IR 05000324/1989009
| ML20244E053 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1989 |
| From: | Levis W, David Nelson, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20244E036 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-89-09, 50-324-89-9, 50-325-89-09, 50-325-89-9, NUDOCS 8906200124 | |
| Download: ML20244E053 (33) | |
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't UNITED STATES j )
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.j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
REGION 11 o,
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
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Report No. 50-325/89-09 and 50-324/89-09 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket No. 50-325 and 50-324 License No. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: April 18 - May 15, 1989 Inspectors:
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W. H. Ruland (
D6te' Signed YL
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W. Levis Date $ighed
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D. J. Nelson Date Eighed
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Approved By:
H'. C. Dance, Section Chief Da'te Signed
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Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine safety inspection by the resident inspectors involved the areas of maintenance observation, operational safety verification, service water design
deficiencies, onsite Licensee Event Reports (LER) review, followup of onsite events, management meeting, and action on previous inspection findings.
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Results:
In the areas inspected, one continuing weakness was identified. The operations
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staff did not convey two potential operability concerns to the technical i
i support staff for evaluation and disposition, paragraph 3.a.
A potentially significant problem =s found by the Diagnostic Evaluation Team concerning the Service Water System and its ability to perform its design function under all accident and single failure scenarios.
The licensee has
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prepared an Engir.eering Evaluation Report to justify continued operation, implemented several short term measures and is continuing to evaluate the continued operability of the system.
Pending the results of further licensee testing and evaluation and NRC review,. this issue will remain unresolved, paragraph 4.
The licensee declared an ALERT on April 27, 1989, due to a fire in the Nuclear Service Water pump motor 2B.
Inspection of the event showed the licensee actions to be appropriate, paragraph 6.b.
The licensee discovered a cut fire hose in the radwaste area.
Attempts to locate the cause were unsuccessful, paragraph 6.a.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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e REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees K. Altman, Engineering Supervisor W. Biggs, Engineering Supervisor
- F. Blackmon, Manager - Operations J. Brown, Resident Engineer S. Callis, On-Site Licensing Engineer T. Cantebury, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA
- K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance R. Groover, Manager - Project Construction J. Harness, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security A. Hegler, Supervisor - Radwaste/ Fire Protection
- R. Helme, Manager - Technical Support J. Holder, Manager - Outages L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)
M. Jones, Director - On-Site Nuclear Safety - BSEP R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Training B. Parks, Engineering Supervisor
- M. Pastva, Senior Specialist R. Poulk, Project Specialist - NRC J. Simon, Engineer, Operations W. Simpson, Manager - Site Planning and Control J. Smith, Director - Administrative Support S. Smith, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
R. Starkey, Project Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project R. Warden, Manager - Maintenance B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force members.
- Attended the exit interview Acronyms and abbreviations used in the report are listed in paragraph 10.
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2.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that:
redundant components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate-quality control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate
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post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification l
requirements were implemented. The inspectors independently verified that i
selected equipment was properly returned to service.
l Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance.
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The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities:
89-AKGC1 2SW-V105 Auxiliary Contactor Replacement.
89-ALAQ1 25W-V106 Troubleshooting and Repair.
No significant safety matters, violations, or deviations were identified.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors verified that Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operated in compliance with Technical Specifications and other regulatory requirements by direct observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.
The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the technical specifications were met. Control operator, shift supervisor, clearance, STA, daily and standing instructions, and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain information concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to ensure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operations.
Direct observations were conducted of control room panels,
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instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to verify
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operability and that operating parameters were within Technical Specification limits.
The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The inspectors verified the status of selected control room annunciators.
Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature division was verified weekly by insuring that:
each accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct position; each power supply and breaker w6s closed for b
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l components that must activate upon initiation signal; the RHR subsystem cross-tie valve for each unit was closed with the power removed from the
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valve operator; there v,as no leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.
Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve lineup, if accessible.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies / procedures were followed.
This included observation of HP practices and a review of area surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.
The inspectors verified that:
the security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area; vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; effective compensatory measures were employed when required; and security's response to threats or alarms was adequate.
The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, v.erified position of certain containment isolation valves, checked a clearance, and verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources, e.
Operations / Technical Sumrt Interface During a tour of the Unit 1 Reactor Building on May 10, 1989, the inspector noted that the piping upstream of the E41-F013, the RCIC injection valve, was hot, indicating backleakage through the normally shut valve.
