IR 05000324/1988037

Insp Repts 50-324/88-37 & 50-325/88-37 on 881017-19 & 27. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20196E164
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	11/25/1988
From:	Kantor F, Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20196E113	List: IR 05000324/1988037 ML20196E106 ML20196E143
References
50-324-88-37, 50-325-88-37, NUDOCS 8812090284
Download: ML20196E164 (15)

Text

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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REOlON il

 '#g '      j[          101 MARIETTA ST., f ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323   ;

e.... NOV 2 5 W  ! Report Nos.: 50-325/88-37 and 50-324/88-37 Licensee: Carolina Powcr and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 , Raleigh, NC 27602 !

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Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 ) i Inspection Conducted: October 17-19 and 27, 1988  : Irispector: 4 4 M ///23!98

Q W. M. 5artor, J Date Signc I !

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Accompanying Persennel: F. Kantor, NRR/PEPB  ! J. Will (PNL) 1 Approved by: Ab w2 ~ <

                  //h3lSS W. H. Rankin, Acting Section Chief        Date Signed :
>          Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards        :

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. SUMMARY r

. i Scope: Th., 3, announced inspection involved observation and evaluation , of the annu rge acy preparedness exercise and associated critiqu Followup on o n iten was conducted by three NRC representatives observing key ,

!  locations reo functions during the exercis This was a full. participation i
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exercise r 'ncluded Region 11 Site Team respons Results: One viniation was identified for failure to correct an exercise  !

,  weakness       identified in the 1987 Emergency Exercise regarding Control Room       [

l staff failure to make offsite followup notifications, and two exercise r weaknesses for failure to fully meet exercise objective l

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  * Altman, Manager, Maintenance
  * Bean, Director of New Programs, Corporate Conrunications
  * Black, Manager Emergency Preparedness
  * Blackman, Manager, Operatinns
  * Dorosko, Project Engineer, Tech Support
  * Enzor, Director, Regulatory Compliance
  *J. Harness, Plant General Manager
  *R. Helme, Manager, Technical Sapport
  *J. Holder, Manager, Outage Management
  *B. Houston, Specialist Emergency Preparedness
  *R. Indelicato, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Project Specialist
  *L. Jones Director, Q9ality Assurance / Quality Control
  *G. Oliver, Manager, Planning and Controls
  *J. Smith , Director, Administration
  *R. Starkey, Manager, Brunswick Project
  *l.. Waganer, Director, Long Range Planning Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, technicians, and administrative personne NRC Resident Inspector W. Ruland
  * Attended exit interview Exercise Scenario (82301)

The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the licensee's integrated capability as well as a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plans and Organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654 Section !!. The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives prior to the exercise. While no major problems were identified, the potential for emergency classifications at times other than postulated in the scenario timeline were discussed. During the exercise, controller restrictions as to when emergency class.fications were permitted to be effective were required to keep the scenario timeline on schedule. Although this somewbet detracted from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization, it j

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4 did not adversely affect the overall conclusion that based upon the scenario used and the response of the licensee, there was reasonable assurance that in the event of an emergency appropriate protective measures could and would be taken.

No violations or deviations were identifie . Assignment and Responsibility (82301) l This area was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV. A ard specific ! criteria in NUREG-0654, Sectim. II. A.

, The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made

for the licensee's emergency response organizatio The inspector

observed portions of the activation, staffing, and operation of "^

J emergency organization in the Control Room, the Technical Support Center

      (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC), and tne Emergency Operations 1      Facility (EOF). At each of the emergency facilities, the assignments of

' l responsibility appeared to be consistent with the licensee's Emergency Pla No violations or deviations were identifie . Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

The licensee's onsite energency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and the specific criteria defined in Section II.B of NUREG-0654

      (a) responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined; (b) adequate staffing was provided to assure initial facility accident 1      response in key functional areas at all times; and (c) the onsite and i      offsite support organizational interactions were specified.

j The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency orgenization was i adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organizatio Tts Shift Operating i Supervisor assumed the duties of Site Emergency Cor.rdinator promptly upon

,      initiation of the simulated amergency and directeo the response until j      relieved by the Plant Gemral Manager. The Plant General Manager astumed

< the prime responsibilith of the Site Emergency Coordinator and declared i activation of the TSC. an inspector noted that one of the exercise i objectives that supported an evaluation of the onsite emergency ] organization was not fuliy met. The objective was "Demonstrate the i adequacy of the TSC in providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment and mitigation, and corrrnunication/ notification activities."

