ML20132G875
| ML20132G875 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 12/13/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20132G860 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-96-17, 50-325-96-17, NUDOCS 9612270067 | |
| Download: ML20132G875 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000324/1996017
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,
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REGION ll >
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Docket Nos: 50-325 and 50-324
License Nos: DPR-71 and DPR-62
Report Nos: 50-325 and 50-324/96-17
Licensee: Carolina Power & Light Company
Facility: Brunswick Nuclear Station
Location: 8470 River Road SE
Southport, NC 35611
Date: November 13-15,1996
Inspector: D.H. Thompson, Safeguards inspector -
Approved by: A.F. Gibson, Director
Division of Reactor Safety
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ENCLOSURE 2
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9612270067 961213
PDR ADOCK 05000324
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,' EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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On November 8,1006, the licensee found at 1:00 a.m., that exterior Unit 1 railroad door
RB-10 had wire protruding from the security lock core. At 1:10 a.m., the licensee determined
that Unit 2 exterior railroad door RB-09 could not be opened and subsequently the licensee
determined that the lock also had a wire inserted into the core.
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On November 8,1996, at 10:18 p.m., the licensee discovered a lock at Unit 2 Reactor
Building door RB-16 with a thin gauge wire inserted into the security lock. The lock had been ]
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checked at 8:44 p.m., same date and found to be operational. The wire that was inserted '
into the locks at the three doors was determined to be the same type wire. As a result of the l
event at RB-16 the licensee conducted another search of the area and discovered a piece of l
wire similar to the other wire lying on the floor in the vicinity of the switch-gear room door. l
There was not any evidence of tampering with the switch-gear room door. I
A chronological Sequence of Events was established by the inspector for the November 8,
1996, security lock tampering at Unit 1 and Unit 2 railroad airlock doors, and at Unit 2 reactor
building door. The Sequence of Events is documented in Attachment A to this report.
Overall the licensee's response to the November 8,1996, lock tampering events, was
excellent. However, the licensee's reporting of the events to the NRC was not in accordance
with regulatory requirements, in addition, the control room was not notified of the tampering
events in a timely manner. The licensee's evaluation concluded that the lock tampering -
events were perpetrated by individual or individuals who had authorized, unescorted access
to the site.
The inspector concluded that site management appropriately pursued identification of the
individual or individuals who may have placed the wire into the lock cores.
Following extensive reviews by the licensee and independent verification by NRC, the
inspector concluded that tampering occurred; however, to date no suspect has been
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identified.
The investigative staff of the corporate, assisted by a consulting firm, Risk Management
Associates, adequately reviewed the event and other previous events to ensure that any
potential tampering events had been fully evaluated. They concluded that the wire was most
probably inserted as an act of vandalism.
The licensee restored the doors to operational status immediately after the events were
discovered.
The inspector concluded that the licensee adequately evaluated other systems for signs of
tampering.
The inspector concluded that there was no evidence of additional tampering and that the
licensee had adequately evaluated plant condition reports and other documentation for
additional examples of potential tampering.
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The licensee appropriately identified actions to be taken to enhance det ction of additional
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tampering.
The licensee was in compliance with the Physical Security Plan (PSP) with respect to fitness i
for duty, personnel access authorization, criminal history checks, and access control of I
protected and vital areas. However, the licensee failed to meet the one hour event reporting I
requirements of the regulations,10 CFR 73.71, and Security Instruction OSI-20, " Reporting of
Safeguards Events," Revision 15, dated September 12,1996. This is a violation of
Regulatory Requirements (96-17-08).
Attachment C contains information provided to Brunswick site management by NRC to assist
in the licensee's response to the events. The attachment contains NRC Information Notice
(IN) 83-27 conceming deliberate acts directed against plant equipment and intemal NRC
guidance for plant system check-out following suspected sabotage.
Attachment D contains a representation of the wire and cop;es of photographs of the doors.
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. Reocrt Details
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j O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
O2.1 Tamoerina Event
1 i On November 8,1996, at 1:00 a.m., a security officer, while conducting the seven day j functional test of security equipment, discovered a small gauge wire protruding from j -
the security lock core in Unit 1 railroad door RB-10. Continuing the equipment check,
at 1:10 a.m., the officer discovered that he was unable to open the security lock on
- Unit 2 railroad door RB-09 because of an obstruction.~ Subsequently, the RB-09 lock
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was found to have a small gauge wire jammed in the lock core (Attachment D).' The
l licensee initiated Condition Report (CR) 96-03723 for these two events.
l On November 8,1996, at 10:18 p.m., a third event of tampering with ' security locks ;
- was discovered when an officer, on increased security patrol, discovered a small l
l gauge wire similar to those previously discovered inserted in the security lock at 4
Unit 2 Reactor Building Door RB-16. Also at 4:50 a.m., a wire similar to the other
j wires was discovered on the floor outside the cable spread-room near Door CS-02.
- There was not any evidence of tampering with the door lock at the cable spread-room.
. The licensee initiated CR-96-03730 for this event.
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l O2.1.1 Evaluation and Correction of Damaaed Components ! ! f a. Insoection Scope I
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluation of the damaged locks to determine if i
- the as-found conditions represented tampering and to determine if the damaged i
j' components were replaced and whether operability was satisfactorily demonstrated.
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i b. Observation and Findinos ! l l The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions as a result of the lock tampering event. l The inspector noted that the licensee event team concluded that there were no j apparent safety implicstions from the act of tampering. Five factors were considered
in determining the probability of a malevolent act:
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- The wire was discovered protruding from the cylinder of two of the three locks,
i which indicated the person who inserted the wire was not trying to hide the
- tampering act. A thorough search of the interior of the area did not disclose
j evidence of deliberate manipulation of any equipment within the areas.
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There was no communicated threat received toward the plant or plant
} equipment.
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There were no other events of this nature.
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The events involved a low level of sophistication. The wire used for the
tampering events were readily available on various types of equipment tags
throughout the plant area, and the wire was too fine and pliable to be used as
a lock picking device.
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The target selection indicated that the individual possessed a poor knowledge
of the plant parameters. In the first event, the railroad airlock doors are
infrequently used. They are used for equipment ingress / egress only. Also,
there are vitallocked and alarmed doors interior to the railroad doors. In the
second event, the door leading from the Turbine Building to the Reactor
Building is between two tumstiles used for personr.el access. The door and
adjacent turnstiles are alarmed and controlled by card readers. The door is
mainly used for equipment and infrequently for visitors and handicapped
access. As the door is unlocked electronically via card reader and electric
door strike, disabling the mechanical lock by tampering would not prevent the
opening of the door,
c. Conclusion
The acts of tampering with the security locks did not compromise security or
continued safe operation of plant systems.
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02.1.2 Evaluation of Plant Systems for Additional Tamperino
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector verified that plant safety systems have been sufficiently evaluated for
potential tampering to assure they could perform their intended functions.
b. Observation and Findinos
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In response to the security locks being tampered with, the licensee performed an
inspection of additional systems, including safety reisted systems and non-safety
related systems that could have an impact on the safe operation of the plant, to
assure that the systems were intact, with no signs of potential tampering. The
Operations and Engineering departments conducted independent walk-downs of the
systems. Acceptance criteria for these system walk-downs were conducted using the
NRC Draft information Notice, " Guidelines for Assessing Indications of Equipment
Tampering / Sabotage," (Attachment C) and Standing Instruction (SI) 96-154.
On November 8,1996, a condition was identified that warranted additional review.
While performing scram time testing on Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) 26-23, a metal
valve tag for the scram inlet valve was found positioned between an extension of the
stem and a fixed nut above it (attached to the valve body). The metal tag was
positioned in a way that it may have caused the valve to bind when stroked. It was
removed prior to the HCU being scrammed without incident. All Unit 1 HCUs were
checked for the same condition and none were found. The valve tag that presented
the concem was long enough for the tag to be in that position which was unique only
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c to that HCU, presenting the possibility the tag may have becomeiodged in that ;
- . position. The licensee concluded that the tag was not intentionally placed in that !
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position. Additionally, the licensee, considering the placement of the tag and the J
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material of the tag, concluded that the rod would have inserted into the core if a ;
.. reactor scram had occurred. The Resident inspector reviewed the event and
concurred with the licensee's analysis.
j On November 9,1996, the licensee found two cut locking tabs in the Standby Liquid l Control area. However, all valves that should have been locked were found to be
locked. The licensee concluded that the locking tabs had been cut off as part of
maintenance, and when replaced, the old locking tabs were discarded on the floor.
The licensee considered this event as an example of poor housekeeping practices.
On November 12,1996, at approximately 7:15 p.m., a security officer was unable to
operate a security padlock on the diesel generator roll-up door. The lock core was
removed and replaced. A subsequent inspection of the faulty core revealed a piece of
paper in the core. The piece of paper was turned over to the investigative team who
concluded that the paper appeared to be old and may have been in the core for a
long period of time. They concluded that the paper in the core was not part of the
lock tampering events.
c. Review of Previous CRs for Evidence of Tamperina -
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The licensee reviewed the CRs in an effort to determine if any other suspected issues !
existed that had the potential to have been caused by tampering. The events are as
follows:
1. On October 26,1996, at approximately 6:00 a.m., two toggle switches
(load / unload and audible alarm) at the top of the panel of the 1D air
compressor in the Unit 1 Turbine Building,20 foot elevation, were found to .
have been changed from their normal positions. The condition was found by l
an operator who checks the gauges on the compressor during his normal -
rounds. The plant process computer data was reviewed and confirmed that
the toggle switches were changed at about 5:53 a.m. The switches were
placed in the correct positions, and the event was reported to the Control
Room.
The licensee reviewed the event and determined that a fluorescent light fixture
located approximately 13 inches above the top of the compressor cabinet and
about 24 inches directly above the toggle switches had fresh hand prints on
both bulbs. The hand prints ran the entire length of the bulbs. The top of the
cabinet was uniformly covered.with dust except for the area directly over the
switches where the dust had been disturbed. The panel on which the switches
are located had dust covering it except for an area approximately 2 feet wide
which was wiped clean. The switches are just off center of the wiped clean
area.