In addition, a small amount of leakage was noted to be coming from a hose connected to the V33 valve, the upstream vent.
The inspector determined that the licensee was aware of this condition as WR/JO 89-AKEN1, dated April 29, 1989, was initiated to correct the condition.
However, no evaluation was performed to determine the effect of this leakage on the unit's containment isolation capabilities.
When informed of this discrepancy by the inspector, the licensee performed a preliminary evaluation which concluded that the leakage was within allowable Technical Specification values for leakage.
A more detailed evaluation to confirm the initial conclusion was in progress and not yet completed at the end of the inspection period.
The licensee also plans to replace the leaking vent valve V33, at the earliest opportunity.
During a tour of the Unit 2 Reactor Building on May 8,1989, the inspector noted a small steam leak on the HPCI supply drain pot drain line.
On a followup inspection of the leak on May 11, 1989, the
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inspector noted that the leak had become much worse.
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questioned the licensee on their plans to correct the condition and the effect of the leak on the environmental qualification of the EQ equipment in the area.
The licensee's technical support staff evaluated the condition and recommended that the leak be repaired.
Initial attempts to isolate the drain line to effect repairs were unsuccessful due to the leaking of the isolation valves.
The licensee then chose to isolate the HPCI system, repair the leak, and perform other maintenance originally scheduled for May 16, 1989.
Both of the conditions discussed above, the leaking RCIC valve and the HPCI steam leak, demonstrate the continued communication problem between the licensee's operations and technical support organizations.
A condition which can threaten the operability of a component or system must be conveyed to the appropriate personnel for disposi-tioning.
The licensee's management acknowledged this deficiency and is currently pursuing actions to correct the problem.
These corrective actions will be inspected in future routine inspections.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
4.
Service Water Design Deficiencies (71707)
The NRC Analysis and Evaluation of Operating Data Branch Diagnostic Evaluation Team conducted a review of the nuclear service water s;; tem during this reporting period.
Several key issues were raised concerning whether the service water system can meet its safety design objectives.
In response, the licensee conducted a separate review and performed testing to establish performance data for the service water system.
Testing results indicate that the ECCS heat exchangers and cooling loads cannot be supplied with required design flows under the worst case accident scenario which includes a Loss of Coolant Accident, a loss of Offsite Power, the demand of cooling all four diesel generators from one unit's nuclear service water header, and a failure of emergency bus El, E2, E3, or E4.
Additionally, testing indicates that the service water nuclear header-to-conventional header leakage is significant - thus representing a leak path which starves flow from safety-related heat exchangers.
Based on this testing, the licensee developed an Engineering Evaluation Report (EER 89-0135, dated May 4, 1989), which imposed more stringent requirements on the number of operable nuclear and conventional service water pumps as well as a maximum temperature requirement for service water temperature.
Subsequently, EER-89-0163, dated May 14, 1989, provided a revised service water system normal lineup which puts the RBCCW loads on the conventional header and places an RHR service water booster pump and the RHR room coolers in continuous service.
This lineup also allows for higher service water injection temperatures than authorized by EER-89-0135.
The licensee was operating with the revised lineup at the end of the inspection period.
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There art several service water. issues that the ? censee must still resolve.
The licensee plans to conduct testing on the Unit I service water-system to determine the amount of header crosstie leakage, further evaluate the RHR heat exchanger design basis heat loading, and examine the i
effects of running the service water pump motors at potentially higher l
than normal temperatures.
Inasmuch as the service water system operability is still under review by the licensee and the NRC, this issue
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will be identified as an Unresolved Item *:
Service Water Design Deficiencies, (325/89-09-01 and 324/89-09-01).
Violations or deviations were not identified.
One unresolved item was L
identified concerning service water design deficiencies.
5.
Onsite Review of Licensee "ent Reports (92700)
The below listed LERs were reviewed to verify that the information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The verification included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of the event.
Onsite inspections were performed and concluded that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance with existing requirements, licensee conditions and commitments.
(CLOSED) LER 2-87-004, Reactor Scram on Low Vessel Level Due to a loss of the Uninterruptible Power Supply and Subsequent Loss of Feedwater Flow to l
the Vessel.
This item is discussed in paragraph 8.a. and is considered closed.
Violations or deviations were not identified.
