IR 05000324/1986035
| ML20207K336 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1986 |
| From: | Decker T, Kreh J, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207K324 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-86-35, 50-325-86-34, NUDOCS 8701090394 | |
| Download: ML20207K336 (18) | |
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1 k Ofe UNITED STATES jk ug'o
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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REGION 11 n
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
ATLANTA, GEO'1GI A 30323 49 * " * *,o DEC 2 41986
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Report Nos.: 50-325/86-34 and 50-324/86-35 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos.: 50-325 and 50-324
'.icense Nos. :
DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Inspection Conducted: December 9-11, 1986 Inspectors:
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/3./.93/ 84 W. M. Sartor Date Signed Y
l'1/3 3lM J. L. Kreh Date Signed
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Accompanying Personnel:
G.E. Arthur (Sonalysts)-
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M. E. Stein (Sonalysts)
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Approved by: tI [
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T. R. Decker, Chief Date S'igned Emergency Preparedness Section i
l Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved observation and evaluation of key emergency organizational functions and locations 'during an emergency exercise.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
Two exercise weaknesses were identified.
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8701090394 861224 PDR ADOCK 05000324
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REPORT DETAILS
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Persons Contacted
I Licensee Employees I
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- P. W. Howe, Vice President, Brunswick Nuclear Project
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- C. R. Dietz, General Manager r
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- R. B. Starkey, Jr., Manager, Nuclear Safety and Environmental Services
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(Corporate)
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- R. G. Black, Jr., Manager, Emergency Preparedness (Corporate)
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- B. H. Webster, Manager, Radiation and Chemical Support (Corporate)
- K. E. Enzor, Director, Regulatory Compliance
- G. R. Peeler, Director, Planning and Scheduling
- L. E. Jones, Director, Quality Assurance / Quality Control
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- J. A. Smith, Director, Administrative Support
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- L. V. Wagoner, Director, Long-Range Planning
- G. J. Oliver, Manager, Site Planning j
- J. O'Sullivan, Manager, Maintenance
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- E. A. Bishop, Manager, Operations l
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- E. R. Eckstein, Manager, Technical Support i
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- A. G. Cheatham, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
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- E. M. Bean, Director of News Programs, Corporate Communications
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- P. G. Dorosko, Administrative Supervisor
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- S. W. Morgan, Senior Specialist, Operator Training
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- W. L. Triplett, Project Specialist l
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- J. L. Parchman, Project Engineer, Operations
- A. F. Spencer, Senior Specialist, Operations
- D. E. Novotny, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
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- B. D. McFeaters, Emergency Planner (Corporate)
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- R. A. Indelicato, Senior Specialist, Emergency Preparedness i
i Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
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I operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
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j Other Organizations j
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- H. L. Reese, Emergency Planner, North Carolina Division of Emergency
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Management
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NRC Resident Inspectors f
- W. H. Ruland
- L. W. Garner-i i
- Attended exit interview
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2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 11, 1986, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Exercise Scenario (82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine whether provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's emergency plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to fully exercise the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency information to the State and loca'. government agencies for their respective participation in the exercise.
On the second day of the exercise, the licensee provided support to the State of North Carolina, Division of Emergency Management in conducting a 50-miis ingestion pathway exercise.
The scenario was received three days after the desired submittal date, but was reviewed and discussed in advance of the scheduled exercise date with licensee representatives.
No major problems with the scenario were identified during the review.
One inconsistency in the licensee's response and the scenario regarding the venting of the drywell was observed; however, this inconsistency did not detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.
During the exercise critique on December 11, 1986, it was discussed with management representatives that the objective for demonstrating the operation and adequacy of the post-accident sampling system (PASS) was not met.
Since the scenario stated that no sample was to be taken, licensee representatives acknowledged that the objective should have been worded differently and that the operation and adequacy of the PASS had not in fact been demonstrated during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Assignment of Responsibility (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established and whether adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required
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by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654, Fections II.A and II.B.
The inspectors verified that the licensee made specific assignments to the emergency organization.
The inspectors observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organizations in the Control Room, the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (0SC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F).
At each of these centers, the assignment of emergency staff personnel appeared to be consistent with the licensee's emergency plan.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made and whether other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E Paragraph IV. A; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
An inspector observed that the Radiological Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures provided for requesting and using assistance resources. However, assistance resources were not observed during this exercise as there was neither a medical nor a fire drill that required offsite assistance.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
l This area was observed to determine whether a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
An emergency action level scheme was in place and used to classify the emergency.
The initial emergency classification was based on exceeding a fire event emergency action level.
The declaration was delayed approximately two minutes because the control operators in the Control Room who received the telephone message failed to pass all information received to the Shift Operations Supervisor. The information which was inadvertently omitted was that a portable fire extinguisher had been discharged.
This information is pertinent because the EAL for an Unusual Event states
" Unplanned fire within the Protected Area not brought under control more than 20 minutes after activation of a Fire Suppression System or 10 minutes af ter manual fire fighting efforts have begun."
An Alert declaration requires the same conditions and that the fire potentially affects vital safety-related equipment.
As a result of these events, the licensee identified the need to review this EAL to insure that the declaration of an emergency classification based on a fire is not dependent upon whether a
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Fire Suppression System has been activated or manual fire fighting efforts have begun.
Inspector Follow-up Item (50-325/86-34-01, 50-324/86-35-01): Review changes made to EALs for the fire event category.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether procedures had been established for notification by the licensee of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations had been established; and means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway have been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.
Inspectors observed that notification methods and procedures had been established to pro /ide information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State, and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.
However, an inspector noted that when the Alert notifications were made from the Control Room via the automatic ringdown (ARD) telephone, an additional party, not identified in Plant Emergency Procedure PEP-02.6.21,
" Emergency Communicator," responded to the notification.
Although this initially confused the communicator, notifications were continued and completed in a timely manner.
The additional party was the New Hanover County Emergency Services Office.
The need to be cognizant of all parties on the ARD telephone and for the procedures to be accurate in listing these organizations was identified as an exercise weakness.
Exercise Weakness (50-325/86-34-02, 50-324/86-35-02):
Procedures did not accurately reflect all parties on the ARD telephone used for notification.
An inspector also noted that the Emergency Response Manager (ERM) in the EOF had a follow-up message transmitted indicating that the event classification remained General Emergency (GE) when, in fact, the classification had just been downgraded to Site Area Emergency (SAE).
This created some confusion with the county emergency management coordinators who had received the downgrading information from the conference call line that was maintained with the ERM.
Inspector Follow-up Item (50-325/86-34-03, 50-324/86-35-03):
ERM needs to insure that follow-up messages correctly reflect the emergency classification in effect.
It was also noted by the inspector in the TSC that the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC-) downgraded from GE to SAE without consulting with the State, and before conditions were stable as indicated by the fact that
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drywell venting was still in progress.
Additionally, sheltering was in effect and no discussions were observed addressing the possibility of revising the protective action recommendation (PAR).
Exercise Weakness (50-325/85-34-04, 50-324/86-35-04):
The SEC downgraded the emergency classification without considering revision of the PAR and without coordinating the decision with appropriate personnel.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether provisions existed for prompt communications among the principal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
Emergency communications among the emergency organizations appeared adequate throughout the exercise.
The sole exception to this was the difficulty noted in the communications between members of the onsite fire brigade when wearing their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) face masks.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether information concerning the simulated emergency had been made available fcr dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and the public in advance of the exercise.
The licensee established a Media Center next to the Visitors Center and provided periodic news announcements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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11. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.4/(b)(8); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The emergency facilities were activated and staffed during the exercise.
The facilities appeared to be adequately equipped to support the emergency response.
No violations or deviations were identifie.
12. AccidentAssessment(82301)
This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
An inspector noted that although the Operations Support Center (OSC)
simulated moving to an alternate location because of the radiological hazard associated with the drywell venting, further OSC operations were conducted with no discussion or consideration of the effects of that release.
Inspector Follow-up Item (50-325/86-34-05, 50-324/86-35-05): OSC operations were conducted without consideration of the effects of the drywell venting.
The inspector in the E0F noted that the engineering assessment of plant status was initially hampered because the posted plant status parameters were one hour behind when the E0F was activated.
Inspector Follow-up Item (50-325/86-34-06, 50-324/86-35-06):
Plant status parameters posted in the EOF were not always current.
No violations or deviations were identified.
13. Protective Response (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether guidelines for protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
An inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the ten-mile EPZ.
The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with the EPA and other criteria.
No violations or deviations were identified.
14.
Exercise Critique (82301)
l The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to verify that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organizations were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by
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10 CFR 50.47(b)(14); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted a post-exercise critique on December 10, 1986, and presented.the results to licensee management the next day.
The licensee's critique was thorough, and identified some 23 items requiring follow-up which included in substance the majority of findings observed by the NRC team.
The licensee's critique did not contain player input.
The NRC inspector identified the need for player self-critique input to be a part of the observations provided to the licensee evaluators.
Inspector Follow-up Item (50-325/86-34-07, 50-324/86-35-07):
Licensee critique did not have player input.
No violations or deviations were identified.
15.
Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team ~(Regional Assistance Conmittee and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV Staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
16.
Inspector Follow-up (92701)
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(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-324/85-20-01:
Additional training of licensee and State organizations regarding emergency notification procedures / methods / interactions attending emergency declarations.
This previous IFI addressed delayed notifications to the counties because the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) had not yet activated.
Timely notifications were made to the counties throughout the exercise, both before and after SERT activation, b.
(Closed) IFI 50-324/85-20-03:
ERFs maintenance of records of in-plant and offsite radiological conditions.
The records maintained by the emergency response facilities for in-plant and offsite radiological conditions appeared to be adequate during the exercise.
c.
(Closed) IFI 50-324/85-20-04:
Air sampling and sample removal procedures should be implemented as required.
No problems were identified during the exercise with air sampling and sample removal procedures, d.
(Closed) IFI 50-324/85-20-05:
Additional training required for EOF personnel regarding protective action recommendations involving notifications and communications.
Personnel in the E0F properly completed the form for making protective action recommendations.
Attachment:
Exercise Objectives and Scenario Timeline
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY PLAN FOR BRUNSWICK EMERCENCY EXERCISE -- DECEMBER 10 & 11, 1986 (continued)
OBJECTIVES TO BE DEMONSTRATED / TESTED:
A.
Demonstrate the ability to augment the emergency organization within the specified time limits.
(normal working hours)
B.
Demonstrate that staffing levels are adequate to facilitate shift turnover, based on an emergency of extended duration.
(No actual turnover will occur.)
C.
Demonstrate the adequacy of control room staff in the ability to perform control and accident mitigation activities along with accident assessment.
D.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Operations Support Center (OSC) providing additional manpower support and coordination.
E.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center (TSC) providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment and communication / notification activities.
F.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) in providing evaluation and coordination of all off-site activities and information exchange with Federal, State and local authorities.
C.
Demonstrate the ability to disseminate information to the media at the near-site emergency media center.
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CAROLINA POWER & LICHT COMPANY PLAN FOR BRUNSWICK EMERCENCY EXERCISE -- DECEMBER 10 & 11, 1986 (continued)
H.
Demonstrate the adequacy of emergency kits in the emergency
response facilities for providing necessary protective equipment.
(i.e.,
dosimetry, instrumentation, protective clothing, respiratory equipment, etc.)
I.
Demonstrate the ability to communicate between emergency response facilities, as well as, with environmental monitoring teams.
J.
Test the ability of on-site personnel to effectively utilize
the emergency action level scheme.
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Demonstrate the ability to promptly notify off-site authorities, and in all cases within 15 minutes from the time
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of emergency classification.
L.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the information provided in the initial notification, as well as, follow up notifications to the State and Counties.
M.
Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for. alerting, notifying, and mobilizing emergency response personnel.
N.
Demonstrate the - ability of designated dose assessment personnel te determine the release path, as_ well as, potential release paths, release rates and dose to the public at multiple downwind distances under varying meteorological conditions.
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CAROLINA POWER & LICllT COMPANY PLAN FOR BRUNSWICK EMERCENCY EXERCISE -- DECEMBER 10 & 11, 1986 (continued)
O.
Demonstrate the ability of emergency response personnel to formulate protective action recommendations based on pre-established criteria.
P.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate news releases.
(Federal, State, local and licensee, as appropriate).
Q Demonstrate the adequacy of the equipment utilized for off-site radiological monitoring.
R.
Demonstrate the ability of the field monitoring teams to detect radioiedine in concentrations as low as IE-7 uCi/cc under field conditions and in the presence of noble gas and background radiation.
S.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate off-site radiological monitoring with state monitoring teams in the ingestion pathway.
T.
Demonstrate the transfer of responsibility from the Control Room staff to the Technical Support Center staff.
U.
Demonstrate the transfer of responsibility for off-site activities from the Technical Support Center s ta f f to the Emergency Off-site Facility staff.
V.
Demonstrate the ability to acquire meteorological data from an alternate location.
(Other than the on-site meteorological system).
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CAROLINA POWER-& LIGHT COMPANY PLAN FOR BRUNSWICK EMERCENCY EXERCISE -- DECEMBER 10 & 11, 1986 (continued)
W.
Demonstrate the operation of and the adequacy of the post accident sampling system.
(No actual sample will be taken).
D X.
Demonstrate the ability to pe rf orm on-site accountability within 30 minutes from the time of emergency declaration.
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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY i
BRUNSWICK ANNUAL EMERCENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE INITIAL CONDITIONS j
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DECEMBER 10, 1986 I
l BRUNSWICK UNIT NO. 1
- BSEP Unit #1 has been at.100% power for the past'188 days.
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plant parameters are stable.
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"C" RHR pump, 4160 volt breaker i s out for maintenance.
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BRUNSWICK UNIT NO. 2
- B",EP Unit #2 has been at 100% power for the past 91 days.
All-11 ant parameters are stable.
- Diesel generator f4 is out for maintenance and scheduled to be in service at 19:00 E.S.T.
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- "B" SBCT fan motor and filter train are out of service.
