IR 05000324/1988037
| ML20196E164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1988 |
| From: | Kantor F, Rankin W, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196E113 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-88-37, 50-325-88-37, NUDOCS 8812090284 | |
| Download: ML20196E164 (15) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES ! j g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REOlON il '#g ' j[ 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W.
f e.... ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
NOV 2 5 W Report Nos.: 50-325/88-37 and 50-324/88-37 Licensee: Carolina Powcr and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 , Raleigh, NC 27602 ! Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62
Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 ) i Inspection Conducted: October 17-19 and 27, 1988
Irispector: 4 4 M ///23!98
Q W. M. 5artor, Jr.
Date Signc I !
Accompanying Persennel: F. Kantor, NRR/PEPB ! J. Will (PNL)
Ab w2 //h3lSS Approved by: ~ < W. H. Rankin, Acting Section Chief Date Signed
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards
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SUMMARY r . i Scope: Th., 3, announced inspection involved observation and evaluation of the annu rge acy preparedness exercise and associated critique.
, Followup on o n iten was conducted by three NRC representatives observing key , ! locations reo functions during the exercise.
This was a full. participation i exercise r 'ncluded Region 11 Site Team response.
Results: One viniation was identified for failure to correct an exercise ! weakness identified in the 1987 Emergency Exercise regarding Control Room [ , l staff failure to make offsite followup notifications, and two exercise r weaknesses for failure to fully meet exercise objectives.
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Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- K. Altman, Manager, Maintenance
- E. Bean, Director of New Programs, Corporate Conrunications
- R. Black, Manager Emergency Preparedness
- C. Blackman, Manager, Operatinns
- P. Dorosko, Project Engineer, Tech Support
- K. Enzor, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- J. Harness, Plant General Manager
- R. Helme, Manager, Technical Sapport
- J. Holder, Manager, Outage Management
- B. Houston, Specialist Emergency Preparedness
- R. Indelicato, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Project Specialist
- L. Jones Director, Q9ality Assurance / Quality Control
- G. Oliver, Manager, Planning and Controls
- J. Smith, Director, Administration
- R. Starkey, Manager, Brunswick Project
- l.. Waganer, Director, Long Range Planning Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.
NRC Resident Inspector W. Ruland
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exercise Scenario (82301) The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the licensee's integrated capability as well as a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plans and Organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654 Section !!.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives prior to the exercise. While no major problems were identified, the potential for emergency classifications at times other than postulated in the scenario timeline were discussed.
During the exercise, controller restrictions as to when emergency class.fications were permitted to be effective were required to keep the scenario timeline on schedule. Although this somewbet detracted from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization, it j
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did not adversely affect the overall conclusion that based upon the scenario used and the response of the licensee, there was reasonable assurance that in the event of an emergency appropriate protective measures could and would be taken.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Assignment and Responsibility (82301) l This area was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee were specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV. A ard specific ! criteria in NUREG-0654, Sectim. II. A.
The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made ,
for the licensee's emergency response organization.
The inspector
observed portions of the activation, staffing, and operation of "^ J emergency organization in the Control Room, the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC), and tne Emergency Operations
1 Facility (EOF).
At each of the emergency facilities, the assignments of l responsibility appeared to be consistent with the licensee's Emergency ' Plan.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite energency organization was observed to assure that the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and the specific criteria defined in Section II.B of NUREG-0654: (a) responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined; (b) adequate staffing was provided to assure initial facility accident
response in key functional areas at all times; and (c) the onsite and i offsite support organizational interactions were specified.
j The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency orgenization was i adequately defined and that staff was available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization.
Tts Shift Operating i Supervisor assumed the duties of Site Emergency Cor.rdinator promptly upon , initiation of the simulated amergency and directeo the response until j relieved by the Plant Gemral Manager.
The Plant General Manager astumed the prime responsibilith of the Site Emergency Coordinator and declared < i activation of the TSC.
an inspector noted that one of the exercise i objectives that supported an evaluation of the onsite emergency ] organization was not fuliy met.
The objective was "Demonstrate the adequacy of the TSC in providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose i assessment and mitigation, and corrrnunication/ notification activities."
