IR 05000324/2021001
ML21134A126 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Brunswick ![]() |
Issue date: | 05/14/2021 |
From: | Stewart Bailey NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
To: | Krakuszeski J Duke Energy Progress |
References | |
IR 2021001 | |
Download: ML21134A126 (18) | |
Text
May 14, 2021
SUBJECT:
BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000324/2021001 AND 05000325/2021001
Dear Mr. Krakuszeski:
On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. On April 29, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Brunswick Steam Electric Plant.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Stewart N. Bailey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000324 and 05000325 License Nos. DPR-62 and DPR-71
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers: 05000324 and 05000325 License Numbers: DPR-62 and DPR-71 Report Numbers: 05000324/2021001 and 05000325/2021001 Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0073 Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, LLC Facility: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Location: Southport, NC Inspection Dates: January 01, 2021 to March 31, 2021 Inspectors: M. Schwieg, Reactor Inspector G. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector S. Downey, Senior Reactor Inspector A. Rosebrook, Senior Reactor Analyst Approved By: Stewart N. Bailey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Inadequate Maintenance Procedure for Service Water Bay Inspections and Cleaning Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.5] - Work 71111.12 Systems NCV 05000325/2021001-01 Management Open An NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of technical specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for the failure to provide an adequate maintenance procedure associated with licensee procedure 0PM-STU500 Service Water Intake Structure Inspection and Cleaning. As a result, debris under the pump suction clogged the 1B conventional service water (CSW) pump strainer following pump start, which led to the inoperability of the 1B CSW pump on January 7, 2021.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the period at 100 percent (full) rated thermal power (RTP) and essentially operated there for the entire inspection period.
Unit 2 began the period at 100 percent RTP and operated there until February 16 when the unit was derated to 87 percent due to the loss of one of the four Unit 2 main switchyard lines. Following restoration of the off-site power line on February 17, the unit was stored to full power where it continued to operate until March 6 when the unit was shut down for a refueling outage. The unit remained shut down for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather Winter storm Uri and Tornado warning on February 18, 2021. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather due to storms that moved across the country on March 18, 2021.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Emergency diesel generator (EDG) No. 4 air intake ventilation system on January 21, 2021
- (2) Unit 2 'B' residual heat removal (RHR) train while the 'A' RHR train was out of service for a planned maintenance outage on February 4, 2021
- (3) Sodium hypochlorite injection system on February 17, 2021
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) EDG building cells 1 thru 4 on January 7, 2021
- (2) EDG building 50' elevation (EL) on January 7, 2021
- (3) Unit 1 control building EL 23 on February 22, 2021
- (4) Unit 2 control building EL 23 on February 22, 2021
- (5) Battery rooms 1A, 2A, 1B, and 2B on February 24, 2021 Fire Brigade Drill Performance Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Partial)
(1) (Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the on-site fire brigade training and performance during an announced fire drill on January 8, 2021.
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) Unit 2 safety-related 'B' RHR heat exchanger on March 9, 2021
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding
Activities (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated boiling water reactor non-destructive testing by reviewing the following examinations from March 22, 2021 to March 26, 2021:
1. Liquid Penetrant Examination a. 2-SW-581, Pipe to Pipe Weld, ASME Class 3. This included a review of associated welding activities b. 2-B32-1010, Pipe to Fitting Socket Weld, ASME Class 1. This included a review of associated welding activities c. 2-B32-1011, Pipe to Fitting Socket Weld, ASME Class 1. This included a review of associated welding activities 2. Ultrasonic Examination a. 2B11-RPV-F, Reactor Vessel Shell to Flange Weld, ASME Class 1 b. 2B11-RPV-N10, Nozzle N10 to Reactor Vessel Weld, ASME Class 1 c. 2B32RECIRC-28-A-7, Pipe to Elbow Weld, ASME Class 1 3. Visual Examination a. VT-3 examination of Suppression Chamber Metallic Liner (Below Water Line), ASME Class MC
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
(1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the main control room during a down power to 72 percent for a control rod improvement on January 15, 2021.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator usage of the newly revised (Rev. 4)emergency operating procedures during licensed operator exercises on January 28, 2021.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 1 service water bay cleaning and 1B strainer failure on January 7, 2021
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Unit 1 elevated risk due to 1B CSW pump strainer failure on January 1, 2021
- (2) Yellow risk for Unit 1 hardened wet well vent valve, 1-CAC-V8, planned maintenance on January 19, 2021
- (3) Elevated risk due to EDG-3 maintenance on February 1, 2021
- (4) Elevated risk due to Unit 2 A RHR outage combined with maintenance on 2A CSW pump on February 3, 2021
- (5) Unit 1 Elevated risk due to 4160 volt safety-related bus E4 outage on March 12, 2021
- (6) Yellow shutdown risk due to core alterations (core offload) with secondary containment inoperable on March 10, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) EDG-4 expansion tank leak (NCR 2355931) on March 2, 2021
- (2) 2B CSW pump strainer failure (NCR 2364279) on January 15, 2021
- (3) EDG-3 overspeed trip (NCR 2374676) on March 29, 2021
- (4) Battery 2B1 pilot cell failure (NCR 2374924) on March 31, 2021
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)
(1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Engineering Change 403762, Unit 2 SAT replacement and AC low margin resolution
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) 0PT-08.2.2.2C, LPCI/RHR System Operability Test after 2-E11-F048A actuator rebuild on February 4, 2021
- (2) 2MST-XFR41R, Automatic Transfer UAT to SAT following SAT replacement on March 30, 2021
- (3) 0PT-20.3, Local Leak Rate Testing after 2-B32-F019 reconditioning on March 26, 2021
- (4) 1D-BFIV-RB damper repair on February 16, 2021
- (5) 2MST-BAT11BQ, 125 VDC Battery 2B-1 Quarterly Operability Test following battery cell replacement on March 9, 2021
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
(1) (Partial)
The inspectors evaluated Brunswick's Unit 2 refueling outage (B2R25) from March 5 to March 31, 2021.
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (2) 2MST-SCIS42R, Reactor Building Group 2/6 Isolation Functional Test on February 17, 2021
- (3) 0MST-HPCI28Q, HPCI Reactor High Water Level Trip on February 25, 2021
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) 0PT-08.2.2C, LPCI/RHR System Operability Test on February 26,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.01) ===
- (1) Unit 1 (January 01, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 01, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 01, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 01, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 (January 01, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
- (2) Unit 2 (January 01, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) AR 2347793, Sodium Hypochlorite Injection on February 18, 2021
- (2) AR 02370795, U1 250 BATT Ground Seal-in on March 31,
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL 2515/194 - Inspection of the Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative Associated With the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities In Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the Nuclear Energy Institute Voluntary Industry Initiative, (ADAMS Accession No. ML15075A454) dated March 16, 2015.
This included reviewing how the licensee updated their licensing basis to reflect the need to protect against open phase conditions.
Inspection of the Licensees Implementation of Industry Initiative Associated With the Open Phase Condition Design Vulnerabilities In Electric Power Systems (NRC Bulletin 2012-01)
(1 Sample)
- (1) Revision 0 of this Temporary Instruction (TI) was previously inspected, and closed, in Inspection Report 2019012 (ADAMS ML19324D085). However, a subsequent revision to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Voluntary Initiative (Revision 3) provided plants the option of to leave the open phase protection system in monitoring mode only in lieu of activating the automatic trip circuitry, provided it was supported by a risk evaluation. Revision 1 (and later Revision 2) of this TI was issued to provide inspection guidance for the new option.
The inspectors reviewed licensee analyses and procedures that demonstrated operator manual actions would successfully mitigate the impact of an Open Phase Condition (OPC). The analyses were reviewed remotely, and the procedures were reviewed and walked down on site. The inspectors completed Section 03.01c of TI 2515/194, Revision 2.
The inspectors verified that modeling used for the OPC reflected the as-designed and as-built plant, assumptions made by the licensee were reasonable, and licensee procedures were adequate to successfully respond to an OPC. The inspectors also verified that human reliability analysis and recovery evaluations were done in accordance with NEI and voluntary initiative guidance.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation: TI-194 Observations 2515/194 The licensee's probabilistic risk assessment analysis for Brunswick's open phase condition credits operator recovery of equipment once the open phase condition is cleared. To support this analysis the license provided engineering calculation BNP-E-4.008, Open Phase Condition Response Time, Revision 00, which supported the licensee's position that credited equipment would not be damaged by the open phase condition prior to the local over current protection devices tripping and protecting the equipment. The inspectors verified that procedures were in place to aid the operators in restoring the credited equipment and that sufficient time was available to complete the required actions and human error probabilities were developed and were reasonable.
Inadequate Maintenance Procedure for Service Water Bay Inspections and Cleaning Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.5] - Work 71111.12 Systems NCV 05000325/2021001-01 Management Open An NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation (NCV) of technical specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to provide an adequate maintenance procedure associated with licensee procedure 0PM-STU500 Service Water Intake Structure Inspection and Cleaning. As a result, debris under the pump suction clogged the 1B conventional service water (CSW)pump strainer following pump start, which led to the inoperability of the 1B CSW pump on January 7, 2021.
Description:
On January 6, 2021, the 1B CSW pump was declared out of service for SW bay inspection and cleaning. TS action statement 3.7.2 condition C was entered for the service water system and ultimate heat sink (UHS). On January 7, 2021, TS 3.7.2 was exited. The 1B CSW pump was started and the running 1C CSW pump secured. Operators in the control room received 1-UA-1 (5-8) Conventional Pump Strainer B Diff-High and 1-UA-24 (1-1)
Conventional Header Service Water Press-low alarms.
The 1B CSW pump strainer differential pressure (DP) was reported at 9.8 psid and slowly increasing. The 1B CSW pump strainer was not rotating with the motor running which is contrary to normal operation of the strainer. The licensee restarted the 1C CSW pump to restore conventional header pressure. The licensee decision making process concluded the 1B CSW pump was inoperable because the strainer DP was greater than 8 psid.
Maintenance personnel discovered the 1B CSW pump strainer was clogged with 15 gallons of oyster shells and the motor shear pin was broken. The strainer was cleaned, and the motor shear pin replaced. On January 10, 2021, the 1B CSW pump strainer was returned to service and the TS LCO was exited.
Inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 0PM-STU500, Service Water Intake Structure Inspection and Cleaning and noted step 7.2.17 was to ensure shells have not settled under the service water pump suctions during cleaning activities to avoid strainers being clogged following pump start. Inspectors questioned whether the procedure was followed correctly. The licensee did not have sufficient records (i.e. video) to demonstrate that the 1B SW bay was cleaned properly due to limited access around the pump suction and poor water visibility (6 to 12 inches). However, the licensee believed the loose debris most likely came from the adjacent uncleaned 1C CSW pump bay area which was disturbed when the associated pump was secured. This debris was then ingested by the 1B CSW pump. This rapid influx of debris resulted in the backwash line becoming clogged, the strainer motor shear pin breaking, and a high strainer DP until the pump was secured. The procedure does not specify which adjacent CSW pump should be running during the pump bay cleaning. In this case, the procedure could have specified operation of the previously cleaned 1A CSW pump instead of the 1C CSW pump. This could have prevented the debris from the uncleaned bay from getting ingested during 1B CSW pump start and the subsequent inoperability of the 1B CSW pump.
Corrective Actions: The licensee repaired the broken motor shear pin and cleaned the strainer of debris. The 1B CSW pump was declared operable on January 10, 2021. The licensee is evaluating the pump bay cleaning procedure regarding the running of adjacent CSW pumps.
Corrective Action References: AR 2364279
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Failure to provide an adequate maintenance procedure to clean and inspect the interior pump bay areas was a performance deficiency. This resulted in inoperability of the 1B CSW pump on January 7, 2021.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the maintenance procedure did not ensure the interior pump bays were clean which led to the clogging of the 1B CSW pump strainer and inoperability of the 1B CSW pump on January 7, 2021.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was screened under Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions and was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because all screening questions were answered no.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specifications 5.4.1.a, Procedures required in part, written procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, November 1972.Section I.1 of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, required in part, maintenance which can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.
Contrary to the above, licensee procedures used to perform Service Water Intake Structure Inspection and Cleaning were not appropriate to the circumstances. Specifically, the maintenance procedures did not ensure the interior pump bay areas were clean prior to pump start. As a result, debris settled under the pump suction and clogged the 1B CSW pump strainer during pump start. The 1B CSW pump was declared inoperable due to the high DP on January 7, 2021.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 29, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to John Krakuszeski and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 25, 2021, the inspectors presented the baseline inservice inspection results to Steven Nichols, General Manager - Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On February 25, 2021, the inspectors presented the TI-194 Open Phase Follow Up inspection results to Steven Nichols, General Manager - Engineering, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
2515/194 Calculations BNP-E-4.008 OPEN PHASE CONDITION RESPONSE TIME 0
2515/194 Calculations BNP-PSA-117 Brunswick Nuclear Station PRA Analysis of Implementation 0
Options for Open Phase Condition Protection
2515/194 Engineering EC 300946 Unit 1 MPT Open Phase Detection System 001
Changes
2515/194 Engineering EC 300947 Unit 2 MPT Open Phase Detection System 001
Changes
71111.01 Procedures 0AI-68 Severe Weather 61
71111.01 Procedures 0AOP-13.0 Operation During Hurricane, Flood Conditions, Tornado, or 70
71111.04 Drawings D-02267 Diesel Generator Air Intake Exhaust & Crankcase Vacuum 1
System Piping Diagram
71111.04 Drawings D-02525 Sheet Reactor Building Residual Heat Removal piping diagram 75
1A
71111.04 Drawings D-02525 Sheet Reactor Building Residual Heat Removal piping diagram 72
1B
71111.05 Fire Plans 0PFP-013 General Fire Plan 54
71111.05 Fire Plans CSD-BNP-PFP- Control Building Pre-Fire Plans 5
0CB
71111.05 Procedures AD-OP-ALL-0207 FIRE BRIGADE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 3
71111.05 Procedures CSD-BNP-PFP- Diesel Generator Building Pre-Fire Plan 1
0DG
71111.07A Procedures 0ENP-2704 Administrative Control of NRC Generic Letter 89-13 25
Requirements
71111.08G Calculations 0RIP-1013 Drywell Liner Repair 8
71111.08G Corrective Action NCR 02111138, 02373428, 02373409, 02373916, 02373932,
Documents 02373968, 02374037, 02374393, 02374394, 02374461,
2374791
71111.08G Miscellaneous Procedure GTAW Welding Process 1
Qualification
Record No. 16
71111.08G Miscellaneous Procedure GTAW Welding Process 1
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
Qualification
Record No. 39
71111.08G Miscellaneous Welding Manual GTAW Process, CuNi, P-34-P-34 1
Procedure
Specification
GTOO3434-01
71111.08G Miscellaneous Welding GTAW or SMAW or Combination 11
Procedure
Specification
GTSM0808-01
71111.08G NDE Reports NDE Report # Liquid Penetrant Examination Report for Weld 2-SW-581 03/16/2021
63142
71111.08G NDE Reports NDE Report # Liquid Penetrant Examination of Weld 2-B32-1010 03/13/2021
63413
71111.08G NDE Reports NDE Report # Liquid Penetrant Examination of Weld 2-B32-1011 03/13/2021
63414
71111.08G NDE Reports UT-21-008 Ultrasonic Examination of 2B32RECIRC-28-A-7 (Pipe to 03/18/2021
Elbow Weld)
71111.08G NDE Reports VE-21-008 Ultrasonic Examination of RPV Vessel to Flange Weld - F 03/18/2021
71111.08G NDE Reports VE-21-009 Ultrasonic Examination of Nozzle N10 to Reactor Vessel 03/18/21
Weld
71111.08G Procedures NDE-NE-ALL- Utilization of PDI-UT-2 Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic 003
6102 Examination of Austenitic Pipe Welds
71111.08G Procedures NDE-NE-ALL- Utilization of PDI-UT-12 Procedure for Manual Phased Array 002
212 Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds
71111.08G Procedures QP.10.09B Procedure for VT-1 and VT-3 Visual Examinations of Class 3
MC Metallic Shell and Penetration Liners and Class CC
Pressure Retaining Components and their Integral
Attachments
71111.11Q Procedures 0GP-12 Power Changes 93
71111.11Q Procedures LORX-Rev 4 Rapid Loss of Condenser Vacuum with High-powered ATWS 0
71111.12 Corrective Action 2364279
Documents
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.12 Miscellaneous PI data Unit 1 Conventional Service Water Pumps
71111.12 Procedures 0PM-STU500 Service Water Intake Structure Inspection and Cleaning 27
71111.12 Procedures AD-EG-ALL-1210 Maintenance Rule Program 2
71111.13 Procedures 0AP-025 BNP Integrated Scheduling 60
71111.13 Procedures AD-OP-ALL-0201 Protected Equipment 8
71111.13 Procedures AD-WC-ALL- On-Line Work Management 19
200
71111.13 Procedures AD-WC-ALL- Work Implementation and Completion 12
250
71111.13 Procedures AD-WC-ALL- Work Activity Integrated Risk Management 11
0410
71111.15 Corrective Action NCR 2355931
Documents
71111.15 Corrective Action NCR 2364279
Documents
71111.15 Corrective Action NCR 2374676
Documents
71111.15 Corrective Action NCR 2374924
Documents
71111.15 Procedures AD-OP-ALL-0105 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments 4
71111.18 Engineering EC 403762 Unit 2 SAT replacement and AC low margin resolution 1
Changes
71111.19 Procedures 0PT-08.2.2C LPCI/RHR System Operability Test 97
71111.19 Procedures 0PT-20.3 Local Leakrate Testing 92
71111.19 Procedures 2MST-XFR41R Automatic Switching From UAT to SAT Functional Test 12
71111.19 Work Orders 20453156
71111.20 Procedures 0GP-02 Approach to Criticality and Pressurization of the Reactor 124
71111.20 Procedures 0GP-03 Unit Startup and Synchronization 98
71111.20 Procedures 0GP-04 Increasing Turbine Load to Rated Power 130
71111.20 Procedures 0GP-05 Unit Shutdown 202
71111.20 Procedures 0GP-06 Cold Shutdown to Refueling (Head Unbolted) 49
71111.20 Procedures 0GP-07 Preparations for Core Alteration 66
71111.20 Procedures 0GP-08 Refueling to Cold Shutdown 55
Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or
Procedure Date
71111.20 Procedures 0GP-13 Increasing Unit Capacity at the End of Core Cycle 57
71111.20 Procedures 0GP-15 RPV Water Inventory Control Guidance 3
71111.22 Procedures 0MST-HPCI28Q HPCI REACTOR HIGH WATER LVL TRIP UNIT CAL AND 8
CHAN FUNCTIONAL TEST
71111.22 Procedures 0PT-08.2.2C LPCI/RHR System Operability Test 97
71111.22 Procedures 0PT-46.4 Control Building HVAC Auto Initiation 38
71111.22 Procedures 2MST-SCIS42R CAC PCIS Group 2/6 and SCIS Isolation Logic Functional 10
Test
71111.22 Work Orders 20437814
71151 Procedures AD-PI-ALL-0700 Performance Indicators 4
71152 Corrective Action 2347793
Documents
71152 Corrective Action 2370795
Documents
71152 Procedures AD-PI-ALL-0100 Corrective Action Program 25
15