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The licensee, as part of the event review, interviewed personnel who would
normally be responsible for changing or adjusting lights and reviewed the
i applicable work orders. No work orders were found for lighting in this area. l Loss Prevention Unit (LPU) personnel questioned had no knowledge of any-
- lighting repairs in _this area. No housekeeping or decon personnel had any
[ knowledge of lighting work in that area. Environmental and Radiation Control i '
personnel noted that two people wearing CP&L hard hats were seen carrying
two fluorescent bulbs in that area in the early moming of October 26,1996.
t {- 2. On October 26, at about 9:00 p.m., a chemistry technician found and reported
- an eyewash and shower unit located on the 20 foot elevation of the Unit 1 !
! Turbine Building was leaking and that a puddle of water about 3 feet in ! diameter was on the floor in the area. The LPUs were called and secured the !- shower unit.
l The chemistry technician who found the leaking shower attempted to secure it :
- but couldn't get the arm to lift to the fully closed position. When LPU
- attempted in secure the unit, they had to manipulate it several times to get the ;
! arm to fully close. The valve was not functioning properly. When the unit was ! tested on October 27, it was found to be faulty and a Work Request Job Order !
(96-AlENI) was submitted to have it repaired. )
- Discussions with LPU indicate that similar failures have resulted in leakage on !
t other shower stations. Surveillance Procedure OPT 34.21.3.0 requires a
monthly functional test of these stations. The last test performed on the !
j, station found to be leaking on October 26 was conducted on October 7,1996. , l
The station was found to be working properly at that time.
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3. On October 26, at about 10:00 a.m., an auxiliary operator (AO) found the tower
outlet valve on the B cooling tower of the supplemental spent fuel cooling .
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j system in a throttled condition. The towers are located on the roof area at the i i 50 foot elevation of the Unit 1 Turbine Building. The valve is normally kept in
- the full open position- The valve was placed in the open position and the '
event was reported to the Control Room. _
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The B cooling tower was found to be losing a considerable amount of water
through the overflow. The amount of water exceeded the capability of the i
catch container, and water was flowing onto the roof of the building. An AO
arrived on the scene and secured the flow of water by adjusting the position of
the A tower outlet valve. On October 26, an AO confirmed that the valves
were correctly positioned at about 2:00 p.m. He also found the water levels of
the two towers to be normal during rounds at about 4:00 p.m. Another AO
found the B tower vaive ihrottled at about 10:00 p.m. He found that the i
locking device on the valve handle was stuck in the open position allowing the
handle to move freely. During this period, the temperature of the water in the
fuel pool may have increased by as much as two tenths of a degree. Prior to
10:00 p.m., water was spilling off the roof of the Unit 1 Turbine Building in this 1
area at a rate great enough to require grating be laid down to traverse the
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puddle created on the ground. Also, just prior to the AO securing the valve,
i Projects personnel noted that water was collecting in the area of the storm i drain.
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The licensee concluded that the three events appeared to be distinct and unrelated.
The air compressor appeared to be an example of someone affecting operating
- equipment while performing a housekeeping task. The eyewash / shower event
j appeared to be an example of equipment failure. It was noted by LPU personnel that i these units per'odically have valve failures which result in conditions like those found
- at this shower. The investigation of the supplemental spent fuel pool cooling system-
i has not yet yielded a viable conclusion. With the handle stuck open, an inadvertent . misposition of the valve is a possibilit/ as is operator error. i
- d. Conclusion -
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Based on independent review of the documentation of the licensee's inspections and
walk-down of the plant, the inspector concluded that there did not appear to be any
, other examples of tampering related to the three security lock events. (
O2.1.3 Site Manaoement's Response to the Event
a. Inspection Scope -
The inspector reviewed the actions taken by site management in responding to the
tampering with security locks to determine if management's response was appropriate
for the circumstances.
b. Observation and Findinas
The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions for recovery from the event. Prompt
action was taken to investigate the event and a recovery action plan was quickly -
started. The action plan included the following:
- ensure integrity / operability of required security equipment;
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- initiate / conduct an independent investigation;
- develop a plan for recovery from the event; and
- communication and event documentation.
Management initiated the following immediate measures: (1) compensatory security
measures to prevent against any continued acts of tampering; (2) detailed walk <fown
inspections by Operations and Engineering to ensure thwe was no evidence of
tampering with plant equipment; and (3) an independent investigation to determine
who may have tampered with the locks and the extent of any tampering. ;
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Management met frequently with plant personnel to discuss the status of the recovery
effort. In addition, management kept NRC (site personnel, Regional NRC
management, and NRR management) informed of the actions being taken and the
status of the recovery plan. I
c. Conclusion
The inspector concluded that site management appropriately pursued identification of ,
the individual or individuals who tampered with the security locks and sought )
identification of any additional potential tampering with plant equipment.
The inspector concluded that tampering with the security locks had occurred and that
the most likely individual or individuals involved had authorized access to the
protected area and potentially had access to the vital areas.
O2.1.4 Imolementation of Interim Action to Detect New Tamperina
a. Inspection Scope
Determine if adequate interim actions to detect new tampering had been implemented.
b. Observation and Findinas -
After the second lock tampering event, the licensee took the following actions to
detect new tampering:
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checked all security locks for tampering;
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established one hour patrols of RB-09 and RB-10;
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inspected Control Room back panels;
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had operations perform an inspection of the Turbine Building and Diesel
Generator Building; and
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had operations conduct an inspection of all Unit 1 and 2 vital areas.
After the third lock tampering event, the licensee took the following additional actions ,
to detect new tampenng:
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Additional security surveillance was established for selected plant areas (two-
man patrols in the Diesel Generator Building, south side of the protected area,
and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Buildings). ;
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Access to the protected area was limited. I
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A "two-man rule" was implemented for all personnel inside the protected area. I
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Plant walk-downs were performed by Operations and Engineering using NRC's
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Draft 1989 Information Notice, " Guidance For Assessing Indications of
Equipment Tampering / Sabotage," as guidance.
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The Emergency Response Facility Information System and plant processing
computer were reviewed for changes or transients.
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Target areas for enhanced protection were defined.
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Additional surveillance cameras to monitor known target areas were installed.
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Personnel and equipment were searched when departing protected area.
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c. Conclusion
The licensee expedited the implementation of actions to enhance detection of
additional tampering through the use of patrols and surveillance equipment. The
licensee intends to maintain some of the surveillance equipment to detect or deter
future tampering.
S1 Conduct of Security and Safeguards Activities
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S1.2.5 Security Investiaation of the Event
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector determined if Security and Investigation staffs adequately reviewed the
event.
b. Observations and Findinos
! The corporate investigators responded to the site on November 9,1996, to determine
independently when and how the wire was inserted into the security locks. The '
investigative team employed personnel from " Risk Management Associates" to assist
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with the investigation.
The site Security and Investigative staffs researched files to determine if any workers
were recently at other sites where tampering events had occurred, obtained a list of
. outage workers terminated after November 8,1996, obtained a list of personnel within
the protected area since 4:00 p.m., on November 8,1996, cross-referenced the list of
personnel within the protected area against those in the protected area during a valve
mispositioning on October 26,1996, and interviewed selected personnel who were
within the protected area after 4:00 p.m., on November 8,1996. Additionally, the
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investigators forwarded selected statements for verbiage analysis to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The investigators administered a polygraph to selected
individuals, with negative results.
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c. Conclusion
The investigative staff thoroughly reviewed the event and concluded that there is
evidence to support the conclusion that an unknown individual or individuals had j
inserted a foreign object into two security locks at the railroad doors and one iock at a j
door in the Reactor Buildinn Thn investigation is continuing. The Region 11 Physical l
Security staff is continui" unitor the investigation.
S1.2.7 Evaluation of Comoliance with the Physical Security Plan (PSP)
a. Inspection Scope
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The inspector determined if the licensee was in compliance with the PSP and j
procedures. '
b. Observations and Findinas j
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To preclude individuals from being authorized access to the facility who may engage
in tampering, the licensee established a screening program in accordance with
10 CFR 73.56 requirements. The PSP states that "...at Carolina Power & Light's ,
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Nuclear Plants, all elements of Regulatory Guide 5.66 have been implemented to
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56." The PSP further requires that, -
" Identification and access authorization is controlled by an automated security
system." Portals for granting access to the protected area are locked and alarmed.
The inspector while reviewing the lock tampering events noted that the licensee had
discovered the first event of lock tampering at the Unit 1 railroad door on November 8,
1996, at 1:00 a.m., and the second event at the Unit 2 railroad door at 1:10 a.m. The
inspector determined that the licensee failed to report the events to the NRC until
5:46 a.m., 5 hours and 46 minutes after discovery. The third lock tampering event
was discovered on November 8,1996, at 10:18 p.m., at the Unit 2 Reactor Building l
door. The licensee reported this event to the NRC at 11:40 p.m.,1 hour and
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20 minutes after discovery. All three the events were not reported to the NRC within
one hour. The inspector also noted that security did not notify the Control Room of
the event until approximately 3:25 a.m.,2 hours and 25 minutes after documenting.
The Control Room staff is responsible for operations of the plant and should be
notified immediately of any event that may impact the safe operation of the plant.
Paragraph 2.0 of the PSP, Revision O, dated March 15,1996, requires that, "... plant
security procedures are established to provide detailed information to the security
force on implementation of plan performance objectives and commitments."
Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 73(l)(3), Reportable Safeguards Events, requires that
4 <ents that cause " Interruption of normal operation of a licensee's nuclear power
mactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components,
or controls including the security system," be reported to the NRC within one hour.