Observations to support this finding included: (1) t te Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) in the TSC was not fully aware of engoing repair
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activities or their status as indicated by a desire to upgrade to a Site , Area Emergency (SAE) at 9:00 a.m. when in fact the repair action by ' maintenance to repair the flange leak on E11-F014B was comp (leted at a 9:00 a.m.. This allowed the B loop of Residual Heat Removal RHR) to be ' ' back in service for shutdown cooling; (2) although the SEC received statur
reports from his Directors, a clear sumary statement of ongoing status . I and priorities from the SEC to his staff was not observed; (3) no obvious
effort on the part of the TSC personnel to trend data was observed.
The ' Unit 1 heat-up rate of 36 degrees / hour was accepted without requesting more frequent coolant temperatures to trend the heat-up rate. When it was anticipated that the Unit 2 reactor level was likely to change abruptly, more frequent level readings were not requested; (4) there was no posting , in the TSC of dose projections no.' was there a clear posting of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS); and (5) the escalation to General Emergency
) (blocked by controllers) did not appear to consider PARS.
i This finding was identified as an exercise weakness and will be tracked by inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-325,324/88-37-01.
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No violations or deviations were ident;fied.
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5.
Emergencj Response Support and Resources (82301) ! "
! j This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and 2ffectively using assistance resources had been made and that other [ J organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified , as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A.
l ' and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section !!.C.
i l ] Licensee contact with offsite organizations was conducted in accordance ,
with Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, and was [ ] consistent with the scope and objectives of the exorcise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
! 6.
Emergency Classification System L s This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification ~i and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by CFR [ 10 CFP. 50.47(b)(4),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C., and specific , i ' criteria in NUREG-0654, Section !!.0.
I l Plant Emergency Procedure (PEP) 2.01, titled Initial Emergency Actions, i ' , provided an Emergency Classification Guide Flowchart and Emergency Action
Levels (EALs) classification scheme.
A licensee identified objective for ! I this exercise was "Demonstrate the ability of onsite personnel to effectively utilize the emergency action level scheme." The licensee did i , a l not fully meet this objective.
Observations supporting this cenclusion l ! i included: (1) a Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE) was declared on the ) basis of a potentially contaminated individual; whereas, the EAL specifies L transportation of a contaminated or potentially centaminated, injured ! j l li . ,
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i individual to an off-si+,e hospital; (2) at 9:00 a.m., the SEC was i
preparing to escalate to a SAE on the basis of Section 5 of the flowchart f to PEP 2.1 which lists a SAE for the event in question as a loss of any '
function needed for plant hot shutdown - this EAL was for going from power l operations to hot shutdown.
The SEC was using it to support his i !. escalation on the basis of moving from Mode 4 to 3; (3) during the , exercise there were three times that the SEC was delayed by exercise i ! controllers in declaring emergency classifications due to the l conservativeness of the classifications vice the scenario developers t I interpretation of the EAls; and (4) there were no closecut actions for the NOUE for the transported, contaminated, injured individual or the Unit 1 Alert for loss of shutdown cooling.
This exercise weakness will be ! tracked as IFl 50-325,324/88-37-02.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
f ! I ' 7.
NotificationMethodsandProcedures(82301) This arca was observed to determine that procedures had been established , i by the licensee for notification of State and local response l l organizations, licensee emergency per?'nnel, and that the content of
initial and followup messages to response organizations had been
i established; and the meLns to provide early notification to the populace f i within the plume exposure pathway had been established a3 required by l l 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),10 CFR 50. Appendix E. Paragraph IV.D. and specific ! j criteria in NUREG-0654, Section !!.E.
i An inspector observed that notification methods and procedures had been established and were available for use in providing infonnation concerning i
i the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response j { organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response ' j organization.
The initial notification of the offsite response , q organization from the Control Room was conducted in a very prompt and i effective manner. Likewise, the Alert notifications made from the Contral I f Room were prompt.
However, the inspector noted that no followup messares ( were provided to the State /Countics to maintain an awareness of the stitus i i ' ) of the events for which emergency classifications had been made. Bect.use i j an exercise weakness finding of the 1987 Emergency exercise had been a I i failure of the Control Rood personnel to provide timely followup messages i to the offsite authorities, the observation of the same finding in the j I 1988 E.nergency exercise was identified as a violation.
10 CFR 50, )) Appendix E. Section IV.F.5 reouires, in part, that exercise weaknesses that are identified shall be corrected.
This failure to correct an identified I exercise weainess was identified as a violation, which will be tracked as l Violation (VIO) 50-325,324/88-37-03.
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! I An additional finding regarding notificatirn precet ires was observed in
l the TSC.