Observations to support this finding included: (1) t te Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) in the TSC was not fully aware of engoing repair

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activities or their status as indicated by a desire to upgrade to a Site  ;

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Area Emergency (SAE) at 9:00 a.m. when in fact the repair action by a

' maintenance 9:00 a.m.. Thisto repair allowedthethe flange leak B loop on E11-F014B of Residual was compRHR)

Heat Removal (leted at to be

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back in service for shutdown cooling; (2) although the SEC received statur 4 . reports from his Directors, a clear sumary statement of ongoing status I and priorities from the SEC to his staff was not observed; (3) no obvious  ;

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effort on the part of the TSC personnel to trend data was observed. The Unit 1 heat-up rate of 36 degrees / hour was accepted without requesting more frequent coolant temperatures to trend the heat-up rate. When it was anticipated that the Unit 2 reactor level was likely to change abruptly, , more frequent level readings were not requested; (4) there was no posting in the TSC of dose projections no.' was there a clear posting of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS); and (5) the escalation to General Emergency  ; ) (blocked by controllers) did not appear to consider PARS.

i This finding was identified as an exercise weakness and will be tracked by inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-325,324/88-37-01.

J  : ' No violations or deviations were ident;fie !

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" Emergencj Response Support and Resources (82301)  !

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j This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting

[ and 2ffectively using assistance resources had been made and that other J organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified    ,

' as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph I l and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section !!.C.

i l ] Licensee contact with offsite organizations was conducted in accordance ,

: with Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, and was    [

] consistent with the scope and objectives of the exorcis No violations or deviations were identifie ! Emergency Classification System L s ~i This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by CFR [ i 10 CFP. 50.47(b)(4),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C., and specific ,

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criteria in NUREG-0654, Section !!. I l Plant Emergency Procedure (PEP) 2.01, titled Initial Emergency Actions, i

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provided an Emergency Classification Guide Flowchart and Emergency Action

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Levels (EALs) classification schem A licensee identified objective for  ! this exercise was "Demonstrate the ability of onsite personnel to I effectively utilize the emergency action level scheme." The licensee did

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i a l not fully meet this objectiv Observations supporting this cenclusion l

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i included: (1) a Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE) was declared on the ) basis of a potentially contaminated individual; whereas, the EAL specifies L j transportation of a contaminated or potentially centaminated, injured  ! l li .

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l l , 4  : i individual to an off-si+,e hospital; (2) at 9:00 a.m., the SEC was i

preparing to escalate to a SAE on the basis of Section 5 of the flowchart f

' to PEP 2.1 which lists a SAE for the event in question as a loss of any  : function needed for plant hot shutdown - this EAL was for going from power l operations to hot shutdown. The SEC was using it to support his i escalation on the basis of moving from Mode 4 to 3; (3) during the , !. exercise there were three times that the SEC was delayed by exercise i ! controllers in declaring emergency classifications due to the l conservativeness of the classifications vice the scenario developers t I interpretation of the EAls; and (4) there were no closecut actions for the NOUE for the transported, contaminated, injured individual or the Unit 1 Alert for loss of shutdown coolin This exercise weakness will be  ! tracked as IFl 50-325,324/88-37-02.

l No violations or deviations were identifie f

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I ' 7. NotificationMethodsandProcedures(82301) This arca was observed to determine that procedures had been established , i by the licensee for notification of State and local response l l organizations, licensee emergency per?'nnel, and that the content of  ;

initial and followup messages to response organizations had been *

i established; and the meLns to provide early notification to the populace f i within the plume exposure pathway had been established a3 required by l l 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),10 CFR 50. Appendix E. Paragraph IV.D. and specific  ! j criteria in NUREG-0654, Section !!.E.

i An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been

established and were available for use in providing infonnation concerning i i the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response j

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{ organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response j organizatio The initial notification of the offsite response , q organization from the Control Room was conducted in a very prompt and i effective manner. Likewise, the Alert notifications made from the Contral I f Room were prompt. However, the inspector noted that no followup messares ( i were provided to the State /Countics to maintain an awareness of the stitus i