6.
Followup of Onsite Events (93702)
a.
Cut Fire Hose On April 25, 1989, the licensee discovered a suspected case of vandalism of plant equipment.
A fabric covered fire hose installed in a hose rack in the radwaste building was discovered with an approximate 1 inch cut near the female coupling end.
The licensee stated that the cut appeared to be intentionally made and not the result of degradation or mishandling.
In accordance with the licensee's security plan, an entry was made in the security event 109 describing the event. The inspector examined all other hose racks in the radwaste building and detected no other evidence of tampering.
An investigation conducted by the licensee concluded that the hose was cut between 9:25 p.m. on April 24 and 3:30 p.m. on April 25 (time of discovery). This conclusion is based on the reports of
- An unresolved item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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watchstanders who make rounds in the area.
The licensee concluded that the damage was most likely an act of vandalism because no other credible means could be determined.
Identification of the responsible
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b.
Alert Declared On April 27, 1989, Unit 2 entered an ALERT event classification due to a motor fire in the 2B Nuclear Service Water pump motor. At 3:32 p.m., a licensee employee reported heavy smoke and sparks coming from a pump motor in the service water building.
A senior reactor operator dispatched to the scene determined the affected motor to be on 2B NSW pump.
The pump was secured and the motor breaker was racked out.
The fire brigade responded and trained water on the motor for approximately 4 minutes.
At 4:00 p.m., the fire was declared out.
At no time were flames observed within or around.the motor.
In accordance with the licensee's emergency plan, an ALERT was declared at 4:04 p.m., and was immediately downgraded to an UNUSUAL EVENT. The ALERT classification was based on the criteria of
"a - fire which could potentially affect vital safety-related equipment."
The UNUSUAL EVENT was terminated at 4:07 p.m.
The licensee made proper notification to NRC, state, and local authorities.
The fire was contained within the affected motor.
A sufficient number of standby pumps were available to ensure the service water system remained OPERABLE.
The licensee replaced the motor and will conduct an investigation to determine the cause of the failure.
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Violations or deviations were not identified.
7.
Management Meeting (30703)
NRC and CP&L management met onsite on May 8, 1989, to discuss the status of third party management reviews of the company and the Brunswick plant.
The CP&L project manager gave a project overview, followed by selected recommendations of the third party reviews.
The slides used by CP&L are included as Attachment 1 to the report.
CP&L also discussed their plans for reactor recirculation system piping inspections and, if needed, i
replacement.
The Regional Administrator stated that NRC will develop an inspection plan
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l to review CP&L actions regarding the third party reviews.
Meeting Attendees Licensee Employees:
L. W. Eury, Executive Vice President R. A. Watson, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Generation R. B. Starkey, Project Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project W. W. Simpson, Manager - Site Planning & Control J. R. Holder, Manager - Outages
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NRC Employees:
S. B. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II S. A. Varga, Director, Division of Reactor Projects I/II, NRR E. G. Adensam, Director, Project Directorate 11-1, NRR E. W. Merschoff, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region 11 H. E. Dance, Section Chief, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II
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W. H. Ruland, Brunswick Senior Resident Inspector 8.
Action a Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a.
(CLOSED)
Unresolved Item 324/87-06-04, Review of March 11, 1987,
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Scram LER and E41-F007 Motor Failure Determination.
This item was unresolved pending the review of the LER, the corrective actions to preclude repetition, and the determination of the E41-F007 motor failure.
The inspector reviewed LER 2-87-004, dated April 10, 1987. The scram on Unit 2 on April 11, 1987, resulted from operator error.
The A0 was attempting to transfer power to the UPS bus from the reserve source to the standby converter.
Due to the infrequent performance of this evolution, a specific procedure did not exist.
The shift personnel issued a temporary revision to an existing procedure which instructed the A0 to perform the procedure in reverse order.
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L the performance of 'the procedure in reverse order, the A0 missed a step which caused the UPS bus to deenergize resulting in the signal to the RFPs to ramp back to minimum which ultimately caused a reactor scram on low vessel water level.
The licensee has since provided further guidance to operations personnel concerning the appropriate-
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ness of reversing steps in a procedure. This item was inspected and closed in Inspection Report 88-19.
Following the scram recovery, the E41-F007 valve, a normally open valve in the HPCI inspection flowpath, was found closed. Attempts to open the valve from the RTGB were unsuccessful.