Specifically, althcugh a more mpedient systen for providing i updated and brief status reports to the 5 tite and local governments was [ observed in the TSC, it has not been proceduralized into the applicable r ! I - - m
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emergency comunicator pro:edure.
This will be tracked as IFI 50-325, 324/88-37-04.
j f One violation was identified.
8.
Emergency Comunications (82301) This area was observed to as ure that provisions existed for prompt i communications among the principel response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, , Paragraph IV.E. and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section II.F.
, The comunications hardware among the licensee's emergency response ! ' facilities and emergency organization and between the licensee's (mergency response organization and offsite authorities appeared adequate, j No violations or deviations were identified, f 9.
Public Educatien and Infonnation (82301) This area was observed to determine that information concerning the ! simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public es . l required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph !Y D. and i specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Section !!.G.
[ [ The licensee established its Plant Media Center and provided information ! to the public.
The licensee also demonstrated its ability to coordinate
news releases with State and County personnel, j , l No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301) j This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and ! equipment to supp 7t an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by IC CFA 50.47(b)(8),10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.E. and
specific criterla M NUREG 9654, Section II.H.
No facility or equipment problems were noted by the inspector.
The ! liettsee reported that a telephone in the OSC was not working.
No violations or deviations were identified.
11. Accident Assessment (82301) This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing ano monitoring actual or potentiel offsite consequences cf a radiological emergcocy condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B. and specific reiteria in NUREG-C654, Section 11.1.
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! I The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment for plant staus and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and i ' i offsite personnel reulting from the accident.
During the exercise, the
engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively, j l Radiolegical assessment activities were spread over several groups nd
appeared to be less effective.
The inspector noted that the actual or i potential offsite consequences of the radiological emergency condition '
were difficult to determine because status briefings did not appear to l emphasize this nor were postings of tre radiological conditions to include !
) PARS adequate in the TSC.
The failure to provide dose projections after ! i declaration of a SAE as required by PEP 2.4 was initially identified as an f q exercise weakness during the exit meeting; however, the licensee indicated that these had been initiated and discussed among the TSC staff.
As a - result of additional information provided by the Brunswick Emergency ! Preparedness Specialist on October 27, 1988, which indicated that the Dose Assessment Team Log contained source term calculations initiated after the SAE declaration, this is not being identified as an exercise weakness.
, However, the failure to have radiological status boards with timely l l posting of recommended PARS or State implemented PARS was identified as a . IFl 50-324, 325/88-37-05, i l h violations or deviations were identified, i { 12.
Protective Responses (823G1) f This area was observed to detennine that guidelines for protective
actions during an emergency, consistent with federal guidance, were ! developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, ! ' I including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were impler. anted promptly [ i as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, i j Section !!.J.
! f
I The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for L formulating PARS for offsite populations within the 10-mile Emergency i Planning Zone (EPZ).
The PARS observed for this exercise appeared to be i scenario driven.
However, the inspector noted that the accountability ! objective to demonstrate protective response for onsite personnel could i j not be demonstrated because non-essential personnel had been moved to l assembly creas prior to an accountability being requested.
Accordingly,
, { the licensee committed to conducting an accountability drill at a later I l date with the NRC Resident Staff monitoring.
This will be tracked as
IFI 50-325, 324/88-37-06.
No violations or deviations were identified.
, ) 13. Federal Evaluation Team Report ( I i i The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee i i and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV Staff) concerning the , i !
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i activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
14. Action on Previeus Inspectbn Findings (92701) a.
(Closed)IFl 50-325/87-40-01,50-324/87-41-01 , ! A previous inspection identified that the Control Room personnel "
failed to provide timely followup messages to the offsite authorities.
This observation was again made during this inspection . and was identified as a violation for failure to correct an exercise
] weakness.
l b.
(Closed) IF1 50-325/87-40-02, 50-324/87-41-02 ! Failure to provide news release in a timely manner.
An inspector ! visited the Plant Media Center and reviewed the news releases which !- appeared to be released in a timely mi..iner.
) c.
(Closed)IFI 50-325/87-40-03,50-324/87-41-03 ! J Provide Security and Health Physics at the Plant Media Center during i exercise and/or events.
Procedural changes to PEPS 2.6.8 and 3.8.4 l were made and implemented to correct this finding, d.
