IR 05000324/1986033
| ML20212B577 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/1986 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Garner L, Mellen L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212B521 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-86-33, 50-325-86-32, 50-325-86-33, NUDOCS 8612290276 | |
| Download: ML20212B577 (16) | |
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km Moo UNITEO STATES
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'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION il n
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101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
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'2 ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.:
50-325/86-32 and 50-324/86-33 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos.:
50-325 and 50-324 License Nos.:
DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brunswick I and 2
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IInspection Cpnducted'; \\
November 1-30, 1986 12_ j Z
Inspectors:
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H. Rula nd Da~te Signed J$Mk a Inks
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M. W. Garner Date Signed
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.L Mellen Date Signed Approved by:
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P3 E. Fredrickson, Section Chief Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY-
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Scope: This routine safety inspection involved the areas of followup on previous enforcement matters, maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verification, ESF System walkdown, onsite Licensee Event Reports (LER)
review, IE Bulletin followup, followup on inspector identified and unresolved items, onsite followup of events, and access control.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project C. Dietz, General Manager - Brunswick Nuclear Project T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction J. Holder, Manager - Outages E. Bishop, Manager - Operations L. Jones, Director - Quality Assurance (QA)/ Quality Control (QC)
R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP J. Chase, Assistant to General Manager J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance R. Groover, Manager - Project Construction A. Hegler, Superintendent - Operations W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor B. Wilson,_ Engineering Supervisor R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
R. Warden, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
C. Treubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist D. Novotny, Senior Regulatory Specialist W. Murray, Senior Engineer - Nuclear Licensing Unit Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force members.
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 1, 1986, with the general manager. The licensee acknowledged the findings without exception. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
3.
Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(CLOSED) Violation (50-325/81-11-01), Inadequate Maintenance Procedures.
The inspector reviewed ENP-03 which adequately covered the deficiencies noted in this violation.
The inspector has no further concerns.
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(CLOSED) Violation (50-325/82-45-01 and 50-324/82-45-01), Failure to Followup
on Corrective Actions.
The inspector reviewed the procedure Q-List Volume XI, Revision 22, which implemented the changes required by this item and the current revision (29) which still contains all pertinent information from Revision 22. This revision adequately addressed the inspectors concerns.
(CLOSED) Violation (50-325/82-45-02 and 50-324/82-45-02), Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) Inadequate Review, and Violation (50-325/83-03-01),
PNSC Inadequate Review of Procedure GP-1.
The inspector reviewed Revision 76 of the Administrative Procedure (AP).
The AP adequately addressed the concerns noted in the violation.
(CLOSED) Violation (50-325/82-45-03 and 50-324/82-45-03), Failure to Establish Calibration Procedures.
The inspector reviewed PT-03.1.21, Rev. 11; PT-10.1.1, Rev. 23; and 01-03,_Rev. 22; which adequately addressed this item.
(CLOSED) Violation (50-324/83-03-01), Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Was Not Isolated Within One Hour as Required by Technical Specifications (TS). The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to this violation and the applicable sections of the TS.
(CLOSED) Violation (50-325/83-03-02), Failure to Implement, and Violation (50-325/83-03-04), Failure to Maintain FH-11. The inspector reviewed FH-11 and found that it adequately addressed the concerns noted in both violations.
(CLOSED) Violation (50-325/84-07-01 and 50-324/84-07-01), Failure to Meet
- Posting Requirement of 10 CFR 19. The licensee's response to the Notice of Violation, dated May 2, 1984, committed to revise plant procedures RCI-6.2 and RCI-8.1 to improve discussion of posting requirements.
The inspector verified that RCI-6.2, NRC Inspection and Enforcement Inspection Reports, Revision 3, step 2.2 and RCI-8.1, Incoming NRC Correspondence, Revision 1, step 2.3, adequately address the posting requirements of 10 CFR 19.11(a).