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The licensee's Security Instruction OSI-20, Reporting of Safeguards Events,
Revision 15, dated September 12,1996, Paragraph 4.17, defines tampering as "when
used in connection with Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 73, altering for improper purpose
or in an improper manner." l
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Paragraph 6.2.9 of Security Instruction, OSI-20, Reporting of Safeguards Events,
requires that events of confirmed tampering of suspicious origin or unauthorized use ,
of safety or security equipment be reported to the NRC within one hour. l
On November 8,1996, the licensee failed to report the lock tampering events to the
NRC within one hour. The first event was not reported for 5 hours and 46 minutes ,
and the second event was not reported for 1 hour and 20 minutes. This is a violation i
of regulatory requirement (96-17-01). l
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c. Conclusion !
The licensee was in compliance with the PSP with respect to fitness for duty, i
personnel access authorization, criminal history checks, and access control of vital ,
areas. The licensee failed to report the lock tampering events to the NRC within one '
hour of discovery and did not notify the control room of the lock tamperings in a timely j
manner. '
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 71707: Plant Operations
IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
IP 81601: Safeguards Contingency Plan implementing Review
IP 81700: Physical Security Program for Power Reactors
IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations
IP 92902: Followup - Maintenance and Surveillance
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspection scope and findings were summarized to licensee management at the
conclusion of the inspection on November 15,1996. The inspector described the areas
inspected and discussed the inspection results. The inspector discussed the licensee's
failure to report the events to the NRC within the required time. The licensee acknowledged
the inspector's findings. Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting
comments were not received from the licensee.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
K. Ahem, Performance Evaluation Section
A. Brittain, Supervisor Security
W. Campbell, Vice President
J. Corcetti, Security
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B. Deacy, Supervisor Outage Maintenance
M. Denton, Corporate Security Investigator
C. Gannon, Manager Maintenance
T. Hackler, Operations
M. Harris, Site Communications Manager
S. Holth-Nguyen, Security
B. Lindgren, Site Support Services Manager
W. Levis, Director Site Operations
W. Murray, Licensing
NRC
R. Hannah, Public Affairs, Region 11
C. Patterson, Senior Resident inspector
D. Verrelli, Acting Branch Chief, Region il
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Other licensee employees contacted included Operations, Engineering, Licensing, and
Maintenance personnel.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
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AO Auxiliary Operator -
CR Condition Report
IN information Notice
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR Nuclear Reactor Regule. ion
PSP Physical Security Plan
SOM Shift Outage Manager
SI Security Instruction
SRO Sen.'or Reactor Operator
SS Shift Supervisor
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CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVEN
EVENT '
k f security
T_IME
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DATE Officer on duty conducting h an operational che
11/8/96
1:00 a.m. equipment found a wire protruding from t e d
Officer reported that the dlock on Unit 2 railroaha
11/8/96
1:10 a.m. open. Subsequently the lock was foun to
which prevented the lock from working. ti e security ;
Security supervision determined at 9:00 p.m. on
that the last! l
11/8/96
1:30 a.m. closed RB-10 was 4:19 p.m. on November
time RB-09 was closed and locked was
November 4,1996. t
Security management was notified of the eve
1:45 a.m.
11/8/96
Security management on-site. t o events.
2:35 a.m.
11/8/96 Shift Supervisor notified Control Room and reported
Room of th -
3:25 a.m.
11/8/96 Security management went to the Control
4:55 a.m. the tampering event.
11/8/96 l to check all
Security management directed security
ig pat
11/8/96
5:00 a.m. security locks and equipment for tamper n .
ment of events.
Operations supervisor notified f r security senior
concems.man
5:10 a.m.
11/8/96 Inspected Control Room back panel area o
5:37 a.m. Nothing found. firmed tampering
11/8/96
5:46 a m.
One hour notification to NRC mad
of security locks.
11/8/96 uipment. No
Security completed inspection of all secu
5:59 a.m. other tampering noted. t certain key
11/8/96
Earlier in shift it was discovered h
i areas for
by Se
11/8/96
6:00 a.m.
locks had foreign material stu
evidence of tampering: d Diesel Building
Operations checked the Turbine pering. Buildin
11/8/96
6:00 a.m. and other vital equipment for possible
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DATE TIME EVENT
11/8/96 6:06 a.m. Performed walk-down of building checked locking devices to
vital areas. No problems noted.
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11/8/96 6:15 a.m. RB-09 and RB-10 placed under increased patrol (1 hour).
11/8/96 6:24 a.m. Building AOs inspected all vital areas for security abnormalities.
Nothing noted. j
11/8/96 7:10 a.m. Protected and vital areas searched for wire from equipment
tags. The wire was suspected of coming from that source.
11/8/96 9:32 a.m. Operators inspected selected key locks and door locks in Unit 2
Reactor Building, Turbine Building, Control Building (including
back panels), and outside areas (Diesel Building, Service
Building, and 4-Day Tank room). No discrepancies or unusual
conditions found.
11/8/96 9:52 a.m. Completed tour of outside vital areas as directed by SS to check
all locked areas to ensure there was no lock tampering. The
following locks and key lock switches were checked: -
,
Diesel Building: door 113 north, dr 103 south, panels 1 A-HA7,
1 A-DG-H32,18-HA8,18-DG-H33, 2A-DG-HQ6, 2A-HC1, and
2B-HC2, E4 to E2 SBO SS-B, E4 ASSD keylocks components: l
Ali, ALO, AK9, AK8, AK7, AK4, AK3, AK1, AKO, E3 to E1 SBO
SS-B, E3 ASSD keylocks components: AJ4, AJ3, AJ2, AJO, Al4,
Al3, E2 to E4 SBO SS-B, E2 to E1 ASSD X-TIE SS-B, E2 ASSD
keylocks components: AH6, AH5, AH4, AH3, AH2, AH1, AG9,
AG8, AG6, and AG5: E1 to E2 ASSD X-TIE SS-B, E1 to E3
SBO SS-B, E1 ASSD keylocks components: AF9, AF8, AF3,
AE8, AE7. ES, E6, E7, and E8 RSD and ASSD keylocks. DG1,
2,3, and 4 ASSK keylocks.
Four-Day Fuel Oil Tank Room:- door 001
Service Water Building: door 4 north - door 3 south
11/8/96 10:15 a.m. Completed inspection as directed by the SS of ke switches and
keylocks for signs of tampering (Ref CR 96-731 Items
inspected included doors and MCCs located ,n th9 Unit 1
Rea'ctor Building and Turbine Building; the Control Building
including the 70' HVAC ares, Cable Spread, and back panels;
the Radwaste Building; and the outside areas including the
Diesel Generator Building, SW Building, and the 4-Day Tank
room. No discrepancies noted.
11/8/96 1:35 p.m. Entered AOP-13. Verified doors on attachment 3 closed.
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11/8/96 2:35 p.m. Completed OSAO portion of OSAP-13.0, severe weather door
check and walk-down of outside areas. Various equipment
throughout plant site needs securing. SOM informed.
i , ( 11/8/96 5:02 p.m. Service water piping in the radwaste pipe tunnels had been !
- walked down during rounds LAW 001-03.5, page 24, items 8-11. !
l Service water lineup was found to be satisfactory. ! '
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11/8/96 - 5:12 p.m. Completed tour of all outside tank areas as directed by the
Unit 1 SRO to check for tampering of valve positions and locking ;
- devices. The following tanks were checked
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- U-1 CST HPCl/RCIC/CRD and condensate transfer lines !
t - U-2 CST HPC1/RCIC/CRD and condensate transfer lines i i. - 7-day fuel oil tank aux boiler, diesel fire tank, and aux boiler :
lines ,
j - MUD tank demin water lines and diesel fire pump aux line i
- - Fire protection tank lines to diesel fire pump and motor j
!. driven fire pump -
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- . There were no valves out of their normal position and alllocking _ l
l devices were in good condition and intact. ! !
11/8/96 5:15 p.m. Completed a visual lineup verification of all outside Tank areas
'
- as directed by the SS. Inspection was performed to check for
j signs of tampering (Ref CR 96-3723). Areas inspected included 1
both Units' CSTs, 7-Day Fuel Oil Storage Tank, Diesel Fire
- Pump Fuel Tank, the Fire Protection Tank, and the MUD Tank.
- No valves were noted to be out of position and all applicable
j, locking devices were intact. } 11/8/96 5:46 p.m. Performed safety / security walk-down of the following Unit 1 2 ,
components: 1XA,1XB,1XC,1XD, RSDP, RCIC inverter,1XA-
4 2,1XB-2,1A-RX,1B-RX,1AB-RX. No abnormalities or i discrepancies noted. Keys were physically inserted into all
ASSD and remote shutdown key lock switches.
l , 11/8/96 6:00 p.m. Performed safety / security walk-down of the following Unit 2 ! components: 2XA, 2XB, 2XC, 2XD, RSDP, RCIC inverter, 2XA- t 2,2XB-2,2A-RX,28-RX,2AB-RX. No abnormalities or j discrepancies were noted. Keys physically inserted into all l ASSD and remote shutdown key lock switches.
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DATE _ EVENT
11/8/96 6:05 p.m. Performed security walk-down of the following Unit 2
components: 2E7,2E8,32A,2A,2B,2C,2D,2AB, RPS and
UPS distribution panels, UAT backfeed keylocks,2A-TB, 2B-TB,
2AB-TB, 2C-TB1, 2D-TB1, 2E-TB, 2F-TB, 2D-TB2, 2C-TB2,
circulating water backwash valves and panel 10A. All locks
were physically challenged and inspected for obstructions with
no abnormalities noted.
11/8/96 6:14 p.m. Performed security walk-down of the following Unit 1
components: _ 1 E7,1 E8, 31 A,' 1 A,18,1C,1D,1 AB, RPS and
UPS distribution panels, UAT backfeed keylocks,1 A-TB,1B-TB,
1 AB-TB, 1 C-TB 1, 1 D-TB 1, 1 E-TB , 1 F-TB, 1 D-TB2, 1 C-TB2, 9A,
and circulating water backwash valves. All locks were physically
challenged and inspected for tampering / operability.