Further investigation revealed that the motor had burned up, possibly due to attempting to open a valve which was thermally bound.
The licensee was unable to determine how the valve was shut.
As reported in Inspection Report 89-02, the licensee is undergoing an extensive design review of their MOVs.
This review is evaluating valve design / application along with motor sizing. This item concerning the E41-F007 valve will be followed up during the inspection of IFI 325/89-02-02 and 324/89-02-02.
The licensee's corrective actions included verification that no damage had occurred to the HPCI full flow test line, along with subsequent tests of HPCI and selected components.
Operations personnel were also provided with additional instructions concerning i
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the operation of throttle valves, operation of HPCI and RCIC in the injection and full flow test mode and additional constraints on UPS transfer functions.
Based on these actions and previous inspections in this area, this item is closed.
b.
(CLOSED)
IFI 325/87-42-07, Lonegran SLC Relief Valve Plug Installed with Incorrect Drain Plug. The inspector reviewed the results of the Harris E&E Center evaluation concerning the drain plug material and also reviewed the licensee's 10 CFR 21 deportability assessmert. The Harris E&E evaluation determined that the failed drain plug and the drain plug of the spare relief valve were 1030 carbon steel and the non-failed plugs from the other 3 installed relief valves were 1010 carbon steel.
The failed plug showed severe corrosion damage with most of the threads dissolved.
No corrosion damage was noted on the other drain plugs, The valve body is constructed of 304 stainless steel.
The drain plugs should also have been stainless steel.
The vendor was contacted to determine the cause of the incorrect plug type being installed.
The vendor determined that, since CP&L special ordered the valves which included specifying the material for certain parts of the valve, the drain plugs were supplied as carbon steel since it was not specifically noted as requiring special material. The drain
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plugs were not shown on the valve drawing, contributing to the problem.
The vendor then inspected the bill of materials for all five of the supplied valves to determine if other examples of improper materials could be found. The vendor did find that a carbon steel bonnet spacer instead of a stainless steel bonnet spacer had been provided for the valve with the failed drain plug and also for the valve in stores.
The spacer was inspected by the licensee, replaced with the spacer from the spare valve and evaluated as acceptable as a temporary repair as documented in EER-88-0073, dated February 12, 1988.
The spacer has since been replaced with the proper type.
The licensee evaluation of potential 10 CFR 21 deportability is documented in EWR-06106A. The evaluation concluded that the item was not reportable since the failure of the drain plug did not constitute a substantial safety hazard.
This determination was based on an operability assessment performed on the SLC system which evaluated the effects of the failed drain plug both in a standby condition and in a condition when SLC is injecting to the vessel.
For both cases, the licensee concluded that the system would perform its design function. The inspector had no further questions on this issue.
Violations or deviatisns were not identified.
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Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 15, 1989, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the. inspection findings listed below.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
Item Number Description / Reference Paragraph 325, 324/89-09-01 URI - Service Water Design Deficiencies, (paragraph 4).
10. List of Abbreviations for Unit I and 2 AE00 Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data A0 Auxiliary Operator BSEP Brunswick Steam Electric Plant DET Diagnostic Evaluation Team E&E Energy & Environmental ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EER Engineering Evaluation Report ESF Engineered Safety Feature EWR Engineering Work Request F
Degrees Fahrenheit HP Health Physics HPCI High Pressure Coolant Injection I&C Instrumentation and Control IE NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement IFI Inspector Followup Item IPBS Integrated Planning Budget System LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LOOP Loss of Offsite Power MOV Motor Operated Valve NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSW Nuclear Service Water PA Protected Area PCIS Primary Containment Isolation System PNSC Plant Nuclear Safety Committee QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control RBCCW Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RFP Reactor Feed Pump i
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10 RTGB Reactor Turbine Gauge Board SLC Standby Liquid Control STA Shift Technical Advisor TS.
Technical Specification UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply URI Unresolved Item WR/JO Work Request / Job Order i
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ATTACHMENT 1
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CA30~2NA :?OWER & :ZGE:0
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i Brunswick Nuclear Project Presentation. to Stewart D. Ebneter
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Region II Administrator
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
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AGENDA
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o PROJECT OVERVIEW
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CORPORATE MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT TEAM l
o NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS APPRAISAL o
CORPORATE ORGANIZATION ANALYSIS o
SUMMARY
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PROJECT OVERVIEW
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o Two Unit Project
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Approximately 16% (1580 MWe) of CP&L's maximum
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dependable capacity i
Approximately 33% (approx. $147M) of CP&L's
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production budget is allocated to Brunswick.