Plant Notice PN-17, Posting of Materials on Plant Bulletin Boards, Revir. ion 7, step 2.3, requires 10 CFR 19 materials to be posted on bulletin boards in the administration building and the service building.
(CLOSED) Violation (50-324/84-31-02), Inadequate Functional Test of Standby Gas 1reatment (SBGT) System Valves.
The inspector verified that IMST-SCIS41R, Secondary Containment Isolation Logic System Functional Test, Revision 1, verifies per steps 7.3.6, 7.3.7, 7.4.20 and 7.4.21, that the D and H valves open on a secondary containment isolation signal.
Procedure 2MST-SCIS41R, Revision 2, performs a similar verification for Unit 2.
Unit 2 is designed such that SBGT system train suction valves will also open on an isolation signal.
Testing of these are also performed by 2MST-SCIS41R.
The applicable Unit 2 steps are 7.3.6, 7.3.7, 7.3.9 through 7.3.12, and 7.4.20 through 7.4.2 l
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The licensee committed in their response to the notice of violation, dated January 30, 1985, to implement controls to ensure drawing changes involving logic changes will trigger procedure changes.
The inspector verified that ENP-25, Plant Drawing Correction Procedure, Revision 4, step 5.2, contains an adequate trigger mechanism.
No additional violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to verify that work was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that:
redundant components were operable; admin-istrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personni were qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points were adequate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification requirements were implemented.
The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to service.
Outstanding work requests were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance.
The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities:
85-AHGH1 Calibration of No. 2 Diesel Generator (DG) Wattmeter.
86-BKWL1 Replacement of 2B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water (SW) Pump Per Maintenance Instruction MI-16-561, Rev. 7.
86-BTCU1 DG No. 1 Lube Oil Change.
86-BUJJ1 Repair of Stater Cooling Temperature Control Valve GSC-TV-Y-07 Controller.
86-8UU51 Calibration of "A" Feedwater Square Root Flow Converter.
MI-03-5A Fischer and Porter Models 5181451 and 51C1451 Temperature Controller.
MI-03-6F4 Square Root Converter Type 565 Special for G31 FY-K602/K603/
K605.
SP-86-091 Seismic In-Situ Testing of MCC 2CA, Rev..
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During performance of MI-03-6F4 on November 13, 1986, the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technician stated to the inspector that all calibration points were satisfactory and began to remove the test equipment.
Review of the data showed that one data point was 0.01 outside of tolerance. The instrument, reactor water cleanup square root converter K603, was recali-brated. The inspector noted that the first line supervisor's review of the data had not been performed at the time he made the observation. This was reported to the cognizant supervisor.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical Speci-fications. Through observation and record review, the inspectors verified that: tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements; administra-tive controls were followed; personnel were qualified; instrumentation was calibrated; and data was accurate and complete. The inspectors independently verified selected test results and proper return to service of equipment.
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:
IMST-FWC21Q Feedwater Control (FWC) Remote Shutdown Panel (RSDP) Reactor Vessel Pressure Channel Calibration.
IMST-RSDP21Q RSDP and RTGB Panel Reactor Water Level Indicator Channel Calibration.
PT-12.2a No. 1 DG Monthly Load Test.
PT-15.1 Standby Gas Treatment System Filter Test.
t No violations or deviations were identified.
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l 6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.
The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the technical specifications were met.
Control room, shift supervisor and clearance logs were reviewed to obtain information concerning operating trends and out of service safety systems to ensure that there were j
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no conflicts with Technical Specificatior.s Limiting Conditions for Operations.
Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation
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and recorder traces important to safety to verify operability and that
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parameters were within Technical Specification limits.
The inspectors observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained.
The inspectors verified the status of selected control room annunciators.
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Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) train was verified by insuring that: each accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct position; each power supply and breaker, including control room fuses, were aligned for components that must activate upon initiation signal; removal of power from those ESF motor-operated valves, so identified by Technical Specifications, was completed; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did not exist which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.
Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified operable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve lineup, if accessible.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies /proce-dures were followed. This included a review of area surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.
The inspectors verified that: the security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area (PA); vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; personnel in vital areas were authorized; and effective compensatory measures were employed when required.
The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified position of certain containment isolation valves, checked a clearance, and verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.
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Inspector Observations On November 24, 1986, the inspector observed that the Unit 2 safety relief valve tailpipe temperature strip chart recorder was printing point 6 as ambient. The ambient point should be point 12. Apparently the print wheel had slipped out of sequence.
The licensee issued a trouble ticket to repair.
On November 25, 1986, the inspector observed that the control room ventilation inlet tornado damper, 2A-CV-CB position indicator on the main control board was not illuminated.
This was discussed with the control operator.
He was not sure if it had ever been operational.
The similar indicator on Unit I showed a red open indication. The licensee issued work request 86-BWSG1 to trouble shoot the lack of indication.
The lack of attention to this item was discussed with the operations manager. The inspectors have observed increased sensitivity to control board indications recently.
The discovery of the standby gas treatment 1B heater circuit problem discussed in paragraph 7 is one such exampl.
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b.
Hydrogen Transportation On-Site The licensee routinely receives compressed hydrogen by truck for the main generator cooling system.
The hydrogen trucks drive along a roadbed that is adjacent to the chlorine tank car. The deliveries occur about once a week.
Railroad tracks, a chain link fence and 20 feet separate the roadbed from the chlorine tank car.
NRR expressed concern about this practice during the technical review for the upcoming hydrogen water chemistry testing.
The concern related to chlorine-hydrogen interaction in the. event of a simultaneous leak of the chlorine tank car and the hydrogen truck. NRR plans to review the
'3 safety consequences of this practice.
The inspector questioned the l'censee about current controls on the hydrogen truck while on site.
The security manager reported that a security watchperson rides with the driver at all times while in the protected area and that the speed ifmit in the protected area is 10 miles per hour. Pending NRR review, this is an Inspector Followup Item: NRR Hydrogen-Chlorine Interaction Concerns (50-325/86-32-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors performed a walkdown of the accessible portions of the Units 1 and 2 SBGT systems. The inspectors verified that valves and fan motors were properly maintained, component labeling was correct, instrumentation was functioning, valves and associated control switches were in the correct position per OP-10, Standby Gas Treatment System Operating Procedure, and power was available to motor-operated valves. The inspectors verified that OP-10, Revision 8, for Unit 1 and Revision 26, for Unit 2 contained the major system valves as indicated by the SEGT piping and instrument drawings 9527-F-4073 and 40073, sheet 3.
The inspectors observed that there were labeling discrepancies between the OP-10 breaker check list and the labels on the Motor Control Centers (MCC).
The discrepancies involved only the noun identifier.
In all cases, the MCC compartment number and numeric valve identifier matched with that in the operating procedures.
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discrepancies on Unit 2 are noted below:
Procedure Name MCC Label Purge Exhaust Fans Suction Valve Standby Gas Treatment Valve 2I-BFV-RB 2I-BFV-RB Primary Containment Post LOCA SGT Bypass Vlv V8 (Dynotype)
Vent Valve, 2-SGT-V8 STBY GAS TRTMNT EXH FAN 2A OUTLET CV 2A-BFCV-RB (permanent tag)
The inspectors also observed that only a few of the 120 volt distribution panel circuit breakers had the new type labels attached.
Resolution of these items will be tracked as part of Inspector Followup Item 50-325 and 324/82-25-01, Review Activities to Establish and Implement a Valve and
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Breaker Label Replacement Program.
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On November 25, 1986, the Unit 1 SBGT train B was placed under clearance to repair the heater circuit. At approximately 1:30 a.m.,
the control operator had observed an increase in the inlet temperature. Within 15 minutes the temperature had increased to approximately 250 degrees F.
Normal value is 100 degrees F or less.
Troubleshooting of the heater control circuit revealed no problems.
