IR 05000324/1988036

Insp Repts 50-324/88-36 & 50-325/88-36 on 880912-16.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Mark I Containment long-term Program Mods.Three Unresolved Items Identified,Including Suppression Pool Temp

ML20205Q910
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	10/28/1988
From:	Blake J, Chou R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20205Q895	List: IR 05000324/1988036 ML20205Q890
References
50-324-88-36, 50-325-88-36, IEB-79-02, IEB-79-14, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8811090394
Download: ML20205Q910 (13)

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s.a ass uq 3l  % UNITED STATES j .j*

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)" NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  ;

o REGION 11 101 MARIETTA ST., l

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e ATLANTA. GEORotA 31323

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Report Nos.: 50-325/88-36 and 50-324/88-36  ;

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company f P. O. Box 1551  ;

Raleigh, NC 27602  !

t Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.: OPR-71 and DPR-62 :

l Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 l

Inspection Conducted: September 12-16, 1988

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Inspector: CW / E'~ N ~ I I R1 . . Ch Date Signed f Approved by: , / /o 2e 90 J. M e, Chief ~ Date Signed i M f.e tais and Processes Section i gj eering Branch

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vision of Reactor Safety

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! SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of Mark I containment long term program modifications, pipe support base l

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plate designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts (IEB 79-02) snd ,

j seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems (IEB '

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Results: In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified, f

Three Unresolved Items (UNR) were identified on suppression pool  !

• emperature monitoring system, accuracy of as-built Phase II walkdown

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v9eification, and pipe support discrepancie The licensee appears r to nave a strong QA department and some weaknesses in the i'

, construction field group. The qualification and training of field walkdown personnel needs to be enhance The licensee management

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must resolve the above problem to assure the accuracy of as-built L d Phase II piping system walkdown verification progra !

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e911090394 891103

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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• J. M. Brown, Resident Engineer W. J. Dorman, QA Supervisor R. Fronerath, Senior Engineer

• J. L. Harness. General Manager

• R. E. Helme, Technical Support Manager D. Jenkins, Control Room Operator - Unit 2

• L. E. Jones, OA/QC Director T. Mathews, Field Engineer J. McCracken, Field Engineer

• J. A. McKee, QC Supervisor

• W. G. Monroe, Principal Engineer L. J. Pillarella, Senior Nuclear Specialist - Instrument & Electrical Engineer

• R. M. Poulk, Project Specialist

• R. Storkey, Designated Manager

• A. M. Worth, Engineering Supervisor

• T. H. Wyllie, Engineering and Construction Manager Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, technicians, and administrative personne Other Organizations 0. Dubnick - QC Inspector, Daniel International Corporation NRC Resident Inspector

• Ruland, Senior Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview Unresolved Item .

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or deviations. Three unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 3, 4, and :

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! (Closed) Mark I Containment Long Term Program Modification For Units 1 and 2 (25585, TI 2515/85, Unresolved Safety Issue A-7)-

This inspection is a continuation of Inspection Report No. 50-325, ;

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< 324/88-13 and the final inspection for Mark I Containment Long Term Program Modification. This inspection focused on the documentation and system installation revie Plant Modification and Turnover Pack &ge Review (1) Plant Modification Plant Modification 82-069 was for Mark I Torus Modification, Phale 3. The plant modification included the following main elements: function sunmary, design basis document, drawing '

list, bill of materials, field sketches, modification procedure, safety analysis, environmental impact summary, acceptance test, document revision sheet, technical review, operability

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checksheet, plant modification cleanup sheet and FSAR change letter and forms. The scope of this plant modi #ication included (a) removal and relocation of existing platforms and catwalk in Torus, (b) cutting 12" from length of downcomer legs and installing new transverso bracing from leg to leg, (c) addition of downcomer reinforcement by welding gussets of 1/2" thick steel plate at the intersection of the downcomers and the vent header, (d) adding four new 6" 4 vent header support columns for every vent header, (e) adding Safety Relief Valve (SRV) line ,

penetration reinforcement, and (f) relocating corrosion :

, monitoring assemblies on existing platform and catwal (2) preliminary Turnover Packages f Preliminary Turnover Packages contain the inspection records ,

generated during the construction. These items include weld '

map, material list, purchase order number, certificate letter for material, material chemical analysis report, weld p epara-tions and inspection, nondestructive examination, et l I