(Closed)IFI 50-325/87-40-04,50-324/87-41-04 Conduct player briefings, or provide initial conditions prior to the start of the exercise.
Initial conditions were provided to the players prior to the start of the exercise, e.
(Closed)IFl 50-325/87-40 05, 50-324/87-41-05 Provide timely and accurate technical support for conducting accident mitigation and assessment. Technical support appeared to be provided timely and accurately, f.
(Closed) IFl 50-325/87-40-06,50-324/87-41-06 Ensure the operability of the PA system in the dose projection area of the TSC. The PA system in the dose projection area of the TSC was functional, g.
(Closed) IFl 50-325/87 40-07, 50-323/8741-07 Failure to include Brunswick Training Unit personnel in the ensite accountability check.
The revised procedures provided for the notification of training unit personnel of personnel accountability.
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(Closed)IFI 50 325/87-33-02 { l.icensee identified failure to perform an evaluation of adequacy of [ interface between licensee and State and local government.
The August 1987 Quality Assurance QAA/0021-87-07 memorandum reviewed by
the inspector indicated the interfact had been determined to be j adequate.
i i 15.
Exercise Critique (82301) and Exit Interview
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to assure ! that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses
noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally ! presented to licensee management for corractive actions as required by i 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F. and specific ! criteria in NVREG-0654, Section II.N.
!
A formal critique for exercise participants was held on October 19, 1988.
- Personnel in attendance included licensee management, exercise controllers l
and observers, and NRC representatives.
l The licensee's critique identified strong points and deficiencies.
I Following the licensee's critique, the NRC inspector sumarized the i findings observed during the exercise.
The NRC inspector also identified ! an IFI because the critique was not sufficiently critical and failed to j accurately access the accomplishment of exercise objectives (IFl 50-325, [ 324/88-37-07).
The licensee indicated that their earlier controller / observer critique was more thorough; however, the NRC inspector strt.ssed the impor*ance of being more self-critical in providing exercise findings to manac.nent.
Item Number Description and Referene_e, 50-325, 324/88-37-01 Exercise Weakness - Failure to fully demonstrate the adequacy of the TSC in providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment and mitigation, and comunication/ notification activities, Paragraph 4.
50-325, 324/88-37-02 Exercise Weakness - Failure to fully demonstrate the ability of onsite personnel to 9ffectively utilize the emergency action level scheme.
Paragraph 6.
50-325, 324/88-37-03 Violation - Failure to correct 1987 exercise weakness of control room personnel not making timely followup messages to offsite authorities, Paragraph 7.
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, f 50-325,324/88-37-04 IFl - Use of new form for followup [ messages not proceluralized.
, Paragraph 7.
l ! 50-325, 324/88 37-05 IFl - Failure to have radiologicai l
boards with timely posting of t PARS. Faragraph 11.
! 50-325,324/88-37-06 IFl - Failure to demonstrate , accountability objective.
Paragraph 12, 50-325, 324/88 37-07 IFl - Critique to management not t sufficiently critical.
l Paragraph 15.
, ! Licensee management was informed that the eight IFis discussed in l i Paragraph 14 were considered closed.
l ! t .I l t i Attachment: Scope and Objectives ! and Narrative Sumary h , [
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_ _ _ _ _ _ i t- . . . . ! I ' i . y . . . _c .[ CAROLINA POWER & LICVT COMPAq
i PLAN FOR BRUNSWICK STEAM E1.ECT1t!C Pt. ANT EMERCENCY EXERCISE j Oc t obe r 14. 1944 i
1.
MISS10W AND PURPOSE OF EXERCISE
To activate and evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities and other elements of the CP&L 3runswick Steam Electric Plant Plan, associated implementing procedures, and the CP&L Corporate
Emergency Plans in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Coassission (WRC)
Regulation 10 Crt 50.47(b).
' ij !!. SCOPE AND Os)ECT!VES
{ A.
,5c o pe ) A simulated accident at the grunswick Steam Electric Plant (gSEP) ' i
which could escalate to a general emergency and w!!! involve planned response and recovery actions to includes emergency , classificationi notification of off-site organisations and plant ' '. personnell actions to correct the emergency conditionst and initiation of accident assessment and protective actions as ' , i necessary to cope with the accident. The esercise will simulate an
emergency that results in off-site radi' logical releases which o ,9 require responses ty state and local government personnel.
d >
3.
Objectives ' 1.