Approximately 20% (approx.1,000) of CP&L's
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production employees were in the Brunswick organization at year-end (1988).
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PROJECT OVERVIEW
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o Historv i
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1974 and 1976 Startup
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Design opportunities
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Reactor Water Clean-Up System
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Circulation water pump motors
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Condenser tube leaks
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Early 1980's j
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TMI modifications and other regulatory driven
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modifications Design improvements
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Regulatory difficulties
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Brunswick Improvement Program
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Maintenance Improvement Program
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Mid 80's to Today
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Continuous improvement in operation
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Lost some momentum (plateau) in late 1987 and
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early 1988 Regulatory concerns related to management
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issues; e.g., Motor Operated Valves
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CORPORATE MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT TEAM
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Introduction
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Purpose - Initial assessment of Brunswick Operations o
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Role of Team Gather data by observing, interviewing, reviewing
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documents, etc.
Analyze data
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Identify areas for improvement and/or further review
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Make recommendations
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Short-term
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Longer term and/or inclusion in independent review
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i Report completed on August 26 o
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CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
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Problem Areas
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Repetitive failures and root cause analysis 2.
Resource allocation 3.
Management of backlogs 4.
HPCI/DG availability
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Management focus on availability 6.
Engineering / Technical effectiveness
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CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
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OVERSIGHT TEAM
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Ess_ commendations o
18 short-term / intermediate recommendations j
10 implemented as of mid-April
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o 9 long-term recommendations
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Addressed primarily through the CRESAPindependent
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management appraisal
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u C
o n
n l
i t
I on le l
l y
v n
pe o
P l
N M
t y
e e
o n
i s
t d
t nn e
H l
i A T M
an s
i i
i st oo r
b r a
om o
n i
i t
e si i
t c r H
O nm a e v
s a a
t i r i
p t r vp r
i M
t t
t e r c
ng ed C
mte nt e
e o v
o G
E e e me e n T
n t
mp r
or a t
pd n
e e
n l
ps e a n
vV a
EI R
o mu p
me pm o
rO l
l c
s S
D u e mr s
i i
o n
T E
nci p
c pM df s
d a x e
u m
nt o
A R i
i T
at d
f o
id an
-
t e
c ot nn f
en e
t
.R E C
n o n ao n s a
a ei p
mty a
t a
t e r e pn ag r s i
n E
me a oe o
em u gi o
l l
O V L
u t
ab l
u c
l l
l m
e u nk e e ina v
c e
s i
c r r ed a c ct t
i v
E o ue e
a c s r al e
P O y
e S
Dpp Dr Mb As Amr D
R s
O g
.s d
o v
l y
a l
n k
t y
c C
i S
a n
c i
l t
n i
i si o
a s
A b
l h
b i
e s i
a b
c t
r y E
a f
l a
e ul o
a T
i a
c l
R l
i n
o t
v a
/
ia f a n
A v
g l
A la e
a n
.
e e v s e
m G
y ir M
nt u
c e
D oi e
i l
e t
r g
/
i a
i
.
E t
c u
a I
sb n
e o
n C
ua i
ci g
L pt s
a P
ol n
o e
e e
B Rr R
M H
F r E
o OR
-
.
.
.
.
.
P
2
4
6
.
!
-
.
.
-
.
.
-
.
.
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT TEAM
.
.
'
Summary Aggressive follow-through has taken place and will continue o
Comprehensive action plans and challenging schedules for
-
,
short/ intermediate term recommendations Independent appraisal by CRESAP was initiated to
-
'
address long-term recommendations Results currently being realized in many areas o
.
i O
O
&
-
,
.
'
NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL & MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS APPRAISAL
.
.
.
Objective
,
o Assist CP&L in examining the management and operational effectiveness of the Brunswick Project and its supporting corporate organizations.
Scope Management programs
-
Root cause and repetitive failure analysis methods
-
Corrective action programs
-
Communications
-
Plant goals process
-
Supervisory attention and leadership
-
Resource allocation
-
l l
Management awareness of problems and employee
-
.
concerns
.