11/8/96 9:55 p.m. Performed safe,ty/ security walk-down of the following equipment:
All 480V MCCs with ASSD keylocks, all locked 120V panels,
RSDP, LEP tool boxes, all high radiation doors and
miscellaneous doors within the RX Building. A key was inserted
in all locks and no abnormalities were found. -
11/8/96 10:18 p.m. A security officer on patrol discovers a wire inserted into the
security lock at the Unit 2 Reactor Building door (RB-16).
11/9/96 12:45 p.m. Performed walk-down of north and south HCU banks on Unit 2.
Inspected for proper valve configuration, amphenois properly
connected and for possible interference with the operation of the
126 and 127 valves. All HCUs found to be in satisfactory
condition.
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11/9/96 1:00 a.m. Completed walk-down of Unit 2 HCU north and south banks.
Checked valve positions, amphenol connections, and for
interference with proper operation of the _-V126 and -V127
valves on each HCU. No discrepancies were noted.
11/9/96 2:15 a.m Two-man rule implemented.
o 11/9/96 4:50 a.m. A wire similar to the other wires used in the tampering events
was discovered outside the cable spread room.
11/10/96_ 6:00 p.m. Two-man rule terminated.
11/13/96 11:00 a.m. NRC safeguards inspector on site.
11/15/96 12:00 p.m. Investigation and additional security will continue pending the
licensee providing the NRC with a recover plan.
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LIST OF LICENSEE DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Physical Security Plan
,
Security Instruction, OSI 20, Reporting of Safeguards Events
- Event Notification Worksheet, dated 11/8/96
Condition Report #96-03723
1
Operations Logs ;
Event Notification Worksheet, dated 11/9/96
,
Condition Report #96-03730
<
Security Shift Report 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., dated 11/8-9/96
Evaluation of the Tampering Events, dated November 8,1996 !
Standing Instruction SI-96-154 !
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Historical Access Control Reports
d
Radiation Control Shift Turnover, dated 11/09/96
Operability Test /!nspection, dated 10/01 to 11/01/96
f
Security incident Reporia
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ATTACHMENT B
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INFORMATION PROVIDED TO LICENSEE BY NRC ON NOVEMBER 8,1996
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(1) NRC IN 83-27
(2) NRC Intemal memo, dated December 12,1985
(3) NRC Intemal memo, dated July 14,1982
(4) Draft Document 89-XX, Guidelines For Assessing Indications of Equipment i
Tampering / Sabotage l
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ATTACHMENT C
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4 l < SSIRS No.i: 68381 l IN 83 27 '
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UNITED STATES
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W NJCLEAR REELATORY CGWISSION .
-
0FFICE OF INSFECTION AND ENFORCIMENT
i WASHI!ETON, D.C. 20555 4
- May 4, 1983
i
IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 33-27: OPERATIONAL RESPONSE TO
- El18ERATE ACTS DIRECTED AGAINST Pt. ANT
, IDUIPMENT j Addressees: . j
All nuclear reactor fac111';ies noisiing an operating license (01.) or construction
permit (CP).
4 { Surcese: ,
i j his "ifer atten retica *:icr:vtene as a notifi:sti:n of events wnica may nave
utvolves celiberate acts :1recrea against ::lant sout:::nent anc a lack of station
,
.rocecures concerning response cy c:erattr.g personnel. It is expected that
! *ect
,roceeures.ients will review the jinfor arion for appliceo111ty to their station
, I
No specific action or response is recuired at this time.
!
Descrittien' of C'reumstance\ s:
.
l WP !
A review of recent operatirg reacter events indicetes thet some improper yelve
posittening ana '9strumentation irregularittes may nave involvec deliberate
sets directed against ::' ant eautement in vital areas. The following is a brief
l acc:Unt Of these events. ;
I
! a
At *ne 'irst f acility, durtng reusine operation, the Control Room Operator
receiven a steam generator jfeeswszar puso (SGFP) hign vibration alam.- Subse-
! quently sne SGFP trippen and the aparator innimaiately reeucea turbine losa ' i
to crevent the unit from tr1pptng. The instrument valves on the low vacuum
~
trio sensing line located outside vital areas were apparently celiberately
repositionee resulting in the guns trip. The licensee concluden that this
l- deliberate act eculd have been a result of a labor dispute. ! At the second facility duritng a routine operator tour at approximatal ! 1:00
4.m.. a manual velve wa,s fauna snus in the common suction piping to higt -
- heta safety injection (HHSII) Temps. The valve was inveediately reope mis
i valve. which is checked by operaters each shift, had been verified open at i
about 6:30 p.m. the previous day. 7e chain and paeleck which secured this
i valve in tne open oosition were mtssing. additionally On the previous dey the ! manual suction isolation valves of the tnree auxiliary fesa-water pumps he6 been !
founo ur.cnained ana unlecxed in v11olation of technical specifications reeutre=
i i
ments. *hese valves were f suae tn Intir normally ocen cosition. *he motive
benine the actions was not preven, :ut the actions resultaa in the rHSI system
j - teing tr.operanla.
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! IN r I -
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4,1983-
f.ef't
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lhese events.' and events !
at other plants, demonstrate that the potential or- f
deliberate acts directea ngsinst plant.'onal
folloevo actions. eutpae
la the
Other11iconsees may or may not be preseree to assess
situation
to safety or nate andescisions
take necessary concerning continuedsteos tooperation.assure opersaility of
Guidelines er-
deliberate ane inaavertant acts with respe
available.
e
system (s) main power supply,The guidelin
)
e
'n addition interrelated systems should be
inspected ane selected sefaty-relatee electrical panels and
the plant and in the constiol room, may require a detailed inspection .
additional tampering is detectae, the licensee snould be . If
ovepar
cecisien en wnether
systams neesssary 4 a safe tr.ut::wn are caeraole. er ret: ::ntinusa ccerstten $s justifien -
ene w
Coeratt:nal ano security crocoeures t:
threats 1:
Apoenc1x Csafety of Part 73. must be develonen in accoreance with 10 CFR 7
*h6 potential impact of any deliberata act d1 Petted
W against plant
antteipated safety eeutoment
censequerzas.ust be evaluatea, sna actions taken to mitig
l
No written response to this notice is requires. !
approortate NRC Regional Off11:e. Or tats cffice.regarein !
l
e.owa
d"'
. vorean, 01 rector _
~ 01visi n of Emergency Prepareeness
and Engineering Resocnse
i
Offica cf Inspection and Enforceaset
Tecnnical Contact: Paul R.!Ferren, !E
(301).498-4766
!
Attactment: l
1.ist cf Recently Issueo II Infonnation Notices
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Deceinbar 12. 1985 j
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MIM03ANDUM 701: DR8&P Staff
! FROM1 A. E. Chaf fae. . Chisf i I
Rosasor Projects Branch
'
ENCLC8UREt
' 1
MemorlandumfromEDJordantoBrianGrima
i " Plant systems checkout Following suspecte.d sabotage"
l
- SU3JIC"
POTENTIAL SABOTAGE: GUIDANCE TOR TOLLCf1-UP l
1 > l
- 4
Encicaura 1 provides guidance for NRC and licensee actions when potsattal
j sabotage has been identified. This guidance is provid.ed for your retteer and
use.
F1sasa also review ithe licenses's program for d.ealing with poteattal i
sabotage from an operaticks standpoint. Enclosure 1 is a good guide to use
j '
in svaluating the license'a's program. You will note that this guidasse is ,
not included in any forssi document. Pisase find a nethod to file this l
, I
document so it is availallis vhan needed.
2
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l A. E. Cha faa. Chisf
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Reactor Projects . Branch
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f Uht?ED STAT 88
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t NUCLEAR RESULATORY COMMISSION
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assumeten,s.e, asses Y).p. . )WS.' E
. hse +
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MtHORANDUM FORr
trias K. Getues, Of rector. Olvision of Emergency
Prpperessass,IE.
.
FRONT
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Edwani L. Assurance.
Jentaa. Director. Division of Engineerin
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and quality IE
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, SUBJECT! ! PLANT SYSTEM 5 CHECKOUT FOLLOWIHR ( ' .
The enciessa, procanure provides guidance for actions owing
to
instancas of suspected $bbtage.
t We request that you enke this guidasse
I j ,
avetlable to (E Hanage'nant l
on-call and the IE Operati
We are issutnq the orecesure as a Tamoorary Instruction e Restenal
for us
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an, Director
Divistos( f Engineer
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Qust' Assurance,ing IE and
1 .Enclosuret
In41cated SabotagePreceoure for' Assessing
1. 0_ p h '
w . {^- }1 - 4 ABO _,,- ow.
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H. R. Denton. NRR
J. S. Davis, MNS$
R. C. DeVoun
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J. L. 31ths.gIEIE -
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J. G. Xeppler
J. T. Ce11tns AI!! { .
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) R. W. Engelkan,Arv ;. -
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J. M. Taylor. IE ,
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i ' } - PROCEDURE FOR ASSESS!NS 510N!PICANCE OF
INDICATION OF
! - SABOTAGE PRIOR TO CONTINUED DPERAf!0N
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- In view of recent events involving indication of potential sabotage et the
Sales
instances oneofBrunswick
this kind. fact 11t1 s. a precedure has been prepared for use in fu
The pursess of tien procesure is to'detemine if -
sabotaos The
censittens. hasprocedure
been costittes
1 intanced ne totocheek provideout the plant
guidance foFto
it ensure contiW sa
,
cen1NIW suty offiter and management.en-call, and regional personne,) both inyajyggeperggiens *
l
with r6sponse to such eventst.