(a) Vent Header Column Support at Bay A (A mith 90* to 135') l

] < L I Materials (3-1/2"e pin, SA-193, GR.BS, and 1/4" washer, i SA-516, GR. 70) were checked against purchase order B15949 l

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C/02 and the detail drawing. QC signed-off sheets for Weld ;

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Nos. 2-TVH-008, 2-TVH-009, 2-TVH-022, and 2-TVH-553 were

checked for fit-up, root pass, visual inspection (VT), and Magnetic Farticle Test (MT) except that root pass for 2-TVH-553 was not required dua to single penetration weld

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joint design, i

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(b) Gusset Plate Al Gusset plates were used to re'.nforce the intersections of vent header pipes and downtomers. Therefore, gusset plates were attached and welded from vent header pipe or cross intersection to downcomer. Materials (1/2" thickness of plate, SA-516, GR. 70) for purchase orders B162608 and B17192 were c'ecked against Dwg. No. Z820691001, Rev. Weld Nos. 2-TVH-225, 228, 274, and 276 were checked for sign-off by QC inspector Certificate letters for materials from Bethlehem Steel Corporation were also checke (c) T-Quens ar, A2, and End Support (Unit 1)

T-Quencher, A2, for Safety Relief Valve Line No. 1-821-12-10-304 was checked. 10"e pipes with A-234, G Reducer, and 65* Elbow were checke Weld Nos.1-NB-162 and 393 had VT and MT inspection Weld No.1-NS-165 was repaired, rechecked, and accepted finally with inspections of VT, Fit-up, MT, and Radiograph Test (RT). End supports for the above T-Quencher were checked against Owg. No. 2791P1013. Materials (8"o sen.60 pipe with SA-106 GR.B 3"4 sch.80 with $A .160 GR 8, and 3/4" tnickness of plate with SA-516 GR.70) were reviewed. Weld Nos. 1-TQS-025, 032, and 645 had VT inspection (3) F,inal Turnover Package Final Turnover Package was the sign-off sheets with the check list summary of inspecticns; this is a QA review. Table of

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contents includes plant mocification, field revision, excep-tinns, inspection / test documentation, bill of naterials, correspondence, and request for final walkdow This package also included the Ultrasonic Test for corrosion of liner plat b. Calculation Review

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Calculation Nos. 9527-1-SC-TE-11-F, Rev. 2, 9527-1-SC-PL-05 Rev.1, 9527-E-SC-55-9, Rev. O, and 9527-E-SC-SR-3-F, Rev. I were listed on Inspection Report No. 50-325, 324/88-11. These calculations were reviewed and found acceptable, c. Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring System ,

The Brunswick Nuclear Plans had a Suppression Pool Temperature d

Monitoring System (SPTMS) before the Mark I Containment Long Term Prcgam Modif f ution. The Plar.t Unique Analysis Report (PUAR) did not include the SPTMS oualification or analysis. The previous SPTMS did not meet the requirements for pool temperature monitoring as outlined in NUREG-0661, Mark I Containment Long Term Program and i

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NUkEG-0783, Suppression Pool Temperature Limits for BWR containmen !

Plant Modification No.81-251 was implemented to meet the NRC

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requirements in monitoring bulk pool temperature The modification scope included replacuent and relocation of existing sensors, installation of add i ti ona', new sensors, and installation of microprocessors and r2 corders. The temperatures monitored by sensors were sent so the new divisionalized microprocessor based computing devices to calculate bulk water temperature based on a weighteri average sampling algurithm. The calculated bulk temperatures are used for comparison against preprogrammed setpoint alarm signal levels and for transmission to a multi point recorder mounted in the Control Board of the Control Roo The physical failure of each

< sensor will be displayed on a back panel. The NUREG-0661 sets a maximum of 200 F for water temperature at the discharge point of A

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T-Quencher. No alarm could be set to monitor the water temperature exceeding 200'F. The licensee responsible engineer could not present

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documentation to prove that this system was approved by the NRC. The

analysis or design documents were also not available, for review, to ensure that the water temperature would not exceed 200*F.

i The inspector noticed the air and water temperature monitoring ;

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devices attaching to the service platform support column during the i suppression pool walkdown on Inspection Report No. 50-325, 324/88-1 ! Orawing No. F-03522, Sheet 1. Rev. 31 showed locations of sensors.

J Orawing No. LL-7044, Rev. 3 showed a detailed installation of l sensor Drawing Nos. 0-02515, Sheet IB, Rev. 38, and LL-7000, Sheet.2, Rev. 49, and F-07008, Rev. 37, and F-9020, Rev. O, and F-9568. Rev. 2 were reviewed for water temperature monitoring system cables from the suppression pool to the control room panel TE 4426- The inspector observed tne displays of 1-CAC-TY-4426-2 for Division II and 1-CAC-TY-4426-1 for Division I in the control roo The inspector 615o reviewed the Technical Specification, Rev. 5 Unit 2 and discussed the system with the control operators and responsible engineer in the control roo Per Section 3.6.2.1 of Technical Specification, the following limiting condition for operation applies for the operating conditions listed:

(1) The pool water Maximum average temperature of 95'F during Operational Condition 1 or 2, except that tne maximum average temperature may be permitted to increase to:

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105'F during testing which adds heat to the suppression chambe *F witn Thereal Power less than or equal to l'. of RATED THERMAL POWE *F with the main steam line isolation valves closed following a scra ,

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(2) Two Operable Suppression chamber water temperature instrumentation channels with a minimum of 11 operable resistance Temperature Detectors (RTD) or called sensors inputs per channel (this permits that one sensor could fail &t each

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channel).

Pending the licensee's location of the analysis for the suppression pool temperature monitoring system to prove that the water temperature at the outlet of the T quencher would not exceed 200 F for all cases and the 95*F set point for bulk water temperature is adequate, this item is identified as new open item Unresolved Item 1 (UNR) 50-325, 324/83-36-U1, Suppression Pool Temperature Monitorina  :

System Adequac l Drywell To Wetwell Differential Pressure System Per PUAR, this system was not used by the licensee to take the benefit of reduction on the applied loads in the analyses and  :

calculations for piping sy s tein s . The licensee engineer also confirmed no installation for this syste Conclusion

Overall, the licensee performance on Mark I Containment Lang Term '

Program Modification conformed to commitments of the PVAR with good workmanship. With the exception of UNR 50-324/88-13-01 and UNR 50-325, 324/88-36-01, it appears that all commitments of the PUAR have been satisfied. Therefore, the Mark I Containment Long Term Program Modification (Unresolved Safety issue A-7) is complete for

Units 1 and 2 and this issue is close . (Closed) Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor l t

Bolts - IEB 79-02 (25528)

i l The licensee stated that the work for this 79-02 had been completed. Any l new anchor bolts insta'lation or modification will go with IEB 79-14. The '

NRC Region II Inspection Report Nos. 50-325/79-27, 80-02, 80-32, 85-06, 85 19, 87-18 for Unit 1 and 50-324/79-26, 80-02, 80-?9, 85-06, 85-19, 87-18 for Unit 2 were performed for IEB 79-02 to verify anc review the

' procedures, inspection programs, analytical methods, modifications, and documentation for concrete expansion anchor bolts. The licensee responses l to NRC were reviewed such as Letter GD-79-1739, dated July 12, 1979; GO-79-3130, dated December 6, 1979; BSEP/80-2139, dated December 30, 1980; BSEP/81-0440, dated February 25, 1981; BSEP/S2-1616, dated July 26, 1982; NL5/84-214, dated November 26, 1984. The licensee is preparing the final i summary report for IEB 79-02. The report will summarize the bulletin requirements and the licensee solutions, methods, analyses, actions, commitments, or modifications to respond to the reavirements. Pending the licensee final summary report submissions for each unit for IEB 79-02, l

! this item is identified as new open item Inspector Followup Item (IFI)  ;

50-325, 324/88-36-02, Final Summary Report for IEB 79 0 ;

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Hilti anchor bolts were used in both units. IEB 79-02 reauires the licensee to determine the anchor bolt allowables based on the testing ;

capacity in field er catalog capacity published by the manufacturer if QA documentation is available. NRC Information Notices 86-94 and 88-25 require the licensees who use Hilti anchor bolts to review the allowables used in design calculations since the NRC found that the test capacity in field was 30% to 40% below catalog capacity due to i variations in concrete mixture The inspector requested that the licensee !

review the Hilti anchor bolt allowables per IEB 79-02, NRC Information Notices No, 86-94 and 88-20. This item is identified as 'ew open item; IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-03, Hilti Anchor Bolt Allowable Review anu Justifica-tions per IEB 79-02, NRC Information Notices No. 86-94 at.d 88-25.

The inspector also performed field walkdowns during this inspection to verify the licensee performance and commitments on 1EBs 79-02 an.d 79-14 as l stated in Pa*agraph Based on the previous inspection reports, this ,

inspection, and review of the licensee responses as stated above, IEB '

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d 79-02 for Units 1 and 2 is considered closed except for the open item I (0 pen) Seismic Analysis For As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems

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IEB 79-14 (25529, 50090)

l As-Built Phase II Piping Systems Walkdown Verification >

The inspector held conferences with the licensee QA Manager, Manager ,

l of Construction and Engineering, Resident Engineer, and the responsible engineers tc discuss problems, program, walkdown personnel qualification and training, status, and QA audit program ;

for As-Built Phase II Piping System Walkdown Verification. (For QA i audit program and walktown personnel qualification and training, see i Paragraph 5.c.) Alt saf ety-related piping systems under IEB 79-14 requirements were walked oown by the licensee around 1979 and 198 ;

After the as-built walkdown inspections for IEB 79-14, some piping systems were modified due to the new loads or other requirements and had QC inspections due to modifications. Since the remaining piping i systems had no requirements for modifications af ter the walkdown l inspection, they did not have QC inspection The licensee QA l department found some discrepancies between I built drawings and as-installed conditions during the performance of QA surveillance 86-004, verification of pipe support as-built drawing Non- i conformance Report (NCR) No. 5-86-021 was issued on March 28, 198 The discrepancies found were in the piping systems which aid not have I r

the modifications and QC inspection After the QA department expanded the sampling inspections in the non-modification 3/ stems, the licensee made the decision, around April 1988, to have the As-Dut it Phase 11 Piping System Walkdown Verification on the piping ;

systems which did not have modifications after the initial IEB 79-14 ,

walkdowns inspection _ _____ ________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ .

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7 There are approximately 40 piping systems, 430 pipe stress isometric drawings, and 7330 pipe supports for both units. Approxi...ately 1370 pipo supports were walked down by QC during the 1987 and 1988 outages which had modifications. During the expanded sampling inspections, the teams of one QC Inspector and one Field Engineer walked down about 210 pipe suppcets. After the licensee initiated the As-Built Phase II Piping System Walkdown Verification, the field engineering group uses two field engineers as a team without QC Inspector participation to walk down abuut 790 pipe supports so far. After the walkdown verification, the piping systems will be evalusted for discrepancies by Engineering Department, modified if required, 6., d documented if require The whole program will be finished around 199 Walkdown Reinspection To check the licensee's perf emance on the pipe support modifications and walkdown verifications on Unit 2, the inspector randomly selected 33 pipe supports on five isometric drawing Fifteen supports on four isometric drawings were the modified supports with QC inspec-tions af ter modi fications. Eighteen supports in ISO No. D-02846, Sheet 12, Rev.17 were the original walkcown for IEB 79-14 without modifications where walkdowns were just completed, per the As-Built Phase II Piping System Walkdown Verification, by field engineers without QO inspe: tor reverification or audit. The inspector walkdown reinspection was completed with the assistance from the licens6e field engineer ant.' OC inspector. The field engineer is c walkdown team member of As-Built Phase 11 Piping System Walkdowc Verification Progra The supnorts were partially reinspected against their detail drawings for configuration, identification, fastener / anchor installations, memoer size, weld sizes, component identification

numbers, dirensions, rust, maintenance, and damage / protection.

Listed below is the reinspected supports with discrepancies / comments.

] All supports are in Unit 2.

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TABLE I

SUPPC .'S REINSPECTED

, Re Data Isometrics / Support N N Point Discrepancies / Comments Iso. D-02846 Sheet 12 17 Locations of Support No. 2E51-40SSS4 and

] 2E51-40SS86 should be

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reversed in Iso, crawin Support NC. 2E51-40FH10 2 245 None

- Support No. 2E51-405533 0 246 None

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SUPPORTS REINSPECTED Re Data Isometrics / Support N N Point ~

Discrepancies / Comments (cont'd)

- Support No. 2E51-40FH9 1 255 None {

- Support No. 2E51-40S$84 0 257 Weld all around between component end bracket and 6" wide flange was in fiel Drawing showed weld on two sides ,

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Detail A was 5" in field instead of 9"

show on drawin Support No. 2E51-40SS86 0 258 None i

- Support No. 2E51-40SS85 0 264 None

- Support No. 2E51-40SS87 1 272 4" vide flange beam was

not shown in bill of 1 materia Support No. 2E51-40FS8 1 265 Weld size at trunion to plate was 3/16". i Drawing showed 1/4".

Weld size et 8" wide

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r flange beam and bottom t p' 's was 3/16" all !

' rawing showed er two side Support No. 2E51-40SSS8 0 281 k..a size for end ,

bracket was 1/8" at top and bottom and 3/16" l for East and West '

sides. Drawing showed 3/16" all aroun ,

Weld si; 2 at 4" wide !

flange beam and base [

- plate was 3/16" for two

side Drawing showed l 1/4" for two side i

- Support No. 2E51-40PG7 1 35 None

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- Support No. 2E51-40PG6 1 10 Weld size at 8 wide ,

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flange beam and base

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plate was 3/16".

t Drawing showed 1/4".

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SUPPORTS REINSPECTED ,

Re Data Isometries / Support N N Point Discrepancies / Comments (cont'd)  ;

- Support No. 2CO-202FS15 0 351 None j

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- Support No. 2CO-202PG14 2 340 None  ;

1 - Support No. 2CO-202PG18 0 340(z) None i - Support No. 2CO-202FH13 3 325 None

- Support No. 200-2025512 1 326 None

- Support No. 2CO-202FH11 3 323 None

- Support No. 200-2025519 0 318 None ,

r Iso. D-02846 Sheet 30 N/A

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- Support No. 2E11-128VH248 3 165 None j

- Support No. 2E11-128pG249 3 155 None Iso. D-02846 Sheet 118 0

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- Support No. 2E41-V378 0 50 None

- Support No. 2E41-VS79 0 100 None 4 Iso. D-02846 Sheet 261 0  ;

- Support No. 2E11-128VS250 5 55 None

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i - Support No. 2E11-128PG600 1 110 None  ;

- Support No. 2E11-128DG601 0 142 hone I

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i - Support No. 2E11-128PG602 0 155 None

- Support No. 2E11-12SPG613 0 175 None P

'so. 0-02346 Sheet 266 0 i

- Support No. 2E11-132VH260 1 150 Two shim plates between

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wide flange beam and embedded plate were not

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shown on drawing.

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- Support No. 2E11-132PG261 2 180 None

- Supoort No. 2E11-132VS262 1 250 None

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SUPPORTS REINSPECTED Re Data '

Isometrics / Support N N Point Discrepancies / Comments (cont'd)

- Support No. 2E11-132PG1071 0 300 Three bolts for clamp were in fiel Drawing showed two bolt .

- Support No. 2E11-132SS264 1 310 None

- Support No. 2E11-132FH265 4 340 None  ;

c. Walkdown Personnel Qualification and QA Audit Program

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During the conferences as stated at paragraph 5.a above, the licensee

! attributed the failure of the on .ginal walkdown on IEB 79-14 due to the lack of measurements on some supports and the negligence of some walkdown personnel. But after the review of NCR No. S-86-021 and the program presentation during conferences, the inspector raised two concerns about the walkdown personnel qualification and training and

': QA audit progra The licensee stated that all the walkdown verification personnel are the field engineers who are qualified and trained for the walkdown verificatio The qualification is a high i

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school degree with one year engineering-related experience. Some field engineers had some experience in design work. The inspector was concerned that wLlkdown verification by team members without participation by an experienced design engineer or a QC inspector as ;

a team leader could lead to a f ailure of walkdown again. But the i

licensee had confidence about the field engineers performance on this ,

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walkdowr, Although the licensee initiated the As-Built Phase II Piping Systems :

Walkdown Verification, the QA department did not have the specific audit program to check the walkdown verification accuracy performed by the field engineer The QA Department will do random audit of the supports verified per As-Built Phase II Piping System Walkdown Verification. The inspector requested that the QA Department set up !

the timing and quantity for auditing otherwise it may be too late to correct the problems if the QA Department finds problems after the

mos. of supports have been verifieo per the program. The licensee

QA manager agreed to set up the timing and quantity of supports to be audited af ter a certain amount of supports have bren verified by the field engineers per walkdown verification progra *

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The inspector performed the walkdown reinspection as stated in Paragraph 5.b. Some discrepancies were found as shown in Table More discrepancies were found on the piping systems without modifica-tions but with the walkdown verification performed by the field engineers. Especially, the weld sizes were increased and weld symbols were corrected in the walkdown drawings during the walkdown verification performed by the field engineer These weld si' ie increases and weld symbol changes were of concern to the inspector and the licensee QC inspector and appeared to be indicative of inadequate performance by the field engineers. These discrepancies emphasized the inspector's previous concerns about the accuracy of the walkdown verification program, the walkdown personnel qualification and training, and the QA audit progra Another conference was held with the licensee QA Supervisor (QA Manager was not available), Manager of Construction and Engineering, Resident Engineer, responsible engineers, and QC Inspector to discuss the

, discrepancies especially the weld size increases and welu symbol

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changes by the field engineers. The responsible engineers r eplied

, that the weld s;2e increases and weld symbol changes by field engineers were based on the standard, NCIG-01, "Visual Weld

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Acceptance Criteria" by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). In '

] one example, the filed engineers measured the weld size as over 7A i which is between 8/32" and 6/32", and the weld size can be called out i as 8/32" or 1/4." But the QC inspector measured the above weld size

as not over 7/32" but under 7/32"; therefore, the weld size should

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be called out as 6/32" or 3/16". (By the way, NCIG-01, Visual Weld Acceptance Criteria is not adopted erd accepted by the licensee QA Department as an official acceptance criteria when the conference was held). The licensee agreed to review the walkdown verification program, valkdown personnel qualification and training, design

engineer or QC inspector participating as walkdown leader, and the acceptance criteria for weld siz Pending the licensee actions to improve the accuracy for walkdown verification, this new open item is 4 identified as Unresolved item (UNR) 50-325, 324/88-36-04, Accuracy of As-Built Phase II Pipin; System Walkdown Verificatio The QA '

Department stated snat 4; out of 316 supports in Unit I and 17 out of

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474 Supports in Unit 2 were auaited after the field engineer verificatio The audit results were not available during the inspection. An internal memo Serial: BNP/QA/QC-88-281 was issued on

. September 14, 1938 af ter conference for audit sampling sizes on the

, supports performed under the As-Built Phase II Piping System Walkdown Verification by the Field Engineering and the supports verified by the QC inspectors af ter modifications during the last two outages.

j Pending licensee implementation and results of the audit of piping

systems for As-Built Phase II Piping System Walkcown Verification i (Reinspection) and for supports modified during the last two outages,

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this new open item is identified as IFI 50-325, 324 '88-36-05, QA l Auditing of the Supports in As-Built Phase II Piping System Walkdown j Verification Program and the Modified Systems with QC Inspection ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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12 Findings and Results The above discrepancies found in Table I during the walkdown reinspection between the field and as-built drawings were discussed with the licensee management, engineers, and QC inspector during the

< conference and other meeting The licensee evaluated the

! discrepancies and determined there to be no impact to the system operabilit Per. ding the licensee review and revisions of the drawings and calculations, this item is identified as a new open item, UNR 50-325, 324/88-36-06, Discrepancies Between As-Built Drawings and As-Installed Conditions in Piping System . Exit Interview

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The inspection scope and results were summarized on September 16, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed belo Proprietary information is not contained in this repor Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee. The inspector expressed concerns about the accuracy of the As-Built Piping System Walkdown Verification, the walkdown personnel qualification and training,

desigr. engineer or QC inspector participating as walkdown leader, and the acceptance criteria for weld siz The management agreed to review and i Resolve the above concern (0 pen) UNR 50-325, 324/8S-36-01, Suppression Pool Temperatt.re Monitoring

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Systems Adequac (0 pen) IFI 5C-325, 324/88-36-02, Final Summary Report for IEB 70-0 (Open) IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-03, Hilti Anchor Bolt Allowable Review and Justifications per IEB 79-02, NRC Information Notices No. 86 94 and 88-25.

i (0 pen) UNR 50-325, 324/8S-36-04, Accuracy of As-Built Phase II Piping System Walkdown Verification.

(0 pen) IFI 50-325, 324/88-36-05, QA Auditing of the Supports in As-Built i

Phase II Piping System Walkdown Verificatic i Program and the Modified Systems with QC Inspection (0 pen) UNR 50-325, 324/88-36-06, Discrepancies Between As-Built Drawings j and As-Installed Conditions in Piping Systems.

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