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) of the events for which emergency classifications had been made. Bect.use i j an exercise weakness finding of the 1987 Emergency exercise had been a I i failure of the Control Rood personnel to provide timely followup messages i to the offsite authorities, the observation of the same finding in the j I 1988 E.nergency exercise was identified as a violatio CFR 50, Appendix E. Section IV.F.5 reouires, in part, that exercise weaknesses that )) are identified shall be corrected. This failure to correct an identified exercise weainess was identified as a violation, which will be tracked as I l Violation (VIO) 50-325,324/88-37-0 }

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I An additional finding regarding notificatirn precet ires was observed in  ; the TSC. Specifically, althcugh a more mpedient systen for providing i l updated and brief status reports to the 5 tite and local governments was [ observed in the TSC, it has not been proceduralized into the applicable r ! I _ ____-___-__ m

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emergency comunicator pro:edur This will be tracked as IFI 50-325, 324/88-37-0 j f One violation was identifie . Emergency Comunications (82301) This area was observed to as ure that provisions existed for prompt i communications among the principel response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, , Paragraph IV.E. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section I :

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The comunications hardware among the licensee's emergency response !

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facilities and emergency organization and between the licensee's (mergency response organization and offsite authorities appeared adequate, j No violations or deviations were identified, f Public Educatien and Infonnation (82301) This area was observed to determine that information concerning the ! simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public es . required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph !Y D. and i l specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section !!. [

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The licensee established its Plant Media Center and provided information ! to the publi The licensee also demonstrated its ability to coordinate : news releases with State and County personnel, , j l No violations or deviations were identifie . Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301) j This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and ! equipment to supp 7t an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by IC CFA 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.E. and ; specific criterla M NUREG 9654, Section I ! No facility or equipment problems were noted by the inspecto The liettsee reported that a telephone in the OSC was not workin ; No violations or deviations were identifie . Accident Assessment (82301) This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing ano monitoring actual or potentiel offsite consequences cf a radiological emergcocy condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B. and specific reiteria in NUREG-C654, Section 11.1.

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I The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment for plant staus and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and i offsite personnel reulting from the acciden During the exercise, the

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engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively, j

l Radiolegical assessment activities were spread over several groups nd

appeared to be less effective. The inspector noted that the actual or !

i potential offsite consequences of the radiological emergency condition ' 1 were difficult to determine because status briefings did not appear to l

emphasize this nor were postings of tre radiological conditions to include !

) PARS adequate in the TSC. The failure to provide dose projections after ! i declaration of a SAE as required by PEP 2.4 was initially identified as an f q exercise weakness during the exit meeting; however, the licensee indicated

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that these had been initiated and discussed among the TSC staff. As a result of additional information provided by the Brunswick Emergency ! Preparedness Specialist on October 27, 1988, which indicated that the Dose Assessment Team Log contained source term calculations initiated after the SAE declaration, this is not being identified as an exercise weaknes , However, the failure to have radiological status boards with timely l l posting of recommended PARS or State implemented PARS was identified as a . IFl 50-324, 325/88-37-05, i l h violations or deviations were identified, i { 1 Protective Responses (823G1) f This area was observed to detennine that guidelines for protective

;     actions during an emergency, consistent with federal guidance, were !

' developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, ! I including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were impler. anted promptly [ i as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, i j Section !!. ! f 1 I The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for L formulating PARS for offsite populations within the 10-mile Emergency i Planning Zone (EPZ). The PARS observed for this exercise appeared to be i scenario driven. However, the inspector noted that the accountability ! objective to demonstrate protective response for onsite personnel could i j not be demonstrated because non-essential personnel had been moved to l

assembly creas prior to an accountability being requested. Accordingly, ,

{ the licensee committed to conducting an accountability drill at a later I l date with the NRC Resident Staff monitorin This will be tracked as

IFI 50-325, 324/88-37-0 No violations or deviations were identifie ,

) 13. Federal Evaluation Team Report ( i I i The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee i i and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV Staff) concerning the , i  ! ,  ; } i i

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i activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.

14. Action on Previeus Inspectbn Findings (92701)

, (Closed)IFl 50-325/87-40-01,50-324/87-41-01

! " A previous inspection identified that the Control Room personnel

failed to provide timely followup messages to the offsite . authorities. This observation was again made during this inspection

and was identified as a violation for failure to correct an exercise weakness.

] l (Closed) IF1 50-325/87-40-02, 50-324/87-41-02 ! Failure to provide news release in a timely manner. An inspector ! visited the Plant Media Center and reviewed the news releases which !- appeared to be released in a timely mi..iner.

) (Closed)IFI 50-325/87-40-03,50-324/87-41-03

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J Provide Security and Health Physics at the Plant Media Center during i exercise and/or events. Procedural changes to PEPS 2.6.8 and 3. were made and implemented to correct this finding, l (Closed)IFI 50-325/87-40-04,50-324/87-41-04 Conduct player briefings, or provide initial conditions prior to the start of the exercise. Initial conditions were provided to the players prior to the start of the exercise, (Closed)IFl 50-325/87-40 05, 50-324/87-41-05 Provide timely and accurate technical support for conducting accident mitigation and assessment. Technical support appeared to be provided timely and accurately, (Closed) IFl 50-325/87-40-06,50-324/87-41-06 Ensure the operability of the PA system in the dose projection area of the TSC. The PA system in the dose projection area of the TSC was functional, (Closed) IFl 50-325/87 40-07, 50-323/8741-07 Failure to include Brunswick Training Unit personnel in the ensite accountability chec The revised procedures provided for the notification of training unit personnel of personnel accountabilit _ _ _ _ . _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ - _ _ .

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l.icensee identified failure to perform an evaluation of adequacy of [ interface between licensee and State and local government. The August 1987 Quality Assurance QAA/0021-87-07 memorandum reviewed by  ; the inspector indicated the interfact had been determined to be j adequat i i 1 Exercise Critique (82301) and Exit Interview  : The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to assure  ! that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses  : noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally  ! presented to licensee management for corractive actions as required by i 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F. and specific  ! criteria in NVREG-0654, Section I !

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A formal critique for exercise participants was held on October 19, 198 * Personnel in attendance included licensee management, exercise controllers l and observers, and NRC representative l The licensee's critique identified strong points and deficiencie I Following the licensee's critique, the NRC inspector sumarized the i findings observed during the exercis The NRC inspector also identified ! an IFI because the critique was not sufficiently critical and failed to j accurately access the accomplishment of exercise objectives (IFl 50-325, [ 324/88-37-07). The licensee indicated that their earlier controller / observer critique was more thorough; however, the NRC inspector strt.ssed the impor*ance of being more self-critical in providing exercise findings to manac .nen Item Number Description and Referene_e, 50-325, 324/88-37-01 Exercise Weakness - Failure to fully demonstrate the adequacy of the TSC in providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment and mitigation, and comunication/ notification activities, Paragraph , 324/88-37-02 Exercise Weakness - Failure to fully demonstrate the ability of onsite personnel to 9ffectively utilize the emergency action level schem Paragraph , 324/88-37-03 Violation - Failure to correct 1987 exercise weakness of control room personnel not making timely followup messages to offsite authorities, Paragraph ;

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f 50-325,324/88-37-04 IFl - Use of new form for followup [ messages not proceluralize , Paragraph l

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50-325, 324/88 37-05 IFl - Failure to have radiologicai l 1 boards with timely posting of t PARS. Faragraph 1 ! 50-325,324/88-37-06 IFl - Failure to demonstrate , accountability objectiv : Paragraph 12, 50-325, 324/88 37-07 IFl - Critique to management not t sufficiently critica l Paragraph 1 ,

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i Licensee management was informed that the eight IFis discussed in l Paragraph 14 were considered close l

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.I l i t Attachment: Scope and Objectives  ! and Narrative Sumary h ,

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i . y . . . _c .[ CAROLINA POWER & LICVT COMPAq

i PLAN FOR BRUNSWICK STEAM E1.ECT1t!C Pt. ANT EMERCENCY EXERCISE j Oc t obe r 14. 1944 i 4 MISS10W AND PURPOSE OF EXERCISE

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To activate and evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities and other elements of the CP&L 3runswick Steam Electric

Plant Plan, associated implementing procedures, and the CP&L Corporate

;   Emergency Plans in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Coassission (WRC)

Regulation 10 Crt 50.47(b). ' i j  !!. SCOPE AND Os)ECT!VES

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A simulated accident at the grunswick Steam Electric Plant (gSEP)

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:    which could escalate to a general emergency and w!!! involve
,    planned response and recovery actions to includes emergency
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classificationi notification of off-site organisations and plant

'. personnell actions to correct the emergency conditionst and

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initiation of accident assessment and protective actions as i necessary to cope with the accident. The esercise will simulate an

;    emergency that results in off-site radi'o logical releases which
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require responses ty state and local government personne : Objectives

' Demonstrate the ability of on-site personnel to ef fectively
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ut!!!ae the emergency action level schem , Demonstrate the ability of on-site personnel to classify the j emergency based on entsting plant conditions.

l Demonstrate the adequacy of the control room staf f in the ability to perfore control and accident mitigation activities

,    along with accident assessmen .
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4 Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for alerting, notif ying, and mobilising emergency response personnel (some

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individuals will be pre-staged within the local area).

, Demonstrate that coasmunications capabilities esist to ac:omplish notification of off-site agencie l Demonstrate the ability to notify off-site authorities within

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15 minutes of the emergency classification.

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, monstrate t>c adequacy of the information provided in the tiistial notification, as well ce follow-up notifications to
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the State and Countie : i -1- (87-2HRC/pcj)

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! y'3   I SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE 3 (Cont'd)
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! Demonstrate the ability of on-site personnel to formulate 1 I    protective action recomunendations based on pre-established
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{    criteri i f' - Demonstrate ability of personnel to activate the Tsc, Osc, l j

EOF, and Plant Media center as described in the emergency plan and procedure i

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,j    10. Demonstrate transfer of responsibility between emergency i    response facilities as described in the plan and procedure "

l 11. Demonstrate the ability-to comununicate-between emergency 4 responce facilitie } 1 Demonstrate the adequacy of the operations support Center in

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provid ng manpower support and coordinatio , 13. Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center in

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providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment, and conununication/ notification activitie l 1 Demonstrate the adequacy of the EO,F in conrdinating off-site

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utility activitie b,

]   15. Denonstrate recordkeeping requirements as described in the i    plan and procedure ,

;   1 Demenstrate that status boards are maintained and update >
',   1 Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate. radiation i    protection services such as dosimetry and personnel
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lj 1 Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological iaonitoring activities and assassments.

ik '} 1 Demonstrate the ability to support the radiological assessment j process while maintaining personnel radiation exp'osure as-low-j as-reasonably achievable (ALARA).

lI '] 2 Demonstrate the assessment of radiological consequences of the I accident and of any relesses of radioactive material to the environmen ; l

{   2 Demonstrate the activation, operation, and reporting of the fleid monitoring teams within and beyond the site bounda :b'

I 2 )..roonstrate the ability to perform on-site accountability .

!, gg .tithin 30 minutes from the time of the order for

, s y accountabilit ; [lli . j ,

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     -2-  (87-2HRC/;cj)

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$ I SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES (Cont'd)

2 Demonstrate the ability to provide safe on-site access to off-g site emer6ency services and/or support personnel (normal

;   security access procedures will be adhered to).

f 2,4 . Demonstrate the ability of onsite personnel to respond to a - 1 medical emergency involving a contaminated individua l  !

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l 2 Demonstrate the adequacy of the interface between off-site j Emergency Medical Services (rescue squad) personnel and the l

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j plant personnel (transportation.off-site will be simulated).

'I t j 2 Demonstrate the ability to coordinate news releases with state

.j   and county personne i i

: III. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
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i Exercise Dates . I s

; Submit exercise scope, and objectives to NRC
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j Exercise - 75 days (August 4, 1988).

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'a Submit exercise scenario to NRC
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I Exercise - 45 days (September 2,1988).

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-) Final Evaluator Meeting 'l

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Exercise - October 17, 19888 1400 hours

;   TSC/E0F Training Building, Room No. 143- } Exercise:
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i October 18, 1988 0600 to 1700 hours Evaluator Croup Meeting: I[ i ,. October 18, 1988; 1700 to 1900 hours

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* Lead Evaluator Meeting - Room No. 122

'- October 19, 19081 0800 to 1100 hours

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(I ,{ Post Exercise Critique Report to Players

j October 19, 19881 jggg NRC Exit / Critique t **

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' October 19, 1988 e

.I    -3-  (87-2HRC/pej)

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 ' Narrative Summary       '
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# Initial conditions l
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Unit 1 is in cold shutdown with the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) temperature

,j  at 175'F. De conventional service water header is under clearance, drained, g  with some piping removed. The B loop of RHR is in shutdown coc, ling. no A J  loop of RHR is in standby and is designated as the backup for decay heat removal.