Demonstrate the ability of on-site personnel to ef fectively ut!!!ae the emergency action level scheme.
+ 2.
Demonstrate the ability of on-site personnel to classify the , j emergency based on entsting plant conditions.
l 3.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the control room staf f in the ability to perfore control and accident mitigation activities along with accident assessment.
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Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for alerting, . ' notif ying, and mobilising emergency response personnel (some individuals will be pre-staged within the local area).
' 5.
Demonstrate that coasmunications capabilities esist to , ac:omplish notification of off-site agencies.
l 6.
Demonstrate the ability to notify off-site authorities within 15 minutes of the emergency classification.
. 7.
monstrate t>c adequacy of the information provided in the , e.
tiistial notification, as well ce follow-up notifications to " ' ';' the State and Counties.
' .
i-1-(87-2HRC/pcj)
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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE 3 (Cont'd) l,' r . ~ d ! 8.
Demonstrate the ability of on-site personnel to formulate I protective action recomunendations based on pre-established { criteria.
f' - i 9.
Demonstrate ability of personnel to activate the Tsc, Osc, j EOF, and Plant Media center as described in the emergency plan and procedures.
2l,j 10.
Demonstrate transfer of responsibility between emergency i response facilities as described in the plan and procedures.
1" l 11. Demonstrate the ability-to comununicate-between emergency
responce facilities.
} 12.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the operations support Center in provid ng manpower support and coordination.
, 13. Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center in , ] providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment, ' j and conununication/ notification activities.
. l 14.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the EO,F in conrdinating off-site - utility activities.
b, ] 15. Denonstrate recordkeeping requirements as described in the i plan and procedures.
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16.
Demenstrate that status boards are maintained and updated.
> ', 17.
Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate. radiation i protection services such as dosimetry and personnel ,' mor.horirg.
' lj 18.
Demonstrate the capability to perform radiological iaonitoring activities and assassments.
ik'} 19.
Demonstrate the ability to support the radiological assessment j process while maintaining personnel radiation exp'osure as-low-j as-reasonably achievable (ALARA).
lI '] 20.
Demonstrate the assessment of radiological consequences of the I accident and of any relesses of radioactive material to the environment.
l { 21.
Demonstrate the activation, operation, and reporting of the
- b'
fleid monitoring teams within and beyond the site bounda y.
I 22.
)..roonstrate the ability to perform on-site accountability . !, ggy.
.tithin 30 minutes from the time of the order for y accountability.
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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES (Cont'd) p ,
23.
Demonstrate the ability to provide safe on-site access to off-g site emer6ency services and/or support personnel (normal
security access procedures will be adhered to).
f 2,4. Demonstrate the ability of onsite personnel to respond to a -
medical emergency involving a contaminated individual.
! l \\ l 25.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the interface between off-site j Emergency Medical Services (rescue squad) personnel and the ' j plant personnel (transportation.off-site will be simulated).
'Itj 26.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate news releases with state .j and county personnel.
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III. SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS - , i A.
Exercise Dates . I s
1.
Submit exercise scope, and objectives to NRC . j Exercise - 75 days (August 4, 1988).
_ , 'i. ei?.'a 2.
Submit exercise scenario to NRC ? I Exercise - 45 days (September 2,1988).
! ' 3.
Final Evaluator Meeting -) 'l Exercise - October 17, 19888 1400 hours . '
TSC/E0F Training Building, Room No. 143-B.
} 4.
Exercise: , i October 18, 1988 0600 to 1700 hours 5.
Evaluator Croup Meeting: I[ i October 18, 1988; 1700 to 1900 hours ,.
6.
Lead Evaluator Meeting - Room No. 122 October 19, 19081 0800 to 1100 hours '- ) (I 7.
Post Exercise Critique Report to Players ,{
- j October 19, 19881 jggg 8.
NRC Exit / Critique t
'l ' October 19, 1988 . e .I-3-(87-2HRC/pej) 0g l 7 K;@'y%",y TM'9@4WFPYO ~ # * '9W WN" VW WC}?? WIN 'N
5 )
. . . i, . . . i ' Narrative Summary ' . 'i. y l
Initial conditions Unit 1 is in cold shutdown with the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) temperature . ,j at 175'F. De conventional service water header is under clearance, drained, g with some piping removed. The B loop of RHR is in shutdown coc, ling. no A J loop of RHR is in standby and is designated as the backup for decay heat removal.