The controller was replaced with one from stores.
Examination of the temperature controller found heat damage; some solder joints had melted.
The system still did not perform correctly.
The licensee then determined that the probable cause was air backflowing through the train. That is, cold air was flowing over the thermostat switch causing it to be continuously actuated.
The outlet check valve was removed and replaced. The system then responded correctly and was returned to service.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Onsite Review of Licensee Event Reports (92700)
The listed Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed to verify that the information provided met NRC reporting requirements.
The verification included adequacy of event description and corrective action taken or planned, existence of potential generic problems and the relative safety significance of the event. Onsite inspections were performed and concluded that necessary corrective actions have been taken in accordance with existing requirements, licensee conditions and commitments.
The following reports are considered closed:
(CLOSED) LER 1-81-46, Snubber Shaft Broken on RHR Piping During Operation in Steam Condensing Mode. The licensee has eliminated the RHR steam condensing mode. The inspector has no further questions.
(CLOSED) LER 1-81-54, 3K Snubber Installed Where a 20K Snubbar Was Required on the RHR Suction Line. The inspector reviewed the completed work request for installation of the correct snubber and the program to reinspect all existing snubbers to ensure they were of an appropriate size.
The program has been completed and the inspector has no further questions.
(CLOSED) LER 1-83-25, Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.
The inspector reviewed the completed work package and applicable sections of TS 3.1.5.
(CLOSED) LER 1-83-34, Instrument Isolation Valves Were Closed Rendering Vacuum Breakers Inoperable.
The inspector reviewed the incident report and selected samples of the procedures that were modified to preclude the recurrence of this event.
There are no further questions at this time.
(CLOSED) LER 1-84-03, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Electronic Speed Controller Malfunction Causes Erratic Turbine Speed.
The licensee submitted a supplement, dated September 19, 1984, as committed in the original LER.
Neither the licensee nor the vendor could determine the problem with the EGM (speed controller).
The inspector revicwed the engineer's statement that EGM Serial No.1600157 was removed from the stores system. The inspector has no further questions.
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(CLOSED)' LER 1-84-07, Automatic Isolation of HPCI System. The inspector
reviewed the LER closecut package and has no further concerns.
(CLOSED) LER 1-84-14, Unit 1 Scram Due to Electronic Keying of Two-Way Radio Effecting Average Power Range Monitors (APRMs). The licensee committed to perform test to determine areas in which use of two-way radios would adversely effect instruments. The inspector reviewed the results of the testing. The
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licensee installed signs in these areas.
The inspector verified that selected signs were still in place.
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Failure of a MSIV solenoid was also described in the subject report.
Solenoid failures were addressed by the licensee in LER 2-85-08.
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(CLOSED) LER 1-84-22, Group 3 Primary Containment Isolation Due to Erroneous
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Signal from Temperature Sensor Module.
The module was repaired and the system returned to service. The licensee committed to perform an additional evaluation of the component breakdown. The inspector reviewed the evaluation conducted by the instrumentation and control group. No determination of
the component failure within the module could be made because the vendor considered the applicable drawings as proprietary.
An Engineering Work
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Request (EWR) 84-01647, was issued to evaluate improvements and/or replace-
ment units as deemed necessary.
Discussion with the cognizant engineer revealed that the _ method of testing was contributing to premature failure
of the modules.
Revision of the test procedures has reduced the failures.
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I (CLOSED) LER.1-84-27, Localized High Temperature Due to Steam Leak Isolates Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System. The steam leak was repaired.
The licensee committed to have appropriate licensed personnel review the report. The inspector verified that Real Time Training Package No. 84-4-2,
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dated November 15, 1984, included this LER in the list of material to be
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discussed.
(CLOSED) LER 1-85-09, Reactor Building Roof Ventilation Monitor Inoperable Due to Annunciator Card Not Installed. The licensee committed to instruct appropriate personnel on this event. The inspector reviewed the documenta-tion from the shift operating supervisors indicating that the item was
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reviewed with their shift.
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(CLOSED) LER 1-85-11, Removal of Main Steam Line Monitor Detector Results in Noise Induced Reactor Protection System Actuation.
The inspector verified that Maintenance Procedure MI-16-29A, Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors D12-RM-K603 A-D, Revision 0, was issued on September 23, 1985, as committed.
The inspector also verified that signs were installed as stated.
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(CLOSED) LER 1-85-12, Control Building Emergency Air Filtration System Actuations.
One of these events was attributed to personnel error. The
event was reviewed by the affected work group.
The inspector reviewed the I
training attendance list.
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(CLOSED) LER 1-85-13, Control Building Heating, Ventilating and Air
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Conditioning (HVAC) system Manually Isolated in Response to High Chlorine Alarm.
The licensee could not determine the cause of the chlorine alarm.
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9 (CLOSED) LER 1-85-25, Failure to Perform Required C02 Storage Cylinders'
Minimum Weight Surveillance. The licensee committed to provide operations'
fire protection group staff training concerning this event. The inspector verified that both staff members were listed on the training roster dated July 26, 1985, as attending the session.
(CLOSED) LER 1-85-29, Accidental Shorting of a Test Lead Causes Primary Containment Group 1 Isolation to Occur When Fuse Blows.
The inspector observed the installation of some of the HFA relays under the enhanced controls described in the LER.
(CLOSED) LER 2-83-66 and LER 2-83-73, RWCU Flow Indicator Reading High. The inspector reviewed EWR 83-307 which covered the long term corrective action to prevent air entrapment in the instrument sensing lines. The EWR has been completed and appeared to adequately address the problem.
(CLOSED)
rR 2-83-74, Reactor Recirculation Pump Trip Due to High Motor Generator et Drive Temperature. This event was caused by personnel error.
The inspector reviewed the training records. to verify that appropriate corrective actions were taken to prevent recurrence.
(CLOSED) LER 2-83-77, Both Reactor Recirculation Pumps Tripped Due to Actuation of ATWS/RPT Instruments. This event was caused by personnel error while performing a Periodic Test (PT). The inspector reviewed PT-55.3PC to ensure that appropriate precautionary notes were in t procedure.
(CLOSED) LER 2-83-80, Suppression Pool Water Level Exceeded TS Limit. The cause of the event was the failure of the anti-rotation device.
The licensee considers this a random equipment failure.
The inspector reviewed the completed LER package and has no further questions.
(CLOSED) LER 2-83-88, B RHR Subsystem Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve Failed to Open.
Failed component was replaced and valve returned to service.
The licensee determined this to be an isolated failure.
The inspector has no further concerns on this issue.
(CLOSED) LER 2-83-90, Drywell Equipment Not Adequately Supported. Portions of the Drywell Equipment Drain (DWED), Drywell Floor Drain (DWFD) and containment service air systems were not adequately supported due to design calculation errors. The DWED and DWFD were reanalyzed and resupported. The portion of the service air header in question was cut and capped.
The inspector reviewed the seismic calculations and found them to be acceptable.
(CLOSED) LER 2-83-98, Individual Verification Not Provided to Verify Each Reactor Protection System (RPS) Channel Is Capable of Deenergizing Appropriate RPS Scram Relay.
The inspector reviewed LER documentation, interviewed selected CP&L employees, and reviewed a sample of available performance test procedures to determine the adequacy of the corrective actions delineated in the LER closeout package.
The closecut package, documentation and corrective actions appear complete.
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(CLOSED) LER 2-84-01, Primary Containment Isolation Valve Problems Revealed Through Local I.eak Rate Testing. The inspector reviewed the LER closeout package and work requests.
(CLOSED) LER 2-84-02, Loss of Plant Emergency AC Bus E-4.
The inspector noted a number of discrepancies in the paper work associated with the LER closecut package.
However, these did not impact the proposed corrective actions. The technical aspects of the work package appear complete.
(CLOSED) LER 2-84-14, Failure of RHR Level Control Valve E11-LV-F053A. The steam condensing mode of RHR is no longer used at Brunswick. Therefore, the water _ hammer issues in this LER are no longer a concern.
The inspector reviewed the corrective actions relating to the signal Jack, with no further concerns at this time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
IE Bulletin Followup (92703)
(CLOSED) (50-325/80-BU-17 and 50-324/80-BU-17), Failure of 76 of 185 Control Rods to Fully Insert at a BWR. The inspector reviewed the work packages and documentation associated with the plant modifications to the scram discharge volume, scram discharge instrument volume and associated piping.
This appears to meet the intent of 80-BU-17.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Followup on Inspector Identified and Unresolved Items (92701)
(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item (50-324/78-SB-10), Review of Licensee's Response to IEB 78-04. The inspector reviewed the completed package for IEB 78-04.
Based upon this review ar.d the Environmental Qualification (EQ)
i program currently in place at Brunswick, the inspector has no further questions on this matter.
(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item (50-325/80-04-01 and 50-324/80-04-01),
Verification That Instrumentation to Carry Out Operator Actions in SBLOCA is Environmentally Qualified.
Brunswick is in compliance with Bulletin 79-01.
l (CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item (50-324/81-06-03), RCIC Exhaust Line Check Valve Fails Closed. The inspector reviewed the work package which covered the installation of an angle lift check valve in place of the existing swing check valve.
The information package appeared complete.
(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item (50-325/81-12-03 and 50-324/81-12-03),
Training for Mitigating Core Damage.
The inspector reviewed selected training records and the completed inspection report oackage. This item is
complete and there are no further inspection concerns.
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(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item (50-325/81-22-02), Investigation of Grease Leakage from Containment Building Tendon Voids.
Previously inspected in report No. 84-19.
The licensee has completed the evaluation of grease leakage and found that it has a negligible effect upon both the surrounding concrete and the tendons. However, CP&L has issued a contract to develop a program for periodic tendon inspection for normal degradation. There are no further questions in this area.
(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item (50-325/82-05-04 and 50-324/82-05-04),
Environmental Qualification of Safety Relief Valve Position Indication.
Based upon the environmental qualification program in place at Brunswick, the inspector has no further questions on this matter.
(CLOSED) Unresolved Item (50-325/82-08-04 and 50-324/82-08-04), RPS Pressure Switch May Not Be Q Item. The inspector Reviewed the Revised Procedures and Upgraded Program.
(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item (50-325/82-30-01 and 50-324/82-30-01),
Evaluation of Ensuring Operations Personnel Are Aware of Changes Within a Clearance Boundary. The inspector reviewed Operations Instruction 01-13, Rev. 003, which adequately addressed this item.
(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item (50-325/82-30-02 and 50-324/82-30-02),
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Evaluation of the Need for Additional Supervision When Performing Work Using a Vendor Manual in Lieu of a Written Procedure. The inspector reviewed the completed evaluation package.
(CLOSED) Unresolved Item (50-324/82-39-02), Inadequate Auxiliary Operator (AO) Training on Valve Line Up Procedures.
The inspector reviewed the Incident Investigation - Followup Final Report.
(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item (50-324/83-03-02), Review of Safety Relief Valve Operations. The inspector reviewed the associated scram report which appears to adequately address the inspectors concerns about the operation of safety relief valves.
(CLOSED) Unresolved Item (50-325/83-03-03), Provide an Explicit Definition of Mode 5.
An explicit definition of Mode 5 is provided in General Procedure (GP)-06, Section 5.1.11.
(CLOSED) Inspector Followup Item (50-325/85-27-02), Administrative Control Changes to Ensure VT-2 Inspections in Post Maintenance Requirements.
Immediate corrective action was discussed in the subject report.
The licensee showed the inspector after the issuance of the inspection report that Maintenance Procedure MP-14 required the VT-2 inspection to be recorded on the Post Maintenance Test Requirement (PMTR) sheet at the time of occur-rence.
The inspector verified that MP-14A, Corrective Maintenance -
Automated Maintenance Management System, Revision 3, step V.C.5.g has a similar requirement.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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11. Onsite Followup of Events (93702)
a.
Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Systems Relays The licensee found that components in the SBGT systems had questionable
. environmental qualifications. The licensee had found, on October 17, 1986, that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system speed sensors were not qualified (see inspection report 50-325/86-29 and 50-324/86-30).
HPCI was qualified as a skid and not by individual components. The licensee then commenced a review program to re-verify 100% of the EQ equipment, starting with the other major skid mounted equipment - SBGT.
On November 21, 1986, the licensee found that two relays in each train on both units were not listed in the Brunswick EQ program. The relays provide logic for SBGT valve / damper alignment.
The Unit I relays, GE type CR 2810, were identical to qualified relays in the unit's motor control centers. The licensee plans to qualify the relays as is. The Unit 2 relays, GE type CR 120, have no qualification record at Brunswick and the licensee plans to replace them.
The licensee has taken the necessary steps regarding this issue as listed in Generic Letter 86-15, namely:
determine operability, establish plan to correct with a schedule, and complete a written Justification for Continued Operation (JCO). The inspector reviewed the HC0 and examined schematic drawings that referenced two of the relays in question. The inspector verified that the relays operate dampers that are already in their accident required position or only need to operate once when SBGT is actuated.
The EQ of the SBGT relays is an Unresolved Item * pending Region II review for possible enforcement action: SBGT Relays Not Documented EQ, (50-325/86-32-01 and 50-324/86-33-01).
b.
Unit 1 Reactor Scram On November 16,1986, at 5:17 a.m., Unit 1 experier:cd a reactor high pressure scram.
While attempting to increase the main turbine lube oil temperature by reducing flow through the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW) Heat Exchangers, a high temperature stator coolant runback (automatic reduction in turbine generator load setpoint)
occurred. Operations personnel ran recirculation pumps back to minimum and had begun insertion of the first rod when the scram occurred. The power reduction (94% to 54%) plus all bypass capacity (25% installed capacity) was not sufficient to offset the turbine runback rate. The scram resulted in a level shrink to the low level scram.setpoint and actuation of the group 2, 6 and 8 isolations. All four DGs started on turbine generator primary lockout as designed.
No other ESF systems actuated or were required to actuate.
The reactor was placed into condition 3 (hot standby) using the main condenser and the feedwater
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more infcrmation is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviatio.
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system. The licensee found that the high temperature in the cooling system was caused by the temperature control valve being incorrectly set in the direct acting mode.
In this mode, a temperature increase in the - stator cooling system will cause more flow through the heat exchanger bypass line, further increasing temperature.
The licensee is investigating the controller installation error.
An Agastat timer problem and an operator error contributed to the event.
The turbine runback rate Agastat timer imposed the load reduction in 45 seconds instead of the 2 minutes.
The licensee repaired the timer circuit. An operator failed to verify proper cooling flow through the remaining heat exchanger prior to removing a TBCCW heat exchanger from service. Operations removed a TBCCW heat exchanger from service with the other heat exchanger with virtually no flow due to a partially closed valve. As a result, temperature alarms began coming in shorting.
after the securing of the heat exchanger.
Operations responded by restoring the TBCCW heat exchangers to service. TBCCW temperature had already reached its peak and was returning to normal values at the time of the scram.
Apparently, however, this operations evolution was sufficient to cause the stator cooling system tempersture controller setpoint to be reached. Once it started attempting to reduce temper-ature, it actually started opening the bypass line around the stator cooling system heat exchanger. The controller was set in direct acting mode instead of desired indirect acting mode.
Thus, less cooling occurred and the controller continued to open the bypass line further until almost all flow was through the bypass line.
The control valve is a three way valve. As it was opening the bypass line it was simul-taneously closing off the heat exchanger inlet line.
Thus, the operations evolution was the trigger which, when coupled with the other problems, resulted in the scram.
Inspection of the stator cooling system on Unit 2 revealed that a similar problem did not exist.
However, the licensee is evaluating making a change to the Unit 2 controller and associated valve to improve reliability. This controller is set in the direct acting mode but this was compensated for by switching the controller air output lines to the valve positioner.
Failure of the connection between the controller and positioner would result in the positioner fully opening the bypass line.
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Unit I was returned to service on November 17, 1986.
c.
Diesel Generator Building Ventilation Supply Dampers The licensee found that the Diesel Generator Building HVAC supply dampers fail closed on a loss of Interruptible Instrument Air (IAI).
The licensee first suspected there was a problem on November 4,1986, during analysis for a site-specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA).
On November 6,1986, the issue was turned over to the systems engineers for resolution. On November 7, 1986, operations had compen-satory measures in place. A single failure would isolate HVAC from
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the all DG Cells for all 4 DGs. Ventilation to the Diesel Generator building is supplied by four supply fans that exhaust to a supply plenum. One fan is on, two are controlled by temperature switches, with the fourth fan in standby, capable of being manually started.
Eight supply. dampers, two for each DG cell, direct air to the cells from the supply plenum. The dampers are pneumatically controlled and modulate in response to a temperature signal.
Upon loss of IAI, all supply dampers would fail closed, removing all supply air from the DG cells. The fan exhaust fans for each cell would still be available since the exhaust dampers are fail open.
To compensate for the potential failure of the supply dampers, the licensee gave operations the following instructions:
1)
If the diesels are running and a "DG Cell Temp High" annunciator is received, then dispatet an Auxiliary Operator to the DG Building and verify whether the supply dampers are open or closed.
2)
If dampers are found open, take normal actions to clear the alarm.
3)
If the dampers are closed the following actions need to be taken:
a)
Verify all exhaust fans are running and dampers are open.
b)
Open the security doors on the North and South ends of the building and post security guards, as necessary.
c)
Open the double doors between each DG Cell and station firewatches, as necessary, to ensure these doors remain open.
4)
These actions should remain in force until the high temperatures condition clears.
The inspector verified that the temperature switches that give a "DG Cell Temp High" alarm had been calibrated in February 1986.
The licensee has asked United Engineers & Constructors (UE&C) to evaluate the operability of the Diesel Generators with the present HVAC design and to recommend possible modifications.
That evaluation is ongoing.
The inspector has no concerns regarding DG operability as affected by the HVAC system with the above compensatory measures in place.
However, the licensee reports that the design deficiency of the supply dampers has most likely existed since construction. The inspectors will review the UE&C evaluation and DG HVAC plant modifications to identi fy enforcement issues, if any.
This is an Unresolved Item:
DG HVAC Supply Dampers Subject to Single Failure (50-325/86-32-03).
No violations or deviations were identifie e
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e 12. Access Control (71707)
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The licensee granted unescorted. access on November 21, 1986, to a mechanic who had successfully ' completed a 28 day drug treatment program. The main-tenance mechanic _had turned himself in to the private program on October 17, 1986, to obtain treatment for cocaine abuse. The mechanic completed the in patient program on November 14, 1985.
The licensee restored unescorted access to the mechanic after a urinalysis, performed on November 17, 1986, was negative.
The mechanic belongs to the traveling maintenance crew based at Brunswick.
The mechanic was working at the Sutton (fossil) plant when he was admitted to the drug treatment program and had not been granted unescorted access at that time. However, he had been granted unescorted access in the past.
The licensee has taken several steps to insure that the mechanic has not or will not ad;ersely affect plant safety.
In addition to the urinalysis prior to re-badging, the mechanic is subject to future unannounced urinalysis.
The licensee has reviewed the mechanic's past work and found no case where work he performed was returned to a safety-related application without adequate testing.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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