'.t no motors for all three ;f the main condensate pumps are removed for replace-i sent. All other Unit 1 systems are in normal lineup for cold shutdown. ne

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'I dryvell is closed and inerted. All radiological conditions are norma 's  Unit 2 is at 100% power. All systems are in their normal lineups. hvo staan
.}  1esks are known to exist; one in the MSIV pit of unknown origin and one in thi j'  ECCS pipe tunnel, ne leak in the ECCS pipe tunnel is from the E41-F003 J  packing. Rose leaks have no appreciable impact on the radiological j  conditions. Dredging operations are also in progress in the intake canal in q  front of the Service Water Building. n e drill r.inario will coerence with j  these initial conditions at 060 .

The initial event will o: cur at 0630.due to ,.>. arsc,a nc will need to g be transported off sit (Transportation s - -' ispea w will be j ' simulated.) no individual was injured in a . - i arts of the redwaste

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low level warehouse but ran out of the area before cola.psing. H e victim's j injuries will be simulated with moulage and contamination will be simulated

:-  by using silk lantern mantles. Background radiation / contamination levels 1  will be as read. An UNUSUAI, EVE q should be. declare *

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At 0700, a very large leak will develop on the upstresa flange of 1-E11-F014B 1 that will require isolation of the lea Isolation of this leak will render ths A and B loops of shutdown cooling ino.n*Mle. this is due to the 1{

conventional header being, drained and due to the isolation of the leak preventing the RER service water pump suction cross-tie line from being use j No other method of shutdown cooling can be established. D e reactor vessel i vill heat up due to decay heat and the plant will enter mode 3 at 0800. An

AI.ERT should be declared at this tim ) j At 0815, the contaminated / injured person has been decontaminated and

.j  stabilized, and all contaminated material has been returned to the sit J  At 0900, Maintenance will have completed the necessary repairs to 1-E11-F0145, y

and the B loop of RHR will be placed in shutdown cooling to return Unit 1 to

:  mode At 0930, all Reactor Building ventilation will be lost on Unit Operations j  will start both SBGT trains to maintain negative pressure in the buildin Temperatures will begin to ris j  At 0935, the Unit 1 RPV temperature will decrease to below 212*F and the unit
!  will be in mode 4. No further events will occur on Unit 1 for the remainder j  of the scenari **
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MSC/88 194

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i At' 0943, a Group I isolation and re' actor scram will occur due to high steas

.;  line temperature. n e control rods will fail to insert due to an undetected
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+ prer. usly flooded scran discharge volume. The SLC System will be initiated, I  but '.o squib valves fail to open. A SIIT EMERGENCY will be declare ,j  Operations will coerence alternate methods of inserting control rods and    )

j injecting SLC. Operations will begin injecting SLC through the RVCU precoat y tank. Drywell pressure will start to gradually increase at a rate of 6 psi /15 minutes due to a large amount of energy being added to the primary y' 4 containmen i j At 1001, HPCI will isolate due to high steam line ten,perature, causing core uncovery and fuel / cladding damage by 1004. The reactor will bs depressurized

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.{  and level restored at 1011 by the A loop of R50t. Due to core uncovery, dose   l

rates in the vicinity of RHR piping will increase. Subsequent operation of RHR B loop and RVCU will result in significant localized dose rate increase Attempts to halt the containment pressure increase will not be effectiv ] At 1230, all service water will be lost to Unit 2 due to dredging operations 3 causing clogging of the service water pump discharge strainers. A GENERAI, j EMERGENCY should be declared at this point. , Operations will also commence j vaating the primary containment due to failure of other attempts to stop the 1 pressure increase. The release will continue at a near constant rate until i 1530. Significant dose rate increases will occur due to collection of

;  radioactive material in the SBGT filters and the exhaust piping. Dose i  projection and environmental monitoring personnel will assess the magnitude
!  and off-site impact of the release. During the vent / release, the containment
{ g pressure will stabilize at 57 psig, i y
!,  At 1400, a slight power decrease will start. This will not be a significant
. reduction but will indicate that the boron is getting into the RP E I  At 1515, the SLC squib valves will have been repaired and the systes
}  successfully started. At 1530, all control rods will be inserted and the j  remainder of the SLC tank pumped into the RPV. The release will be terminated and containment pressure will be decreased using suppression pool sprays.

.I !( Service water will also be restored at this time.

i3 ii At 1545, Operations will start shutdown cooling on the A loop of RH A !]i discussion of future recovery actions is expected at this time.

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MSC/88-194 J

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