'.t no motors for all three ;f the main condensate pumps are removed for replace-i sent. All other Unit 1 systems are in normal lineup for cold shutdown. ne dryvell is closed and inerted. All radiological conditions are normal.
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's Unit 2 is at 100% power. All systems are in their normal lineups. hvo staan .} 1esks are known to exist; one in the MSIV pit of unknown origin and one in thi j' ECCS pipe tunnel, ne leak in the ECCS pipe tunnel is from the E41-F003 J packing. Rose leaks have no appreciable impact on the radiological j conditions. Dredging operations are also in progress in the intake canal in front of the Service Water Building. n e drill r.inario will coerence with q j these initial conditions at 0600.
. The initial event will o: cur at 0630.due to ,. >. arsc,a nc will need to g be transported off site.
(Transportation s ispea w will be - -' j simulated.) no individual was injured in a. - i arts of the redwaste '
low level warehouse but ran out of the area before cola.psing. H e victim's j injuries will be simulated with moulage and contamination will be simulated
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by using silk lantern mantles.
Background radiation / contamination levels will be as read. An UNUSUAI, EVE q should be. declared.
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1 At 0700, a very large leak will develop on the upstresa flange of 1-E11-F014B
that will require isolation of the leak.
Isolation of this leak will render 1{ ths A and B loops of shutdown cooling ino.n*Mle.
this is due to the conventional header being, drained and due to the isolation of the leak
preventing the RER service water pump suction cross-tie line from being used.
j No other method of shutdown cooling can be established. D e reactor vessel vill heat up due to decay heat and the plant will enter mode 3 at 0800. An i
AI.ERT should be declared at this time.
)j At 0815, the contaminated / injured person has been decontaminated and .j stabilized, and all contaminated material has been returned to the site.
J At 0900, Maintenance will have completed the necessary repairs to 1-E11-F0145, and the B loop of RHR will be placed in shutdown cooling to return Unit 1 to y
mode 4.
At 0930, all Reactor Building ventilation will be lost on Unit 2.
Operations 1j will start both SBGT trains to maintain negative pressure in the building.
Temperatures will begin to rise.
j At 0935, the Unit 1 RPV temperature will decrease to below 212*F and the unit ! will be in mode 4.
No further events will occur on Unit 1 for the remainder j of the scenario.
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- i At' 0943, a Group I isolation and re' actor scram will occur due to high steas .; line temperature. n e control rods will fail to insert due to an undetected ' + prer. usly flooded scran discharge volume. The SLC System will be initiated, I but '.o squib valves fail to open. A SIIT EMERGENCY will be declared.
,j Operations will coerence alternate methods of inserting control rods and j injecting SLC. Operations will begin injecting SLC through the RVCU precoat y tank. Drywell pressure will start to gradually increase at a rate of 6 psi /15 minutes due to a large amount of energy being added to the primary y' 4 containment.
ij At 1001, HPCI will isolate due to high steam line ten,perature, causing core
uncovery and fuel / cladding damage by 1004. The reactor will bs depressurized , I .{ and level restored at 1011 by the A loop of R50t.
Due to core uncovery, dose
rates in the vicinity of RHR piping will increase. Subsequent operation of RHR B loop and RVCU will result in significant localized dose rate increases.
Attempts to halt the containment pressure increase will not be effective.
] At 1230, all service water will be lost to Unit 2 due to dredging operations
causing clogging of the service water pump discharge strainers. A GENERAI, j EMERGENCY should be declared at this point., Operations will also commence j vaating the primary containment due to failure of other attempts to stop the
pressure increase. The release will continue at a near constant rate until i 1530. Significant dose rate increases will occur due to collection of
radioactive material in the SBGT filters and the exhaust piping. Dose i projection and environmental monitoring personnel will assess the magnitude ! and off-site impact of the release. During the vent / release, the containment { g pressure will stabilize at 57 psig, i y !, At 1400, a slight power decrease will start. This will not be a significant reduction but will indicate that the boron is getting into the RPV.
. EI At 1515, the SLC squib valves will have been repaired and the systes } successfully started. At 1530, all control rods will be inserted and the j remainder of the SLC tank pumped into the RPV. The release will be terminated and containment pressure will be decreased using suppression pool sprays.
.I Service water will also be restored at this time.
!( i3 ii At 1545, Operations will start shutdown cooling on the A loop of RHR.
A !] discussion of future recovery actions is expected at this time.
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