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On December 10, 1986, Units 1 and 2 are operating at power with initial
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conditions as follows:
Unit 1 --- 100% power --- 188 days of continuous service.
Inerting of dryvell is in progress.
1C RHR pump 4160 volt breaker undergoing relay change-out and maintenance.
Unit 2 --- 100% power ---- 91 days of continuous service.
09:00 A fire alarm is received in the control room.
UA-27(3-6)
" Fire Diesel Cen. El. 23 N.
SWCR".
A.Q.
is dispatched to investigate.
09:04 A.O. reports 480V feeder breaker to MCC IXA on Substation E-5 is burning and smoking badly.
The A.O.
reported that concurrent with this call a fire watch was applying portable CO2 but due to ex'cessive smoke, he was forced to leave the room.
09:06 Plant fire alarm is sounded.
09:20 Fire brigade arrives at scene and begins to prepare to fight
the fire. an " ALERT" should be declared based on a fire on safety related equipment lasting greater than 10 minutes a[ter manned fire fighting began.
" ALERT"
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F 09:23 Shift fire commander requests that substation E-5 be de-energized for combating the fire.
09:30 Shift fire commander reports to control room that the fire.is out.
Requests support to evaluate the condition at the Substation.
Commenced reactor power reduction in preparation for unit shutdown.
l 10:00 Unit I reports the following symptoms:
1. "A" loop recirc. flow increase I
2. "A" loop jet pump flow increased I
3. Generator megawatt decrease 4. Increase in total core flow 5. #5 jet pump flow pegged high l
r 10:15 Unit I has the following symptoms:
Annunciator UA-23 2-6 " Main Steam Line Rad. Hi" SJAE and MSL radiation recorders increasing.
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10:35 Unit I receives a reactor scram and group 1 isolation.
The scram and isolation were caused by main steam line Hi/Hi radiation.
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1. Drywell pressure increased rapidly to 49 psig and stabilized at 30 psig.
2. Reactor vessel level decreased rapidly and has recovered.
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3. HPCI and RCIC initiated and have tripped on low steam supply pressure.
4. A RHR pump tripped, "C" RHR pump 4160V breaker is disassembled for maintenance.
5. "B"
& "D" RHR pumps started in LPCI mode.
6. "A"
& "B" core spray systems started and are operating.
A " Site Emergency" should be declared
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" SITE EMERCENCY" I
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,11:25 The "B" RHR loop inboard containment spray valve (Ell-F021B)
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12:30 Service water flow to "B" RHR heat exchanger has been lost.
RHR service water booster pumps are running and both the haat exchanger flow control outlet valve Ell-F002B and the flow control valve Ell-F068B indicate open.
No flow is indicated through the system and the pumps are at shut-off head.
" GENERAL EMERGENCY" 13:25 Primary containment pressure at 57 psig.
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13:30 Primary containment pressure at 58 psig.
13:45 The 18" vent line from the suppression pool was opened to reduce primary containment pressure.-
Flow is estimated at 16,000 SCFM.
The vent path is through the purge exhaust system.
All small vent lines are open.
Pressure in containment is decreasing.
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i 13:50 Service water flow to
"B" RHR loop has been established.
"B" RHR loop has been diverted to torus cooling.
Core spray is being used to maintain reactor vessel level.
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13:55 Feeder breaker from substation E-5 to MCC IXA has been i
repaired.
MCC IXA has been energized.
RHR pump 1A breaker
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has been repaired.
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i 14:00 Primary containment venting was secured at 13:55.
The drywell was sprayed using "A" RHR loop.
Drywell pressure has decreased to 26 psig.
s 14:15
"A" RER loop being used to maintain reactor vessel level.
"B" RHR loop is in suppression pool cooling.
Both core spray loops have been secured.
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15:00 continuing plant cooldown.
16:00 (Approximately)
Suspend the first day of the exercise i
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DECEMBER 11, 1986 08:00 Resume second day of the exercise.
The second day will be to support the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management (DEM) in conducting the 50 mile ingestion pathway exercise.
The CP&L Technical Support Center and other plant emergency centers (except the plant media center) will be terminated on the suspension of play, December 10, 1986.
The CP&L Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will participate on a limited basis to support DEM activities.
The Emergency Response Manager (ERM), the Radiological Control Director (RDC), Health Physics Supervisor, Environmental Supervisor, Environmental Field Coordinator, all CP&L Environmental Monitoring Teams and the CP&L public information personnel will participate on December 11, 1986, in support of. DEM activities.
Appropriate CP&L controllers will be provided copies of the DEM exercise scenario and will provide (
information to CP&L players as required.
A second release of radioactivity will occur after suspension of play on December 10, 1986, but will not relate to plant conditions or activities during the December 10, 1986 exercise.
14:00 (approximately)
TERMINATION OF SECOND DAY EXERCISEE