- l
CSJECT1Yt :
i i . i ! The
is to- crimary objective
ensure continues in'deak
safe Jacilitytne with an event inetcative of potantial pate
conditions.
i
or intentionally.. initiates. J udgments must. be made When en event
regardine of. cure :sosteentl y
potentia),6
i -- j of the event ano the correcstve
eenditions ane minimite the conseguences. actions to be taken to eliminate the inttittleg
sgsg. '
.
After potential or actual sanotage has been identified it is necessary to gather
sufficient facts to enable 'aiclear unserstanding of the significante of the
identiftsa sabotage. i
i Gaining such
in responding to the identifted sabotees.understanding is the first action to be teken '
j .
first action is referred to < n ites A 6elow.Infomation that may assist in this
With an understanetnq of the
'
identified satetage, it is ttlen appropriate to establish an initial.pri6rittred
l saaren of the assectated or suseect systems. The resulting information is then ,
the tasts for deterwHnin .
i plant is enecked (i.e.. g speseevent action. Claarty ttne extent to which the
iptettattens of further sabotage foune during the chectout. Items 8 ans C er 0 be
~
A. Sabotaes Event twelvati n - * - *
i ! 1
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The enklesure to the nesorandum dated November1981 6 to Coastssioner *
Brasford from W. Direks censists of 1 procedure Yor this evaluaties. A
! cesy is encloses. It is { of this proceevre. to be uses for general guidance on implementattee '
.
3. , Overe)1 Inssection of Mant
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As set forth on page 3 c f the enclosed " Sabotage Event Evaluation " the *
conosctplant
overall 'of search sne a
end'then seuipment chest should include a check of the
system by system inspection, as appropriate.
:
j The evere11 plant and sytem by system hatings reflects a ahanes-en"
, approach that would entale an inspector to verify sne licensee's ..
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action in checking out a nuclear power 91snt in instances of .;
i 6tage. ; i
ant. T4 repeat. tt is the licensee. not NRC. that checks the
'
- overall guidanes to pThe assumpties is made that the FSAR would be
Specifications would at system reevirements one that the plant est
i operation er notart. satisfied befen justification of continued t .
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; Prior to a. systems ehethout based on the listing in itses C and 0 b
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Ginspection
chtegori,es.. , Dese aref
'Ahnutd be 1 rgely by visual amans n
s * on *
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i 1.
eentrol room inse tien. .
2. plant structures 1 spection.
,
5. piping.and valve walkdown, and
4. electrical power i ntegrity confimation. '
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This broad inspectien s *
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- abnormality such as a damages otpeline or a planted explosive.bou It should
'
not be progrensnee to detect all potentially faulted systems.
! ,
In the control room. v'1 ~
ano instee caninets wit "ttual inscaction should be mese of ali pa' nels, bearts
j j
be alert to spotting jui npers, an eye to spotting any obvious fault. One shou
and certainly to any strange " packages." ld .
.
In the visual checkout af plant structures. the some generet attitude
! Should be appropriate. iLook for tenormalities one foreign materials. His j category
reactor buildingshould includet the main plant buildings, that is. containment,
turoine building ans of course. the intake structure or
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The piping and valve wahkdown should use the same serspective. i
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not seek to distingutsht It should '
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that.which is not. Thinbetween system p ing whics is safety-g
inspection shes simply consist of a ses
i ' patrol of a)1 accessibt p ne.
of f4uiting. For naame e.iping runs being alert to the more obvious type i
tot ensin of a "thain a e padlocked" one should be essected
valve aandle. toOn be ehte to " find * a j
{t the other . ene !
-
should not expect to ce firin yalve alignennt during this initi61
, ',
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i .PTn11y2 the initial ch ek of the electrical system should be mese with.the i
i sans ueneret approach. l1t should seet to verify that the vital power
1 '
es were not "alterse" in a significant way. 'He purpose of this
j ' shou 18 be to make1 sure it was safe to turn power on for further
;
systems checking.
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! investigation i determination.cf sabotage has been made and further
itates that specific. systems might be affected. It att .
i
he necessary to perform;e complete welkdown of certain systems, chtskitg
.
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i sad electrical switch:I ed motor operated
nsitions, etc. Aatual valve posittens, circuit- brecher
system welkdowns
.
! 8890sta)1y pertinent wsk respect ts stanehr systems whose j cannet
in hi be completely $monstrated during norum) plaat speesttens.11
radiation areas may be required
t
' const eretion of the evidence of sabetage n t en dotatted .
ALAAA consideratten. * e arvas and a pe$sth14
4 . -
idlen evidence of sa
,
j , see identified, conste is found a;.sd specific cameenents and
should be taken. tien of the conseeventes of corrective game
i j correetive actions shodad be made and constatency plans 1
ressenses should be deteretnee -
prior to taking corrective actions.
i !
B6
operation.* tatted examination of systems including these a l
-
appHesble. ' F0110 win 9
The system to be examines are 11sted in item C er 0'as
Leuen a checkout. it then would be appropriete.to
, confirm systems operanqity throughout the plant using the Technical I Specification requirennuts as the measure of safe operability. i conforsensa with Techn(ss) Specification reevirements representsThis the l 4
ende of reactor operatioverall ons. critaria on WMeh decisiona may be m
'
,
l C. BWp 71 ant Systems
,
'
1.. Reactor Systaa
s .- Yessel '
! b. ches for obvious abnormal condition ' !
Yessel 1.sve) Rastrumentation - consonainq channers, piping, dp
I ratta, wirinq .
,
'
1. Reactor Retirculation $ystem
,
.
,
.
.t ~. Piping
{ i
. h. Yalves disd e and sustion l
. C. Motor,, pump.< controls
{ 'd. .
Ptwer supplymiset. cables, modules. breakers
-
- e. Contro) catiants. wiring, beares, breakers *
4
.. .
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. , ..
. .
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.
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j 97 sne plant is operating,aantinued operation should and must be oeruttted
j until
downsufficientsafety. chacr.s has been maae to assure that the plant can be shut .
1 >- ..
.
-
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3. Centre) Roe Drive Hydraulis System -
.
'
.
6.
4
- MCus (Hyeraulle
isolation ystves,Contre) unlts), directional contret valves,
seren valves
b. Pising throughout MCDs, 30V
*
t. SDV drain and vent valves.1{$4 7 Level ramswitches Discharge,Velume)
! d. Centrol ctreettry - tables. bear j e. Mr supply ipiping ame valves, dscontrols, pilot valves
' ,
!
4 '. - 5)anetly Liquid to trol System
- i
.
a. ELC tank level, piping
i D. Pomos ane meters. cover supplies, controls i ' c. Valves. south.1solatten
-
d. Centre) etrevitry, peasts, cabinets, cables
! ' ' .. \
5. Residual Heat Aemival (AMI) System .- ..
a. jiest exchangers, primary side (shall)i secondary side (tube)
.
servies water
b. Primary sideL(LPCI) pusest s'otors. ptaing valves. (sels na
valves, detwell spray piping and valves, torus , spray ptog *
ads valves l
c.
Other primary side ptaing and valves.1.a.. shutdown' cooling,
isolation geoling where a
d.
Control ctresitry wtiri].
Power supplies contro power supplies
panela. pplicatie boeres. Logic inte'resanestions.
-
e. RMR 3ervics Water System
Wat
) Pumps 4 motorsIves.er supply structure
Piping)ane va 1 solation ana intercormections
1 w -
.
.-
iv })- CentrePower' supply, circuitryIe,
cat iring, heares, panels
breakers, cop,trols
,
. 3. Cf,re,$ pray System'
.
*
4. Puses. motort
'
b. Piping and v41ves .
c. check valves
Control circuitry, wiring toolstion, panela. valves $0gic, control power
W. Power supplios, esale4 treakers, controls
7.' Hig'h Pressure Cool ant Inhattien System -
-
*
e. ' Pump and tursiine driver *
b. Piping
c. Centrol valvos.1solatten
ciresitry, wiv' ting. velves,
lette.condensate control power traps i
de . !
n. Turbine ot1 tystem./tursine control valvgs. speed go. verner
. ,,
*
.
. ;
* .
.
.
9
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.
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. 5-
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! . . .
.
8. Automatic Depresstrisasten System -
! a. ! b. Safety)reliet
Contro cirevitry. valeswiring,
operability
timer. logic
- e. Mr or pneumatic essumulators, air supply check valves, att
j supply piping ,
= .
! 9. Reactor Core Ise10 tion Cooling $ystese *
,
. i .
W '
a. Stees and tv ine dMyer
.
*
! .
b. check moves, condensate treps
A Pipingl
Centro ctre (try. w1Mng logicvalv s. imission valves
l 10. Diesel Generator $ystem
a. Day tanks an stessge tanst ! b. Feel oil pumps. notors pi
!
*
c. Centrol C1resttry. wiring, ping: logic - .
: ./ d. Diesel air start and lube oil systems -
- e.
l Generator protecstve devices and output interconnections (See ! electMeal systems) ,
.
! l, 11. Containment Systems
.
l a. Primary cantainment isolation valves including H51Vs and saattels i b. PMmary contatanmurt inerting system pipings valves. controls, i stapling l i c. Suppressten theater water level .
*
l d. Vesuum brosskrs - OW to torus to reactor building
3
e. $tansby gas tressment system oeersatitty
[ f. DW purge endivent valves control
.
~
i 12. Wr'ser Systems .
'
i . i t. lost servtte !
- . b. tamtgency se nica vaterwater
piping {.{fapplicatie)
valves, pumps, motors
piping, valves,pumpe.
4
. mBlers .
! c. ! state strue bare integrity i d. Reactor buil ting closes cooling water. turbine building clesed l cooling wter feel pool' cooling - { *
e. Circulating water. system
i f. Diesel generator tooling water system - i 9. . Ceneensate aW fasawater system including storage tanks and
4 . deennerali sers -
I h. Ceneensate.Fbeenster piping, pumps. valves
l 1. F4eewater hentem with associated pt>1ng and valves
i : -
'
*
i :
'
'.