Inter-plant and intra-organizational interaction
-
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
--
-
-
-
.
- - - -
.
NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL & MANAGEMENT
'
-
-
I EFFECTIVENESS APPRAISAL l
.
.
PhaseI Aporoach
,
(
Approximately 60 reconnaissance interviews conducted by o
senior CRESAP consultants with CP&L officers, managers, supervisors, and operators, and NRC resident inspectors.
Review of appropriate documentation.
o Development of major issue categories.
o
I
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. - _ _ _ _ _
A t
4 O a
h a
e i
t n
M A[
S I
c s
s z
m e
I T
i
-
r d i e
r A
n e
r n
g u
C u
s
-
R A Ih d
a a
a t
m l
N m
a a
w g n l
P EU o
o e
e r
a u
P TM C
G L R O M C
M A
O E
E EEEE E
.
C e
S S
v i
S N
t E T l
a O
o N N r
r I
h t
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s t
T a
i n
V L C
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n o
I P VL y l i
C N
I O t
ct m C R U
TR e
urd d
T AT r
NoA n
E A F RN L
a p
A T O S
epk g
MS C
tu c gn g F E C
r aS it ni n T
AI F L N D a
r writ i R
E I N
e of so n e n E C MA l
npngi OY T
D e
ra upad a U
P G A
u ot rul u r T N s
CS BS P B T P O N
UL s 3 E EE M g
i n
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i MC y
n t r D
h
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g i
n e E I r
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r e e S O n
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t t e e mn
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enc ei s
a r
A S el o no n g g ET n
e u p ii a a n N
N T E 2G T e
N N c
g p gt r nE n
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e u EusM e M
R R M L t gR S
A ME nn e
rs c
R eeE kcl ktA s n B
E U
A U
t m c n a cs l a
&
Q EI C a eria c in y a n wot i e E
G O r ra wi i D
TN R oue sl n sC i rt L
H pcl nph n l e n AT A E P r oc umc ud a t i N
E o ru roe rn u a a C PN BC T BAQMM H
O R
EEEB EE 3EE I
O D
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A N
W
.
d t
l R
A n o n
Ar e E
t m
E ln S
e s P
1N C a o g n O
O N e tC a
o A
s c I
I n
n i
.
n n n
I M Th e
a t o a m oM a R
A i
i n n l
AR A
N t e ot e e
E E
EP I
at r a
.
E g R A
r nii S
TO M e i vd a
L t C A
p a n a u R C
oMER 0 N H
U E5E 3E P
_
N i
,
_ - - -
---
-
-
.
.
-.
.
' NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL & MANAGEMENT i
'
)
EFFECTIVENESS APPRAISAL
.
.
Status
-
Fact finding and analysis completed in early March.
o Conclusions / preliminary recommendations presented o
To CP&L Management March 9,1989
-
To Region II March 10,1989
-
Detailed recommendations and draft implementation plans o
completed in mid-April.
I Corporate and site management review currently taking place, o
Selected implementation already in progress.
o
.
e
.
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _
.
.. -
.
-
-
.
S s
T T
on N
N i
ta s
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p
-
i)
e E
M v n c.
t y
a ut s a n m, a
e l
w M
M r
r r e mm
-
e e O
d oa vd nCe en E
C l( T S u
!
.
GL AA NS y
I S
eg AA t
N ar d
O n
MR ts I
s a
T n
s P
A o
se i
&P D
a o
t c
c r
N n
p i
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m n
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ns i
AS M
nn oc aa NS O
l l e
pp v
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m s
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O N n
er E
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R g
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u TE D
p o
r b n el AV E
m h e o
t t T
c a
n c RI C
a ei h n T
E o
p t
u g
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e t
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D S c O E F
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va
.
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sn A
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.
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co e
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-
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.
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.
NS S
l I
a N
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pn pi t
A mt ad e
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t P
N o
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a
&P t d f
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c p O
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f e
C gr r m AS E
ne pe t
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ef NS R
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D x
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a e u T
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N h s n ui l
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Apt S a RIT E C P
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.
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p R
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k o d
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.
