inspector verified that the acceptance test had been completed through a documentation revie The licensee has stopped testing the PLU circuit on Unit 2 until the same PM can be made. The licensee has approved a project for Unit 2 for implementation not later than the next refueling outag The inspector verified, through document review, that any other problems found during the event were corrected. The GE site representative entered the failure in GE's appropriate data bas This notification would include all GE BWRs, but would exclude other GE turbine generator owner The LER was reviewed per the licensee's program as required by Section 6 of T No violations or deviations were identifie . In Office Licensee Event Report Review (90712)

The below listed LER was reviewed to verify that the information provided met NRC reporting requirement The verification included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existahce of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of the even (CLOSED) LER 1-89-03, Automatic Isolation of Units 1 and 2 Common Control Building Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning System Due to Actuation of Chlorine Detector 2-X-AT-297 No violations or deviations were identifie _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .

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8 TMI Action Items (25565)

(CLOSED) II.K.3.57 - Identify Water Sources Prior to Manual Actuation of l

ADS (Units 1 and 2).

l The inspector verified that the Emergency Operating Procedures include j verification of a source of cooling water prior to manual actuation of l

AD The only exception to this action is using the steam cooling mode i addressed in E0P-01-STCP, Steam Cooling Procedur The BWROG Emergency l

Procedure Guidelines recognizes this method of core cooling as a "last ditch effort" when there are no high pressure, low pressure, or alternate

! coolant injection systems available. The inspector verified up-to-date E0Ps were properly approved and in the control room, and that personnel had been adequately trained prior to implementatio No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Startup from Refueling - Unit 1 (71711)

The inspectors reviewed / observed activities associated with Unit 1 startup after the refueling outage to determine if activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures and Technical Specification The inspection included a review of the changes to GP-01, Revision 110, Startup Checklist; direct observation of startup and approach to criticality; observation of selected surveillance tests; and inspection of equipment, piping and components in areas not normally accessible, Specific inspection items included:

(1) Drywell and Torus Closecut The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the torus and drywell just prior to the licensee's closecut. The inspection included the dome and five foot elevation in the drywell, areas that require a respirator. The inspectors examined supports, mirror insulation, manual valve positions, motor operators, snubbers, pipe hangers, and other equipment. SRV vacuum breakers and torus drywell vacuum breakers were examined with a licensee employee's assistance and found satisfactor (2) Valve Lineups The completed valve lineup sheets for the Automatic Depressurization System were reviewed for completeness. Both trains of the RHR system were walked down in the plant to verify system condition, especially piping and supports. Proper system status was verified during start-up as system line-ups changed.

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(3) Reactor Building Inspection Several areas were inspected that are normally high radiation areas to look for housekeeping and general material condition 'The areas inspected included the HPCI roof, RCIC steam tunnel and the 66-foot penetration roo (4) Procedure Reviews The inspectors reviewed startup procedures and checklists to verify that all prerequisites for changing operational conditions were met. This review included examining the computerized surveillance tracking system 'PT completion requirement Procedures reviewed were:

GP-01, Startup Checklist GP-02, Approach to Criticality and Pressurization of the Reactor GP-03, Unit Startup and Synchronization (5) Physics Testing The inspectors witnessed and/or reviewed portions of the following physics test:

PT-50.12, Measurement of In-Sequence Critical Data b. The inspectors founo:

(1) Safety Relief Vcive J. Acoustic Monitor Insulation Degraded The inspectors discovered cracked insulation on SRV J sonic detector cable. The crack occurred where the cable exited the Raychem heat shrink and appeared to be caused by the cable experiencing excessive bend radius at this point. The cable exited the Raychem heat shrink at a 90 degree angle. These detectors are removed each outage to support SRV removal and subsequent re-installation. The removal and re-installation of the SRV sonic detectors was accomplished by WR/JO 88-APML1, The ccrrective action section of the work order states that the detector was re-installed and left in a satisfactory conditio The licensee theorizes that, subsequent to installation, the detector was bumped or stepped on which caused the insulation of the cable to crac To correct the problem, the licensee replaced the sensor and cable. In addition, they submitted a pr;cedure revision request to their procedure OCM-FT001 to provi& more explicit installa-tion configuration instruction The sonic detectors are EQ component It is critical that l maintenance actions restore the devices to their qualified

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10 configuration. Ir. this case, it is not clear if improper maintenance was the cause of the problem or if personnel may have bumped or stepped on the device. In any case, the licensee has taken appropriate action to correct the immediate problem

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L Th.e failure to maintain the environmental qualification of the l acoustic monitor for SRV J is a violation of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. Since Technical Specification 3.3.5.3 would allow

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the operation of the unit with the acoustic monitor inoperable I (provided temperature indication were operable), and the fact that this appears to be an isolated case, as all other SRV acoustic monitors were satisfactory, the violation is classified as a Severity Level V Violatio Since the requirements of Section V.A. of the NRC Enforcement Policy was met, no Notice of Violation will be cited: SRV Acoustic Monitor EQ Cable Insula-tion Cracked, Violation 325/89-07-0 (2) Cigarette Butt in Drywell The inspector found a cigarette butt in penetration X-49 at azimuth 31 This penetration was previously capped and was used during this outage for a plant modification. The licensee has experienced other problems with smoking in unauthorized areas as discussed in inspection report 88-18. The licensee's recent actions to eliminate smoking in unauthorized areas have been aggressiv They have issued a memorandum to all site personnel re-inforcing the smoking policy. The inspectors will continue to monitor the licensee's efforts in this area.

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(3) Debris in Drywell to Torus Downcomer The inspector found a roll of tape and other smaller debris in the drywell to torus downcome The engineering senior specialist that accompanied the inspector removed the debri The inspector believes that the specialist would have found and removed the debris without the inspector's presence since the licensee's drywell walkdown had not been complete (4) Change in System Status After GP Sign-off The inspcctor noted that once a system was signed off as complete in GP-01, there was no requirement to alter or rescind that signatur Only the shift foreman's non-procedural, non-required review would then verify that the specific item would be completed prior to startup. The inspector determined that the licensee's controls appeared adequate but did warrant a further review by the license The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comment in the exit intervie One violation was identifie _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

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11 Determination of Reactor Shutdown Margin - Unit 1 (61707)

The inspector verified that the licensee performed PT-14.3.1, Revision 4, In-Sequence Critical Shutdown Margin Calculation, in accordance with the approved procedur The procedure appeared technically adequate. The licensee used data from the corporate supplied Core Management Repor The determined shutdown margin closely matched the predicted margin of 1.80% (less than 1% deviation). The inspector verified the approximate value of the reactivity associated with the period seen during the test data collectio No violations or deviations were identifie . Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation (35502)

An internal office evaluation was conducted on April 11, 1989, of the licensee's quality assurance program implementation by reviewing recent inspection reports, SALP reports, open items, licensee corrective actions for NRC inspection findings, and licensee event report Particular emphasis was placed on all new items or findings since the last SALP report (August 31,1988). Recommendations were made to perform additional inspection modules in the Safety Assessment / Quality Verification and Engineering and Techaical Support functional areas during the current SALP cycl . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701) (92702)

(CLOSED) Violation 324/86-12-02, PT-6.2.3 Inadequate By Running Test with Idle Pump Discharge Valve Shut and Failure to Follow Procedure When Measuring Test Tank Level. The inspector reviewed the current revision to PT-6.2.3, Standby Liquid Control System Injection Test. The portion of the surveillance that verifies SLC flow rate has been deleted and incorporated into PT-6.1, SLC Operability Test. The inspector verified that PT-6.1 does not reposition the idle pump discharge valve nor establish any other bypass flow paths that would invalidate the flow rate determinatio Additionally, the inspector reviewed training documenta-tion on the proper method to measure test tank level while the flow rate surveillance is performe No violations or deviations were identifie . ExitInterview(30703)

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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on April 17, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the l- areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings listed below and those addressed in the report summar Dissenting comments were l not received from the license Proprietary information is not contained l in this repor Item Number Description / Reference Paragraph l

325/89-07-01 VIOLATION - SRV Acoustic Monitor EQ Cable Insulation Cracked, (paragraph 8.b.(1)).

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Item Number Description / Reference Paragraph (cont'd)

325, 324/89-07-02 *URI - Service Water Lube Water Support Operability, (paragraph 4.a).

325,324/89-07-03 IFI - Provide Additional Guidance to Operators Concerning Delta T Requirements, (paragraph 4.b).

13. List of Abbreviations for Unit I and 2 ADS Automatic Depressurization System A0 Auxiliary Operator BSEP Brunswick Steam Electric Plant BWR Boiling Water Reactor BWROG Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group CRD Control Rod Drive CSW Conventional Service Water DC Direct Current E0P Emergency Operating Procedure EQ Environmental Qualification ESF Engineered Safety Feature F Degrees Fahrenheit GE General Electric GP General Procedure HP Health Physics I&C Instrumentation and Control IE NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement IFI Inspector Followup Item IPBS Integrated Planning Budget System LER Licensee Event Report MG' Motor Generator MI Maintenance Instruction NCR Non-Conformance Report NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSW Nuclear Service Water

! 01 Operating Instruction OP Operating Procedure PA Protected Area l PLU Power Load Unbalance PM Plant Modification l PNSC Plant Nuclear Safety Committee PT Periodic Test

• An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviatio _ - - _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ .

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QA Quality Assurance-QC Quality Control RHR Residual Heat Removal RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RSDP -Remote Shutdown Panel RTGB Reactor Turbine Gauge Board SIL Service Information Letter SLC Standby Liquid Control SP Special Procedure SRV Safety Relief Valve STA Shift Technical Advisor TCV Thermostatic Control Valve TMI Three Mile Island TS Technical Specification URI Unresolved Item V Volt WR/JO Work Request / Job Order

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