I #FD"eUTTIF"BBks using an ,isonetton condenser for this function, only the
steve igens (f.b.) ans (9. c.)areappliostle. , .
l
,
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.- . -
.. -.
-- - --_
j , . FRest M AC 1*D1 88.1. 1993 L*844
. *
; pg 3
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.
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esasas
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ac c eranst.4a No. net egy
. . .
. .
,
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.
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I
*
l 13. Instrumentation and Contro) Systems l '
s. Renator prot 6ction systes, boards. rocks. relays, complete
sentrol rous cheek
) -
b. Nektron menhoring system including TIP piping and valves and
.
SRM APRM
*
c. Proces. IRM.
s cent Fe interfaces *
.
, 6. tagineered safe)ty feature controls. rocks i s. 1&C for safe shutdown including control room habitshtlit j : '*J
.
,
f. Other !&C - e.g., fuel poet coo)ing, offets monitoring, yete systen ' '
14. ~14ctrical
> Systems
I
a. DC system su' p ply and monitoring on 125 volt ane 250 volt
i
batteries kne chargers, switchgear ans panels
i b. Vital AC seuipment incluaing 4kv. 480 volt ane 130 volt huses
* and sw eer
i
C. Vital motor entre) centers . .
.-
d. taerp acy 1 hting system
<
e. Remote snu control system -
< f. Cable spreedNag room .
*
- IL. Compressee Air $ystem .
.
.
- s Compressers. accumulater tanks sne motors -
'
i
i b.- Piping and valves ' i c. Centrol circuitry, wiring - *
.
!
;*t ti . ,
j ,
lir a.in rur.in. .ener. tor -
.
s. Turbine contro) system including electrohydraulic oil system
,b .
.
c. Sgssvalve; controls .
retorp7tectivesystems .
,
! D ., NR plant tvstams ' i l
.
.,1. Rtecter Systes
! I
a. Manter pressers vessel
i i
h. Castrol roe prive mechanism above reactor vossa)
c. Centrol sne linstrumentation for the reactor protection system
1 (RP5) ane fths overpretsure protection system .
'
1. Reactor Coolant stem (RCS)
'
i a. Prtsery sne Isocondary coolant loops pipine, valves (including
] safety rettef), instrumentation ans conirol *
j h. Reactor costant pumps (RCF3 and assestated component cooling . 5
including iconsenent coeltne of lube eti coolers and eet .
- sooting valves ans piping out to cent (inannt senetratten
.
f '
e
,
h
. - _ . - - - -- . - - -- ..
_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ ._.- ___ _ _ _ _ _ _
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stene toned Mee eas m asT 4 N3.331 ggg-
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i . ! C. Steam generator externa) dhange, including safety relief valves i d.
Pressortsar instudine P0ltV.'s. assestated seetrol. sir (or
l nitrogen) tupply heater control and hester backup power j
supply, ana valves and piping to pressure relief tant
. >
) - 3. Emergency Core Cooling System (tCC3) * j -
,
as
.
i
Accumulatorsiand piping to.RCS vent see isolation valves,
'
- ,
2*-
*
nitrogen pressure ans supsly -
- b. High hees charging pumes, chstging lines, beron injecties
i -
tants. all;other safety injection pumps (l.a., intermeetate
!
l
4 hete
alignmentpianot if appliestle)
(tectuaing manual ana relatas
isolation piping)and
valves to RCSvs1ve i
- c. Restaual heat roovat (RNR$ systems heat anchangers.
I
puses, valves iniuding qnanval system isolatten valve
!
. alignment .ane associated control circuitry wiring, panels. l
interconnections, power supplies and centret power supplies ;
l d. '
RHR servica water system inclucing peeps. motors, piping, . l
4
valves (especially system isolation volves)
l e. Refusiing water storage tank. associated 1, solation valvks and
piping for:(CCS puso suction
j f. Instrument and control racks for the entire CCCS system
,
4 Component Ccoling;Syatem .,
'
a. Component deling pumps. heat exchangers, spent fuel pool heat
asenangers. water seal heat enchangers
b. Special attention should go to conoonent cooling for' RCPs.
emergency diese) generators. ICCS pumas and essatisted
isolation valves and piping
.
l. Instrumentation sna Control
, s
a. Visual inspection and functional testing of Rp5 and engineering
. safeguarest systems
. b. Visual chect:of instrument racks and wiring for RHR, auxillary
feesweter syntes and snutdown systems
c. presserational testing of EllMs. IRMS and all other power -
level instruments -
*
d. Centrol room and musiliary room ventilation system .
e. Instrument control ate (or. nitrogen) pressure ve)ves ans
piping fortsafety systems
f. , Centrol, room: panels ans cabinets
- -
.
, .
*
. .
'
.
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6. Waste Disposal and Raditien Protection System
'
a. Radiation monitors for service water discharge headers and plant
vents
b. Reacter ecolant drain tanks. CYC5 holdup tanks, and the waste
holdup tanks, valves, piping and adiation alarms 1
Waste gas monitor tanks, vrive li is up to service water
'
- c.
system
d. Gas decay tanks, analyzer tanks and.nlant vent valve lineup and ,
j
< ,
2 *2
,
associated raoiation monitors
7. 06ntainment Systems
4
a. Containment isolation valves. CVCS 'ietd wn lines. MSIVs
- b. Containment pressure relief valves, purge exnaust valves and
all other manually cperateo containment valves which are
accessible ,
*
c. Personnel and eoui; ment access hatenes .
-
j
I
d. Centainment spray systems, piping, valves. instrumentation and
wiring, ;: umps, heat exenanger ene recirculation system sump, j
pump and controls )
e. Hydrogen reccmeiner units including the control panels and
- power supply
- f. Fan coolers with safety cooling %ncti:ns and ice condensers 1
(ifapplicable)
8. Electrical Systems
a. Auxiliary power system, including 4160/480 vital buses. 125 vo'.t 4
' OC control buses / battery and 120 VAC vital instrument bus '
b.. Emergency diesel generator system controls, fuel oil, lube oil,
tanks anc piping '
-
c. Cable spreading reem
. 9. Ha'in Steam System '
'
a. Associated relief valves
b. Turbines include lube oil system, bypass valves and
generator protection systems
c. Steam generator feedpumos and val e lineup through FW heaters
d. Auxiliary feedwater system pumos snd manual isolat.icn valves
10. Spent fuel pool and fuel handling syctems (i.e., if in refueling
outage), including cooling system ano level indicatiens
11. Service water system including piping. ' .ilves ; umps, and heat
excnangers .
12. Sampling system for appropriate systems including isolation valver,
N N-
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UNITED STJTES'
y RUCLEAR REG 1!LATURY t0MMIS$10N
OFFICE OF NUCCEAR RI; ACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20555 ,,
February xx,19By -
'
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-XX: GUIDEl.INES FOR ASSESSING INDICATIONS
OF EQUIPMENT TAMPERING / SABOTAGE
.
Addressees:
All holders of operating l icenses or can'struction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
This information notice in being provided to assist addressees in pisaning
_. for events involving inditation of possible sabotage. If such an event -
"oecurs, wnether accidentally or intentionally initiated, judgments must be
made regarding potential tonsecuences of the event and the corrective actions
necessary to eliminate th6 initiating conditions and minimize the consequences.
Itisexpectedthatrecipjentswillreviewtheinformationforapplicability
to their fac11fties. Howpver, suggestions contained in this information notice
do not constit.ute NRC requirements therefore, no specific action or Written
response is required.
'
Description of Circumstances:
Nuclear power reactor Ifc ensees personnel have identified several instances of
equipment tampering, for example, misaligned breakers or valves, cut wires or
cables or the placement af foreign objects in a piece of machinery or contamin-
ating liquids in reservoi rs or tanks.
Discussion:
In determining what actio.ns are appropriate following an indication of. sabotage
or tampering at a nucleari power plant, the governing principle is to avoid undue
risk to the public health' and safety. Jn implementing this principle, all per-
tinent factors cust be carefully examinhd to determine whether the condition
resulted from en accident l or from a deliberate act of vandalism, malicious mis-
chief, or sabotage. If judged to be an attempted act of radiological sabotage
factors such as sophistidatton, intent andthepossibilityofotheractsbytbe
same person cust be const'dered, as well as the event history of the plant.
I
in forculating any resporse action, the' licensee should consider cote uttal
safety consequences of su ch actions and the condition of the plant. lefore
making any change in the the licensee should
consider the basis for tt operating
e change status
and its of the
potential facilityltigating
for m or com-
pounding the situation. As a general rule, the public health and safety are
probably best served by i nitially maintaining a stable mode of plant operation
as the transtants caused by changes in plant status could contribute to a
Q reduction in plant safety
need to be initiated to
In addition, contingency plans and other measures
(o.rrect the condition and prevent further acts while
the facts of the matter i re being fullf assessed.
:
DA A PT
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Page 2 of it;
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Eard and fast rules for dealing with-
l Because each plant situation seemis practica
unique,l. However, some general * guidelines
'
attesiptad sabotage do not
appear appropriate in most circumstances.
-
A. Evaluation of a Tamoorino/ Sabotage Event
l
After potential or ahtual sabota g_gr tampering has been identified, it is
,
necessary to gather sufficien acts o permit a clear understanding of the
i
- significance of the d dentified s age or tampering.
1
Some of the factors that should be considered in gathering this information
l 2 are as follows: .
* The event may prevent a safety system from performing its intended
l function.
'~ *
i
~~ ' The event may prevent a system designed to preve'nt 6r mitigate the
consequence of italfunction from performing its intended function,
i resulting in a aossible release of radioactive material. s ) * The event may cause a safety system failure only if multiple other
! events occur.
i
*
The event may p'revent a system designed to support a safety system,
l from performing its intended function. l l
*
There are no apparent safety implications.
1 i Three factors should be censidered in determining the probability of a j malevolent act, as opposed to an accidental occurrence: 4
I
1. OVERTNESS - Sometimes by the act itself, it'is obvious that ar. act
of sacotage has been perpetrated; but more often than not the cause
1
!
of an event is}not obvious. The cause could be miss11gned valves, for
-
example. In such cases, the following criteria should be used in
- determinine whdther sabotage occurred.
) a. Physical e vidence clearly related to the event, for example, the
lock to aivalve is cut and the valve misaligned; or the actuator
}
te d e mofor control valve is shorted.
l
! b. Physical vidence tangentially related to the event, for example,
-
the door o the vital areas (VA) is forced open and the valve is
misaligne .
Das n
~
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b c. Circumstant ial evidence clearly related to the event for exemple,
i the lock and chain are mi,ssing and the valve is misaI1gned.
d. Circumstan1 1:1 evidence t'angentially related to the event for
i example, the key to the VA door is missing and the valve Is ! misaligned. 1
e. No evidence l of deliberate' manipulation of equipment.
l ! 2. INTENT '- Some iriferences conce'rning the intent of the adversary can ! De crown from analyzing the safety significance and the overtness of
- the act. In addition, intent 'can be determined by other means, the
j most obvious being a cosaunicated threat.
l a. A comunicated threat is received before the event.
'
" --
b. A comunicated threat is received, and circumstantial evidence -
relating t6 the event exists.
c. A comunic ited threat is received, but no other evidence
(physical or circumstantial) exists. No event occurs.
.
d. No comuni :sted threat it received.
3. HISTORY - The historical significance of an event should'be evaluated
using the following criteria: i
a. History ofl recent similar events escalating in safety
significance. l
l l
b. History of; random events with no escalation in safety significance.
'
c. Historyofvandalismrelatingtolabor/managementproblems.
.d. No previou s events.
An analysis of the above factors may lead to a conclusion about whether the act
was willful or accidental. When overtness is judged to be low, and history is
found to be low, the ever;t may be less .likely to involve sabotage. If the
evidence is not conclusive or if the ev,ent is determined to be accidental, the
appropriate corrective action to prevent recurrence and to mitigate the con-
sequences should be take 1
If the event is ceterminod to be an act of sabotage or, after evaluation of
the previous factors sabotatie cannot be ruled out, a judgment must ha made
regarding the level of s6phtstication of the event and the consequences intended
by the adversary. Some 'nferences regarding the adversary's capability can be
drawn from the safety significance of the target. If the adversary's capability
is evaluated as being high, the potential to do significant damage is greett
L therefore, the level of.nophistication of the event is a critical element in
%s the decision. Evaluatica of the following factors may provide some insight
regarding the level of saphistication.
4
'
.
.
-
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-
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page 4 of4t! 3 ,l
4. Level of Sophistication -
,
'
s. Target sel)ction and timihg clearly doesnstrate an intention to-
cause consehuences to the public health and safety. A high degree- i
of knowledg's of the plant and the sabota
'
high level }of professional capabilities (ge expert scheine deemastrate
employment and- a-
most advantageous location of explosives or installation of a
i
'
jumperthat would nullify the safety function of a vital component).
4
b. Evidence irdicates an int'ent % n to cause consequences to'the public
health and safety and a sophisticated sabotage method is used but
target seis ction and timing demonstrate limited plant knowledge.
c. Target saleetion and timing indicate poor knowledge of plants a
crude sabotage method is used.
-
'-
--
After constderation olf the above fa'ctors, a response liction should be ta
that is comensurateiwith the potential safety consequence of the act and
the sophistication 1dvel of the adversary. The following is a list of
possible response actions; one or more of these measures may be needed:
*
Contact the F.BJI_to request their assistance in investigating the '
incident and provide technical assistance to the FBI as requested.
~
*
Ensure that effective coordination and comunication exists between
plant operations and securf ty personnel during the FBI investigation.
'
Identify which Sampered/ sabotaged equipment-has had recent maintenance
performed and who performed it.
*
Identify by computer check (if feasible) the personnel who had recent
, access to the areas W which tampering / sabotage occurred.
*
Increase securi:y measures for areas of concern to include additional
access controls and increase vital area patrols for the rest of the
plant until the investigation is completed and the perpetrator removed.
*
Des
support1gnate a senior
and ressond manager
to inquiries as the point
pertaining to the of 6)}to assist and c
investigation.
'
Review recent p ersonnel problems or issues for indications of dis-
gruntlement.
*
Initiate accele rated functional testing.
*
Establish limited two. man rul6 for area in which event occurred.
~
'
Establish tota tw;. man rule for all vital areas in the plant.
*
Consider contr lled shutdown.
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Page 4 of ft l
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tionical specifications and operating procedure
for example
i
oneoperatingafstemtothenext. ensure availability of require
-
,
llith an understandin
establish an initial of the identif'ied sabotage, it is then appropriate
resultin earch of the associated or suspect systees. The t
action. gClearl
informatib then will be the basis for determining subsequent
th
and C or D belo extent to which the plaht is checked !
'
sabotagefounddurinithecheckout.dep'irnds on judgment regardin t
.
B. Overall Inspsetion of Plant I
As set forth in item
.-
-
Innd f search and A, " Evaluation of Tampertng/ Sabotage Event ,
" the
,
pverall p an , and couloment check should include
then a system-by-system inspectTon]a as'appropetate. chect- of
The overall
approach planttout
in checking ane system-by-system listings reflects a " ha
a nuclear
sabotage.
3 ewer
would be satisfied be plant in instances of suspectedThe assum !
fore justification of continued operation or res' tart.
( Before a system's chtekout based on the listing in items C and
a broad inspection
inspection should be of the glant sho'uld be made by the Thislicensee
,
, ,
main categories: large y visual and consist of the following four
1. Control repm inspection
-
2. Plant strut.tures inspection
3. Piping and valve walkdown inspection
4
Confirmati n of electrical power integrity
,
This broad
abnormality suchinspection
at should be initially performed to spot any a
not be programmed to d damaged
detect all pi eline or a planted explostve. It should
otentially faulted systems.
visual thspection
to spot any obvious should be made of all pan
and other arent that contain vital electrical equipment
"sult.
,
should ba spotted. Unauthorized jumpers and any strange * packa
'
.
.
in appropriate.
be the visual checko1t of plant structures, the same general at
Plant structuresAbn)rmalitter
include the main and foreign materialsthat
plant buildings, should
is be looked for.
the reactor building, the auxiliary building, the turbine Eu11dinthe con
course the intate structure or connection to ultimate heat sink. g, and of ,
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tion should involve the same per.
The
spective.piping and valve
This inspection shouldusikdown
no inspe(t seek to distinguish 1
grade and nonsafety grade system piping. This inspection should titoly !
consist of a routine patrol of all tecessible piping runs in which tw
inspector is alert to the more obvious type of faulting. For example,
' the inspector should be able to " find" a cut chain of a " chained and
padlocked" valve hand le. On the other hand, the inspector should not
'
expect to confirm valve altgnment during this initial check. ,
' ,
Finally, the initial : heck of the electrical system should be made with '
4
the same general apgranch. It shou id seek to verify that the vital power
.
suppiters were not a ltered" in a significant way. The purpose of this
check shohld be to ma ke sure it was safe to turn power on for further
- checking of systems.
i .
-
-- If preliminary determination of sabotage has been made and further
,
investigation indicatbs that specific systems might bh affected, it s;ty -
!
be recessary to perform a complete walkdown inspection of certain systems, l
checking all accessibile manual and shotor-operated valve positions, circuit, l
breaker and electricall switch positions, etc. Actual system walkdown
inspections are espec'1:11y pertinent with respect to standby systems whose
t
carability cannot be completely demonstrated during nonnel plant operations. l
Caecks in high ractatkon areas may he required depending on data 11ed con-
sideration of the evidence of sabotage in these areas and as low as is !
reasonablyachievable(ALARA)consitleration.
If evidence of sabotage is found an# specific components and systems are
identified consideration of the cohsequences of corrective :ctions should ;
'
be made. d thorough Betermination of possible system response to correct 1y
actions should'be made and contingency plans to address tnese respontas
"
should be determined before corrective actions are taken
f systems including those associated with the
Detailed examination hy be necessary to establish the basis fo
identified sabotage,
operation.* The systems to be examined are listed in item C or 0, as
applicable. Followin
. confirm system operab[h such a checkbut,
11ty throughout it thenthe
the plant using would be appropriate to
technical
4
specification requirements as the mbasure of safe operability. This
,
conformance with tech'nical specification requirements represents the
overall criteria on Which decisions may be made regarding changing the
mode of reactor opera'tions.
C. Boilino-WaterReactor(BWR)plantSystems
1. Reactor System
a.
b.
Yessel-checkforobviousabnormalcondition
Yessel Level Instrumentation - condensing chan6ers, piping,
different1s') pressure (DP.) racks, and wiring
\ mad
=IT the plant is operating operation sh'ould continue until sufficient checks
havebeenmadetoensuredeplantcanbeshutdown.
hU Y
_ - -.. - _ _ - . - - _ _ -
.; - - _ - - _ - . - --.
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2. Reactor Recirculation System -
. i s. Piping - ! b. Yalves-discharge and suction . i' c. Motor, pump-, cnd controls
d. Power suaply setor generator (MG) set, cables, sedules,
and breaaern
j e. Control cab Insts, wiring, . boards, and breakers t 4 i
3. Control Red Drivo Hydraulic System
l . i 4.
- Hydraulic
isolation volves, control
and units
scram (HCUs)lvesdirectional
va control valves, !
! b. Pfping throughout HCUs and scram discharge volume ! c. ) !
$DY drain and vent valves and instrumented volume level l
switches
.
.
~
--
d. Control circuitry - cables and boards
j e. Air supply a piping and valves, controls, ahd pilot valves - 1 j 4 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System
)
i a. SLC tank, lovel, and piping
- b.
Pumps and motors, power supplies, and controls '
c. Valves squ1b, and isolation
1 d. Controlcircuitry, panels, cabinets,andcables ,
5. Residual Heat Reieval (RHR) System
- j
a. Heat exchanglers, primary . side (shell), secondary s
and service water
b. Primary sido low-pressurecoreinjection(LPCI) pumps, motors,
j p1 ing valve s, isolation valves, drywell spray piping and '
va ves, and, torus spray piping and va,'ves
c.
. -
Other
and isolati primary side piping,and
n coolin where op llenb valves,le:htt is, shutdown cooling
d .- Control cir uttry, w ing, pane s boards
power supplies, and control power, supplies, logic interconnections, i
e. RHR Service Water System
j
(( )) Pipingmotors and water suppl
Pumps,
and va ves, isolation, yand structure
interconnections
! i
/ Contro 1 circuit w
!
- dJ Power nupply, ca is, iring brasboards,
ers, andand panels
controls
i '
6. Core Spray Systen -
'
< i a. Pumps, and istors ', b. Piping and valves, isolation valves and check valves
c. Control cirhuttry, wiring, panels, logic, and control power j d. Power supp11es, cable, breakers, and controls ; ! Q
1
'
o _
-. --
_
c a ten n a i, asug
88.14.1996 888SS p,
*
.
-
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-
-
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' ' !N.xx .. I
-
Page 8 of 125 --
V 7. High Pressure Co plant Injection System i
,
a. Pump and tu rbine driver -
--
b. Piping val /es, isolation valves, and condensate.trapa
c. Controlcir :uitry, wiring, logic, and control power
d. Turbine oil system, turbine control valves, and ' peed
s governor
i
8. Automatic Depressurization System
a. Safety reli ef valves operability 1
b. Control cir:uitry, wiring tim and logic l
I
c. Air or pneumatic accumulafors,eralr supply check valves, and
air supply siping
9. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System *
.
--
a. Pump and turbine driver
b. Piping, valkes, isolation valves, check valves'and condensate -
traps
c. Control cirlcuitry, wiring, and logic
,
10. Diesel Generator System
a. Day tanks apd storage tanks I
b. Fuel oil pupps, motors an
9 c. Control circuitry, wiring,d pipingand logic ,
d. Diesel air start and lube oil systems
e. Generator protective devices and output interconnections (see
electrical systems)
11. Containment Systems
I
a. Primary containment isolation valves, including main steam
isolation vpives (HS!Ys) and controls
b. Primary containment inerting system piping, valves, controls,
andsamplink
c. Suppression chamber water level
d. Vacuum breakers - drywell (DW) to torus to reactor building
e. Standby gas' treatment system operai.111ty
f. DW purge an'd vent valves control
12. Water Systems
a. valves pumps and motors
b. RHR service
Emergency s'arvicewater
water piping (if app 1Icable), piping, valties,
and motors l
c. Intake structure integrity
d.
Reactor butling water, and fuel pool cooling 1 ding closed c
closedcooll
V 'For earlier Bk'Rs using an isolation condenser for this function, only the
above items 9.b cnd 9.c are applicable.
.
-
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- .
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4,'
Page 9 of'! E -
-
e.
f. Circulating,
Diesel go ator water system
cooling wa . ter system
g. Condensate nd feedwater systemii ncluding storagt tanks and.
*
domineralia rs '
l h. Condensate-Feedwater piping, pumps, and valves .'
- 1. Feedwater h' esters with associated piping and valves ~
! 13. Instrumentation and Control (!!C) Systems 1 ! a.
Reactor protection system, boards, racks, relays, and complete
i 1
.
control roeps check . :
b.
i Neutron monitoring system, including traveling incore probe (TIP) !
piping and valves and source range monitor intermediate
range monitor (IRM), and everage power mon range ($RM)Ito
! c. Process control interfaces I d. Engineered ! safety feature controls and racks i l : e.
~~ Instrumenta' tion and control (!&C) for safe shutdown, including
i control room habitability system ~
-
! f. Other I&C J for example, fuel pool cooling, offgas monitoring, -
etc.
t ! 14. Electrical Syptom: 1
l
, s. DC system supply end monitoring on 125-volt and 250-volt batteries
and chargers, switchgear, and panels
l 1
y b. Vital AC equipment including 4ky, 480-volt and 230-volt busea
and switchgear
- c. Vital motor control centers
! -
d. Emergencylightingsystem
e. Remotesautdowncontrolsystem
"
f. Cable spreading room
j !
- -
15. Compressed Air fystem l
l ,
n. Compressort, accumulator tanks, and motors
j b. Piping and: valves i c. Control circuitry, and wiring
16. Main Turbine Gaoerator
'
a. Turbine con l trol system, including electrohydraulic o
b. Bypassvaltecontrols
c. Generatorprotectivesystems
D. Pressurfted-WaterRenctor(PhR)plantSystems
.
1. Reactor System
a. Reactor prossure vessel
b. Control roid drive mechanism above reactor vessel
c. Control anii instrumentation for the reactor protection system
(RPS) and the overpressure protection systas: -
.
.,
.
_ _ _. . _ _ , . .
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.
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2. Reactor Coolant systems (RCS) ,
s. Primary and secondary coolant loop. piping, valver(including
safety r:11 f), instrumentation and control .
b. Reactor coo ant pumps (RCP) and associated compopent cooling,
including qomponent cooling of lube oil coolers and component
cooling val
c. External st'ves
eamand piping to
generator containment
including safe penetration
relief valves
d. Pressurizar, including po,wer operated rol of valves (PORVs),
associated control air ior nitrogen) supply, heater control and
heater bac up power supply, and valves and piping to pressure
relief tan,
3. Emergency Core C ooling System (ECCS)
. a. Accumulators and piping to RCS vent and isolation valves and
.-' --
nitrogen pressure and supply
b. Hi[h head charging pumps, chargin lines bbron injection tanksr
al other i . 'et i.e., , intermediate head umps,
if applicab.e) y injection pumpsand related plaing and valv
manual isol ation valves to R:S
. c. Residual heat removal ( HR) system-heat exchangers pumps
valves (includingmanualsystemisolationvalvea1Ignment},.
associated control circuitry, wiring, anels, interconnections,
ower supp lies, and control power supp ies
d. HR service water system including l
(especially system isolakion valves) pumps, motors, piping, valves
-
e. Refueling water storage tank, associated isolation valves, and
piping for ECCS pump suction
J f. Instrument and control racks for the entire ECCS system
4 Component Cooling System
.
a. Component ;ooling pumps, heat exchangers, spent fuel pool heat
exchangers-, and water seal heat exchangers
b. Special attention should be given component cooling for RCPs,
energency hiesel generaters ECCS pumps, and associated isolation
valves and piping
5. Instrumentation and Control
a. Visual ins pection and functional testing of RPS and engineering
safeguards' systems
b. Visual che'ck of instrument racks and wiring for RHR, auxiliary
feedwatertsystem,andshutdownsystems
c. Preoperatipnal testing of SRMS, IRMS, and all other power level
instruments
d. Control room and auxiliary room ventilation system
e. Instrumen control air (or nitrogen) pressure valves and piping
for safe systems
f. Control rcom panels and cabinets
0
m
- * , V&ri r 1, :.:.: -
.
.
- .
-
Ill4*
. .
Page 11 of tr.'
i l 6. Wasta Disposal and Radiation Protection System _
4. Radiation sonitors for service water discharge headers and plant-
l
- vents
i b. Reactor coolant drain tanks, chemical and volume' control system
(CYCS) holdup tanks, and the waste holdup tanks, valves,' piping
. i
and radiatjon alams
- c. Waste gas monitor tanks, and valve line to service water system
- 'd . Gas decay enks, analyzer tanks, plant vent valves lineup. and
j associated radiation monitors i l
7. Containment Systans
l
a. Containment isolation valves, CYCS letdown lines, and MSIVs
l Containment pressure relief valves, purge exhaust valves and all l
b.
- other manually operated containment valves that ~
are accessible
.~ Personnel ind eauipment access hatches -
!
--
c.
l d. Containment spray systems, piping, valves, instrumentation and , wiring, pu s, heat exchanger and recirculation system sump i
> ump and c ntrols
!
e. Vdrogen r combiner units, including the control panels and
!
powersupply
j f. Fan coolers with safety cooling functions and ice condensers- 2 (ifapplicable)
'
8. Electrical Syst1ms
l
a. Auxiliary power system, including 4160/480 vital buses, 125 volt
buses / battery and 120-VAC vital instrument bus
b. DC control,#1esel generator system controls, fuel oil, lube oil,
Emergency
tanks,and, piping
. c. Cable spreading room
l
9. Main Steam System
a. Associate relief valves
b. Turbines,l including lube oil system, bypass valves and generator
protection, systems
c. Steam generator f6adpumps and valve lineup through feedwater (FW)
heaters
d. Auxiliary lfeedwater system pumps and manual isolation valves
10. Spent fuel pool and fuel handling systems (i.e., if in refueling
outage),incluc ing cooling system and level indications
11. Service water system, including piping, valves, pumps, and heat
exchangers
12. Sampling syste for appropriate systems, including isolation valves
L :
.
1
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,
. . _ - - . - _-. _ -
.
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'
No specific action or written response is required by this infor
i
If you have any questions about this matterhe please contact one.cf the technical
!
contacts listed below or Regional Administrator of the app
j
- office. '
;
e i i Charles E. Rossi, Director
; Division of Operational Events '
i
- Assessment
4
'
Office of Huclear Reactor Regulation
SafeguardsTechnicalContket:'
Eugene W. McPeek, NRR
(3 1) 492-3210
..
i -- .0perational Technical Contact: Richard Lobel, NRR . ! (301)492-1157
Attachment: List of Recently !ssued NRC Information Notices
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Lock Tampering, wire found in lock.
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Lock Tampering. wire found in lock
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Unit One Reactor Building Entrance
RB-14. RB-15. RB-16
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