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t r
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pd c
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N ne a
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n n
mi n
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m MR s
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gn we l
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f e
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c ri c
/
&P k
E awt r
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r r
n M
l s o op as a np wt e
L A M
n up yr o r k n f
O u
u i
B c e i
t l
C a
m pd s
AS i
z r n w
e o
e mc E
inf o s g o
NS R
i n
i a st a
s r D
ge c u n
,p E
r c u r
e a
k E
oir Bm t
O N a
t t c
T ec s e
di w C
c an c g i
l I
E a pc al s n nr o no os TE k
L h dd h
nu c
E n nn n a or S
Eaa Eb CB AV RIT EP C O EF RF tn AE e
mer E
uco
.
L r
S p
C A
d E
na
.
U R
g A
n N
W ire
E e
I n
V ig E
n R
E
.
l
T
-
N
.
d ged E
nh e is t
S si c
-
M sl T
eb e t N
c a o y
ot r E
a d
r s E
M w
e pe p
.
t, r n r
r d ei M
e GL Q
e rt h a d
c ont e n
c C
U A
Wc wa i
e r
AA NS I
s r e
t e -
l N
c g b
ro O
on i
P s
p r o s
I pl o
p T
&P t
A ge e p
u n h g s
r D
t l
d o
a i
L A N
nmu f
c n ob s
i E
a r
t r e r
e M
pf h o
l AS lc M
s "n "o s
p t
f NS e
e w r
o O
n t
l o
n E
C n
a o
isdi O N i
E u
c s
i s s R
bl n
i l
v l
l a
e oo I
D h r r n g o
n r
TE n "t i
E p
t
"
f i n T
d ei e
C gi n AV t
l v
E s aa am o
it u
r eh a
l L
dt n ae p
RI E
e a
v r ol m
T S
Rs p Et s I
EP C O EF RF AE lor tn
-
E oC L
d
.
S n
C A
a E
no
.
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i t
A ar N
W ts i
E n
I i
V m
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.
l
p ', ?
.
' ' NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL & MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS APPRAISAL
.
l-Summary
'
CRESAP has provided a very comprehensive set of o
recommendations, which will take time to evaluate fully Some recommendations involve other departments
-
Some recommendations will require corporate support
-
CRESAP's current review of the Robinson Nuclear
-
Project could affect Brunswick Many of the DET findings willlikely parallel CRESAP
-
recommendations We are moving forward with corrective actions where o
appropriate Tracking process to be in place by mid-June o
.
e
..._..__.____.-.__-_-____________._ _ __ _ _ _ _._ _ _ _
e o ci ot
-
ra S
m )S Pti
-
I l
a S
ei eB c
Y ha T T
,
t L
F I
t d l
r c
n A
od e
a N
f n j
a o
A e
L r&
l
,
P bg P
N an A C t i O
nn O(
I uia T
o r A
cT c
Z A
I ev N
i tc A
ep G
s nr o e R
P i
ta e O
t d
i l i i s ctau R
P O O
..
F s
'
issn E
y o l
i R
at s
)
na e
r U
Ad n e g
t e
t T
n e
a)
t r
mi n m e
C o
m a
e a
m f
g m M
e U
a t
n em o
t n
R e
aC n a lbo e
mT M g T
ac ms t
n a
r t e r
t (
S nR o r r
a i
.
e a
p i
u n e p
e od e
t e
D S S cn D
(
ca A
.
,
,
'
l re s
S b
e
.
o s g
'
t
n n
?
c oa
ih
,
D sC l
N icg
t A
en
p Di e
S S
k ga l
nM S
i t
f n s
P S
E ag fi u
g s
T t e
u n
S B S
A o
-
S l
i t
y a
Y l
d u
n
J em
m l
A o
e c
n X
e u
R J
A
n l
g y
i a
P aks M
E t re
T aoD l
DW S
n A
l ff o ir ooi X
p t
ssa A
iiz
l ssi yyn h
ll a
c aag
r nnr
a AAO M
)
l A
a l
n y
r Z
r e
a
,t
u n x
r o E b
1 i X
d e
t F
c n P
e a
A E l l
l l y
T a
.
G o
r S C n a
r
,
R u
a e t
n t
a a n O
I J
D (
l
r
.
<.
"
j
...
SUMMARY
.
.
o Management improvement initiatives
-
Corporate Management Oversight Team i
-
CRESAP Nuclear Operational and
-
Management Effectiveness Appraisal Corporate Organization Analysis
-
,
Implementation of recommendations will o
require time and substantial effort o
Findings of the NRC Diagnostic Evaluation Team will need to be addressed o
Post Script
.
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _ _