IR 05000324/1986031
| ML20215C698 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1986 |
| From: | Conlon T, Wiseman G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215C663 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-86-31, 50-325-86-30, NUDOCS 8612150341 | |
| Download: ML20215C698 (10) | |
Text
_
-
r,
,
,..
'
sm
' "
.
t
.
UNITED STATES
[SmErrg 'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI'SSION
",,
["
REGION 11
'
p g
j
.101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
- ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
%...../
Report Nos.: 50-325/86-30 and 50-324/86-31 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: November 3-7, 1986 Inspector:
k
/2///f6 G. R. Wisem Date Signed Approve fM
/ W- / - PC,
'
T. E. Conlon, Chief Date Signed Plant Systems Section Division of Reactor Safety SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site in the areas of fire protection / prevention and followup on previously identified inspection items.
Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
86121503418612Og4 PDR ADOCK 0500 G
-
.
-
. - -
.
.
REPORT ETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- E. A. Bishop, Manager - Operations
- C. F. Blackmon, Superintendent - Operations
- J. W. Chase, Assistant to General Manager
- E. R. Eckstein, Manager - Technical Support
- K. E. Enzor, Director, - Regulatory Compliance
- P. W. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick
- L. E. Jones, Director - QA/QC
- P. W. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick
- J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Mairtenance
- R. E. Porterfield, Project Specialist (Fire Protection) - Technical Support
- J. D. Wilcox, Principal Engineer - Operations Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organization R. E. Deacy, Fire Protection Engineer, Impell Corporation NRC Resident Inspectors
- W. H. Ruland
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 7,1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
Inspector Followup Item (324/86-31-01), Improper Mounting of Smoke Detectors in the Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room and EER Areas - paragraph a.
5.f.(1)
Maintenance of Inspector Followup Item (325/86-30-01 and 324/86-31-02),
b.
Fire Pumps - paragraph 5.f.(2)
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspectio =
-
-
-
-.
.
._
.
,
.
.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous' Enforcement Matters (Closed) Violation Item (324/86-04-01 and 325/86-03-01), Inadequate a.
Fire Brigade Drills and Training.
The licensee has implemented Fire Protection Procedure FPP-031, Fire Brigade Roster, which requires the preparation and issuance of a weekly Fire Brigade Qualification Roster on which only fire brigade members are listed that are qualified through verification of training and From this list, the shift fire team members are drill performance.
A shift Brigade Roster is posted on the control room work selected.
schedule bulletin board.
These additional procedural measures give i'
assurance that shift fire brigade members are qualified at the time of their assignment to shift brigade duty; therefore, this item is closed.
Failure to (Closed) Violation Item (324/86-04-02 and 325/86-03-02, b.
'
Implement Fire Protection Procedures FFP-013.
Procedure FFP-013 has been revised to include attachments (checklists)
for identification of limited (threshold) transient combustible to be expected in a specific plant area.
The procedure material requires that any identified excess material be removed or additional fire protection provided. The checklists also identify fire protection components to be inspected for impairments and identification of any The failure to follow other plant fire protection procedures.
,
corrective actions taken for problem areas are documented and retained for record purposes. The inspector reviewed completed inspection forms Based on this
.
for September and October 1986 licensee walk throughs.
review, it appears that the revised licensee's program for
!
implementation of the weekly fire protection inspection is adequate and, therefore, this item is closed.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (324/81-23-05 and 325/81-23-05), Fire / Flame c.
Barrier ReqLirements for Service Water Pumps.
the fire / flame impingement The if censee has removed portions of I
barriers around the service water pumps because the shields are causing higher than normal ambient temperatures in the immediate vicinity of the pump electric motors.
In a letter, dated December 22, 1981, CP&L provided documentation to justify the barrier's removal to NRR and requested formal concurrence
'
NRC/NRR that the service water pump barriers were not necessary.
responded to the request by letter to Mr. J. A. Jones of CP&L, dated February 1, 1982. The NRR letter stated that the requirements for fire
barriers, such as the ones in question, is set forth by Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50; therefore, the requirements for fire barriers remain in effect and must be complied with, unless the
,
!
licensee requests and receives an exemption from the applicable
!
requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
l
._
___
_ _ _ __ _ _ _ _____._,_ _ __.. _ _
_ _ -. _. - -
.
.
On April 24, 1984, the licensee submitted to NRC/NRR for their review the Alternative Shutdown Capability Assessment (ASCA) Report for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 and 2.
The report was submitted in resolution The ASCA of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
Report for the Service Water Building does not identify the installation of the Service Water pump flame impingement barriers.
Additional guidance on Appendix R was presented in Generic Letter 86-10, dated April 24, 1986, ehich allows the licensee to perform an evaluation to assess the adequacy of fire boundaries in their plants.
During the inspection, the licensee provided the inspector with such an evaluation to support removal of the service water pump flame impingment barriers.
This item remains open pending review of this evaluation and NRR's review and issuance of a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on the Appendix R (ASCA) submittal.
4.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Fire Protection Prevention Program (64704)
The inspector reviewed the following Fire Prevention / Administrative Procedures:
Ti tle Precedure No.
FPP-003 (Rev. 4)
Fire Brigade Training FPP-005 ( Rev.1)
Fire Watch Qualifications FPP-013 (Rev. 2)
Weekly Fire Inspection and Plant Housekeeping FPP-014 (Rev. 2)
Control of Combustibles and Transient Loads FPP-015(Rev.4)
Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Work Control FPP-019(Rev.0)
Fire Investigation and Reporting FPP-023 (Rev. 1)
Periodic Test Scheduling and Control FPP-031 (Rev.0)
Fire Brigade Roster 01-36 (Rev. 1)
On-Shift Drills
'
These procedures were found to comply with the NRC guidelines in the document entitled " Nuclear Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative, Controls and Quality Assurance" dated June 14, 1977.
I
.
.
b.
Fire Protection Surveillance Procedures The inspector reviewed the following Fire Protection System Surveil-lance Procedures:
Title Procedure No.
Fire Suppression System Control PT-34.2.5.0 Valve Position Verification (Monthly)
Diesel Generator Building Sprinkler PT-34.6.4.4 and Spray Systems Visual Inspection (18 Months)
Hose Station Inspection Control PT-34.2.3.3 Building)and Radwaste Building (Monthly HPCI High Pressure C0p Operability PT-34.5.3.1 Test (Annuali The above surveillance procedures were reviewed to determine if the various test outlines and inspection instructions adequately implement the requirements of the plant's Fire Protection Technical In addition, these procedures were reviewed to Specifications.
determine if the inspection and test instructions followed General Industry Fire Protection Practices, NRC Fire Protection Program Guidelines and the guidelines of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Codes.
Based on this review, it appears that the above procedures are satisfactory, Fire Protection System Surveillance Inspections and Tests c.
The inspector reviewed the following surveillance inspection and test records for the dates indicated:
(1)
PT-34.2.5.0, Fire Suppression System Control Valve Position Verification (Monthlyi January 1986 through October 1986 (2)
PT-34.11.1.0, Hose House Inventory (Monthly)
January 1986 through October 1986 (3)
PT-34.4.2.0, C0 CylinderWeightVerification,(SixMonths)
-
January 30, 1986 and June 30, 1986 l
l
-
,
-
.
.... -
-.
-
-.
.
i
'
.
.
'
-
(4)
PT-34.2.3.3, Hose Station Inspection Control Building and Radwaste Building (Monthly)
' January 1986 through October 1986
.
FPP-013 Weekly Fire Inspection and Plant Housekeeping (5)
i -
September 1986 and October 1986 The surveillance test record data and testing frequency associated with the above fire protection system surveillance tests / inspections were found to be satisfactory with regard to meeting the requirements of the plant's Fire Protection Technical Specifications.
I d.
Fire Protection Audit
!
The most recent audit reports of the Brunswick Fire Protection Program were reviewed. These audits were:
(1) Quality Assurance' Audit, QAA/21-28, June 27 - July 1,1983.
h (2) Quality Assurance Audit, QAA/21-33, June 18-22, 1984, (Tri-Annual l
Audi t).
(3) Nuclear Material Limited (NML) Periodic Property Loss Prevention Inspection, October 2-3, 1984.
(4) Quality Assurance Audit, QAA/21-86-03, April 28 - May 2,1986, These audits identified several fire protection program discrepancies i
and. unresolved items, and recommended several program improvements.
The licensee had either implemented the corrective actions associated
,
with these audit findings or a scheduled date for completion of the i
i correction actions had been established.
The licensee appears to be taking the appropriate corrective actions on these findings, l
e.
Fire Brigade (11 Organization
The fire brigade is composed of six shifts of fully dedicated fire brigade personnel from the operations staff.
The brigade leader is normally one of the Senior Reactor Operators and the remaining i
i.
fire brigade members are composed of Auxiliary Operators and a i
radwaste representative.
The inspector reviewed the "On Shift
!
Duty Roster" for each of the weeks of September and October 1986, and verified that sufficient qualified fire brigade personnel were
on duty to meet the provisions of Technical Specification 6.2.2:
l
!
!
,
.
--<s y
v,,.,w,..c.
..
<--.n
---,-,,v.---
. -,, - - - -.
..,~...----..-.,-,.----..-----,-,...,,.--,--.,.,---.,-.---.-,,-.--.-..-.n-.
~. - - - -, -,, -
,
,., -
- - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
In addition, the inspector verified that sufficient personnel were assigned to each shift to meet the minimum operating and fire brigade staff requirements of the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, it appears based on the review of the duty rosters associated with the above dates, that there was sufficient manpower on duty to meet both the operational and fire brigade requirements of the plant's Technical Specifications.
(2) Training The inspector reviewed the training and drill records for three brigade leaders and 12 brigade member for the first three quarters of 1986.
The records reviewed indicated that each of these leaders and members had received an annual medical review, attended the required training, and participated into the required number of drills.
The fire brigade training records which were inspected were found satisfactory.
(3) Fire Drills The inspector reviewed the January 1986 through September 10, 1986 fire brigade drill records to verify that the fire drills areIn being conducted in accordance with Technical Specifications.
reviewing the fire brigade drill records, the inspector confirmed that an adequate number of drills were being conducted for each fire brigade shift per calendar quarter.
However, this review indicated that an insufficient number of fire brigade drills, which simulated various fire conditions in a variety of safety -
related safe shutdown plant areas, was conducted during the period. Therefore, on the basis that fire brigade drill scenarios have not frequently involved safe shutdown areas, the utilization of the fire preplans by the fire brigade team leader during drill exercise has not been required.
The licensee's training department indicated that future scheduled drills will include additional safety related plant areas; therefore, this item will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
(4) Fire Brigade Drills With Offsite Fire Departments The inspector reviewed the 1985 Emergency Preparedness Exercise drill records for July 10, 1985 and the 1986 drill records, No.86-021, conducted on September 17, 1986, to determine to what extent drills were conducted in accordance with Operating Instruction 01-36.
Paragraph 5.6,
"Offsite Fire Department Participation" indicates that drills should include actual hcak-up of the off-site equipment to the plant fire main.
The above drill records indicate that actual hookup of the offsite fire department equipment was not included in the 1985 or 1986 drills. This item has been identified to plant management by the licensee's fire protection staff and will be reviewed during a future NRC inspection.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
r
.
(5)
Fire Brigade Drill During this inspection, the inspector witnessed an unannounced fire brigade drill (86-023).
The drill fire scenario was a fire The in the Reactor Building, North RHR Room, (-)17' Elevation.
apparent drill fire condition was caused by oil ignition involving Fire Brigade the IB Control Rod Drive (CRD) Pump and Pump Motor. The brigade nembers responded to the pending fire emergenc;.
assembled outside the Elevation 20' stairwell to the RHR Room in full protective firefighting turnout clothing and self contained An initial size-up of the fire condition was breathing apparatus.
A 21-inch fire hose siamesed to made by the fire brigade leader.
two 11-inch fire attack hose lines were advanced into the stairwell down to the North RHR room. The fire attack hose lines were placed in service on the fire and the fire was placed under control in approximately 33 minutes.
In addition, the fire brigade initiated Health Physics monitoring, fire victim search and rescue, smoke control, and water control operations.
The fire brigade utilized proper manual firefighting methods and reacted to the fire drill scenario in an effective and efficient manner.
f.
Plant Tour During the plant tour, the A plant tour was made by the inspector.
following safe shutdown related plant areas and their related fire protection features were inspected:
Diesel Generator Building - 2', 23' elevations Service Water Building - 4', 20' elevations Reactor Building Unit 1 - 20', (-)17' elevations Reactor Building Unit 2 - (-)17' elevation Control Building - 23' and 49' elevations Water Treatment Building The inspector visually inspected the fire / smoke detection capabilities, the manual firefighting equipment (i.e., portable extinguishers, hose stations, etc.) and the fire barriers walls associated with the above In addition, the inspector visually inspected the plant areas.
sprinkler protection associated with the Service Water Building and Based on the visual inspection, it appears Diesel Generator Basement.
that the fire protection features associated with the above plant areas were properly maintained and fully functional except:
(1) Control Building A fire detector in the Unit 2 cable spreading room near door 101-A is not installed at ceiling level but is hanging down from the Also, detectors C2-5 and C2-6 located in the 49'
overhead.
elevation of the Unit 2 Electronic Equipment Room (EER) area have
.
.
The been removed from the ceiling due to plant modifications.
licensee has identified these discrepancies and have issued Engineering Work Requests (EWRs) Nos.84-170 and 83-130 respectively to provide corrective actions; however, this work has These conditions are not yet been scheduled for completion.
identified as Inspector Followup Item (324/86-31-01), Improper Mounting of Smoke Detectors in the Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room and EER Areas, and will be reviewed during a subsequent NRC inspection.
(2) Water Treatment Building The inspector noted that both the diesel-driven and electric The motor-driven fire pumps had leaking pump shaft seals.
that a Trouble Ticket No. 85-AKLW1 dated licensee stated was written to address the leaking seal problem August 30, 1985, and also additional problems requiring pump bearing sleeve These conditions do not degrade the fire pump
,
replacement.
operability as denoted in the Technical Specifications; however, due to the excessive leakage of fire water from the system,
.equire that the fire protection jockey pumps run continuously to The licensee stated that the fire pump maintain system pressure.
replacement / repair parts No. 729-932-56 were received on October 21, 1986, and were under Quality Assurance review prior to However, issuance of a work order to overhaul the fire pumps.
this pump overhaul has not yet scheduled by the plant maintenance department; therefore, this is identified as Inspector Followup Item (325/86-30-01 and 324/86-31-02), Maintenance of Fire Pumps.
This item will be reviewed during a future NRC inspection.
The plant tour also verified the licensee's implementation of the fire prevention administrative procedures.
The control of combustibles and flammable materials, liquids and gases and the general housekeeping was found to be satisfactory in the areas inspected or were identified in the licensee's weekly housekeeping checklist of procedure FPR-013 for corrective action.
Within the areas inspected no violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Inspector Followup Items (IFI's)
Maintenance of Sprinkler
,
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (325, 324/82-37-03),
System Deluge System Valves in the Closed Position.
- The sprinkler systems for the North and South portions of the Service Water Building are designed as preaction type systems, but are presently being
maintained as wet pipe systems pending completion of repairs to annunciator
_ _ _ _ - - - -
.
.
__ __.-
,
cables JUS-XN3 and JUS-XN3/1 which are inoperable due to underground shorts This condition has existed within the cabling routed to the control room.
30, 1983.
The since the sprinkler control valves were tagged out on May corrective actions to the cabling problems are being tracked by the licensee At the time of this through Engineering Work Request (EWR) No.83-533.
inspection no Modification Work Order (MWO) had been issued to initiate replacement of these defective cables nor had a definitive schedule to accomplish this work been established.
Pending resolution of the cable repairs and realign of the sprinkler systems this item remains open.
7.
Licensee Identified Items (Closed) 2-SR-83-18 (CDR-83-18), Inoperable Fire Doors:
Roll-up Fire door Nos. 222 and 224 located in the Diesel Generator Building 24, 1983, by submittal were reported inoperable to the NRC Region II on JulyThe doors were declared inope of a Special Report (2-SR-83-18).
The licensee damaged counter balance tensioning devices on the doors.due to the inoperable doo issued LCOs 1-83-570 and 2-83-652 Fire door No. 224 was fire watches were posted at the door locations.
21, 1983.
repaired, functionally tested, and returned to service on June The automatic starter closing device was repaired on Work Request 1-M-83-3647 for Fire door No. 222 on September 15, 1983.
The door was satisfactorily functionally tested and returned to service on September 17, 1983.
i l
l
!
i (
t
_
-
_
~_
,_.
_ _. _ - _ - _ - - _, - -. _ - _ _ _ _,, -, _ _ -
. - -.,,
,, -